LibTomCrypt

Developer Manual

LibTom Projects

This document is part of the LibTomCrypt package and is hereby released into the public domain.

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Contents

1	Intr	roduction	1
	1.1	What is the LibTomCrypt?	1
	1.2	Why did I write it?	1
		1.2.1 Modular	2
	1.3	License	2
	1.4	Patent Disclosure	2
	1.5	Thanks	3
2	The	e Application Programming Interface (API)	5
	2.1		5
	2.2		ĉ
	2.3	Functions with Variable Length Output	7
	2.4		3
	2.5		9
3	Syn	ametric Block Ciphers	ı
	3.1	Core Functions	
	-	3.1.1 Key Scheduling	1
		3.1.2 ECB Encryption and Decryption	2
		3.1.3 Self-Testing	2
		3.1.4 Key Sizing	
		3.1.5 Cipher Termination	3
		3.1.6 Simple Encryption Demonstration	
	3.2	Key Sizes and Number of Rounds	
	3.3	The Cipher Descriptors	
		3.3.1 Notes	3
	3.4	Symmetric Modes of Operations	
	-	3.4.1 Background	3
		3.4.2 Choice of Mode	9
		3.4.3 Ciphertext Stealing	
		3.4.4 Initialization	
		3.4.5 Encryption and Decryption	
		3.4.6 IV Manipulation	
		3.4.7 Stream Termination	2
		3.4.8 Examples	

	3.4.9 LRW Mode
	3.4.10 XTS Mode
	3.4.11 F8 Mode
4	Stream Ciphers
	4.1 ChaCha
	4.2 RC4
	4.3 Sober128
	4.0 00001120
5	Authenticated Encryption
	5.1 EAX Mode
	5.2 OCB Modes
	5.2.1 Preface
	5.2.2 OCB
	5.2.3 OCB3
	5.3 CCM Mode
	5.3.1 Initialization
	5.3.2 Nonce Vector
	5.3.3 Additional Authentication Data
	5.3.4 Plaintext Processing
	5.3.5 State Termination
	5.3.6 State Reset
	5.3.7 One–Shot Packet
	5.3.8 Example Usage
	5.4 GCM Mode
	5.4.1 Initialization
	5.4.2 Initialization Vector
	5.4.3 Additional Authentication Data
	5.4.4 Plaintext Processing
	5.4.5 State Termination
	5.4.6 State Reset
	5.4.7 One–Shot Packet
	5.4.8 Example Usage
	5.5 ChaCha20-Poly1305
	5.5.1 Initialization
	5.5.2 Initialization Vector
	5.5.3 Additional Authentication Data
	5.5.4 Encryption / Decryption
	5.5.5 State Termination
	5.5.6 One–Shot Packet
6	One-Way Cryptographic Hash Functions
	6.1 Core Functions
	6.2 Hash Descriptors
	6.2.1 Hash Registration
	6.3 Cipher Hash Construction
	6 A CUAS CUAKE

	6.5	Notice	3
7	Che	cksum Functions 59)
	7.1	Preface)
	7.2	CRC-32 – Cyclic redundancy check)
	7.3	Adler-32)
8	Mes	sage Authentication Codes 61	1
Ü	8.1	HMAC Protocol	
	8.2	OMAC Support	
	8.3	PMAC Support	
	8.4	Pelican MAC	
	0.4	8.4.1 Example	
	8.5	XCBC-MAC	
	8.6	F9-MAC	
	0.0		
		8	
	0.7	8.6.2 F9–MAC Functions	
	8.7	Poly1305–MAC	
	8.8	BLAKE2s + BLAKE2b MAC	3
9	Pseu	udo-Random Number Generators 75	5
	9.1	Core Functions	5
		9.1.1 Remarks	3
		9.1.2 Example	7
	9.2	PRNG Descriptors	7
		9.2.1 PRNGs Provided	3
	9.3	The Secure RNG)
		9.3.1 The Secure PRNG Interface	2
10	DCA	A Public Key Cryptography 83	2
10		Introduction	
		PKCS #1 Padding	
	10.2		
		"	
	10.9	10.2.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 Decoding	
	10.3	PKCS #1 v2.1 Encryption	
		10.3.1 OAEP Encoding	
	40.4	10.3.2 OAEP Decoding	
	10.4	PKCS #1 Digital Signatures	
		10.4.1 PSS Encoding	
		10.4.2 PSS Decoding	
	10.5	RSA Key Operations	
		10.5.1 Background	
		10.5.2 RSA Key Generation	
		10.5.3 RSA Exponentiation	3
		10.5.4 RSA Key Size	3
	10.6	RSA Key Encryption	3
		10.6.1 Extended Encryption)

	10.7	RSA Key Decryption
		10.7.1 Extended Decryption
	10.8	RSA Signature Generation
		10.8.1 Extended Signatures
	10.9	RSA Signature Verification
		10.9.1 RSA Signature Salt Length
		10.9.2 Extended Verification
	10.10	ORSA Encryption Example
	10.11	1RSA Key Format
		10.11.1 RSA Key Export
		10.11.2 RSA Key Import
11		ie-Hellman Key Exchange 97
		Background
		Core Functions
		Other Diffie-Hellman Functions
	11.4	Remarks on Usage
		11.4.1 Remarks on The Snippet
19	Elli.	otic Curve Cryptography 103
14	-	Background
		Fixed Point Optimizations
		Key Format
		ECC Curve Parameters
		Core Functions
	12.5	
		12.5.1 ECC Key Generation
		12.5.2 Extended Key Generation
		12.5.3 ECC Key Free
		12.5.4 ECC Key Export
		12.5.5 ECC Key Import
		12.5.6 Extended Key Import
		12.5.7 ANSI X9.63 Export
		12.5.8 ANSI X9.63 Import
		12.5.9 Extended ANSI X9.63 Import
	100	12.5.10 ECC Shared Secret
	12.6	ECC Diffie-Hellman Encryption
		12.6.1 ECC-DH Encryption
		12.6.2 ECC-DH Decryption
		12.6.3 ECC Encryption Format
	12.7	EC DSA Signatures
		12.7.1 EC-DSA Signature Generation
		12.7.2 EC-DSA Signature Verification
	12.8	ECC Keysizes

13 Dig	ital Signature Algorithm 111
13.1	Introduction
13.2	Key Format
13.3	Key Generation
13.4	Key Verification
13.5	Signatures
	13.5.1 Signature Generation
	13.5.2 Signature Verification
13.6	DSA Encrypt and Decrypt
	13.6.1 DSA Encryption
	13.6.2 DSA Decryption
13.7	DSA Key Import and Export
	13.7.1 DSA Key Export
	13.7.2 DSA Key Import
13.8	Other DSA Functions
14 Sto	adards Support 117
	ASN.1 Formats
14.1	14.1.1 SEQUENCE Type
	14.1.2 SET and SET OF
	14.1.3 ASN.1 INTEGER
	14.1.4 ASN.1 BIT STRING
	14.1.5 ASN.1 RAW BIT STRING
	14.1.6 ASN.1 OCTET STRING
	14.1.7 ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER
	14.1.8 ASN.1 IA5 STRING
	14.1.9 ASN.1 TELETEX STRING
	14.1.10 ASN.1 PRINTABLE STRING
	14.1.11 ASN.1 UTF8 STRING
	14.1.12 ASN.1 UTCTIME
	14.1.13 ASN.1 GeneralizedTime
	14.1.14 ASN.1 CHOICE
	14.1.15 ASN.1 Flexi Decoder
14 2	Password Based Cryptography
11.2	14.2.1 PKCS #5
	14.2.2 Algorithm One
	14.2.3 Algorithm Two
14 3	Key Derviation Functions
11.0	14.3.1 HKDF
	14.3.2 HKDF Extract
	14.3.3 HKDF Expand
	14.3.4 HKDF Extract-and-Expand
	1

Mis	cellaneous	135
15.1	Base64 Encoding and Decoding	. 135
	15.1.1 Standard 'base64' encoding	. 135
	15.1.2 URL—safe 'base64url' encoding	. 136
15.2		
	· ·	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
15.5		
•		143
16.1	Secure Pseudo Random Number Generators	. 143
16.2	Preventing Trivial Errors	. 143
16.3	Registering Your Algorithms	. 143
16.4	Key Sizes	. 144
	16.4.1 Symmetric Ciphers	
	16.4.2 Asymmetric Ciphers	. 144
16.5	· -	
	·	
		147
17.1	Introduction	. 147
17.2	Makefile variables	. 147
	17.2.1 MAKE, CC, AR and CROSS_COMPILE	. 147
	17.2.2 IGNORE_SPEED and LTC_DEBUG	. 148
	17.2.3 LIBNAME	. 148
	17.2.4 Installation Directories	. 148
17.3	Extra libraries	. 149
17.4	Building a Static Library	. 150
17.5	Building a Shared Library	. 150
	17.7.1 X memory routines	. 151
	·	
	17.7.5 LTC TEST	. 152
	v i v	
	17.7.10 LTC EASV	153
	17.7.10 LTC_EASY	
	17.7.10 LTC_EASY	. 153
	15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 Pro ; 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 Con 17.1 17.2	15.1.2 URL-safe 'base64url' encoding 15.2 Primality Testing 15.3 Random MPI Generation 15.4 Helper functions 15.4.1 Zero'ing data 15.4.2 Constant-time memory compare 15.4.3 Radix to binary conversion 15.5 Dynamic Language Support Programming Guidelines 16.1 Secure Pseudo Random Number Generators 16.2 Preventing Trivial Errors 16.3 Registering Your Algorithms 16.4 Key Sizes 16.4 Symmetric Ciphers 16.4.2 Asymmetric Ciphers 16.5 Thread Safety Configuring and Building the Library 17.1 Introduction 17.2 Makefile variables 17.2.1 MAKE, CC, AR and CROSS_COMPILE 17.2.2 IGNORE_SPEED and LTC_DEBUG 17.2.3 LIBNAME 17.2.4 Installation Directories 17.3 Extra libraries 17.4 Building a Static Library 17.5 Building a Shared Library 17.6 Header Configuration 17.7 Customisation 17.7 Ustomisation 17.7.1 X memory routines 17.7.2 X clock routines 17.7.3 LTC_NO_FILE 17.7.4 LTC_CLEAN_STACK 17.7.5 LTC_TEST 17.7.6 LTC_TEST 17.7.6 LTC_NO_FAST 17.7.7 LTC_FAST 17.7.7 LTC_FAST 17.7.8 LTC_NO_ASM 17.7.9 Symmetric Ciphers, One-way Hashes, PRNGS and Public Key Functions

		17.7.14 LTC_SMALL_CODE
		17.7.15 LTC_PTHREAD
		17.7.16 LTC_ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT
		17.7.17 LTC_RSA_BLINDING
		17.7.18 LTC_RSA_CRT_HARDENING
		17.7.19 Math Descriptors
		•
18		imizations 157
	18.1	Introduction
	18.2	Ciphers
		18.2.1 Name
		18.2.2 Internal ID
		18.2.3 Key Lengths
		18.2.4 Block Length
		18.2.5 Rounds
		18.2.6 Setup
		18.2.7 Single block ECB
		18.2.8 Testing
		18.2.9 Key Sizing
		18.2.10 Acceleration
	18.3	One-Way Hashes
		18.3.1 Name
		18.3.2 Internal ID
		18.3.3 Digest Size
		18.3.4 Block Size
		18.3.5 OID Identifier
		18.3.6 Initialization
		18.3.7 Process
		18.3.8 Done
		18.3.9 Acceleration
		18.3.10 HMAC Acceleration
	18.4	Pseudo-Random Number Generators
		18.4.1 Name
		18.4.2 Export Size
		18.4.3 Start
		18.4.4 Entropy Addition
		18.4.5 Ready
		18.4.6 Read
		18.4.7 Done
		18.4.8 Exporting and Importing
	18.5	BigNum Math Descriptors
	10.0	18.5.1 Conventions
		18.5.2 ECC Functions
		18.5.3 RSA Functions

List of Figures

2.1 2.2	Load And Store Macros 7 Rotate Macros 7
	Built–In Software Ciphers
6.1	Built-In Software Hashes
9.1	List of Provided PRNGs
13.1	DSA Key Sizes
14.1	List of ASN.1 Supported Types
	RSA/DH Key Strength

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 What is the LibTomCrypt?

LibTomCrypt is a portable ISO C cryptographic library meant to be a tool set for cryptographers who are designing cryptosystems. It supports symmetric ciphers, one-way hashes, pseudo-random number generators, public key cryptography (via PKCS #1 RSA, DH or ECCDH), and a plethora of support routines.

The library was designed such that new ciphers/hashes/PRNGs can be added at run-time and the existing API (and helper API functions) are able to use the new designs automatically. There exists self-check functions for each block cipher and hash function to ensure that they compile and execute to the published design specifications. The library also performs extensive parameter error checking to prevent any number of run-time exploits or errors.

1.2 Why did I write it?

You may be wondering, Tom, why did you write a crypto library. I already have one. Well the reason falls into two categories:

- 1. I am too lazy to figure out someone else's API. I'd rather invent my own simpler API and use that
- 2. It was (still is) good coding practice.

The idea is that I am not striving to replace OpenSSL or Crypto++ or Cryptlib or etc. I'm trying to write my **own** crypto library and hopefully along the way others will appreciate the work.

With this library all core functions (ciphers, hashes, prngs, and bignum) have the same prototype definition. They all load and store data in a format independent of the platform. This means if you encrypt with Blowfish on a PPC it should decrypt on an x86 with zero problems. The consistent API also means that if you learn how to use Blowfish with the library you know how to use Safer+, RC6, or Serpent as well. With all of the core functions there are central descriptor tables that can be used to make a program automatically pick between ciphers, hashes and PRNGs at run-time. That means your application can support all ciphers/hashes/prngs/bignum without changing the source code.

Not only did I strive to make a consistent and simple API to work with but I also attempted to make the library configurable in terms of its build options. Out of the box the library will build with any modern version of GCC without having to use configure scripts. This means that the library will work with platforms where development tools may be limited (e.g. no autoconf).

On top of making the build simple and the API approachable I've also attempted for a reasonably high level of robustness and efficiency. LibTomCrypt traps and returns a series of errors ranging from invalid arguments to buffer overflows/overruns. It is mostly thread safe and has been clocked on various platforms with *cycles per byte* timings that are comparable (and often favourable) to other libraries such as OpenSSL and Crypto++.

1.2.1 Modular

The LibTomCrypt package has also been written to be very modular. The block ciphers, one-way hashes, pseudo-random number generators (PRNG), and bignum math routines are all used within the API through descriptor tables which are essentially structures with pointers to functions. While you can still call particular functions directly (e.g. sha256_process()) this descriptor interface allows the developer to customize their usage of the library.

For example, consider a hardware platform with a specialized RNG device. Obviously one would like to tap that for the PRNG needs within the library (e.g. making a RSA key). All the developer has to do is write a descriptor and the few support routines required for the device. After that the rest of the API can make use of it without change. Similarly imagine a few years down the road when AES2 (or whatever they call it) has been invented. It can be added to the library and used within applications with zero modifications to the end applications provided they are written properly.

This flexibility within the library means it can be used with any combination of primitive algorithms and unlike libraries like OpenSSL is not tied to direct routines. For instance, in OpenSSL there are CBC block mode routines for every single cipher. That means every time you add or remove a cipher from the library you have to update the associated support code as well. In LibTomCrypt the associated code (chaining modes in this case) are not directly tied to the ciphers. That is a new cipher can be added to the library by simply providing the key setup, ECB decrypt and encrypt and test vector routines. After that all five chaining mode routines can make use of the cipher right away.

1.3 License

The project is hereby released as public domain.

1.4 Patent Disclosure

The author (Tom St Denis) is not a patent lawyer so this section is not to be treated as legal advice. To the best of the author's knowledge the only patent related issues within the library are the RC5 and RC6 symmetric block ciphers. They can be removed from a build by simply commenting out the two appropriate lines in *tomcrypt_custom.h*. The rest of the ciphers and hashes are patent free or under patents that have since expired.

1.5 Thanks

The RC2 and RC4 symmetric ciphers are not under patents but are under trademark regulations. This means you can use the ciphers you just can't advertise that you are doing so.

1.5 Thanks

I would like to give thanks to the following people (in no particular order) for helping me develop this project from early on:

- 1. Richard van de Laarschot
- 2. Richard Heathfield
- 3. Ajay K. Agrawal
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- 7. Jason Klapste
- 8. Dobes Vandermeer
- 9. Daniel Richards
- 10. Wayne Scott
- 11. Andrew Tyler
- 12. Sky Schulz
- 13. Christopher Imes

There have been quite a few other people as well. Please check the change log to see who else has contributed from time to time.

Chapter 2

The Application Programming Interface (API)

2.1 Introduction

In general the API is very simple to memorize and use. Most of the functions return either **void** or **int**. Functions that return **int** will return **CRYPT_OK** if the function was successful, or one of the many error codes if it failed. Certain functions that return int will return -1 to indicate an error. These functions will be explicitly commented upon. When a function does return a CRYPT error code it can be translated into a string with

```
const char *error_to_string(int err);
   An example of handling an error is:

void somefunc(void)
{
   int err;

   /* call a cryptographic function */
   if ((err = some_crypto_function(...)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("A crypto error occurred, %s\n", error_to_string(err));
      /* perform error handling */
   }
   /* continue on if no error occurred */
}
```

There is no initialization routine for the library and for the most part the code is thread safe. The only thread related issue is if you use the same symmetric cipher, hash or public key state data in multiple threads. Normally that is not an issue.

To include the prototypes for LibTomCrypt.a into your own program simply include tomcrypt.h like so:

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void) {
```

```
return 0;
}
```

The header file tomcrypt.h also includes stdio.h, string.h, stdlib.h, time.h and ctype.h.

2.2 Macros

There are a few helper macros to make the coding process a bit easier. The first set are related to loading and storing 32/64-bit words in little/big endian format. The macros are:

STORE32L(x, y)	ulong32 x, unsigned char *y	$x \to y[0 \dots 3]$
STORE64L(x, y)	ulong64 x, unsigned char *y	$x \to y[0\dots 7]$
LOAD32L(x, y)	ulong32 x, unsigned char *y	$y[0\dots 3] \to x$
LOAD64L(x, y)	ulong64 x, unsigned char *y	$y[0\dots 7] \to x$
STORE32H(x, y)	ulong32 x, unsigned char *y	$x \to y[3 \dots 0]$
STORE64H(x, y)	ulong64 x, unsigned char *y	$x \to y[7 \dots 0]$
LOAD32H(x, y)	ulong32 x, unsigned char *y	$y[3\dots 0]\to x$
LOAD64H(x, y)	ulong64 x, unsigned char *y	$y[7\dots 0] \to x$
BSWAP(x)	$\mathbf{ulong32} \ \mathbf{x}$	Swap bytes

Figure 2.1: Load And Store Macros

There are 32 and 64-bit cyclic rotations as well:

ROL(x, y)	$\mathbf{ulong32} \ \mathbf{x}, \ \mathbf{ulong32} \ \mathbf{y}$	$x << y, 0 \le y \le 31$
ROLc(x, y)	ulong32 x, const ulong32 y	$x << y, 0 \le y \le 31$
ROR(x, y)	ulong32 x, ulong32 y	$x >> y, 0 \le y \le 31$
RORc(x, y)	ulong32 x, const ulong32 y	$x >> y, 0 \le y \le 31$
ROL64(x, y)	ulong64 x, ulong64 y	$x << y, 0 \le y \le 63$
ROL64c(x, y)	ulong64 x, const ulong64 y	$x << y, 0 \le y \le 63$
ROR64(x, y)	ulong64 x, ulong64 y	$x >> y, 0 \le y \le 63$
ROR64c(x, y)	ulong64 x, const ulong64 y	$x >> y, 0 \le y \le 63$

Figure 2.2: Rotate Macros

2.3 Functions with Variable Length Output

Certain functions such as (for example) $rsa_export()$ give an output that is variable length. To prevent buffer overflows you must pass it the length of the buffer where the output will be stored. For example:

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void) {
    rsa_key key;
    unsigned char buffer[1024];
    unsigned long x;
    int err;

/* ... Make up the RSA key somehow ... */

/* lets export the key, set x to the size of the
    * output buffer */
    x = sizeof(buffer);
    if ((err = rsa_export(buffer, &x, PK_PUBLIC, &key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
        printf("Export error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
        return -1;
```

```
}

/* if rsa_export() was successful then x will have
 * the size of the output */
printf("RSA exported key takes %d bytes\n", x);

/* ... do something with the buffer */
return 0;
}
```

In the above example if the size of the RSA public key was more than 1024 bytes this function would return an error code indicating a buffer overflow would have occurred. If the function succeeds, it stores the length of the output back into x so that the calling application will know how many bytes were used.

As of v1.13, most functions will update your length on failure to indicate the size required by the function. Not all functions support this so please check the source before you rely on it doing that.

2.4 Functions that need a PRNG

Certain functions such as $rsa_make_key()$ require a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). These functions do not setup the PRNG themselves so it is the responsibility of the calling function to initialize the PRNG before calling them.

Certain PRNG algorithms do not require a *prng_state* argument (sprng for example). The *prng_state* argument may be passed as **NULL** in such situations.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void) {
    rsa_key key;
    int err;

    /* register the system RNG */
    register_prng(&sprng_desc)

    /* make a 1024-bit RSA key with the system RNG */
    if ((err = rsa_make_key(NULL, find_prng("sprng"), 1024/8, 65537, &key))
        != CRYPT_OK) {
        printf("make_key error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
        return -1;
    }

    /* use the key ... */
    return 0;
}
```

2.5 Functions that use Arrays of Octets

Most functions require inputs that are arrays of the data type *unsigned char*. Whether it is a symmetric key, IV for a chaining mode or public key packet it is assumed that regardless of the actual size of *unsigned char* only the lower eight bits contain data. For example, if you want to pass a 256 bit key to a symmetric ciphers setup routine, you must pass in (a pointer to) an array of 32 *unsigned char* variables. Certain routines (such as SAFER+) take special care to work properly on platforms where an *unsigned char* is not eight bits.

For the purposes of this library, the term *byte* will refer to an octet or eight bit word. Typically an array of type *byte* will be synonymous with an array of type *unsigned char*.

Chapter 3

Symmetric Block Ciphers

3.1 Core Functions

LibTomCrypt provides several block ciphers with an ECB block mode interface. It is important to first note that you should never use the ECB modes directly to encrypt data. Instead you should use the ECB functions to make a chaining mode, or use one of the provided chaining modes. All of the ciphers are written as ECB interfaces since it allows the rest of the API to grow in a modular fashion.

3.1.1 Key Scheduling

All ciphers store their scheduled keys in a single data type called *symmetric_key*. This allows all ciphers to have the same prototype and store their keys as naturally as possible. This also removes the need for dynamic memory allocation, and allows you to allocate a fixed sized buffer for storing scheduled keys. All ciphers must provide six visible functions which are (given that XXX is the name of the cipher) the following:

The XXX_setup() routine will setup the cipher to be used with a given number of rounds and a given key length (in bytes). The number of rounds can be set to zero to use the default, which is generally a good idea.

If the function returns successfully the variable *skey* will have a scheduled key stored in it. It's important to note that you should only used this scheduled key with the intended cipher. For example, if you call *blowfish_setup()* do not pass the scheduled key onto $rc5_ecb_encrypt()$. All built–in setup functions do not allocate memory off the heap so when you are done with a key you can simply discard it (e.g. they can be on the stack). However, to maintain proper coding practices you should always call the respective XXX_done() function. This allows for quicker porting to applications with externally supplied plugins.

3.1.2 ECB Encryption and Decryption

To encrypt or decrypt a block in ECB mode there are these two functions per cipher:

These two functions will encrypt or decrypt (respectively) a single block of text¹, storing the result in the ct buffer (pt resp.). It is possible that the input and output buffer are the same buffer. For the encrypt function pt^2 is the input and ct^3 is the output. For the decryption function it's the opposite. They both return **CRYPT_OK** on success. To test a particular cipher against test vectors⁴ call the following self-test function.

3.1.3 Self-Testing

```
int XXX_test(void);
```

This function will return **CRYPT_OK** if the cipher matches the test vectors from the design publication it is based upon.

3.1.4 Key Sizing

For each cipher there is a function which will help find a desired key size. It is specified as follows:

```
int XXX_keysize(int *keysize);
```

Essentially, it will round the input keysize in *keysize* down to the next appropriate key size. This function will return **CRYPT_OK** if the key size specified is acceptable. For example:

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
   int keysize, err;

   /* now given a 20 byte key what keysize does Twofish want to use? */
   keysize = 20;
   if ((err = twofish_keysize(&keysize)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Error getting key size: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
      return -1;
   }
   printf("Twofish suggested a key size of %d\n", keysize);
   return 0;
}
```

¹The size of which depends on which cipher you are using.

²pt stands for plaintext.

³ct stands for ciphertext.

⁴As published in their design papers.

3.1 Core Functions 13

This should indicate a keysize of sixteen bytes is suggested by storing 16 in keysize.

3.1.5 Cipher Termination

When you are finished with a cipher you can de-initialize it with the done function.

```
void XXX_done(symmetric_key *skey);
```

For the software based ciphers within LibTomCrypt, these functions will not do anything. However, user supplied cipher descriptors may require to be called for resource management purposes. To be compliant, all functions which call a cipher setup function must also call the respective cipher done function when finished.

3.1.6 Simple Encryption Demonstration

An example snippet that encodes a block with Blowfish in ECB mode.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
  unsigned char pt[8], ct[8], key[8];
   symmetric_key skey;
   int err;
   /* ... key is loaded appropriately in key ... */
  /* ... load a block of plaintext in pt ... */
   /* schedule the key */
  if ((err = blowfish_setup(key, /* the key we will use */
                               8, /* key is 8 bytes (64-bits) long */
                               0, /* 0 == use default # of rounds */
                           &skey) /* where to put the scheduled key */
       ) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Setup error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
   }
   /* encrypt the block */
  blowfish_ecb_encrypt(pt,
                                 /* encrypt this 8-byte array */
                                 /* store encrypted data here */
                        ct,
                        &skey); /* our previously scheduled key */
   /* now ct holds the encrypted version of pt */
   /* decrypt the block */
  blowfish_ecb_decrypt(ct,
                                  /* decrypt this 8-byte array */
                                  /* store decrypted data here */
                                /* our previously scheduled key */
                        &skey);
   /* now we have decrypted ct to the original plaintext in pt */
```

```
/* Terminate the cipher context */
blowfish_done(&skey);

return 0;
}
```

3.2 Key Sizes and Number of Rounds

As a general rule of thumb, do not use symmetric keys under 80 bits if you can help it. Only a few of the ciphers support smaller keys (mainly for test vectors anyways). Ideally, your application should be making at least 256 bit keys. This is not because you are to be paranoid. It is because if your PRNG has a bias of any sort the more bits the better. For example, if you have $\Pr[X=1] = \frac{1}{2} \pm \gamma$ where $|\gamma| > 0$ then the total amount of entropy in N bits is $N \cdot -log_2\left(\frac{1}{2} + |\gamma|\right)$. So if γ were 0.25 (a severe bias) a 256-bit string would have about 106 bits of entropy whereas a 128-bit string would have only 53 bits of entropy.

The number of rounds of most ciphers is not an option you can change. Only RC5 allows you to change the number of rounds. By passing zero as the number of rounds all ciphers will use their default number of rounds. Generally the ciphers are configured such that the default number of rounds provide adequate security for the given block and key size.

3.3 The Cipher Descriptors

To facilitate automatic routines an array of cipher descriptors is provided in the array *cipher_descriptor*. An element of this array has the following (partial) format (See Section 18.2):

```
struct _cipher_descriptor {
    /** name of cipher */
    char *name;

    /** internal ID */
    unsigned char ID;

    /** min keysize (octets) */
    int min_key_length,

    /** max keysize (octets) */
        max_key_length,

    /** block size (octets) */
        block_length,

    /** default number of rounds */
        default_rounds;
...<snip>...
};
```

Where name is the lower case ASCII version of the name. The fields min_key_length and max_key_length are the minimum and maximum key sizes in bytes. The $block_length$ member is the block size of the cipher in bytes. As a good rule of thumb it is assumed that the cipher supports the min and max key lengths but not always everything in between. The $default_rounds$ field is the default number of rounds that will be used.

For a plugin to be compliant it must provide at least each function listed before the accelerators begin. Accelerators are optional, and if missing will be emulated in software.

The remaining fields are all pointers to the core functions for each cipher. The end of the cipher_descriptor array is marked when *name* equals **NULL**.

As of this release the current cipher_descriptors elements are the following:

Name	Descriptor Name	Block Size	Key Range	Rounds
Blowfish	blowfish_desc	8	8 56	16
X-Tea	xtea_desc	8	16	32
RC2	rc2_desc	8	5 128	16
RC5-32/12/b	$rc5_desc$	8	8 128	12 24
RC6-32/20/b	$rc6_desc$	16	8 128	20
SAFER+	$saferp_desc$	16	16, 24, 32	8, 12, 16
AES	aes_desc	16	16, 24, 32	10, 12, 14
	aes_enc_desc	16	16, 24, 32	10, 12, 14
Twofish	twofish_desc	16	16, 24, 32	16
DES	des_desc	8	8	16
3DES (EDE mode)	des3_desc	8	16, 24	16
CAST5 (CAST-128)	$cast5_desc$	8	5 16	12, 16
Noekeon	noekeon_desc	16	16	16
Skipjack	skipjack_desc	8	10	32
Anubis	anubis_desc	16	16 40	12 18
Khazad	khazad_desc	8	16	8
SEED	kseed_desc	16	16	16
KASUMI	kasumi_desc	8	16	8
Camellia	camellia_desc	16	16, 24, 32	18, 24

Figure 3.1: Built–In Software Ciphers

3.3.1 Notes

1. For AES, (also known as Rijndael) there are four descriptors which complicate issues a little. The descriptors rijndael_desc and rijndael_enc_desc provide the cipher named rijndael. The descriptors aes_desc and aes_enc_desc provide the cipher name aes. Functionally both rijndael and aes are the same cipher. The only difference is when you call find_cipher() you have to pass the correct name. The cipher descriptors with enc in the middle (e.g. rijndael_enc_desc) are related to an implementation of Rijndael with only the encryption routine and tables. The decryption and self_test function pointers of both encrypt only descriptors are set to NULL and should not be called.

The encrypt only descriptors are useful for applications that only use the encryption function of the cipher. Algorithms such as EAX, PMAC and OMAC only require the encryption function. So far this encrypt only functionality has only been implemented for Rijndael as it makes the most sense for this cipher.

- 2. Note that for *DES* and *3DES* they use 8 and 24 byte keys but only 7 and 21 [respectively] bytes of the keys are in fact used for the purposes of encryption. My suggestion is just to use random 8/24 byte keys instead of trying to make a 8/24 byte string from the real 7/21 byte key.

 For *3DES* exists a two-key mode, that can be initialized by calling the setup function with a *keylen* of 16. This results in the re-usage of key *K1* as key *K3*. This mode has been specified as *Keying*
- 3. Note that Twofish has additional configuration options (Figure 3.2) that take place at build time. These options are found in the file $tomcrypt_cfg.h$. The first option is $TWOFISH_SMALL$ which when defined will force the Twofish code to not pre-compute the Twofish g(X) function as a set of four 8×32 s-boxes. This means that a scheduled key will require less ram but the resulting cipher will be slower. The second option is $TWOFISH_TABLES$ which when defined will force the Twofish code to use pre-computed tables for the two s-boxes q_0, q_1 as well as the multiplication by the polynomials 5B and EF used in the MDS multiplication. As a result the code is faster and slightly larger. The speed increase is useful when $TWOFISH_SMALL$ is defined since the s-boxes and MDS multiply form the heart of the Twofish round function.

TWOFISH_SMALL	TWOFISH_TABLES	Speed and Memory (per key)
undefined	undefined	Very fast, 4.2KB of ram.
undefined	defined	Faster key setup, larger code.
defined	undefined	Very slow, 0.2KB of ram.
defined	defined	Faster, 0.2KB of ram, larger code.

Figure 3.2: Twofish Build Options

4. As of v1.18.0 of the library RC2 got an extended setup function (which didn't fit in the regular API):

This setup function also allows to configure the effective key length in bits of the RC2 cipher as in its original specification.

To work with the cipher_descriptor array there is a function:

```
int find_cipher(char *name)
```

Option 2 in FIPS 46-3.

Which will search for a given name in the array. It returns -1 if the cipher is not found, otherwise it returns the location in the array where the cipher was found. For example, to indirectly setup Blowfish you can also use:

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
  unsigned char key[8];
  symmetric_key skey;
  int err;
  /* you must register a cipher before you use it */
  if (register_cipher(&blowfish_desc)) == -1) {
     printf("Unable to register Blowfish cipher.");
     return -1;
  }
  /* generic call to function (assuming the key
   * in key[] was already setup) */
  if ((err =
       cipher_descriptor[find_cipher("blowfish")].
          setup(key, 8, 0, &skey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error setting up Blowfish: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
  }
   /* ... use cipher ... */
```

A good safety would be to check the return value of find_cipher() before accessing the desired function. In order to use a cipher with the descriptor table you must register it first using:

```
int register_cipher(const struct _cipher_descriptor *cipher);
```

Which accepts a pointer to a descriptor and returns the index into the global descriptor table. If an error occurs such as there is no more room (it can have 32 ciphers at most) it will return -1. If you try to add the same cipher more than once it will just return the index of the first copy. To remove a cipher call:

```
int unregister_cipher(const struct _cipher_descriptor *cipher);
```

Which returns CRYPT_OK if it removes the cipher, otherwise it returns CRYPT_ERROR.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
   int err;

   /* register the cipher */
   if (register_cipher(&rijndael_desc) == -1) {
      printf("Error registering Rijndael\n");
      return -1;
```

```
/* use Rijndael */

/* remove it */
if ((err = unregister_cipher(&rijndael_desc)) != CRYPT_OK) {
    printf("Error removing Rijndael: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
    return -1;
}

return 0;
}
```

This snippet is a small program that registers Rijndael.

3.4 Symmetric Modes of Operations

3.4.1 Background

A typical symmetric block cipher can be used in chaining modes to effectively encrypt messages larger than the block size of the cipher. Given a key k, a plaintext P and a cipher E we shall denote the encryption of the block P under the key k as $E_k(P)$. In some modes there exists an initialization vector denoted as C_{-1} .

ECB Mode

ECB or Electronic Codebook Mode is the simplest method to use. It is given as:

$$C_i = E_k(P_i) \tag{3.1}$$

This mode is very weak since it allows people to swap blocks and perform replay attacks if the same key is used more than once.

CBC Mode

CBC or Cipher Block Chaining mode is a simple mode designed to prevent trivial forms of replay and swap attacks on ciphers. It is given as:

$$C_i = E_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1}) \tag{3.2}$$

It is important that the initialization vector be unique and preferably random for each message encrypted under the same key.

CTR Mode

CTR or Counter Mode is a mode which only uses the encryption function of the cipher. Given a initialization vector which is treated as a large binary counter the CTR mode is given as:

$$C_{-1} = C_{-1} + 1 \pmod{2^W}$$

$$C_i = P_i \oplus E_k(C_{-1})$$
(3.3)

Where W is the size of a block in bits (e.g. 64 for Blowfish). As long as the initialization vector is random for each message encrypted under the same key replay and swap attacks are infeasible. CTR mode may look simple but it is as secure as the block cipher is under a chosen plaintext attack (provided the initialization vector is unique).

CFB Mode

CFB or Ciphertext Feedback Mode is a mode akin to CBC. It is given as:

$$C_i = P_i \oplus C_{-1}$$

$$C_{-1} = E_k(C_i) \tag{3.4}$$

Note that in this library the output feedback width is equal to the size of the block cipher. That is this mode is used to encrypt whole blocks at a time. However, the library will buffer data allowing the user to encrypt or decrypt partial blocks without a delay. When this mode is first setup it will initially encrypt the initialization vector as required.

OFB Mode

OFB or Output Feedback Mode is a mode akin to CBC as well. It is given as:

$$C_{-1} = E_k(C_{-1})$$

$$C_i = P_i \oplus C_{-1}$$
(3.5)

Like the CFB mode the output width in CFB mode is the same as the width of the block cipher. OFB mode will also buffer the output which will allow you to encrypt or decrypt partial blocks without delay.

3.4.2 Choice of Mode

My personal preference is for the CTR mode since it has several key benefits:

- 1. No short cycles which is possible in the OFB and CFB modes.
- 2. Provably as secure as the block cipher being used under a chosen plaintext attack.
- 3. Technically does not require the decryption routine of the cipher.
- 4. Allows random access to the plaintext.
- 5. Allows the encryption of block sizes that are not equal to the size of the block cipher.

The CTR, CFB and OFB routines provided allow you to encrypt block sizes that differ from the ciphers block size. They accomplish this by buffering the data required to complete a block. This allows you to encrypt or decrypt any size block of memory with either of the three modes.

The ECB and CBC modes process blocks of the same size as the cipher at a time. Therefore, they are less flexible than the other modes.

3.4.3 Ciphertext Stealing

Ciphertext stealing is a method of dealing with messages in CBC mode which are not a multiple of the block length. This is accomplished by encrypting the last ciphertext block in ECB mode, and XOR'ing the output against the last partial block of plaintext. LibTomCrypt does not support this mode directly but it is fairly easy to emulate with a call to the cipher's ecb_encrypt() callback function

The more sane way to deal with partial blocks is to pad them with zeroes, and then use CBC normally.

3.4.4 Initialization

The library provides simple support routines for handling CBC, CTR, CFB, OFB and ECB encoded messages. Assuming the mode you want is XXX there is a structure called *symmetric_XXX* that will contain the information required to use that mode. They have identical setup routines (except CTR and ECB mode):

```
int XXX_start(
                               int
                                   cipher,
              const unsigned char *IV,
              const unsigned char *key,
                               int keylen,
                               int num_rounds,
                    symmetric_XXX *XXX);
int ctr_start(
                                   cipher,
                               int
              const unsigned char *IV,
              const unsigned char *key,
                               int
                                   keylen,
                               int
                                   num_rounds,
                               int
                                   ctr_mode,
                    symmetric_CTR *ctr);
int ecb_start(
                               int
                                   cipher,
              const unsigned char *key,
                               int keylen,
                               int num_rounds,
                    symmetric_ECB *ecb);
```

In each case, *cipher* is the index into the cipher_descriptor array of the cipher you want to use. The *IV* value is the initialization vector to be used with the cipher. You must fill the *IV* yourself and it is assumed they are the same length as the block size⁵ of the cipher you choose. It is important that the *IV* be random for each unique message you want to encrypt. The parameters *key*, *keylen* and *num_rounds* are the same as in the XXX_setup() function call. The final parameter is a pointer to the structure you want to hold the information for the mode of operation.

The routines return **CRYPT_OK** if the cipher initialized correctly, otherwise, they return an error code.

⁵In other words the size of a block of plaintext for the cipher, e.g. 8 for DES, 16 for AES, etc.

CTR Mode

In the case of CTR mode there is an additional parameter ctr_mode which specifies the mode that the counter is to be used in. If CTR_COUNTER_ LITTLE_ENDIAN was specified then the counter will be treated as a little endian value. Otherwise, if CTR_COUNTER_BIG_ENDIAN was specified the counter will be treated as a big endian value. As of v1.15 the RFC 3686 style of increment then encrypt is also supported. By OR'ing LTC_CTR_RFC3686 with the CTR mode value, ctr_start() will increment the counter before encrypting it for the first time.

As of V1.17, the library supports variable length counters for CTR mode. The (optional) counter length is specified by OR'ing the octet length of the counter against the *ctr_mode* parameter. The default, zero, indicates that a full block length counter will be used. This also ensures backwards compatibility with software that uses older versions of the library.

Changing the counter size has little (really no) effect on the performance of the CTR chaining mode. It is provided for compatibility with other software (and hardware) which have smaller fixed sized counters.

3.4.5 Encryption and Decryption

To actually encrypt or decrypt the following routines are provided:

Where XXX is one of $\{ecb, cbc, ctr, cfb, ofb\}$.

In all cases, len is the size of the buffer (as number of octets) to encrypt or decrypt. The CTR, OFB and CFB modes are order sensitive but not chunk sensitive. That is you can encrypt ABCDEF in three calls like AB, CD, EF or two like ABCDE and F and end up with the same ciphertext. However, encrypting ABC and DABC will result in different ciphertexts. All five of the modes will return $\mathbf{CRYPT_OK}$ on success from the encrypt or decrypt functions.

In the ECB and CBC cases, *len* must be a multiple of the ciphers block size. In the CBC case, you must manually pad the end of your message (either with zeroes or with whatever your protocol requires).

To decrypt in either mode, perform the setup like before (recall you have to fetch the IV value you used), and use the decrypt routine on all of the blocks.

3.4.6 IV Manipulation

To change or read the IV of a previously initialized chaining mode use the following two functions.

The XXX_getiv() functions will read the IV out of the chaining mode and store it into IV along with the length of the IV stored in len. The XXX_setiv will initialize the chaining mode state as if the original IV were the new IV specified. The length of the IV passed in must be the size of the ciphers block size.

The XXX_setiv() functions are handy if you wish to change the IV without re–keying the cipher. What the *setiv* function will do depends on the mode being changed. In CBC mode, the new IV replaces the existing IV as if it were the last ciphertext block. In CFB mode, the IV is encrypted as if it were the prior encrypted pad. In CTR mode, the IV is encrypted without first incrementing it (regardless of the LTC_RFC_3686 flag presence). In F8 mode, the IV is encrypted and becomes the new pad. It does not change the salted IV, and is only meant to allow seeking within a session. In LRW, it changes the tweak, forcing a computation of the tweak pad, allowing for seeking within the session. In OFB mode, the IV is encrypted and becomes the new pad.

3.4.7 Stream Termination

To terminate an open stream call the done function.

```
int XXX_done(symmetric_XXX *XXX);
```

This will terminate the stream (by terminating the cipher) and return $\mathbf{CRYPT_OK}$ if successful.

3.4.8 Examples

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
   unsigned char key[16], IV[16], buffer[512];
   symmetric_CTR ctr;
  int x, err;
   /* register twofish first */
  if (register_cipher(&twofish_desc) == -1) {
     printf("Error registering cipher.\n");
     return -1;
  }
   /* somehow fill out key and IV */
   /* start up CTR mode */
   if ((err = ctr_start(
        find_cipher("twofish"), /* index of desired cipher */
                           IV, /* the initialization vector */
                           key, /* the secret key */
                            16, /* length of secret key (16 bytes) */
                             0, /* 0 == default # of rounds */
    CTR_COUNTER_LITTLE_ENDIAN, /* Little endian counter */
                         &ctr) /* where to store the CTR state */
     ) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("ctr_start error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
   /* somehow fill buffer than encrypt it */
  if ((err = ctr_encrypt(
                                 buffer, /* plaintext */
                                 buffer, /* ciphertext */
                          sizeof(buffer), /* length of plaintext pt */
                                  &ctr) /* CTR state */
     ) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("ctr_encrypt error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
  /* make use of ciphertext... */
   /* now we want to decrypt so let's use ctr_setiv */
   if ((err = ctr_setiv( IV, /* the initial IV we gave to ctr_start */
                          16, /* the IV is 16 bytes long */
                        &ctr) /* the ctr state we wish to modify */
       ) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("ctr_setiv error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
  }
```

```
if ((err = ctr_decrypt(
                                  buffer, /* ciphertext */
                                  buffer, /* plaintext */
                          sizeof(buffer), /* length of plaintext */
                                   &ctr) /* CTR state */
      ) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("ctr_decrypt error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
   /* terminate the stream */
  if ((err = ctr_done(&ctr)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("ctr_done error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
      return -1;
  }
   /* clear up and return */
  zeromem(key, sizeof(key));
  zeromem(&ctr, sizeof(ctr));
   return 0;
}
```

3.4.9 LRW Mode

LRW mode is a cipher mode which is meant for indexed encryption like used to handle storage media. It is meant to have efficient seeking and overcome the security problems of ECB mode while not increasing the storage requirements. It is used much like any other chaining mode except with two key differences.

The key is specified as two strings the first key K_1 is the (normally AES) key and can be any length (typically 16, 24 or 32 octets long). The second key K_2 is the *tweak* key and is always 16 octets long. The tweak value is **NOT** a nonce or IV value it must be random and secret.

To initialize LRW mode use:

This will initialize the LRW context with the given (16 octet) IV, cipher K_1 key of length keylen octets and the (16 octet) K_2 tweak. While LRW was specified to be used only with AES, LibTomCrypt will allow any 128-bit block cipher to be specified as indexed by cipher. The number of rounds for the block cipher num_rounds can be 0 to use the default number of rounds for the given cipher.

To process data use the following functions:

These will encrypt (or decrypt) the plaintext to the ciphertext buffer (or vice versa). The length is specified by *len* in octets but must be a multiple of 16. The LRW code uses a fast tweak update such that consecutive blocks are encrypted faster than if random seeking where used.

To manipulate the IV use the following functions:

These will get or set the 16-octet IV. Note that setting the IV is the same as *seeking* and unlike other modes is not a free operation. It requires updating the entire tweak which is slower than sequential use. Avoid seeking excessively in performance constrained code.

To terminate the LRW state use the following:

```
int lrw_done(symmetric_LRW *lrw);
```

3.4.10 XTS Mode

As of v1.17, LibTomCrypt supports XTS mode with code donated by Elliptic Semiconductor Inc. ⁶. XTS is a chaining mode for 128-bit block ciphers, recommended by IEEE (P1619) for disk encryption. It is meant to be an encryption mode with random access to the message data without compromising privacy. It requires two private keys (of equal length) to perform the encryption process. Each encryption invocation includes a sector number or unique identifier specified as a 128-bit string.

To initialize XTS mode use the following function call:

⁶www.ellipticsemi.com

This will start the XTS mode with the two keys pointed to by key1 and key2 of length keylen octets each.

To encrypt or decrypt a sector use the following calls:

```
int xts_encrypt(
   const unsigned char *pt, unsigned long ptlen,
        unsigned char *ct,
   const unsigned char *tweak,
        symmetric_xts *xts);

int xts_decrypt(
   const unsigned char *ct, unsigned long ptlen,
        unsigned char *pt,
   const unsigned char *tweak,
        symmetric_xts *xts);
```

The first will encrypt the plaintext pointed to by pt of length ptlen octets, and store the ciphertext in the array pointed to by ct. It uses the 128-bit tweak pointed to by tweak to encrypt the block. The decrypt function performs the opposite operation. Both functions support ciphertext stealing (blocks that are not multiples of 16 bytes).

The P1619 specification states the tweak for sector number shall be represented as a 128-bit little endian string.

To terminate the XTS state call the following function:

```
void xts_done(symmetric_xts *xts);
```

3.4.11 F8 Mode

The F8 Chaining mode (see RFC 3711 for instance) is yet another chaining mode for block ciphers. It behaves much like CTR mode in that it XORs a keystream against the plaintext to encrypt. F8 mode comes with the additional twist that the counter value is secret, encrypted by a *salt key*. We initialize F8 mode with the following function call:

This will start the F8 mode state using key as the secret key, IV as the counter. It uses the $salt_key$ as IV encryption key (m in the RFC 3711). The salt_key can be shorter than the secret key but it should not be longer.

To encrypt or decrypt data we use the following two functions:

These will encrypt or decrypt a variable length array of bytes using the F8 mode state specified. The length is specified in bytes and does not have to be a multiple of the ciphers block size.

To change or retrieve the current counter IV value use the following functions:

These work with the current IV value only and not the encrypted IV value specified during the call to f8_start(). The purpose of these two functions is to be able to seek within a current session only. If you want to change the session IV you will have to call f8_done() and then start a new state with f8_start().

To terminate an F8 state call the following function:

```
int f8_done(symmetric_F8 *f8);
```

Chapter 4

Stream Ciphers

Stream ciphers are symmetric key ciphers which operate on a stream of bytes (in theory on a stream of bits however LibTomCrypt's implementation works with bytes).

The API for all stream ciphers operates in mode: setup - crypt - crypt - ... - done. Please note that both encryption and decryption are implemented via crypt.

Another useful feature of the stream ciphers API is generation of a random stream of bytes which works like: setup - keystream - keystream - ... - done. The random stream generation is implemented like encryption of a stream of $\theta x \theta \theta$ bytes.

Note: You shouldn't use the keystream interface as a PRNG, as it doesn't allow to re-seed the internal state.

4.1 ChaCha

ChaCha is currently the most modern stream cipher included in LibTomCrypt, so use this one unless you have a reason for using some of the older algorithms.

For more information about ChaCha see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChaCha_(cipher). Supported key size: 16 or 32 bytes (128 or 256 bits).

You can initialize ChaCha with 96bit nonce + 32bit counter:

```
chacha_state st;
err = chacha_setup(&st, key, key_len, rounds);
err = chacha_ivctr32(&st, nonce, 12, initial_32bit_ctr);

Or with 64bit nonce + 64bit counter:
chacha_state st;
err = chacha_setup(&st, key, key_len, rounds);
err = chacha_ivctr64(&st, nonce, 8, initial_64bit_ctr);
```

The *chacha_setup* takes the number of rounds as a parameter – choose 20 if you are not sure. As always never ever use the same key + nonce pair more than once.

For the actual encryption or decryption you have to call:

```
err = chacha_crypt(&st, in_buffer, in_len, out_buffer);
```

If you just want a random stream of bytes initialize the cipher with a truly random key (32) bytes), a truly random nonce (8 bytes) and zero initial counter. After that you can get a stream of pseudo-random bytes via:

```
err = chacha_keystream(&st, out_buffer, out_len);
  At the end you have to terminate the state:
err = chacha_done(&st);
4.2
       RC4
```

```
For more information about RC4 see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4.
   Supported key size: 5-256 bytes
   You need to initialize RC4 only with a key.
rc4_state st;
err = rc4_stream_setup(&st, key, key_len);
   For the actual encryption or decryption you have to call:
err = rc4_stream_crypt(&st, in_buffer, in_len, out_buffer);
```

If you just want a random stream of bytes initialize the cipher with truly random key. After that you can get a stream of pseudo-random bytes via:

```
err = rc4_stream_keystream(&st, out_buffer, out_len);
  At the end you have to terminate the state:
err = rc4_stream_done(&st);
```

4.3 Sober128

```
Supported key size: must be multiple of 4 bytes
```

You need to initialize Sober128 with a key and a nonce (must be multiple of 4 bytes).

```
sober128_state st;
err = sober128_stream_setup(&st, key, 16);
err = sober128_stream_setiv(&st, nonce, 12);
  For the actual encryption or decryption you to call:
err = sober128_stream_crypt(&st, in_buffer, in_len, out_buffer);
```

If you just want a random stream of bytes initialize the cipher with a truly random key and a truly random *nonce*. After that you can get a stream of pseudo-random bytes via:

```
err = sober128_stream_keystream(&st, out_buffer, out_len);
  At the end you have to terminate the state:
err = sober128_stream_done(&st);
```

Chapter 5

Authenticated Encryption

Authenticated Encryption - sometimes also called Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) - is a variant of encryption that provides not only confidentiality (as other symmetric or stream ciphers) but also integrity.

The inputs of Authenticated Encryption are: *key*, *nonce* (sometimes called initialization vector), *plaintext*, optional *header* (sometimes called additional authenticated data - AAD). The outputs are: *ciphertext* and *tag*.

5.1 EAX Mode

LibTomCrypt provides support for a mode called EAX^1 in a manner similar to the way it was intended to be used by the designers. First, a short description of what EAX mode is before we explain how to use it. EAX is a mode that requires a cipher, CTR and OMAC support and provides encryption and authentication². It is initialized with a random *nonce* that can be shared publicly, a *header* which can be fixed and public, and a random secret symmetric key.

The *header* data is meant to be meta-data associated with a stream that isn't private (e.g., protocol messages). It can be added at anytime during an EAX stream, and is part of the authentication tag. That is, changes in the meta-data can be detected by changes in the output tag.

The mode can then process plaintext producing ciphertext as well as compute a partial checksum. The actual checksum called a tag is only emitted when the message is finished. In the interim, the user can process any arbitrary sized message block to send to the recipient as ciphertext. This makes the EAX mode especially suited for streaming modes of operation.

The mode is initialized with the following function.

¹See M. Bellare, P. Rogaway, D. Wagner, A Conventional Authenticated-Encryption Mode.

²Note that since EAX only requires OMAC and CTR you may use *encrypt only* cipher descriptors with this mode.

```
unsigned long noncelen,
const unsigned char *header,
    unsigned long headerlen);
```

Where eax is the EAX state. The cipher parameter is the index of the desired cipher in the descriptor table. The key parameter is the shared secret symmetric key of length keylen octets. The nonce parameter is the random public string of length noncelen octets. The header parameter is the random (or fixed or **NULL**) header for the message of length headerlen octets.

When this function completes, the *eax* state will be initialized such that you can now either have data decrypted or encrypted in EAX mode. Note: if *headerlen* is zero you may pass *header* as **NULL** to indicate there is no initial header data.

To encrypt or decrypt data in a streaming mode use the following.

The function $eax_encrypt$ will encrypt the bytes in pt of length octets, and store the ciphertext in ct. Note: ct and pt may be the same region in memory. This function will also send the ciphertext through the OMAC function. The function $eax_decrypt$ decrypts ct, and stores it in pt. This also allows pt and ct to be the same region in memory.

You cannot both encrypt or decrypt with the same *eax* context. For bi–directional communication you will need to initialize two EAX contexts (preferably with different headers and nonces).

Note: both of these functions allow you to send the data in any granularity but the order is important. While the eax_init() function allows you to add initial header data to the stream you can also add header data during the EAX stream with the following.

This will add the *length* octet from *header* to the given *eax* header. Once the message is finished, the *tag* (checksum) may be computed with the following function:

This will terminate the EAX state *eax*, and store up to *taglen* bytes of the message tag in *tag*. The function then stores how many bytes of the tag were written out back in to *taglen*.

The EAX mode code can be tested to ensure it matches the test vectors by calling the following function:

5.1 EAX Mode 33

```
int eax_test(void);
This requires that the AES (or Rijndael) block cipher be registered with the cipher descriptor table
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
  int
                 err;
  eax_state
                 eax;
  unsigned char pt[64], ct[64], nonce[16], key[16], tag[16];
  unsigned long taglen;
  if (register_cipher(&rijndael_desc) == -1) {
      printf("Error registering Rijndael");
      return EXIT_FAILURE;
  }
   /* ... make up random nonce and key ... */
  /* initialize context */
  if ((err = eax_init(
                                   &eax, /* context */
                find_cipher("rijndael"), /* cipher id */
                                  nonce, /* the nonce */
                                      16, /* nonce is 16 bytes */
                               "TestApp", /* example header */
                                      7) /* header length */
       ) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Error eax_init: %s", error_to_string(err));
      return EXIT_FAILURE;
  }
  /* now encrypt data, say in a loop or whatever */
  if ((err = eax_encrypt(
                               &eax, /* eax context */
                                 pt, /* plaintext (source) */
                                 ct, /* ciphertext (destination) */
                          sizeof(pt) /* size of plaintext */
      ) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Error eax_encrypt: %s", error_to_string(err));
      return EXIT_FAILURE;
```

/* finish message and get authentication tag */

&taglen

&eax,

tag,

/* eax context */

/* where to put tag */

/* length of tag space */

}

taglen = sizeof(tag);
if ((err = eax_done(

```
) != CRYPT_OK) {
    printf("Error eax_done: %s", error_to_string(err));
    return EXIT_FAILURE;
}

/* now we have the authentication tag in "tag" and
    * it's taglen bytes long */
}
```

You can also perform an entire EAX state on a block of memory in a single function call with the following functions.

```
int eax_encrypt_authenticate_memory(
                    int cipher,
   const unsigned char *key,
                                 unsigned long keylen,
   const unsigned char *nonce,
                                 unsigned long noncelen,
   const unsigned char *header, unsigned long headerlen,
   const unsigned char *pt,
                                 unsigned long ptlen,
          unsigned char *ct,
          unsigned char *tag,
                                 unsigned long *taglen);
int eax_decrypt_verify_memory(
                    int cipher,
   const unsigned char *key,
                                 unsigned long keylen,
   const unsigned char *nonce,
                                 unsigned long noncelen,
   const unsigned char *header, unsigned long headerlen,
   const unsigned char *ct,
                                 unsigned long ctlen,
          unsigned char *pt,
          unsigned char *tag,
                                 unsigned long taglen,
          int
                        *res);
```

Both essentially just call eax_init() followed by eax_encrypt() (or eax_decrypt() respectively) and eax_done(). The parameters have the same meaning as with those respective functions.

The only difference is eax_decrypt_verify_memory() does not emit a tag. Instead you pass it a tag as input and it compares it against the tag it computed while decrypting the message. If the tags match then it stores a 1 in *res*, otherwise it stores a 0.

5.2 OCB Modes

5.2.1 Preface

LibTomCrypt provides support for a mode called OCB in version 1 "OCB" and version 3 "OCB3". OCB is an encryption protocol that simultaneously provides authentication. It is slightly faster to use than EAX mode but is less flexible.

³See P. Rogaway, M. Bellare, J. Black, T. Krovetz, OCB: A Block Cipher Mode of Operation for Efficient Authenticated Encryption.

⁴See RFC7253, T. Krovetz, P. Rogaway, The OCB Authenticated-Encryption Algorithm.

5.2 OCB Modes 35

Please be aware that all versions of OCB are patented and there are several licensing models provided by P. Rogaway, the patent holder – see http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb/license.htm.

5.2.2 OCB

Initialization and processing

Let's review how to initialize an OCB context.

This will initialize the *ocb* context using cipher descriptor *cipher*. It will use a *key* of length *keylen* and the random *nonce*. Note that *nonce* must be a random (public) string the same length as the block ciphers block size (e.g. 16 bytes for AES).

This mode has no Associated Data like EAX mode does which means you cannot authenticate metadata along with the stream. To encrypt or decrypt data use the following.

This will encrypt (or decrypt for the latter) a fixed length of data from pt to ct (vice versa for the latter). They assume that pt and ct are the same size as the block cipher's block size. Note that you cannot call both functions given a single ocb state. For bi-directional communication you will have to initialize two ocb states (with different nonces). Also pt and ct may point to the same location in memory.

State Termination

When you are finished encrypting the message you call the following function to compute the tag.

This will terminate an encrypt stream *ocb*. If you have trailing bytes of plaintext that will not complete a block you can pass them here. This will also encrypt the *ptlen* bytes in *pt* and store them in *ct*. It will also store up to *taglen* bytes of the tag into *tag*.

Note that *ptlen* must be less than or equal to the block size of block cipher chosen. Also note that if you have an input message equal to the length of the block size then you pass the data here (not to ocb_encrypt()) only.

To terminate a decrypt stream and compared the tag you call the following.

Similarly to the previous function you can pass trailing message bytes into this function. This will compute the tag of the message (internally) and then compare it against the *taglen* bytes of *tag* provided. By default *res* is set to zero. If all *taglen* bytes of *tag* can be verified then *res* is set to one (authenticated message).

Packet Functions

To make life simpler the following two functions are provided for memory bound OCB.

This will OCB encrypt the message pt of length ptlen, and store the ciphertext in ct. The length ptlen can be any arbitrary length.

Similarly, this will OCB decrypt, and compare the internally computed tag against the tag provided. res is set appropriately to 1 if the tag matches or to 0 if it doesn't match.

5.2 OCB Modes 37

5.2.3 OCB3

Initialization and processing

This will initialize the *ocb* context using cipher descriptor *cipher*. It will use a *key* of length *keylen* and the random *nonce* of length *noncelen*. The *nonce* must be a random (public) string of an arbitrary length between 1 and 15 octets. The desired length of the TAG that should be created when terminating the state has to be passed in *taglen* and has to be between 0 and 16 octets.

Note that you can only use ciphers with a block length of 16.

Additional Authenticated Data

OCB3 has, in contrary to OCB, the possibility to add "Additional Authenticated Data" (AAD) when performing cryptographic operations.

```
int ocb3_add_aad(ocb3_state *ocb, const unsigned char *aad, unsigned long aadlen);
```

This will add the AAD at aad of the arbitrary length aadlen to be authenticated within the context ocb.

This will encrypt (or decrypt for the latter) a fixed length of data from pt to ct (vice versa for the latter). They assume that pt and ct are the same size as the block cipher's block size. Note that you cannot call both functions given a single ocb state. For bi-directional communication you will have to initialize two ocb states (with different nonces). Also pt and ct may point to the same location in memory.

State Termination

```
const unsigned char *ct,
    unsigned long ctlen,
    unsigned char *pt);
```

This has to be called for the last encrypt (or decrypt) operation. Note that if you have to invoke only a single operation you can directly use these functions instead of $ocb3_encrypt()$ or $ocb3_encrypt()$.

When you are finished encrypting the message you call the following function to compute the tag.

```
int ocb3_done(ocb3_state *ocb, unsigned char *tag, unsigned long *taglen);
```

This stores the tag of the *ocb* state in *tag*. The *taglen* parameter defines on input the length of the tag to output and will be set to the actual length written, which is at most 16 octets.

Packet Functions

To make life simpler the following two functions are provided for memory bound OCB3.

```
int ocb3_encrypt_authenticate_memory(int cipher,
    const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen,
    const unsigned char *nonce, unsigned long noncelen,
    const unsigned char *adata, unsigned long adatalen,
    const unsigned char *pt, unsigned long ptlen,
        unsigned char *ct,
    unsigned char *tag, unsigned long *taglen);
```

This will OCB3 encrypt the message pt of length ptlen, and store the ciphertext in ct. The length ptlen can be any arbitrary length. The additional authenticated data adata of length adatalen is optional and can be left out by passing NULL as adata. The length of the authentication TAG will be stored in tag, which is also optional. The length of the TAG passed in taglen has to be between 0 and 16.

Similarly, this will OCB3 decrypt, and compare the internally computed tag against the tag provided. res is set appropriately to 1 if the tag matches or to 0 if it doesn't match.

5.3 CCM Mode

CCM is a NIST proposal for encrypt + authenticate that is centered around using AES (or any 16-byte cipher) as a primitive.

5.3 CCM Mode 39

5.3.1 Initialization

To initialize the CCM context with a secret key call the following function.

This initializes the CCM state *ccm* for the given cipher indexed by *cipher*, with a secret key *key* of length *keylen* octets. The cipher chosen must have a 16-byte block size (e.g., AES). Unlike EAX and OCB mode, CCM is only meant for *packet* mode where the length of the input is known in advance. This is why the length of the stream to authenticate is given as *ptlen*. With CCM, a header is meta-data you want to send with the message but not have encrypted. The header len is given in the init as *aadlen*.

5.3.2 Nonce Vector

After the state has been initialized (or reset) the next step is to add the session (or packet) initialization vector. It should be unique per packet encrypted.

This adds the nonce (a.k.a. salt) *nonce* of length *noncelen* octets to the CCM state *ccm*. Note that this function must be called once and only once.

5.3.3 Additional Authentication Data

The header is meta-data you want to send with the message but not have encrypted, it must be stored in adata of length adatalen octets.

This adds the additional authentication data adata of length adatalen to the CCM state ccm.

5.3.4 Plaintext Processing

After the AAD has been processed, the plaintext (or ciphertext depending on the direction) can be processed.

This processes message data where pt is the plaintext and ct is the ciphertext. The length of both are equal and stored in ptlen. Depending on the mode pt is the input and ct is the output (or vice versa). When direction equals $\mathbf{CCM_ENCRYPT}$ the plaintext is read, encrypted and stored in the ciphertext buffer. When direction equals $\mathbf{CCM_DECRYPT}$ the opposite occurs.

5.3.5 State Termination

To terminate a CCM state and retrieve the message authentication tag call the following function.

This terminates the CCM state ccm and stores the tag in tag of length taglen octets.

5.3.6 State Reset

The call to ccm_init() will perform considerable pre–computation and if you're going to be dealing with a lot of packets it is very costly to have to call it repeatedly. To aid in this endeavour, the reset function is provided.

```
int ccm_reset(ccm_state *ccm);
```

This will reset the CCM state *ccm* to the state that ccm_init() left it. The user would then call ccm_add_nonce(), ccm_add_aad(), etc.

5.3.7 One-Shot Packet

To process a single packet under any given key the following helper function can be used.

5.3 CCM Mode 41

This will initialize the CCM state with the given key, nonce and AAD value then proceed to encrypt or decrypt the message text and store the final message tag. The definition of the variables is the same as it is for all the manual functions.

If you are processing many packets under the same key you shouldn't use this function as it invokes the pre–computation with each call.

