Final Report

Problem Statement:

An organization that has tens of thousands of clients a year, across many product (event) categories, is sitting on a lot of data. I initially was curious to identify what opportunities can be found in analyzing the data that could contribute to the business growth of the business. While the data indeed showed a number of interesting patterns, which will be discussed briefly below, it became apparent that the available data presents an interesting pricing optimization problem. Stated briefly: *Are the event prices that are being charged from attendees revenue maximizing?*

Dataset Description:

The dataset is of orders from a company that organizes dozens of annual B2B conferences of varying sizes and across several industries. While there was a single source - the company's CRM - there were two different data sets that were eventually merged to form the final analysis and model. The two data sets are: 1. Individual orders, this includes ticket price, time, type, etc. and 2. Event performance metrics, this includes metrics like event revenue, number of attendees, number of paid attendees and more.

A number of cleaning and wrangling operations were necessary:

- A few orders included erroneous symbols or currency symbols these were cleaned up
- A small number of negative orders were removed
- A unique 'id' variable was created from first names, last names and emails to eliminate the latter and proceed with the analysis without sensitive user data
- New variable was created to attribute sales source by registration type in the form of a new categorical series
- A new variable was created to denote the number of attendees in a group registration (the value of 1 for an individual registration with no group)
- A new seniority variable was created and populated by keywords from the individual job titles


Before proceeding to EDA, a number of data type conversions took place:

- Variables such as order type and order source were converted to categorical
- Order and event dates were converted to datetime
- Price data was converted to floats

More information on variable definitions and transformations can be found in the <u>Capstone</u> <u>proposal</u>.

Initial Findings:

There are two ways in which attendees can register for the events: 1. passively - online, chat or via customer service or 2. actively - through a consultative phone conversation with a sales rep. Seems the growth in attendee registrations has come mainly through the latter.



I became curious about the motivation behind registrations, while pricing plays a major part in a purchasing decision, there could be other elements at play, such as scarcity, exclusivity and social pressure. In order to try and distill some of the key reasons, I looked at the top registration days for ticket purchases.

| Α | II Orders | |
|------------|-------------|-------|
| | mean | count |
| Order_Date | | 97 |
| 2018-01-31 | 1341.435957 | 141 |
| 2018-04-30 | 1254.289841 | 126 |
| 2017-01-31 | 1390.507265 | 117 |
| 2018-02-28 | 1103.890000 | 103 |
| 2017-02-28 | 1404.298600 | 100 |
| 2017-03-31 | 1354.684105 | 95 |
| 2017-09-29 | 1212.224839 | 93 |
| 2016-08-31 | 1114.764767 | 86 |
| 2015-01-30 | 1805.966395 | 86 |
| 2017-03-30 | 1099.386588 | 85 |

It became apparent that the last day of the month is a day with many ticket purchases. There could be two reasons for this: 1. Discounting - discounts often end on the last day of the month, which would offer a strong incentive for purchase and 2. Internal commission deadlines - As we previously saw, the majority of sales come through a sales team and their incentives also tended to align with monthly deadlines.

In order to distill which of the two was more likely at play, I ran the numbers based on passive orders only - this allowed us to ignore the commission deadlines as they do not apply to such sales. It became apparent that pricing, perhaps with added messaging about the pricing, is a strong factor in the decision to purchase event tickets.


Pricing and Revenue:

Initial EDA was focused on understanding the correlation between average event prices and event revenue. The assumption was that there could be a point of diminishing return, at which demand would drop and the number of total ticket purchases, even at the higher rate, would not result in as high of an overall revenue.

Looking at all events showed a central tendency of average event prices in the \$1,000-\$2,000 range, while the number of paid attendees varied greatly within this range. There were also a number of outliers in terms of ticket price (<\$700 or >\$2,500) and in terms of paid attendees (events with more than 400 paid attendees).