5.3.8 Example Usage

The following is an example usage of how to use CCM over multiple packets with a shared secret key.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int send_packet(const unsigned char *pt,
                                             unsigned long ptlen,
                const unsigned char *nonce, unsigned long noncelen,
                const unsigned char *aad,
                                             unsigned long aadlen,
                      ccm_state
{
   int
                 err:
   unsigned long taglen;
  unsigned char tag[16];
   /* reset the state */
  if ((err = ccm_reset(ccm)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
  }
  /* Add the nonce */
  if ((err = ccm_add_nonce(ccm, nonce, noncelen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   /* Add the AAD (note: aad can be NULL if aadlen == 0) */
  if ((err = ccm_add_aad(ccm, aad, aadlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
  /* process the plaintext */
  if ((err =
        ccm_process(ccm, pt, ptlen, pt, CCM_ENCRYPT)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   /* Finish up and get the MAC tag */
   taglen = sizeof(tag);
   if ((err = ccm_done(ccm, tag, &taglen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   /* ... send a header describing the lengths ... */
```

```
/* depending on the protocol and how nonce is
    * generated you may have to send it too... */
   send(socket, nonce, noncelen, 0);
   /* send the aad */
   send(socket, aad, aadlen, 0);
   /* send the ciphertext */
   send(socket, pt, ptlen, 0);
   /* send the tag */
   send(socket, tag, taglen, 0);
   return CRYPT_OK;
}
int main(void)
   ccm_state
                 ccm;
   unsigned char key[16], NONCE[12], pt[PACKET_SIZE];
                 err, x;
   unsigned long ptlen;
   /* somehow fill key/NONCE with random values */
   /* register AES */
   register_cipher(&aes_desc);
   /* init the CCM state */
   if ((err =
        ccm_init(&ccm, find_cipher("aes"), key, 16, PACKET_SIZE, 16, size(NONCE))) != CRYPT_OK) {
      whine_and_pout(err);
   }
   /* handle us some packets */
   for (;;) {
      ptlen = make_packet_we_want_to_send(pt);
       /* use NONCE as counter (12 byte counter) */
       for (x = 11; x \ge 0; x--) {
           if (++NONCE[x]) {
              break;
           }
       }
       if ((err = send_packet(pt, ptlen, NONCE, 12, NULL, 0, &ccm))
           != CRYPT_OK) {
           whine_and_pout(err);
       }
```

5.4 GCM Mode 43

```
}
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
```

5.4 GCM Mode

Galois counter mode is an IEEE proposal for authenticated encryption (also it is a planned NIST standard). Like EAX and OCB mode, it can be used in a streaming capacity however, unlike EAX it cannot accept *additional authentication data* (meta-data) after plaintext has been processed. This mode also only works with block ciphers with a 16-byte block.

A GCM stream is meant to be processed in three modes, one after another. First, the initialization vector (per session) data is processed. This should be unique to every session. Next, the the optional additional authentication data is processed, and finally the plaintext (or ciphertext depending on the direction).

5.4.1 Initialization

To initialize the GCM context with a secret key call the following function.

This initializes the GCM state gcm for the given cipher indexed by cipher, with a secret key key of length keylen octets. The cipher chosen must have a 16-byte block size (e.g., AES).

5.4.2 Initialization Vector

After the state has been initialized (or reset) the next step is to add the session (or packet) initialization vector. It should be unique per packet encrypted.

This adds the initialization vector octets from IV of length IVlen to the GCM state gcm. You can call this function as many times as required to process the entire IV.

Note: the GCM protocols provides a *shortcut* for 12-byte IVs where no pre-processing is to be done. If you want to minimize per packet latency it is ideal to only use 12-byte IVs. You can just increment it like a counter for each packet.

5.4.3 Additional Authentication Data

After the entire IV has been processed, the additional authentication data can be processed. Unlike the IV, a packet/session does not require additional authentication data (AAD) for security. The AAD is meant to be used as side-channel data you want to be authenticated with the packet. Note:

once you begin adding AAD to the GCM state you cannot return to adding IV data until the state has been reset.

This adds the additional authentication data adata of length adatalen to the GCM state qcm.

5.4.4 Plaintext Processing

After the AAD has been processed, the plaintext (or ciphertext depending on the direction) can be processed.

This processes message data where pt is the plaintext and ct is the ciphertext. The length of both are equal and stored in ptlen. Depending on the mode pt is the input and ct is the output (or vice versa). When direction equals $\mathbf{GCM_ENCRYPT}$ the plaintext is read, encrypted and stored in the ciphertext buffer. When direction equals $\mathbf{GCM_DECRYPT}$ the opposite occurs.

5.4.5 State Termination

To terminate a GCM state and retrieve the message authentication tag call the following function.

This terminates the GCM state gcm and stores the tag in tag of length taglen octets.

5.4.6 State Reset

The call to gcm_init() will perform considerable pre–computation (when **GCM_TABLES** is defined) and if you're going to be dealing with a lot of packets it is very costly to have to call it repeatedly. To aid in this endeavour, the reset function has been provided.

```
int gcm_reset(gcm_state *gcm);
```

This will reset the GCM state gcm to the state that $gcm_init()$ left it. The user would then call $gcm_add_iv()$, $gcm_add_aad()$, etc.

5.4 GCM Mode 45

5.4.7 One-Shot Packet

To process a single packet under any given key the following helper function can be used.

This will initialize the GCM state with the given key, IV and AAD value then proceed to encrypt or decrypt the message text and store the final message tag. The definition of the variables is the same as it is for all the manual functions.

If you are processing many packets under the same key you shouldn't use this function as it invokes the pre–computation with each call.

5.4.8 Example Usage

The following is an example usage of how to use GCM over multiple packets with a shared secret key.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int send_packet(const unsigned char *pt, unsigned long ptlen,
                const unsigned char *iv, unsigned long ivlen,
                const unsigned char *aad, unsigned long aadlen,
                      gcm_state
                                    *gcm)
{
  int
                 err:
  unsigned long taglen;
  unsigned char tag[16];
   /* reset the state */
  if ((err = gcm_reset(gcm)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     return err;
   /* Add the IV */
  if ((err = gcm_add_iv(gcm, iv, ivlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     return err;
   /* Add the AAD (note: aad can be NULL if aadlen == 0) */
  if ((err = gcm_add_aad(gcm, aad, aadlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     return err;
```

```
}
   /* process the plaintext */
   if ((err =
        gcm_process(gcm, pt, ptlen, pt, GCM_ENCRYPT)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }
   /* Finish up and get the MAC tag */
   taglen = sizeof(tag);
   if ((err = gcm_done(gcm, tag, &taglen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     return err;
   }
   /* ... send a header describing the lengths ... */
   /* depending on the protocol and how IV is
    * generated you may have to send it too... */
   send(socket, iv, ivlen, 0);
   /* send the aad */
   send(socket, aad, aadlen, 0);
   /* send the ciphertext */
   send(socket, pt, ptlen, 0);
   /* send the tag */
   send(socket, tag, taglen, 0);
   return CRYPT_OK;
}
int main(void)
   gcm_state
                gcm;
   unsigned char key[16], IV[12], pt[PACKET_SIZE];
                err, x;
   unsigned long ptlen;
   /* somehow fill key/IV with random values */
   /* register AES */
   register_cipher(&aes_desc);
   /* init the GCM state */
   if ((err =
        gcm_init(&gcm, find_cipher("aes"), key, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      whine_and_pout(err);
   }
```

```
/* handle us some packets */
for (;;) {
    ptlen = make_packet_we_want_to_send(pt);

    /* use IV as counter (12 byte counter) */
    for (x = 11; x >= 0; x--) {
        if (++IV[x]) {
            break;
        }
    }

    if ((err = send_packet(pt, ptlen, iv, 12, NULL, 0, &gcm))
        != CRYPT_OK) {
        whine_and_pout(err);
    }
}
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
```

5.5 ChaCha20-Poly1305

This authenticated encryption is based on ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator. It is defined by https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539.

5.5.1 Initialization

To initialize the ChaCha20-Poly1305 context with a secret key call the following function.

This initializes the ChaCha20-Poly1305 state st with a secret key key of length keylen octets (valid lengths: 32 or 16).

5.5.2 Initialization Vector

After the state has been initialized the next step is to add the initialization vector.

This adds the initialization vector from iv of length ivlen octects (valid lengths: 8 or 12) to the ChaCha20-Poly1305 state st.

This also adds the initialization vector from *iv* of length *ivlen* octects (valid lengths: 8 or 12) to the state *st* but it also incorporates 64bit *sequence_number* into IV as described in RFC7905. You can call only one of *chacha20poly1305_setiv* or *chacha20poly1305_setiv_rfc7905*.

5.5.3 Additional Authentication Data

After the IV has been set, the additional authentication data can be processed.

This adds the additional authentication data adata of length adatalen to the ChaCha20–Poly1305 state st.

5.5.4 Encryption / Decryption

After the AAD has been processed, the plaintext (or ciphertext depending on the direction) can be processed.

This encrypts the data where in is the plaintext and out is the ciphertext. The length of both are equal and stored in inlen.

This decrypts the data where in is the ciphertext and out is the plaintext. The length of both are equal and stored in inlen.

5.5.5 State Termination

To terminate a ChaCha20-Poly1305 state and retrieve the message authentication tag call the following function.

This terminates the ChaCha20-Poly1305 state st and stores the tag in tag of length taglen octets (always 16).

5.5.6 One–Shot Packet

To process a single packet under any given key the following helper function can be used.

This will initialize the ChaCha20–Poly1305 state with the given key, IV and AAD value then proceed to encrypt (*direction* equals **CHCHA20POLY1305_ENCRYPT**) or decrypt (*direction* equals **CHCHA20POLY1305_DECRYPT**) the message text and store the final message tag. The definition of the variables is the same as it is for all the manual functions.

Chapter 6

One-Way Cryptographic Hash Functions

6.1 Core Functions

Like the ciphers, there are hash core functions and a universal data type to hold the hash state called *hash_state*. To initialize hash XXX (where XXX is the name) call:

```
void XXX_init(hash_state *md);
```

This simply sets up the hash to the default state governed by the specifications of the hash. To add data to the message being hashed call:

Essentially all hash messages are virtually infinitely 1 long message which are buffered. In the case where this limit is reached the $XXX_process()$ function returns $CRYPT_HASH_OVERFLOW$. The data can be passed in any sized chunks as long as the order of the bytes are the same, the message digest (hash output) will be the same. For example, this means that:

 $^{^{1}}$ Most hashes are limited to 2^{64} bits or 2,305,843,009,213,693,952 bytes.

This function will finish up the hash and store the result in the *out* array. You must ensure that *out* is long enough for the hash in question. Often hashes are used to get keys for symmetric ciphers so the $XXX_done()$ functions will wipe the md variable before returning automatically.

To test a hash function call:

```
int XXX_test(void);
```

This will return **CRYPT_OK** if the hash matches the test vectors, otherwise it returns an error code. An example snippet that hashes a message with md5 is given below.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
    hash_state md;
    unsigned char *in = "hello world", out[16];
    /* setup the hash */
    md5_init(&md);
    /* add the message */
    md5_process(&md, in, strlen(in));
    /* get the hash in out[0..15] */
    md5_done(&md, out);
    return 0;
}
```

6.2 Hash Descriptors

Like the set of ciphers, the set of hashes have descriptors as well. They are stored in an array called *hash_descriptor* and are defined by:

```
struct _hash_descriptor {
    char *name;
                                /* digest output size in bytes */
    unsigned long hashsize;
    unsigned long blocksize;
                               /* the block size the hash uses */
    void (*init)
                   (hash_state *hash);
         (*process)(
                             hash_state *hash,
                    const unsigned char *in,
                          unsigned long inlen);
    int.
         (*done)
                   (hash_state *hash, unsigned char *out);
         (*test)
                   (void);
    int
};
```

The *name* member is the name of the hash function (all lowercase). The *hashsize* member is the size of the digest output in bytes, while *blocksize* is the size of blocks the hash expects to the compression function. Technically, this detail is not important for high level developers but is useful to know for performance reasons.

The *init* member initializes the hash, *process* passes data through the hash, *done* terminates the hash and retrieves the digest. The *test* member tests the hash against the specified test vectors.

There is a function to search the array as well called *int find_hash(char *name)*. It returns -1 if the hash is not found, otherwise, the position in the descriptor table of the hash.

In addition, there is also find_hash_oid() which finds a hash by the ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER string.

```
int find_hash_oid(const unsigned long *ID, unsigned long IDlen);
```

You can use the table to indirectly call a hash function that is chosen at run-time. For example:

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
   unsigned char buffer[100], hash[MAXBLOCKSIZE];
   int idx, x;
  hash_state md;
   /* register hashes .... */
   if (register_hash(&md5_desc) == -1) {
     printf("Error registering MD5.\n");
      return -1;
  }
   /* register other hashes ... */
   /* prompt for name and strip newline */
  printf("Enter hash name: \n");
   fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), stdin);
   buffer[strlen(buffer) - 1] = 0;
   /* get hash index */
   idx = find_hash(buffer);
   if (idx == -1) {
      printf("Invalid hash name!\n");
      return -1;
   }
   /* hash input until blank line */
  hash_descriptor[idx].init(&md);
  while (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), stdin) != NULL)
         hash_descriptor[idx].process(&md, buffer, strlen(buffer));
  hash_descriptor[idx].done(&md, hash);
   /* dump to screen */
   for (x = 0; x < hash_descriptor[idx].hashsize; x++)</pre>
       printf("%02x ", hash[x]);
```

```
printf("\n");
return 0;
}
```

Note the usage of MAXBLOCKSIZE. In LibTomCrypt, no symmetric block, key or hash digest is larger than MAXBLOCKSIZE in length. This provides a simple size you can set your automatic arrays to that will not get overrun.

There are three helper functions to make working with hashes easier. The first is a function to hash a buffer, and produce the digest in a single function call.

This will hash the data pointed to by *in* of length *inlen*. The hash used is indexed by the *hash* parameter. The message digest is stored in *out*, and the *outlen* parameter is updated to hold the message digest size.

The next helper function allows for the hashing of a file based on a file name.

This will hash the file named by *fname* using the hash indexed by *hash*. The file named in this function call must be readable by the user owning the process performing the request. This function can be omitted by the LTC_NO_FILE define, which forces it to return CRYPT_NOP when it is called. The message digest is stored in *out*, and the *outlen* parameter is updated to hold the message digest size.

This will hash the file identified by the handle *in* using the hash indexed by *hash*. This will begin hashing from the current file pointer position, and will not rewind the file pointer when finished. This function can be omitted by the **LTC_NO_FILE** define, which forces it to return **CRYPT_NOP** when it is called. The message digest is stored in *out*, and the *outlen* parameter is updated to hold the message digest size.

To perform the above hash with md5 the following code could be used:

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
   int idx, err;
   unsigned long len;
```

6.2 Hash Descriptors 55

```
unsigned char out[MAXBLOCKSIZE];
   /* register the hash */
   if (register_hash(&md5_desc) == -1) {
     printf("Error registering MD5.\n");
     return -1;
   /* get the index of the hash */
   idx = find_hash("md5");
   /* call the hash */
   len = sizeof(out);
   if ((err =
      hash_memory(idx, "hello world", 11, out, &len)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error hashing data: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
  }
  return 0;
}
```

6.2.1 Hash Registration

Similar to the cipher descriptor table you must register your hash algorithms before you can use them. These functions work exactly like those of the cipher registration code. The functions are:

```
int register_hash(const struct _hash_descriptor *hash);
int unregister_hash(const struct _hash_descriptor *hash);
```

The following hashes are provided as of this release within the LibTomCrypt library:

Name	Descriptor Name	Size of Message Digest (bytes)
WHIRLPOOL	whirlpool_desc	64
SHA3-512	sha3_512_desc	64
SHA-512	sha512_desc	64
BLAKE2B-512	blake2b_512_desc	64
SHA3-384	sha3_384_desc	48
SHA-384	sha384_desc	48
RIPEMD-320	$\rm rmd160_desc$	40
SHA-512/256	$sha512_256_desc$	32
SHA3-256	sha3_256_desc	32
SHA-256	sha256_desc	32
RIPEMD-256	$\rm rmd160_desc$	32
BLAKE2S-256	$blake2s_256_desc$	32
BLAKE2B-256	blake2b_256_desc	32
SHA-512/224	$sha512_224_desc$	28
SHA3-224	sha3_224_desc	28
SHA-224	sha224_desc	28
BLAKE2S-224	blake2s_224_desc	28
BLAKE2B-384	blake2b_384_desc	48
TIGER-192	tiger_desc	24
SHA-1	sha1_desc	20
RIPEMD-160	$rmd160_desc$	20
BLAKE2S-160	$blake2s_160_desc$	20
BLAKE2B-160	blake2b_160_desc	20
RIPEMD-128	$rmd128_desc$	16
MD5	$md5_desc$	16
MD4	$md4_desc$	16
MD2	$md2_desc$	16
BLAKE2S-128	blake2s_128_desc	16

Figure 6.1: Built–In Software Hashes

6.3 Cipher Hash Construction

An addition to the suite of hash functions is the *Cipher Hash Construction* or *CHC* mode. In this mode applicable block ciphers (such as AES) can be turned into hash functions that other LTC functions can use. In particular this allows a cryptosystem to be designed using very few moving parts.

In order to use the CHC system the developer will have to take a few extra steps. First the *chc_desc* hash descriptor must be registered with register_hash(). At this point the CHC hash cannot be used to hash data. While it is in the hash system you still have to tell the CHC code which cipher to use. This is accomplished via the chc_register() function.

```
int chc_register(int cipher);
```

A cipher has to be registered with CHC (and also in the cipher descriptor tables with register_cipher()). The chc_register() function will bind a cipher to the CHC system. Only one cipher can be bound to the CHC hash at a time. There are additional requirements for the system to work.

- 1. The cipher must have a block size greater than 64-bits.
- 2. The cipher must allow an input key the size of the block size.

Example of using CHC with the AES block cipher.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
   int err;
  /* register cipher and hash */
  if (register_cipher(&aes_enc_desc) == -1) {
      printf("Could not register cipher\n");
      return EXIT_FAILURE;
  }
  if (register_hash(&chc_desc) == -1) {
      printf("Could not register hash\n");
      return EXIT_FAILURE;
  }
   /* start chc with AES */
  if ((err = chc_register(find_cipher("aes"))) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Error binding AES to CHC: %s\n",
             error_to_string(err));
  }
   /* now you can use chc_hash in any LTC function
    * [aside from pkcs...] */
}
```

6.4 SHA3 SHAKE

The SHA3 class of algorithms provides a special XOF (Extendable Output Functions) mode, called SHAKE. SHAKE operates in 2 security configurations, 128bit or 256bit, and allows to generate message digests of an arbitrary length.

For further information see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-3 Example of using SHAKE256 with an arbitrary length output.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
   int err;
  hash_state state;
  const void* msg = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog";
  unsigned char output[345];
   if ((err = sha3_shake_init(&state, 256)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Could not init SHAKE256 (%s)\n", error_to_string(err));
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
  }
  if ((err = sha3_shake_process(&state, msg, strlen(msg))) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Could not process SHAKE256 (%s)\n", error_to_string(err));
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
  if ((err = sha3_shake_done(&state, output, sizeof(output))) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Could not finish SHAKE256 (%s)\n", error_to_string(err));
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
  }
  return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
```

6.5 Notice

It is highly recommended that you **not** use the MD2, MD4, MD5, or SHA-1 hashes for the purposes of digital signatures or authentication codes. These hashes are provided for completeness and they still can be used for the purposes of password hashing or one-way accumulators (e.g. Yarrow).

The other hashes such as the SHA-2 (that includes SHA-512, SHA-512/384, SHA-384, SHA-512/256, SHA-256 and SHA-224) and TIGER-192 are still considered secure for all purposes you would normally use a hash for.

Chapter 7

Checksum Functions

7.1 Preface

The API for all checksum functions operate in mode: init - update - update - ... - finish. The finish functions allow to output a partial result if necessary.

7.2 CRC-32 – Cyclic redundancy check

A Cyclic Redundancy Check is an error-detecting code, where LibTomCrypt implements CRC-32 with the polynomial 0x04C11DB7.

For further information see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclic_redundancy_check

```
void crc32_init(crc32_state *ctx);
void crc32_update(crc32_state *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned long length);
void crc32_finish(crc32_state *ctx, void *hash, unsigned long size);
```

7.3 Adler-32

```
Adler-32 is a checksum algorithm.
```

For further information see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adler-32.

```
void adler32_init(adler32_state *ctx);
void adler32_update(adler32_state *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned long length);
void adler32_finish(adler32_state *ctx, void *hash, unsigned long size);
```

Chapter 8

Message Authentication Codes

8.1 HMAC Protocol

Thanks to Dobes Vandermeer, the library now includes support for hash based message authentication codes, or HMAC for short. An HMAC of a message is a keyed authentication code that only the owner of a private symmetric key will be able to verify. The purpose is to allow an owner of a private symmetric key to produce an HMAC on a message then later verify if it is correct. Any impostor or eavesdropper will not be able to verify the authenticity of a message.

The HMAC support works much like the normal hash functions except that the initialization routine requires you to pass a key and its length. The key is much like a key you would pass to a cipher. That is, it is simply an array of octets stored in unsigned characters. The initialization routine is:

The *hmac* parameter is the state for the HMAC code. The *hash* parameter is the index into the descriptor table of the hash you want to use to authenticate the message. The *key* parameter is the pointer to the array of chars that make up the key. The *keylen* parameter is the length (in octets) of the key you want to use to authenticate the message. To send octets of a message through the HMAC system you must use the following function:

hmac is the HMAC state you are working with. in is the array of octets to send into the HMAC process. inlen is the number of octets to process. Like the hash process routines, you can send the data in arbitrarily sized chunks. When you are finished with the HMAC process you must call the following function to get the HMAC code:

```
int hmac_done( hmac_state *hmac,
```

```
unsigned char *out,
unsigned long *outlen);
```

The *hmac* parameter is the HMAC state you are working with. The *out* parameter is the array of octets where the HMAC code should be stored. You must set *outlen* to the size of the destination buffer before calling this function. It is updated with the length of the HMAC code produced (depending on which hash was picked). If *outlen* is less than the size of the message digest (and ultimately the HMAC code) then the HMAC code is truncated as per FIPS-198 specifications (e.g. take the first *outlen* bytes).

There are two utility functions provided to make using HMACs easier to do. They accept the key and information about the message (file pointer, address in memory), and produce the HMAC result in one shot. These are useful if you want to avoid calling the three step process yourself.

This will produce an HMAC code for the array of octets in *in* of length *inlen*. The index into the hash descriptor table must be provided in *hash*. It uses the key from *key* with a key length of *keylen*. The result is stored in the array of octets *out* and the length in *outlen*. The value of *outlen* must be set to the size of the destination buffer before calling this function. Similarly for files there is the following function:

hash is the index into the hash descriptor table of the hash you want to use. fname is the filename to process. key is the array of octets to use as the key of length keylen. out is the array of octets where the result should be stored.

To test if the HMAC code is working there is the following function:

```
int hmac_test(void);
```

Which returns **CRYPT_OK** if the code passes otherwise it returns an error code. Some example code for using the HMAC system is given below.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
   int idx, err;
   hmac_state hmac;
   unsigned char key[16], dst[MAXBLOCKSIZE];
   unsigned long dstlen;
```

8.2 OMAC Support 63

```
/* register SHA-1 */
if (register_hash(&sha1_desc) == -1) {
  printf("Error registering SHA1\n");
   return -1;
/* get index of SHA1 in hash descriptor table */
idx = find_hash("sha1");
/* we would make up our symmetric key in "key[]" here */
/* start the HMAC */
if ((err = hmac_init(&hmac, idx, key, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) {
   printf("Error setting up hmac: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
   return -1;
/* process a few octets */
if((err = hmac_process(&hmac, "hello", 5) != CRYPT_OK) {
   printf("Error processing hmac: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
   return -1;
/* get result (presumably to use it somehow...) */
dstlen = sizeof(dst);
if ((err = hmac_done(&hmac, dst, &dstlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
   printf("Error finishing hmac: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
   return -1;
}
printf("The hmac is %lu bytes long\n", dstlen);
/* return */
return 0;
```

8.2 OMAC Support

}

OMAC¹, which stands for *One-Key CBC MAC* is an algorithm which produces a Message Authentication Code (MAC) using only a block cipher such as AES. Note: OMAC has been standardized as CMAC within NIST, for the purposes of this library OMAC and CMAC are synonymous. From an API standpoint, the OMAC routines work much like the HMAC routines. Instead, in this case a cipher is used instead of a hash.

To start an OMAC state you call

http://crypt.cis.ibaraki.ac.jp/omac/omac.html

```
unsigned long keylen);
```

The *omac* parameter is the state for the OMAC algorithm. The *cipher* parameter is the index into the cipher_descriptor table of the cipher² you wish to use. The *key* and *keylen* parameters are the keys used to authenticate the data.

To send data through the algorithm call

This will send *inlen* bytes from *in* through the active OMAC state *state*. Returns **CRYPT_OK** if the function succeeds. The function is not sensitive to the granularity of the data. For example,

```
omac_process(&mystate, "hello", 5);
omac_process(&mystate, "world", 6);

Would produce the same result as,
omac_process(&mystate, "hello world", 11);
```

When you are done processing the message you can call the following to compute the message tag.

Which will terminate the OMAC and output the tag (MAC) to out. Note that unlike the HMAC and other code outlen can be smaller than the default MAC size (for instance AES would make a 16-byte tag). Part of the OMAC specification states that the output may be truncated. So if you pass in outlen = 5 and use AES as your cipher than the output MAC code will only be five bytes long. If outlen is larger than the default size it is set to the default size to show how many bytes were actually used.

Similar to the HMAC code the file and memory functions are also provided. To OMAC a buffer of memory in one shot use the following function.

This will compute the OMAC of *inlen* bytes of *in* using the key key of length keylen bytes and the cipher specified by the cipher'th entry in the cipher_descriptor table. It will store the MAC in out with the same rules as omac_done.

To OMAC a file use

²The cipher must have a 64 or 128 bit block size. Such as CAST5, Blowfish, DES, AES, Twofish, etc.

8.2 OMAC Support 65

Which will OMAC the entire contents of the file specified by *filename* using the key key of length keylen bytes and the cipher specified by the cipher'th entry in the cipher_descriptor table. It will store the MAC in out with the same rules as omac_done.

To test if the OMAC code is working there is the following function:

```
int omac_test(void);
```

Which returns **CRYPT_OK** if the code passes otherwise it returns an error code. Some example code for using the OMAC system is given below.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
₹
  int idx, err;
  omac_state omac;
  unsigned char key[16], dst[MAXBLOCKSIZE];
  unsigned long dstlen;
  /* register Rijndael */
  if (register_cipher(&rijndael_desc) == -1) {
     printf("Error registering Rijndael\n");
     return -1;
  }
  /* get index of Rijndael in cipher descriptor table */
  idx = find_cipher("rijndael");
  /* we would make up our symmetric key in "key[]" here */
  /* start the OMAC */
  if ((err = omac_init(&omac, idx, key, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error setting up omac: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
  /* process a few octets */
  if((err = omac_process(&omac, "hello", 5) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error processing omac: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
  }
  /* get result (presumably to use it somehow...) */
  dstlen = sizeof(dst);
  if ((err = omac_done(&omac, dst, &dstlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error finishing omac: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
```

```
return -1;
}
printf("The omac is %lu bytes long\n", dstlen);

/* return */
return 0;
}
```

8.3 PMAC Support

The PMAC³ protocol is another MAC algorithm that relies solely on a symmetric-key block cipher. It uses essentially the same API as the provided OMAC code.

A PMAC state is initialized with the following.

Which initializes the *pmac* state with the given *cipher* and *key* of length *keylen* bytes. The chosen cipher must have a 64 or 128 bit block size (e.x. AES).

To MAC data simply send it through the process function.

This will process *inlen* bytes of *in* in the given *state*. The function is not sensitive to the granularity of the data. For example,

```
pmac_process(&mystate, "hello", 5);
pmac_process(&mystate, "world", 6);

Would produce the same result as,
pmac_process(&mystate, "hello world", 11);
```

When a complete message has been processed the following function can be called to compute the message tag.

This will store up to *outlen* bytes of the tag for the given *state* into *out*. Note that if *outlen* is larger than the size of the tag it is set to the amount of bytes stored in *out*.

Similar to the OMAC code the file and memory functions are also provided. To PMAC a buffer of memory in one shot use the following function.

³J.Black, P.Rogaway, A Block-Cipher Mode of Operation for Parallelizable Message Authentication

 $8.4 \ Pelican \ MAC$ 67

This will compute the PMAC of *msglen* bytes of *msg* using the key key of length keylen bytes, and the cipher specified by the *cipher*'th entry in the cipher_descriptor table. It will store the MAC in out with the same rules as pmac_done().

To PMAC a file use

Which will PMAC the entire contents of the file specified by *filename* using the key key of length keylen bytes, and the cipher specified by the cipher'th entry in the cipher_descriptor table. It will store the MAC in out with the same rules as pmac_done().

To test if the PMAC code is working there is the following function:

```
int pmac_test(void);
```

Which returns **CRYPT_OK** if the code passes otherwise it returns an error code.

8.4 Pelican MAC

Pelican MAC is a new (experimental) MAC by the AES team that uses four rounds of AES as a mixing function. It achieves a very high rate of processing and is potentially very secure. It requires AES to be enabled to function. You do not have to register_cipher() AES first though as it calls AES directly.

This will initialize the Pelican state with the given AES key. Once this has been done you can begin processing data.

This will process *inlen* bytes of *in* through the Pelican MAC. It's best that you pass in multiples of 16 bytes as it makes the routine more efficient but you may pass in any length of text. You can call this function as many times as required to process an entire message.

```
int pelican_done(pelican_state *pelmac, unsigned char *out);
```

This terminates a Pelican MAC and writes the 16-octet tag to out.

8.4.1 Example

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
  pelican_state pelstate;
  unsigned char key[32], tag[16];
  int
               err;
  /* somehow initialize a key */
  /* initialize pelican mac */
  if ((err = pelican_init(&pelstate, /* the state */
                         key,
                                  /* user key */
                                   /* key length in octets */
                        )) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error initializing Pelican: %s",
            error_to_string(err));
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
  /* MAC some data */
  /* length of data */
                           )) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error processing Pelican: %s",
            error_to_string(err));
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
  }
  /* Terminate the MAC */
  if ((err = pelican_done(&pelstate,/* the state */
                         tag /* where to store the tag */
                         )) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error terminating Pelican: %s",
            error_to_string(err));
     return EXIT_FAILURE;
  /* tag[0..15] has the MAC output now */
  return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
```

8.5 XCBC-MAC 69

8.5 XCBC-MAC

As of LibTomCrypt v1.15, XCBC-MAC (RFC 3566) has been provided to support TLS encryption suites. Like OMAC, it computes a message authentication code by using a cipher in CBC mode. It also uses a single key which it expands into the requisite three keys for the MAC function. A XCBC-MAC state is initialized with the following function:

This will initialize the XCBC–MAC state xcbc, with the key specified in key of length keylen octets. The cipher indicated by the cipher index can be either a 64 or 128–bit block cipher. This will return $\mathbf{CRYPT_OK}$ on success.

It is possible to use XCBC in a three key mode by OR'ing the value LTC_XCBC_PURE against the *keylen* parameter. In this mode, the key is interpretted as three keys. If the cipher has a block size of n octets, the first key is then keylen - 2n octets and is the encryption key. The next 2n octets are the K_1 and K_2 padding keys (used on the last block). For example, to use AES-192 keylen should be $24 + 2 \cdot 16 = 56$ octets. The three keys are interpretted as if they were concatenated in the key buffer.

To process data through XCBC-MAC use the following function:

This will add the message octets pointed to by *in* of length *inlen* to the XCBC–MAC state pointed to by *state*. Like the other MAC functions, the granularity of the input is not important but the order is. This will return **CRYPT_OK** on success.

To compute the MAC tag value use the following function:

This will retrieve the XCBC–MAC tag from the state pointed to by *state*, and store it in the array pointed to by *out*. The *outlen* parameter specifies the maximum size of the destination buffer, and is updated to hold the final size of the tag when the function returns. This will return **CRYPT_OK** on success.

Helper functions are provided to make parsing memory buffers and files easier. The following functions are provided:

This will compute the XCBC-MAC of *msglen* bytes of *msg*, using the key *key* of length *keylen* bytes, and the cipher specified by the *cipher*'th entry in the cipher_descriptor table. It will store the MAC in *out* with the same rules as xcbc_done().

To xcbc a file use

Which will XCBC-MAC the entire contents of the file specified by *filename* using the key key of length keylen bytes, and the cipher specified by the cipher'th entry in the cipher_descriptor table. It will store the MAC in out with the same rules as xcbc_done().

To test XCBC-MAC for RFC 3566 compliance use the following function:

```
int xcbc_test(void);
```

This will return **CRYPT_OK** on success. This requires the AES or Rijndael descriptor be previously registered, otherwise, it will return **CRYPT_NOP**.

8.6 F9-MAC

The F9–MAC is yet another CBC–MAC variant proposed for the 3GPP standard. Originally specified to be used with the KASUMI block cipher, it can also be used with other ciphers. For LibTomCrypt, the F9–MAC code can use any cipher.

8.6.1 Usage Notice

F9–MAC differs slightly from the other MAC functions in that it requires the caller to perform the final message padding. The padding quite simply is a direction bit followed by a 1 bit and enough zeros to make the message a multiple of the cipher block size. If the message is byte aligned, the padding takes on the form of a single 0x40 or 0xC0 byte followed by enough 0x00 bytes to make the message proper multiple.

If the user simply wants a MAC function (hint: use OMAC) padding with a single 0x40 byte should be sufficient for security purposes and still be reasonably compatible with F9–MAC.

8.6.2 F9–MAC Functions

A F9–MAC state is initialized with the following function:

 $8.6 ext{ } F9\text{--}MAC$

This will initialize the F9–MAC state f9, with the key specified in key of length keylen octets. The cipher indicated by the cipher index can be either a 64 or 128–bit block cipher. This will return **CRYPT_OK** on success.

To process data through F9–MAC use the following function:

This will add the message octets pointed to by *in* of length *inlen* to the F9–MAC state pointed to by *state*. Like the other MAC functions, the granularity of the input is not important but the order is. This will return **CRYPT_OK** on success.

To compute the MAC tag value use the following function:

This will retrieve the F9–MAC tag from the state pointed to by *state*, and store it in the array pointed to by *out*. The *outlen* parameter specifies the maximum size of the destination buffer, and is updated to hold the final size of the tag when the function returns. This will return **CRYPT_OK** on success.

Helper functions are provided to make parsing memory buffers and files easier. The following functions are provided:

This will compute the F9-MAC of *msglen* bytes of *msg*, using the key key of length keylen bytes, and the cipher specified by the cipher'th entry in the cipher_descriptor table. It will store the MAC in out with the same rules as f9_done().

To F9–MAC a file use

Which will F9–MAC the entire contents of the file specified by *filename* using the key key of length keylen bytes, and the cipher specified by the cipher'th entry in the cipher_descriptor table. It will store the MAC in out with the same rules as f9_done().

To test f9–MAC for RFC 3566 compliance use the following function:

```
int f9_test(void);
```

This will return **CRYPT_OK** on success. This requires the AES or Rijndael descriptor be previously registered, otherwise, it will return **CRYPT_NOP**.

8.7 Poly1305-MAC

The Poly1305–MAC is a cryptographic message authentication code created by Daniel J. Bernstein. More info at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poly1305.

A Poly1305–MAC state is initialized with the following function:

This will initialize the Poly1305–MAC state st, with the key specified in key of length keylen octets (always 32).

To process data through Poly1305–MAC use the following function:

This will add the message octets pointed to by in of length inlen to the Poly1305–MAC state pointed to by st.

To compute the MAC tag value use the following function:

This will retrieve the Poly1305–MAC tag from the state pointed to by st, and store it in the array pointed to by mac. The maclen parameter specifies the maximum size of the destination buffer, and is updated to hold the final size of the tag when the function returns.

Helper functions are provided to make parsing memory buffers and files easier. The following functions are provided:

This will compute the Poly1305–MAC of *inlen* bytes of *in*, using the key key of length keylen bytes. It will store the MAC in mac with the same rules as poly1305_done().

To Poly1305-MAC a file use

Which will Poly1305–MAC the entire contents of the file specified by *fname* using the key key of length keylen bytes. It will store the MAC in mac with the same rules as poly1305_done().

$8.8 \quad BLAKE2s + BLAKE2b MAC$

The BLAKE2s and BLAKE2b are cryptographic message authentication code designed by Jean–Philippe Aumasson, Samuel Neves, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn, and Christian Winnerlein. More info at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693.

A BLAKE2s/b-MAC state is initialized with the following function:

This will initialize the BLAKE2s/b-MAC state st, with the key specified in key of length keylen octets (up to 64). The outlen specifies the size of the final tag (up to 64 octets).

To process data through BLAKE2s/b-MAC use the following function:

This will add the message octets pointed to by in of length inlen to the BLAKE2s/b-MAC state pointed to by st.

To compute the MAC tag value use the following function:

This will retrieve the BLAKE2s/b–MAC tag from the state pointed to by st, and store it in the array pointed to by mac. The maclen parameter specifies the maximum size of the destination buffer, and is updated to hold the final size of the tag when the function returns.

Helper functions are provided to make parsing memory buffers and files easier. The following functions are provided:

This will compute the BLAKE2s/b-MAC of *inlen* bytes of *in*, using the key *key* of length *keylen* bytes. It will store the MAC in *mac* with the same rules as blake2smac_done().

To BLAKE2s/b-MAC a file use

Which will BLAKE2s/b-MAC the entire contents of the file specified by *fname* using the key key of length keylen bytes. It will store the MAC in mac with the same rules as blake2smac_done().

Chapter 9

Pseudo-Random Number Generators

9.1 Core Functions

The library provides an array of core functions for Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) as well. A cryptographic PRNG is used to expand a shorter bit string into a longer bit string. PRNGs are used wherever random data is required such as Public Key (PK) key generation. There is a universal structure called *prng_state*. To initialize a PRNG call:

```
int XXX_start(prng_state *prng);
```

This will setup the PRNG for future use and not seed it. In order for the PRNG to be cryptographically useful you must give it entropy. Ideally you'd have some OS level source to tap like in UNIX. To add entropy to the PRNG call:

Which returns **CRYPT_OK** if the entropy was accepted. Once you think you have enough entropy you call another function to put the entropy into action.

```
int XXX_ready(prng_state *prng);
```

Which returns CRYPT_OK if it is ready. Finally to actually read bytes call:

Which returns the number of bytes read from the PRNG. When you are finished with a PRNG state you call the following.

```
void XXX_done(prng_state *prng);
```

This will terminate a PRNG state and free any memory (if any) allocated. To export a PRNG state so that you can later resume the PRNG call the following.

This will write a *PRNG* state to the buffer out of length outlen bytes. The idea of the export is meant to be used as a seed file. That is, when the program starts up there will not likely be that much entropy available. To import a state to seed a PRNG call the following function.

This will call the start and add_entropy functions of the given PRNG. It will use the state in in of length *inlen* as the initial seed. You must pass the same seed length as was exported by the corresponding export function.

Note that importing a state will not *resume* the PRNG from where it left off. That is, if you export a state, emit (say) 8 bytes and then import the previously exported state the next 8 bytes will not specifically equal the 8 bytes you generated previously.

When a program is first executed the normal course of operation is:

- 1. Gather entropy from your sources for a given period of time or number of events.
- 2. Start, use your entropy via add_entropy and ready the PRNG yourself.

When your program is finished you simply call the export function and save the state to a medium (disk, flash memory, etc). The next time your application starts up you can detect the state, feed it to the import function and go on your way. It is ideal that (as soon as possible) after start up you export a fresh state. This helps in the case that the program aborts or the machine is powered down without being given a chance to exit properly.

Note that even if you have a state to import it is important to add new entropy to the state. However, there is less pressure to do so.

To test a PRNG for operational conformity call the following functions.

```
int XXX_test(void);
```

This will return **CRYPT_OK** if PRNG is operating properly.

9.1.1 Remarks

It is possible to be adding entropy and reading from a PRNG at the same time. For example, if you first seed the PRNG and call ready() you can now read from it. You can also keep adding new entropy to it. The new entropy will not be used in the PRNG until ready() is called again. This allows the PRNG to be used and re-seeded at the same time. No real error checking is guaranteed to see if the entropy is sufficient, or if the PRNG is even in a ready state before reading.

9.1.2 Example

Below is a simple snippet to read 10 bytes from Yarrow. It is important to note that this snippet is **NOT** secure since the entropy added is not random.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
  prng_state prng;
  unsigned char buf[10];
  int err;
   /* start it */
  if ((err = yarrow_start(&prng)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Start error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
  }
   /* add entropy */
  if ((err = yarrow_add_entropy("hello world", 11, &prng))
       != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Add_entropy error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
  /* ready and read */
  if ((err = yarrow_ready(&prng)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Ready error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
  printf("Read %lu bytes from yarrow\n",
          yarrow_read(buf, sizeof(buf), &prng));
  return 0;
}
```

9.2 PRNG Descriptors

PRNGs have descriptors that allow plugin driven functions to be created using PRNGs. The plugin descriptors are stored in the structure $prng_descriptor$. The format of an element is:

```
prng_state *);

void (*done)(prng_state *);

int (*pexport)(unsigned char *, unsigned long *, prng_state *);

int (*pimport)(const unsigned char *, unsigned long, prng_state *);

int (*test)(void);
};
```

To find a PRNG in the descriptor table the following function can be used:

```
int find_prng(const char *name);
```

This will search the PRNG descriptor table for the PRNG named *name*. It will return -1 if the PRNG is not found, otherwise, it returns the index into the descriptor table.

Just like the ciphers and hashes, you must register your prng before you can use it. The two functions provided work exactly as those for the cipher registry functions. They are the following:

```
int register_prng(const struct _prng_descriptor *prng);
int unregister_prng(const struct _prng_descriptor *prng);
```

The register function will register the PRNG, and return the index into the table where it was placed (or -1 for error). It will avoid registering the same descriptor twice, and will return the index of the current placement in the table if the caller attempts to register it more than once. The unregister function will return **CRYPT_OK** if the PRNG was found and removed. Otherwise, it returns **CRYPT_ERROR**.

9.2.1 PRNGs Provided

Name	Descriptor	Usage
ChaCha20	chacha20_prng_desc	Stream Cipher PRNG (recommended, fast)
Fortuna	fortuna_desc	Fast long-term PRNG (recommended, secure)
RC4	rc4_desc	Stream Cipher PRNG
SOBER-128	sober128_desc	Stream Cipher PRNG
sprng	sprng_desc	Secure PRNG using the System RNG
Yarrow	yarrow_desc	Fast short-term PRNG

Figure 9.1: List of Provided PRNGs

Yarrow

Yarrow is fast PRNG meant to collect an unspecified amount of entropy from sources (keyboard, mouse, interrupts, etc), and produce an unbounded string of random bytes.

Note: This PRNG is still secure for most tasks but is no longer recommended. Users should use Fortuna or ChaCha20 instead.

Fortuna

Fortuna is a fast attack tolerant and more thoroughly designed PRNG suitable for long term usage. It is faster than the default implementation of Yarrow¹ while providing more security.

Fortuna is slightly less flexible than Yarrow in the sense that it only works with the AES block cipher and SHA-256 hash function. Technically, Fortuna will work with any block cipher that accepts a 256-bit key, and any hash that produces at least a 256-bit output. However, to make the implementation simpler it has been fixed to those choices.

Fortuna is more secure than Yarrow in the sense that attackers who learn parts of the entropy being added to the PRNG learn far less about the state than that of Yarrow. Without getting into to many details Fortuna has the ability to recover from state determination attacks where the attacker starts to learn information from the PRNGs output about the internal state. Yarrow on the other hand, cannot recover from that problem until new entropy is added to the pool and put to use through the ready() function.

RC4

RC4 is an old stream cipher that can also double duty as a PRNG in a pinch. You key RC4 by calling add_entropy(), and setup the key by calling ready().

You really should not use RC4 for cryptographical purposes, it's broken.

SOBER-128

SOBER-128 is a stream cipher designed by the QUALCOMM Australia team. Like RC4, you key it by calling add_entropy(). There is no need to call ready() for this PRNG as it does not do anything.

Note: this cipher has several oddities about how it operates. The first call to add_entropy() sets the cipher's key. Every other time call to the add_entropy() function sets the cipher's IV variable. The IV mechanism allows you to encrypt several messages with the same key, and not re—use the same key material.

Unlike Yarrow and Fortuna, all of the entropy (and hence security) of this algorithm rests in the data you pass it on the **first** call to add_entropy(). All buffers sent to add_entropy() must have a length that is a multiple of four bytes.

Like RC4, the output of SOBER-128 is XOR'ed against the buffer you provide it. In this manner, you can use sober128_read() as an encrypt (and decrypt) function.

Since SOBER-128 has a fixed keying scheme, and is very fast (faster than RC4) the ideal usage of SOBER-128 is to key it from the output of Fortuna (or Yarrow), and use it to encrypt messages. It is also ideal for simulations which need a high quality (and fast) stream of bytes.

ChaCha20

ChaCha20 is a fast stream cipher built on a pseudorandom function designed by Daniel J. Bernstein. It can also double duty as a PRNG.

It is recommended to use 40 bytes of truly random bytes for initialization.

The implementation supports adding entropy via the add_entropy() function while already being operational.

¹Yarrow has been implemented to work with most cipher and hash combos based on which you have chosen to build into the library.

Example Usage

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
  prng_state prng;
  unsigned char buf[32];
   int err;
  if ((err = rc4_start(&prng)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("RC4 init error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
      exit(-1);
  }
   /* use "key" as the key */
  if ((err = rc4_add_entropy("key", 3, &prng)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("RC4 add entropy error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
      exit(-1);
  }
   /* setup RC4 for use */
  if ((err = rc4_ready(&prng)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("RC4 ready error: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
      exit(-1);
  }
  /* encrypt buffer */
  strcpy(buf, "hello world");
  if (rc4_read(buf, 11, &prng) != 11) {
      printf("RC4 read error\n");
      exit(-1);
  }
   return 0;
```

To decrypt you have to do the exact same steps.

9.3 The Secure RNG

An RNG is related to a PRNG in many ways, except that it does not expand a smaller seed to get the data. They generate their random bits by performing some computation on fresh input bits. Possibly the hardest thing to get correctly in a cryptosystem is the PRNG. Computers are deterministic that try hard not to stray from pre–determined paths. This makes gathering entropy needed to seed a PRNG a hard task.

There is one small function that may help on certain platforms:

```
unsigned long rng_get_bytes(
   unsigned char *buf,
   unsigned long len,
   void (*callback)(void));
```

9.3 The Secure RNG 81

Which will try one of three methods of getting random data. The first is to open the popular /dev/random device which on most *NIX platforms provides cryptographic random bits². The second method is to try the Microsoft Cryptographic Service Provider, and read the RNG. The third method is an ANSI C clock drift method that is also somewhat popular but gives bits of lower entropy. The callback parameter is a pointer to a function that returns void. It is used when the slower ANSI C RNG must be used so the calling application can still work. This is useful since the ANSI C RNG has a throughput of roughly three bytes a second. The callback pointer may be set to **NULL** to avoid using it if you do not want to. The function returns the number of bytes actually read from any RNG source. There is a function to help setup a PRNG as well:

This will try to initialize the prng with a state of at least bits of entropy. The callback parameter works much like the callback in $rng_get_bytes()$. It is highly recommended that you use this function to setup your PRNGs unless you have a platform where the RNG does not work well. Example usage of this function is given below:

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
   ecc_key mykey;
  prng_state prng;
  int err;
   /* register yarrow */
   if (register_prng(&yarrow_desc) == -1) {
      printf("Error registering Yarrow\n");
      return -1;
  }
  /* setup the PRNG */
   if ((err = rng_make_prng(128, find_prng("yarrow"), &prng, NULL))
       != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Error setting up PRNG, %s\n", error_to_string(err));
      return -1;
  }
   /* make a 192-bit ECC key */
   if ((err = ecc_make_key(&prng, find_prng("yarrow"), 24, &mykey))
       != CRYPT_OK) {
      printf("Error making key: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
      return -1;
  }
  return 0;
}
```

 $^{^2}$ This device is available in Windows through the Cygwin compiler suite. It emulates /dev/random via the Microsoft CSP.

9.3.1 The Secure PRNG Interface

It is possible to access the secure RNG through the PRNG interface, and in turn use it within dependent functions such as the PK API. This simplifies the cryptosystem on platforms where the secure RNG is fast. The secure PRNG never requires to be started, that is you need not call the start, add_entropy, or ready functions. For example, consider the previous example using this PRNG.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
  ecc_key mykey;
  int err;
  /* register SPRNG */
  if (register_prng(&sprng_desc) == -1) {
     printf("Error registering SPRNG\n");
     return -1;
  }
  /* make a 192-bit ECC key */
  if ((err = ecc_make_key(NULL, find_prng("sprng"), 24, &mykey))
       != CRYPT_OK) {
     printf("Error making key: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
     return -1;
  }
  return 0;
}
```

Chapter 10

RSA Public Key Cryptography

10.1 Introduction

RSA wrote the PKCS #1 specifications which detail RSA Public Key Cryptography. In the specifications are padding algorithms for encryption and signatures. The standard includes the v1.5 and v2.1 algorithms. To simplify matters a little the v2.1 encryption and signature padding algorithms are called OAEP and PSS respectively.

10.2 PKCS #1 Padding

PKCS #1 v1.5 padding is so simple that both signature and encryption padding are performed by the same function. Note: the signature padding does **not** include the ASN.1 padding required. That is performed by the rsa_sign_hash_ex() function documented later on in this chapter.

10.2.1 PKCS #1 v1.5 Encoding

The following function performs PKCS #1 v1.5 padding:

This will encode the message pointed to by msg of length msglen octets. The $block_type$ parameter must be set to LTC_PKCS_1_EME to perform encryption padding. It must be set to LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA to perform signature padding. The $modulus_bitlen$ parameter indicates the length of the modulus in bits. The padded data is stored in out with a length of outlen octets. The output will not be longer than the modulus which helps allocate the correct output buffer size.

Only encryption padding requires a PRNG. When performing signature padding the *prng_idx* parameter may be left to zero as it is not checked for validity.

10.2.2 PKCS #1 v1.5 Decoding

The following function performs PKCS #1 v1.5 de-padding:

```
int pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(
   const unsigned char *msg,
        unsigned long msglen,
        int block_type,
        unsigned long modulus_bitlen,
        unsigned char *out,
        unsigned long *outlen,
        int *is_valid);
```

This will remove the PKCS padding data pointed to by msg of length msglen. The decoded data is stored in out of length outlen. If the padding is valid, a 1 is stored in is_valid , otherwise, a 0 is stored. The $block_type$ parameter must be set to either LTC_PKCS_1_EME or LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA depending on whether encryption or signature padding is being removed.

10.3 PKCS #1 v2.1 Encryption

PKCS #1 RSA Encryption amounts to OAEP padding of the input message followed by the modular exponentiation. As far as this portion of the library is concerned we are only dealing with th OAEP padding of the message.

10.3.1 OAEP Encoding

The following function performs PKCS #1 v2.1 encryption padding:

This accepts *msg* as input of length *msglen* which will be OAEP padded. The *lparam* variable is an additional system specific tag that can be applied to the encoding. This is useful to identify which system encoded the message. If no variance is desired then *lparam* can be set to **NULL**.

OAEP encoding requires the length of the modulus in bits in order to calculate the size of the output. This is passed as the parameter $modulus_bitlen$. $hash_idx$ is the index into the hash descriptor table of the hash desired. PKCS #1 allows any hash to be used but both the encoder and decoder must use the same hash in order for this to succeed. The size of hash output affects the maximum sized input message. $prng_idx$ and prng are the random number generator arguments required to randomize the padding process. The padded message is stored in out along with the length in outlen.

If h is the length of the hash and m the length of the modulus (both in octets) then the maximum payload for msg is m-2h-2. For example, with a 1024-bit RSA key and SHA-1 as the hash the maximum payload is 86 bytes.

Note that when the message is padded it still has not been RSA encrypted. You must pass the output of this function to rsa_exptmod() to encrypt it.

10.3.2 OAEP Decoding

This function decodes an OAEP encoded message and outputs the original message that was passed to the OAEP encoder. msg is the output of pkcs_l_oaep_encode() of length msglen. lparam is the same system variable passed to the OAEP encoder. If it does not match what was used during encoding this function will not decode the packet. $modulus_bitlen$ is the size of the RSA modulus in bits and must match what was used during encoding. Similarly the $hash_idx$ index into the hash descriptor table must match what was used during encoding.

If the function succeeds it decodes the OAEP encoded message into *out* of length *outlen* and stores a 1 in res. If the packet is invalid it stores 0 in res and if the function fails for another reason it returns an error code.

10.4 PKCS #1 Digital Signatures

10.4.1 PSS Encoding

PSS encoding is the second half of the PKCS #1 standard which is padding to be applied to messages that are signed.

```
int pkcs_1_pss_encode(
   const unsigned char *msghash,
        unsigned long msghashlen,
        unsigned long saltlen,
```

This function assumes the message to be PSS encoded has previously been hashed. The input hash msghash is of length msghashlen. PSS allows a variable length random salt (it can be zero length) to be introduced in the signature process. $hash_idx$ is the index into the hash descriptor table of the hash to use. $prng_idx$ and prng are the random number generator information required for the salt.

Similar to OAEP encoding modulus_bitlen is the size of the RSA modulus (in bits). It limits the size of the salt. If m is the length of the modulus h the length of the hash output (in octets) then there can be m - h - 2 bytes of salt.

This function does not actually sign the data it merely pads the hash of a message so that it can be processed by rsa_exptmod().

10.4.2 PSS Decoding

To decode a PSS encoded signature block you have to use the following.

This will decode the PSS encoded message in *sig* of length *siglen* and compare it to values in *msghash* of length *msghashlen*. If the block is a valid PSS block and the decoded hash equals the hash supplied *res* is set to non–zero. Otherwise, it is set to zero. The rest of the parameters are as in the PSS encode call.

It's important to use the same *saltlen* and hash for both encoding and decoding as otherwise the procedure will not work.

10.5 RSA Key Operations

10.5.1 Background

RSA is a public key algorithm that is based on the inability to find the *e-th* root modulo a composite of unknown factorization. Normally the difficulty of breaking RSA is associated with the integer factoring problem but they are not strictly equivalent.

The system begins with with two primes p and q and their product N = pq. The order or Euler totient of the multiplicative sub-group formed modulo N is given as $\varphi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ which can be reduced to lcm(p-1,q-1). The public key consists of the composite N and some integer e such that $gcd(e,\varphi(N)) = 1$. The private key consists of the composite N and the inverse of e modulo $\varphi(N)$ often simply denoted as $de \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(N)}$.

A person who wants to encrypt with your public key simply forms an integer (the plaintext) M such that 1 < M < N - 2 and computes the ciphertext $C = M^e \pmod{N}$. Since finding the inverse exponent d given only N and e appears to be intractable only the owner of the private key can decrypt the ciphertext and compute $C^d \equiv (M^e)^d \equiv M^1 \equiv M \pmod{N}$. Similarly the owner of the private key can sign a message by decrypting it. Others can verify it by encrypting it.

Currently RSA is a difficult system to cryptanalyze provided that both primes are large and not close to each other. Ideally e should be larger than 100 to prevent direct analysis. For example, if e is three and you do not pad the plaintext to be encrypted than it is possible that $M^3 < N$ in which case finding the cube-root would be trivial. The most often suggested value for e is 65537 since it is large enough to make such attacks impossible and also well designed for fast exponentiation (requires 16 squarings and one multiplication).

It is important to pad the input to RSA since it has particular mathematical structure. For instance $M_1^d M_2^d = (M_1 M_2)^d$ which can be used to forge a signature. Suppose $M_3 = M_1 M_2$ is a message you want to have a forged signature for. Simply get the signatures for M_1 and M_2 on their own and multiply the result together. Similar tricks can be used to deduce plaintexts from ciphertexts. It is important not only to sign the hash of documents only but also to pad the inputs with data to remove such structure.

10.5.2 RSA Key Generation

For RSA routines a single rsa_key structure is used. To make a new RSA key call:

Where wprng is the index into the PRNG descriptor array. The size parameter is the size in bytes of the RSA modulus desired. The e parameter is the encryption exponent desired, typical values are 3, 17, 257 and 65537. Stick with 65537 since it is big enough to prevent trivial math attacks, and not super slow. The key parameter is where the constructed key is placed. All keys must be at least 128 bytes, and no more than 512 bytes in size (that is from 1024 to 4096 bits).

Note: the $rsa_make_key()$ function allocates memory at run–time when you make the key. Make sure to call $rsa_free()$ (see below) when you are finished with the key. If $rsa_make_key()$ fails it will automatically free the memory allocated.

There are two types of RSA keys. The types are **PK_PRIVATE** and **PK_PUBLIC**. The first type is a private RSA key which includes the CRT parameters¹ in the form of a RSAPrivateKey (PKCS #1 compliant). The second type, is a public RSA key which only includes the modulus and public exponent. It takes the form of a RSAPublicKey (PKCS #1 compliant).

¹As of v0.99 the PK_PRIVATE_OPTIMIZED type has been deprecated, and has been replaced by the PK_PRIVATE type.

10.5.3 RSA Exponentiation

To do raw work with the RSA function, that is without padding, use the following function:

This will load the bignum from in as a big endian integer in the format PKCS #1 specifies, raises it to either e or d and stores the result in out and the size of the result in outlen. which is set to **PK_PUBLIC** to use e (i.e. for encryption/verifying) and set to **PK_PRIVATE** to use d as the exponent (i.e. for decrypting/signing).

Note: the output of this function is zero–padded as per PKCS #1 specification. This allows this routine to work with PKCS #1 padding functions properly.

10.5.4 RSA Key Size

To fetch the key size of an RSA key, use the following function:

```
int rsa_get_size(rsa_key *key);
```

This can be used to determine the modulus size of an RSA key.

10.6 RSA Key Encryption

Normally RSA is used to encrypt short symmetric keys which are then used in block ciphers to encrypt a message. To facilitate encrypting short keys the following functions have been provided.

This function will OAEP pad in of length inlen bytes, RSA encrypt it, and store the ciphertext in out of length outlen octets. The lparam and lparamlen are the same parameters you would pass to pkcs_1_oaep_encode().

10.6.1 Extended Encryption

As of v1.15, the library supports both v1.5 and v2.1 PKCS #1 style paddings in these higher level functions. The following is the extended encryption function:

```
int rsa_encrypt_key_ex(
    const unsigned char *in,
        unsigned long inlen,
        unsigned char *out,
        unsigned long *outlen,
    const unsigned char *lparam,
        unsigned long lparamlen,
        prng_state *prng,
        int prng_idx,
        int padding,
        rsa_key *key);
```

The parameters are all the same as for rsa_encrypt_key() except for the addition of the *padding* parameter. It must be set to LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 to perform v1.5 encryption, or set to LTC_PKCS_1_OAEP to perform v2.1 encryption.

When performing v1.5 encryption, the hash and lparam parameters are totally ignored and can be set to **NULL** or zero (respectively).

10.7 RSA Key Decryption

This function will RSA decrypt in of length inlen then OAEP de-pad the resulting data and store it in out of length outlen. The lparam and lparamlen are the same parameters you would pass to pkcs_1_oaep_decode().

If the RSA decrypted data is not a valid OAEP packet then *stat* is set to 0. Otherwise, it is set to 1.

10.7.1 Extended Decryption

As of v1.15, the library supports both v1.5 and v2.1 PKCS #1 style paddings in these higher level functions. The following is the extended decryption function:

```
int rsa_decrypt_key_ex(
    const unsigned char *in,
        unsigned long inlen,
        unsigned char *out,
        unsigned long *outlen,
    const unsigned char *lparam,
        unsigned long lparamlen,
        int hash_idx,
        int padding,
        int *stat,
        rsa_key *key);
```

Similar to the extended encryption, the new parameter *padding* indicates which version of the PKCS #1 standard to use. It must be set to LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 to perform v1.5 decryption, or set to LTC_PKCS_1_OAEP to perform v2.1 decryption.

When performing v1.5 decryption, the hash and lparam parameters are totally ignored and can be set to **NULL** or zero (respectively).

10.8 RSA Signature Generation

Similar to RSA key encryption RSA is also used to *digitally sign* message digests (hashes). To facilitate this process the following functions have been provided.

This will PSS encode the message digest pointed to by *in* of length *inlen* octets. Next, the PSS encoded hash will be RSA *signed* and the output stored in the buffer pointed to by *out* of length *outlen* octets.

The $hash_idx$ parameter indicates which hash will be used to create the PSS encoding. It should be the same as the hash used to hash the message being signed. The saltlen parameter indicates the length of the desired salt, and should typically be small. A good default value is between 8 and 16 octets. Strictly, it must be small than $modulus_len - hLen - 2$ where $modulus_len$ is the size of the RSA modulus (in octets), and hLen is the length of the message digest produced by the chosen hash.

10.8.1 Extended Signatures

As of v1.15, the library supports both v1.5 and v2.1 signatures. The extended signature generation function has the following prototype:

This will PKCS encode the message digest pointed to by *in* of length *inlen* octets. Next, the PKCS encoded hash will be RSA *signed* and the output stored in the buffer pointed to by *out* of length *outlen* octets. The *padding* parameter must be set to LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 to produce a v1.5 signature, otherwise, it must be set to LTC_PKCS_1_PSS to produce a v2.1 signature.

As of v1.18.0, the library also supports v1.5 signature generation without ASN.1 encoding the signature which can be indicated by passing LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1 as padding parameter. This option has been introduced to provide compatibility to SSL3.0 implementations which implemented this.

When generating a standard v1.5 signature the *prng*, and *prng_idx* parameters are ignored. When generating a v1.5 signature without ASN.1 decoding additionally the textithash_idx parameter is ignored.

10.9 RSA Signature Verification

This will RSA verify the signature pointed to by sig of length siglen octets. Next, the RSA decoded data is PSS decoded and the extracted hash is compared against the message digest pointed to by msghash of length msghashlen octets.

If the RSA decoded data is not a valid PSS message, or if the PSS decoded hash does not match the *msghash* value, *res* is set to 0. Otherwise, if the function succeeds, and signature is valid *res* is set to 1.

10.9.1 RSA Signature Salt Length

The v2.1 signature algorithm requires a salt length to be able to properly encode resp. decode. To fetch the maximum possible salt length this function is provided:

```
int rsa_sign_saltlen_get_max(int hash_idx, rsa_key *key);
```

As stated in the PKCS#1 RFC3447 "Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output of the hash function Hash) and 0". This function is provided to be able to use other lengths as well and to make sure at runtime that the RSA key can handle the desired salt length.

10.9.2 Extended Verification

As of v1.15, the library supports both v1.5 and v2.1 signature verification. The extended signature verification function has the following prototype:

This will RSA verify the signature pointed to by sig of length siglen octets. Next, the RSA decoded data is PKCS decoded and the extracted hash is compared against the message digest pointed to by msghash of length msghashlen octets.

If the RSA decoded data is not a valid PSS message, or if the PKCS decoded hash does not match the *msghash* value, *res* is set to 0. Otherwise, if the function succeeds, and signature is valid *res* is set to 1.

The padding parameter must be set to LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 to perform a v1.5 verification. Otherwise, it must be set to LTC_PKCS_1_PSS to perform a v2.1 verification.

As of v1.18.0, the library also supports v1.5 signature verification without ASN.1 decoding the signature which can be indicated by passing LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1 as padding parameter.

When performing a standard v1.5 verification the *saltlen* parameter is ignored. When performing a v1.5 verification without ASN.1 decoding additionally the *hash_idx* parameter is ignored.

10.10 RSA Encryption Example

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
   int         err, hash_idx, prng_idx, res;
   unsigned long l1, l2;
   unsigned char pt[16], pt2[16], out[1024];
   rsa_key         key;

/* register prng/hash */
   if (register_prng(&sprng_desc) == -1) {
```

```
printf("Error registering sprng");
   return EXIT_FAILURE;
/* register a math library (in this case TomsFastMath)
ltc_mp = tfm_desc;
if (register_hash(&sha1_desc) == -1) {
  printf("Error registering sha1");
   return EXIT_FAILURE;
hash_idx = find_hash("sha1");
prng_idx = find_prng("sprng");
/* make an RSA-1024 key */
if ((err = rsa_make_key(NULL,
                                 /* PRNG state */
                        prng_idx, /* PRNG idx */
                        1024/8, /* 1024-bit key */
                                 /* we like e=65537 */
                        65537,
                        &key)
                                 /* where to store the key */
    ) != CRYPT_OK) {
    printf("rsa_make_key %s", error_to_string(err));
    return EXIT_FAILURE;
/* fill in pt[] with a key we want to send ... */
11 = sizeof(out);
if ((err = rsa_encrypt_key(pt, /* data we wish to encrypt */
                           16, /* data is 16 bytes long */
                          out, /* where to store ciphertext */
                          &11, /* length of ciphertext */
                    "TestApp", /* our lparam for this program */
                            7, /* lparam is 7 bytes long */
                         NULL, /* PRNG state */
                     prng_idx, /* prng idx */
                     hash_idx, /* hash idx */
                        &key) /* our RSA key */
    ) != CRYPT_OK) {
    printf("rsa_encrypt_key %s", error_to_string(err));
    return EXIT_FAILURE;
/* now let's decrypt the encrypted key */
12 = sizeof(pt2);
if ((err = rsa_decrypt_key(out, /* encrypted data */
                            11, /* length of ciphertext */
                           pt2, /* where to put plaintext */
                           &12, /* plaintext length */
                     "TestApp", /* lparam for this program */
                             7, /* lparam is 7 bytes long */
```

10.11 RSA Key Format

The RSA key format adopted for exporting and importing keys is the PKCS #1 format defined by the ASN.1 constructs known as RSAPublicKey and RSAPrivateKey. Additionally, the OpenSSL key format is supported as well.

10.11.1 RSA Key Export

To export a RSA key use the following function.

This will export the RSA key depending on the value of type.

The RSAPublicKey (PKCS #1 type) format will be used for the public key, indicated by **PK_PUBLIC**. The RSAPrivateKey (PKCS #1 type) format will be used for the private key, indicated by **PK_PRIVATE**.

As of v1.18.0 this function can also export OpenSSL-compatible formatted public RSA keys. By OR'ing **PK_STD** and **PK_PUBLIC** the public key will be exported in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo (X.509 type) format.

10.11.2 RSA Key Import

To import a RSA key use one of the following function.

Import from standard formats

This will import the key stored in *in* of length inlen and import it to *key*.

These formats are normally distributed in the PEM format, consisting of a label defining the content and base64 encoded DER-serialized data.

All the import functions expect binary DER data.

This function can import both RSAPublicKey and RSAPrivateKey formats.

As of v1.06 this function can also import OpenSSL DER formatted public RSA keys. They are essentially encapsulated RSAPublicKeys. LibTomCrypt will import the key, strip off the additional data and fill in the *rsa_key* structure.

This function can import RSA private keys serialized in PKCS#8 format.

It provides a *password* parameter for the encrypted PKCS#8 format, but this functionality is currently NOT implemented.

This function can import the RSA public key from a X.509 certificate.

Import from plain big numbers

This function can import the plain RSA key parameters N, e and d. The parameter d is optional and only required when importing a private key.

This function can import the plain RSA key factors p and q.

This function can import the plain RSA CRT (chinese remainder theorem) parameters $dP,\ dQ$ and qP.

After importing p, q, dP, dQ and qP the library can perfrom the optimized CRT calculations on private key operations.

Chapter 11

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

11.1 Background

Diffie-Hellman was the original public key system proposed. The system is based upon the group structure of finite fields. For Diffie-Hellman a prime p is chosen and a "base" b such that $b^x \pmod{p}$ generates a large sub-group of prime order (for unique values of x).

A secret key is an exponent x and a public key is the value of $y \equiv g^x \pmod{p}$. The term "discrete logarithm" denotes the action of finding x given only y, g and p. The key exchange part of Diffie-Hellman arises from the fact that two users A and B with keys (A_x, A_y) and (B_x, B_y) can exchange a shared key $K \equiv B_y^{A_x} \equiv A_y^{B_x} \equiv g^{A_x B_x} \pmod{p}$. From this public encryption and signatures can be developed. The trivial way to encrypt (for

From this public encryption and signatures can be developed. The trivial way to encrypt (for example) using a public key y is to perform the key exchange offline. The sender invents a key k and its public copy $k' \equiv g^k \pmod{p}$ and uses $K \equiv k'^{A_x} \pmod{p}$ as a key to encrypt the message with. Typically K would be sent to a one-way hash and the message digested used as a key in a symmetric cipher.

It is important that the order of the sub-group that g generates not only be large but also prime. There are discrete logarithm algorithms that take \sqrt{r} time given the order r. The discrete logarithm can be computed modulo each prime factor of r and the results combined using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. In the cases where r is "B-Smooth" (e.g. all small factors or powers of small prime factors) the solution is trivial to find.

To thwart such attacks the primes and bases in the library have been designed and fixed. Given a prime p the order of the sub-group generated is a large prime namely $\frac{p-1}{2}$. Such primes are known as "strong primes" and the smaller prime (e.g. the order of the base) are known as Sophie-Germaine primes.

11.2 Core Functions

This library also provides core Diffie-Hellman functions so you can negotiate keys over insecure mediums. The routines provided are relatively easy to use and only take two function calls to negotiate a shared key. There is a structure called "dh_key" which stores the Diffie-Hellman key in a format these routines can use. The first set of routines are to make a Diffie-Hellman private key

pair:

```
int dh_set_pg_groupsize(int groupsize, dh_key *key);
int dh_generate_key(prng_state *prng, int wprng, dh_key *key);
```

The "groupsize" is the size of the modulus you want in bytes. Currently support sizes are 96 to 1024 bytes which correspond to key sizes of 768 to 8192 bits. The smaller the key the faster it is to use however it will be less secure. When specifying a size not explicitly supported by the library it will round up to the next key size. If the size is above 512 it will return an error. So if you pass "groupsize == 32" it will use a 768 bit key but if you pass "groupsize == 20000" it will return an error. The primes and generators used are built-into the library and were designed to meet very specific goals. The primes are strong primes which means that if p is the prime then p-1 is equal to 2r where r is a large prime. The bases are chosen to generate a group of order r to prevent leaking a bit of the key. This means the bases generate a very large prime order group which is good to make cryptanalysis hard.

The next two routines are for exporting/importing Diffie-Hellman keys in/from DER encoded ASN.1. This is useful for transport over communication mediums.

```
int dh_export(unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen,
              int type, dh_key *key);
int dh_import(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, dh_key *key);
  The ASN.1 sequence used to represent a DH key is as following:
DiffieHellmanKey ::= SEQUENCE {
      version Version,
      flags
              Flags,
              INTEGER, -- prime
      p
              INTEGER, -- base/group
      g
              INTEGER -- either x when private key or y when public key }
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
         ::= BIT STRING {
                      (0) -- this BIT is '1' if it's a private key
      privateKey
                                      or '0' if it's a public key
}
```

These two functions work just like the "rsa_export()" and "rsa_import()" functions except these work with Diffie-Hellman keys. Its important to note you do not have to free the ram for a "dh_key" if an import fails.

You can free a "dh_key" using:

```
void dh_free(dh_key *key);
```

After you have exported a copy of your public key (using **PK_PUBLIC** as "type") you can now create a shared secret with the other user using:

Where "private_key" is the key you made and "public_key" is the copy of the public key the other user sent you. The result goes into "out" and the length into "outlen". If all went correctly the data in "out" should be identical for both parties. It is important to note that the two keys have to be the same size in order for this to work. There is a function to get the size of a key:

```
int dh_get_groupsize(dh_key *key);
```

This returns the size in bytes of the modulus chosen for that key.

11.3 Other Diffie-Hellman Functions

To be able to import Diffie-Hellman keys LibTomCrypt provides several API functions.

To import the prime and group from binary format:

This sets the prime p of length plen and the generator/base q of length plen in the DH key key.

To import the prime and group from an ASN.1 encoded DHparam Sequence:

```
int dh_set_pg_dhparam(const unsigned char *dhparam, unsigned long dhparamlen, dh_key *key);
```

This sets the parameters in *dhparam* of *dhparamlen* in the DH key key.

To import a private or public key from binary data:

```
int dh_set_key(const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen, int type, dh_key *key);
```

This will import, depending on *type* which can be either *PK_PRIVATE* or *PK_PUBLIC*, the according part of the DH key *key* from *in* of length *inlen*. After import the key will be verified and in case of an error it will be free'd.

11.4 Remarks on Usage

Its important that you hash the shared key before trying to use it as a key for a symmetric cipher or something. An example program that communicates over sockets, using MD5 and 1024-bit DH keys is¹:

¹This function is a small example. It is suggested that proper packaging be used. For example, if the public key sent is truncated these routines will not detect that.

```
int establish_secure_socket(int sock, int mode, unsigned char *key,
                            prng_state *prng, int wprng)
  unsigned char buf[4096], buf2[4096];
  unsigned long x, len;
  int res, err, inlen;
  dh_key mykey, theirkey;
   /* make up our private key */
  if ((err = dh_set_pg_groupsize(128, &mykey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     return err;
  }
  if ((err = dh_generate_key(prng, wprng, &mykey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
  }
  /* export our key as public */
  x = sizeof(buf);
  if ((err = dh_export(buf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, &mykey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     res = err;
      goto done2;
  }
  if (mode == 0) {
      /* mode 0 so we send first */
      if (send(sock, buf, x, 0) != x) {
        res = CRYPT_ERROR;
        goto done2;
     }
      /* get their key */
     if ((inlen = recv(sock, buf2, sizeof(buf2), 0)) <= 0) {</pre>
        res = CRYPT_ERROR;
         goto done2;
     }
  } else {
      /* mode >0 so we send second */
     if ((inlen = recv(sock, buf2, sizeof(buf2), 0)) <= 0) {</pre>
        res = CRYPT_ERROR;
         goto done2;
     }
      if (send(sock, buf, x, 0) != x) {
        res = CRYPT_ERROR;
         goto done2;
     }
   if ((err = dh_import(buf2, inlen, &theirkey)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      res = err;
```

```
goto done2;
  }
   /* make shared secret */
  x = sizeof(buf);
  if ((err = dh_shared_secret(&mykey, &theirkey, buf, &x)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     res = err;
      goto done;
   /* hash it */
                    /* default is MD5 so "key" must be at least 16 bytes long */
  len = 16;
   if ((err = hash_memory(find_hash("md5"), buf, x, key, &len)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     res = err;
      goto done;
   /* clean up and return */
  res = CRYPT_OK;
done:
   dh_free(&theirkey);
   dh_free(&mykey);
   zeromem(buf, sizeof(buf));
  zeromem(buf2, sizeof(buf2));
   return res;
}
```

11.4.1 Remarks on The Snippet

When the above code snippet is done (assuming all went well) there will be a shared 128-bit key in the "key" array passed to "establish_secure_socket()".

Chapter 12

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

12.1 Background

The library provides a set of core ECC functions as well that are designed to be the Elliptic Curve analogy of all of the Diffie-Hellman routines in the previous chapter. Elliptic curves (of certain forms) have the benefit that they are harder to attack (no sub-exponential attacks exist unlike normal DH crypto) in fact the fastest attack requires the square root of the order of the base point in time. That means if you use a base point of order 2^{192} (which would represent a 192-bit key) then the work factor is 2^{96} in order to find the secret key.

The curves in this library are taken from the following website:

http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/dss.htm

As of v1.15 three new curves from the SECG standards are also included they are the secp112r1, secp128r1, and secp160r1 curves. These curves were added to support smaller devices which do not need as large keys for security.

They are all curves over the integers modulo a prime. The curves have the basic equation that is:

$$y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b \pmod{p} \tag{12.1}$$

The variable b is chosen such that the number of points is nearly maximal. In fact the order of the base points β provided are very close to p that is $||\varphi(\beta)|| \sim ||p||$. The curves range in order from $\sim 2^{112}$ points to $\sim 2^{521}$. According to the source document any key size greater than or equal to 256-bits is sufficient for long term security.

12.2 Fixed Point Optimizations

As of v1.12 of LibTomCrypt, support for Fixed Point ECC point multiplication has been added. It is a generic optimization that is supported by any conforming math plugin. It is enabled by defining MECC_FP during the build, such as

CFLAGS="-DTFM_DESC -DMECC_FP" make

which will build LTC using the TFM math library and enabling this new feature. The feature is not enabled by default as it is **NOT** thread safe (by default). It supports the LTC locking macros (such as by enabling LTC_PTHREAD), but by default is not locked.

The optimization works by using a Fixed Point multiplier on any base point you use twice or more in a short period of time. It has a limited size cache (of FP_ENTRIES entries) which it uses to hold recent bases passed to $ltc_ecc_mulmod()$. Any base detected to be used twice is sent through the pre-computation phase, and then the fixed point algorithm can be used. For example, if you use a NIST base point twice in a row, the 2^{nd} and all subsequent point multiplications with that point will use the faster algorithm.

The optimization uses a window on the multiplicand of FP_LUT bits (default: 8, min: 2, max: 12), and this controls the memory/time trade-off. The larger the value the faster the algorithm will be but the more memory it will take. The memory usage is $3 \cdot 2^{FP_LUT}$ integers which by default with TFM amounts to about 400kB of memory. Tuning TFM (by changing FP_SIZE) can decrease the usage by a fair amount. Memory is only used by a cache entry if it is active. Both FP_ENTRIES and FP_LUT are definable on the command line if you wish to override them. For instance,

```
CFLAGS="-DTFM_DESC -DMECC_FP -DFP_ENTRIES=8 -DFP_LUT=6" make
```

would define a window of 6 bits and limit the cache to 8 entries. Generally, it is better to first tune TFM by adjusting FP_SIZE (from tfm.h). It defaults to 4096 bits (512 bytes) which is way more than what is required by ECC. At most, you need 1152 bits to accommodate ECC-521. If you're only using (say) ECC-256 you will only need 576 bits, which would reduce the memory usage by 700%.

12.3 Key Format

LibTomCrypt uses a unique format for ECC public and private keys. While ANSI X9.63 partially specifies key formats, it does it in a less than ideally simple manner. In the case of LibTomCrypt, it is meant solely for NIST and SECG GF(p) curves. The format of the keys is as follows:

```
ECCPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
                BIT STRING(0), -- public/private flag (always zero),
    flags
    keySize
                 INTEGER,
                                -- Curve size (in bits) divided by eight
                                -- and rounded down, e.g. 521 \Rightarrow 65
    pubkey.x
                 INTEGER,
                                -- The X co-ordinate of the public key point
                                -- The Y co-ordinate of the public key point
    pubkey.y
                 INTEGER,
ECCPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
                BIT STRING(1), -- public/private flag (always one),
    flags
                 INTEGER,
                                -- Curve size (in bits) divided by eight
    keySize
                                -- and rounded down, e.g. 521 \Rightarrow 65
                                -- The X co-ordinate of the public key point
    pubkey.x
                 INTEGER,
    pubkey.y
                 INTEGER,
                                -- The Y co-ordinate of the public key point
                 INTEGER,
                                -- The secret key scalar
    secret.k
}
```

The first flags bit denotes whether the key is public (zero) or private (one).

12.4 ECC Curve Parameters

The library uses the following structure to describe an elliptic curve. This is used internally, as well as by the new extended ECC functions which allow the user to specify their own curves.

```
/** Structure defines a NIST GF(p) curve */
typedef struct {
   /** The size of the curve in octets */
   int size;
   /** name of curve */
   char *name;
   /** The prime that defines the field (encoded in hex) */
   char *prime;
  /** The fields B param (hex) */
   char *B;
  /** The order of the curve (hex) */
  char *order;
  /** The x co-ordinate of the base point on the curve (hex) */
   char *Gx;
   /** The y co-ordinate of the base point on the curve (hex) */
   char *Gv;
} ltc_ecc_set_type;
```

The curve must be of the form $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b$, and all of the integer parameters are encoded in hexadecimal format.

12.5 Core Functions

12.5.1 ECC Key Generation

There is a key structure called *ecc_key* used by the ECC functions. There is a function to make a key:

The *keysize* is the size of the modulus in bytes desired. Currently directly supported values are 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 48, and 65 bytes which correspond to key sizes of 112, 128, 160, 192, 224, 256, 384, and 521 bits respectively. If you pass a key size that is between any key size it will round the keysize up to the next available one.

The function will free any internally allocated resources if there is an error.

12.5.2 Extended Key Generation

As of v1.16, the library supports an extended key generation routine which allows the user to specify their own curve. It is specified as follows:

This function generates a random ECC key over the curve specified by the parameters by dp. The rest of the parameters are equivalent to those from the original key generation function.

12.5.3 ECC Key Free

To free the memory allocated by a ecc_make_key(), ecc_make_key_ex(), ecc_import(), or ecc_import_ex() call use the following function:

```
void ecc_free(ecc_key *key);
```

12.5.4 ECC Key Export

To export an ECC key using the LibTomCrypt format call the following function:

This will export the key with the given type (PK_PUBLIC or PK_PRIVATE), and store it to out.

12.5.5 ECC Key Import

The following function imports a LibTomCrypt format ECC key:

This will import the ECC key from *in*, and store it in the ecc_key structure pointed to by *key*. If the operation fails it will free any allocated memory automatically.

12.5.6 Extended Key Import

The following function imports a LibTomCrypt format ECC key using a specified set of curve parameters:

12.5 Core Functions 107

This will import the key from the array pointed to by *in* of length *inlen* octets. The key is stored in the ECC structure pointed to by key. The curve is specified by the parameters pointed to by dp. The function will free all internally allocated memory upon error.

12.5.7 ANSI X9.63 Export

The following function exports an ECC public key in the ANSI X9.63 format:

The ECC key pointed to by *key* is exported in public fashion to the array pointed to by *out*. The ANSI X9.63 format used is from section 4.3.6 of the standard. It does not allow for the export of private keys.

12.5.8 ANSI X9.63 Import

The following function imports an ANSI X9.63 section 4.3.6 format public ECC key:

This will import the key stored in the array pointed to by *in* of length *inlen* octets. The imported key is stored in the ECC key pointed to by *key*. The function will free any allocated memory upon error.

12.5.9 Extended ANSI X9.63 Import

The following function allows the importing of an ANSI x9.63 section 4.3.6 format public ECC key using user specified domain parameters:

This will import the key stored in the array pointed to by in of length inlen octets using the domain parameters pointed to by dp. The imported key is stored in the ECC key pointed to by key. The function will free any allocated memory upon error.

12.5.10 ECC Shared Secret

To construct a Diffie-Hellman shared secret with a private and public ECC key, use the following function:

The $private_key$ is typically the local private key, and $public_key$ is the key the remote party has shared. Note: this function stores only the x co-ordinate of the shared elliptic point as described in ANSI X9.63 ECC-DH.

12.6 ECC Diffie-Hellman Encryption

ECC-DH Encryption is performed by producing a random key, hashing it, and XOR'ing the digest against the plaintext. It is not strictly ANSI X9.63 compliant but it is very similar. It has been extended by using an ASN.1 sequence and hash object identifiers to allow portable usage. The following function encrypts a short string (no longer than the message digest) using this technique:

12.6.1 ECC-DH Encryption

As the name implies this function encrypts a (symmetric) key, and is not intended for encrypting long messages directly. It will encrypt the plaintext in the array pointed to by *in* of length *inlen* octets. It uses the public ECC key pointed to by *key*, and hash algorithm indexed by *hash* to construct a shared secret which may be XOR'ed against the plaintext. The ciphertext is stored in the output buffer pointed to by *out* of length *outlen* octets.

The data is encrypted to the public ECC key such that only the holder of the private key can decrypt the payload. To have multiple recipients multiple call to this function for each public ECC key is required.

12.6.2 ECC-DH Decryption

This function will decrypt an encrypted payload. The *key* provided must be the private key corresponding to the public key used during encryption. If the wrong key is provided the function will not specifically return an error code. It is important to use some form of challenge response in that case (e.g. compute a MAC of a known string).

12.6.3 ECC Encryption Format

The packet format for the encrypted keys is the following ASN.1 SEQUENCE:

12.7 EC DSA Signatures

There are also functions to sign and verify messages. They use the ANSI X9.62 EC-DSA algorithm to generate and verify signatures in the ANSI X9.62 format.

12.7.1 EC-DSA Signature Generation

To sign a message digest (hash) use the following function:

This function will EC-DSA sign the message digest stored in the array pointed to by *in* of length *inlen* octets. The signature will be stored in the array pointed to by *out* of length *outlen* octets. The function requires a properly seeded PRNG, and the ECC *key* provided must be a private key.

This function creates the same EC-DSA signature as ecc_sign_hash only the output format is different. The format follows https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-3.4, sometimes it is also called plain signature.

12.7.2 EC-DSA Signature Verification

This function will verify the EC-DSA signature in the array pointed to by sig of length siglen octets, against the message digest pointed to by the array hash of length hashlen. It will store a non-zero value in stat if the signature is valid. Note: the function will not return an error if the signature is invalid. It will return an error, if the actual signature payload is an invalid format. The ECC key must be the public (or private) ECC key corresponding to the key that performed the signature. The function ecc_verify_hash implements signature format according to X9.62 EC-DSA, and the output is compliant for GF(p) curves.

This function validate the EC-DSA signature as *ecc_verify_hash* only the signature input format follows https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-3.4.

12.8 ECC Keysizes

With ECC if you try to sign a hash that is bigger than your ECC key you can run into problems. The math will still work, and in effect the signature will still work. With ECC keys the strength of the signature is limited by the size of the hash, or the size of they key, whichever is smaller. For example, if you sign with SHA256 and an ECC-192 key, you in effect have 96-bits of security.

The library will not warn you if you make this mistake, so it is important to check yourself before using the signatures.

Chapter 13

Digital Signature Algorithm

13.1 Introduction

The Digital Signature Algorithm (or DSA) is a variant of the ElGamal Signature scheme which has been modified to reduce the bandwidth of the signatures. For example, to have 80-bits of security with ElGamal, you need a group with an order of at least 1024-bits. With DSA, you need a group of order at least 160-bits. By comparison, the ElGamal signature would require at least 256 bytes of storage, whereas the DSA signature would require only at least 40 bytes.

13.2 Key Format

Since no useful public standard for DSA key storage was presented to me during the course of this development I made my own ASN.1 SEQUENCE which I document now so that others can interoperate with this library.

```
DSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    publicFlags
                   BIT STRING(0), -- must be 0
                   INTEGER
                                 , -- base generator
                                   -- check that g^q mod p == 1
                                   -- and that 1 < g < p - 1
                   INTEGER
                                 , -- prime modulus
    p
                                 , -- order of sub-group
                   INTEGER
                                   -- (must be prime)
                   INTEGER
                                 , -- public key, specifically,
    У
                                   -- g^x mod p,
                                  -- check that y^q mod p == 1
                                   -- and that 1 < y < p - 1
}
DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    publicFlags
                   BIT STRING(1), -- must be 1
                   INTEGER
                                 , -- base generator
```

```
-- check that g^q mod p == 1
                                   -- and that 1 < g < p - 1
                    INTEGER
                                   -- prime modulus
    p
                   INTEGER
                                   -- order of sub-group
    q
                                   -- (must be prime)
                    INTEGER
                                   -- public key, specifically,
    У
                                   -- g^x mod p,
                                   -- check that y^q \mod p == 1
                                   -- and that 1 < y < p - 1
                    INTEGER
                                   -- private key
    X
}
```

The leading BIT STRING has a single bit in it which is zero for public keys and one for private keys. This makes the structure uniquely decodable, and easy to work with.

13.3 Key Generation

To make a DSA key you must call the following function

The variable prng is an active PRNG state and wprng the index to the descriptor. $group_size$ and $modulus_size$ control the difficulty of forging a signature. Both parameters are in bytes. The larger the $group_size$ the more difficult a forgery becomes upto a limit. The value of $group_size$ is limited by $15 < group_size < 1024$ and $modulus_size - group_size < 512$. Suggested values for the pairs are as follows.

Bits of Security	group_size	$modulus_size$
80	20	128
120	30	256
140	35	384
160	40	512

Figure 13.1: DSA Key Sizes

When you are finished with a DSA key you can call the following function to free the memory used.

```
void dsa_free(dsa_key *key);
```

13.4 Key Verification

Each DSA key is composed of the following variables.

13.5 Signatures 113

- 1. q a small prime of magnitude 256^{group_size} .
- 2. p = qr + 1 a large prime of magnitude $256^{modulus_size}$ where r is a random even integer.
- 3. $g = h^r \pmod{p}$ a generator of order q modulo p. h can be any non-trivial random value. For this library they start at h = 2 and step until q is not 1.
- 4. x a random secret (the secret key) in the range 1 < x < q
- 5. $y = g^x \pmod{p}$ the public key.

A DSA key is considered valid if it passes all of the following tests.

- 1. q must be prime.
- 2. p must be prime.
- 3. g cannot be one of $\{-1,0,1\}$ (modulo p).
- 4. g must be less than p.
- 5. $(p-1) \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$.
- 6. $g^q \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.
- 7. 1 < y < p 1
- 8. $y^q \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.

Tests one and two ensure that the values will at least form a field which is required for the signatures to function. Tests three and four ensure that the generator g is not set to a trivial value which would make signature forgery easier. Test five ensures that q divides the order of multiplicative sub-group of $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. Test six ensures that the generator actually generates a prime order group. Tests seven and eight ensure that the public key is within range and belongs to a group of prime order. Note that test eight does not prove that g generated g only that g belongs to a multiplicative sub-group of order g.

The following function will perform these tests.

```
int dsa_verify_key(dsa_key *key, int *stat);
```

This will test key and store the result in stat. If the result is stat = 0 the DSA key failed one of the tests and should not be used at all. If the result is stat = 1 the DSA key is valid (as far as valid mathematics are concerned).

13.5 Signatures

13.5.1 Signature Generation

To generate a DSA signature call the following function:

Which will sign the data in *in* of length *inlen* bytes. The signature is stored in *out* and the size of the signature in *outlen*. If the signature is longer than the size you initially specify in *outlen* nothing is stored and the function returns an error code. The DSA *key* must be of the **PK_PRIVATE** persuasion.

13.5.2 Signature Verification

To verify a hash created with that function use the following function:

Which will verify the data in *hash* of length *inlen* against the signature stored in *sig* of length *siglen*. It will set *stat* to 1 if the signature is valid, otherwise it sets *stat* to 0.

13.6 DSA Encrypt and Decrypt

As of version 1.07, the DSA keys can be used to encrypt and decrypt small payloads. It works similar to the ECC encryption where a shared key is computed, and the hash of the shared key XOR'ed against the plaintext forms the ciphertext. The format used is functional port of the ECC encryption format to the DSA algorithm.

13.6.1 DSA Encryption

This function will encrypt a small payload with a recipients public DSA key.

This will encrypt the payload in *in* of length *inlen* and store the ciphertext in the output buffer out. The length of the ciphertext outlen must be originally set to the length of the output buffer. The DSA key can be a public key.

13.6.2 DSA Decryption

This will decrypt the ciphertext *in* of length *inlen*, and store the original payload in *out* of length *outlen*. The DSA *key* must be a private key.

13.7 DSA Key Import and Export

13.7.1 DSA Key Export

To export a DSA key so that it can be transported use the following function:

This will export the DSA key to the buffer out and set the length in outlen (which must have been previously initialized to the maximum buffer size). The type variable may be either **PK_PRIVATE** or **PK_PUBLIC** depending on whether you want to export a private or public copy of the DSA key.

13.7.2 DSA Key Import

To import an exported DSA key use the following function:

This will import the DSA key from the buffer in of length inlen to the key. If the process fails the function will automatically free all of the heap allocated in the process (you don't have to call $dsa_free()$).

13.8 Other DSA Functions

The following functions allow to create a DSA key in 2 steps:

1. Load or generate p, q, q part of the key via $dsa_set_pqq()$, $dsa_set_pqq_dsaparam()$ or $dsa_generate_pqq()$.

2. Load or generate the actual DSA key – private (x and y value) or public (y value).

This will initialise the p, q and g part of key structure by directly loading binary representation of p (with length of plen), q (with length of qlen) and g (with length of glen). A simple DSA key validity check (without primality testing) is performed at the end of this function.

This will initialise the p, q and g part of key structure by directly loading binary representation of DSA parameters stored as a binary data in a buffer dsaparam (with length of dsaparamlen). A simple DSA key validity check (without primality testing) is performed at the end of this function. The dsaparam can be generated via:

```
openssl dsaparam 2048 -outform DER -out dsaparam.der
```

This will initialise the p, q and g part of key structure with newly generated random values. As for the parameters they are the same as by dsa_make_key .

This function can be used for setting the actual DSA key. If type is $PK_PRIVATE$ then the buffer in (with length of inlen) contains a binary representation of x part of the key (the public part y is computed). If type is PK_PUBLIC then the buffer in contains a binary representation of y part of the key.

This function generates a private DSA key containing both x and y parts.

Chapter 14

Standards Support

14.1 ASN.1 Formats

LibTomCrypt supports a variety of ASN.1 data types encoded with the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) suitable for various cryptographic protocols. The data types are all provided with three basic functions with *similar* prototypes. One function has been dedicated to calculate the length in octets of a given format, and two functions have been dedicated to encoding and decoding the format.

On top of the basic data types are the SEQUENCE and SET data types which are collections of other ASN.1 types. They are provided in the same manner as the other data types except they use list of objects known as the ltc_asn1_list structure. It is defined as the following:

The type field is one of the following ASN.1 field definitions. The data pointer is a void pointer to the data to be encoded (or the destination) and the size field is specific to what you are encoding (e.g. number of bits in the BIT STRING data type). The used field is primarily for the CHOICE decoder and reflects if the particular member of a list was the decoded data type. To help build the lists in an orderly fashion the macro LTC_SET_ASN1(list, index, Type, Data, Size) has been provided.

It will assign to the *index*th position in the *list* the triplet (Type, Data, Size). An example usage would be:

```
ltc_asn1_list sequence[3];
unsigned long three=3;
```

```
LTC_SET_ASN1(sequence, 0, LTC_ASN1_IA5_STRING, "hello", 5);
LTC_SET_ASN1(sequence, 1, LTC_ASN1_SHORT_INTEGER, &three, 1);
LTC_SET_ASN1(sequence, 2, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0);
```

The macro is relatively safe with respect to modifying variables, for instance the following code is equivalent.

```
...
ltc_asn1_list sequence[3];
unsigned long three=3;
int x=0;
LTC_SET_ASN1(sequence, x++, LTC_ASN1_IA5_STRING, "hello", 5);
LTC_SET_ASN1(sequence, x++, LTC_ASN1_SHORT_INTEGER, &three, 1);
LTC_SET_ASN1(sequence, x++, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0);
```

Definition	ASN.1 Type	
LTC_ASN1_EOL	End of a ASN.1 list structure.	
LTC_ASN1_BOOLEAN	BOOLEAN type	
LTC_ASN1_INTEGER	INTEGER (uses mp_int)	
LTC_ASN1_SHORT_INTEGER	INTEGER (32-bit using unsigned long)	
LTC_ASN1_BIT_STRING	BIT STRING (one bit per char)	
LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING	OCTET STRING (one octet per char)	
LTC_ASN1_NULL	NULL	
LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER	OBJECT IDENTIFIER	
LTC_ASN1_IA5_STRING	IA5 STRING (one octet per char)	
LTC_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING	PRINTABLE STRING (one octet per char)	
LTC_ASN1_UTF8_STRING	UTF8 STRING (one wchar_t per char)	
LTC_ASN1_UTCTIME	UTCTIME (see ltc_utctime structure)	
LTC_ASN1_CHOICE	CHOICE	
LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE	SEQUENCE (and SEQUENCE OF)	
LTC_ASN1_SET	SET	
LTC_ASN1_SETOF	SET OF	
LTC_ASN1_RAW_BIT_STRING	BIT STRING (one octet per char)	
LTC_ASN1_TELETEX_STRING	TELETEX STRING (one octet per char)	
LTC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED	A constructed type that is not SEQUENCE or SET	
LTC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC	A context-specific type	
LTC_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME	GeneralizedTime (see ltc_generalizedtime structure)	

Figure 14.1: List of ASN.1 Supported Types

14.1.1 SEQUENCE Type

The SEQUENCE data type is a collection of other ASN.1 data types encapsulated with a small header which is a useful way of sending multiple data types in one packet.

14.1 ASN.1 Formats 119

SEQUENCE Encoding

To encode a sequence a ltc_asn1_list array must be initialized with the members of the sequence and their respective pointers. The encoding is performed with the following function.

This encodes a sequence of items pointed to by *list* where the list has *inlen* items in it. The SEQUENCE will be encoded to *out* and of length *outlen*. The function will terminate when it reads all the items out of the list (upto *inlen*) or it encounters an item in the list with a type of LTC_ASN1_EOL.

The data pointer in the list would be the same pointer you would pass to the respective ASN.1 encoder (e.g. der_encode_bit_string()) and it is simply passed on verbatim to the dependent encoder. The list can contain other SEQUENCE or SET types which enables you to have nested SEQUENCE and SET definitions. In these cases the data pointer is simply a pointer to another ltc_asn1_list.

SEQUENCE Decoding

Decoding a SEQUENCE is similar to encoding. You set up an array of **ltc_asn1_list** where in this case the *size* member is the maximum size (in certain cases). For types such as IA5 STRING, BIT STRING, OCTET STRING (etc) the *size* field is updated after successful decoding to reflect how many units of the respective type has been loaded.

This will decode upto *outlen* items from the input buffer *in* of length *inlen* octets. The function will stop (gracefully) when it runs out of items to decode. It will fail (for among other reasons) when it runs out of input bytes to read, a data type is invalid or a heap failure occurred.

For the following types the *size* field will be updated to reflect the number of units read of the given type.

- 1. BIT STRING
- 2. OCTET STRING
- 3. OBJECT IDENTIFIER
- 4. IA5 STRING
- 5. PRINTABLE STRING

SEQUENCE Length

The length of a SEQUENCE can be determined with the following function.

This will get the encoding size for the given list of length inlen and store it in outlen.

SEQUENCE Multiple Argument Lists

For small or simple sequences an encoding or decoding can be performed with one of the following two functions.

These either encode or decode (respectively) a SEQUENCE data type where the items in the sequence are specified after the length parameter.

The list of items are specified as a triple of the form (type, size, data) where type is an **int**, size is a **unsigned long** and data is **void** pointer. The list of items must be terminated with an item with the type LTC_ASN1_EOL.

It is ideal that you cast the *size* values to unsigned long to ensure that the proper data type is passed to the function. Constants such as 1 without a cast or prototype are of type **int** by default. Appending *UL* or pre-pending *(unsigned long)* is enough to cast it to the correct type.

This example encodes a SEQUENCE with two IA5 STRING types containing "Hello" and "World!" respectively. Note the usage of the **UL** modifier on the size parameters. This forces the compiler to pass the numbers as the required **unsigned long** type that the function expects.

14.1 ASN.1 Formats 121

14.1.2 SET and SET OF

SET and SET OF are related to the SEQUENCE type in that they can be pretty much be decoded with the same code. However, they are different, and they should be carefully noted. The SET type is an unordered array of ASN.1 types sorted by the TAG (type identifier), whereas the SET OF type is an ordered array of a **single** ASN.1 object sorted in ascending order by the DER their respective encodings.

SET Encoding

SETs use the same array structure of ltc_asn1_list that the SEQUENCE functions use. They are encoded with the following function:

This will encode the list of ASN.1 objects in *list* of length *inlen* objects, and store the output in *out* of length *outlen* bytes. The function will make a copy of the list provided, and sort it by the TAG. Objects with identical TAGs are additionally sorted on their original placement in the array (to make the process deterministic).

This function will **NOT** recognize DEFAULT objects, and it is the responsibility of the caller to remove them as required.

SET Decoding

The SET type can be decoded with the following function.

This will decode the SET specified by list of length outlen objects from the input buffer in of length inlen octets.

It handles the fact that SETs are not strictly ordered and will make multiple passes (as required) through the list to decode all the objects.

SET Length

The length of a SET can be determined by calling der_length_sequence() since they have the same encoding length.

SET OF Encoding

A SET OF object is an array of identical objects (e.g. OCTET STRING) sorted in ascending order by the DER encoding of the object. They are used to store objects deterministically based solely on their encoding. It uses the same array structure of ltc_asn1_list that the SEQUENCE functions use. They are encoded with the following function.

This will encode a SET OF containing the list of inlen ASN.1 objects and store the encoding in the output buffer out of length outlen.

The routine will first encode the SET OF in an unordered fashion (in a temporary buffer) then sort using the XQSORT macro and copy back to the output buffer. This means you need at least enough memory to keep an additional copy of the output on the heap.

SET OF Decoding

Since the decoding of a SET OF object is unambiguous it can be decoded with der_decode_sequence().

SET OF Length

Like the SET type the der_length_sequence() function can be used to determine the length of a SET OF object.

14.1.3 **ASN.1 INTEGER**

To encode or decode INTEGER data types use the following functions.

These will encode or decode a signed INTEGER data type using the bignum data type to store the large INTEGER. To encode smaller values without allocating a bignum to store the value, the *short* INTEGER functions were made available.

14.1 ASN.1 Formats 123

These will encode or decode an unsigned **unsigned long** type (only reads upto 32-bits). For values in the range $0...2^{32} - 1$ the integer and short integer functions can encode and decode each others outputs.

14.1.4 ASN.1 BIT STRING

These will encode or decode a BIT STRING data type. The bits are passed in (or read out) using one **char** per bit. A non–zero value will be interpreted as a one bit, and a zero value a zero bit.

14.1.5 ASN.1 RAW BIT STRING

These will encode or decode a BIT STRING data type. The bits are passed in (or read out) using one **unsigned char** per 8 bit.

This function differs from the normal BIT STRING, as it can be used to directly process raw binary data and store it to resp. read it from an ASN.1 BIT STRING data type.

The length function is the same as for the normal BIT STRING der_length_bit_string().

14.1.6 ASN.1 OCTET STRING

These will encode or decode an OCTET STRING data type. The octets are stored using one **unsigned char** each.

14.1.7 ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER

These will encode or decode an OBJECT IDENTIFIER object. The words of the OID are stored in individual **unsigned long** elements, and must be in the range $0 cdots 2^{32} - 1$.

14.1.8 ASN.1 IA5 STRING

14.1 ASN.1 Formats 125

These will encode or decode an IA5 STRING. The characters are read or stored in individual char elements. These functions performs internal character to numerical conversions based on the conventions of the compiler being used. For instance, on an x86.32 machine 'A' == 65 but the same may not be true on say a SPARC machine. Internally, these functions have a table of literal characters and their numerical ASCII values. This provides a stable conversion provided that the build platform honours the run–time platforms character conventions.

14.1.9 ASN.1 TELETEX STRING

These will decode a TELETEX STRING. The characters are read in individual **char** elements. The internal structure is similar to that of the IA5 STRING implementation, to be able to provide a stable conversion independent of the build—and run—time platform.

14.1.10 ASN.1 PRINTABLE STRING

These will encode or decode an PRINTABLE STRING. The characters are read or stored in individual **char** elements. These functions performs internal character to numerical conversions based on the conventions of the compiler being used. For instance, on an x86_32 machine 'A' == 65 but the same may not be true on say a SPARC machine. Internally, these functions have a table of literal characters and their numerical ASCII values. This provides a stable conversion provided that the build platform honours the run-time platforms character conventions.

14.1.11 ASN.1 UTF8 STRING

```
int der_encode_utf8_string(const wchar_t *in,
```

These will encode or decode an UTF8 STRING. The characters are read or stored in individual wchar_t elements. These function performs no internal mapping and treat the characters as literals.

These functions use the **wchar_t** type which is not universally available. In those cases, the library will typedef it to **unsigned long**. If you intend to use the ISO C functions for working with wide–char arrays, you should make sure that wchar_t has been defined previously.

14.1.12 ASN.1 UTCTIME

The UTCTIME type is to store a date and time in ASN.1 format. It uses the following structure to organize the time.

The time can be offset plus or minus a set amount of hours (off_hh) and minutes (off_mm). When off_dir is zero, the time will be added otherwise it will be subtracted. For instance, the array $\{5, 6, 20, 22, 4, 00, 0, 5, 0\}$ represents the current time of 2005, June 20th, 22:04:00 with a time offset of +05h00.

14.1 ASN.1 Formats 127

The encoder will store time in one of the two ASN.1 formats, either YYMMDDhhmmssZ or $YYMMDDhhmmss\pm hhmm$, and perform minimal error checking on the input. The decoder will read all valid ASN.1 formats and perform range checking on the values (not complete but rational) useful for catching packet errors.

It is suggested that decoded data be further scrutinized (e.g. days of month in particular).

14.1.13 ASN.1 GeneralizedTime

The GeneralizedTime type is to store a date and time in ASN.1 format. It uses the following structure to organize the time.

```
typedef struct {
   unsigned YYYY, /* year
                                       0--9999 */
            MM, /* month
                                       1--12 */
            DD, /* day
                                       1--31 */
            hh, /* hour
                                       0--23 */
            mm, /* minute
                                       0--59 */
            ss, /* second
                                       0--59 */
            fs, /* fractional seconds 1--UINT_MAX */
            off_dir, /* timezone offset direction 0 == +, 1 == - */
            off_hh, /* timezone offset hours */
            off_mm; /* timezone offset minutes */
} ltc_generalizedtime;
```

The time can be offset plus or minus a set amount of hours (off_hh) and minutes (off_mm). When off_dir is zero, the time will be added otherwise it will be subtracted. For instance, the array $\{2005, 6, 20, 22, 4, 0, 122, 0, 5, 0\}$ represents the current time of 2005, $June\ 20th$, 22:04:00.122 with a time offset of +05h00.

The encoder will store time in one of the following ASN.1 formats, either YYYYMMDDhhmmssZ or $YYYYMMDDhhmmss\pm hhmm$ or YYYYMMDDhhmmss.fsZ or $YYYYMMDDhhmmss.fs\pm hhmm$, and perform minimal error checking on the input. The decoder will read all valid ASN.1 formats

and perform range checking on the values (not complete but rational) useful for catching packet errors

The fractional seconds are always added in case they are not 0. The implementation of fractional seconds is currently unreliable and you can't detect decoded resp. encode leading 0's (e.g. 20170424232717.005Z would be decoded as 22. April 2017, 23:27:17.5).

It is suggested that decoded data be further scrutinized (e.g. days of month in particular).

14.1.14 ASN.1 CHOICE

The CHOICE ASN.1 type represents a union of ASN.1 types all of which are stored in a *ltc_asn1_list*. There is no encoder for the CHOICE type, only a decoder. The decoder will scan through the provided list attempting to use the appropriate decoder on the input packet. The list can contain any ASN.1 data type¹ except for other CHOICE types.

There is no encoder for the CHOICE type as the actual DER encoding is the encoding of the chosen type.

This will decode the input in the *in* field of length *inlen*. It uses the provided ASN.1 list specified in the *list* field which has *outlen* elements. The *inlen* field will be updated with the length of the decoded data type, as well as the respective entry in the *list* field will have the *used* flag set to non–zero to reflect it was the data type decoded.

14.1.15 ASN.1 Flexi Decoder

The ASN.1 flexi decoder allows the developer to decode arbitrary ASN.1 DER packets (provided they use data types LibTomCrypt supports) without first knowing the structure of the data. Where der_decode_sequence() requires the developer to specify the data types to decode in advance the flexi decoder is entirely free form.

The flexi decoder uses the same ltc_asn1_list but instead of being stored in an array it uses the linked list pointers prev, next, parent and child. The list works as a doubly-linked list structure where decoded items at the same level are siblings (using next and prev) and items encoded in a SEQUENCE are stored as a child element.

When a SEQUENCE or SET has been encountered a SEQUENCE (or SET resp.) item will be added as a sibling (e.g. list.type == LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE) and the child pointer points to a new list of items contained within the object.

This will decode items in the *in* buffer of max input length *inlen* and store the newly created pointer to the list in *out*. This function allocates all required memory for the decoding. It stores the number of octets read back into *inlen*.

¹Except it cannot have LTC_ASN1_INTEGER and LTC_ASN1_SHORT_INTEGER simultaneously.

14.1 ASN.1 Formats 129

The function will terminate when either it hits an invalid ASN.1 tag, or it reads *inlen* octets. An early termination is a soft error, and returns normally. The decoded list *out* will point to the very first element of the list (e.g. both parent and prev pointers will be **NULL**).

An invalid decoding will terminate the process, and free the allocated memory automatically.

The flexi decoder calls itself when decoding a constructed type. This leads to a 'child process' that will terminate when it decodes an unkown/invalid identifier and leaves an allocated but uninitialized child element. However the parent processing will continue with a "soft-error". This can be detected by checking for *child* elements with type LTC_ASN1_EOL after decoding.

As of v1.18.0 the flexi decoder will also decode arbitrary constructed types other than SE-QUENCE and SET. The *type* field will be set to **LTC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED** and the plain identifier that was indicated in the ASN.1 encoding is stored in the *used* field. Further decoding is done in the same way as if it were a SEQUENCE or SET.

Also as of v1.18.0 the flexi decoder is capable to handle *context-specific* encodings. The *type* field will be set to LTC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC and the plain identifier that was indicated in the ASN.1 encoding is stored in the *used* field. Encapsulated data in the *context-specific* encoding is copied to newly allocated memory and is accessible through the *data* field.

Note: the list decoded by this function is **NOT** in the correct form for der_encode_sequence() to use directly. You will first have to convert the list by first storing all of the siblings in an array then storing all the children as sub-lists of a sequence using the .data pointer. Currently no function in LibTomCrypt provides this ability.

Sample Decoding

Suppose we decode the following structure:

```
User ::= SEQUENCE {
               IA5 STRING
   Name
   LoginToken
               SEQUENCE {
      passwdHash
                   OCTET STRING
      pubkey
                   ECCPublicKey
   }
   Last0n
               UTCTIME
}
and we decoded it with the following code:
unsigned char inbuf[MAXSIZE];
unsigned long inbuflen;
ltc_asn1_list *list;
int.
              err:
/* somehow fill inbuf/inbuflen */
if ((err = der_decode_sequence_flexi(inbuf, inbuflen, &list)) != CRYPT_OK) {
   printf("Error decoding: %s\n", error_to_string(err));
   exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
```

At this point *list* would point to the SEQUENCE identified by *User*. It would have no sibblings (prev or next), and only a child node. Walking to the child node with the following code will bring us to the *Name* portion of the SEQUENCE:

```
list = list->child;
```

Now *list* points to the *Name* member (with the tag IA5 STRING). The *data*, *size*, and *type* members of *list* should reflect that of an IA5 STRING. The sibbling will now be the *LoginToken* SEQUENCE. The sibbling has a child node which points to the *passwdHash* OCTET STRING. We can walk to this node with the following code:

```
/* list already pointing to 'Name' */
list = list->next->child;
```

At this point, *list* will point to the *passwdHash* member of the innermost SEQUENCE. This node has a sibbling, the *pubkey* member of the SEQUENCE. The *LastOn* member of the SEQUENCE is a sibbling of the LoginToken node, if we wanted to walk there we would have to go up and over via:

```
list = list->parent->next;
```

At this point, we are pointing to the last node of the list. Lists are terminated in all directions by a **NULL** pointer. All nodes are doubly linked so that you can walk up and down the nodes without keeping pointers lying around.

Shrink'ing a Flexi List

While decoding the flexi decoder will recursively decode an ASN.1 constructed type it will store the decoded list as well as the plain data that was decoded. To free up this additional data a shrink function is provided.

```
void der_sequence_shrink(ltc_asn1_list *in);
```

This will free all the plain constructed data, but keep the decoded list intact.

Free'ing a Flexi List

To free the list use the following function.

```
void der_sequence_free(ltc_asn1_list *in);
```

This will free all of the memory allocated by der_decode_sequence_flexi().

14.2 Password Based Cryptography

14.2.1 PKCS #5

In order to securely handle user passwords for the purposes of creating session keys and chaining IVs the PKCS #5 was drafted. PKCS #5 is made up of two algorithms, Algorithm One and Algorithm Two. Algorithm One is the older fairly limited algorithm which has been implemented for completeness. Algorithm Two is a bit more modern and more flexible to work with.

The OpenSSL project implemented an extension to Algorithm One that allows for arbitrary keylengths; we have a compatible implementation described below.

14.2.2 Algorithm One

Algorithm One accepts as input a password, an 8-byte salt, and an iteration counter. The iteration counter is meant to act as delay for people trying to brute force guess the password. The higher the iteration counter the longer the delay. This algorithm also requires a hash algorithm and produces an output no longer than the output of the hash.

Where password is the user's password. Since the algorithm allows binary passwords you must also specify the length in password_len. The salt is a fixed size 8-byte array which should be random for each user and session. The iteration_count is the delay desired on the password. The hash_idx is the index of the hash you wish to use in the descriptor table.

The output of length up to *outlen* is stored in *out*. If *outlen* is initially larger than the size of the hash functions output it is set to the number of bytes stored. If it is smaller than not all of the hash output is stored in *out*.

As above, but we generate as many bytes as requested in outlen per the OpenSSL extension to Algorithm One. If you are trying to be compatible with OpenSSL's EVP_BytesToKey() or the "openssl enc" command line (or variants such as perl's Crypt::CBC), then use this function with MD5 as your hash (ick!) and iteration_count=1 (double-ick!!).

14.2.3 Algorithm Two

Algorithm Two is the recommended algorithm for this task. It allows variable length salts, and can produce outputs larger than the hash functions output. As such, it can easily be used to derive session keys for ciphers and MACs as well initialization vectors as required from a single password and invocation of this algorithm.

```
int hash_idx,
unsigned char *out,
unsigned long *outlen)
```

Where password is the users password. Since the algorithm allows binary passwords you must also specify the length in password_len. The salt is an array of size salt_len. It should be random for each user and session. The iteration_count is the delay desired on the password. The hash_idx is the index of the hash you wish to use in the descriptor table. The output of length up to outlen is stored in out.

```
/* demo to show how to make session state material
 * from a password */
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
    unsigned char password[100], salt[100],
                  cipher_key[16], cipher_iv[16],
                  mac_key[16], outbuf[48];
                  err, hash_idx;
    int
    unsigned long outlen, password_len, salt_len;
    /* register hash and get it's idx .... */
    /* get users password and make up a salt ... */
    /* create the material (100 iterations in algorithm) */
    outlen = sizeof(outbuf);
    if ((err = pkcs_5_alg2(password, password_len, salt,
                           salt_len, 100, hash_idx, outbuf,
                           &outlen))
       != CRYPT_OK) {
       /* error handle */
    }
    /* now extract it */
    memcpy(cipher_key, outbuf, 16);
    memcpy(cipher_iv, outbuf+16, 16);
    memcpy(mac_key,
                       outbuf+32, 16);
    /* use material (recall to store the salt in the output) */
}
```

14.3 Key Derviation Functions

14.3.1 HKDF

A key derivation function (KDF) is a basic and essential component of cryptographic systems. Its goal is to take some source of initial keying material and derive from it one or more cryptographically strong secret keys.

HKDF follows the "extract-then-expand" paradigm, where the KDF logically consists of two modules. The first stage takes the input keying material and "extracts" from it a fixed-length pseudorandom key K. The second stage "expands" the key K into several additional pseudorandom keys (the output of the KDF).

In many applications, the input keying material is not necessarily distributed uniformly, and the attacker may have some partial knowledge about it (for example, a Diffie-Hellman value computed by a key exchange protocol) or even partial control of it (as in some entropy-gathering applications). Thus, the goal of the "extract" stage is to "concentrate" the possibly dispersed entropy of the input keying material into a short, but cryptographically strong, pseudorandom key. In some applications, the input may already be a good pseudorandom key; in these cases, the "extract" stage is not necessary, and the "expand" part can be used alone.

The second stage "expands" the pseudorandom key to the desired length; the number and lengths of the output keys depend on the specific cryptographic algorithms for which the keys are needed.

14.3.2 HKDF Extract

To perform the extraction phase, use the following function:

```
int hkdf_extract( int hash_idx,
    const unsigned char *salt,
        unsigned long saltlen,
    const unsigned char *in,
        unsigned long inlen,
        unsigned char *out,
        unsigned long *outlen);
```

The hash_idx parameter is the index into the descriptor table of the hash you want to use. The salt parameter is a pointer to the array of octets of length saltlen containing the salt or a NULL pointer if a salt is not being used (in that case set saltlen to 0). in is a pointer to an array of octets of length inlen containing the source entropy. The extracted output is stored in the location pointed to by out. You must set outlen to the size of the destination buffer before calling this function. It is updated to the length of the extracted output. If outlen is too small the extracted output will be truncated

While the salt is optional, using one improves HKDF's security. If used, the salt should be randomly chosen, but does not need to be secret and may be re-used. Please see RFC5869 section 3.1 for more details.

14.3.3 HKDF Expand

To perform the expansion phase, use the following function:

```
int hkdf_expand(    int hash_idx,
    const unsigned char *info,
        unsigned long infolen,
    const unsigned char *in,
        unsigned long inlen,
        unsigned char *out,
        unsigned long outlen);
```

The hash_idx parameter is the index into the descriptor table of the hash you want to use. The info parameter, an array of octets of length infolen, is an optional parameter (set info to NULL and infolen to 0 if not using it) which may be used to bind the derived keys to some application and context specific information. This prevents the same keying material from being generated in different contexts. Please see RFC5869 section 3.2 for more information. The extracted keying material is passed as octet array in of length inlen. Expanded output of length outlen is generated and stored in octet arrat out.

14.3.4 HKDF Extract-and-Expand

To perform both phases together, use the following function:

Parameters are as in $hkdf_{-}extract()$ and $hkdf_{-}expand()$.

Chapter 15

Miscellaneous

15.1 Base64 Encoding and Decoding

The library provides functions to encode and decode a RFC 4648 Base64 coding scheme.

15.1.1 Standard 'base64' encoding

The characters used in the mappings are:

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/

Those characters are supported in the 7-bit ASCII map, which means they can be used for transport over common e-mail, usenet and HTTP mediums. The format of an encoded stream is just a literal sequence of ASCII characters where a group of four represent 24-bits of input. The first four chars of the encoders output is the length of the original input. After the first four characters is the rest of the message.

Often, it is desirable to line wrap the output to fit nicely in an e-mail or usenet posting. The decoder allows you to put any character (that is not in the above sequence) in between any character of the encoders output. You may not however, break up the first four characters.

To encode a binary string in base64 call:

Where in is the binary string and out is where the ASCII output is placed. You must set the value of outlen prior to calling this function and it sets the length of the base64 output in outlen when it is done. To decode a base64 string call:

The function base64_decode works in a relaxed way which allows decoding some inputs that do not strictly follow the standard. If you want to be strict during decoding you can use:

15.1.2 URL-safe 'base64url' encoding

The characters used in the mappings are:

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_

Those characters are sometimes also called URL and filename safe alphabet. The interface is analogous to base64_xxxx functions in previous chapter.

15.2 Primality Testing

The library includes primality testing and random prime functions as well. The primality tester will perform the test in two phases. First it will perform trial division by the first few primes. Second it will perform $LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS$ (pre-defined to 35) rounds of the Rabin-Miller primality testing algorithm. If the candidate passes both phases it is declared prime otherwise it is declared composite. No prime number will fail the two phases but composites can. Each round of the Rabin-Miller algorithm reduces the probability of a pseudo-prime by $\frac{1}{4}$ therefore after sixteen rounds the probability is no more than $\left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^8 = 2^{-16}$. In practice the probability of error is in fact much lower than that.

When making random primes the trial division step is in fact an optimized implementation of Implementation of Fast RSA Key Generation on Smart Cards¹. In essence a table of machine-word sized residues are kept of a candidate modulo a set of primes. When the candidate is rejected and ultimately incremented to test the next number the residues are updated without using multi-word precision math operations. As a result the routine can scan ahead to the next number required for testing with very little work involved.

¹Chenghuai Lu, Andre L. M. dos Santos and Francisco R. Pimentel

In the event that a composite did make it through it would most likely cause the the algorithm trying to use it to fail. For instance, in RSA two primes p and q are required. The order of the multiplicative sub-group (modulo pq) is given as $\varphi(pq)$ or (p-1)(q-1). The decryption exponent d is found as $de \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(pq)}$. If either p or q is composite the value of d will be incorrect and the user will not be able to sign or decrypt messages at all. Suppose p was prime and q was composite this is just a variation of the multi-prime RSA. Suppose q = rs for two primes r and s then $\varphi(pq) = (p-1)(r-1)(s-1)$ which clearly is not equal to (p-1)(rs-1).

These are not technically part of the LibTomMath library but this is the best place to document them. To test if a mp_int is prime call:

```
int is_prime(mp_int *N, int *result);
```

This puts a one in *result* if the number is probably prime, otherwise it places a zero in it. It is assumed that if it returns an error that the value in *result* is undefined. To make a random prime call:

Where len is the size of the prime in bytes $(2 \le len \le 256)$. You can set len to the negative size you want to get a prime of the form $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$. So if you want a 1024-bit prime of this sort pass len = -128 to the function. Upon success it will return **CRYPT_OK** and N will contain an integer which is very likely prime.

15.3 Random MPI Generation

Several Public Key Cryptography algorithms require random MPI's for operations like signature generation. The library provides two API functions to generate random MPI's which allow the utilisation of a user-defined PRNG to aquire the random data.

This ensures that N is set to a random MPI in the range $1 \le N < limit$.

int wprng);

15.4 Helper functions

15.4.1 Zero'ing data

As widely know optimizing-compilers are sometimes allowed to remove an invocation of $memset(out, \theta, outlen)$, which could result in sensitive data beeing not zero'ed out. Therefore LibTomCrypt implements a variant of this routine which won't be optimized-away.

```
void zeromem(volatile void *out, size_t outlen);
```

This zero's the buffer out of size outlen.

15.4.2 Constant-time memory compare

Some symmetric-key cryptographic operation-modes are vulnerable to timing attacks in case non-contant-time memory comparison functions are used to compare results. Therefore LibTomCrypt implements a constant-time memory compare function.

```
int mem_neq(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
```

This will compare the buffer a against the buffer b for len bytes. The return value is either θ when the content of a and b is equal or 1 when it differs.

15.4.3 Radix to binary conversion

All public-key cryptographic algorithms provide a way to import and/or export their key parameters in binary format. In order to be able to import keys stored in different formats, e.g. hexadecimal strings, the $radix_to_bin()$ function is provided.

```
int radix_to_bin(const void *in, int radix, void *out, unsigned long *len);
```

This will convert the MPI in of radix radix to the buffer pointed to by out. The field len is a pointer to the length of the buffer on input and the length stored on output.

In case you don't know the length of the buffer you can use $radix_to_bin()$ to determine the length for you.

```
#include <tomcrypt.h>
int main(void)
{
   const char *mpi = "AABBCCDD";
   unsigned long l = 0;
   void* buf;
   int ret;
   ltc_mp = ltm_desc;

if (radix_to_bin(mpi, 16, NULL, &l) != CRYPT_BUFFER_OVERFLOW)
   return EXIT_FAILURE;
```

```
buf = malloc(1);

ret = EXIT_SUCCESS;
if (radix_to_bin(mpi, 16, buf, &1) != CRYPT_OK)
    ret = EXIT_FAILURE;

free(buf);
return ret;
}
```

15.5 Dynamic Language Support

Various LibTomCrypt functions require that their callers define a struct (or a union) and provide a pointer to it, or allocate sufficient memory and provide its pointer. Programs written in C or C++ can obtain the necessary information by simply including the appropriate header files, but dynamic languages like Python don't understand C header files, and without assistance, have no way to know how much memory to allocate. A similar story can be told for certain LTC constant values.

LTC's Dynamic Language Support provides functions that return the size of a named struct or union, the value of a named constant, a list of all sizes supported, and a list of all named constants supported. Two additional functions can initialize LTM and TFM.

To get the size of a named struct or union:

namein is spelled exactly as found in the C header files. This function will return -1 if namein is not found.

To get the value of a named constant:

namein is spelled exactly as found in the C header files. Again, -1 is returned if namein is not found.

To get the names of all the supported structs, unions and constants:

You may want to call these functions twice, first to get the amount of memory to be allocated for the $names_list$, and a final time to actually populate $names_list$. If $names_list$ is NULL, $names_list_size$ will be the minimum size needed to receive the complete $names_list$. If $names_list$ is NOT NULL, $names_list$ must be a pointer to sufficient memory into which the $names_list$ will be written. Also,

the value in $names_list_size$ sets the upper bound of the number of characters to be written. A -1 return value signifies insufficient space.

The format of the names_list string is a series of name, value pairs where each name and value is separated by a comma, the pairs are separated by newlines, and the list is null terminated.

Calling either of these functions will initialize the respective math library.

```
void init_LTM(void);
void init_TFM(void);
void init_GMP(void);
```

Here is a Python program demonstrating how to call various LTC dynamic language support functions.

```
from ctypes import *
# load the OSX shared/dynamic library
LIB = CDLL('libtomcrypt.dylib')
# print info about this library
little = c_int()
                     # assume False is big
word32 = c_int()
                    # assume False is 64-bit
LIB.crypt_get_constant('ENDIAN_LITTLE', byref(little))
LIB.crypt_get_constant('ENDIAN_32BITWORD', byref(word32))
print('this lib was compiled for a %s endian %d-bit processor'
     % ('little' if little else 'big', 32 if word32 else 64))
# print the size of the struct named "sha256_state"
struct_size = c_int()
# don't forget to add the '_struct' or '_union' suffix
LIB.crypt_get_size('sha256_state_struct', byref(struct_size))
print('allocate %d bytes for sha256_state' % struct_size.value)
# print a list of all supported named constants
list_size = c_int()
# call with NULL to calc the min size needed for the list
LIB.crypt_list_all_constants(None, byref(list_size))
```

Chapter 16

Programming Guidelines

16.1 Secure Pseudo Random Number Generators

Probably the single most vulnerable point of any cryptosystem is the PRNG. Without one, generating and protecting secrets would be impossible. The requirement that one be setup correctly is vitally important, and to address this point the library does provide two RNG sources that will address the largest amount of end users as possible. The *sprng* PRNG provides an easy to access source of entropy for any application on a UNIX (and the like) or Windows computer.

However, when the end user is not on one of these platforms, the application developer must address the issue of finding entropy. This manual is not designed to be a text on cryptography. I would just like to highlight that when you design a cryptosystem make sure the first problem you solve is getting a fresh source of entropy.

16.2 Preventing Trivial Errors

Two simple ways to prevent trivial errors is to prevent overflows, and to check the return values. All of the functions which output variable length strings will require you to pass the length of the destination. If the size of your output buffer is smaller than the output it will report an error. Therefore, make sure the size you pass is correct!

Also, virtually all of the functions return an error code or **CRYPT_OK**. You should detect all errors, as simple typos can cause algorithms to fail to work as desired.

16.3 Registering Your Algorithms

To avoid linking and other run—time errors it is important to register the ciphers, hashes and PRNGs you intend to use before you try to use them. This includes any function which would use an algorithm indirectly through a descriptor table.

A neat bonus to the registry system is that you can add external algorithms that are not part of the library without having to hack the library. For example, suppose you have a hardware specific PRNG on your system. You could easily write the few functions required plus a descriptor. After

registering your PRNG, all of the library functions that need a PRNG can instantly take advantage of it. The same applies for ciphers, hashes, and bignum math routines.

16.4 Key Sizes

16.4.1 Symmetric Ciphers

For symmetric ciphers, use as large as of a key as possible. For the most part *bits are cheap* so using a 256-bit key is not a hard thing to do. As a good rule of thumb do not use a key smaller than 128 bits.

16.4.2 Asymmetric Ciphers

The following chart gives the work factor for solving a DH/RSA public key using the NFS. The work factor for a key of order n is estimated to be

$$e^{1.923 \cdot ln(n)^{\frac{1}{3}} \cdot ln(ln(n))^{\frac{2}{3}}} \tag{16.1}$$

Note that n is not the bit-length but the magnitude. For example, for a 1024-bit key $n = 2^{1024}$. The work required is:

RSA/DH Key Size (bits)	Work Factor (log_2)
512	63.92
768	76.50
1024	86.76
1536	103.37
2048	116.88
2560	128.47
3072	138.73
4096	156.49

Figure 16.1: RSA/DH Key Strength

The work factor for ECC keys is much higher since the best attack is still fully exponential. Given a key of magnitude n it requires \sqrt{n} work. The following table summarizes the work required:

16.5 Thread Safety 145

ECC Key Size (bits)	Work Factor (log_2)
112	56
128	64
160	80
192	96
224	112
256	128
384	192
521	260.5

Figure 16.2: ECC Key Strength

Using the above tables the following suggestions for key sizes seems appropriate:

Security Goal	RSA/DH Key Size (bits)	ECC Key Size (bits)
Near term	1024	160
Short term	1536	192
Long Term	2560	384

16.5 Thread Safety

The library is not fully thread safe but several simple precautions can be taken to avoid any problems. The registry functions such as register_cipher() are not thread safe no matter what you do. It is best to call them from your programs initialization code before threads are initiated.

The rest of the code uses state variables you must pass it such as hash_state, hmac_state, etc. This means that if each thread has its own state variables then they will not affect each other, and are fully thread safe. This is fairly simple with symmetric ciphers and hashes.

The only sticky issue is a shared PRNG which can be alleviated with the careful use of mutex devices. Defining LTC_PTHREAD for instance, enables pthreads based mutex locking in various routines such as the Yarrow and Fortuna PRNGs, the fixed point ECC multiplier, and other routines.

Chapter 17

Configuring and Building the Library

17.1 Introduction

The library is fairly flexible about how it can be built, used, and generally distributed. Additions are being made with each new release that will make the library even more flexible. Each of the classes of functions can be disabled during the build process to make a smaller library. This is particularly useful for shared libraries.

As of v1.06 of the library, the build process has been moved to two steps for the typical LibTom-Crypt application. This is because LibTomCrypt no longer provides a math API on its own and relies on third party libraries (such as LibTomMath, GnuMP, or TomsFastMath).

The build process now consists of installing a math library first, and then building and installing LibTomCrypt with a math library configured. Note that LibTomCrypt can be built with no internal math descriptors. This means that one must be provided at either build, or run time for the application. LibTomCrypt comes with three math descriptors that provide a standard interface to math libraries.

17.2 Makefile variables

All GNU driven makefiles (including the makefile for ICC) use a set of common variables to control the build and install process. Most of the settings can be overwritten from the command line which makes custom installation a breeze.

17.2.1 MAKE, CC, AR and CROSS_COMPILE

The MAKE, CC and AR flags can all be overwritten. They default to make, \$CC and \$AR respectively. Changing MAKE allows you to change what program will be invoked to handle subdirectories. For example, this

gmake install MAKE=gmake

will build and install the libraries with the gmake tool. Similarly,

```
make CC=arm-gcc AR=arm-ar
```

will build the library using arm-gcc as the compiler and arm-ar as the archiver.

```
make CROSS_COMPILE=arm-none-eabi-
```

will build the library using the arm-none-eabi- prefix'ed toolchain.

17.2.2 IGNORE SPEED and LTC DEBUG

When **IGNORE_SPEED** has been defined the default optimization flags for CFLAGS will be disabled which allows the developer to specify new CFLAGS on the command line. E.g. to add debugging

```
make IGNORE_SPEED=1 CFLAGS="-g3"
```

This will turn off optimizations and add -g3 to the CFLAGS which enables debugging.

Alternatively one can define LTC_DEBUG instead, which additionally defines LTC_NO_ASM and enables debug output on test failures.

Defining $LTC_DEBUG=2$ has the effect to enable verbose output in some of the tests.

```
make LTC_DEBUG=2
```

will build the library without compiler-optimisation or architecture specific code and will enable debugging and verbose debug output.

17.2.3 LIBNAME

LIBNAME is the name of the output library (archive) to create. It defaults to *libtomcrypt.a* for static builds and *libtomcrypt.la* for shared. On installation of the shared library the appropriately versioned *libtomcrypt.so*, *libtomcrypt.so*.0 etc. will be created by *libtool*.

17.2.4 Installation Directories

DESTDIR is the location where the output will be stored. It default to an empty string. **PRE-FIX** is the prefix for the installation directories. It defaults to /usr/local. **LIBPATH** is the location of the library directory which defaults to \$PREFIX/lib. **INCPATH** is the location of the header file directory which defaults to \$PREFIX/include. **DATAPATH** is the location of the data (documentation) directory which defaults to \$PREFIX/share/doc/libtomcrypt/pdf. **BINPATH** is the location of the binary file directory which defaults to \$PREFIX/bin.

They allow to configure the installation locations of the libary.

make PREFIX=/home/tom/project DATAPATH=/home/tom/project/docs install

This will build the library and install it to the directories under /home/tom/project/. e.g.

17.3 Extra libraries 149

```
/home/tom/project/:
total 1
drwxr-xr-x 2 tom users 80 Jul 30 16:02 docs
drwxr-xr-x 2 tom users 528 Jul 30 16:02 include
drwxr-xr-x 2 tom users 80 Jul 30 16:02 lib
/home/tom/project/docs:
total 452
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 459009 Jul 30 16:02 crypt.pdf
/home/tom/project/include:
total 132
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 2482 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 702 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_argchk.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 2945 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_cfg.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 22763 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_cipher.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 5174 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_custom.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 11314 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_hash.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 11571 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_mac.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 13614 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_macros.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 14714 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_math.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 632 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_misc.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 10934 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_pk.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 2634 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_pkcs.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 7067 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_prng.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 1467 Jul 30 16:02 tomcrypt_test.h
/home/tom/project/lib:
total 1073
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tom users 1096284 Jul 30 16:02 libtomcrypt.a
```

For further information see: https://www.gnu.org/prep/standards/html_node/DESTDIR.html and https://www.freebsd.org/doc/en/books/porters-handbook/porting-prefix.html.

17.3 Extra libraries

EXTRALIBS specifies any extra libraries required to link the test programs and shared libraries. They are specified in the notation that GCC expects for global archives.

```
make install test timing CFLAGS="-DTFM_DESC -DUSE_TFM" EXTRALIBS=-ltfm
```

This will install the library using the TomsFastMath library and link the *libtfm.a* library out of the default library search path. The two defines are explained below. You can specify multiple archives (say if you want to support two math libraries, or add on additional code) to the **EXTRALIBS** variable by separating them by a space.

Note that **EXTRALIBS** is not required if you are only making and installing the static library but none of the test programs.

17.4 Building a Static Library

Building a static library is fairly trivial as it only requires one invocation of the GNU make command

make install CFLAGS="-DTFM_DESC"

That will build LibTomCrypt (including the TomsFastMath descriptor), and install it in the default locations indicated previously. You can enable the built–in LibTomMath descriptor as well (or in place of the TomsFastMath descriptor). Similarly, you can build the library with no built–in math descriptors.

make install

In this case, no math descriptors are present in the library and they will have to be made available at build or run time before you can use any of the public key functions.

Note that even if you include the built—in descriptors you must link against the source library as well.

gcc -DTFM_DESC myprogram.c -ltomcrypt -ltfm -o myprogram

This will compile *myprogram* and link it against the LibTomCrypt library as well as Toms-FastMath (which must have been previously installed). Note that we define **TFM_DESC** for compilation. This is so that the TFM descriptor symbol will be defined for the client application to make use of without giving warnings.

17.5 Building a Shared Library

LibTomCrypt can also be built as a shared library through the *makefile.shared* make script. It is similar to use as the static script except that you **must** specify the **EXTRALIBS** variable at install time.

make -f makefile.shared install CFLAGS="-DTFM_DESC" EXTRALIBS=-ltfm

This will build and install the library and link the shared object against the TomsFastMath library (which must be installed as a shared object as well). The shared build process requires libtool to be installed.

17.6 Header Configuration

The file $tomcrypt_cfg.h$ is what lets you control various high level macros which control the behaviour of the library. Build options are also stored in $tomcrypt_custom.h$ which allow the enabling and disabling of various algorithms.

17.7 Customisation 151

ARGTYPE

This lets you control how the LTC_ARGCHK macro will behave. The macro is used to check pointers inside the functions against NULL. There are four settings for ARGTYPE. When set to 0, it will have the default behaviour of printing a message to stderr and raising a SIGABRT signal. This is provided so all platforms that use LibTomCrypt can have an error that functions similarly. When set to 1, it will simply pass on to the assert() macro. When set to 2, the macro will display the error to stderr then return execution to the caller. This could lead to a segmentation fault (e.g. when a pointer is **NULL**) but is useful if you handle signals on your own. When set to 3, it will resolve to a empty macro and no error checking will be performed. Finally, when set to 4, it will return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG to the caller.

Endianness

There are five macros related to endianness issues. For little endian platforms define, **ENDIAN_LITTLE**. For big endian platforms define **ENDIAN_BIG**. Similarly when the default word size of an *unsigned long* is 32-bits define **ENDIAN_32BITWORD** or define **ENDIAN_64BITWORD** when its 64-bits. If you do not define any of them the library will automatically use **ENDIAN_NEUTRAL** which will work on all platforms.

Currently LibTomCrypt will detect x86-32, x86-64, MIPS R5900, SPARC and SPARC64 running GCC as well as x86-32 running MSVC.

17.7 Customisation

There are also options you can specify from the tomcrypt_custom.h header file.

17.7.1 X memory routines

At the top of tomcrypt_custom.h are a series of macros denoted as XMALLOC, XCALLOC, XRE-ALLOC, XFREE, and so on. They resolve to the name of the respective functions from the standard C library by default. This lets you substitute in your own memory routines. If you substitute in your own functions they must behave like the standard C library functions in terms of what they expect as input and output.

These macros are handy for working with platforms which do not have a standard C library. For instance, the OLPC¹ bios code uses these macros to redirect to very compact heap and string operations.

17.7.2 X clock routines

The rng_get_bytes() function can call a function that requires the clock() function. These macros let you override the default clock() used with a replacement. By default the standard C library clock() function is used.

¹See http://dev.laptop.org/git?p=bios-crypto;a=summary

17.7.3 LTC_NO_FILE

During the build if LTC_NO_FILE is defined then any function in the library that uses file I/O will not call the file I/O functions and instead simply return CRYPT_NOP. This should help resolve any linker errors stemming from a lack of file I/O on embedded platforms.

17.7.4 LTC_CLEAN_STACK

When this functions is defined the functions that store key material on the stack will clean up afterwards. Assumes that you have no memory paging with the stack.

17.7.5 LTC_TEST

When this has been defined the various self–test functions (for ciphers, hashes, prngs, etc) are included in the build. This is the default configuration. If LTC_NO_TEST has been defined, the testing routines will be compacted and only return CRYPT_NOP.

17.7.6 LTC_NO_FAST

When this has been defined the library will not use faster word oriented operations. By default, they are only enabled for platforms which can be auto-detected. This macro ensures that they are never enabled.

17.7.7 LTC_FAST

This mode (auto-detected with x86_32, x86_64 platforms with GCC or CLANG) configures various routines such as ctr_encrypt() or cbc_encrypt() that it can safely XOR multiple octets in one step by using a larger data type. This has the benefit of cutting down the overhead of the respective functions.

This mode does have one downside. It can cause unaligned reads from memory if you are not careful with the functions. This is why it has been enabled by default only for the x86 class of processors where unaligned accesses are allowed. Technically LTC_FAST is not *portable* since unaligned accesses are not covered by the ISO C specifications.

In practice however, you can use it on pretty much any platform (even MIPS) with care.

By design the *fast* mode functions won't get unaligned on their own. For instance, if you call ctr_encrypt() right after calling ctr_start() and all the inputs you gave are aligned than ctr_encrypt() will perform aligned memory operations only. However, if you call ctr_encrypt() with an odd amount of plaintext then call it again the CTR pad (the IV) will be partially used. This will cause the ctr routine to first use up the remaining pad bytes. Then if there are enough plaintext bytes left it will use whole word XOR operations. These operations will be unaligned.

The simplest precaution is to make sure you process all data in power of two blocks and handle remainder at the end. e.g. If you are CTR'ing a long stream process it in blocks of (say) four kilobytes and handle any remaining incomplete blocks at the end of the stream.

If you do plan on using the *LTC_FAST* mode, a *LTC_FAST_TYPE* type which resolves to an optimal sized data type you can perform integer operations with is required. For the auto-detected platforms this type will be defined automatically. Ideally it should be four or eight bytes since it

17.7 Customisation 153

must properly divide the size of your block cipher (e.g. 16 bytes for AES). This means sadly if you're on a platform with 57-bit words (or something) you can't use this mode. So sad.

17.7.8 LTC_NO_ASM

When this has been defined the library will not use any inline assembler. Only a few platforms support assembler inlines but various versions of ICC and GCC cannot handle all of the assembler functions.

17.7.9 Symmetric Ciphers, One-way Hashes, PRNGS and Public Key Functions

There are a plethora of macros for the ciphers, hashes, PRNGs and public key functions which are fairly self-explanatory. When they are defined the functionality is included otherwise it is not. There are some dependency issues which are noted in the file. For instance, Yarrow requires CTR chaining mode, a block cipher and a hash function.

Also see technical note number five for more details.

17.7.10 LTC_EASY

When defined the library is configured to build fewer algorithms and modes. Mostly it sticks to NIST and ANSI approved algorithms. See the header file *tomcrypt_custom.h* for more details. It is meant to provide literally an easy method of trimming the library build to the most minimum of useful functionality.

17.7.11 TWOFISH_SMALL and TWOFISH_TABLES

Twofish is a 128-bit symmetric block cipher that is provided within the library. The cipher itself is flexible enough to allow some trade-offs in the implementation. When TWOFISH_SMALL is defined the scheduled symmetric key for Twofish requires only 200 bytes of memory. This is achieved by not pre-computing the substitution boxes. Having this defined will also greatly slow down the cipher. When this macro is not defined Twofish will pre-compute the tables at a cost of 4KB of memory. The cipher will be much faster as a result.

When TWOFISH_TABLES is defined the cipher will use pre-computed (and fixed in code) tables required to work. This is useful when TWOFISH_SMALL is defined as the table values are computed on the fly. When this is defined the code size will increase by approximately 500 bytes. If this is defined but TWOFISH_SMALL is not the cipher will still work but it will not speed up the encryption or decryption functions.

17.7.12 GCM_TABLES

When defined GCM will use a 64KB table (per GCM state) which will greatly speed up the perpacket latency. It also increases the initialization time and is not suitable when you are going to use a key a few times only.

17.7.13 GCM_TABLES_SSE2

When defined GCM will use the SSE2 instructions to perform the $GF(2^x)$ multiply using 16 128-bit XOR operations. It shaves a few cycles per byte of GCM output on both the AMD64 and Intel Pentium 4 platforms. Requires GCC and an SSE2 equipped platform.

17.7.14 LTC_SMALL_CODE

When this is defined some of the code such as the Rijndael and SAFER+ ciphers are replaced with smaller code variants. These variants are slower but can save quite a bit of code space.

17.7.15 LTC_PTHREAD

When this is activated all of the descriptor table functions will use pthread locking to ensure thread safe updates to the tables. Note that it doesn't prevent a thread that is passively using a table from being messed up by another thread that updates the table.

Generally the rule of thumb is to setup the tables once at startup and then leave them be. This added build flag simply makes updating the tables safer.

17.7.16 LTC_ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT

When this has been defined the ECC point multiplier (built–in to the library) will use a timing resistant point multiplication algorithm which prevents leaking key bits of the private key (scalar). It is a slower algorithm but useful for situations where timing side channels pose a significant threat.

This is enabled by default and can be disabled by defining LTC_NO_ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT.

17.7.17 LTC_RSA_BLINDING

When this has been defined the RSA modular exponentiation will use a blinding algorithm to improve timing resistance.

This is enabled by default and can be disabled by defining LTC_NO_RSA_BLINDING.

17.7.18 LTC_RSA_CRT_HARDENING

When this has been defined the RSA modular exponentiation will do some sanity checks regarding the CRT parameters and the operations' results.

This is enabled by default and can be disabled by defining LTC_NO_RSA_CRT_HARDENING.

17.7.19 Math Descriptors

The library comes with three math descriptors that allow you to interface the public key cryptography API to freely available math libraries. When **GMP_DESC**, **LTM_DESC**, or **TFM_DESC** are defined descriptors for the respective library are built and included in the library as gmp_desc , ltm_desc , or tfm_desc respectively.

In the test demos that use the libraries the additional flags USE_GMP, USE_LTM, and USE_TFM can be defined to tell the program which library to use. Only one of the USE flags can be defined at once.

17.7 Customisation 155

 $\label{lem:make-form} \begin{tabular}{ll} make -f makefile.shared install timing CFLAGS="-DGMP_DESC -DLTM_DESC -DTFM_DESC -DUSE_TFM" \setminus EXTRALIBS="-lgmp -ltommath -ltfm" \\ \end{tabular}$

That will build and install the library with all descriptors (and link against all), but only use TomsFastMath in the timing demo.

Chapter 18

Optimizations

18.1 Introduction

The entire API was designed with plug and play in mind at the low level. That is you can swap out any cipher, hash, PRNG or bignum library and the dependent API will not require updating. This has the nice benefit that one can add ciphers (etc.) not have to re—write portions of the API. For the most part, LibTomCrypt has also been written to be highly portable and easy to build out of the box on pretty much any platform. As such there are no assembler inlines throughout the code, I make no assumptions about the platform, etc...

That works well for most cases but there are times where performance is of the essence. This API allows optimized routines to be dropped in–place of the existing portable routines. For instance, hand optimized assembler versions of AES could be provided. Any existing function that uses the cipher could automatically use the optimized code without re–writing. This also paves the way for hardware drivers that can access hardware accelerated cryptographic devices.

At the heart of this flexibility is the *descriptor* system. A descriptor is essentially just a C *struct* which describes the algorithm and provides pointers to functions that do the required work. For a given class of operation (e.g. cipher, hash, prng, bignum) the functions of a descriptor have identical prototypes which makes development simple. In most dependent routines all an end developer has to do is register_XXX() the descriptor and they are set.

18.2 Ciphers

The ciphers in LibTomCrypt are accessed through the ltc_cipher_descriptor structure.

```
struct ltc_cipher_descriptor {
   /** name of cipher */
   char *name;

   /** internal ID */
   unsigned char ID;

   /** min keysize (octets) */
   int min_key_length,
```

```
/** max keysize (octets) */
    max_key_length,
/** block size (octets) */
     block_length,
/** default number of rounds */
     default_rounds;
/** Setup the cipher
   @param key
                      The input symmetric key
   @param keylen
                      The length of the input key (octets)
   @param num_rounds The requested number of rounds (0==default)
                      [out] The destination of the scheduled key
   @param skey
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int (*setup)(const unsigned char *key,
                              int keylen,
                              int num_rounds,
                    symmetric_key *skey);
/** Encrypt a block
                  The plaintext
   @param pt
                  [out] The ciphertext
   @param ct
                 The scheduled key
   @param skey
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
int (*ecb_encrypt)(const unsigned char *pt,
                         unsigned char *ct,
                         symmetric_key *skey);
/** Decrypt a block
   @param ct
                  The ciphertext
                  [out] The plaintext
   @param pt
   @param skey
                  The scheduled key
  @return CRYPT_OK if successful
int (*ecb_decrypt)(const unsigned char *ct,
                         unsigned char *pt,
                         symmetric_key *skey);
/** Test the block cipher
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful,
           CRYPT_NOP if self-testing has been disabled
*/
int (*test)(void);
/** Terminate the context
   @param skey
                 The scheduled key
```

18.2 Ciphers 159

```
void (*done)(symmetric_key *skey);
  /** Determine a key size
      @param keysize
                         [in/out] The size of the key desired
                                 The suggested size
      @return CRYPT_OK if successful
  */
  int (*keysize)(int *keysize);
/** Accelerators **/
  /** Accelerated ECB encryption
      @param pt
                     Plaintext
      @param ct
                     Ciphertext
      Oparam blocks The number of complete blocks to process
      @param skey
                     The scheduled key context
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
  */
  int (*accel_ecb_encrypt)(const unsigned char *pt,
                                  unsigned char *ct,
                                  unsigned long blocks,
                                  symmetric_key *skey);
   /** Accelerated ECB decryption
      @param pt
                     Plaintext
                     Ciphertext
      @param ct
      Oparam blocks The number of complete blocks to process
      @param skey
                     The scheduled key context
      @return CRYPT_OK if successful
  int (*accel_ecb_decrypt)(const unsigned char *ct,
                                  unsigned char *pt,
                                  unsigned long blocks,
                                  symmetric_key *skey);
   /** Accelerated CBC encryption
      @param pt
                     Plaintext
      @param ct
                     Ciphertext
      Oparam blocks The number of complete blocks to process
      @param IV
                     The initial value (input/output)
                     The scheduled key context
      @param skey
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
  int (*accel_cbc_encrypt)(const unsigned char *pt,
                                  unsigned char *ct,
                                  unsigned long blocks,
                                  unsigned char *IV,
                                  symmetric_key *skey);
  /** Accelerated CBC decryption
```

```
Plaintext
   @param pt
   @param ct
                  Ciphertext
   Oparam blocks The number of complete blocks to process
                  The initial value (input/output)
   @param IV
   @param skey
                  The scheduled key context
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
int (*accel_cbc_decrypt)(const unsigned char *ct,
                              unsigned char *pt,
                              unsigned long blocks,
                              unsigned char *IV,
                              symmetric_key *skey);
/** Accelerated CTR encryption
   @param pt
                  Plaintext
   @param ct
                  Ciphertext
   Oparam blocks The number of complete blocks to process
                  The initial value (input/output)
   @param IV
   @param mode
                  little or big endian counter (mode=0 or mode=1)
   @param skey
                  The scheduled key context
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
int (*accel_ctr_encrypt)(const unsigned char *pt,
                              unsigned char *ct,
                              unsigned long blocks,
                              unsigned char *IV,
                                        int mode,
                              symmetric_key *skey);
/** Accelerated LRW
   @param pt
                  Plaintext
   @param ct
                  Ciphertext
   Oparam blocks The number of complete blocks to process
   @param IV
                  The initial value (input/output)
   Oparam tweak The LRW tweak
                  The scheduled key context
   @param skey
   Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int (*accel_lrw_encrypt)(const unsigned char *pt,
                              unsigned char *ct,
                              unsigned long blocks,
                              unsigned char *IV,
                        const unsigned char *tweak,
                              symmetric_key *skey);
/** Accelerated LRW
   @param ct
                  Ciphertext
   @param pt
                  Plaintext
   Oparam blocks The number of complete blocks to process
                  The initial value (input/output)
   @param IV
```

18.2 Ciphers 161

```
The LRW tweak
    @param tweak
    @param skey
                  The scheduled key context
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int (*accel_lrw_decrypt)(const unsigned char *ct,
                               unsigned char *pt,
                               unsigned long blocks,
                               unsigned char *IV,
                         const unsigned char *tweak,
                               symmetric_key *skey);
/** Accelerated CCM packet (one-shot)
    @param key
                     The secret key to use
    @param keylen
                     The length of the secret key (octets)
    @param uskey
                     A previously scheduled key [can be NULL]
    @param nonce
                     The session nonce [use once]
    Oparam noncelen The length of the nonce
                     The header for the session
    @param header
    Oparam headerlen The length of the header (octets)
    @param pt
                     [out] The plaintext
    @param ptlen
                     The length of the plaintext (octets)
    @param ct
                      [out] The ciphertext
                      [out] The destination tag
    @param tag
    @param taglen
                     [in/out] The max size and resulting size
                               of the authentication tag
    Oparam direction Encrypt or Decrypt direction (0 or 1)
    @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int (*accel_ccm_memory)(
    const unsigned char *key,
                                 unsigned long keylen,
    symmetric_key
                      *uskev,
    const unsigned char *nonce, unsigned long noncelen,
    const unsigned char *header, unsigned long headerlen,
         unsigned char *pt,
                                unsigned long ptlen,
          unsigned char *ct,
          unsigned char *tag,
                                unsigned long *taglen,
                   int direction);
/** Accelerated GCM packet (one shot)
    @param key
                     The secret key
    @param keylen
                     The length of the secret key
    @param IV
                     The initialization vector
    @param IVlen
                     The length of the initialization vector
    @param adata
                     The additional authentication data (header)
    @param adatalen
                     The length of the adata
    @param pt
                     The plaintext
    @param ptlen
                     The length of the plaintext/ciphertext
    @param ct
                     The ciphertext
    @param tag
                      [out] The MAC tag
                      [in/out] The MAC tag length
    @param taglen
```

```
@param direction Encrypt or Decrypt mode (GCM_ENCRYPT or GCM_DECRYPT)
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
int (*accel_gcm_memory)(
    const unsigned char *key,
                                     unsigned long keylen,
    const unsigned char *IV,
                                     unsigned long IVlen,
    const unsigned char *adata, unsigned long adatalen,
           unsigned char *pt,
                                     unsigned long ptlen,
           unsigned char *ct,
           unsigned char *tag, unsigned long *taglen,
                      int direction);
/** Accelerated one shot OMAC
    Oparam key The secret key

      Oparam inlen
      Length of message (octets)

      Oparam out
      [out] Destination for tag

    ©param outlen [in/out] Initial and final size of out
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
*/
int (*omac_memory)(
    const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen,
    const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
           unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen);
/** Accelerated one shot XCBC
    Oparam key The secret key
    @param keylen
                           The key length (octets)
    Oparam in
                          The message

      Cparam inlen
      Length of message (octets)

      Cparam out
      [out] Destination for tag

      Cparam outlen
      [in/out] Initial and final size of out

    @return CRYPT_OK on success
int (*xcbc_memory)(
    const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen,
    const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
           unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen);
/** Accelerated one shot F9
    Oparam key The secret key

      Oparam inlen
      Length of message (octets)

      Oparam out
      [out] Destination for tag

      Oparam outlen
      [in/out] Initial and final size of out

    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
    Oremark Requires manual padding
*/
```

18.2 Ciphers 163

```
int (*f9_memory)(
    const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen,
    const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
        unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen);
};
```

18.2.1 Name

The *name* parameter specifies the name of the cipher. This is what a developer would pass to find_cipher() to find the cipher in the descriptor tables.

18.2.2 Internal ID

This is a single byte Internal ID you can use to distinguish ciphers from each other.

18.2.3 Key Lengths

The minimum key length is min_key_length and is measured in octets. Similarly the maximum key length is max_key_length . They can be equal and both must valid key sizes for the cipher. Values in between are not assumed to be valid though they may be.

18.2.4 Block Length

The size of the ciphers plaintext or ciphertext is block_length and is measured in octets.

18.2.5 Rounds

Some ciphers allow different number of rounds to be used. Usually you just use the default. The default round count is *default_rounds*.

18.2.6 Setup

To initialize a cipher (for ECB mode) the function setup() was provided. It accepts an array of key octets key of length keylen octets. The user can specify the number of rounds they want through num_rounds where $num_rounds = 0$ means use the default. The destination of a scheduled key is stored in skey.

Inside the *symmetric_key* union there is a *void *data* which you can use to allocate data if you need a data structure that does not fit with the existing ones provided. Just make sure in your *done()* function that you free the allocated memory.

18.2.7 Single block ECB

To process a single block in ECB mode the ecb_encrypt() and ecb_decrypt() functions were provided. The plaintext and ciphertext buffers are allowed to overlap so you must make sure you do not overwrite the output before you are finished with the input.

18.2.8 Testing

The test() function is used to self–test the *device*. It takes no arguments and returns **CRYPT_OK** if all is working properly. You may return **CRYPT_NOP** to indicate that no testing was performed.

18.2.9 Key Sizing

Occasionally, a function will want to find a suitable key size to use since the input is oddly sized. The keysize() function is for this case. It accepts a pointer to an integer which represents the desired size. The function then has to match it to the exact or a lower key size that is valid for the cipher. For example, if the input is 25 and 24 is valid then it stores 24 back in the pointed to integer. It must not round up and must return an error if the keysize cannot be mapped to a valid key size for the cipher.

18.2.10 Acceleration

The next set of functions cover the accelerated functionality of the cipher descriptor. Any combination of these functions may be set to **NULL** to indicate it is not supported. In those cases the software defaults are used (using the single ECB block routines).

Accelerated ECB

These two functions are meant for cases where a user wants to encrypt (in ECB mode no less) an array of blocks. These functions are accessed through the accel_ecb_encrypt and accel_ecb_decrypt pointers. The *blocks* count is the number of complete blocks to process.

Accelerated CBC

These two functions are meant for accelerated CBC encryption. These functions are accessed through the accel_cbc_encrypt and accel_cbc_decrypt pointers. The blocks value is the number of complete blocks to process. The IV is the CBC initialization vector. It is an input upon calling this function and must be updated by the function before returning.

Accelerated CTR

This function is meant for accelerated CTR encryption. It is accessible through the accel_ctr_encrypt pointer. The blocks value is the number of complete blocks to process. The IV is the CTR counter vector. It is an input upon calling this function and must be updated by the function before returning. The mode value indicates whether the counter is big (mode = CTR_COUNTER_BIG_ENDIAN) or little (mode = CTR_COUNTER_LITTLE_ENDIAN) endian.

This function (and the way it's called) differs from the other two since ctr_encrypt() allows any size input plaintext. The accelerator will only be called if the following conditions are met.

- 1. The accelerator is present
- 2. The CTR pad is empty
- 3. The remaining length of the input to process is greater than or equal to the block size.

18.2 Ciphers 165

The CTR pad is empty when a multiple (including zero) blocks of text have been processed. That is, if you pass in seven bytes to AES-CTR mode you would have to pass in a minimum of nine extra bytes before the accelerator could be called. The CTR accelerator must increment the counter (and store it back into the buffer provided) before encrypting it to create the pad.

The accelerator will only be used to encrypt whole blocks. Partial blocks are always handled in software.

Accelerated LRW

These functions are meant for accelerated LRW. They process blocks of input in lengths of multiples of 16 octets. They must accept the *IV* and *tweak* state variables and updated them prior to returning. Note that you may want to disable **LRW_TABLES** in *tomcrypt_custom.h* if you intend to use accelerators for LRW.

While both encrypt and decrypt accelerators are not required it is suggested as it makes lrw_setiv() more efficient.

Note that calling lrw_done() will only invoke the cipher_descriptor[].done() function on the symmetric_key parameter of the LRW state. That means if your device requires any (LRW specific) resources you should free them in your ciphers() done function. The simplest way to think of it is to write the plugin solely to do LRW with the cipher. That way cipher_descriptor[].setup() means to init LRW resources and cipher_descriptor[].done() means to free them.

Accelerated CCM

This function is meant for accelerated CCM encryption or decryption. It processes the entire packet in one call. You can optimize the work flow somewhat by allowing the caller to call the setup() function first to schedule the key if your accelerator cannot do the key schedule on the fly (for instance). This function MUST support both key passing methods.

key	uskey	Source of key
NULL	NULL	Error, not supported
non-NULL	NULL	Use key, do a key schedule
NULL	non-NULL	Use uskey, key schedule not required
non-NULL	non-NULL	Use uskey, key schedule not required

This function is called when the user calls ccm_memory().

Accelerated GCM

This function is meant for accelerated GCM encryption or decryption. It processes the entire packet in one call. Note that the setup() function will not be called prior to this. This function must handle scheduling the key provided on its own. It is called when the user calls gcm_memory().

Accelerated OMAC

This function is meant to perform an optimized OMAC1 (CMAC) message authentication code computation when the user calls omac_memory().

Accelerated XCBC-MAC

This function is meant to perform an optimized XCBC-MAC message authentication code computation when the user calls xcbc_memory().

Accelerated F9

This function is meant to perform an optimized F9 message authentication code computation when the user calls f9_memory(). Like f9_memory(), it requires the caller to perform any 3GPP related padding before calling in order to ensure proper compliance with F9.

18.3 One-Way Hashes

The hash functions are accessed through the ltc_hash_descriptor structure.

```
struct ltc_hash_descriptor {
   /** name of hash */
   char *name;
   /** internal ID */
   unsigned char ID;
   /** Size of digest in octets */
   unsigned long hashsize;
   /** Input block size in octets */
   unsigned long blocksize;
   /** ASN.1 OID */
   unsigned long OID[16];
   /** Length of DER encoding */
   unsigned long OIDlen;
   /** Init a hash state
     Oparam hash The hash to initialize
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
   int (*init)(hash_state *hash);
   /** Process a block of data
     Oparam hash The hash state
     @param in
                   The data to hash
     Oparam inlen The length of the data (octets)
     @return CRYPT_OK if successful
   int (*process)(
                           hash_state *hash,
                   const unsigned char *in,
                         unsigned long inlen);
```

```
/** Produce the digest and store it
      Oparam hash The hash state
      @param out
                    [out] The destination of the digest
      @return CRYPT_OK if successful
    int (*done)( hash_state *hash,
                unsigned char *out);
    /** Self-test
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful,
              CRYPT_NOP if self-tests have been disabled
    int (*test)(void);
    /* accelerated hmac callback: if you need to-do
       multiple packets just use the generic hmac_memory
       and provide a hash callback
    int (*hmac_block)(const unsigned char *key,
                             unsigned long keylen,
                       const unsigned char *in,
                             unsigned long inlen,
                             unsigned char *out,
                             unsigned long *outlen);
};
```

18.3.1 Name

This is the name the hash is known by and what find_hash() will look for.

18.3.2 Internal ID

This is the internal ID byte used to distinguish the hash from other hashes.

18.3.3 Digest Size

The hashsize variable indicates the length of the output in octets.

18.3.4 Block Size

The *blocksize* variable indicates the length of input (in octets) that the hash processes in a given invocation.

18.3.5 OID Identifier

This is the universal ASN.1 Object Identifier for the hash.

18.3.6 Initialization

The init function initializes the hash and prepares it to process message bytes.

18.3.7 Process

This processes message bytes. The algorithm must accept any length of input that the hash would allow. The input is not guaranteed to be a multiple of the block size in length.

18.3.8 Done

The done function terminates the hash and returns the message digest.

18.3.9 Acceleration

A compatible accelerator must allow processing data in any granularity which may require internal padding on the driver side.

18.3.10 HMAC Acceleration

The hmac_block() callback is meant for single—shot optimized HMAC implementations. It is called directly by hmac_memory() if present. If you need to be able to process multiple blocks per MAC then you will have to simply provide a process() callback and use hmac_memory() as provided in LibTomCrypt.

18.4 Pseudo-Random Number Generators

The pseudo-random number generators are accessible through the ltc_prng_descriptor structure.

```
struct ltc_prng_descriptor {
   /** Name of the PRNG */
   char *name;
   /** size in bytes of exported state */
   int export_size;
   /** Start a PRNG state
       @param prng [out] The state to initialize
       Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
   int (*start)(prng_state *prng);
   /** Add entropy to the PRNG
       @param in
                         The entropy
       @param inlen
                         Length of the entropy (octets)
                         The PRNG state
       @param prng
       Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
```

```
int (*add_entropy)(const unsigned char *in,
                        unsigned long inlen,
                           prng_state *prng);
/** Ready a PRNG state to read from
                  The PRNG state to ready
   @param prng
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
int (*ready)(prng_state *prng);
/** Read from the PRNG
   Oparam out
                  [out] Where to store the data
   Oparam outlen Length of data desired (octets)
   @param prng     The PRNG state to read from
   Oreturn Number of octets read
unsigned long (*read)(unsigned char *out,
                     unsigned long outlen,
                        prng_state *prng);
/** Terminate a PRNG state
   Oparam prng The PRNG state to terminate
   Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
int (*done)(prng_state *prng);
/** Export a PRNG state
               [out] The destination for the state
   @param out
   Oparam outlen [in/out] The max size and resulting size
   Oparam prng The PRNG to export
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int (*pexport)(unsigned char *out,
              unsigned long *outlen,
                 prng_state *prng);
/** Import a PRNG state
                  The data to import
   @param in
   Oparam inlen The length of the data to import (octets)
                  The PRNG to initialize/import
   @param prng
   Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful
int (*pimport)(const unsigned char *in,
                    unsigned long inlen,
                       prng_state *prng);
/** Self-test the PRNG
   Oreturn CRYPT_OK if successful,
            CRYPT_NOP if self-testing has been disabled
*/
```

```
int (*test)(void);
};
```

18.4.1 Name

The name by which find_prng() will find the PRNG.

18.4.2 Export Size

When an PRNG state is to be exported for future use you specify the space required in this variable.

18.4.3 Start

Initialize the PRNG and make it ready to accept entropy.

18.4.4 Entropy Addition

Add entropy to the PRNG state. The exact behaviour of this function depends on the particulars of the PRNG.

18.4.5 Ready

This function makes the PRNG ready to read from by processing the entropy added. The behaviour of this function depends on the specific PRNG used.

18.4.6 Read

Read from the PRNG and return the number of bytes read. This function does not have to fill the buffer but it is best if it does as many protocols do not retry reads and will fail on the first try.

18.4.7 Done

Terminate a PRNG state. The behaviour of this function depends on the particular PRNG used.

18.4.8 Exporting and Importing

An exported PRNG state is data that the PRNG can later import to resume activity. They're not meant to resume *the same session* but should at least maintain the same level of state entropy.

18.5 BigNum Math Descriptors

The library also makes use of the math descriptors to access math functions. While bignum math libraries usually differ in implementation it hasn't proven hard to write *glue* to use math libraries so far. The basic descriptor looks like.

```
/** math descriptor */
typedef struct {
  /** Name of the math provider */
  char *name;
  /** Bits per digit, amount of bits must fit in an unsigned long */
  int bits_per_digit;
/* ---- init/deinit functions ---- */
  /** initialize a bignum
    @param a The number to initialize
    @return CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*init)(void **a);
  /** init copy
    @param dst
                   The number to initialize and write to
    @param src
                   The number to copy from
    @return CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*init_copy)(void **dst, void *src);
  /** deinit
                 The number to free
     @param a
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  void (*deinit)(void *a);
/* ---- data movement ---- */
  /** negate
     Oparam src The number to negate
     @param dst The destination
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*neg)(void *src, void *dst);
  /** copy
     Oparam src The number to copy from
     Oparam dst The number to write to
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*copy)(void *src, void *dst);
/* ---- trivial low level functions ---- */
  /** set small constant
     @param a
                 Number to write to
                 Source upto bits_per_digit (actually meant for very small constants)
     @param n
```

```
Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
int (*set_int)(void *a, unsigned long n);
/** get small constant
   Oparam a Small number to read,
             only fetches up to bits_per_digit from the number
            The lower bits_per_digit of the integer (unsigned)
unsigned long (*get_int)(void *a);
/** get digit n
  Oparam a The number to read from
  Oparam n The number of the digit to fetch
  Oreturn The bits_per_digit sized n'th digit of a
ltc_mp_digit (*get_digit)(void *a, int n);
/** Get the number of digits that represent the number
  Oparam a The number to count
 Oreturn The number of digits used to represent the number
int (*get_digit_count)(void *a);
/** compare two integers
  Oparam a The left side integer
  Oparam b The right side integer
  @return LTC_MP_LT if a < b,</pre>
         LTC_MP_GT if a > b and
         LTC_MP_EQ otherwise. (signed comparison)
int (*compare)(void *a, void *b);
/** compare against int
  Oparam a The left side integer
  @param b The right side integer (upto bits_per_digit)
  @return LTC_MP_LT if a < b,</pre>
         LTC_MP_GT if a > b and
         LTC_MP_EQ otherwise. (signed comparison)
*/
int (*compare_d)(void *a, unsigned long n);
/** Count the number of bits used to represent the integer
  @param a The integer to count
  Oreturn The number of bits required to represent the integer
*/
int (*count_bits)(void * a);
/** Count the number of LSB bits which are zero
  Oparam a The integer to count
```

```
Oreturn The number of contiguous zero LSB bits
  */
  int (*count_lsb_bits)(void *a);
  /** Compute a power of two
    Oparam a The integer to store the power in
    @param n The power of two you want to store (a = 2^n)
    @return CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*twoexpt)(void *a , int n);
/* ---- radix conversions ---- */
  /** read ascii string
    @param a
               The integer to store into
    Oparam str The string to read
    Oparam radix The radix the integer has been represented in (2-64)
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
   int (*read_radix)(void *a, const char *str, int radix);
  /** write number to string
    @param a
              The integer to store
    Oparam str The destination for the string
    Oparam radix The radix the integer is to be represented in (2-64)
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*write_radix)(void *a, char *str, int radix);
  /** get size as unsigned char string
    Oparam a The integer to get the size (when stored in array of octets)
    Oreturn The length of the integer in octets
  unsigned long (*unsigned_size)(void *a);
   /** store an integer as an array of octets
    Oparam src The integer to store
    Oparam dst The buffer to store the integer in
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*unsigned_write)(void *src, unsigned char *dst);
  /** read an array of octets and store as integer
    Oparam dst The integer to load
    Oparam src The array of octets
    Oparam len The number of octets
    @return CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*unsigned_read)(
                                void *dst,
                       unsigned char *src,
```

```
unsigned long len);
/* ---- basic math ---- */
  /** add two integers
    @param a The first source integer
    @param b The second source integer
    Oparam c The destination of "a + b"
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*add)(void *a, void *b, void *c);
   /** add two integers
    Oparam a The first source integer
               The second source integer
               (single digit of upto bits_per_digit in length)
    @param c The destination of "a + b"
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*addi)(void *a, unsigned long b, void *c);
  /** subtract two integers
    Oparam a The first source integer
    @param b
               The second source integer
    @param c The destination of "a - b"
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*sub)(void *a, void *b, void *c);
  /** subtract two integers
    Oparam a The first source integer
               The second source integer
    @param b
               (single digit of upto bits_per_digit in length)
    {\tt @param\ c\ } {\tt The\ destination\ of\ "a\ -b"}
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*subi)(void *a, unsigned long b, void *c);
  /** multiply two integers
    Oparam a The first source integer
               The second source integer
                (single digit of upto bits_per_digit in length)
               The destination of "a * b"
    @param c
    Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*mul)(void *a, void *b, void *c);
  /** multiply two integers
    Oparam a The first source integer
    @param b
              The second source integer
```

```
(single digit of upto bits_per_digit in length)
            The destination of "a * b"
 Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
*/
int (*muli)(void *a, unsigned long b, void *c);
/** Square an integer
 @param a
             The integer to square
 @param b
             The destination
 Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
int (*sqr)(void *a, void *b);
/** Divide an integer
 @param a
             The dividend
 @param b
             The divisor
 @param c
             The quotient (can be NULL to signify don't care)
             The remainder (can be NULL to signify don't care)
 @param d
 Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
*/
int (*mpdiv)(void *a, void *b, void *c, void *d);
/** divide by two
   @param a The integer to divide (shift right)
  @param b The destination
   Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
int (*div_2)(void *a, void *b);
/** Get remainder (small value)
   @param a
               The integer to reduce
   @param b
               The modulus (upto bits_per_digit in length)
   @param c
               The destination for the residue
   Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
int (*modi)(void *a, unsigned long b, unsigned long *c);
/** gcd
  @param a
                The first integer
  @param b
                The second integer
   @param c
                The destination for (a, b)
  Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
int (*gcd)(void *a, void *b, void *c);
/** lcm
   @param a
                The first integer
  @param b
                The second integer
                The destination for [a, b]
  @param c
  Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
```

```
int (*lcm)(void *a, void *b, void *c);
  /** Modular multiplication
                   The first source
     @param a
     @param b
                   The second source
     @param c
                   The modulus
     @param d
                   The destination (a*b mod c)
     @return CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*mulmod)(void *a, void *b, void *c, void *d);
  /** Modular squaring
     @param a
                   The first source
     @param b
                   The modulus
     @param c
                   The destination (a*a mod b)
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*sqrmod)(void *a, void *b, void *c);
  /** Modular inversion
      @param a
                   The value to invert
     @param b
                   The modulus
                   The destination (1/a mod b)
     @param c
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*invmod)(void *, void *, void *);
/* ---- reduction ---- */
  /** setup Montgomery
      Oparam a The modulus
      Oparam b The destination for the reduction digit
      @return CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*montgomery_setup)(void *a, void **b);
  /** get normalization value
      Oparam a The destination for the normalization value
      @param b
                The modulus
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*montgomery_normalization)(void *a, void *b);
  /** reduce a number
      @param a
                 The number [and dest] to reduce
      @param b
                 The modulus
                 The value "b" from montgomery_setup()
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
```

```
int (*montgomery_reduce)(void *a, void *b, void *c);
  /** clean up (frees memory)
      @param a The value "b" from montgomery_setup()
      @return CRYPT_OK on success
  void (*montgomery_deinit)(void *a);
/* ---- exponentiation ---- */
   /** Modular exponentiation
                  The base integer
      @param a
                  The power (can be negative) integer
      @param b
                  The modulus integer
      @param c
      @param d
                  The destination
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*exptmod)(void *a, void *b, void *c, void *d);
  /** Primality testing
      @param a
                   The integer to test
      @param b
                   The number of Miller-Rabin tests that shall be executed
                   The destination of the result (FP_YES if prime)
      @param c
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*isprime)(void *a, int b, int *c);
/* ---- (optional) ecc point math ---- */
  /** ECC GF(p) point multiplication (from the NIST curves)
      Oparam k The integer to multiply the point by
      @param G The point to multiply
      Oparam R The destination for kG
      Oparam modulus The modulus for the field
      Oparam map Boolean indicated whether to map back to affine or not
                  (can be ignored if you work in affine only)
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*ecc_ptmul)(
                        void *k,
                   ecc_point *G,
                    ecc_point *R,
                        void *modulus,
                         int map);
  /** ECC GF(p) point addition
      @param P
                  The first point
      @param Q
                  The second point
      @param R
                  The destination of P + Q
      Oparam modulus The modulus
                 The "b" value from montgomery_setup()
      @param mp
```

```
@return CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*ecc_ptadd)(ecc_point *P,
                    ecc_point *Q,
                    ecc_point *R,
                        void *modulus,
                        void *mp);
   /** ECC GF(p) point double
      @param P
                 The first point
                 The destination of 2P
      @param R
      Oparam modulus The modulus
      @param mp The "b" value from montgomery_setup()
      @return CRYPT_OK on success
   */
  int (*ecc_ptdbl)(ecc_point *P,
                    ecc_point *R,
                        void *modulus,
                         void *mp);
  /** ECC mapping from projective to affine,
      currently uses (x,y,z) \Rightarrow (x/z^2, y/z^3, 1)
      Oparam P
                   The point to map
      Oparam modulus The modulus
                   The "b" value from montgomery_setup()
      @param mp
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
      Oremark The mapping can be different but keep in mind a
               ecc_point only has three integers (x,y,z) so if
              you use a different mapping you have to make it fit.
  int (*ecc_map)(ecc_point *P, void *modulus, void *mp);
   /** Computes kA*A + kB*B = C using Shamir's Trick
      @param A
                      First point to multiply
      @param kA
                      What to multiple A by
      @param B
                      Second point to multiply
                      What to multiple B by
      @param kB
      @param C
                      [out] Destination point (can overlap with A or B)
      Oparam modulus Modulus for curve
      Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*ecc_mul2add)(ecc_point *A, void *kA,
                      ecc_point *B, void *kB,
                      ecc_point *C,
                          void *modulus);
/* ---- (optional) rsa optimized math (for internal CRT) ---- */
  /** RSA Key Generation
                      An active PRNG state
      @param prng
```

```
@param wprng
                      The index of the PRNG desired
      @param size
                      The size of the key in octets
      @param e
                      The "e" value (public key).
                      e==65537 is a good choice
                      [out] Destination of a newly created private key pair
      @param key
      @return CRYPT_OK if successful, upon error all allocated ram is freed
   int (*rsa_keygen)(prng_state *prng,
                             int wprng,
                            int size,
                           long e,
                        rsa_key *key);
   /** RSA exponentiation
     @param in
                     The octet array representing the base
     @param inlen
                     The length of the input
     @param out
                     The destination (to be stored in an octet array format)
                     The length of the output buffer and the resulting size
     @param outlen
                      (zero padded to the size of the modulus)
     @param which
                     PK_PUBLIC for public RSA and PK_PRIVATE for private RSA
     @param key
                     The RSA key to use
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*rsa_me)(const unsigned char *in,
                                           unsigned long inlen,
                      unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen, int which,
                      rsa_key *key);
/* ---- basic math continued ---- */
  /** Modular addition
                   The first source
     @param a
     @param b
                   The second source
     @param c
                   The modulus
                   The destination (a + b mod c)
     @param d
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  int (*addmod)(void *a, void *b, void *c, void *d);
   /** Modular substraction
                   The first source
     @param a
     @param b
                   The second source
     @param c
                   The modulus
                   The destination (a - b mod c)
     @param d
     Oreturn CRYPT_OK on success
  */
  int (*submod)(void *a, void *b, void *c, void *d);
/* ---- misc stuff ---- */
  /** Make a pseudo-random mpi
```

Most of the functions are fairly straightforward and do not need documentation. We'll cover the basic conventions of the API and then explain the accelerated functions.

18.5.1 Conventions

All bignums are accessed through an opaque void * data type. You must internally cast the pointer if you need to access members of your bignum structure. During the init calls a void ** will be passed where you allocate your structure and set the pointer then initialize the number to zero. During the deinit calls you must free the bignum as well as the structure you allocated to place it in.

All functions except the Montgomery reductions work from left to right with the arguments. For example, $\text{mul}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c})$ computes $c \leftarrow ab$.

All functions (except where noted otherwise) return **CRYPT_OK** to signify a successful operation. All error codes must be valid LibTomCrypt error codes.

The digit routines (including functions with the i suffix) use a ltc_mp_digit to represent the digit. If your internal digit is larger than this you must then partition your digits. Note that if your digit is smaller than an ltc_mp_digit that is also acceptable as the $bits_per_digit$ parameter will specify this.

ltc_mp_digit

Depending on the architecture ltc_mp_digit is either a 32- or 64-bit long unsigned data type.

18.5.2 ECC Functions

The ECC system in LibTomCrypt is based off of the NIST recommended curves over GF(p) and is used to implement EC-DSA and EC-DH. The ECC functions work with the **ecc_point** structure and assume the points are stored in Jacobian projective format.

```
/** A point on a ECC curve, stored in Jacobian format such
    that (x,y,z) => (x/z^2, y/z^3, 1) when interpreted as affine */
typedef struct {
    /** The x co-ordinate */
    void *x;
    /** The y co-ordinate */
    void *y;
    /** The z co-ordinate */
    void *z;
} ecc_point;
```

All ECC functions must use this mapping system. The only exception is when you remap all ECC callbacks which will allow you to have more control over how the ECC math will be implemented. Out of the box you only have three parameters per point to use (x, y, z) however, these are just void pointers. They could point to anything you want. The only further exception is the export functions which expects the values to be in affine format.

Point Multiply

This will multiply the point G by the scalar k and store the result in the point R. The value should be mapped to affine only if map is set to one.

Point Addition

This will add the point P to the point Q and store it in the point R. The mp parameter is the b value from the montgomery_setup() call. The input points may be in either affine (with z=1) or projective format and the output point is always projective.

Point Mapping

This will map the point P back from projective to affine. The output point P must be of the form (x, y, 1).

Shamir's Trick

To accelerate EC–DSA verification the library provides a built–in function called ltc_ecc_mul2add(). This performs two point multiplications and an addition in roughly the time of one point multiplication. It is called from ecc_verify_hash() if an accelerator is not present. The acclerator function must allow the points to overlap (e.g., $A \leftarrow k_1 A + k_2 B$) and must return the final point in affine format.

18.5.3 RSA Functions

The RSA Modular Exponentiation (ME) function is used by the RSA API to perform exponentiations for private and public key operations. In particular for private key operations it uses the CRT approach to lower the time required. It is passed an RSA key with the following format.

```
/** RSA PKCS style key */
typedef struct Rsa_key {
    /** Type of key, PK_PRIVATE or PK_PUBLIC */
    int type;
    /** The public exponent */
    void *e;
    /** The private exponent */
    void *d;
    /** The modulus */
    void *N;
    /** The p factor of N */
    void *p;
```

```
/** The q factor of N */
void *q;
/** The 1/q mod p CRT param */
void *qP;
/** The d mod (p - 1) CRT param */
void *dP;
/** The d mod (q - 1) CRT param */
void *dQ;
} rsa_key;
```

The call reads the in buffer as an unsigned char array in big endian format. Then it performs the exponentiation and stores the output in big endian format to the out buffer. The output must be zero padded (leading bytes) so that the length of the output matches the length of the modulus (in bytes). For example, for RSA-1024 the output is always 128 bytes regardless of how small the numerical value of the exponentiation is.

Since the function is given the entire RSA key (for private keys only) CRT is possible as prescribed in the PKCS #1 v2.1 specification.

aes_desc, 15	$\operatorname{ccm_done}(), 40$
aes_enc_desc, 15	$\operatorname{ccm_init}(), 39$
anubis_desc, 15	ccm_memory(), 40, 165
AR, 147	ccm_process(), 39
	ccm_reset(), 40
$base64_decode(), 135$	CFB Mode, 20
base64_encode(), 135	CFB mode, 19
base64_strict_decode(), 136	cfb_decrypt(), 21
BINPATH, 148	$cfb_done(), 22$
blake2bmac_done(), 73	cfb_encrypt(), 21
blake2bmac_file(), 74	cfb_getiv(), 22
blake2bmac_init(), 73	cfb_setiv(), 22
blake2bmac_memory(), 74	cfb_start(), 20
blake2bmac_process(), 73	chacha20poly1305_add_aad(), 48
blake2smac_done(), 73	chacha20poly1305_decrypt(), 48
blake2smac_file(), 74	chacha20poly1305_done(), 48
blake2smac_init(), 73	chacha20poly1305_encrypt(), 48
blake2smac_memory(), 73	chacha20poly1305_init(), 47
blake2smac_process(), 73	- V
blowfish_desc, 15	chacha20poly1305_memory(), 49
blowfish_done(), 13	chacha20poly1305_setiv(), 47
blowfish_ecb_decrypt(), 13	chacha20poly1305_setiv_rfc7905(), 47
blowfish_ecb_encrypt(), 13	chc_register(), 57
blowfish_setup(), 13	Cipher Decrypt, 12
BSWAP, 6	Cipher Descriptor, 14
	Cipher descriptor table, 15
camellia_desc, 15	Cipher Encrypt, 12
CBC Mode, 20	Cipher Hash Construction, 57
CBC mode, 18	Cipher Setup, 11
cbc_decrypt(), 21	Cipher Testing, 12
cbc_done(), 22	Ciphertext stealing, 20
cbc_encrypt(), 21	CMAC, 63
$cbc_getiv(), 22$	CROSS_COMPILE, 147
cbc_setiv(), 22	CRYPT_ERROR, 5
cbc_start(), 20	CRYPT_HASH_OVERFLOW, 51
CC, 147	CRYPT_OK, 5
ccm_add_aad(), 39	CTR Mode, 20
ccm_add_nonce(), 39	CTR mode, 18
V /	•

$\operatorname{ctr_decrypt}(), 21$	der_length_teletex_string(), 125
$\operatorname{ctr_done}(),22$	der_length_utctime(), 126, 127
$\operatorname{ctr_encrypt}(), 21$	der_length_utf8_string(), 125
$\operatorname{ctr_getiv}(), 22$	der_sequence_free(), 130
ctr_setiv(), 22	der_sequence_shrink(), 130
$\operatorname{ctr_start}(), 20$	$des3_desc, 15$
	$des_desc, 15$
DATAPATH, 148	DESTDIR, 148
der_decode_bit_string(), 123	$dh_{export}(), 98$
der_decode_choice(), 128	$dh_get_groupsize(), 99$
der_decode_ia5_string(), 124	$dh_import(), 98$
$der_decode_integer(), 122$	$dh_make_key(), 98$
der_decode_object_identifier(), 124	$dh_{set_key}(), 99$
der_decode_octet_string(), 123	$dh_{set_pg}(), 99$
der_decode_printable_string(), 125	$dh_{set_pg_dhparam}(), 99$
der_decode_raw_bit_string(), 123	dh_shared_secret(), 98
der_decode_sequence(), 119	dsa_decrypt_key(), 115
der_decode_sequence_flexi(), 128	dsa_encrypt_key(), 114
der_decode_sequence_multi(), 120	$dsa_export(), 115$
der_decode_set(), 121	dsa_free(), 112
der_decode_short_integer(), 122	dsa_generate_key(), 116
der_decode_teletex_string(), 125	dsa_generate_pqg(), 116
der_decode_utctime(), 126, 127	dsa_import(), 115
der_decode_utf8_string(), 125	dsa_set_key(), 116
der_encode_bit_string(), 123	$dsa_set_pqg(), 116$
der_encode_ia5_string(), 124	dsa_set_pqg_dsaparam(), 116
der_encode_integer(), 122	dsa_sign_hash(), 113
der_encode_object_identifier(), 124	dsa_verify_hash(), 114
der_encode_octet_string(), 123	dsa_verify_key(), 113
der_encode_printable_string(), 125	Dynamic Language Support, 139
der_encode_raw_bit_string(), 123	, 5 5 11 /
der_encode_sequence(), 119	eax_addheader(), 32
der_encode_sequence_multi(), 120	eax_decrypt(), 32
der_encode_set(), 121	eax_decrypt_verify_memory, 34
der_encode_setof(), 121	$eax_done(), 32$
der_encode_short_integer(), 122	$eax_encrypt(), 32$
der_encode_utctime(), 126, 127	eax_encrypt_authenticate_memory, 34
der_encode_utf8_string(), 125	eax_init(), 31
der_length_bit_string(), 123	$eax_test(), 32$
der_length_ia5_string(), 124	ECB mode, 18
der_length_integer(), 122	ecb_decrypt(), 21
der_length_object_identifier(), 124	ecb_decrypt(), 21 ecb_done(), 22
der_length_octet_string(), 123	ecb_encrypt(), 21
der_length_printable_string(), 125 der_length_printable_string(), 125	ecb_encrypt(), 21 ecb_start(), 20
der_length_sequence(), 120	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 1 (//	ECC Key Format, 104
der_length_short_integer(), 122	$ecc_ansi_x963_export(), 107$

ecc_ansi_x963_import(), 107	GMP_DESC, 154
ecc_ansi_x963_import_ex(), 107	
ecc_decrypt_key(), 108	Hash descriptor table, 55
ecc_encrypt_key(), 108	Hash Functions, 51
ecc_export(), 106	hash_file(), 54
	hash_filehandle(), 54
ecc_free(), 106	hash_memory(), 54
ecc_import(), 106	HKDF, 133
ecc_import_ex(), 106	hkdf(), 134
ecc_make_key(), 105	
ecc_make_key_ex(), 106	hkdf_expand(), 133
ecc_shared_secret(), 108	hkdf_extract(), 133
ecc_sign_hash(), 109	hmac_done(), 61
$ecc_sign_hash_rfc7518(), 109$	hmac_file(), 62
ecc_verify_hash(), 110	hmac_init(), 61
ecc_verify_hash_rfc7518(), 110	$hmac_memory(), 62$
$error_to_string(), 5, 7, 17$	$hmac_process(), 61$
EXTRALIBS, 149	$hmac_test(), 62$
F8 Mode, 26	IGNORE_SPEED, 148
f8_decrypt(), 26	INCPATH, 148
f8_done(), 27	11.0111111, 110
f8_encrypt(), 26	kasumi_desc, 15
f8_getiv(), 27	Key Sizing, 12
f8_setiv(), 27	khazad_desc, 15
f8_start(), 26	kseed_desc, 15
f9_done(), 71	13004_4050, 10
· ·	LIBNAME, 148
f9_file(), 71	LIBPATH, 148
f9_init(), 70	LOAD32H, 6
f9_memory(), 71, 166	LOAD32L, 6
f9_process(), 71	LOAD64H, 6
f9_test(), 71	LOAD64L, 6
find_cipher(), 16, 17, 163	lrw_decrypt(), 24
find_hash(), 53	$lrw_done(), 25$
find_hash_oid(), 53	lrw_encrypt(), 24
find_prng(), 78	v = · · · ·
Fixed Point ECC, 103	lrw_getiv(), 25
FP_ENTRIES, 104	lrw_setiv(), 25
FP_LUT, 104	lrw_start(), 24
FP_SIZE, 104	LTC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED, 128
11 1/) 44	LTC_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC, 128
gcm_add_aad(), 44	LTC_ASN1_EOL, 119, 120
gcm_add_iv(), 43	ltc_asn1_list structure, 117
gcm_done(), 44	LTC_DEBUG, 148
gcm_init(), 43	ltc_ecc_mul2add(), 181
$gcm_memory(), 45, 165$	ltc_ecc_set_type, 105
gcm_process(), 44	LTC_FAST_TYPE, 152
$gcm_reset(), 44$	ltc_mp_digit, 180

LTC_PKCS_1_EME, 84	$omac_test(), 65$
LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, 84	pelican_done(), 67
LTC_PKCS_1_OAEP, 89	pelican_init(), 67
LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5, 89	pelican_process(), 67
LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1, 91	PK_PRIVATE, 87
LTC_PTHREAD, 145	•
LTC_SET_ASN1 macro, 117	PK_PUBLIC, 87
ltc_utctime structure, 126, 127	PKCS #5, 130
LTC_XCBC_PURE, 69	pkcs_1_oaep_decode(), 85
LTM_DESC, 154	pkcs_1_oaep_encode(), 84, 88
NATE 445	pkcs_1_pss_decode(), 86
MAKE, 147	pkcs_1_pss_encode(), 85
MECC_FP, 103	pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(), 84
mem_neq(), 138	pkcs_1_v1_5_encode(), 83
Message Digest, 51	pkcs_5_alg1(), 131
1 1 15	pkcs_5_alg1_openssl(), 131
noekeon_desc, 15	pkcs_5_alg2(), 131
oah2 add aad() 27	pmac_done(), 66
ocb3_add_aad(), 37	pmac_file(), 67
ocb3_decrypt(), 37	pmac_init(), 66
ocb3_decrypt_last(), 37	pmac_memory(), 66
ocb3_decrypt_verify_memory(), 38	$pmac_process(), 66$
ocb3_done(), 38	$pmac_test(), 67$
ocb3_encrypt(), 37	$poly1305_done(), 72$
ocb3_encrypt_authenticate_memory(), 38	$poly1305_file(), 72$
ocb3_encrypt_last(), 37	$poly1305_init(), 72$
$\operatorname{ocb3_init}(), 37$	$poly1305_memory(), 72$
$\operatorname{ocb_decrypt}(), 35$	poly1305_process(), 72
ocb_decrypt_verify_memory(), 36	PREFIX, 148
ocb_done_decrypt(), 36	Primality Testing, 136
ocb_done_encrypt(), 35	PRNG, 8
$ocb_encrypt(), 35$	PRNG add_entropy, 75
$ocb_{init}(), 35$	PRNG Descriptor, 77
OFB Mode, 20	PRNG done, 75
OFB mode, 19	PRNG export, 76
ofb_decrypt(), 21	PRNG import, 76
$ofb_done(), 22$	PRNG read, 75
ofb_encrypt(), 21	PRNG ready, 75
$ofb_getiv(), 22$	PRNG start, 75
$ofb_setiv(), 22$	PRNG test, 76
ofb_start(), 20	Pseudo Random Number Generator, 8
OMAC, 63	T BOURD THOMAS IN THAMES OF COMMUNICATION OF
omac_done(), 64	radix_to_bin(), 138
$omac_file(), 64$	rand_bn_bits(), 137
omac_init(), 63	rand_bn_upto(), 137
omac_memory(), 64, 165	Random MPI Generation, 137
omac_process(), 64	rc2_desc, 15
• \/ /	,

$rc2_setup_ex(), 16$	STORE32L, 6
$rc5_{desc}$, 15	STORE64H, 6
rc6_desc, 15	STORE64L, 6
register_cipher(), 17	Symmetric Keys, 14
register_hash(), 55	
register_prng(), 8, 78	TFM, 104
rng_get_bytes(), 80	tfm.h, 104
rng_make_prng(), 81	TFM_DESC, 154
ROL, 7	Twofish build options, 16
ROL64, 7	twofish_desc, 15
	TWOFISH_SMALL, 16
ROL64c, 7	TWOFISH_TABLES, 16
ROLc, 7	_ ,,
ROR, 7	unregister_cipher(), 17
ROR64, 7	unregister_hash(), 55
ROR64c, 7	unregister_prng(), 78
RORc, 7	USE_GMP, 154
rsa_decrypt_key(), 89	USE_LTM, 154
rsa_decrypt_key_ex(), 89	USE_TFM, 154
rsa_encrypt_key(), 88	OSE_11 M, 194
rsa_encrypt_key_ex(), 89	variable length output, 7
rsa_export(), 7, 94	variable length output, i
rsa_exptmod(), 88	XCALLOC, 151
rsa_free(), 87	xcbc_done(), 69
rsa_get_size(), 88	$xcbc_file(), 70$
rsa_import(), 94	xcbc_init(), 69
rsa_import_pkcs8(), 95	xcbc_memory(), 69, 166
rsa_import_x509(), 95	xcbc_process(), 69
rsa_make_key(), 8, 87	$xcbc_test(), 70$
rsa_set_crt_params(), 95	XFREE, 151
	XMALLOC, 151
rsa_set_factors(), 95	XMEMCMP, 151
rsa_set_key(), 95	
rsa_sign_hash(), 90	XMEMCPY, 151
rsa_sign_hash_ex(), 90	XMEMMOVE, 151
rsa_sign_saltlen_get_max(), 91	XMEMSET, 151
rsa_verify_hash(), 91	XREALLOC, 151
rsa_verify_hash_ex(), 92	XSTRCMP, 151
	xtea_desc, 15
saferp_desc, 15	$xts_decrypt(), 26$
Secure RNG, 80	$xts_done(), 26$
SET, 121	$xts_encrypt(), 26$
SET OF, 121	$xts_start(), 25$
Shamir's Trick, 181	0
skipjack_desc, 15	zeromem(), 138
sprng_desc, 82	
SSE2, 154	
STORE32H, 6	
~ - · - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	