Looking at individual event subject areas showed varying demand distributions. *Additional breakdown can be found in appendix B.*




In looking at the retail events in more detail, I tried to identify a correlation between the average price increase and the overall association to increased revenue

44.20399685876672 199656.7614655343
For Retail Events - On average, a pricepoint increase of \$100 is associated with added revenue of 4420.4 dollars




There are a number of outlier events, however, such as those that have a greater natural demand. Those were removed to see what a more typical event correlation might be:

37.405379663222256 87172.44871670128
After removing the outlier events - for Retail Events - on average, a pricepoint increase of \$100 is associated with added revenue of 3740.54 dollars



Lastly, a number of events had a very low average price-point, which means that they were driven mostly by comps. Removing these shows an even lower association:

26.491319779672047 104210.4962551559
After removing the outlier events - for Retail Events - on average, a pricepoint increase of \$100 is associated with added revenue of 2649.13 dollars



Machine Learning:

After cleaning up the data for a linear regression and creating dummy variables for event types and seniority of registrant, an initial linear regression model gave a baseline model, which we've subsequently attempted to improve:

OLS Regression Results

| Dep. Variable: To | tal_Net_Price | R-squared: | | | 0.599 | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Model: | OLS | Adj. R-squ | ared: | | 0.598 | |
| Method: | Least Squares | F-statisti | ic: | | 594.7 | |
| Date: Mon | , 04 Mar 2019 | Prob (F-st | catistic): | | 0.00 | |
| Time: | 17:51:22 | Log-Likeli | hood: | -1.3 | 463e+05 | |
| No. Observations: | 17997 | AIC: | | 2. | 694e+05 | |
| Df Residuals: | 17951 | BIC: | | 2. | 697e+05 | |
| Df Model: | 45 | | | | | |
| Covariance Type: | nonrobust | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | coef | std err | t | P> t | [0.025 | 0.975] |
| const | 68.8719 | 50.950 | 1.352 | 0.176 | -30.996 | 168.740 |
| Group Size | -34.7636 | 1.564 | -22.228 | 0.000 | | -31.698 |
| Days Ahead of Event | -1.4576 | 0.070 | -20.724 | 0.000 | -1.595 | -1.320 |
| Total Dels | 0.7192 | | | 0.002 | | 1.179 |
| Total Rev | -13.8399 | 7.255 | -1.908 | 0.056 | | 0.381 |
| Booking Pattern Comparis | | 0.087 | 3.499 | 0.000 | 0.133 | 0.473 |
| Total Guests | -0.6846 | 0.067 | -10.197 | 0.000 | -0.816 | -0.553 |
| Avg_Cost_of_Acquisition | | 0.082 | -3.383 | 0.001 | -0.439 | -0.117 |
| Mktg Dels | 2.4522 | 0.693 | 3.539 | 0.000 | 1.094 | 3.810 |
| Mktg Rev | 13.8355 | 7.255 | 1.907 | 0.057 | -0.385 | 28.056 |
| Mktg Price Point | 0.1263 | 0.018 | 7.209 | 0.000 | 0.092 | 0.161 |
| PP act | 0.0027 | 0.000 | 5.475 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Sales Dels | -0.2905 | 0.498 | -0.583 | 0.560 | -1.268 | 0.686 |
| Sales Rev | 13.8405 | 7.255 | 1.908 | 0.056 | -0.380 | 28.061 |
| Sales perc of ttl rev | 3.6173 | 0.858 | 4.215 | 0.000 | 1.935 | 5.300 |
| Sales Price Point | 0.1158 | 0.042 | 2.728 | 0.006 | 0.033 | 0.199 |
| Num Active Inq | 0.0002 | 0.076 | 0.002 | 0.998 | -0.150 | 0.150 |
| Active Ing Del | -0.7710 | 0.486 | -1.585 | 0.113 | -1.724 | 0.182 |
| Num Passive PDF | 0.0845 | 0.014 | 5.920 | 0.000 | 0.057 | 0.112 |
| Passive_PDF_Del | -0.6714 | 0.355 | -1.891 | 0.059 | -1.367 | 0.025 |
| Total EQ Rev | 13.8402 | 7.255 | 1.908 | 0.056 | -0.380 | 28.061 |
| EQ Price Point | 0.2573 | 0.041 | 6.226 | 0.000 | 0.176 | 0.338 |
| | | | | | | 4.563 |
| EQ_perc_of_ttl_Rev | 2.9773 -6.557e-05 | 0.809 | 3.681 -2.318 | 0.000 | 1.392 | |
| Spex_Rev | | 2.83e-05 1.61e-05 | | 0.020 | -0.000 -9.42e-05 | -1.01e-05 -3.12e-05 |
| Spex_Last_Year | -6.268e-05 0.0222 | 0.019 | -3.904 1.165 | 0.000 | -0.015 | 0.059 |
| Num_Spex_EQs | | 0.019 | 0.350 | 0.726 | | 0.039 |
| Num_Spex_Props | 0.0746 0.3274 | 0.213 | | | -0.343 | 0.492 |
| Props_Last_Year | | | 1.795 | 0.073 | -0.030 | |
| Num_TMs | 0.0081 | 0.013 0.299 | 0.637 | 0.524 | -0.017 | 0.033 |
| Num_SPKRs | 1.1335 | | 3.787 | 0.000 | 0.547 | 1.720 |
| Avg_Pricepoint | 0.3799 | 0.085 | 4.449 | 0.000 | 0.213 | 0.547 |
| CX | 25.6570 | 16.031 | 1.600 | 0.110 | -5.766 | 57.080 |
| Finance | 41.0102 | 16.004 | 2.563 | 0.010 | 9.641 | 72.379 |
| HR | -131.0859 | 21.712 | -6.038 | 0.000 | -173.643 | -88.529 |
| Logistics | 28.9191 | 11.716 | 2.468 | 0.014 | 5.955 | 51.884 |
| Pharma | 78.7483 | 23.122 | 3.406 | 0.001 | 33.427 | 124.069 |
| Procurement | 83.9195 | 13.178 | 6.368 | 0.000 | 58.090 | 109.749 |
| Retail | -58.2963 | 11.560 | -5.043 | 0.000 | -80.956 | -35.637 |
| C-Level | 26.8527 | 14.440 | 1.860 | 0.063 | -1.451 | 55.156 |
| Consultant | -24.8530 | 37.816 | -0.657 | 0.511 | -98.975 | 49.269 |
| Director | 20.6079 | 12.298 | 1.676 | 0.094 | -3.498 | 44.714 |
| Manager | 4.2354 | 12.027 | 0.352 | 0.725 | -19.339 | 27.810 |
| Other | -8.3233 | 12.341 | -0.674 | 0.500 | -32.513 | 15.867 |
| VP | 50.3522 | 13.731 | 3.667 | 0.000 | 23.438 | 77.266 |
| Delegate_Sales | -185.8159 | 27.289 | -6.809 | 0.000 | -239.306 | -132.326 |
| ACD Conversion | -241.6378 | 35.301 | -6.845 | 0.000 | -310.832 | -172.444 |

The root mean square error of this initial model was \$429, which is nearly 25% of the average, or baseline, conference passes. Subsequent models were created to attempt to improve the RMSE.


Before evaluating the VIFs and addressing collinearity, there was an attempt to look at a model solely with some of the key features which would logically have the largest effects on the price paid:

OLS Regression Results

| OLS Regression Results | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------|----------|-------|----------|----------|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | |
| Model: | OLS | | | 0.438 | | | | |
| Method: | Least Squares | | | | 739.8 | | | |
| | on, 04 Mar 2019 | | | | 0.00 | | | |
| Time: | 17:51:29 | * | | | 765e+05 | | | |
| No. Observations: | 17.31.29 | AIC: | inoou: | | 753e+05 | | | |
| Df Residuals: | 17977 | BIC: | | | 755e+05 | | | |
| Df Model: | 17977 | BIC: | | ۷. | 733E+03 | | | |
| Covariance Type: | nonrobust | | | | | | | |
| covariance Type: | | | | | | | | |
| | coef | std err | | P> t | | 0.9751 | | |
| | | | | | [0.025 | 0.575] | | |
| const | 1660.6272 | 16.554 | 100.316 | 0.000 | 1628.180 | 1693.074 | | |
| Group Size | -42.6307 | 1.815 | -23.491 | 0.000 | -46.188 | -39.073 | | |
| Total Dels | 0.5481 | 0.080 | 6.821 | 0.000 | 0.391 | 0.706 | | |
| Days_Ahead_of_Event | -1.0273 | 0.082 | -12.500 | 0.000 | -1.188 | -0.866 | | |
| сх — — — | 256.0893 | | 13.716 | | 219.491 | 292.687 | | |
| Finance | 315.2602 | | 16.431 | 0.000 | 277.651 | | | |
| Pharma | 1351.5533 | 19.678 | 68.682 | 0.000 | 1312.982 | 1390.125 | | |
| Logistics | 260.5486 | 12.860 | 20.261 | 0.000 | 235.342 | 285.755 | | |
| HR | 260.5486 -387.3481 110.5695 | 25.355 | -15.277 | 0.000 | -437.046 | | | |
| Procurement | 110.5695 | 15.004 | 7.370 | 0.000 | 81.161 | 139.978 | | |
| Delegate Sales | -153.7055 | 5.514 | -27.877 | 0.000 | -164.513 | -142.898 | | |
| Full Delegate Sale | -93.3789 | | -11.294 | 0.000 | -109.585 | -77.173 | | |
| Booking Pattern Compar | ison -0.6910 | 0.052 | -13.362 | 0.000 | -0.792 | -0.590 | | |
| Total Guests | -2.0744 | 0.048 | -43.442 | 0.000 | -2.168 | -1.981 | | |
| Mktg Dels | -2.2637 | 0.300 | -7.536 | 0.000 | -2.852 | -1.675 | | |
| Num Active Inq | 0.3499 | 0.057 | 6.164 | | 0.239 | 0.461 | | |
| Spex Rev | 0.0005 | 1.7e-05 | 27.728 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | | |
| Director | | 10.322 | 5.058 | 0.000 | 31.981 | 72.446 | | |
| Manager | 13.2002 | 9.587 | 1.377 | | -5.592 | | | |
| VP | 125.7505 | 13.479 | 9.330 | 0.000 | 99.331 | 152.170 | | |
| Delegate_Sales | -153.7055 | 5.514 | -27.877 | 0.000 | -164.513 | | | |
| 0 | | | | | | | | |
| Omnibus: | 3724.419 | Durbin-Wat | | | 1.033 | | | |
| Prob(Omnibus): | 0.000 | | ra (JB): | 18 | | | | |
| Skew: | 0.913 | Prob(JB): | | - | 0.00 | | | |
| Kurtosis: | 7.660 | Cond. No. | | | .48e+21 | | | |

While it is interesting to see that nearly all of the features had a statistically significant effect on the final price and that the baseline (constant) was close to the average price-point, the explanatory strength of this model decreased and do did the RMSE. The RMSE of this model went up to \$507, meaning our error took us even further from the actual price paid.

As mentioned, the next step was to address collinearity. Firstly, the dummy variables were removed and subsequently by looking at a correlative heatmap (below) and the Variance Inflation Factors, some of the highly collinear variables were removed from the model.



The outcome of this exercise was a model in which all variables had low VIFs, although the explanatory strength of the model was lower than the baseline linear regression model:

OLS Regression Results

| Dep. Variable: Total_Net_Price | | R-squared: | | 0.170 | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|-------------|-------|-----------|----------|--|
| Model: | | OLS Adj. R-squared: | | 0.169 | | | |
| Method: | Least Squares | s F-statistic: | | 282.5 | | | |
| | n, 04 Mar 2019 | | | | 0.00 | | |
| Time: | 17:52:44 | Log-Li | kelihood: | -1 | .4117e+05 | | |
| No. Observations: | 17997 | AIC: | | | 2.824e+05 | | |
| Df Residuals: | 17983 | BIC: | | | 2.825e+05 | | |
| Df Model: | 13 | | | | | | |
| Covariance Type: | nonrobust | | | | | | |
| | coef | std err | | P> t | [0.025 | 0.975] | |
| const | 1983.2474 | 17.022 | 116.510 | 0.000 | 1949.882 | 2016.612 | |
| Group Size | -60.9438 | 2.197 | -27.736 | 0.000 | -65.251 | -56.637 | |
| Days Ahead of Event | -0.6802 | | -6.853 | | -0.875 | | |
| Avg_Cost_of_Acquisition | -0.7263 | 0.087 | -8.362 | 0.000 | -0.897 | -0.556 | |
| | -1.6651 | | -21.703 | | | | |
| Active Inq Del | 3.2628 | 0.235 | 13.910 | 0.000 | 2.803 | 3.723 | |
| Num Spex EQs | -0.0659 | 0.009 | -7.392 | 0.000 | -0.083 | -0.048 | |
| Num Spex Props | 0.9358 | 0.228 | 4.100 | 0.000 | 0.488 | | |
| Props Last Year | | | -8.703 | | -1.544 | -0.977 | |
| Num TMs | 0.0167 | 0.015 | 1.087 | 0.277 | -0.013 | 0.047 | |
| ACD Conversion | -251.5956 | 33.310 | -7.553 | 0.000 | -316.886 | -186.305 | |
| Full_Delegate_Sale | -358.4752 | 13.707 | -26.152 | 0.000 | -385.343 | -331.608 | |
| Inquiry Conversion | -217.8789 | 16.965 | -12.843 | 0.000 | -251.133 | -184.625 | |
| PDF_Conversion | -334.9936 | 15.076 | -22.220 | 0.000 | -364.545 | -305.442 | |
| Omnibus: | 4184.018 | Durbin | -Watson: | | 0.699 | | |
| Prob(Omnibus): | 0.000 | Jarque | -Bera (JB): | | 15244.757 | | |
| Skew: | 1.137 | Prob(J | B): | | 0.00 | | |
| Kurtosis: | 6.894 | Cond. | No. | | 1.02e+04 | | |

Warnings:

- [1] Standard Errors assume that the covariance matrix of the errors is correctly specified.
- [2] The condition number is large, 1.02e+04. This might indicate that there are strong multicollinearity or other numerical problems.

RMSE went further up as well, to over \$600.

There would be one more attempt to improve the linear regression models by looking only at the data of registrants through the marketing (online) channels, this in order to remove the human discounting bias of sales representatives over the phone. The resulting RMSE of \$552 showed that this discounting bias might not have been a major issue and unfortunately an improvement on the base linear model did not happen through these adjustments.

Random Forest:

Initial regressions using an out-of-the-box Random Forest gave similar results to the a linear model, with a score of .53 - very similar to the R-squared of the linear model. Hyperparameter tuning ensued using GridSearch. Finally, it seemed that a deeper tree (depth of 15) and more trees as part of the forest (100 estimators), gave a model that had a close fit with the test data:

```
from sklearn import tree
from sklearn.model selection import GridSearchCV
parameters = {'max depth':range(3,20), 'n estimators':[50,100]}
clf = GridSearchCV(RandomForestRegressor(random_state=1), parameters, n_jobs=4)
clf.fit(X=X_train, y=y_train)
tree_model = clf.best_estimator_
print (clf.best_score_, clf.best_params_)
print (tree model.score(X test, y test))
0.6942490063407305 {'max_depth': 15, 'n_estimators': 100}
0.7045193845165232
y = orders_merged_delegate_primary['Total_Net_Price']
X = orders merged delegate primary.drop('Total Net Price', 1)
X train, X test, y train, y test = train test split(X, y, test size=0.2, random state=1)
regr = RandomForestRegressor(max_depth=15, n_estimators=100, random_state=1)
regr.fit(X_train, y_train)
y pred = regr.predict(X test)
```

377.47535356025656

y_true = y_test.values

rms = np.sqrt(mean_squared_error(y_true, y_pred))

Indeed, this model also had a lower RMSE than any of the previous linear models or the initial attempts to model using a RandomForest.

Business Case:

Getting attendees to pay a price that is closer to the price paid by others with similar characteristics to them could offer a significant financial opportunity. While charging each person a different price for attendance might not be feasible, making some pricing decision can indeed have a large impact.

Just how large of an impact?

Calculating the RMSE from the average price paid per event instance as compared to the price paid for the ticket results in a price difference of \$542 on average. Comparing this to our models RMSE of \$377 shows a potential improvement of up to 30% from a pricing optimization that taken into account the models features.

Some immediate business recommendations include:

- Tickets sold offline show strong discounting incentivizing attendees to purchase passes online can result in an increase of over \$150 per ticket holding all else constant.
- There is a significant variation in pricing between events in different industries. For example, some models have shown that HR events charge \$360 less than a similar

purchased in a different vertical. It would be important to evaluate the opportunities in this market and test how they would impact the demand.

Future Scope of Work:


One of the downsides of these models is that they looked at passes purchased without considering the full demand equation and taking into consideration those people that inquires about events and did not purchase. Doing demand analysis using such data would be good next step in identifying what markets might have pricing power and could do with a price increase.

If time and resources would allow, considerations for continued work include:

- Monitoring the prices that are coming through by the utilization of the model. Are they
 improving the average prices and overall revenue?
- Increased data set that would include inquiries, to get a better idea of the demand model
- More quantitative data to be included in the model from other analytics sources for example Google Analytics (visits, page conversions, etc...) and company analytics (size, emploress, resources, etc...) as these would contribute to a greater demand and ability to pay.
- The biggest return for such analysis might be on the sponsorship side. A pricing
 optimization/demand analysis would be fruitful to understand optimal sponsorship
 behavior on events given company and event characteristics.
 - Some questions to be answered:
 - Do more speakers at an event contribute to greater sponsorships?
 - Does seniority of attendees have a major impact?
 - What type of inquiry behavior contribute to sponsoring an event (downloading brochure, attendee list, etc..)

Appendix A: Attendee types and purchase source

Bar chart of attendee seniority by type of attendee:




Attendee seniority by source of purchase:

| | index | Sales_Source_Cat | job_title | Registration_Type | as_percentage |
|----|-------|------------------|------------|-------------------|---------------|
| 0 | 0 | Delegate Sales | C-Level | 3871 | 9.68 |
| 1 | 1 | Delegate Sales | Consultant | 270 | 0.68 |
| 2 | 2 | Delegate Sales | Director | 9582 | 23.96 |
| 3 | 3 | Delegate Sales | Manager | 12307 | 30.78 |
| 4 | 4 | Delegate Sales | Other | 9213 | 23.04 |
| 5 | 5 | Delegate Sales | VP | 4741 | 11.86 |
| 6 | 6 | Marketing | C-Level | 1214 | 9.60 |
| 7 | 7 | Marketing | Consultant | 166 | 1.31 |
| 8 | 8 | Marketing | Director | 3184 | 25.18 |
| 9 | 9 | Marketing | Manager | 2769 | 21.90 |
| 10 | 10 | Marketing | Other | 3474 | 27.48 |
| 11 | 11 | Marketing | VP | 1837 | 14.53 |
| 12 | 12 | Production | C-Level | 4192 | 21.11 |
| 13 | 13 | Production | Consultant | 139 | 0.70 |
| 14 | 14 | Production | Director | 5614 | 28.27 |
| 15 | 15 | Production | Manager | 2383 | 12.00 |
| 16 | 16 | Production | Other | 3151 | 15.86 |
| 17 | 17 | Production | VP | 4383 | 22.07 |
| 18 | 18 | Sponsorship | C-Level | 3072 | 9.72 |
| 19 | 19 | Sponsorship | Consultant | 508 | 1.61 |
| 20 | 20 | Sponsorship | Director | 7417 | 23.48 |
| 21 | 21 | Sponsorship | Manager | 7101 | 22.48 |
| 22 | 22 | Sponsorship | Other | 8236 | 26.07 |
| 23 | 23 | Sponsorship | VP | 5257 | 16.64 |

Appendix B: Attendee types and purchase source

Box plot of average price-point by topic area:



Box plot of delegate revenue by topic area:

