

# **Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory**

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## **ABSTRACT**

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Motivation

The idea of robots or other intelligent agents living in a human environment has been a persistent aspiration from science fiction books to artificial intelligence and robotic laboratories. Collaborative robots are expected to become an integral part of human environments to accomplish their industrial and household tasks. In these environments, humans will be involved in the robots' operations and decision-making processes. The involvement of humans influences the efficiency of robots' interaction and performance, and makes the robots sensitive to human cognitive abilities and behaviors.

A key aspect of the sociability of robots is their ability to collaborate with humans in the same environment. Collaboration is a coordinated activity in which the participants work jointly to satisfy a shared goal [103]. There are many challenges in achieving a successful collaboration between robots and humans. To meet these challenges, it is crucial to understand what makes a collaboration not only successful, but also efficient. Existing computational models of collaboration explain some of the important concepts underlying collaboration; such as the presence of a reason for the collaborators' commitment, and the necessity of communicating about mental states in order to maintain progress over the course of a collaboration. The most prominent collaboration theories are based on plans and intentions [54] [103] [150], and are derived from Bratman's Belief–Desire–Intention (BDI) architecture

[26]. Two theories, Joint Intentions [54] and SharedPlans [100, 101, 103], have been used to support teamwork and collaboration between humans and robots or virtual agents [34] [171] [237] [266]. However, these theories explain only the structure of a collaboration. For instance, in SharedPlans theory collaborators build a shared plan containing a collection of beliefs and intentions about the actions in the plan. Collaborators communicate these beliefs and intentions via utterances about actions that contribute to the shared plan. This communication leads to the incremental construction of a shared plan, and ultimately successful completion of the collaboration. In contrast, in Joint Intentions theory, the notion of joint intention is viewed as a persistent commitment of the team members to a shared goal. In this theory, once an agent enters into a joint commitment with other agents, it should communicate its private beliefs to other team members.

Although existing collaboration theories explain the important elements of a collaboration structure, the underlying processes required to dynamically create, use, and maintain the elements of this structure are largely unexplained. In particular, a general mechanism has yet to be developed that allows an agent to effectively integrate the influence of its collaborator's perceived or anticipated emotions into its own cognitive mechanisms to prevent shared task failures while maintaining collaborative behavior. Therefore, a process view of collaboration must include certain key elements. It should inherently involve social interactions, since all collaborations occur between social agents, and it should contain a means of modifying the content of social interaction as the collaboration unfolds. The social functions of emotions explain some aspects of the underlying processes in collaboration. This thesis makes the case for emotion-driven processes within collaboration and demonstrates how it furthers collaboration between humans and robots.

## 1.2 Thesis Statement and Scope

In this thesis, we develop and validate a framework based on *Affective Motivational Collaboration* (AMC) theory which can improve the effectiveness of collaboration between agents/robots and humans. This thesis is based on the reciprocal influence of collaboration structure and the appraisal processes in a dyadic collaboration. We focus only on two-participant collaboration; teamwork collaboration is out of our scope. Furthermore, this work focuses on a) the influence of emotion-regulated processes on the collaboration structure, and b) prediction and interpretation of the observable behaviors of the other during a collaborative interaction.

We describe the cognitive processes involved in a collaboration in the context of a cognitive architecture. There are several well-developed cognitive architectures, e.g., Soar [137] and ACT-R [126], each with different approaches to defining the basic cognitive and perceptual operations. There have also been efforts to integrate affect into these architectures [61, 158]. In general, however, these cognitive architectures do not focus on processes to specifically produce emotion-regulated goal-driven collaborative behaviors. At the same time, existing collaboration theories, e.g., SharedPlans [103] theory, focus on describing the structure of a collaboration in terms of fundamental mental states, e.g., mutual beliefs or joint intentions. However, they do not describe the associated processes, their relationships, and influences on each other. *Affective Motivational Collaboration* theory deals with the major affect-driven processes having an impact on collaboration structure. This theory is informed by research in psychology and artificial intelligence which is reviewed in Chapter 2. Our contribution, generally speaking, is to synthesize prior work on appraisal<sup>1</sup>, collaboration, and motivation to provide a new computational theory of the prominent emotion-regulated goal-driven phenomena in a dyadic collaboration.

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<sup>1</sup>We have chosen appraisal-based modeling of emotions among several theories of emotions.

### 1.3 Contributions

Throughout this work we aim to show how a robot can leverage emotion-driven processes using appraisal algorithms to improve collaboration with humans. As such, in this thesis, we introduce a novel framework, called Affective Motivational Collaboration, which allows a robotic agent to collaborate with a human while incorporating underlying emotion-driven processes and the expressed emotion of the human collaborator. This framework is based on computational models of collaboration and appraisal allowing for task-driven interaction with robots or other agents. The theoretical foundation, computational models and algorithms, as well as the overall framework, and the end-to-end evaluation of the framework make the following contributions:

#### 1. Introducing *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*:

(Chapter 3) As mentioned earlier, since the theoretical foundation of AMC framework is built on the combination of SharedPlans theory of collaboration [103] and cognitive appraisal theory of emotions [162] [223], one of the contributions of our work is to introduce theoretical concepts incorporating key notions of both theories in a dyadic collaboration context. Applying cognitive appraisal theory in the collaboration context is novel. Other models of the appraisal theory have not paid attention to the dynamics of the collaboration.

#### 2. Developing new computational models and algorithms for *Affective Motivational Collaboration Framework*:

(Chapter 4) Another contribution of our work is to create computational models and algorithms to compute the value of appraisal variables based on the collaboration structure in a dyadic collaboration. Reciprocally, we use the evaluative nature of the appraisal to make changes to the collaboration structure as required. We have also developed a new algorithm for emotion-driven goal management in the context of collaboration. Goal management is one of




Figure 1.1: A robotic arm collaborating with a human to achieve a shared goal using *Affective Motivational Collaboration* framework.

the important functions of emotions during collaboration. Existing models and implementations of emotions focus only on how emotions regulate and control internal processes and sometimes behaviors. This part of our work shows how appraisal components of the self and the human collaborator contributes to goal management as an emotion function.

### 3. Implementing a computational system based on *Affective Motivational Collaboration* theory:

In order to evaluate our computational models and algorithms within an interaction with human collaborators, we needed an overall functional system to perceive, process and act in a collaborative environment. we have implemented a computational system which employs our models and algorithms for *Affective Motivational Collaboration* theory. Our computational system implements the

key concepts related to *Affective Motivational Collaboration* theory as well as minimal implementation of other processes which are required for validation of the model but are not part of this thesis' contributions. The emphasis of the implementation is on the underlying cognitive processes of collaboration and appraisal, however the implementation also includes the Perception and the Action mechanisms.

#### 4. Validating *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*:

(Chapter 5) We have conducted two user studies a) to validate our appraisal algorithms before further development of our framework, and b) to investigate the overall functionality of our framework within an end-to-end system evaluation with participants and a robot (see Figure 1.1). The second user study was also conducted to evaluate the benefit of using our computational framework in human-robot collaboration. In the first user study, we crowd-sourced questionnaires to test our hypothesis that our algorithms will provide answers similar to humans' to questions related to different factors within our appraisal algorithms. In the second user study, we investigated the importance of emotional awareness in human-robot collaboration, and the overall functionality of the AMC framework with the participants in our study environment.

# **CHAPTER 2**

## **BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK**

### **2.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, we start by reviewing the background of prominent collaboration theories including the SharedPlans theory [103] as one of the two theoretical foundations of our work. We discuss the similarities and differences between these theories as well as related theoretical and practical work and applications. We continue by discussing the concept of affective computing and the social and communicative aspects of emotions from a psychological point of view. Understanding the social aspects of emotions is important in our work, since our work is focused on collaboration which is a social phenomenon in human environments. We also present the concept of artificial emotions and provide some examples of the existing computational models of emotions. Then, we provide the background of the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions as the second theoretical foundation in our work as well as other computational models of emotions and the related concepts such as some examples of cognitive architectures and the influence of affect in decision-making procedures. This chapter continues with a description of motives and related theories in psychology and artificial intelligence. The role of motives as goal-driven affective components is crucial in our work, since the collaboration structure is based on the concept of a shared goal between collaborators. Finally, a brief description and the related work on theory of mind in psychology and artificial intelligence is provided as another concept used in a limited scale in our work.

## 2.2 Computational Theories of Collaboration

The construction of computer systems and robots that are intelligent, collaborative problem-solving partners is important in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its applications. It has always been important to make computer systems better at helping humans do whatever these systems are designed for. To build collaborative systems, we need to identify the capabilities that must be added to individual agents so that they can work with humans or other agents. As Grosz says, collaboration must be designed into systems from the start; it cannot be patched on later [97].

Collaboration is a special type of coordinated activity in which the participants work jointly, together performing a task or carrying out the activities needed to satisfy a shared goal [101]. Collaboration involves several key properties at both the structural and functional levels: most collaborative situations involve participants who have different beliefs and capabilities; most of the time, collaborators only have partial knowledge of the process of accomplishing the collaborative activities; collaborative plans are more than the sum of individual plans; collaborators are required to maintain mutual beliefs about their shared goal throughout the collaboration; they need to be able to communicate with others effectively; they need to commit to the group activities and to their role in it; collaborators need to commit to the success of others; they need to reconcile between commitments to the existing collaboration and their other activities; and they need to interpret others' actions and utterances in the collaboration context [98]. These collaboration properties are captured by existing computational theories of collaboration.

As mentioned above, to be collaborative, partners, e.g., a robot and a human, need to meet the specifications stipulated by collaboration theories. These theories argue for an essential distinction between a collaboration and a simple interaction or even a coordination [96, 152]. This section briefly provides descriptions of major computational collaboration theories, their similarities and differences, and their application in AI and robotics. It primarily focuses on Joint Intention, SharedPlans

and hybrid theories of collaboration. In this section, we do not present the theories in formal language, but rather describe their features in general terms.

The prominent collaboration theories are mostly based on plans and joint intentions [54] [103] [150], and were strongly influenced by the BDI paradigm introduced by Bratman [26] which is fundamentally reliant on folk psychology [198]. The two theories, Joint Intentions [54] and SharedPlans [103], have been used extensively to analyze and implement teamwork and collaboration.

The SharedPlans theory grew out of the theories of Bratman and Pollack [29, 189, 190], who outlined a mental-state view of plans in which having a plan is not just knowing how to do an action, but also having the intention to do the actions. Bratman's views of intention goes back to the philosophical views of Anscombe [6] and Castañeda [44] about intention. Also, as Grosz and Sidner mention in [103] the natural segmentation of discourse reflects intentional behaviors in each segment.

Cohen and Levesque also mention that in Joint Intentions theory their view of intention is primarily future-directed [55] which makes their view similar to Bratman's theory of intention [27], and contrary to Searle [230].

**Commitment** – One of the most important concepts in teamwork and collaboration is commitment. Collaboration theories are required to meet the notion of commitment, otherwise the participants are just doing some coordinated activities. Since the prominent computational collaboration theories, reviewed in this paper, are based on Bratman's view of intention, we briefly provide his view of commitment here before describing these theories. Bratman defines certain prerequisites for an activity to be considered shared and cooperative [28]. He stresses the importance of:

- a) **Mutual commitment to joint activity** – which can be achieved by agreement on the joint activity, and prevention of abandoning the activity without involving teammates;

- b) **Mutual support** – which can be achieved by team members if they actively try to help teammate activity;
- c) **Mutual responsiveness** – which means team members should take over tasks from teammates if necessary.

In the following sections, we will see how each collaboration theory addresses the notion of commitment.

### 2.2.1 SharedPlans Theory

The SharedPlans theory of collaborative action, developed by Grosz and Sidner [100, 101, 103], aims to provide the theoretical foundations needed for building collaborative robots or agents [97]. SharedPlans is a general theory of collaborative planning that requires no notion of joint intentions (see Section 2.2.2), accommodates multi-level action decomposition hierarchies and allows the process of expanding and elaborating partial plans into full plans. SharedPlans theory explains how a group of agents can incrementally form and execute a shared plan which then guides and coordinates their activity towards the accomplishment of a shared goal. SharedPlans is rooted in the observation that collaborative plans are not simply a collection of individual plans, but rather a tight interleaving of mutual beliefs<sup>1</sup> and intentions of different team members. In [101] Grosz and Kraus use first-order logic to formalize SharedPlans.

Grosz and Sidner in [103] present a model of plans to account for how agents with partial knowledge collaborate in the construction of a domain plan. They are interested in the type of plans that underlie discourse in which the agents are collaborating in order to achieve a shared goal. They propose that agents are building a shared plan in which participants have a collection of beliefs and intentions about the actions in the plan. Agents have a library of how to do their actions, i.e. recipes.

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<sup>1</sup>In our framework we also have the notion of *private* beliefs (vs. *shared* beliefs) which the other collaborator does not know about these beliefs.

These recipes may partially specify how an action is executed, or contributes to a goal. Then, each agent communicates its beliefs and intentions by making utterances about what actions they can contribute to the shared plan. This communication leads to the construction of a shared plan, and ultimately termination of the collaboration with each agent mutually believing that there exists one agent who is going to execute an action in the plan, and the fact that that agent has intention to perform the action, and that each action in the plan contributes to the goal [103] [153].

Later, we will see that to successfully complete a plan the collaborators must mutually believe that they have a common goal and have agreed on a sequence of actions for achieving that goal. They should believe that they are both capable of performing their own actions and intend to perform those actions while they are committed to the success of their plans.

## Recipes

The SharedPlans theory differentiates between knowing how to accomplish a goal (a recipe) and having a plan, which includes intentions. The SharedPlans definition of mutual beliefs states that when agents have a shared plan for doing some action, they must hold mutual beliefs about the way in which they should perform that action [101, 103]. Following Pollack [190], the term recipe refers to what collaborators know when they know a way of doing an action. Recipes are specified at a particular level of detail. Although the agents need to have mutual beliefs about actions specified in the recipe, they do not need to have mutual beliefs about all levels of performing actions. Therefore, having mutual beliefs of the recipe means that the collaborators hold the same beliefs about the way in which an action should be accomplished. Consequently, the collaborators need to agree on how to execute an action. Recipes are aggregations of action-types and relations among them. Action-types, rather than actions, are the main elements in recipes. Grosz and Sidner in their earlier work [103] have considered only simple recipes in which each recipe consisted of only

a single action-type relation [153]. Recipes can be partial, meaning they can expand and be modified over time.

Grosz and Sidner propose that collaboration must have the following three elements, which also indicates the importance of the shared plan:

1. the participants must have commitment to the shared activity;
2. there must be a process for reaching an agreement on a recipe for the group action;
3. there must be commitment to the constituent actions.

*Shared plan* is an essential concept in the collaboration context. The definition of the shared plan is derived from the definition of plans Pollack introduced in [189, 190] since it rests on a detailed treatment of the relations among actions and it distinguishes the intentions and beliefs of an agent about those actions. However, since Pollack's plan model is just a simple plan of a single agent, Grosz and Sidner extended that to plans of two or more collaborative agents. The concept of the shared plan provides a framework in which to further evaluate and explore the roles that particular beliefs and intentions play in collaborative activity [153]. However, Pollack's formulation of shared plans (a) could only deal with activities that directly decomposed into single-agent actions, (b) did not address the requirement for the commitment of the agents to their joint activities, and (c) did not adequately deal with agents having partial recipes [101]. Grosz and Kraus in [101], reformulate Pollack's definition of the individual plans [190], and also revise and expand the SharedPlans to address these shortcomings.

Figure 2.1 shows what we need to add to individual plans in order to have plans for group actions. The top of the figure lists the main components for individual plans. First, an individual agent needs to know the recipe for an action, whereas agents in a group need to have a mutual belief of a recipe for an action (bottom of the figure). In the case of a group plan, having a mutual belief of a recipe, leads

the agents to agree on how they are going to execute the action. Then, similar to individual agents that need to have the ability to perform the constituent actions in an individual plan and must have intentions to perform them, the participants in a group activity need to have individual or group plans for each of the constituent actions in the mutually agreed recipe [97, 103].

### PLANS FOR COLLABORATIVE ACTION

- To have an individual plan for an act, need
  - knowledge of a recipe
  - ability to perform subacts in the recipe
  - intentions to do the subacts
- To have a group plan for an act, need
  - mutual belief of a recipe
  - individual or group plans for the subacts
  - intentions that group perform act
  - intentions that collaborators succeed

Figure 2.1: Plans for collaborative action [97].

As shown in Figure 2.1 (bottom), plans for group actions include two essential constituents that do not have correlates in the individual plan. First, the agents need to have a commitment to the group activity; All the agents need to intend that the group will do the action. **For instance, when a robot and an astronaut are collaborating to install a solar panel, they need to have intentions to install the solar panel together.** Among other things, these intentions will keep them both working on the panels until the panels are installed. Second, the participants need to have some commitment to the other agents to succeed in their own their actions. For instance, the robot must have an intention that the astronaut be able to measure the quality of installation successfully. This intention will prevent the robot from interrupting the astronaut's measurement action or prevent the robot from using the astronaut's measurement tool [97, 103].

## Full Vs. Partial Shared Plan

The SharedPlans formalization distinguishes complete (full) plans and partial plans. A shared plan can be either a *Full Shared Plan (FSP)* or a *Partial Shared Plan (PSP)*. An *FSP* is a complete plan in which agents have fully determined how they will achieve a shared goal. A *PSP* definition provides a specification of the minimal mental state requirements for collaboration to exist and gives criteria governing the process of completing the plan.

An *FSP* to do  $\alpha$  represents a situation where every aspect of a joint activity  $\alpha$  is fully determined. This includes mutual belief and agreement in the complete recipe to do  $\alpha$ . A recipe is a specification of a set of actions  $A_i$ , which constitutes the performance of  $\alpha$  when executed under specified constraints.  $FSP(\mathbf{P}, \Theta, \alpha, T_p, T_\alpha, \mathbf{R}_\alpha)$  denotes a group  $\Theta$ 's plan  $\mathbf{P}$  at time  $T_p$  to do action  $\alpha$  at time  $T_\alpha$  using recipe  $\mathbf{R}_\alpha$ . In short, *FSP* holds if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. All members of group  $\Theta$  mutually believe that they intend to do  $\alpha$ .
2. All members of group  $\Theta$  mutually believe that  $\mathbf{R}_\alpha$  is the recipe for  $\alpha$ .
3. For each step  $A_i$  in recipe  $\mathbf{R}_\alpha$ :
  - A subgroup  $\Theta_j$  has an *FSP* for  $A_i$ , using recipe  $\mathbf{R}_{A_i}$ .
  - Other members of group  $\Theta$  believe that there exists a recipe such that subgroup  $\Theta_j$  can bring about  $A_i$  and have an *FSP* for  $A_i$ .
  - Other members of group  $\Theta$  intend that subgroup  $\Theta_j$  can bring about  $A_i$  using some recipe.

Most times a team and its members do not possess an *FSP* to achieve their shared goal. In this case, the concept of *FSP* puts limits on the SharedPlans theory. However, SharedPlans uses the concept of *PSP* as a snapshot of the team's mental states in different situations, which further leads to communication and planning to fulfill the conditions of an *FSP*. The idea behind *PSP* is enabling the agents to

modify the shared plan over the course of planning without impairing the achievement of the shared goals. Notice that for the same reason recipes also can be partial [101, 103].

## Communicating Intentions

In SharedPlans theory Grosz and Sidner are interested in the type of plans that underlie a discourse in which the agents collaborate to achieve a shared goal. Here we present their view of discourse structure, since it is directly related to the intentions behind collaborators' actions. In [103], Grosz and Sidner argue that the SharedPlans theory recognises three interrelated levels of discourse structure, and the components of the discourse structure are a trichotomy of linguistic structure, intentions structure and the attention state. In their work, the linguistic structure of a discourse is a sequence of utterances aggregating into discourse segments just as the words in a single sentence form constituent phrases. They also discuss the idea of the discourse purpose as the intention that underlies engagement in the particular discourse. They believe this intention is the reason behind performing a discourse rather than some other actions, and also the reason behind conveying a particular content of the discourse rather than some other contents. They describe mechanisms for plan analysis looking at Discourse Segment Purposes (DSPs). In fact, the DSPs specify how the discourse segments contribute to achieving the overall discourse purpose. Finally, the third component in their theory, the attentional state, provides an abstraction of the agent's focus of attention as the discourse unfolds. The focusing structure contains DSPs and the stacking of focus spaces reflects the relative salience of the entities in each space during the discourse. In short, the focusing structure is the central repository for the contextual content required for processing utterances during the discourse [103]. Using discourse plans can help to encode the knowledge about conversation.

## Intention-to and Intention-that

In Grosz and Sidner's SharedPlans theory [103], two intentional attitudes are employed: *intending to* (do an action) and *intending that* (a proposition will hold). The notion of *intention to*, as an individual-oriented intention, models the intention of an agent to do any single-agent action while the agent not only believes that it is able to execute that action, but it also commits to doing so. In short, it is an intention to perform an action, similar to Bratman's view of intention. In contrast with *intention to*, an *intention that*, as an intention directed toward group activity, does not directly imply an action. In fact, an individual agent's *intention that* is directed towards its collaborators' action or towards a group's joint action. *Intention that* guides an agent to take actions (including communication), that enable or facilitate other collaborators to perform assigned tasks. This leads an agent to behave collaboratively. Therefore, agents will adopt intentions to communicate about the plan [101]. As another difference, *Intention to* commits an agent to means-end reasoning and acting [26] while *Intention that* does not necessarily entail this commitment. The key point about *Intention to* and *intention that* is that both commit an agent not to adopt conflicting intentions, and constrain replanning in case of failure. Further, an agent can *intention that* another agent achieve the specified proposition.

### 2.2.2 Joint Intentions Theory

Following Bratman's guidelines, Cohen and Levesque propose a formal approach to building artificial collaborative agents. The Joint Intentions theory of Cohen and Levesque [54, 55, 56, 57, 146] represents one of the first attempts to establish a formal theory of collaboration, and due to its clarity and expression, is a widely used teamwork theory.

The basic idea of Joint Intentions theory is based on individual and joint intentions (as well as commitments) to act as a team member. Their notion of joint

intention is viewed not only as a persistent commitment of the team to a shared goal, but also implies a commitment on part of all its members to a mutual belief about the state of the goal. In other words, Joint Intentions theory describes how a team of agents can jointly act together by sharing mental states about their actions while an intention is viewed as a commitment to perform an action. A joint intention is a shared commitment to perform an action while in a group mental state [55].

In [54] Cohen and Levesque establish that joint intention cannot be defined simply as individual intention with the team regarded as an individual. The reason is that after the initial formation of an intention, team members may diverge in their beliefs and their attitudes towards the intention. Instead, Cohen and Levesque generalize their own definition of intention. First, they present a definition of individual persistent goal (see Section 2.2.2) and individual intention (see Section 2.2.2). Then, they define analogues of these concepts by presenting mutual belief in place of individual belief. The definition of joint persistent goal (see Section 2.2.2) requires team members to commit to informing other members, if it comes to believe that the shared goal is in its terminal status. As a result, in Cohen and Levesque’s theory, a team with a joint intention is a group that shares a common objective and a certain shared mental state [121].

In this theory, once an agent entered into a joint commitment with other agents, the agent should communicate its private beliefs with other team members if the agent believes that the joint goal is in its terminal status, i.e., either the joint goal is achieved, or it is unachievable, or irrelevant [263]. Thus, as we mentioned above, team members are committed to inform other team members when they reach the conclusion that a goal is achievable, impossible, or irrelevant. For instance, if a robot and an astronaut are collaborating to install a solar panel, and the robot reaches the conclusion that the welding tool has a deficiency, it is essential for the robot to have an intention to communicate with the astronaut and make this knowledge common. Therefore, according to this theory, in a collaboration, agents can count on the commitment of other members, first to the goal and then to the mutual belief

of the status of the goal.

## Individual Commitment

As we mentioned earlier, intentions and commitments are the basic ideas of Joint Intentions theory. Here, we provide the definition of “individual commitment” (also called *persistent goal*) by Cohen et. al. in [53]. According to their definition an agent has a persistent goal relative to q to achieve p only when:

1. agent believes that p is currently false;
2. agent wants p to be true;
3. it is true (and agent knows it) that (2) will continue to hold until the agent comes to believe either that p is true, or that it will never be true, or that q is false.

Note that the condition q is an “escape” clause, which can be omitted for brevity, or it can be used as a reason for the agent to drop a commitment, even though it could be quite vague.

## Individual Intention

As we mentioned above, Joint Intention theory adopts Bratman’s view of future-directed properties of intention. In this theory, an intention is defined to be a commitment to act in a certain mental state. In other words, an agent intends relative to some condition to do an action when it has a persistent goal or commitment (relative to that condition) of having done the action and, moreover, believing throughout that it is doing that action [54].

Intention inherits all the properties of commitment (e.g., consistency with mental states). Typically, an agent uses an intention as a decision within a subgoal-supergoal hierarchy to do a particular action. For instance, initially, the agent

commits to  $p$  becoming true without having any concern about who or how  $p$  is going to be accomplished. Then, the agent commits to  $x$  or  $y$  as a mean to accomplish  $p$ . Lastly, the agent selects one of the actions (e.g.,  $x$ ) and forms an intention to do it. This intention will be given up when for whatever reason  $p$  is accomplished.

## Joint Commitment

Before discussing joint commitment, we provide the definition of the *Weak Achievement Goal* (WAG) concept in Joint Intentions theory which shows the state of a team member nominally working on a goal. The concept of WAG is used to provide the definition of the Joint Commitment in this theory.

An agent has a WAG relative to  $q$  and with respect to a team to bring about  $p$  if either of the following conditions holds:

- The agent has a normal achievement goal to bring about  $p$ ; that is, the agent does not yet believe that  $p$  is true and wants  $p$  to be true as a goal.
- The agent believes that  $p$  is true, will never be true, or is irrelevant, but has as a goal that the status of  $p$  be mutually believed by all the team members.

**Joint commitment** – A joint intention of a team  $\Theta$  is based on its joint commitment, which is defined as a *Joint Persistent Goal* (JPG). A JPG to achieve a team action  $p$ , denoted  $JPG(\Theta, p)$  requires all team members to mutually believe that  $p$  is currently false and want  $p$  to eventually be true. A JPG guarantees that team members cannot decommit until  $p$  is mutually known to be *achieved*, *unachievable* or *irrelevant*. Basically,  $JPG(\Theta, p)$  requires team members to each hold  $p$  as a *Weak Achievement Goal* (WAG), where  $WAG(\mu, p, \Theta)$  in which  $\mu$  is a team member in  $\Theta$ , requires  $\mu$  to achieve  $p$  if it is false. However, if  $\mu$  privately believes that  $p$  is either achieved, unachievable or irrelevant,  $JPG(\Theta, p)$  is dissolved, but  $p$  is left with a commitment to have this belief become  $\Theta$ 's mutual belief. Such a commitment is

required to establish mutual belief in  $\Theta$ ; this commitment typically makes an agent communicate with its teammates [54].

An important consequence of achieving joint commitment in a team is that it predicts future communication which is critical within the course of a collaboration. Thus, this communication leads team members to attain mutual beliefs which is a fundamental concept in teamwork activities. Notice that the minimum mutual belief for team members to attain is the achievement or failure of the shared goal which terminates collaboration.

### **Joint Intention**

Joint intention is defined to be a joint commitment to the team members trying to do a joint action. Based on Cohen and Levesque's definition of joint intention, a team of agents jointly intends (relative to some escape condition) to do an action if and only if the members have a JPG (relative to that condition) of them having the action completed, and having it completed mutually believing throughout that they are doing it (knowingly) [54].

### **Teamwork & Communication**

In summary, according to Joint Intentions theory, the notion of teamwork is characterized by joint commitment, also known as joint persistent goal (see Section 2.2.2). The definition of JPG states that the agents mutually believe they have the appropriate goal, and that they mutually believe a persistent weak achievement goal (which represents the one-way commitment of one agent directed towards another) to achieve it persists until the agents mutually believe that the goal has either been achieved, or become impossible, or irrelevant.

Joint Intentions theory claims that an efficient collaboration requires communication. Sharing information through communication is critical given that collaborators have different capabilities, and each individual often has only partial knowledge rel-

event to solving the problem, and sometimes diverging beliefs about the state of the collaborative activity. Communication is important in coordinating team members' roles and actions to accomplish their goal. For instance, it can help team members to establish and maintain a set of mutual beliefs regarding the current state of the collaboration, and the respective roles and capabilities of each member.

### 2.2.3 STEAM – A Hybrid Approach

Tambe in [249] argues that teamwork in complex, dynamic, multi-agent domains requires the agents to obtain flexibility and reusability by using integrated capabilities. Tambe created STEAM (simply, Shell **TEAM**work) based on this idea. STEAM's operationalization in complex, real-world domains is the key in its development to addressing important teamwork issues, some of which are discussed in Section 2.2.6. STEAM is founded on the Joint Intentions theory and it uses joint intentions as the basic building block of teamwork while it is informed by key concepts from SharedPlans theory.

Building on the well developed theory of joint intentions [54] and SharedPlans [101, 103], the STEAM teamwork model [249] was operationalized as a set of domain-independent rules that describe how teams should work together. According to Tambe, there are several advantages due to this use of Joint Intentions theory, such as achieving a principled framework for reasoning about coordination and communication in a team, which the joint intention can provide. Another advantage is the guidance for monitoring and maintenance of a team activity which the joint commitment in joint intention again provides. And lastly, Tambe believes the joint intention in a team can facilitate reasoning about team activity and team members' contribution to that activity.

However, he also believes that for a high level team goal, one single joint intention is not sufficient to achieve all these advantages. Thus, STEAM borrows some of the concepts of SharedPlans theory. First, STEAM uses the concept of “intention that” (see Section 2.2.1) towards an activity as well as the fact that SharedPlans

theory mandates team members' mutual belief in a common recipe and shared plans for individual steps in the common recipe. Thus, in this case, SharedPlans helps STEAM to achieve coherency within the teamwork. Besides, STEAM uses joint intentions to ensure the teamwork coherency to build the mental attitudes of team members. In other words, as the recipe evolves, STEAM requires all team members to agree on the execution of a step and form joint intentions to execute it while other joint intentions are formed, leading to a hierarchy. A second concept STEAM borrows from SharedPlans is the amount of information that a team member needs to know to perform an action. According to SharedPlans, team members require to know only that a recipe exists to enable them to perform actions (not recipe details – see Section 2.2.1). Similarly in STEAM, team members only track the subteam or individual team member responsible to perform a specific step; this tracking does not need detailed plan recognition. The third issue is parallel to what is called an unreconciled case in SharedPlans theory, which in STEAM is handled by replanning and communication between team members assigning the unassigned or unachieved task. The last issue is communication between team members which also borrows the concept of “intention that” from SharedPlans theory, to help the generalization of STEAM’s communication capabilities beside what Joint Intentions theory offers.

In summary, STEAM builds on both Joint Intention theory and SharedPlans theory and tries to overcome their shortcomings. Based on joint intentions, STEAM builds up hierarchical structures that parallel the SharedPlans theory. Hence, STEAM formalizes commitments by building and maintaining Joint Intentions, and uses SharedPlans to formulate the team’s attitudes in complex tasks.

In [249] Tambe argues that the novel aspects of STEAM relate to its teamwork capabilities. The key novelty in STEAM has team operators beside individual team member operators. In STEAM when agents select a team operator for execution, they instantiate a team’s joint intentions. Team operators explicitly express a team’s joint activities, unlike the regular individual operators which express an agent’s own activities. Hence, STEAM agents maintain their own private (to apply individual

operators) and team states, e.g., mutual belief about the world (to apply team operators).

However, Tambe added more practical concepts into STEAM’s architecture. For instance, STEAM has a team synchronization protocol to establish joint intention (see JPG in Section 2.2.2), or it has constructs for monitoring joint intentions which helps the agent to be able to monitor team performance. STEAM facilitates this monitoring by exploiting its explicit representation of team goals and plans. In particular, STEAM allows an explicit specification of monitoring conditions to determine achievement, unachievability or irrelevancy conditions of team operators. Finally, in STEAM, communication is driven by commitments embodied in the Joint Intentions theory, i.e., team members may communicate to obtain mutual belief while building and disbanding joint intentions. Thus, joint intentions provide STEAM with a principled framework for reasoning about communication. Also, STEAM addresses some practical issues, not addressed in other teamwork theories. One of these issues is STEAM’s detailed attention to communication overheads and risks, which can be significant [248]. Furthermore, operationalization of STEAM is based on enhancements to the Soar architecture [137], plus a set of about 300 domain-independent Soar rules.

#### 2.2.4 Other Approaches

There are other frameworks, approaches, and models focusing on teamwork and collaborative agents. For instance, Jennings provides the Joint Responsibility framework which is specified formally using modal, temporal logic. Joint Responsibility stresses the role of joint intentions (based on Joint Intentions theory) specifying how both individuals and teams should behave whilst engaged in collaborative problem solving [122, 123, 124, 125]. Jennings has developed *Generic Rules and Agent model Testbed Environment* (GRATE) as a prototype system based on the Joint Responsibility framework. In [131] Kinny et. al. elaborate the concept of Planned Team Activity and introduce a language for representing joint plans for teams of agents

and describe how agents can organize the formation of a skilled team to achieve a joint goal. They use joint intentions to capture the mental properties which characterize team activity.

### 2.2.5 Similarities and Differences

There are some similarities between SharedPlans and Joint Intentions theories. Here, we specify some of these similarities:

1. Similar to SharedPlans theory, Joint Intentions theory specifies what it means for agents to execute actions as a team [246].
2. Both theories follow Bratman's basic ideas about the roles of intention in relational actions which prevent the collaborative agents from adopting conflicting intentions. Besides, these two theories also follow Bratman's BDI model.
3. Just as SharedPlans theory, Joint Intentions theory also states that a joint action could not be seen as a collection of individual actions but as agents working together who need to share beliefs.
4. Both theories in their latest articles show that the agents are required to communicate to maintain collaboration. SharedPlans theory requires collaborators to communicate to establish and maintain the shared plan which is crucial especially when collaborators only have a partial shared plan. Similarly in Joint Intentions theory, communication is an explicit requirement of collaborative agents until the shared goal is achieved, unachievable or irrelevant.
5. Both Joint Intentions and SharedPlans theories are concerned about commitment to the joint activity. Although, these two theories use different concepts to fulfill the requirements of commitment during collaboration.

There are also differences between SharedPlans and Joint Intention theories; we address some of them here:

1. The crucial components of the SharedPlans theory (see Section 2.2.1) lack the notion of a joint intention, which is the most significant notion within the Joint Intentions theory; Grosz and Sidner do not believe that such a phenomenon (joint intention) exists in a collaboration. They believe their notion of “intention that” and mutual beliefs about states of the collaboration can provide similar functionalities as described in Joint Intentions theory (see Section 2.2.2).
2. In SharedPlans theory teammates agree on the shared plan, whereas in Joint Intentions theory teammates agree on intentions.
3. In contrast to Joint Intentions, the SharedPlans theory employs hierarchical structures over intentions, thus it overcomes the shortcoming of a single joint intention for complex team tasks.
4. The SharedPlans theory describes the way to achieve a common goal through the hierarchy of plans, whereas the Joint Intentions theory describes only this common goal [239].
5. Joint Intentions theory assumes that knowledge about the teammates is always available, whereas SharedPlans theory uses the concept of partial plan/recipe to make the process of dynamically achieving information possible throughout the collaboration.
6. Communication requirements are derived from “intention that” in SharedPlans theory, as opposed to being “hard-wired” in Joint Intentions theory.

**A critique to Joint Intention theory** – Castelfranchi criticizes the necessary and sufficient conditions (see Section 2.2.2) for the joint persistent goal which plays a crucial role in the Joint Intentions theory. According to his example, if a French scientist and an American scientist are both working on an AIDS vaccine and both have the final goal of p “vaccine anti-AIDS be found” relative to the belief q that “if

vaccine is found, AIDS is wiped out”, they both share the mental attitudes described in Joint Intentions theory. It means that they mutually believe that  $p$  is currently false, and they mutually know they both want  $p$  to be true, and it is true that until they come to believe either that  $p$  is true, that  $p$  will never be true, or that  $q$  is false, they will continue to mutually believe that they each have a weak achievement goal (see Section 2.2.2) relative to  $q$  and with respect to the team (i.e., the WAG with respect to the team has been defined as “a goal that the status of  $p$  be mutually believed by all the team members”). The problem is that we can not claim the French and American professors are working as a team. In fact, given their personal goals of finding the vaccine, they might come to strongly compete with each other [45].

### 2.2.6 Applications of Collaboration Theories

There are many research focusing on different aspects of collaboration based on different collaboration theories, i.e., SharedPlans, Joint Intentions, and hybrid theories of collaboration. In this section, we provide some examples of homogeneous and heterogeneous agent/robot and human collaborations.

There are some works focusing on the concepts of robot assistants [49], or teamwork and its challenges at cognitive and behavioral levels [177, 214]. Some researchers have an overall look at a collaboration concept at the architectural level. In [82] authors present a collaborative architecture, COCHI, to support the concept of emotional awareness. In [75] authors present the integration of emotional competence into a cognitive architecture which runs on a robot, MEXI. In [244] authors discuss the challenges of integrating natural language, gesture understanding and spatial reasoning of a collaborative humanoid robot situated in space. The importance of communication during collaboration has also been considered by some researchers from human-computer interaction and human-robot collaboration [48, 166, 204] to theories describing collaborative negotiation, and discourse planning and structures [5, 102, 236]. There are other concepts such as joint actions and commitments [99],

dynamics of intentions during collaboration [146], and task-based planning providing more depth in the context of collaboration [39, 202]. The concept of collaboration has also received attention in the industry and in research in robotic laboratories [93].

**Applications of SharedPlans Theory** – COLLAGEN [203, 204] is the first implemented system based on the SharedPlans theory. It incorporates certain algorithms for discourse generation and interpretation, and is able to maintain a segmented interaction history, which facilitates the discourse between the human user and the intelligent agent. The model includes two main parts: (1) a representation of a discourse state and (2) a discourse interpretation algorithm for the utterances of the user and agent [205]. In [108] Heeman presents a computational model of how a conversational participant collaborates in order to make a referring action successful. The model is based on the view of language as goal-directed behaviour, and in his work, he refers to SharedPlans as part of the planning and conversation literature. In [153], Lochbaum and Sidner modify and expand the SharedPlan model of collaborative behavior [103]. They present an algorithm for updating an agents beliefs about a partial shared plan and describe an initial implementation of this algorithm in the domain of network management. Lochbaum, in [152], provides a computational model (based on the collaborative planning framework of SharedPlans [101]) for recognizing intentional structure and utilizing it in discourse processing. In short, she presents a SharedPlans model for recognizing Discourse Segment Purposes (DSPs) [103] [236] and their interrelationships. CAST (Collaborative Agents for Simulating Teamwork) [266] [267] is a teamwork framework based on the SharedPlans theory. CAST focuses on flexibility in dynamic environments and on proactive information exchange enabled by anticipating what information team members will need. Petri Nets are used to represent both the team structure and the teamwork process, i.e., the plans to be executed. Researchers in [114] discuss developing an ontology of microsocial concepts for use in an instructional system for teaching cross-cultural communication. They believe being acquainted

with one another is not a strong enough relationship from which to create a society. Hence, there is a need for commitment and shared plans (as the basis of social life) to achieve a shared goal. In this work, Grosz and Sidner’s SharedPlans theory [103] is used to explain the concept of shared plans within the interpersonal relationships of societies in an industrial environment. In [119] Hunsberger and Grosz discuss the idea of whether the rational, utility-maximizing agents should determine commitment to a group activity when there is an opportunity to collaborate. They call this problem the “initial-commitment decision problem” (ICDP) and provide a mechanism that agents can use to solve the ICDP. They use the representation of action, act-types and recipes in the SharedPlans theory. In [269] an integrated agent-based model for Group Decision Support Systems is proposed and discussed. The decisional model that authors outline in this paper is based on the SharedPlans theory. Rauenbusch and Grosz in [197] formally define a search problem with search operators that correspond to the team planning decisions. They provide an algorithm for making the three types of interrelated decisions by recasting the problem as a search problem. Their model respects the constraints on mental states specified by the SharedPlans theory of collaboration. Babaian et. al. in [12] describe Writer’s Aid, a system that deploys AI planning techniques to enable it to serve as an author’s collaborative assistant. While an author writes a document, Writer’s Aid helps in identifying and inserting citation keys and by autonomously finding and caching potentially relevant papers and their associated bibliographic information from various on-line sources. They believe the underlying concepts of SharedPlans is relevant since in collaborative interfaces like Writers Aid, the users establish shared goals with the system and user and the system both take initiative in satisfying them. In [171] researchers address high-level robot planning issues for an interactive cognitive robot that acts in the presence of or in collaboration with a human partner. They describe a Human Aware Task Planner (HATP) which is designed to provide socially acceptable plans to achieve collaborative tasks. They use notions of plans based on SharedPlans theory. In [237] Sidner and Dzikovska

argue that robots, in order to participate in conversations with humans, need to make use of conventions of conversation and the means to be connected to their human counterparts. They provide an initial research on engagement in human-human interaction and applications to stationary robots in hosting activities. They believe hosting activities are collaborative because neither party completely determines the goals to be undertaken nor the means of reaching the goal. To build a robot host, they rely on an agent built using COLLAGEN which is implemented based on the SharedPlans theory.

**Applications of Joint Intentions Theory** – In [131] authors introduce a language for representing joint plans for teams of agents. They describe how agents can organize the formation of a suitably skilled team to achieve a joint goal, and they explain how such a team can execute these plans to generate complex, synchronized team activity. In this paper, authors adopt the underlying concepts of the Joint Intentions theory as the structure of their collaborative agents. Breazeal et. al. in [34] present an overview of their work towards building socially intelligent, cooperative humanoid robots, such as Leonardo, that can collaborate and learn in partnership with humans. They employ the Joint Intentions theory of collaboration to implement the collaborative behaviors while performing a task in collaboration with humans. In [246] the researchers' goal is to develop an architecture (based on the concepts of Joint Intentions theory) that can guide an agent during collaborative teamwork. They describe how a joint intention interpreter that is integrated with a reasoner over beliefs and communicative acts can form the core of a dialogue engine. Ultimately, the system engages in dialogue through the planning and execution of communicative acts necessary to attain the collaborative task at hand. Mutlu et. al. in [175] discuss key mechanisms for effective coordination toward informing the design of communication and coordination mechanisms for robots. They present two illustrative studies that explore how robot behavior might be designed to employ these mechanisms (particularly joint attention and action observation) to improve

measure of task performance in human-robot collaboration. Their work uses Joint Intentions theory to develop shared task representations and strategies for task decomposition. The system GRATE\* by Jennings [124] is based on the Joint Intention theory. GRATE\* provides a rule-based modelling approach to cooperation using the notion of Joint Responsibilities, which in turn is based on Joint Intentions. GRATE\* is geared towards industrial settings in which both agents and the communication between them can be considered to be reliable.

**Applications of Hybrid Theories** – This domain independent teamwork model, STEAM, has been successfully applied to a variety of domains. From combat air missions [112] to robot soccer [134] to teams supporting human organizations [195] to rescue response [215], applying the same set of STEAM rules has resulted in successful coordination between heterogeneous agents. The successful use of the same teamwork model in a wide variety of diverse domains provides compelling evidence that it is the principles of team-work, rather than exploitation of specific domain phenomena, that underlies the success of teamwork based approaches. In [159] authors provide their RoboCup (robotics soccer testbed) in which their focus is on teamwork and learning challenges. Their research investigation in RobotCup is based on ISI Synthetic, a team of synthetic soccer-players. They also investigate the use of STEAM as their model of teamwork which is influenced by the Joint Intentions and SharedPlans theories. In [127] researchers propose a behavioral architecture C<sup>2</sup>BDI that allows the enhancement of the knowledge sharing using natural language communication between team members. They define collaborative conversation protocols that provide proactive behavior to agents for the coordination between team members. Their agent architecture provides deliberative and conversational behaviors for collaboration, and it is based on both of the SharedPlans and Joint Intentions theories.

## 2.3 Emotions and Affective Computing

According to Picard [187], the term affective computing encapsulates a new approach in Artificial Intelligence, to build computers that show human affection. Studies show that the decision making of humans is not always logical [95], and in fact, not only is pure logic not enough to model human intelligence, but it also shows failures when applied in artificial intelligence systems [69].

If we want robots and virtual agents to be more believable and efficient partners for humans, we must consider the personal and social functionalities and characteristics of emotions; this will enable our robots to coexist with humans, who are emotional beings. To have a better understanding of applications of affective computing, we can categorize the whole existing literature of computational emotion modeling and their applications into four major categories of: a) detecting and recognizing human emotions, b) interpreting and understanding human emotions, c) generating artificial emotions and applying the underlying processes to exploit emotion functions, and d) expressing human-perceivable emotions during interaction.

There are some major emotion theories including *appraisal*, *dimensional* and *discrete (basic)* theories, some of which have corresponding computational models, e.g., EMA [162] and WASABI [22, 23]. These models have been used in different domains including AI and robotics. Modeling and applying these theories can help robots and virtual agents to achieve communicative, evaluative, interpretive, and regulatory aspects of emotions in some or all of the four application domains we mentioned above.

This section provides descriptions of major computational emotion theories, their comparison, and their applications in AI and robotics. It includes the existing influential computational emotion theories as well as the underlying psychological theories; it majorly focuses on appraisal and dimensional theories, although it briefly mentions other approaches, e.g. discrete (basic) emotions.

### **2.3.1 Affect and Emotions**

Emotion affects not only what people do, but also the way they do it [60]. Aristotle in *The Nicomachean Ethics* reveals his idea about emotions. He says “Anyone can become angry—that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way—this is not easy [7].”

Intelligence is the process that humans use to explain the different degrees of adaptive success in one’s behavior. It is a set of mental abilities that enables a human to comprehend, reason and adapt in the environment, and as a result, act effectively and purposefully in that environment. Emotions play a crucial role in humans’ explanation of intelligent behaviors. Emotions significantly impact the procedures of action generation, execution, control, and interpretation [272] in different environments. Emotions are conceptualized as ongoing processes rooted in dynamic social contexts, which can shape both implicit and explicit emotional responses [156]. An emotion is a dynamic episode that not only makes changes in cognitive states, but also produces a sequence of response patterns on body movements, posture, voice and face [222]. Emotions typically occur in response to an event, usually a social event, real, remembered, anticipated, or imagined. They are associated with distinctive relational meanings [185]. These relations can be with the individual’s past experience, the individual’s surrounding objects and environment, or the other individuals with or without mutual beliefs in a dyadic or a group setting. Emotions are evaluative and responsive patterns that serve the function of providing appraisal about whether the ongoing event is harmful, threatening or beneficial for the well-being of an individual [272]. Consequently, reasoning and emotional processes have an integral and a supportive relationship, rather than an antagonistic and a conflicting one.

A better question than what emotions are, is the question of what they can do, and how they impact humans’ life. Emotions impact fundamental parts of cognition

including perception, memory, attention and reasoning [50]. This impact is caused by the information emotions carry about the environment and event values. The influence of emotions depends on an individual’s focus of attention. For instance, a positive affect can cause a positive attitude towards an object if the individual’s focus is on the object, whereas the same positive affect can be interpreted as a positive feedback towards one’s partner during the course of a collaboration. As another example, a positive feedback can promote certain cognitive processes, or it can inhibit other cognitive processes according to the conditions in the environment [51]. In both cases, emotions play a regulatory role for cognitive processes [94]. Some of the effects flow from underlying shifts in the way people perceive and think under the influence of emotion.

### 2.3.2 Emotion in Social Context

In this section, we discuss the importance of studying emotions within a social context. This perspective is important in our research because our work is focused on collaboration as a particular social setting between individuals. Understanding the dynamics of collaboration requires one to understand influential underlying components. We have chosen to study emotion as a crucial underlying component in humans’ social life which will be discussed in detail throughout this section.

Emotions are involved in developing social contexts. Humans are social and most of the causations and constitutions of their emotions are social. Brian Parkinson in [183] argues that many of the causes of emotions are interpersonal and communicative rather than internal and reactive phenomena. There are different social aspects of emotions influenced by various factors such as social context and social relationship type. For instance, a dominant-submissive social relationship can cause and contain different emotions with different intensities compared to a reciprocal or a friendship social relationship type. As another example, an emotion can be interpreted in a certain way when an individual is situated in an environment with other people who are expressing a particular emotion.

As mentioned earlier, the social context is an important factor influencing one's emotions. A dyadic interaction is one type of a setting in a social context. Dyadic interaction tasks allow us to study emotion in a social setting [52]. Dyadic interaction tasks make it possible to examine how individuals experience and express emotions during social interactions and how emotions shape and are shaped by the reciprocal interactions between individuals. In addition, eliciting and monitoring emotional processes yields useful information about the role emotion plays in interpersonal relationships. Compared with other emotion-eliciting events, events in a dyadic interaction can better help us study an ongoing emotional relationship between two individuals in addition to their internal emotional and cognitive processes. Dyadic interaction tasks are ideal for studying a range of emotional responses because of the fairly unstructured conversations between the individuals. Thus, dyadic interaction tasks will generate a wide range of emotions in comparison with the controlled emotion-eliciting events.

There are numerous ways that emotions can be social [254]. There is a consensus on the fact that social events and entities surrounding the individual play an essential role in the generation of emotion. There are several ways in which other people elicit emotional responses in us. One is that we feel the emotions of those around us. Also, we have emotions about actions of those people around us. Another is we have emotions about the things that happen to other people. Yet another is our concern about our relationship with others that elicits emotion in us. The groups to which we belong can also elicit our emotions. Moreover, we can feel emotion about the success and failure of our own group or of other groups. In addition, groups or individuals may make salient cultural concerns or societal expectations that can elicit our emotions.

Beside the fact that social context can elicit emotions in individuals, social context provides information about what emotion should be expressed, by whom, and in what situations. For instance, people are well aware of the inappropriateness of expressing too much emotion to acquaintances [254]. However, the social knowl-

edge of emotion expression is only partially delivered in an explicit fashion. There are studies on the regulatory role of society and social relationships on emotions, showing that people's emotions become socialized in implicit and unconscious ways. From this perspective, social context can control and direct our attention toward certain types of events and away from others.

Humans are emotional and social beings. Their emotions and the social context in which they are involved have mutual impacts on each other. But, what if humans can share their emotions with others just as they share their thoughts, resources and their environment. Sharing an emotion with others may alter the experience of an event. For instance, according to the nature of the relationship between the individuals, the expression of emotions can either restrain them from further interactions or improve their relationship. Furthermore, individuals sharing emotions might possess a shared understanding of their environment. Socially shared and regulated emotions also provide social meanings to the events happening in the environment [264]. For instance, people are likely to make social inferences based on the presence or absence of particular emotions in their social environment. Moreover, emotions can provide a basis for judgment depending on the individual's relationships with others. In other words, emotions can associate or disassociate an individual, therefore, they can change or maintain the individual's social relationships [254].

Emotions can also play the role of a motivator in a social context. There is a subset of social emotions delineated as role-taking emotions in [233]. Shott provides two categories of *reflexive* (e.g. shame or pride) and *empathic* (e.g., empathy or pity) role-taking emotions. The reflexive emotions can motivate the individual's self-control which depends on the anticipated reactions of others to the individual's behaviors. For instance, guilt might lead the individual to behave altruistically to restore a positive social stance for that individual. Empathic or vicarious emotions are based on an individual mentally placing himself in other's situation to understand how the other feels in that situation. These emotions motivate prosocial behaviors to maintain an individual's internal well-being [252].

### 2.3.3 Communicating Emotions

Humans need to communicate their emotions within the social context for different reasons. In [85] Goffman argues that human behaviors around others are performative which is often intended to convey information to others. When human's actions are visible in the social context, they behave differently in the presence of the others [268]. The social life of an individual is comprised of the individual's internal cognitive competencies and his interactions in the society. Lazarus says, if society is a fabric, then emotion is its color [140]. Although emotions undeniably have personal aspects, they are usually experienced in a social context and acquire their significance in relation to this context [156].

There are several events that can elicit emotions in social contexts. For instance, during the interaction the cause of an emotion can be verbal (an utterance during conversation), nonverbal (someone's gesture), personal thoughts (interpretation of an event), or even emotions themselves (e.g., happiness for a partner's sense of pride). An utterance can include content and relational meaning. The content carries the information about the topic or the subject of the interaction, and the relational meaning reveals the meaning between the speaker and the hearer. An emotion might seem to be elicited by the content of the utterance, but in fact it is an individual's response to the relational meaning [188].

The interpretation of these relational meanings are handled by the appraisal of the events. Appraisal processes (see Section 4.3) also give us a way of viewing emotion as social [258]. Meaning is created by an individual's social relationships and experiences in the social world. Individuals communicate these meanings through utterances. Utterances in emotionally charged conversations, by their very nature, are supposed to inform the others about something novel. Novelty is an essential component of an event for appraisal. Conversations also possess the concept of consistency because the utterances with consistent meaning constitute the individual's underlying beliefs. Relevancy is another component of an event that can be assessed

by appraisal. The degree to which the individual's personal and mutual beliefs are strong and related controls emotionally rich social contexts. In other words, the more divergent the individual's beliefs, the more effort is required to converge (to be understood) which leads to more emotional responses in individuals. From another point of view, human speech carries emotional information in the semantics and in the speech prosody. The semantics or the content of what an individual says includes obvious expression of emotion. However, the prosody holds more detailed emotional information by combining non-semantic cues in spoken language (e.g., rhythm and intonation) [154].

Interpretation of the events in the social context requires a baseline for the individual's assessment process. Goals as the pillar of collaborative interactions can provide this baseline for an individual. Goals are crucial in relational meanings of the events in a social context. The facilitation, interference and inhibition of goals are each correlated with certain type of emotions. In most conversations during collaboration goals can be categorized into three different groups: goals related to accomplishing a task, goals to reveal one's personal beliefs, and goals to regulate one's social relationships [188]. For instance, for task-related goals, utterances related to accomplished tasks reveal joyful relational meaning; utterances related to impeded tasks reveal disappointing relational meanings which can lead to anger, and utterances related to tasks with no or little progress reveal the frustration of the individuals. Lastly, all these emotional responses in a social context will not only regulate or maintain individual's actions to reveal or hinder an intention, but also can control the way that action should be taken.

A successful and effective emotional communication necessitates ongoing reciprocal adjustments between interactants that can happen by interpreting each other's behaviors [156]. It not only requires proper interpretation of the other's expressions, but also correct assessment of the extent to which others can read an individual's expressions. In emotional communication, individuals are constantly exchanging messages about their mental states, and modifying each other's emotional responses

as they occur. Individuals perceive other's emotional states through verbal and non-verbal responses during the interaction by processing relevant messages. Communication dynamics represent the temporal relationship between these communicative messages. The verbal and nonverbal messages from one participant are better interpreted inside the correct context including the history and the ongoing messages from the other individuals. Interpersonal dynamics (also known as micro-dynamics in sociology) represent this influence of relationships between individuals [172].

#### 2.3.4 Social Functions of Emotions

Humans are able to communicate their emotions in a social context. The social functions of emotions are the reason behind why humans try to communicate their emotions. Ekman in [70] asserts that the primary function of emotions is to mobilize the organism to deal with important interpersonal encounters. Darwin in [62] argues the significance of social communicative functions of emotions. Emotions describe interpersonal dynamics in a way that they can constitute individuals' relationships [183, 254]. One aspect of expressing and communicating emotion in a social context is to express one's social motives and intentions [110]. Another aspect of communicating emotions is to reveal the underlying mental states of an individual [184]. In other words, emotions constitute two different functionalities of expressing communicative signals associated with one's social motives and intentions as well as expressing one's internal states and how one feels about something. In [135] Van Kleef has discussed the idea of inferential processes with which individuals can infer information about others' feelings, relational orientations and behavioral intentions based on their emotional expressions. He also argues that emotional expressions can impact social interactions by eliciting others' affective responses.

Functional accounts vary according to the kind of system being analyzed. Therefore, functional approaches to the emotions should vary by level of analysis. Social functions of emotions can be analyzed in *individual*, *dyadic*, *group* and *cultural* levels. The focus of this research is on social functions in dyadic interaction (more

specifically collaboration); these functions are also considered at the individual's level especially when interpreting the other collaborator's behaviors. Studies in all these levels share a few assumptions about social accounts of emotions. They assume a) individuals are social by nature and pursue solutions to survival problems in social relationships, b) individuals apply their emotions to coordinate their social interactions and relationships to address these survival problems, c) emotions are processes mediating the individuals' relations to their dynamic environment [129]. In dyadic interactions, studies focus on how emotions impact the interactions of individuals in meaningful relationships. In [129] Keltner and Haidt discuss that in a dyadic setting, researchers mostly focus on communication of emotion (e.g. Scherer [217], DePaulo [66]), properties (e.g. emotion contingency, emotion synchrony) of dyadic emotions (e.g. Levenson & Gottman [144]), discourse (e.g. Bretherton [36]), and attachments (e.g. Hazan & Shaver [107]).

### **Examples of Social Emotions:**

There are many different types of emotions, some of which are considered social, since they appear and provide meaning in social context. Here, we provide four examples of these emotions as well as their social functions to show how social functions of emotions impact individuals and the groups they belong to, and what causes them to be expressed by an individual.

**Guilt** – The function of guilt is to positively direct our behavior toward our group. We feel guilt when we hurt someone in our group, or when we fail to reciprocate care or kindness. Guilt motivates us to not hurt people in our group and to give back to others who have given to us, and in this way we strengthen the survival prospects of both the group and ourselves.

**Shame** – The function of shame is twofold. On the one hand, it keeps us within the rules and norms of society by informing us when we have done something dishonorable, disgraceful, or in some way condemned by our group. On the other hand,

it informs the other members of our group that we know that we have dishonored ourselves. The main difference between guilt and shame is that guilt is focused on a behavior, whereas shame is focused on ourselves.

**Embarrassment** – Embarrassment is related to shame, but includes some important differences. Embarrassment can only happen in public, whereas shame can happen when we are alone. We can feel embarrassment about very minor issues that have no moral implications, such as body odor, whereas shame typically concerns more grave issues with moral implications.

**Pride** – The function of pride is to reinforce when we or another person has done or represented something the group finds excellent. In this way, group values are reinforced and incentivized, which again helps the group to function better and motivates us to do things the group values. There is a negative form of pride in which our internal appraisal of our worth is inflated compared to the opinions of others, which is more correctly called hubris.

### 2.3.5 Artificial Emotions

Emotions, as an integral part of rational behavior, provide adaptive values for an artificial creature. They can control an agent's *attention* to focus on the most salient and relevant stimulus to solve the immediate problem. They can also help an agent to *monitor its own performance* so that the agent can make alterations on goals and plans. Emotions can act as a *memory filter* allowing a better recall of the events that are congruent with current cognitive and emotional states [30]. *Assisting the reasoning process* is another role of emotions; they assist the reasoning process by directing the cognitive information processes to the perceptual cues. Emotions impact the transformation of the agent's *decision-making behavior* [84] leading to a particular type of actions in a certain type of environment [272]. Emotions can *govern behavior tendencies* by providing immediate emotional responses, e.g., avoidance of elaborate reasoning because of lack of time or an unconcerned situation. Furthermore, emotions *provide support for social interactions* by helping the agent to

understand others' behaviors as well as making expressions of the agent's internal states more perceivable during the interaction [81].

The importance of these values of emotions for designing social agents having artificial emotions is prominent. However, the question is what problems are we facing in designing an effective social agent? In [63] authors discuss some of these problems and provide references speculating on the nature, function and mechanisms of emotions. Also, the importance of emotions and the incorporation of emotions in intelligent systems as well as implementation of emotions in several multi-agent systems are presented in [164]. Scheutz discusses the role of emotions in artificial intelligence and how we can determine the utility of emotions for the design of an artificial agent [225]. In [25] authors present a definition and theory of artificial emotions viewed as a sequential process comprising the appraisal of the agent's global state; they also show how emotions are generated, represented and used in the Salt and Pepper architecture for autonomous agents. From the behavior perspective, appropriately timed and clearly expressed emotions are a central requirement for believable agents [19].

There are several architectures modelling emotions for the purpose of enhancing the believability and effectiveness of the agents and robots. But the question is how do we model emotions? Hudlika in [117] deconstructs the concept of emotion modelling into: (a) fundamental categories of processes for emotion generation and emotion effects, and (b) identification of some of the fundamental computational tasks required to implement these processes. These building blocks can be helpful as a guideline for the systematic development of new computational models, or for the assessment of existing computational models of emotions as discussed in [148] and [163]. There are also logical formalizations of emotions and emotional attitudes (including speech acts) and corresponding mental states to provide a systematic analysis of computational models of emotions [1, 88, 104].

From another perspective, the necessity of employing emotions in robotics and more specifically social robots has been argued in [186] and [242]. Social robotics

and cognitive robotics have many overlapping concepts, especially when they focus on interaction between a robot and a human. The relationship between cognition and emotion receives more attention due to the mutual influences they have on each other [173, 228]. For instance, in [81] authors employ emotions in the learning procedure of a robot, and in [38] and [224] authors discuss the importance of emotions in the action selection procedure of an agent or a robot, impacting the behavior arbitration and self-adaptation mechanisms. Ultimately, employing artificial emotions will impact the context of human-robot/computer interaction [115] and how humans and robots understand each other’s emotions in a social environment [132, 176]. In [207] authors selected twelve autonomous agents that incorporate an emotion mechanism into the action selection procedure to compare. They introduced a framework based on correlations between emotion roles performed and aspects of emotion mechanisms used to perform those roles. Gratch and Marsella also present one method to evaluate a computational model of emotion in [90] which compares behavior of the model against human behavior.

### 2.3.6 Cognitive Architectures

There are several integrated cognitive architectures trying to produce all aspects of behavior as a single system while remaining constant across different domains [126, 137]. The comparison of underlying philosophy and functional description of the most prominent cognitive architectures have been surveyed; several criteria are provided to evaluate such architectures [47, 139, 253]. The necessity of integrating these cognitive architectures with robots has been discussed from the perspective of developmental psychology [10, 67, 128]. There are also many examples emphasizing the importance of cognitive robotics from this perspective. Some of these cognitive architectures are biologically inspired, e.g., *eBICA* [211], or [20] and [199], while some others are inspired by psychological theories, e.g., *ACT – RΦ* [61], or [170] and [68], while some of them also incorporate the concept of affect in their design [40].

## 2.4 Computational Models of Emotions

There are different types of computational theories of emotion. These theories differ in the type of relationships between their components and whether a particular component plays a crucial role in an individual emotion. For instance, the basic component of an emotion can be the behavioral tendencies, the cognitive elements, or the somatic processes. Emotion theories can also differ based on their representational distinction.

### 2.4.1 Appraisal Theory

Appraisal theories of emotion were first formulated by Arnold [9] and Lazarus [140] and then were actively developed in the early 80s by Ellsworth and Scherer and their students [206] [212] [216] [221] [223]. The emotional experience is the experience of a particular situation [79]. Appraisal theory describes the cognitive process by which an individual evaluates the situation in the environment with respect to the individual's well-being and triggers emotions to control internal changes and external actions.

### Componential Approach

This approach emphasizes the distinct components of emotions, and is often called the *componential* approach [145]. The “components” referred to in this approach are the components of the cognitive appraisal process. These are referred to as *appraisal variables*, and include *novelty*, *valence*, *goal relevance*, *goal congruence*, and *coping abilities* (further on, in this section, some of the appraisal variables used in computational models are introduced) [216, 223]. A stimulus, whether real or imagined, is analyzed in terms of its meaning and consequences for the agent, to determine the affective reaction. The analysis involves assigning specific values to the appraisal variables. Once the appraisal variable values are determined by the organisms evaluative processes, the resulting vector is mapped onto a particular emotion, within



Figure 2.2: Schematic view of the componential theory of emotion [118].

the n-dimensional space defined by the n appraisal variables. The semantic primitives for representing emotions within this model are thus these individual appraisal variables. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship of the individual appraisal dimensions to the broader categories of evaluations taking place during appraisal (Relevance, Implications, etc.).

### Component Process Model

The Component Process Model (CPM) is Scherer's influential and major theory of emotions [218, 223]. This theory focuses on the dynamic unfolding of emotions. The CPM suggests that an event and its consequences are appraised with a set of criteria on multiple levels of processing (the appraisal component). The result of the appraisal will generally have a motivational effect, often changing or modifying the motivational state before the occurrence of the event. Based on the appraisal results and the motivational changes, some effects will occur in the autonomic and somatic nervous system. The CPM considers emotions as the synchronisation of many dif-

ferent cognitive and physiological components. Emotions are identified with the overall process whereby low level cognitive appraisals, in particular the processing of relevance, trigger bodily reactions, behaviours and subjective feelings. The model suggests that there are four major appraisal objectives required to adaptively react to a salient event [220]:

- a) **Relevance:** How relevant is this event for the agent? Does it directly affect the agent or its social reference group?
- b) **Implications:** What are the implications or consequences of this event and how do they affect the agent's well-being and its immediate or long-term goals?
- c) **Coping Potential:** How well can the agent cope with or adjust to these consequences?
- d) **Normative Significance:** What is the significance of this event for the agent's self-concept and for social norms and values?

To attain these objectives, the agent evaluates the event and its consequences on a number of criteria or *Stimulus Evaluation Checks* (SECs), with the results reflecting the agents subjective assessment of consequences and implications on a background of personal needs, goals, and values [223]. Figure 2.3 shows the postulated sequence, the cognitive and motivational inputs and the effects on response systems. Also, the bidirectional effects between appraisal and other cognitive functions are illustrated by the arrows in the upper part of Figure 2.3.

## Appraisal Process

According to this theory, appraisals are separable antecedents of emotion, that is, the individual first evaluates the environment and then feels an appropriate emotion [223]. The appraisal procedure begins with the evaluation of the environment according to the internalized goals and is based on systematic assessment of several elements [218]. The outcome of this process triggers the appropriate emotions.



Figure 2.3: Comprehensive illustration of the CPM of emotion [220, 223].

In many versions of appraisal theory, appraisals also trigger cognitive responses often called *coping strategies*. In fact, the coping mechanism manages the individual's action with respect to the individual's emotional state and the existing internal and/or external demands [77]. The large majority of computational models of emotions are based on this theory. An individual can also use knowledge about the emotional reactions of others to make inferences about them. According to the appraisal patterns, different emotions can be experienced and expressed. Since expression of emotions reflects one's intentions through the appraisal process, the *reverse appraisal* mechanism helps one to infer others' mental states based on their expressions. [64, 106].

Appraisal process is typically viewed as the cause of emotion and the cognitive and behavioral changes associated with emotion. For instance, a particular pattern of the appraisal variables (i.e., individual judgements) will elicit a certain emotion

or emotional expressions. These appraisal variables include [162]:

- **Relevance:** A relevant event has non-zero utility for an agent. This relevancy can either be based on a negative influence of an event on the agent or a positive one.
- **Perspective:** The point of view in which an event will be judged, e.g. self or other.
- **Desirability:** A desirable event advances a state of the utility for an agent whose perspective is being taken, or if it is an undesirable event, inhibits that.
- **Likelihood:** A measure of likelihood of the outcome.
- **Expectedness:** The extent to which the truth value of a state could have been predicted from causal interpretation.
- **Causal Attribution:** The agent who deserves the credit/blame.
- **Controllability:** Whether the outcome can be altered by the agent whose perspective is taken (this variable is related to the coping process).
- **Changeability:** Whether the outcome can be altered by some other causal agent (this variable is related to coping process).

## Coping Process

Another key process involved in appraisal is the coping process. This process determines whether and how the agent should respond with respect to the outcome of appraising the events. There are several coping strategies that computational models like EMA [92] use as control signals. These control signals enable or suppress the cognitive processes that operate on the causal interpretation of the appraisal patterns. The coping process controls the congruency of the actions according to these

patterns. As it is shown below, in [92] coping strategies are organized into two categories: *problem-focused* and *emotion-focused*. Problem-focused coping strategies can be applied when the agent must do something with respect to the problem, whereas Emotion-focused coping works by changing one's interpretation of circumstances. The following is a short list of a broad range of coping strategies [92]:

### Problem-focused coping

- **Active coping:** Taking active steps to remove or circumvent the stressor,
- **Planning:** Coming up w/ action strategies,
- **Seeking social support for instrumental reasons:** Seeking advice, assistance, or information.

### Emotion-focused coping

- **Seeking social support for instrumental reasons:** Getting sympathy, moral support or understanding,
- **Acceptance:** Accepting the stressor and learning to live with it,
- **Restraint coping:** Waiting till the appropriate opportunity (holding back).

### OCC, a Structural Appraisal Theory of Emotion

OCC (Ortony, Clore and Collins) model, similar to Lazarus' [141] and Scherer's [216] cognitive views, considers emotions to arise from affective or valenced reactions subsequent to the appraisal of a stimulus as being beneficial or harmful to one's concern [178]. The model categorizes emotions based on their underlying appraisal patterns. These patterns are fundamental criteria a person employs for evaluating a situation. They involve the person's focus of attention, her concern, and her appraisal preceding an affective reaction. Figure 2.4 shows main building blocks of OCC model.



Figure 2.4: A simple visualization of OCC model [178].

As shown in Figure 2.4, a person could alternatively have three types of focuses. These types of focuses are consequence of events, actions of agents, and aspects of objects. The person evaluates the significance of causes behind these three types of focuses based on her personal concern. As a result, an affective reaction will be elicited resulting in an emotion. Various combinations of the elements depicted in Figure 2.4 create specific patterns demonstrating six main groups of emotions in which all emotion types in a group share the same cognitive pattern. Emotion groups are *fortune-of-others*, *prospect-based*, *well-being*, *attribution*, *well-being/attribution-compound*, and *attraction*. The OCC model introduces 22 emotion types. These emotions are introduced each as representative of a family of similar emotions with various intensities (since relying on a list of discrete emotions that is understood by everyone equally is impossible due to people's language barriers and various interpretations of the actual words). For instance, happiness can be referred to by other emotion terms such as joy, cheerfulness, gladness, delighted while they all share the same eliciting conditions. Thus the emotion types used in the model (e.g., relief, love, pride, and shame) are meant to represent an emotional experience rather than a lexical taxonomy.

For instance, as shown in Figure 2.4, the appraisal criterion for consequences

of events is their *desirability* for achieving one's goals. This generates the affective reaction of being *pleased* in positive cases, or *displeased* in negative ones. Figure 2.5 shows the resulting emotion groups in OCC model such as *fortune-of-others* (e.g., gloating, pity), *prospect-based* (e.g., satisfaction, relief), and *well-being* (e.g., joy, distress) [178]. The appraisal of the praiseworthiness of the actions of an agent against one's personal standards, as well as the appealing aspects of objects happens in the same way as shown in Figure 2.4.




Figure 2.5: OCC taxonomy of emotion triggers and emotions [178].

Finally, the OCC model introduces some global variables of an emotion's in-

tensity to distinguish all types of emotions that a person could experience when encountering events, agents or objects. These variables are as follows

1. Sense of reality (representing the degree to which the event, agent or object in focus appear real to the person),
2. Proximity variable (representing the psychological proximity of an event, agent or object),
3. Unexpectedness (representing how surprising an event is for one, either positive or negative),
4. Arousal (representing how arousing an event, agent or object is).

#### **2.4.2 Other Computational Models**

##### **Constructivist (Dimensional) Emotion Theories**

The components and dimensions of emotions were the subject of much speculation since the 19th century. Dimensional models of emotion attempt to conceptualize human emotions by defining where they lie in two or three dimensions. Dimensional theories of emotion argue that emotion should be conceptualized, as points in a continuous (typically two or three) dimensional space rather than looking at them as discrete entities [43] [168] [209] [261].

Two dimensions that are commonly proposed to describe emotions are valence and physiological arousal [9] [141] [208]. Models based on dimensional theories contrast theories of basic emotion, which propose that different emotions arise from separate neural systems [192]. Many dimensional theories argue that discrete emotion categories (e.g., sadness, fear and anger) have no “reality” in that there are no specific brain regions or functions that correspond to specific emotions [18]. Dimensional theories do not emphasize the term emotion.

One of the most prominent two-dimensional models is Russell’s circumplex model [208]. Russell suggested that affective states are all related to each other systemati-




Figure 2.6: Russell's suggested affective states based on core affect [209].

cially through what is called core affect [208, 209] (see Figure 2.6) and emotions are best described as a change in core affect which, in turn, is describable as a point in a space between two bipolar dimensions. One dimension is *valence* or how good or bad objects and events are for a being ranging from pleasant to unpleasant. The other dimension is *arousal*, ranging from calm to excited. Russell put a number of affective states around a circular space between those two dimensions (see Figure 2.6) which is also known as *circumplex*, representing the variety of core affects [208, 209]. Since sometimes two-dimensional space cannot easily differentiate among emotions that share the same values of arousal and valence, e.g., anger and fear (both characterized by high arousal and negative valence), some of the dimensional models incorporate valence and arousal as well as *intensity*, or *dominance* or *stance* dimensions. Many computational dimensional models build on the three dimensional PAD model of Mehrabian and Russell [168] where these dimensions correspond to pleasure (a measure of valence), arousal (indicating the level of affective activation) and dominance (a measure of power or control). Figure 2.7 shows these three dimensions.




Figure 2.7: Three dimensional model of pleasure, arousal and dominance as tripartite view of experience [17].

### Basic (Discrete) Emotion Theories

Basic emotion theories are inspired by Tomkins' [255] rediscovery of Darwin's work [62, 110] which were later developed by Ekman [70] and Izard [120]. These theories emphasize a small set of discrete and fundamental emotions. The underlying assumption of this approach is that these emotions are mediated by associated neural circuitry, with a hardwired component [70]. Different emotions are then characterized by stable patterns of triggers, behavioral expression, and associated distinct subjective experiences. The emotions addressed by these theories are typically called the *basic* emotions. Emotions including happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust are often considered to comprise the most prototypical basic emotions [70]. The theory of basic emotions holds that there is a set of emotions shared by all humans that evolved to deal with ancestral life challenges [70]. For instance, disgust evolved to address the challenge of avoiding noxious stimuli, and fear evolved to address the challenge of avoiding dangers. Because of the emphasis on discrete categories of states, this approach is also termed the *categorical* approach [182]. Much of the supporting evidence offered for the theory comes from experiments that show




Figure 2.8: Basic emotions and corresponding expressions.

how certain facial expressions are universally associated with specific basic emotions, regardless of the observer's cultural background. This universality has a production side and a recognition side. On the production side, a particular emotional state is said to elicit a facial expression comprised of a fixed set of facial muscles. On the recognition side, observers are able to infer the emotional state of the person who expresses an emotion, due to the direct correspondence between emotional states and the facial expressions they cause. Computational models inspired by the basic emotions or discrete approach often focus on low-level perceptual-motor tasks and encode a two-process view of emotion that argues for a fast, automatic, undifferentiated emotional response and a slower, more differentiated response that relies on higher level reasoning processes (e.g., [8]).

There are other approaches that different researchers take based on their emphasis on the applicability of emotions in their systems.

### Rational Approaches

Rational approaches start from the question of what adaptive functions emotions serve and then attempt to incorporate these functions into a model of intelligence. Emotion, within this approach, is simply another set of processes and constraints that have adaptive value. Models of this sort are most naturally directed towards the goal of improving theories of machine intelligence [4] [227] [238].

### Communicative Approaches

Communicative theories of emotion argue that emotion processes function as a communicative system. They can function first, as a mechanism for informing other individuals of one's mental state (thereby facilitating social coordination), and second, as a mechanism for requesting/demanding changes in the behavior of others. Communicative theories emphasize the social-communicative function of expressions [89]. Computational models inspired by communicative theories focus on machinery that decides when an emotional expression can have a desirable effect on a human counterpart.

#### 2.4.3 Similarities and Differences

Different theoretical perspectives should not be viewed as competing for a single truth. They should be seen as distinct perspectives, each arising from a particular research area (e.g., biological vs. social psychology), focusing on different sets of affective phenomena, considering distinct levels of resolution and fundamental components (e.g., emotions vs. appraisal variables as the distinct primitives). These different perspectives also provide different degrees of support for the distinct processes

of emotion, e.g., the componential theories provide extensive details about cognitive appraisals [118]. Therefore, this section provides a pairwise comparison between these fundamental theories. Note that a distinct pairwise comparison will not be provided for appraisal vs. discrete (basic) emotion theories as important points are adequately covered in the comparisons presented below.

### **Dimensional Vs. Discrete (Basic) Emotion Theories**

The fundamental assumption of the basic emotion theory is that a specific type of event triggers a specific affect program corresponding to one of the basic emotions and producing characteristic expression patterns and physiological response configurations [221]. Dimensional theory's main criticism of basic emotions theory is based on the observation that affective phenomena appear to be both qualitatively and quantitatively diverse.

Russell in [209] argues the labels such as “fear”, “anger”, “happiness” do not capture this diversity. For instance, one might say: a) a person being chased by an assailant brandishing a knife, b) a person who retreats from an insect moving across the floor, and c) a person who is concerned they will never find a fulfilling career are all in a state of fear. On the basic emotions account, an emotional episode involves fixed patterns of neurophysiological and facial expression changes in response to an eliciting stimulus that are distinct between emotions, but are the same within the same emotional category [70]. If this were the case, one would expect that the three individuals described above would respond to their eliciting stimuli in the same way, yet a similarity of behavioral responses between these three cases seems unlikely. Dimensional theorists, in contrast, would argue that the individuals in the above three cases are applying the concept of fear to experience, despite the fact that each individual has a unique core affect. While basic emotion theorists would hold that since all three individuals are experiencing fear, they would perform the same behavioral responses to the stimuli, dimensional theorists would argue this is not the case, as each individual bears a core affective state that is distinguished from the

other two. For instance, the individual's arousal in response to an armed assailant should be higher than the individual in response to an insect, as the former case poses a threat to their life. As a result, the individual in the first case would likely make every effort to escape from the assailant, including trying to negotiate and plead with the assailant, while the individual in the second case would be relatively less dedicated to escaping the insect.

In sum, dimensional theory is compatible with the differences in the behavioral responses to eliciting stimuli, while basic emotions theory only allows for a single fixed behavior of responses to a given emotion. Furthermore, dimensional theories can represent instances of basic emotions (see Figure 2.9), for example, fear elicited by a snake (green rectangle), in terms of variation along affective dimensions, i.e., arousal and valence.




Figure 2.9: Representing basic emotions within a dimensional framework [105].

Also, basic emotion theory fails to account for affect that lacks object-directedness [209]. In the basic emotions approach, an emotion is supposed to have an intentional

object it is directed towards (e.g., being angry at someone, or being sad for someone). The dimensional theory argues that emotion may not necessarily be aimed at a particular object. For instance, an individual can experience a certain type of emotion (e.g., anger) without knowing of anything in particular that has offended her. Dimensional models of emotion are therefore capable of accounting for a wider range of affective phenomena than basic emotions theory.

Another difference between dimensional and basic emotion theories is that the basic emotion categorization of emotions captures facets of the experience of an emotion not conveyed by the dimensional description, such as elicitation of a facial expression of the emotion. In fact, this attribute of the basic emotions theory is one of the major differences with all other emotion theories. As it is argued in basic emotion theory, basic emotions are hard-wired to their corresponding facial expressions. Ekman who elaborated the concept of basic emotions, developed the *Facial Action Coding System* (FACS) which encodes movements of individual facial muscles and it is a common standard to systematically categorize the physical expression of emotions [71].

### **Appraisal Vs. Dimensional Emotions Theories**

Dimensional theories might struggle to adequately distinguish emotions because of the existence of limited dimensions.

To compare the appraisal and dimensional theories of emotion, we can argue that there is a relationship between the dimensions in the constructivist or dimensional theory of emotion and appraisal dimensions. For instance, the pleasure dimension roughly maps onto appraisal dimensions that characterize the valence of an appraisal-eliciting event (e.g., intrinsic pleasantness –desirability–, or goal congruence), dominance roughly maps onto the appraisal dimension of coping potential, and arousal can be considered as a measure of intensity. However, they also have quite different meanings. Appraisal (as mentioned earlier) is a relational construct characterizing the relationship between some specific object/event in the environ-

ment and the individual's mental constructs including beliefs, motives and intentions and several appraisals may be simultaneously active; whereas emotions in dimensional emotion theory are non-relational constructs, each summarizing a unique overall state of the individual.

Furthermore, dimensional emotion theories emphasize different components of emotion than appraisal theories and link these components quite differently. In contrast to appraisal theories, dimensional emotion theories do not address affects antecedents in detail. However, dimensional theorists question the tight causal linkage between appraisal and emotion that is central to appraisal accounts. As mentioned earlier, dimensional theorists believe that the emotion is not necessarily about some object (as in "I am angry at him"). In such theories, many factors may contribute to a change in emotion including intentional judgments (e.g., appraisal). However, in dimensional emotion theories the link between any preceding intentional meaning and emotion is broken and most of the time can not be recovered correctly. For example, Russell argues for the following sequence of emotional components: some external event occurs (e.g., a bear walks out of the forest), it is perceived in terms of its affective quality; this perception results in a crucial change in core affect; this change is attributed to some "object" (e.g., the bear); and only then is the object cognitively appraised in terms of its goal relevance, causal antecedents and future prospects [161].

We can also compare the dimensional emotion theories to OCC model as a cognitive appraisal model. The major similarity between these two models is that they both consider emotions to descend from valenced reactions to the stimuli. Furthermore, they acknowledge the role of arousal in determining emotional reactions. As we mentioned in Section 2.4.2 Russell considered arousal as one of the two key dimensions of emotions which could be used to partially discriminate emotional states [208]. In a different manner, the OCC model recognizes arousal as a necessary condition for eliciting emotions, and regards the arousal as a major determinant of the elicited emotion's intensity which distinguishes among various emotions of a par-

ticular type (e.g., fearful and scared). In [219] Scherer speculates that the arousal dimension in dimensional models gives little information about the underlying appraisal of the elicited emotion and he proposes to replace it with coping potential which is an appraisal dimension referring to the individual's perceived control in a given situation.

Furthermore, models based on dimensional emotions theory pursue the idea of eliciting an emotion according to the joint features in circumplex space (2D or 3D – see Section 2.4.2) while OCC or other models of appraisal theory are based on patterns of antecedents of emotions. This is the fundamental difference between OCC, or appraisal theories in general, and the circumplex approach of Russell [208] or Mehrabian's PAD model [17, 168]. Also, models based on appraisal theory of emotions employ causation, attribution and eliciting conditions in order to distinguish emotions while the eliciting conditions are not directly accessible from a dimensional approach. A dimensional model might fall short in establishing why certain emotions are elicited. However, when the objective is to identify the generated emotions and their level of pleasantness and intensity, a circumplex model presents an excellent opportunity [3].

Finally, here, we discuss how a model based on dimensional emotions theory (i.e., Russell's 2D circumplex) relates to a cognitive model based on appraisal theory (i.e., OCC model). Figure 2.10 shows the relationship between Russell's circumplex and OCC model in terms of categorization of the actual emotions. The number of emotions in a section of Russell's circumplex that fall into an emotion group of OCC are shown in parentheses (see Figure 2.10). For instance, all three emotions in the top section (highly excited, neutrally valenced emotions) fall into prospect based emotion group, hence number (3) is indicated. Or, as another example, emotions in the left section (neutral arousal value, negative valenced emotions) make a one to one relationship between disappointment and the prospect based emotion group, contempt and attribution emotion group, and jealousy and fortune of others emotion group, hence number (1) is indicated in front of each.




Figure 2.10: A rough projection of emotion groups of OCC on the circumplex of affect [3].

#### 2.4.4 Applications in Autonomous Agents and Robots

There are many research areas, including robotics and autonomous agents, that employ the structure and/or functions of emotions in their work with a variety of motivations behind modeling emotions [262]. Some of these works are inspired by specific psychological theories, some are freely using the concept of emotion without using the theoretical background in social sciences, and some are using a combination of concepts from the psychological theories. For instance, in PECS [257] which is designed for modeling human behaviors, the agent's architecture is not based on a certain kind of social or psychological emotion theory. In fact, it is intentionally designed and described in a way which enables the integration of a variety of theories. The PECS' design enables an integrative modeling of physical, emotional, cognitive and social influences within a component-oriented agent architecture. Also, in

[165] the computational architecture which is designed to provide information about the possible overall behavior of a work team is not based any specific theory. As mentioned earlier, some researchers apply combinations of emotion theories in their work [133]. For instance, in [41] Cañamero shows how an agent can use emotions for activity selection while taking into account both dimensional and discrete approaches in an action selection mechanism. Throughout this section, we provide different examples of works using major emotion theories in robots and autonomous agents.

We can also see the application of emotion theories in designing companion robots, robots capable of expressing emotions and social behaviors, as well as robots which can convey certain types of emotion products, e.g., empathy [33] [142] [181] [232]. Robots also use emotions theories for automatic affect recognition using different modalities [109] [270]. Moreover, in some works, researchers have explored the user’s affective state as a mechanism to adapt the robot’s behaviors during the interaction [32] [151].

**Applications of Appraisal Theory** – The emphasis of models derived from appraisal theories of emotion is on making appraisal the central process. Computational appraisal models often exploit elaborate mechanisms for deriving appraisal variables such as decision-theoretic plans [92] [162], reactive plans [196] [201] [245], Markov-decision processes [72] [234], or detailed cognitive models [158]. However, emotion itself is sometimes treated less elaborately, and simply as a label to which behavior can be attached [74]. Appraisal is usually modeled as the cause of emotion being derived via simple rules on a set of appraisal variables.

Computational appraisal models have been applied to a variety of uses including contributions to psychology, robotics, AI, and HCI. For instance, Marsella and Gratch have used EMA [162] to generate specific predictions about how human subjects will appraise and cope with emotional situations and argue that empirical tests of these predictions have implications for psychological appraisal theory [91]

[160]. There are several examples in artificial intelligence and robotics of applying appraisal theory [2] [130] [162]. In robotics, appraisal theory has been used to establish and maintain a better interaction between a robot and a human. For instance in [130] researchers provide their computational model of emotion generation based on appraisal theory to have a positive human-robot interaction experience. In [212] authors describe a system approach to appraisal processes based on Scherer's work on appraisal and the Component Process Model [216]. They show how the temporal unfolding of emotions can be experimentally tested. They also lay out a general domain-independent computational model of appraisal and coping. In [260] researchers consider their robot's (INDIGO) emotion, speech and facial expressions as a key point to establish effective communication between the robot and a human during their interaction. They apply concepts of appraisal theory in INDIGO's emotion modeling. MAGGIE, a sociable robot, also applies the appraisal theory of emotions to consider fear in its decision making system [86]. Velasquez developed Cathexis which is a distributed computational model for generation of emotions and their influence in the behavior of the autonomous agents [259]. The emotion model in this work is based on Roseman's work on appraisal theory. Marinier and Laird in [157] focus on the functional benefits of emotion in a cognitive system. In this work, they integrate their emotion theory (which is based on appraisal theory) with Soar cognitive architecture, and use emotional feedback to drive reinforcement learning. In [116] Hudlicka provides a model of a generic mechanism mediating the affective influences on cognition based on cognitive appraisal. This model is implemented within a domain-independent cognitive-affective architecture (MAMAID).

In the virtual agents community, empathy is a research topic that has received much attention in the last decade [30] [167] [179] [193] [250]. In [191] researchers developed an agent with capability of affective decision-making based on appraisal theory to establish an affective relationship with its users. Then, they compared the performance of their agent with a human (based on a WoZ study) in a speed-dating experiment. In HCI, appraisal theory has been primarily used for the creation

of interactive characters that exhibit emotions in order to make characters more believable [200], more realistic [155] [256], more capable of understanding human motivational states [58] or more able to induce desirable social effects in human users [180].

**Applications of Dimensional Theory** – The emphasis of models influenced by dimensional theories is on processes associated with core affect which is usually represented as a continuous time-varying process, and it can be determined at a given time by a point in a 2D or 3D-space as a response to the eliciting events. Generally, there are detailed mechanisms in computational dimensional models which determine how this point changes over time, e.g., decay to some resting state, and incorporating the impact of dispositional tendencies such as personality or temperament [83] [161]. Models based on dimensional theories have also been used in robotics. For instance, researchers in [147] apply PAD’s three-dimensional space to rate the pleasure, arousal and dominance of their Multimodal Emotional Intelligence robot (MEI) in each interaction with human subjects. Their goal is to introduce the first steps in MEI which can understand and express emotions in voice, gesture and gait. In [271] researchers want to understand the effect of different interface features for a service robot. They use valence and arousal dimensions in their questionnaires to assess the perceived anthropomorphism of their own service robot by their subjects. In [136] researchers introduce the implementation of a dynamic personality for a robot based on a dimensional emotion model. They use WASABI’s architecture [22, 23] as their emotional model. In [149] the author describes an affective knowledge representation scheme to be used in the design of a socially intelligent artificial agent. Lisetti uses the valence-arousal two dimensional model of emotion in this work. This model has been applied in an emotion-based architecture of Lisetti’s autonomous robots as well as a multimodal affective user interface agent. ROMAN, an expressive robotic head, uses a behavior-based emotional control architecture. The approach to the emotional component of the architecture is based on the dimensional emotion theory [113].

**Comparison of Applications of Emotion Theories** – Researchers often use computational dimensional models for behavior generation of animated characters. The reason might be because it is easier for emotion translation to a limited number of dimensions that can be readily mapped to continuous features of behavior such as the spatial extent of a facial expression. For example, PAD models describe all behavior in terms of only three dimensions of pleasure, arousal and dominance, whereas researchers using appraisal models should either associate each behavior with a large number of appraisal variables [222] [243], or try to map appraisal variables into a limited and small number of discrete expressions [74]. For a similar reason, dimensional models also frequently used as a good representational framework for systems that attempt to recognize human emotional behavior and there is some evidence that they may better discriminate user affective states than approaches that rely on discrete labels [18].

There is also a relationship between dimensional and appraisal theories. Some of the computational models of emotion that incorporate dimensional theories have viewed appraisal as the mechanism that initiates changes to core affect. For instance, ALMA [83] includes OCC inspired appraisal rules [178], and WASABI [22] includes appraisal processes inspired by Scherer’s sequential-checking theory into a PAD-based emotion model. Moreover, some computational models explore how core affect in dimensional models can influence cognitive processes. For example, HOTCO 2 [251] allows explanations to be biased by dimensional affect [161].

## 2.5 Affect and Motives

Motives are essential mental components in decision-making procedures and applying them in an affect-driven collaborative agent is part of this thesis’ contribution. In this section, we provide related works on computational models of motivation and discuss the nature of motives. We also explain three of the important social motives which will be used in our work. Finally, we discuss that humans’ beliefs,

emotions and motives are related and influence each other.

Motives' principles and mechanisms, as the reasons behind one's intentions and actions, and the influences of motives on cognition have been discussed in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology and artificial intelligence [15, 24, 37, 238, 240]. There are several examples in AI providing computational models for different psychological theories of motivation. Bach's MicroPsi agent architecture describes the interaction of emotion, motivation and cognition of agents based on Dietrich Dörner's Psi theory [13, 14, 15, 16]. Merrick and Shafi provide a computational model for motivation based on Henry Murray's theory [174] describing the three important social motivations of *achievement*, *affiliation* and *power*. They focus on the role of motivation in a goal-selection mechanism [169]. There are other examples focusing on the impact of motives on different cognitive processes in robots and artificial agents [31, 46, 65, 231, 259, 265]. The motivation mechanism in our work is inspired by Murray's theory and Bach's approach on Dörner's theory. It is focused on the role of motives in cognitive processes, e.g., intention formation in coping, during collaboration, which will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

### 2.5.1 Motives

A motive consists of an urge (that is, a need indicating a demand) and a goal that is related to this urge [14]. Motives shape cognition and behavior [229]. To be motivated means to be moved to do something [210]. Motives direct behaviors towards particular goals, which makes the agent more persistent in actions it takes. They also affect cognitive processes by increasing level of attention. Motive, as the outcome of the motivation process, initiates, directs and maintains goal-oriented behaviors.

Motives are goal-driven and they move the agent towards the attainment of corresponding sets of intentions. In other words, motives as an essential part of affect can lead the agent to empower an intention. They are essentially mechanisms that in light of beliefs tend to produce, modify or select between actions and their reciprocal

intentions. Some of the motives are transient, like helping the Astronaut to hold the panel, while some are long term, like reaching to the shared goal during collaboration which in our example is installing solar panels and satisfying the Astronaut's needs in the field (see Section 3.1).

### 2.5.2 Motivation Theory

There are several motivation theories in psychology [21, 87, 138], some of which have received little attention as the basis for computational models. In [174], Murray described and studied 20 different human motives, of which three have received attention in psychology and artificial intelligence as social motives [169, 273]. The following is a brief description of these three social motives, *achievement*, *affiliation* and *power* [11, 273] which will be used in this thesis:

- **Achievement motivation:** Achievement motivation drives humans to strive for excellence by improving on personal and societal standards of performance. It involves a concern for excellence, for doing one's best. In artificial agents, achievement motivation has potential roles in focusing agent behavior and driving the acquisition of competence.
- **Affiliation motivation:** Affiliation refers to a class of social interactions that seek contact with formerly unknown or little known individuals and maintain contact with those individuals in a manner that both parties experience as satisfying, stimulating, and enriching. It involves a concern with developing friendly connections with others through the two contrasting emotional components of hope of affiliation and fear of rejection. These two components become more crucial in the collaboration domain due to the importance of social emotions and their impact on beliefs and intentions.
- **Power motivation:** Power can be described as a domain specific relationship between two individuals, characterized by the asymmetric distribution of

social competence, access to resources, or social status. It involves concern with having an impact on other people or on the world at large. There are different aspects of fear or avoidance of power which channel and moderate the expression of power into socially acceptable behavior, working as inhibitions to unseemly tendencies. Power motivation can be considered with respect to the probability of success which makes it relevant to the cognitive appraisal of emotions during collaboration.

In [273] it is shown that success of a power goal is associated with anger, confusion and disgust; success at an affiliation goal is associated with interest, happiness and feeling loved; and success at an achievement goal is associated with interest, surprise, happiness, excitement and a sense of focus. In other words, succeeding at a particular motive is associated with experiencing particular emotions.

## 2.6 Theory of Mind

Theory of mind, as a crucial component in human's social interaction, plays an important role in our computational model. It discusses one's beliefs about others as intentional agents. Beside the immediate effect, an individual's action also depends on the beliefs about other's perception of that action as well as the reaction they take. In this thesis, we use this concept whenever the agent needs to anticipate the human's mental states. We will also use the concept of *user model* as a standard collection of properties to describe others.

The concept of theory of mind has received attention in social psychology and artificial intelligence. Eligio et al. explore what collaborators understand about each other's emotions and conclude being aware of each other's emotions helps collaborators to improve their performance [73]. Fussell and Kraus discuss the importance of perspective taking in a successful communication in a social setting [80]. Scassellati discusses the importance of attribution of beliefs, goals and desires to others. He presents two psychological theories on the development of theory of mind in humans

and their potential application in building robots with similar capabilities [213]. Hiatt and Trafton present a cognitive model which borrows mechanisms from three different postulates of theory of mind and show that their model produces behaviors in accordance with various theories of experiences [111]. Si, Marsella and Pynadath discuss PsychSim, an implemented multi-agent-based simulation tool for modeling social interaction, which has its own beliefs about its environment and a recursive model of other agents [194]. They also investigate the computational modeling of appraisal in a multi-agent decision-theoretic framework using POMDP based agents [235, 234]. Since applying the concept of theory of mind is crucial in social interaction and collaboration, this thesis employs a simplified mechanism inspired by the existing works for our agent.

## 2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we started by defining the concept of collaboration based on Grosz and Sidner’s work [103], and listed a number of collaboration properties. Then, we provided the background of two prominent collaboration theories which helped develop a better understanding of the actual theories and how they relate to each other. Next, we presented the SharedPlans theory and its major properties, e.g., partial shared plan, recipe, and two notions of intention. Afterwards, we delivered key concepts of the Joint Intentions theory including joint commitment and joint intention. Then, we continued with the hybrid approach of modeling collaboration and provided one of the most well-established models, STEAM. We also briefly mentioned some other approaches. Later, we presented two different lists to compare similarities and differences between SharedPlans and Joint Intentions collaboration theories. We ended this document with different categories of applications of these theories in agent/robot and human collaboration areas.

We believe the SharedPlans and Joint Intentions collaboration theories are the most well-defined and well-established theories in computer science. We found

SharedPlans theory more convincing than the other major and subordinate approaches, with respect to its inclusive explanation of the collaboration structure and its association to discourse analysis which directly improves the communicative aspects of a collaboration theory. We also understand the value of Joint Intentions theory due to its clarity and closeness to the foundations of collaboration concepts. These specifications of the Joint Intentions theory can make it applicable in multi-agent system designs and human-robot collaboration. We also consider hybrid approaches valuable, such as STEAM, if they clearly understand drawbacks with existing theories and successfully achieve better collaborative agents by infusing different concepts from different theories. Although all these theories are well-defined and properly introduce collaboration concepts, they mostly explain the structure of a collaboration and they lack the underlying domain-independent processes with which collaborative procedures could be defined more systematically and effectively in different applications.

Later, we looked at the description of affective computing and the importance of the concept of emotion in general and in social context. We also discussed the importance of communicating emotions as well as emotions' social functions. Then, we provided some examples of agents and robots using artificial emotions in their decision making process. We also briefly provided a few examples of cognitive architectures producing different aspects of behaviors in robotics.

There are major theories of emotions explaining the concept of emotion. We discussed these major theories in detail separately, providing their psychological background and underlying concepts. Following the explanation of these theories, we were able to discuss the similarities and differences between these major theories. Finally, we provided applications of these theories in robotics and AI.

We believe to develop or work based on computational models of emotions, it is good to follow well-established (in comparison with others) theoretical foundations. These theories can be a guideline for our computational models, and they can explain more details of the structure or the processes involved in affective situations.

However, we do not necessarily think that the computational models must exactly follow only one theory and its descriptions. Meaning, different aspects of models can represent different theories. For instance, appraisal theory is a good representation of the interpretive aspect of emotions and basic emotion theories provide detailed systematic methods for expressive application. More importantly, we believe the interpersonal functions of emotions should be our first concern and we should try to relate them to the structure of our domain, i.e., collaboration. In conclusion, we can see the importance of interpretive, communicative and regulatory aspects of emotion functions in this proposed work.

# CHAPTER 3

## AFFECTIVE MOTIVATIONAL COLLABORATION THEORY

Current computational theories used for human-robot collaboration specify the structure of collaborative activities, but are weak on the underlying processes that generate and maintain these structures. We argue that emotions are crucial to these underlying processes and we have developed a new computational theory, called *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*, that combines emotion-based processes, such as appraisal and coping, with collaboration processes, such as planning, in a single unified framework. This work is implemented as part of a larger effort to build robots capable of generating and recognizing emotions in order to be better collaborators. We have investigated the mutual influences of affective and collaborative processes in a cognitive theory to support interaction between humans and robots or virtual agents. We build primarily on the *cognitive appraisal* theory of emotions and the *SharedPlans* theory of collaboration to investigate the structure, fundamental processes and functions of emotions in a collaboration. We have developed new algorithms for appraisal processes as part of a new overall computational model. We have evaluated our implemented appraisal algorithms by conducting an online user study.

Although existing collaboration theories explain the important elements of a collaboration structure, the underlying processes required to dynamically create, use, and maintain the elements of this structure are largely unexplained. For instance,

a general mechanism has yet to be developed that allows an agent to effectively integrate the influence of its collaborator's perceived or anticipated emotions into its own cognitive mechanisms to prevent shared task failures while maintaining collaborative behavior. Therefore, a process view of collaboration must include certain key elements. It should inherently involve social interactions since all collaborations occur between social agents, and it should essentially constitute a means of modifying the content of social interaction as the collaboration unfolds. The underlying processes of emotions possess these two properties, and social functions of emotions explain some aspects of the underlying processes in collaboration.

There is also a communicative aspect of emotions. For instance, emotions are often intended to convey information to others [85]. Emotions are also involved in verbal behaviors. For instance, an utterance can include both content and relational meaning. An emotion might appear to be elicited by the content of the utterance, but in fact be an individual's response to the relational meaning [188]. The interpretation of these relational meanings are handled by the appraisal of events. Appraisal processes give us a way to view emotion as social [258]. Meaning is created by an individual's social experiences in the social world, and individuals communicate these meanings through utterances. Consequently, the meaning of these utterances and the emotional communication change the dynamic of social interactions. A successful and effective emotional communication necessitates ongoing reciprocal adjustments between interactants that can happen based on interpretation of each other's behaviors [156]. This adjustment procedure requires a baseline and an assessment procedure. While the components of the collaboration structure, e.g., shared plan, provide the baseline, emotion-related processes (e.g., appraisal) provide the assessment procedure.

*Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* is about the interpretation and prediction of the observable behaviors in a dyadic collaborative interaction. The theory focuses on the processes regulated by emotional states. These observable behaviors represent the outcome of processes related to the interpretation of the self's relation-

ship to the collaborative environment. These processes are triggered by the events occurring in the collaboration environment. Therefore, *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* explains how emotions regulate the underlying processes in the occurrence of events during collaboration.

Emotion-regulated processes operate based on the self's mental states including the anticipated mental states of the other. These mental states include beliefs, intentions, goals, motives and emotion instances. Each of these mental states possesses multiple attributes impacting the underlying processes of collaboration and ultimately the relation between cognition and behavior of the agent. The nature of these attributes will be discussed in Section 3.5.




Figure 3.1: Primary influence of mechanisms in *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*.

There are several theories discussed in Chapter 2, which describe the underlying structure of a collaboration based on mental states of the collaborators. The collaboration structure of *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* is based on the SharedPlans theory [96]. *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* focuses

on the processes that generate, maintain and update this structure based on mental states. The collaboration structure is important because social agents/robots ultimately need to co-exist with humans, and therefore need to consider humans' mental states as well as their own internal states and operational goals.

The *Appraisal & Coping* mechanism (see Figure 3.1) consists of the two processes of Appraisal and Coping. The Appraisal mechanism is responsible for evaluating changes in the self's Mental States, the anticipated Mental States of the other, and the state of the collaboration environment. Consequently, the Appraisal mechanism is connected to a) the Theory of Mind mechanism, to serve as an evaluator whenever the self applies the Appraisal mechanism to the mental states attributed to the human collaborator, b) the Collaboration mechanism, to interpret the progress and changes in the collaboration plan and associated Mental States, and to make changes to the shared plan if required, c) the Motivation mechanism, to generate and assess the self's new goal-driven motives whenever a new motive or intention is required, e.g., following the failure of a task, and d) the Perception mechanism, to interpret the external events from the collaboration environment. The Coping mechanism provides the self with different coping strategies associated with changes in the self's mental states with respect to the state of the collaboration. In other words, the Coping mechanism produces cognitive responses by forming new intentions based on the appraisal patterns.

The *Motivation* mechanism (Figure 3.1) provides motives to influence the coping process in terms of the collaborative agent's or the human collaborator's needs. The Motivation mechanism uses the Appraisal mechanism to compute attributes (see Section 3.5) of the competing motives. Also, the Motivation mechanism can serve the Theory of Mind mechanism by helping the self to infer the motive behind the other's current action. Moreover, the Motivation mechanism applies the beliefs associated with the Appraisal mechanism to generate and compare a new set of motives related to the status of the collaboration. The outcome of the Motivation mechanism is involved in forming a new intention to cope with the current event.

As a result, the self can take an action based on the new intention to sustain the collaboration progress.

The *Theory of Mind* mechanism (Figure 3.1) is the mechanism of inferring a model of the other's anticipated Mental States. The self will progressively update this model during the collaboration. The refinement of this model helps the self to anticipate the other's mental state more accurately, which ultimately impacts the quality of the collaboration and the achievement of the shared goal. Furthermore, the self can make inferences about the motive (or intention) behind the other's actions using the Motivation mechanism. This inference helps the self to update its own beliefs about the other's mental state. In the reverse appraisal process, the self also applies the Appraisal mechanism together with updated beliefs about the other's Mental States to make inferences about the other's current mental state based on the other's emotional expression. Finally, the Collaboration mechanism provides the collaboration structure, including status of the shared plan with respect to the shared goal and the mutual beliefs to the Theory of Mind mechanism. Consequently, any change to the self's model of the other will update the self's mental state.

The Collaboration mechanism maintains constraints on actions. These constraints include constraints on task states and on the ordering of tasks. The Collaboration mechanism also provides processes to update and monitor the shared plan. These processes depend on the Appraisal mechanism to evaluate the current Mental States with respect to the current status of the collaboration. The self also shifts its focus of attention according to the outcome of the Appraisal mechanism. Moreover, the Collaboration mechanism can help the self to identify the failure of a task. The Appraisal and Motivation mechanisms provide interpretation of task failure and the formation of new Mental States (e.g. intentions) respectively. Ultimately, the Coping mechanism allows the self to perform behavior appropriate to the current state of the collaboration.

### 3.1 Example Scenario

We now provide the following scenario in a robotic domain to draw your attention to the collaborative interactions. In the scenario, there is a mission specialist astronaut, who has had a high success rate in accomplishing space missions. She is capable of operating the manipulator system and supporting equipment. She works as a commander in the field during the operation. She is focused, organized, mentally stable, curious and patient. She is trained to collaborate with special-purpose field operation robots.

There is also a robot which is assigned to the mission to provide services to the astronaut. It has been tested in extreme environmental conditions and has a very low failure rate. It is capable of communicating with the astronaut and understanding the astronaut's nonverbal behavior. It has the ability to identify and assess its own emotions and those of the astronaut.

The robot and the astronaut will collaborate with each other to achieve their shared goal, which is to install two solar panels. They will face various difficulties, ranging from the task being unpleasant and challenging to conflicts of their private and/or shared goals occurring because of a blocked or a protracted sub-task. The robot and the astronaut will go through a series of assessment processes to figure out a) how did the current blocking happen? b) why is the current task is blocked? and c) what is the next action they are going to take? The robot uses its cognitive abilities and its communication skills to overcome these problems and to motivate the astronaut to propose alternative tasks. The following is part of an interaction between the astronaut and the robot during their collaboration on installing solar panels.

1. **Astronaut:** Please hold the panel on this structure.

*[Robot holds the panel and Astronaut begins to work on the panel.]*

*[Both the Robot and the Astronaut continue their collaboration to achieve their*

*shared goal.]*

2. **Astronaut:** At this point you should be careful how you hold the panel. Turn the right side 45 degrees towards me.

3. **Robot:** Is this what you want?

4. **Astronaut:** Yes, do not move it.

*[Astronaut finishes fixing the panel onto the structure and checks the connectors to make sure they are working.]*

5. **Astronaut:** The connectors on this panel have problems and we might not be able to finish this task.

6. **Robot:** Don't worry! I can replace the connectors in 4 minutes. We definitely can finish this task after that.

7. **Astronaut:** Okay, go ahead and fix the connectors.

*[Robot fixes the issue with the connectors and passes them to the Astronaut. Astronaut connects the wires to the connectors.]*

8. **Astronaut:** I need you to begin welding this panel and also prepare the measurement tool for me.

9. **Robot:** Do you want me to prepare the measurement tool first? Then, I can begin welding afterwards.

10. **Astronaut:** Yes, that's fine!

*[Astronaut waits for the Robot to weld the panel and prepare the measurement tool for him. Robot finishes the welding task after a long time, then prepares and passes the measurement tool to the Astronaut. But, the measurement tool has an accuracy problem.]*

11. **Astronaut:** Oh no! Finishing the quality check of our installation with this measurement problem is so frustrating. I think we should stop now!
12. **Robot:** I see. But, I can help you with the measurement and we can finish the task as originally planned.
13. **Astronaut:** That would be great!

*[Robot helps the Astronaut to finish the measurement task with its own measurement tool.]*

*[Then, the Robot goes back to its own internal goal, which is to fetch the second panel to finish the overall task.]*

### 3.2 General Argument

*Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* focuses on emotion-regulated processes involved in collaboration and builds on two well-established theories in this context. The first is Grosz and Sidner’s SharedPlans collaboration theory, which is based on the concepts of mutual belief and shared plans [96, 103]. Secondly, we build on the computational model of the appraisal theory of emotions by Marsella and Gratch [92, 90, 162, 163] which explains how emotions arise from an individual’s interpretation of its relationship with the environment, and specifies the dimensions of appraisal and the appraisal patterns characteristic of different emotions [223].

Existing collaboration theories (including SharedPlans) consider the nature of a collaboration to be more than a set of individual acts. These theories argue for an essential distinction between a collaboration and a simple interaction or even a coordination in terms of commitments [96, 152]. We believe there is also a need for a computational theory to specify and characterize the underlying cognitive processes of collaborative activities. The study of these cognitive processes helps explain why and how humans collaborate with each other. For instance, SharedPlans theory can describe our scenario in Section 3.1 in terms of fundamental Mental

States, such as mutual beliefs, intentions, and shared plans. However, it does not describe the underlying processes leading to these Mental States. *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* extends the SharedPlans theory by describing these processes. Furthermore, emotions, due to their evaluative and regulatory nature, provide fundamental functions (see Section 3.3.6) each of which plays an essential role in maintaining a collaboration's structure and status. In other words, these functions explain the dynamics of a collaboration structure.

*Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* specifies the processes involved in the progress of a collaboration and how they impact the collaboration's underlying structure. For example in the exchange below, the Robot in order to respond appropriately to the Astronaut's requests, needs to maintain its relationship with the new situation in the environment. Different emotion functions such as adaptation, goal management and attentional focus are involved in such situations:

8. **Astronaut:** I need you to begin welding this panel and also prepare the measurement tool for me.
9. **Robot:** Do you want me to prepare the measurement tool first? Then, I can begin welding afterwards.

What is the nature of the processes involved in a collaboration? For example in the exchange below, the Robot changes its focus of attention to something important to the Astronaut because of its perception of the Astronaut's negative emotion:

5. **Astronaut:** The connectors on this panel have problems and we might not be able to finish this task.
6. **Robot:** Don't worry! I can replace the connectors in 4 minutes. We definitely can finish this task after that.

And, how do these processes impact the social characteristics of a collaboration?

For instance, in the exchange below, emotions and the Appraisal mechanism can influence self's awareness during collaboration:

11. **Astronaut**: Oh no! Finishing the quality check of our installation with this measurement problem is so frustrating. I think we should stop now!

12. **Robot**: I see. But, I can help you with the measurement and we can finish the task as originally planned.

Finally, *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* incorporates motivation as an emotion-regulated and goal-driven mechanism, by which the self can form a new intention based on its own beliefs about self and the other, as well as the result of an Appraisal mechanism. In general, a new motive can be involved in formation of a new intention and the self can take a new action based on the new intention. The Motivation mechanism also connects the outcome of the Appraisal mechanism and the Collaboration mechanism by applying the self's belief structure and appraisal patterns. The result of this process generates a set of competing motives, each of which can influence the formation of self's intention. The self can store its own motives as well as the other's motives along with their corresponding attributes which can impact the Appraisal mechanism. In the following example extracted from the scenario, the Astronaut informs the Robot of a new problem, and the Robot forms a new intention to solve the problem:

5. **Astronaut**: The connectors on this panel have problems and we might not be able to finish this task.

6. **Robot**: Don't worry! I can replace the connectors in 4 minutes. We definitely can finish this task after that.

As another example, the Astronaut faces a problem in his own task and informs the Robot of his decision. The Robot forms a new intention to help the Astronaut to overcome his problem and ultimately, make progress in their collaboration:

11. **Astronaut**: Oh no! Finishing the quality check of our installation with this measurement problem is so frustrating. I think we should stop now!

12. **Robot**: I see. But, I can help you with the measurement and we can finish the task as originally planned.

### 3.3 Events

The *events* occurring in this collaborative environment include a) *utterances* spoken by the collaborators, b) *primitive actions* executed, deferred, or aborted, and c) observable *emotion instances*. These events are the events that our affective collaborative agent perceives. We will discuss below the operation of individual processes in our theory based on these events. Each of the following six sub-sections describe how an individual mechanism in Figure 3.1 handles the events.

#### 3.3.1 Collaboration Mechanism and Events

The Collaboration mechanism is responsible for maintaining the internal structure of a collaboration, including the focus of attention, constraints on actions, updating the shared plan and, in general, monitoring the collaboration. All of these structures require updating each time the self perceives an external event. For instance, an utterance by the other can impact the self's focus of attention during the collaboration, or the effect of a primitive action can influence the self's view of an impasse on a task. As another example, the perception of the other's emotion instance can cause significant changes in the self's collaboration monitoring.

#### 3.3.2 Appraisal Mechanism and Events

The other's *utterances*, the effect(s) of the collaborators' *primitive actions*, and the other's *emotion instances* (expressed nonverbally) are the three types of events perceived by the self during collaboration. The Appraisal mechanism receives the

output of the Perception and Collaboration mechanisms as well as the requisite Mental States related to the current event. It appraises the event, in terms of appraisal variables using the collaboration structure and the history of the self’s related Mental States. The collaboration structure contains information about the collaboration’s shared plan and the collaborators’ shared goal, the temporal and the hierarchical constraints of the tasks, and the current focus of attention. Moreover, the self progressively generates and updates various types of Mental States (discussed in Section 3.5) during collaboration. The occurrence of a new event causes a change in the self’s Mental States. The construct of the new mental state, e.g., beliefs, are semantically connected to the older ones. The Appraisal mechanism uses the history of the Mental States to consistently evaluate a new external event.

### **3.3.3 Coping with Events**

Events do not directly cause the self’s Coping mechanism to operate. Instead, it is the formation of Mental States that cause the Coping mechanism to choose an appropriate cognitive response to these events. The cognitive responses (also known as “coping strategies”) are considered to act upon the self’s relationship to the world and its own Mental States. Events also trigger other processes, which impact the self’s Mental States. The changes in Mental States cause the Coping mechanism to provide consistent and appropriate cognitive responses to the world. For instance, suppose the self perceives an utterance and evaluates it in terms of the appraisal variables. The values of these variables and the corresponding emotion instances will cause new beliefs and intentions to be formed, which then cause the Coping mechanism to appropriately choose the self’s behavior.

### **3.3.4 Motivation and Events**

The Motivation mechanism acts to regulate the self’s Mental States and goal-directed behaviors for internal and social purposes. The Appraisal mechanism eval-

uates the state of self, the environment, or the anticipated mental state of the other. In each of these cases, the outcome of the Appraisal mechanism might indicate the need for internal or behavioral regulation. In such cases, the Motivation mechanism uses the Mental States associated with the state of self, the environment or the other's anticipated Mental States as well as the pattern provided by the Appraisal process to generate motives aligned with private or shared goals. Thus, via the Appraisal mechanism the Motivation mechanism implicitly responds to the events. The attributes of the generated motives (see Section 3.5) will be updated every time a new event occurs. For instance, the Appraisal mechanism may evaluate the outcome of the current task as *unexpected*, *undesirable*, *uncontrollable* and *urgent* which is indicative of the failure of a task. Then, the Motivation mechanism provides goal-directed motives, each of which can influence the formation of an intention.

### **3.3.5 Theory of Mind and Events**

Theory of Mind operates when an event occurs and the self wants to infer and interpret the other's mental state. Thus, Theory of Mind helps the self to choose the behavior best matched to the other's anticipated Mental States. The Theory of Mind mechanism infers the mental state of the other, which helps the self to update the user model of the other. The Motivation and the Appraisal mechanisms are also involved in this procedure. For instance, the self can infer the other's mental state through a reverse appraisal procedure. The Motivation mechanism includes another inverse procedure to infer the other's active motives, which can lead to inferring the other's goal, beliefs, motives and intentions.

### **3.3.6 Functions of Emotions**

We have talked about the crucial role of emotions in communicating Mental States, motivating actions, and evaluating and interpreting internal states and the environment. Emotions, generally speaking, provide a set of intra- and interpersonal

functions which regulate internal processes and the self's relationship to the other during the collaboration. Emotions have meanings in a social context which can be interpreted by an observer. The self uses these emotion meanings to trigger appropriate emotion functions with respect to the current social context. Ultimately, the elicited emotion's functions impact the self's Mental States and consequently behaviors. In the rest of this section, we briefly describe how ten different emotion functions are related to the collaboration context. There are other emotion functions, such as learning and memory control, which are outside of the scope of this thesis. We have used some of the concepts behind these emotion functions such as goal management in our framework (see Chapter 4).

### **Action Selection**

Action selection is the function in which emotion instances influence choosing the most appropriate action out of a repertoire of possible actions at a point in time. This function influences the Coping mechanism and results in consistency of the self's actions based on anticipated emotional responses of the other and the satisfaction of the shared goal.

### **Adaptation**

Adaptation is the raison d'être of emotions. It helps the self to properly respond to changing challenges in a dyadic social context by adjusting its behavior. Adaptation is a specialized problem-solving technique implicating the necessity of the self's emotional states for short and long term behavior changes during collaboration.

### **Social Regulation**

Social regulation by emotions is the process which enables the self to communicate internal Mental States through the expression of emotions in a social context. It can assist the self to regulate various social interactions required in the course of

a collaboration, such as conflict resolution and negotiation. Emotional expressions influence the other's behavior by triggering the other's inferential processes and emotional reactions [135].

## **Sensory Integration**

Sensory integration can guide the self through the course of a collaboration by sustaining rich-sensory tasks to demonstrate more effective collaborative behaviors. It benefits the self by anticipating a certain type of inferential process to the other's mental and emotional states. For instance, perceiving fear in the other can lead to an increased focus of attention on the ongoing task, or discerning anger can raise the probability of avoiding current events (generated by the self) by the other.

## **Alarm**

The alarm mechanism is a purely reactive and pattern-driven process [241]. It accounts for persuading the self that an undesired or unsatisfactory condition happened in the past, and since then, has persisted in the self's mental states. The alarm mechanism also provides the self with a rapid reaction to the external or the internal events. The self will be able to interrupt deliberative processes and show quick behavioral reactions. For instance, the self can consider corrective actions when a high probability of anticipated failure occurs during the collaboration.

## **Motivation**

Motivation is a goal-driven emotion function associated with the self's behaviors. There is a motive behind every intentional action created by the Motivation mechanism. This motive is computed based on underlying beliefs relying on the evaluative role of emotions. Therefore, the motive behind any behavior carries an anticipated value of the future consequence for that behavior. It also reveals the belief foundation of a behavior. Consequently, the self can apply this function of emotions to a)

cope with certain types of problems, and b) infer the other's mental state based on each action.

## **Goal Management**

The goal management function identifies the existence or the need for a high priority goal for the self. These goals include both private goals and shared goals. Emotions provide an evaluation mechanism for the self to choose or reprioritize goals at each point in time. This function of emotions can impact the self's behavior with respect to the dynamics of interaction during the course of a collaboration.

## **Attentional Focus**

Emotion instances and the patterns generated by the Appraisal mechanism are directly linked to the attention mechanism of the self. Both positive and negative results of a cognitive evaluation of events can change, maintain, or intensify the self's focus of attention. For instance, negative emotions, e.g., fear or anger, can influence the self's focus of attention by orienting the self towards the events [76]. Positive emotions, e.g., happiness, can broaden or expand the self's focus of attention from details of the events to their general features [78].

## **Strategic Processing**

The occurrence of new events can lead the self to rapid and/or strategic responses. The Coping mechanism contains various strategies associated with different components of the Mental States, e.g., belief or intention-related strategies. The content of the self's Mental States changes as time passes, which creates internal events causing the Coping mechanism to choose an appropriate action. The Appraisal mechanism allows the self to demonstrate a rapid response or strategically prioritize the current internal events generated based on the changes in the Mental States. For instance, is a mild, reactive facial expression an adequate response to the other's current ut-

terance or does the self need to show a stronger behavior? Is it the new belief about the current state of the collaboration, or is it the new intention pursuing the self's private goal that the self needs to cope with? Thus, appraisal patterns and emotion instances impact the self's strategic processing.

## Self Model

Emotions can be a representation of how the self interprets the collaboration environment. The self can generate or update beliefs about its self-model when faced with unambiguous events and apply the same self-model when confronted with events possessing more ambiguity and uncertainty. Creating a self-model can also help the self to demonstrate more consistent and coherent behaviors when similar situations occur during the collaboration. This reliability in the self's behavior can help the other to predict the self's responses during collaboration.

## 3.4 Components of the Architecture

The *Affective Motivational Collaboration Model* consists of seven mechanisms (see Figure 3.1) most of which directly store and fetch the data in the Mental States. The Mental States will keep all the required data about the self (agent), other (human) and the environment (including events). In this section we explain each of the mechanisms and the Mental States.

### 3.4.1 Collaboration

- **Input:** The input to the *Collaboration* mechanism includes all the data that affects the execution of individual tasks in the collaboration plan. This data will be provided via the different elements of Mental States including beliefs, intentions and goals. These Mental States will establish the agent's initial plan and will be updated throughout the collaboration process by the Perception mechanism and other processes.

- **Output:** The output of *Collaboration* includes all the data that is modified or created during execution of a plan in the form of Mental States. These Mental States will be used by the internal processes in the Theory of Mind mechanism. Additionally, the Appraisal mechanism will use these Mental States to evaluate the events during collaboration. These Mental States also will be used by other processes, e.g. goal management, for the purpose of maintaining the collaboration.
- **Function:** The *Collaboration* mechanism will construct a hierarchy of tasks and also manage and maintain the constraints and other required details of the collaboration specified by the plan. These details include the inputs and outputs of individual tasks, the *preconditions* specifying whether it is appropriate to perform a task, and the *postconditions* specifying whether a just-completed task was successful (which can be used as an indication of an impasse or failure). *Collaboration* also keeps track of the focus of attention, which determines the salient objects, properties and relations at each point of the collaboration. Moreover, *Collaboration* has the ability to shift the focus of attention during the collaboration. All the other mechanisms in the overall *Affective Motivational Collaboration Model* are influenced by changes in the collaboration plan. The *Collaboration* mechanism in general performs various logical deductions required by other processes in our computational model. It is designed to ameliorate the shortcomings of the existing Collaboration theories by providing required inferences such as dynamic planning based on the recent changes in the collaboration environment and the internal changes in the agent's Mental States. For instance, in our scenario (see Section 3.1), when the Astronaut interrupts the Robot asking for a new and urgent task, the Robot needs to alter the collaboration plan to continue. *Collaboration* also supports essential monitoring processes during the collaboration such as event monitoring.

### 3.4.2 Appraisal

- **Input:** The most significant part of *Appraisal*'s input data is based on the activity of the Collaboration mechanism. This data includes all the required Mental States associated with the Collaboration mechanism. For instance, the beliefs and their Strengths will be used by algorithms inside of *Appraisal* to compute the value of the appraisal variables. *Appraisal* also receives data from the Theory of Mind mechanism. This data helps the agent use *Appraisal* for inferring the human's intentions and motives based on a reverse appraisal procedure. The input data from the Perception mechanism is generally needed to support the evaluation of the events. The *Appraisal* mechanism also uses the information about the motives in the underlying processes.
- **Output:** The output of *Appraisal* can directly and indirectly impact other mechanisms. The Motivation mechanism uses this data to generate and maintain motives based on the current appraisal of the environment.
- **Function:** *Appraisal* is a subjective evaluation mechanism based on individual processes each of which computes the value of the appraisal variables used in our computational model. The Collaboration mechanism needs the evaluative assistance of the *Appraisal* mechanism for various reasons. The course of a collaboration is based on a full or a partial plan which needs to be updated as time passes and collaborators achieve, fail at or abandon a goal assigned to them. The failure to achieve a goal should not destroy the entire collaboration. Appraising the environment and the current events helps the agent to update the collaboration plan and avoid further critical failures during collaboration. *Appraisal* also helps the agent to have a better understanding of the human's behavior by making inferences based on appraisal variables. Furthermore, in order to collaborate successfully, a collaborator cannot simply use the plan and reach to the shared goal; there should be an adaptation mechanism not only

for updating the plan but also the underlying Mental States. For instance, there are beliefs about the appraisal of the self and the other that augment the model of what collaborators have done, and what and how they are planning to achieve the current shared goal based on their emotional states. This process will be discussed in more detail under the Motivation mechanism (see Section 3.4.4). Additionally, the beliefs formed based on the appraisals can impact other mechanisms such as the Theory of Mind, Motivation and Coping, essentially including the whole computational model.

### 3.4.3 Coping

- **Input:** The *Coping* mechanism operates based on the data stored in different aspects of the Mental States. This data includes changes in the agent’s beliefs as well as the agent’s intentions (whether they are created or altered during the collaboration), and the private or shared goals.
- **Output:** The output of the *Coping* mechanism is the data specifying the intention for a behavior which the agent needs to perform based on the current state of the collaboration.
- **Function:** The *Coping* mechanism is responsible for interpreting ongoing changes in the Mental States and adopting the appropriate behavior with respect to these changes. This component includes rules categorized into four coping strategies which are *Belief-related*, *Intention-related*, *Attention-related* and *Desires-related* strategies [162]. These rules will apply to the attributes and structures of the Mental States to cope with the internal changes as well as the demands of the environment. For example, the *Coping* mechanism will utilize certain beliefs about the self to regulate the agent’s internal states, while using mutual beliefs to maintain progress in the existing collaboration. As another example, motives’ attributes can guide the *Coping* mechanism by voting for a particular behavior.

### 3.4.4 Motivation

- **Input:** The most essential part of the input to *Motivation* is the Mental States, and more specifically the private and shared goals associated with the collaboration. *Motivation* also uses data from two other mechanisms, namely, Theory of Mind and Appraisal. Input from Theory of Mind is used by *Motivation* whenever new motives need to be generated or compared according to the shared goal. Input from Appraisal is used whenever the motive attributes are involved in the internal processes of the *Motivation*.
- **Output:** The output of *Motivation* includes the data required to form new intentions to reach the private or the shared goals. The motives which are the output of the *Motivation* mechanism are also used by the Coping mechanism to choose appropriate behavior according to the goals of the collaboration plan.
- **Function:** The *Motivation* mechanism works closely with the Appraisal mechanism. The purpose of this component is to generate new motives which will be added to the Mental States. These motives are generated based on what the agent believes about the environment including self and the other collaborator and the corresponding appraisals. The agent uses these motives to achieve a private or shared goal according to new conditions, to interact better with a human who needs social interactions, or to evaluate the success of task performances. The *Motivation* mechanism consists of several processes. These processes generate several motives with respect to the agent's current Mental States. Then, these motives will be used to make a decision to form an intention in the Coping mechanism.

### 3.4.5 Theory of Mind

- **Input:** *Theory of Mind* receives its input from the Mental States as well as the Collaboration and Perception mechanisms. This mechanism uses the current Mental States to infer the human's Mental States (which are simpler than the Mental States associated with self). The Collaboration mechanism provides the structure of the collaboration plan, including the constraints which can be used in the internal inference processes of *Theory of Mind*, such as reverse appraisal. The Perception mechanism also helps *Theory of Mind* with the input data from the sensory system.
- **Output:** The output of *Theory of Mind* will be stored in the Mental States. The Motivation mechanism can use this output to generate new motives according to the current state of the collaboration.
- **Function:** The agent uses the *Theory of Mind* mechanism to infer and attribute beliefs, intentions, motives and goals to its collaborator. The agent can also infer the Mental States of the human based on the reverse appraisals of the human's behavior. Another internal process of the *Theory of Mind* is inferring the human's motives on the basis of his behavior.

### 3.4.6 Perception

We consider the *Perception* mechanism only as a source of data to our computational model (see Figure 3.1). Thus, our computational model starts with high-level semantic representation of events (including utterances), i.e., Natural Language Processing is out of the scope of this work.

- **Output:** We will support the human side of the dialogues using predefined utterances for verbal communication with the agent. These utterances will be a part of the output data of the *Perception* mechanism. The output of the *Perception* mechanism will be given to the Collaboration, Theory of Mind and

Appraisal mechanisms. We will provide a unified perception representation across all of these mechanisms.

- **Function:** The *Perception* mechanism is responsible for producing the sensory information used by other processes in our model.

#### 3.4.7 Action

We consider the *Action* mechanism only as a sink of data in our computational model (see Figure 3.1).

- **Input:** The input to the *Action* mechanism is provided by the Coping mechanism. This data will cause the *Action* mechanism to execute an appropriate behavior of the agent. This data has the same level of abstraction as the output of the Perception mechanism, i.e., it includes agent's utterances, primitive actions and emotional expressions.
- **Function:** The *Action* mechanism functions whenever the agent needs to show a proper behavior according to the result of the internal processes of the collaboration procedure.

#### 3.4.8 Mental States

The Mental States shown in Figure 3.1 comprise the knowledge base required for all the mechanisms in the overall model.

*Beliefs* are a crucial part of the Mental States. We have two different perspectives on categorization of beliefs. In one perspective, we categorize beliefs based on whether they are shared between the collaborators. The SharedPlans [103] theory is the foundation of this categorization, in which, for any given proposition the agent may have: a) private beliefs (the agent believes the human does not know these), b) the inferred beliefs of the human (the agent believes the human collaborator has these beliefs), and c) mutual beliefs (the agent believes both the self and the human

have these same beliefs and both of them believe that). From another perspective, we categorize beliefs based on who or what they are about. In this categorization, beliefs can be about the self, the other, or they can be about the environment. Beliefs about the environment can be about internal events, such as outcomes of a new appraisal or a new motivate, or external events such as the human's offer, question or request, and general beliefs about the environment in which the agent is situated. Beliefs can be created and updated by different processes. They also affect how these processes function as time passes.

*Intentions* are mental constructs directed at future actions. They play an essential role in: a) taking actions according to the collaboration plan, b) coordination of actions with human collaborator, c) formation of beliefs about self and anticipated beliefs about the other, and d) behavior selection in the Coping mechanism. First, taking actions means that the agent will intend to take an action for primitive tasks that have gained the focus of attention, possess active motives, and have satisfied preconditions for which required temporal predecessors have been successfully achieved. Second, intentions are involved in action coordinations in which the human's behavior guides the agent to infer an anticipated behavior of the human. Third, intentions play a role in belief formation mainly as a result of the permanence and commitment inherent to intentions in subsequent processes, e.g., appraisal of the human's reaction to the current action and self regulation. And lastly, intentions are involved in selecting intention-related strategies, e.g., planning, seeking instrumental support and procrastination; these strategies are an essential category of the strategies in the Coping mechanism. Intentions possess a set of attributes, e.g. *Involvement, Certainty, Ambivalence* (see Section 3.5.4), which moderate the consistency between intention and behavior. The issue of consistency between the intentions (in collaboration) and the behaviors (as a result of the Coping mechanism in the appraisal cycle) is important because neither of these two mechanisms alone provides a solution for this concern.

*Motives* are mental constructs which can initiate, direct and maintain goal-

directed behaviors. They are created by the emotion-regulated Motivation mechanism. Motives can cause the formation of a new intention for the agent according to: a) its own emotional states (how the agent feels about something), b) its own private goal (how an action helps the agent to make progress), c) the collaboration goal (how an action helps to achieve the shared goal), and d) the other’s anticipated beliefs (how an action helps the other). Motives also possess a set of attributes, e.g., *Insistence* or *Failure Disruptiveness* (see Section 3.5.3). These attributes are involved in the comparison of newly generated motives based on the current state of the collaboration. Ultimately, the agent forms or updates a belief about the winning motive in the Mental States.

*Goals* help the agent to create and update its collaboration plan according to the current private and shared goal content and structure, i.e., the *Specificity*, *Proximity* and *Difficulty* of the goal. Goals direct the formation of intentions to take appropriate corresponding actions during collaboration. Goals also drive the Motivation mechanism to generate required motive(s) in uncertain or ambiguous situations, e.g., to minimize the risk of impasse or to reprioritize goals. The *Specificity* of goals has two functions for the agent. First, it defines the performance standard for evaluating the progress and quality of the collaboration. Second, it serves the agent to infer the winner of competing motives. The *Proximity* of goals distinguishes goals according to how “far” they are from the ongoing task. Proximal (or short-term) goals are achievable more quickly, and result in higher motivation and better self-regulation than more temporally distant (or long-term) goals. Goals can influence the *Strength* of beliefs, which is an important attribute for regulating the elicitation of social emotions. The *Difficulty* of goals impacts collaborative events and decisions in the appraisal, reverse appraisal, motive generation and intention formation processes. For instance, overly easy goals do not motivate; neither are people motivated to attempt what they believe are impossible goals.

*Emotions* in Mental States are emotion instances that are elicited by the Appraisal mechanism (see Section 3.5.5 for list of emotion types used in this model).

The agent also keeps beliefs about these emotion instances in the Mental States. The Belief Formation mechanism creates or updates these beliefs about emotions. These emotion instances include the agent's own emotions as well as the anticipated emotions of the other which are created with the help of the processes in the Theory of Mind mechanism.

### 3.5 Attributes of Mental States

Mental states are conscious states of the mind providing the content for cognitive processes. As we discussed *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* operates with the following Mental States: beliefs, intentions, motives, goals and emotion instances. These Mental States possess attributes, each of which provides a discriminating and unique interpretation of the related cognitive entities. These Mental States' attributes are used in different cognitive processes such as the Appraisal mechanism and the Motivation mechanism. We provide more details about these attributes in this section.

#### 3.5.1 Attributes of Beliefs

The attributes of a belief are involved within different processes in *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*. They impact the evaluation of an event by the Appraisal mechanism, generation of new motives, updates on the collaboration plan, activation of coping strategies and ultimately the self's behavior. The following six attributes of beliefs are most related to *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*.

- **Strength:** Belief strength is about how strong the self holds salient beliefs about an object, an entity, or an anticipated behavior. It can be measured through scales, for instance, how probable or likely that belief is, or just whether it is true or false. The strength of a belief can impact the self's appraisal processes, e.g. relevance (see Relevance algorithm in Chapter 4). A belief may be strong, but not necessarily accurate, and vice versa.

- **Saliency:** The saliency of a belief is a cognitive attribute that pertains to how easily the self becomes aware of a belief. This property of a belief has a prominent influence on the self's attention during collaboration. It directs the self's focus of attention to the most pertinent spatio-temporal salient event (see Relevance algorithm in Chapter 4).
- **Persistence:** It is argued that beliefs form and change due to cognitive and social considerations [42]. Persistent beliefs are very resistant to these changes. However, even persistent beliefs can change. Persistence of goal-related belief(s) influences the appraisal of the relevancy of an event (see Relevance algorithm in Chapter 4).
- **Recency:** The recency of a belief refers to how temporally close a particular belief is to the current state of collaboration. The recency attribute of the self's belief can bias (recency effect) the evaluation processes of the cognitive mechanism during collaboration. It can create a tendency to weight recent events more than earlier ones whenever it is required according to self's Mental States (see satisfaction drive in Chapter 4). The recency of a belief can ultimately impact adopting an appropriate Coping mechanism.
- **Accuracy:** Accuracy of a belief is the relation between that belief and the truth which that belief is about. The accuracy of a belief can be measured by looking at how closely that belief can relate to the truth. The accuracy of a belief as a gradational property can be used in evaluative processes of the self, i.e., Appraisal. It can also impact the self's other goal-driven processes and triggering of an emotion function.
- **Frequency:** The frequency of a belief is related to how regularly it appears as the result of the occurrence of an event. The frequency of beliefs can impact attributes of the self's other Mental States. For instance, beliefs forming or maintaining intentions with direct experiences (see Section 3.5.4) are more

likely to occur frequently.

### 3.5.2 Attributes of Goals

The attributes of a goal impact the processes in *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*, especially the processes involved in Motivation and Appraisal mechanisms. The attributes of a goal are important because the Motivation and the Appraisal mechanisms in this theory are goal-driven and attribution of the goals according to the self's standards provides coherency of the processes and their outcomes. We discuss the three most relevant goal attributes in this section.

- **Proximity:** Goals can be distinguished by how far they project into the future during the collaboration. Proximal (short-term) goals result in more related motives and subsequently better self and social-regulation than temporally distant goals. Proximal goals can impact the self's behaviors by influencing the goal management process (see Section 4.4 in Chapter 4). As a result, the self can determine and maintain the collaboration progress towards the shared goal more accurately while operating based on proximal goals.
- **Specificity:** Goals incorporating specific performance standards are more likely to enhance the self's self-evaluation than general goals. Specific goals raise the self-evaluation performance because they provide a more accurate baseline for the mechanisms, e.g., Appraisal or Collaboration (see Section 4.4 in Chapter 4), or any arbitration process that the self needs for self-evaluation during collaboration. Consequently, by increasing the self-evaluation performance, the self can improve the level of satisfaction within the collaboration. As an example, holding an object A in a particular position with respect to an object B for a certain amount of time and welding them with a material C is a more specific goal than a general goal of installing an object on another one.

- **Difficulty:** Goals that are moderately difficult have the most impact on the self and social regulation processes of the self. Conversely, overly easy or impossible goals usually do not motivate an individual to achieve the goal. Difficult goals increase the probability of a motive's *failure disruptiveness*, and overly easy goals decrease the *importance* of the related motive; in both cases the goals have less chance to be pursued. The existence of a partial shared plan, dependency on the other to perform a task, the failure of the same or similar task in the past all increase the difficulty level of a goal. See Section 4.4 in Chapter 4 for the influence of difficulty of a goal on the goal management process.

### 3.5.3 Attributes of Motives

According to Sloman, motives can be compared on various dimensions [240]. This comparison is based on motive attributes. In *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory* motives are formed based on the self's existing Mental States under the influence of the Appraisal mechanism. The existence of different Mental States, and the results of self appraisal as well as the reverse appraisal of the other can cause a variety of motives to be formed. The Motivation mechanism needs a set of attributes to compare newly generated motives and choose the one which is most related to the current state of the collaboration. We have chosen the following five motive attributes as most related to the collaboration context.

- **Importance:** The importance of a motive is determined by the corresponding beliefs about the effects of achieving or not achieving the associated goal (see Section 4.3.1 in Chapter 4). It is a function of belief attributes (e.g. saliency) and the current goal. For instance, if a motive is supported by a belief about the current goal with relatively high attribute values, that motive will become important for the self.
- **Urgency:** The urgency of a motive defines how much time the self has to

acknowledge and address that motive before it is too late. The urgency of a motive is a function of beliefs about the other's mental and emotional states (see Section 4.3.1 in Chapter 4). For instance, the self responds to an urgent motive due to the existence of an important anticipated outcome for the other, and limited time to accomplish the corresponding tasks, even if those tasks are not important for the self.

- **Insistence:** The insistence of a motive defines the “interrupt priority level” of the motive, and how much that motive can attract the self’s focus of attention. This dimension of motive is associated with what the Appraisal mechanism considers as *relevance* and *desirability* when evaluating an event. Beliefs about successive subgoals and the other’s anticipated Mental States influence the insistence attribute of a motive. Insistent motives have higher priority and are able to interrupt self’s ongoing tasks.
- **Intensity:** The intensity of a motive determines how actively and vigorously that motive can help the self to pursue the goal if adopted. Motives with higher intensity will motivate the self to apply certain types of coping processes for an obstructed goal to avoid termination of the collaboration. Motives with higher intensity cause the self to find alternative solutions for the problem rather than abandoning the goal and ultimately the collaboration.
- **Failure Disruptiveness:** The failure disruptiveness attribute of a motive determines how disruptive failure is to achieving the corresponding goal. In other words, it gives the self a measure of the pleasantness of achieving a related goal. This attribute directs the self’s behavior toward positive and negative outcomes during collaboration.

### 3.5.4 Attributes of Intentions

The attributes of an intention influence several processes in *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*. They can be involved in mechanisms such as Appraisal and Coping. One of the most important uses of intention attributes is to moderate the intention-behavior relations [59]. Ultimately, the self can show more consistent behavior with respect to its own preceding behaviors and current state of the collaboration. We decided to include the following five intention attributes extracted from the psychology literature in *Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory*.

- **Temporal Status:** The temporal status of an intention can be defined as the extent to which an intention remains consistent over time. The self needs to maintain the stability of its intentions as time passes until the task is performed. Temporally stable intentions helps the other to accurately predict the self's behavior. The anticipated cognitive load of perceiving the self's task by the other impacts the temporal stability of the self's intention. In other words, the temporal stability of an intention moderates the intention-behavior relation of the self during collaboration.
- **Direct Experience:** The direct experience of an intention refers to whether the self previously has performed a task based on a similar intention. The self can refer to the corresponding Mental States of the intention directly experienced in the past before taking a new action. The Mental States associated with the prior experience of an intention can influence the appraisal of a new event requiring the self to perform the same task. For instance, the existence of a direct experience of an intention can impact the degree of the *expectedness* and *controllability* of an event during the collaboration which ultimately guides the Coping mechanism to produce an appropriate behavior.
- **Certainty:** The certainty of an intention is determined by the quality of the underlying motive and the beliefs associated with that motive. The more

*strong, accurate, frequent, recent, salient* and *persistent* a set of pertinent beliefs of the self are, the more chance the related motive has to be selected. Since the certainty of an intention depends on the associated motive, the nature of the pursued goal also implicitly impacts the certainty of that intention. A goal with a higher *specificity* (see Section 3.5.2) value influences the certainty of the affiliated intention. The certainty of an intention is an important moderator of the self's intention-behavior consistency.

- **Ambivalence:** The Mental States of the self might contain contradictory intentions towards the pursuit of the same goal, which makes those intentions ambivalent. For instance, the self might already have an intention to perform a task according to the shared plan, while the Appraisal and the Motivation mechanisms dynamically cause formation of a new opposing intention. Furthermore, ambivalent intentions can occur because of the contrast between the self's private goal and the shared goal during the collaboration. The ambivalence attribute of an intention is inversely related to the intention-behavior consistency of the self.
- **Affective-Deliberative Consistency:** The self's intentions possess an affective and a deliberative component. The affective component refers to the emotion instance and in general the affective evaluation of the self's intention towards its own behavior. However, the deliberate component refers to the self's actual intention which is formed either based on the existing shared plan or under the influence of a new motive generated by the Motivation mechanism. For instance, as an example of affective-deliberative inconsistency, the self can appraise an event as an *urgent* and *uncontrollable* one (which leads the self's emotion towards anger), despite the fact that pursuing the goal related to this intention is required for the satisfaction of the shared plan. In general, mutually consistent affective and deliberate components of an intention positively impacts the consistency of the self's intention and behavior.

### 3.5.5 Emotion Instances

Each emotion has its own functionality in either an intrapersonal or interpersonal level. These emotions not only regulate the self's internal processes, but also assist the self to anticipate the other's Mental States. In this section, we provide the description of some of the emotions that can be elicited during collaboration, and are involved in our scenario (see Section 3.1). In this theory, to avoid the controversial issue of whether virtual agents or robots can feel emotions, we are going to use the convention of having emotions by the agent or the robot. The agent can also possess beliefs about an emotion instance which is similar to having beliefs about any other proposition.

- **Joy:** Joy is the state of an individual's well-being and is associated with the sense of successful achievement of a goal. Joy reveals one's sense of pleasure which implies an impending gain for the individual.
- **Anger:** Anger can be elicited by an unfair obstacle, hindering the individual's goal attainment and it is usually triggered by some external event (e.g., threat) which provokes a behavioral reaction. Anger functions to set boundaries or escape from dangerous situations, and implies an urgent desire for justice.
- **Hope:** Hope is the result of an optimistic evaluation of an event by an individual having expectations of positive and desirable future outcomes related to that event. It is usually a poignant assimilation of the present discontent and the future content implying an imagined or anticipated successful future goal state.
- **Guilt:** Guilt is based on self-condemnation in response to a negative outcome of one's self performance evaluation. It is caused by the violation of others' beliefs about the self, and others' standards and bearing significant responsibility for that violation. The occurrence of guilt usually implies the desire to atone in social context.

- **Pride:** Pride is a product of the satisfied sense of one's own actions or decision outcomes. It implies the self-approval of the evaluation oucomes of one's own actions. Pride is associated with the achievement motivation (see Section 2.5.2) wherein succeeding at a particular goal motivates the corresponding action.
- **Shame:** Shame is produced when one evaluates one's own actions or behaviors and attributes failure to oneself. The individual focuses on specific features of the self which led to failure. Shame implies the existence of remorse.
- **Worry:** Worry is one's emotional attempt to avoid anticipated potential threats or unidentified undesirable events. The individual's concern can be about a real or an imagined issue. Worry implies a fear of a future failure about which one should make a decision or take an action at present.

# CHAPTER 4

## COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK

### 4.1 Introduction

There are several appraisal models (e.g., EMA [162]) contributing in different applications such as social sciences, virtual agents, and robotics. However, none of these models have focused on the appraisal processes during collaboration. We believe appraisal plays a key role in collaboration due to its regulatory and evaluative nature. Also, collaboration induces some changes to appraisal processes due to its unique nature. For instance, although the appraisal models mostly use utility to compute the relevance of an event, we have found new cognitive components involved in determining utility because of the influence of the collaboration. These components, such as the recurrence of a belief by the human collaborator or the influence of the human collaborator's perceived emotion on the robot's decisions emphasize the fact that collaboration requires different procedures in appraisal processes. One of our contributions is to ground general appraisal concepts in the specific context and structure of collaboration.

Furthermore, we believe collaboration and appraisal have reciprocal influences on each other. In this chapter, we also talk about the influence of appraisal on collaboration through the goal management process. Also, we discuss our coping mechanism and strategies within the collaboration context. Then, we provide our computational model of three different motives used in our framework. Finally, we briefly discuss other mechanisms in our framework.




Figure 4.1: Collaboration structure (shared plan).

## 4.2 Collaboration Mechanism

The Collaboration and Appraisal mechanisms have reciprocal influences on each other. In this section, we focus on information about the collaboration structure which will be incorporated in appraisal processes in Section 4.3. We describe some of the methods in our Collaboration mechanism which are used to retrieve information about the collaboration structure.

The Collaboration mechanism constructs a hierarchy of goals associated with tasks in the form of a hierarchical task network (see Figure 4.1), and also manages and maintains the constraints and other required details of the collaboration including the inputs and outputs of individual tasks, the *preconditions* (specifying whether it is appropriate to perform a task), and the *postconditions* (specifying whether a just-completed task was successful). Collaboration also keeps track of the focus of attention, which determines the salient objects, properties and relations at each point, and shifts the focus of attention during the interaction.

Here, we describe the methods which retrieve information about the collaboration structure, and are used in our algorithms to compute the values of appraisal variables. In these methods,  $\varepsilon_t$  is the event corresponding to time  $t$ , and  $g_t$  is a given goal at time  $t$ .

- $\text{recognizeGoal}(\varepsilon_t)$  returns the unique goal to which the given event (action, utterance, or emotional expression) directly contributes; it is only one goal since the robot can only do one primitive action at a time in our collaboration model, i.e, in the goal tree, a given primitive action can only directly contribute to one parent goal. The method returns *ambiguous* if it does not recognize a goal in the plan<sup>1</sup>.
- $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_t)$  returns whether  $g_t$ 's status is ACHIEVED, FAILED, BLOCKED, INAPPLICABLE, PENDING, or IN PROGRESS. In our example, “Check Connector” is the current (focused) goal and it is PENDING, and the “Prepare Panels” and “Install Solar Panels” are IN PROGRESS. The focused goal is the goal that the robot currently pursues.
- $\text{getTopLevelGoal}(g_t)$  returns  $g_t$ 's top level goal.
- $\text{precondStatus}(g_t)$  returns the status of the precondition for the given goal whether it is SATISFIED, UNSATISFIED or UNKNOWN. For instance, the precondition for fixing a panel is whether the panel is appropriately located on its frame.
- $\text{isLive}(g_t)$  returns *true* if all the predecessors of  $g_t$  are ACHIEVED and all the preconditions are SATISFIED, i.e., PENDING or IN PROGRESS goals; otherwise returns *false*.
- $\text{isFocusShift}(g_t)$  returns *true* if the given goal is not the previous focus (top of the stack); otherwise returns *false*.
- $\text{isNecessaryFocusShift}(g_t)$  returns *true* if the status of the previous focus was ACHIEVED; otherwise returns *false* [143].
- $\text{isPath}(g_1, g_2)$  returns *true* if there is a path between  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  in a plan tree structure; otherwise returns *false*.

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<sup>1</sup>Ambiguity introduces some extra complexities which are beyond scope of this thesis.

- $getContributingGoals(g_t)$  returns  $g_t$ 's children.
- $getPredecessors(g_t)$  returns  $g_t$ 's predecessors.
- $getInputs(g_t)$  returns all required inputs for  $g_t$ . For example, the goal “Fix Panels” requires inputs such as *welding tool* and *panel*.
- $isAvailable(g_t)$  returns whether the given input is available. For instance, whether the *welding tool* is available for the goal “Fix Panels”.
- $isFocused(g_t)$  returns whether the focus is on  $g_t$ .
- $getResponsible(g_t)$  returns responsible agent(s) for  $g_t$ . In a dyadic collaboration, both of the agents (jointly) can be partly responsible for a nonprimitive goal, while each (self or other) is responsible for one or more primitive goals. For instance, both the Robot and the Astronaut are responsible for the non-primitive goal of “Install Solar Panels”, whereas it is only the Robot who is responsible for the primitive goal of “Prepare Measurement Tool”.

### 4.3 Appraisal Mechanism and Underlying Processes

In this section, we focus on the specific problem of appraising the *Relevance* (since other appraisals are only computed for relevant events), *Desirability* (since it discriminates facilitating and inhibitory events towards the collaboration progress), *Expectedness* (since it underlies a collaborative robot's attention), and *Controllability* (since it is associated with the agent's coping ability) of events within a collaborative interaction. There are other appraisal variables introduced in psychological [223] and computational literature [92]. We believe most of these variables can be straightforwardly added to our appraisal mechanism whenever they are required. All of the algorithms in this section use mental states of the robot (discussed in Section 3.4.8) which are formed based on the collaboration structure (Figure 4.2). These algorithms use the corresponding recognized goal of the most recent event at

each turn.




Figure 4.2: Using Collaboration structure in Appraisal (mechanisms in our framework).

#### 4.3.1 Relevance

Relevance is an important appraisal variable since the other appraisal variables are meaningful only for relevant events. Relevance as an appraisal variable measures the significance of an event for the self. An event can be evaluated to be relevant if it has a non-zero utility [162]. However, the utility of an event is also influenced by the other collaborator's emotional expressions as the reflection of the other collaborator's mental state with respect to the status of the collaborative environment. Other appraisal models only consider the utility of an event based on the self's goal and plan.

Algorithm 1 determines the relevance of the given event with respect to the current mental state. The relevance of the event depends on the significance of the event with respect to the collaboration status, which is determined based on the utility of the event as presented in [92, 162]. Our algorithm for computing the relevance of an event during collaboration involves other factors that other appraisal models do not consider. For instance, the human's perceived emotion, recurrence of a belief, or occurrence of a belief about an unrelated goal by the human play important roles by influencing the utility of an event during collaboration. As a result, evaluating the relevance of events can cause a collaborative robot to

respond effectively which can positively impact the status of the shared goal, without dedicating all its resources to every event.

After perceiving an event, the belief about that event represents the event in the robot’s mental state. *recognizeGoal* returns the goal to which the current event contributes, unless it is *ambiguous*;  $g_t$  represents the shared goal at time (turn)  $t$  within the shared plan. We compute the utility ( $-1 \leq \mathcal{U} \leq 1$ ) of the event using the values of the attributes associated with the existing beliefs, and the attributes of the motive associated with the recognized goal (see details below). We use three belief attributes (see Section 3.4.8) to compute the belief-related part of the utility:

---

**Algorithm 1** (Relevance)

---

```

1: function ISEVENTRELEVANT(Event  $\varepsilon_t$ )
2:    $g_t \leftarrow \text{recognizeGoal}(\varepsilon_t)$ 
3:    $\mathcal{U} \leftarrow \text{GETEVENTUTILITY}(g_t)$ 
4:    $\tau_t \leftarrow \text{GETEMOTIONALTHRESHOLD}(g_t)$ 
5:   if  $(\tau_t \leq |\mathcal{U}|)$  then
6:     return RELEVANT
7:   else
8:     return IRRELEVANT

```

---

- *Strength*: The extent to which the preconditions ( $\alpha$ ), postconditions ( $\beta$ ), predecessors ( $\lambda$ ), and contributing goals ( $\mu$ ) of a goal are known (SATISFIED or UNSATISFIED) makes beliefs about the goal stronger. An UNKNOWN pre and postcondition status of a goal and its predecessors and contributing goals forms weaker beliefs. For instance, if one knows all predecessors of a pursued goal (e.g., “Check Panels”) are SATISFIED (i.e., “Fix Panels” and “Prepare Panels”), failure of the pursued goal will elicit one’s negative emotion (due to the strong beliefs related to the goal); whereas not knowing the status of the goal-related factors (e.g., whether the Astronaut could find the tool to fix a panel) causes one to form weaker beliefs about the goal.

- *Saliency (S)*: Beliefs related to the focused goal are more salient than beliefs related to any other goal in the plan; according to Figure 4.1, if one of the collaborators is preparing a solar panel, beliefs related to all of the other *live* (PENDING or IN PROGRESS) goals (e.g. “Connect Adaptor”) will be less salient than beliefs related to the focused goal, i.e., “Check Connector”. Beliefs’ saliency decreases according to their corresponding *live* goal’s distance from the focused goal in the shared plan. *Non-live* goals will not be salient.
- *Persistence (P)*: The recurrence of a belief over time (turns) increases the persistence of the belief. Beliefs occurring only once have the lowest value of persistence. For instance, if the Astronaut repeatedly says that she can not find the measurement tool to check the connector, the Robot could pursue a new goal outside of the shared plan to acknowledge Astronaut’s concern.

We also use two motive attributes discussed in Section 3.4.8 to compute the motive related part of the utility ( $\mathcal{U}$ ):

- *Urgency ( $\gamma$ )*: There are two factors impacting the urgency of a motive: a) whether the goal directing the given motive is the predecessor of another goal for which the other collaborator is responsible, and b) whether achieving the goal directing the given motive can mitigate the other collaborator’s negative valenced emotion. For instance, if the Robot has a private goal to fetch another panel while the Astronaut is waiting for the Robot to connect the adaptor, connecting the adaptor will be more urgent than Robot’s private goal.
- *Importance ( $\eta$ )*: A motive is important if failure of the directing goal causes an impasse in the shared plan (i.e., no further goal is available to achieve), or achievement of the directing goal removes an existing impasse. For example, if the Robot cannot find the adaptor (an impasse to connect the adaptor), and the Astronaut provides another adaptor (external motive), the new motive becomes important to remove the impasse in the shared plan.

We provide the utility function ( $\mathcal{U}$ ) in Equation 4.1. This function uses: saliency ( $S$ ) and persistence ( $P$ ) of the belief related to the recognized goal, the recognized goal's status ( $v$ ), and the aggregation of belief and motive attributes ( $\Psi$ ) according to Equation 4.1.

$$\mathcal{U}(\varepsilon_t) = \begin{cases} vP \cdot S^\Psi & \Psi > 0 \\ 0 & \Psi = 0 \end{cases} \quad (4.1)$$

Intuitively, we use  $v$  to generate positive and negative utility values. The  $v$ 's value becomes +1 if the status of the corresponding goal is ACHIEVED, PENDING, or IN PROGRESS, and  $v$ 's value becomes -1 if the status of the corresponding goal is FAILED, BLOCKED, or INAPPLICABLE. The  $P$  influences the value of utility only as a coefficient since recurrent beliefs are not formed frequently during collaboration. The  $\Psi$  value indicates the magnitude of the influence of beliefs and motives using their attributes. Hence, the  $\Psi$  value impacts the saliency value of beliefs exponentially, helping to differentiate between beliefs.

In equation 4.2, the subscript  $k$  refers to the *known* goal-related factors (SATISFIED or UNSATISFIED); whereas the subscript *all* includes both *known* and *unknown* goal-related factors. In this equation, both urgency ( $\gamma$ ) and importance ( $\eta$ ) attributes of motives can impact the outcome of the goal-related belief attributes' ratio, and ultimately the  $\Psi$  value.

$$\begin{aligned} \Psi &= \frac{\alpha_k + \beta_k + \lambda_k + \mu_k}{\alpha_{all} + \beta_{all} + \lambda_{all} + \mu_{all}} + \eta + \gamma & (4.2) \\ \eta, \gamma &\in \mathbb{N}, & \eta, \gamma \geq 0 \\ \alpha_k, \beta_k, \lambda_k, \mu_k &\in \mathbb{N}, & \alpha_k, \beta_k, \lambda_k, \mu_k \geq 0 \\ \alpha_{all}, \lambda_{all}, \mu_{all} &\in \mathbb{N}, & \alpha_{all}, \lambda_{all}, \mu_{all} \geq 0 \\ \beta_{all} &\in \mathbb{N}, & \beta_{all} \geq 1 \end{aligned}$$

The significance of an event in a collaborative environment is based on the utility of the event and the human's perceived emotion. The human's perceived emotion

influences the relevance of the event in the form of a threshold value  $\tau_t$ . In Equation 4.3, we use the valence of the perceived emotion ( $\mathcal{V}_{e_h}$ ) to compute  $\tau_t$ .

$$\tau_t = \begin{cases} 1 - \mathcal{V}_{e_h} & \mathcal{V}_{e_h} > 0 \\ |\mathcal{V}_{e_h}| & \mathcal{V}_{e_h} \leq 0 \end{cases} \quad (4.3)$$

$$\mathcal{V}_{e_h} \in \mathbb{R}, \quad -1 \leq \mathcal{V}_{e_h} \leq 1$$

Hence, perceiving human's positive emotion (e.g., happiness) reduces the threshold value which makes the robot find an event RELEVANT with even a slightly positive utility. Similarly, an event can be considered IRRELEVANT even though the utility has a relatively positive value, because of perceiving the human's negative emotion.

#### 4.3.2 Desirability

Desirability characterizes the value of an event to the robot in terms of whether the event facilitates or thwarts the collaboration goal. Desirability captures the valence of an event with respect to the robot's preferences [92]. In a collaborative robot, preferences are biased towards those events facilitating progress in the collaboration. Desirability plays an important role in the overall architecture; it makes the processes involved in the other mechanisms (e.g., Motivation and Theory of Mind) and consequently the robot's mental state, congruent with the collaboration status which is a collaborative robot's desire. Therefore, it causes the robot to dismiss events causing inconsistencies in the robot's collaborative behavior. Moreover, desirability is also crucial from the collaboration's point of view.

Algorithm 2 provides a process in which the desirability of an event is computed with regard to the status of the shared goal; i.e., it operates based on whether and how the event changes the status of the current shared goal. It distinguishes between the top level goal and the current goal because the top level goal's change of status attains a higher positive or negative value of desirability. For instance, failure of

---

**Algorithm 2** (Desirability)

---

```
1: function ISEVENTDESIRABLE(Event  $\varepsilon_t$ )  
2:    $g_t \leftarrow \text{recognizeGoal}(\varepsilon_t)$   
3:    $g_{top} \leftarrow \text{getTopLevelGoal}(g_t)$   
4:   if ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_{top}) = \text{ACHIEVED}$ ) then  
5:     return MOST-DESIRABLE  
6:   else if ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_{top}) = \text{FAILED}$ ) then  
7:     return MOST-UNDESIRABLE  
8:   else if ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_{top}) = \text{BLOCKED}$ )  
9:     ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_{top}) = \text{INAPPLICABLE}$ ) then  
10:    return UNDESIRABLE  
11:   else if ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_{top}) = \text{PENDING}$ )  
12:     ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_{top}) = \text{INPROGRESS}$ ) then  
13:       if ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_t) = \text{ACHIEVED}$ ) then  
14:         return DESIRABLE  
15:       else if ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_t) = \text{FAILED}$ ) then  
16:         return MOST-UNDESIRABLE  
17:       else if ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_t) = \text{BLOCKED}$ )  
18:         ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_t) = \text{INAPPLICABLE}$ ) then  
19:           return UNDESIRABLE  
20:         else if ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_t) = \text{PENDING}$ )  
21:           ( $\text{getGoalStatus}(g_t) = \text{INPROGRESS}$ ) then  
22:             return NEUTRAL
```

---

the top level goal (e.g., installing solar panel) is more undesirable than failure of a primitive goal (e.g., measuring the quality of the installed panel).

A top level goal' status must be ACHIEVED (i.e., SATISFIED postcondition) to consider the event MOST-DESIRABLE. When the goal's status is FAILED (i.e., UNSATISFIED postcondition) or BLOCKED, the associated event has the MOST-UNDESIRABLE or UNDESIRABLE values respectively. A goal is BLOCKED if any of the required goals or goals recursively through the parent goal are not ACHIEVED. An INAPPLICABLE goal is also considered as UNDESIRABLE. A goal is INAPPLICABLE if any of its predecessors are not ACHIEVED, and/or its preconditions are not SATISFIED. For PENDING and INPROGRESS top level goals, the status of the current goal associated

with the top level goal determines the status of the event  $\varepsilon_t$ . Only a non-primitive goal can have INPROGRESS status, if it has been started but is not yet completed. A goal can be PENDING if it is live, or if it is a non-primitive goal that has not been started yet. ACHIEVED current goals mark an event ( $\varepsilon_t$ ) as DESIRABLE, while FAILED or BLOCKED current goals render the event associated with them as MOST-UNDESIRABLE and UNDESIRABLE respectively. PENDING or INPROGRESS current goals mark their associated events as NEUTRAL.

#### 4.3.3 Expectedness

Expectedness is the extent to which the truth value of a state could have been predicted from causal interpretation of an event. In the collaboration context the expectedness of an event evaluates the congruency of the event with respect to the existing knowledge about the shared goal. Thus, expectedness underlies a collaborative robot’s attention. The collaboration mechanism uses expectedness to maintain the robot’s attention and subsequently its mental state with respect to the shared goal. Reciprocally, the appraisal mechanism uses the underlying information of the collaboration structure to evaluate the expectedness of an event [247].

In Algorithm 3 we provide the process of computing the expectedness based on the shared plan and status of the shared goal. The key point in this algorithm is the status of the current shared goal ( $g_t$ ), which is associated with the event  $\varepsilon_t$  and its relationship with the top level goal ( $g_{top}$ ).

The intuition captured here is that one expects the current goal to be finished before undertaking another activity, but the goals that can be the next focus of attention are also to be expected. Therefore, if the goal is live, the algorithm checks whether the goal has not changed, or whether the interpretation of the last event results in a necessary focus shift. Shifting the focus to a new goal is necessary when the former goal is achieved and a new goal is required. Consequently the new event is the MOST-EXPECTED one. However, even if the focus shift is not necessary, the new event can be considered as EXPECTED, since the corresponding goal is already

---

**Algorithm 3** (Expectedness)

---

```
1: function ISEVENTEXPECTED(Event  $\varepsilon_t$ )  
2:    $g_t \leftarrow \text{recognizeGoal}(\varepsilon_t)$   
3:    $g_{top} \leftarrow \text{getTopLevelGoal}(g_t)$   
4:   if ( $\text{isLive}(g_t)$ ) then  
5:     if ( $\neg \text{isFocusShift}(g_t)$   
6:        $\text{isNecessaryFocusShift}(g_t)$ ) then  
7:         return MOST-EXPECTED  
8:       else  
9:         return EXPECTED  
10:    else  
11:      if ( $\text{isPath}(g_t, g_{top})$ ) then  
12:        return UNEXPECTED  
13:      else  
14:        return MOST-UNEXPECTED
```

---

live. For goals that have not yet been started (that is, are not live), the algorithm must determine how unexpected it would be to pursue one now; if the goal is at least in the plan, i.e., on the path to the top level goal, it is just UNEXPECTED while any others are MOST-UNEXPECTED.

#### 4.3.4 Controllability

Controllability is the extent to which an event can be influenced; it is associated with a robot’s ability to cope with an event [92]. Thus, a robot can determine whether an event’s outcome can be altered by actions under either of the collaborators’ control. In other words, controllability is a measure of a robot’s ability to maintain or change a particular state as a consequence of an event.

Controllability is important for the overall architecture. For instance, the robot can choose to ask or negotiate about a collaborative task which is not controllable, or form a new motive to establish an alternative goal for the current uncontrollable event. In general, other mechanisms in the architecture use the controllability output in their decision making processes; meanwhile controllability uses information from

---

**Algorithm 4** (Controllability)

---

```
1: function ISEVENTCONTROLLABLE(Event  $\varepsilon_t$ )
2:    $g_t \leftarrow \text{recognizeGoal}(\varepsilon_t)$ 
3:    $\mathcal{M} \leftarrow \text{GETAGENCYRATIO}(g_t)$ 
4:    $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow \text{GETAUTONOMYRATIO}(g_t)$ 
5:    $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \text{GETSUCCPREDECESSORSRATIO}(g_t)$ 
6:    $\mathcal{I} \leftarrow \text{GETAVAILABLEINPUTS}(g_t)$ 
7:    $\mathcal{V}_{e_h} \leftarrow \text{GETEMOTIONVALENCE}(g_t)$ 
8:    $\omega \leftarrow \text{GETWEIGHTS}(g_t)$ 
9:    $\mathcal{X} \leftarrow \frac{\omega_0 \cdot \mathcal{M} + \omega_1 \cdot \mathcal{R} + \omega_2 \cdot \mathcal{P} + \omega_3 \cdot \mathcal{I}}{\omega_0 + \omega_1 + \omega_2 + \omega_3} + \mathcal{V}_{e_h}$ 
10:  if ( $\mathcal{X} > 0$ ) then
11:    return CONTROLLABLE
12:  else
13:    return UNCONTROLLABLE
```

---

the collaboration structure, e.g., predecessors of a goal.

An important determinant of one’s emotional response is the sense of control over occurring events. This sense of subjective control is based on one’s reasoning about self’s power. For instance, the robustness of one’s plan for executing actions can increase one’s sense of power and subsequently the sense of control. In the collaboration context, we have translated the sense of control into a combination of four different factors including a) *agency* and b) *autonomy* of the robot, as well as the ratios of c) *successful predecessors*, and d) the *available inputs* of a given goal (i.e.,  $g_t$ ) in the shared plan.

In Algorithm 4, we partially compute the controllability of an event based on the above four factors. We use weighted averaging of these factors to determine their impact on the controllability of an event (line 9). The value of all these weights are set to *1.0* for the purpose of simplicity (**getWeights**). These weights can be adjusted after further investigating the influence of these factors, and implementing

other mechanisms in the overall architecture. We believe that the human’s perceived emotion also impacts the controllability of an event (**getEmotionValence**). The ( $-1.0 \leq \mathcal{V}_{e_h} \leq 1.0$ ) is the valence value of the human’s perceived emotion. Positive emotions, e.g., happiness, possess positive values, and negative emotions, e.g., anger, have negative values. The magnitude of this value can change with respect to the intensity of the perceived emotion. Thus, a positive controllability value indicates that an event is **CONTROLLABLE**; otherwise **UNCONTROLLABLE**.

**GetAgencyRatio:** *Agency* is the capacity of an individual to act independently in a given environment. In a collaborative environment collaborators are sometimes required to act independently of each other. Hence, they need to have some internal motives that are formed based on their own mental states rather than motives that are reinforced by the other. These internal motives will lead the collaborators to acquire new intentions when required. If the robot’s mental state possesses only an internal motive supporting the recognized goal, we consider a maximum agency value denoted as  $\mathcal{M}$  in Algorithm 4 (i.e.,  $\mathcal{M} = 1.0$ ); otherwise we consider the minimum agency value (i.e.,  $\mathcal{M} = 0.0$ ).

**GetAutonomyRatio:** *Autonomy* is the ability to make decisions without the influence of others, and implies acting on one’s own and being responsible for that. In a collaborative environment, tasks are delegated to the collaborators based on their capabilities. Therefore, each collaborator is responsible for the delegated task and the corresponding goal. In Algorithm 4,  $\mathcal{R}$  denotes the value of autonomy with regard to the goal  $g_t$ . This value ( $0.0 \leq \mathcal{R} \leq 1.0$ ) is the ratio of the number of goals contributing to  $g_t$  for which the robot is responsible over the total number of contributing goals, if the goal associated with the current event is a nonprimitive goal. However, if the associated goal of the current event corresponds to a primitive goal the value of  $\mathcal{M}$  would be 0.0 or 1.0. In general, higher autonomy leads to a more positive value of controllability.

**GetSuccPredecessorsRatio:** The structure of a shared plan contains the order of the required *predecessors* of a goal. Predecessors of a goal,  $g_t$ , are goals that the

collaborators should achieve before trying to achieve goal  $g_t$ . We use the ratio of successfully achieved predecessors of the recognized goal over the total number of predecessors of the same goal. If all of the predecessors of the given goal are achieved, then  $\mathcal{P} = 1.0$  which is the maximum value for  $\mathcal{P}$ . On the contrary, failure of all of the predecessors will lead to  $\mathcal{P} = 0.0$ . Therefore, a higher  $\mathcal{P}$  value positively impacts the value of controllability for the current event.

**GetAvailableInputs:** Finally, *inputs* of a task are the required elements that the collaborators use to achieve the specified goal of the task. These inputs are also part of the structure of a shared plan. We compute the ratio of the available required inputs over the total required inputs of the goal associated with the current event. This value (denoted as  $\mathcal{I}$  in Algorithm 4) will be bound between 0.0 and 1.0. Similar to the other factors in the controllability process, the closer the value of  $\mathcal{I}$  gets to 1.0, the more positive impact it has on the overall controllability value of the event.

In summary, the output of these four appraisal processes serves as critical input for the other mechanisms of the Affective Motivational Collaboration Framework, shown in Chapter 3. By providing adequate interpretation of events in the collaborative environment, the appraisal mechanism enables the robot to carry out proper collaborative behaviors.

## 4.4 Goal Management

A collaborative robot needs to be able to regulate and manage shared goals during collaboration. Emotion has a crucial influence on this goal management process. In this section, we provide a cost function that we use to choose the goal in the shared plan with the lowest cost value out of a set of alternative goals. This cost function is a) based on the goal attributes, b) with respect to the reverse appraisal of the perceived emotion, and c) the appraisal of the collaborative environment.

Goals represent an important part of the context during collaboration. However, not all goals are appropriate to pursue at the moment, depending on conditions. In fact, it can be destructive for a collaboration to pursue a good goal in a poor context. Therefore, a collaborative robot must be able to manage shared goals during collaboration. The goal management process has a critical influence on a collaborative robot’s behavior by maintaining or shifting the focus of attention to an appropriate goal based on the collaboration status.

Changes in a collaboration environment alter the balance of alternative goals. These changes can reflect the collaborators’ internal changes and the influence of their actions. In a collaboration environment, emotions represent the outcome of underlying mental processes of the collaborators. Emotions have many different functions [226] including goal management. Goal-oriented emotions such as anger, frustration and worry regulate the mental processes influenced by one’s internal goals. In our example in this section, a robot and an astronaut are collaborating to install solar panels. When one of the astronaut’s goals is blocked, the robot must manage the shared goals in order to prevent failure of the collaboration. By using reverse appraisal [64] of the astronaut’s emotion and its own appraisal of individual goals, the robot is able to successfully shift the focus of attention from the blocked goal (eliciting worry in the astronaut) to an appropriate one to maintain the collaboration. A similar example is provided our conducted user study, which is explained in Chapter 5.

Here, we describe the goal management process in our framework using an astronaut-robot collaboration example. We introduce the goal management process based on a cost function including the influence of affective appraisal and reverse appraisal processes. Goal management is a crucial part of our investigation of the reciprocal influence of appraisal on a collaboration structure (see Figure 4.3).

As we mentioned earlier, we use four appraisal variables including: relevance, desirability, expectedness and controllability. The outcome of each appraisal process is a specific value for the corresponding appraisal variable. The vector containing




Figure 4.3: Using Appraisals’ outcome to influence Collaboration structure (mechanisms in our framework).

these appraisal variables can be mapped to a particular emotion instance at each point in time when required. Moreover, the functions of emotions, such as goal management, in a social setting and the meaning of the collaborator’s perceived emotion in collaboration context are also important.

A collaboration structure provides a hierarchy and constraints of the shared goals in the form of a shared plan (Figure 5.1) which contains both the robot and the human collaborator’s goals. The robot pursues the goals for which the robot is responsible in the shared plan. However, there can be several live goals available for the robot to pursue at each point in time during collaboration. A goal is live if all of its predecessors are achieved and all of its preconditions are satisfied. Therefore, a collaborative robot requires a mechanism to choose between a set of live goals. We believe appraisal processes are crucial to choose between the available live goals, since the appraisals are the immediate outcome of the robot’s assessment of the collaboration environment.

For instance, Figure 4.4 shows a non-primitive “Prepare Panels” goal decomposed into three primitive goals. Therefore, if “Prepare Panels” is live, its primitive goals can be pursued by the responsible agent. In our example, the astronaut is responsible for the “Check Connector” goal; the robot is responsible for the remaining two primitive goals. According to the collaboration mechanism in our overall




Figure 4.4: Cost values indicated by tuples with (second number) and without (first number) the influence of emotions.

framework, “Check Connector” is in focus, with the astronaut pursuing this goal. Suddenly, however the astronaut tells the robot that she can not find the connector and she is *worried* about failure of this goal. The robot’s response to this situation will be explored below as we discuss details of our cost function.

Equation 4.4 shows the function to calculate the cost of each live goal. The base in the equation calculates the cost of pursuing any given goal. The three functions used to calculate the cost are: *proximity*  $P(g)$ , *difficulty*  $D(g)$ , and *specificity*  $S(g)$  (see equations 4.6 to 4.8).

$$Cost(g) = (\omega_0 \cdot P(g) + \omega_1 \cdot D(g) + \omega_2 \cdot \frac{1}{S(g) + 1})^\Gamma \quad (4.4)$$

For simplicity in this example, we assume equal values for the weights:  $\omega_i=1$ .

$$\Gamma = -C[(R_r + 1)D_r + \alpha(R_h + 1)D_h] \quad (4.5)$$

The exponent part of our cost function (Equation 4.5) captures a) the influence of the human’s perceived emotional instance, and b) the influence of self appraisal of the given goal.  $R_h \in [0, 1]$  and  $D_h \in [-1, 1]$  are the relevance and desirability

values respectively, which are based on the *reverse* appraisal of the human’s perceived emotion. For instance, if the astronaut is *worried*,  $D_h$  is negative, e.g., -0.8 (depending on how undesirable the event is according to reverse appraisal), and  $R_h$  will be 1 for the active goal and its value descends to 0 for other live goals depending on their distance to the active goal in the shared plan (e.g., 0.1).

$R_r \in [0, 1]$  and  $D_r \in [-1, 1]$  are relevance and desirability values, provided by the *self* appraisal functions for all of the live goals. For instance, for the active goal for which the astronaut was *worried*,  $D_r$  can be positive, e.g., 0.8 (depending on the self’s desirability appraisal function);  $R_r$  can be 1, since the active goal is relevant for the robot. These values will change for the other live goals depending on how relevant they are with respect to the collaboration status (e.g., 0.9 and 0.8). Finally,  $C \in [1, \infty)$  is a constant (e.g., 2) used to control the influence of affect on cost value. It is negative since undesirability (negative values) should increase the cost.  $\alpha \in [1, \infty)$  is another constant (e.g., 3) used to control the importance of reverse appraisal relative to self appraisal.

The *proximity* of a goal indicates how far the goal is from the current active goal in the shared plan. It is calculated by the distance function (Equation 4.6) which returns the number of edges between the current active goal  $g_{act}$ , and the given goal  $g$  in the shared plan. In our example,  $P(g)$  is 2 for both “Check Impedance” and “Connect Adaptor” goals.

$$P(g) = \max\{1, \text{distance}(g_{act}, g)\} \quad (4.6)$$

The *difficulty* of a goal is a function of three parameters (Equation 4.7) which consider the difficulty based on a) topology of the shared plan tree (domain independent), and b) the amount of effort required to pursue a given goal (domain dependent). The  $\sum pred_e(g)$  is the sum of efforts that all the *predecessors* of a given goal  $g$  require. The  $\sum desc_e(g)$  is the sum of efforts that all the *descendants* of a given goal  $g$  require. The effort values represent the amount of effort for the goals

with respect to the domain. In our example, we assume the values of all the goal efforts are 1 for simplicity. The  $H(g)$  is the height of the given goal  $g$ . The heights of all primitives under “Prepare Panel” goal are 0 in our example.

$$D(g) = (H(g) + 1) \times \left[ \sum_{m=0}^M pred_e(g) + \sum_{n=0}^N desc_e(g) \right] \quad (4.7)$$

The *specificity* of a goal is the function of *depth* (distance from the root) and *degree* (number of children in the graph) of a given goal  $g$ . The first non-primitive goal (root) is the least specific goal, and the primitives (leaves) are the most specific goals. As calculated based on Figure 4.4, the values of  $S(g)$  for the three primitives under the “Prepare Panels” are 2.

$$S(g) = \frac{depth(g)}{degree(g) + 1} \quad (4.8)$$

The tuples below the goals in Fig. 4.4 indicate the cost value of each goal. The first number in each tuple is the normalized cost value without the influence of the affective part of the cost function, i.e., the exponent is equal to 1 in Equation 4.4. The second number of each tuple indicates the normalized value of the cost including the influence of affective appraisal and the astronaut’s perceived emotion.

Based on our cost function, the cost of completing the primitive goal “Check Connector” is 0.82 (see Figure 4.4). As shown, when affect is not considered the cost is 0.26; the negative emotion of the astronaut (worry) significantly increases the cost of the current goal, and also impacts the other two primitive live goals under the same parent. Therefore, instead of insisting on pursuing the same blocked goal which has caused the astronaut’s negative emotion, the robot can mitigate the astronaut’s emotions by adapting to her worry. The robot shifts the focus of attention to “Check Impedance” to maintain progress and prevent failure of the collaboration.

We use our proposed cost function in our goal management algorithm to integrate affective appraisal into the collaboration mechanism in our framework. A similar situation is used in our conducted user study (see Chapter 5) to evaluate the human’s

perception of the robot’s behavior as a result of the goal management process.

## 4.5 Coping Mechanism and Strategies

We have implemented the Coping mechanism to determine how the agent would respond to events using our framework. Our Coping mechanism includes a set of coping strategies that can be triggered based on different conditions (see Figure 4.5). All of these coping strategies are known in the literature. Some of our coping strategies, i.e., *planning*, *active coping* and *seeking social support for instrumental reasons*, are categorized as problem-focused and others, i.e., *acceptance*, *mental disengagement*, and *shifting responsibility*, are categorized as emotion-focused strategies as described in [92]. We selected these six coping strategies since they let our agent demonstrate distinct behaviors with respect to the output of the appraisal mechanism and the agent’s mental state in our framework. The behaviors and underlying processes associated with these coping strategies are described as follows.

### 4.5.1 Planning

The *planning* coping strategy works based on the shared plan and the task structure introduced as an input to our framework. The task structure includes the hierarchy and ordering of the tasks, the required inputs of each task as well as the preconditions and postconditions of individual tasks. We use this task structure to create our shared plan which includes the primitive and non-primitive goals that our agent and its collaborator want to achieve throughout their collaboration. Therefore, our agent executes actions related to its own goals based on this shared plan, and uses the same shared plan to associate goals and their status with the human collaborator. To achieve a goal the agent is required to execute an action, and to execute an action the agent needs to have the right intention. In our framework, whenever this coping strategy is activated the Coping mechanism provides the selected intention to the Action mechanism. The Action mechanism executes an action based on the

given intention to achieve the corresponding goal in the shared plan.

#### 4.5.2 Active Coping

The *active* coping strategy can provide one or all of the following three different intentions with respect to whether this coping strategy is activated and the required conditions are provided. Firstly, this coping strategy can provide an intention to *acknowledge* the human’s emotions. For instance, if the human expresses an emotion with negative valence, the agent can acknowledge human’s negative emotion accordingly. Secondly, the active coping strategy can provide an intention to *respond* to the human if the human asks a question. Currently, in our framework, the agent can respond to the human if the human asks the agent: a) what input is required to achieve a goal, b) how to do a task to achieve a goal, c) to achieve a goal, d) who is responsible to achieve a given goal. For instance, if the human asks the agent to achieve a goal, the active coping strategy forms an intention to either accept the human’s proposal (if achieving the given goal is controllable for the agent), or reject the human’s proposal (if it is not controllable for the agent). Thirdly, the active coping strategy can form an intention to *delegate* a task to the human collaborator. The intention for task delegation can be formed if the agent fails to achieve its own goal, and the human’s perceived emotion is not negative. As mentioned earlier, any or all of these intentions can be formed if active coping is selected. The agent acts accordingly by passing these intentions to the Action mechanism. For instance, if the human is frustrated about a failure that occurred when using a tool to perform its own task and asks the agent whether the agent can provide its own tool, the active coping strategy forms a new intention to acknowledge the human’s frustration and responds to the human by providing the right tool (input) to use and fulfill the task. In this example, there will be no new intention to delegate a new goal to the human since the agent perceives the human’s negative emotion.

#### **4.5.3 Seeking Social Support for Instrumental Reasons**

The *seeking social support for instrumental reasons* strategy forms new intentions for the agent whenever the agent needs the human's help and needs to ask questions from the human collaborator to make progress in collaboration. The questions that our agent can ask are the reciprocal of those questions that the human can ask and the human can respond as we mentioned above. Therefore, our agent can ask a) what input is required to achieve a goal, b) how to do a task to achieve a goal, c) the human to achieve a goal, d) who is responsible to achieve a given goal. Reciprocally, again, the agent expects the human collaborator to accept or reject the agent's proposals. In our framework, whenever this strategy is activated the agent considers human's perceived emotion. For instance, if the human is worried about the outcome of a task failure, the agent does not form an intention to ask questions about any of the above cases and consequently prevents asking for more help.

#### **4.5.4 Acceptance**

The *acceptance* coping strategy forms an intention to drop the intention of pursuing a goal. In our framework, if this strategy becomes activated, the intention to pursue the current goal will be dropped; see Figure 4.5. The acceptance strategy also forms an intention to inform the human collaborator about the agent's decision on not pursuing the current goal.

#### **4.5.5 Mental Disengagement**

The *mental disengagement* coping strategy forms new intention to lower the negative emotional charge associated with a goal in the event of a failure or an impasse. We use our goal management algorithm (see section 4.4) as the underlying process used as the result of selecting this strategy to dissociate the collaboration process and subsequently disengage the collaborator from a negative event (e.g., failure to achieve

a goal). This disengagement helps the agent to lower the utility of an unsuccessful goal achievement attempt and focus on other achievable goals with respect to their costs to facilitate progress of collaboration. In our framework, this coping strategy forms an intention to run the goal management process. As the result of mental disengagement activation, the mechanism also forms another intention to inform the human about the outcome of the goal management process, i.e., whether the agent proposes switching to pursue another goal with lower cost, or if there is not much the agent can do since there is no other goal with a lower cost to pursue. The process and example of choosing another goal with a lower cost are shown in section 4.4.

#### 4.5.6 Shifting Responsibility

The *shifting responsibility* strategy forms new intention to shift the blame from the agent to another entity. In our framework, we use this strategy to mitigate the influence of negative events causing negative emotions in the agent or the human collaborator. For instance, if this strategy becomes activated as a result of a failure, a new intention will be formed to blame the third person who provided the input (if the task needed a tool as an input) or the other collaborator. It can also form an intention to give the credit to the human collaborator to mitigate human's negative emotions.

#### 4.5.7 Activation of Coping Strategies

In our Coping mechanism, there are three components involved as the activation criteria for each coping strategy. The first criterion is the conjunction of emotion valences of the self and the other collaborator (see Emotion Valence column in Figure 4.5). For instance, if the valence of the human collaborator's emotion is *negative* and the valence of the agent's emotion is also *negative*, the active coping, the acceptance, and the mental disengagement coping strategies are the coping strategy

candidates that have potential to become activated if the other activation criteria also exist for any of them. For example, if the human collaborator is frustrated and the agent’s elicited emotion is guilt, the three above mentioned coping strategies become potential candidates to be selected as the agent’s active coping strategy. The second criterion is the need for the agent to cope with an event. The values of our three different motives (i.e., *satisfaction*, *achievement*, and *external*) are involved in the decision of whether there is a need for a particular coping strategy to become activated. We use conjunction of satisfaction motive’s value with the disjunction of achievement and external motives. For instance, if we have highly negative values for all three motives for the potential candidates of coping strategies based on the example we mentioned above, the acceptance coping strategy will be selected as the strategy with the highest need for the agent. For example, this kind of condition can occur when the agent fails doing its own task and pursuing the current goal (negative satisfaction motive), and can not find another goal to overcome the impasse (negative achievement motive). The details about how the motive values are computed is presented in Section 4.6. Finally, the ability to cope with an event is the third criterion that impacts the decision of whether the selected coping strategy can be activated. The controllability of an event represents whether the agent is able to control the situation occurring with the given event. In our example, if the agent finds the event uncontrollable, the acceptance coping strategy becomes activated (see Figure 4.5).

## 4.6 Motivation Mechanism

As we discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, motives are goal-driven emotion-regulated constructs indicating an urge related to their goal. There are several motives in psychological and computational literatures as we reviewed in Chapter 2. However, none of these computational models have particularly focused on the application of motives in the collaboration context. In our framework, we have implemented

| Coping Strategy                                 | Emotions (AND)     |                    | Need [a AND (b OR c)]   |                        |                     | Ability         |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
|   | Other              | Self               | Satisfaction Motive (a) | Achievement Motive (b) | External Motive (c) | Controllability |
| Planning  | Neutral   Positive | Any                | -/+                     | high +                 | high +              | High            |
| Active Coping                                   | Any                | Neutral   Negative | -/+                     | med +                  | med +               | High            |
| Seeking Social Support for Instrumental Reasons | Neutral   Positive | Any                | -/+                     | low +                  | low +               | Low             |
| Acceptance                                      | Negative           | Negative           | high -                  | high -                 | high -              | No              |
| Mental Disengagement                            | Neutral   Negative | Neutral   Negative | low/med -               | low/med -              | low/med -           | No              |
| Shifting Responsibility                         | Neutral   Positive | Negative           | high -                  | -/+                    | -/+                 | No   Low        |

Figure 4.5: Conditions for selecting coping strategies

three computational models of motives for *satisfaction*, *achievement*, and *external* motives. We use the values of these three motives in other mechanisms including the Coping mechanism as we described in Section 4.5 and show in Figure 4.5.

#### 4.6.1 Satisfaction Motive

The satisfaction motive indicates the satisfaction level with the collaboration for the agent and its human collaborator. The satisfaction motive process maintains the value of *satisfaction drive* throughout the collaboration. The satisfaction drive is the quantitative weighted accumulation of desirability values between -1 and +1 over time. For instance, if the desirability values of the agent's appraisal over three consecutive turns are  $\{0.75, 0, -0.25\}$ , and their corresponding weights are  $\{0.25, 0.5, 1.0\}$ , the satisfaction drive value will be  $(0.25)(0.75) + (0.5)(0) + (1.0)(-0.25)$  which is -0.0625. Notice that the latest desirability values get higher weights. Intuitively, it is because older desirable events have less influence on overall desirability and consequently the satisfaction level of the collaboration. The same process computes the satisfaction drive values for the agent and the human collaborator. Only the sources of desirability values are different, i.e., appraisal for the agent and reverse appraisal for the human collaborator. Then, the satisfaction motive process computes the difference between the current and the previous satisfaction drives, called delta of satisfaction drive value,  $\delta_{sat}$ . As shown in equation 4.9, we use the  $\delta_{sat}$  value in all three functions to compute the overall satisfaction motive's value  $\mathcal{M}_{sat}$ . We also use three different functions with respect to the valence value of the the human collaborator's perceived emotion. Our satisfaction motive's model has three user defined parameters  $\mathcal{S}_{sat} \in [0, 1.5]$ , i.e. strength of motive,  $\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{L}}$  where  $\mathcal{B}$  is the base parameter of the function in  $(1, \infty)$  and  $\mathcal{L}$  is the exponential parameter of the same function in  $(0, \infty)$ ; together  $\mathcal{B}$  and  $\mathcal{L}$  define *unsatisfiability* value. In our framework, we set the  $\mathcal{S}_{sat}$  value to 1.5, the  $\mathcal{B}$  to 3.0, and the  $\mathcal{L}$  to 2.0.

$$\mathcal{M}_{sat}(\varepsilon_t) = \begin{cases} \arctan(\mathcal{S}_{sat} \times \delta_{sat}) & valence = 0 \\ \mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{L} \times (\delta_{sat}-1)} & valence > 0 \\ -\mathcal{B}^{-\mathcal{L} \times (\delta_{sat}+1)} & valence < 0 \end{cases} \quad (4.9)$$

Intuitively, if the human collaborator does not express any emotion, the satisfaction motive's value can vary between -1 and +1 (blue curve in Figure 4.6). However, if the agent perceives positive emotion, there will be no negative satisfaction value since the other collaborator is in positive state of mind (red curve in Figure 4.6), and in contrast, if the agent perceives negative emotion, the satisfaction motive value only changes between -1 and 0 (green curve in Figure 4.6) with respect to how satisfied the agent is according to the status of its own goals during collaboration.




Figure 4.6: Three functions of satisfaction motive (blue: valence = 0, red: valence = positive, green: valence = negative). The x-axis indicates the satisfaction drive's delta value in [-1, +1], and the y-axis indicates the magnitude of satisfaction motive in [-1, +1].

#### 4.6.2 Achievement Motive

The achievement motive drives the agent’s need to achieve a goal during the collaboration. According to the literature, e.g. [169], the achievement motive is based on the estimation of success probability and the difficulty of achieving a goal. In our framework, we compute the probability of success as the multiplication of the *controllability* and *expectedness* appraisal values. Intuitively, the more controllable and expected the events are, the probability of successful achievement of their related goal is higher.




Figure 4.7: Two functions of the achievement motive (blue: valence = +1, red: valence = 0, green: valence = -1, orange: valence = close to zero from negative side). The x-axis indicates the success probability value of achieving a goal which is in  $[0, +1]$ , and the y-axis indicates the magnitude of achievement motive in  $[-1, +1]$ .

In our framework we use two sigmoid-based functions to compute the achievement motive’s value. These functions values change based on the probability of success and valence of the human collaborator’s emotion. We use Equation 4.10

when the perceived emotion of the human has positive or zero valence value, and we use Equation 4.11 when the perceived emotion of the human has a negative valence value. As shown in Figure 4.7, when the value of the valence changes between 0 and +1, the output of  $\mathcal{M}^{+ach}$  function changes between the red and the blue lines respectively. Conversely, when the value of the valence changes between -1 and a small negative number (close to zero), the output of  $\mathcal{M}^{-ach}$  function changes between the green and the orange lines.

$$\mathcal{M}^{+ach}(\varepsilon_t) = \frac{2.0}{1 + e^{(2.0-valence) \times (1.05-p(success))}} - \frac{1.0}{1 + e^{(12.0-valence) \times (1.2-p(success))}} \quad (4.10)$$

$$\mathcal{M}^{-ach}(\varepsilon_t) = \frac{1.0}{1 + e^{(0.5+valence) \times (1.05)-p(success)}} - \frac{1.0}{1 + e^{(12.0+valence) \times (p(success)-1.02)}} \quad (4.11)$$

By intuition, as the probability of success increases the agent is more motivated to achieve a goal and this motive gets higher when the human's emotion is positive or at least neutral. The human's negative emotions cause lower values of achievement motive since taking care of and acknowledging the human's negative emotion should have higher priority for a collaborative agent than achieving a goal.

#### 4.6.3 External Motive

The external motive drives the agent's need to achieve a proposed goal by the human collaborator during the collaboration. In our framework, the external motive is also based on the estimation of success probability and the difficulty of achieving a goal, but this goal is proposed by the human collaborator. The probability of success for the external motive is computed the same way as the achievement motive's probability of success, i.e. the multiplication of *controllability* and *expectedness* appraisal values.

The only difference is that we use Equations 4.10 and 4.11 in reverse order for the external motive; i.e. we use Equation 4.11 when the valence of human's perceived emotion is positive, and Equation 4.10 when the valence of the human's perceived emotion is negative or zero.




Figure 4.8: Two functions of external motive (blue: valence = -1, red: valence = 0, green: valence = +1, orange: valence = close to zero from negative side). The x-axis indicates the success probability value of achieving a proposed goal which is in  $[0, +1]$ , and the y-axis indicates the magnitude of the achievement motive in  $[-1, +1]$ .

Intuitively, when the human proposes a new goal while expressing a negative emotion the agent should be more motivated to acknowledge human's proposal and pursue the proposed goal to mitigate human's negative emotion and maintain the collaboration.

## 4.7 Theory of Mind

The Theory of Mind mechanism uses the same collaboration structure and functions as well as appraisal processes to form anticipated beliefs about the human's mental and emotional states. The agent uses the collaboration structure during the human's turn to compute appraisal values with respect to the human's current emotional state and the current goal in the shared goal structure. The outcome of the reverse appraisal forms beliefs about the anticipated mental and emotional state of the human collaborator.

We use the same *relevance*, *expectedness* and *controllability* algorithms for the reverse appraisal as those algorithms we described in Section 4.3. In these three algorithms the Theory of Mind mechanism substitutes the agent's required goal and its corresponding constraints and information with the human's goal and its corresponding information which is provided to the agent within the shared plan structure. In other words, since our agent knows about the human's goals (as part of the shared plan), it can apply the human goals to the same algorithms during the human's turn of the collaboration. However, only for the reverse appraisal of *desirability* we chose to simply use the valence value of the human's perceived emotion and interpret negative, neutral and positive valence values as undesirable, neutral and desirable values respectively. In this way, our agent could directly infer whether the occurrence of the current event and its corresponding goal is desirable for the human. The outcome of all of these processes is a vector of reverse appraisal values that could be used by other mechanisms in our framework.

## 4.8 Perception and Action

As described in Chapter 3, the Perception and Action mechanisms are not part of our theoretical work. Therefore, we only implemented these mechanisms to the extent to which they could help us to run and test our framework. The Perception

mechanism only redirects the input values from the system's users to the framework. For instance, in our conducted user study described in Chapter 5, the Perception mechanism only receives the valence of human's emotion from the input and provides it to the framework. On the other hand, the Action mechanism executes some functions based on the intentions formed and provided by the Coping mechanism described in this section. We group all of these functions into three categories in our framework. The first group of functions includes all of the functions capable of executing some actions with respect to the domain. The second category includes all of the functions involved in revealing the agent's utterances by writing on the screen or conveying through the agent's voice and text to speech systems. The last category includes all of the functions to express the agent's emotion. The emotions can be expressed through colors, emoticons, voice and text. For example, in the user study described in Chapter 5, we expressed the agent's emotions by using emoticons and utterances through the text on the screen as well as the agent's voice.

## 4.9 Emotion Instances

We have also implemented 10 different emotion instances that can be elicited by the agent or anticipated from the human during collaboration in our framework (see Figure 4.10). These emotion instances have meanings in social context and more specifically in collaboration. There are two components involved in selecting a particular emotion: appraisal variables and collaboration context.

We use the outcome of the four appraisal processes discussed in section 4.3 to determine the potential emotion instance to be elicited (if the agent wants to express an emotion), or to anticipate a potential emotion from the human collaborator (if the human response is anticipated). The outcome of appraisal processes can be one of the values presented in Figure 4.9 with respect to the corresponding process.

We also use the collaboration context as our second determinant to select a particular emotion. We define the collaboration context based on: *goal achievement*,

| Appraisal Variable | Relevance  | Desirability     | Expectedness    | Controllability   |
|--------------------|------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Values             | RELEVANT   | HIGH_DESIRABLE   | MOST_EXPECTED   | HIGH_CONTROLLABLE |
|                    |            | DESIRABLE        | EXPECTED        | LOW_CONTROLLABLE  |
|                    | IRRELEVANT | NEUTRAL          | UNEXPECTED      |                   |
|                    |            | UNDESIRABLE      | MOST_UNEXPECTED | UNCONTROLLABLE    |
|                    |            | HIGH_UNDESIRABLE |                 |                   |

Figure 4.9: Appraisal values.

*goal failure, proposal of a goal, acceptance of the proposed goal, and rejection of the proposed goal.* All of these situations can occur by either of the collaborators, i.e., agent or human (see Figure 4.10). There is only one exception and it is when the desirability value is neutral the associated emotion to the event is always neutral without considering the collaboration context and the values of other appraisal variables.

As an example, if the agent finds an event *uncontrollable, unexpected, undesirable* and *relevant* as the result of the human’s proposal of a new goal to the agent (in the agent’s turn), the elicited emotion instance will be *worry* which can be expressed by the agent to indicate the agent’s concern. Similarly, the agent will anticipate *worry* for the human if the same appraisal values are computed while for instance the agent rejects the human’s proposal of the new goal (in the human’s turn).

| #  | Emotion Instance  | Context        | Relevance  | Desirability    | Expectedness                                  | Controllability                         |
|----|-------------------|----------------|--|-----------------|---|---|
| 1  | Neutral           |                |  | NEUTRAL         |   |   |
| 2  | Joy               | human<br>agent | <i>HUMAN_ACHIEVED</i><br><i>AGENT_ACHIEVED</i>   | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>DESIRABLE</i><br><i>HIGH_DESIRABLE</i>     | <b>EXPECTED</b><br><b>MOST_EXPECTED</b> |
| 3  | Sadness           | human<br>agent | <i>HUMAN_FAILED</i><br><i>AGENT_FAILED</i>   | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>UNDESIRABLE</i><br><i>HIGH_UNDESIRABLE</i> | <b>EXPECTED</b><br><b>MOST_EXPECTED</b> |
| 4  | Gratitude         | human<br>agent | <i>AGENT_ACCEPTED</i><br><i>AGENT_ACHIEVED</i><br><i>HUMAN_ACCEPTED</i><br><i>HUMAN_ACHIEVED</i>   | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>DESIRABLE</i><br><i>HIGH_DESIRABLE</i>     | <b>EXPECTED</b><br><b>MOST_EXPECTED</b> |
| 5  | Positive Surprise | human<br>agent | <i>AGENT_PROPOSED</i><br><i>AGENT_ACCEPTED</i><br><i>AGENT_ACHIEVED</i><br><i>HUMAN_PROPOSED</i><br><i>HUMAN_ACCEPTED</i><br><i>HUMAN_ACHIEVED</i>   | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>DESIRABLE</i><br><i>HIGH_DESIRABLE</i>     | <b>MOST_UNEXPECTED</b>                  |
| 6  | Negative Surprise | human<br>agent | <i>AGENT_PROPOSED</i><br><i>AGENT_REJECTED</i><br><i>AGENT_FAILED</i><br><i>HUMAN_PROPOSED</i><br><i>HUMAN_REJECTED</i><br><i>HUMAN_FAILED</i>   | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>UNDESIRABLE</i><br><i>HIGH_UNDESIRABLE</i> | <b>MOST_UNEXPECTED</b>                  |
| 7  | Anger             | human<br>agent | <i>AGENT_REJECTED</i><br><i>AGENT_FAILED</i><br><i>HUMAN_REJECTED</i><br><i>HUMAN_FAILED</i>   | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>HIGH_UNDESIRABLE</i>                       | <b>EXPECTED</b><br><b>MOST_EXPECTED</b> |
| 8  | Worry             | human<br>agent | <i>AGENT_PROPOSED</i><br><i>AGENT_REJECTED</i><br><i>HUMAN_FAILED</i><br><i>AGENT_FAILED</i><br><i>HUMAN_PROPOSED</i><br><i>HUMAN_REJECTED</i><br><i>HUMAN_FAILED</i><br><i>AGENT_FAILED</i> | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>UNDESIRABLE</i><br><i>HIGH_UNDESIRABLE</i> | <b>UNEXPECTED</b>                       |
| 9  | Frustration       | human<br>agent | <i>AGENT_PROPOSED</i><br><i>AGENT_FAILED</i><br><i>HUMAN_PROPOSED</i><br><i>HUMAN_FAILED</i>   | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>UNDESIRABLE</i>                            | <b>EXPECTED</b><br><b>MOST_EXPECTED</b> |
| 10 | Guilt             | human<br>agent | <i>HUMAN_FAILED</i><br><i>AGENT_FAILED</i>   | <b>RELEVANT</b> | <i>UNDESIRABLE</i><br><i>HIGH_UNDESIRABLE</i> | <b>EXPECTED</b><br><b>MOST_EXPECTED</b> |

Figure 4.10: Conditions for selecting emotion instances

# CHAPTER 5

## EVALUATION

In this chapter, we provide the explanation and results of two different user studies. The first user study (see Section 5.1) was conducted online to evaluate our appraisal algorithms. The goal of this study was to validate the effectiveness of the factors involved in our appraisal algorithms. We prepared online questionnaires and asked participants to tell us what their decision would be in the simple situations provided. The participants' answers to our questionnaires were compared with the results of our algorithms for the given situations. The results are provided in Section 5.1. The second user study (see Section 5.2) was conducted in the Human-Robot Interaction lab. The goal of this user study was to provide an end-to-end system evaluation using our overall framework. We provided several pre- and post-study questionnaires as well as an open-ended questionnaire to study the humans' evaluation of a robot collaborating using our framework. The results are provided in Section 5.2.

### 5.1 Evaluating Appraisal Algorithms (Crowd Sourcing)

In this section, we present a crowd-sourcing user-study and the results, which we conducted to validate the components of our appraisal processes.

#### 5.1.1 Experimental Scenario

We developed an experimental scenario in which participants were asked to carry out a sequence of hypothetical collaborative tasks between themselves and an imaginary

friend, Mary, in order to accomplish their shared goal. To minimize the background knowledge necessary for our test subjects, we used a simple domestic example of preparing a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, and a hard boiled egg sandwich for a hiking trip. The tasks did not require the participants to solve problems; rather, the tasks were part of simple daily activities that should be familiar to all participants.

### 5.1.2 Hypothesis and Methodology

#### Hypothesis

We conducted this user study to test our hypothesis that humans and our algorithms will provide similar answers to questions related to different factors used to compute four appraisal variables: relevance, desirability, expectedness, and controllability.




Figure 5.1: Collaboration task model for the evaluation.

#### Procedure

We conducted a between-subject user study using an online crowdsourcing website – CrowdFlower<sup>1</sup>. We had a questionnaire for each appraisal variable. There were 12 questions (including 2 test questions) in the controllability and expectedness questionnaires, 14 questions (including 2 test questions) in the desirability questionnaire, and 22 questions (including 3 test questions) in the relevance questionnaire.

<sup>1</sup><http://www.crowdflower.com>

We provided textual and graphical instructions for all questionnaires; Figure 5.1 shows the corresponding task model. The instructions, provided in the Appendix, presented a sequence of hypothetical collaborative tasks to be carried out by the test subject and an imaginary friend, Mary, in order to accomplish their goal of preparing two sandwiches. We also provided a simple definition and an example of each appraisal variable. The collaboration structure and the instructions were the same for all questionnaires. The questions introduced specific situations related to the shared plan, which included blocked tasks and failure or achievement of a shared goal. Each question provided three answers which were counterbalanced in the questionnaire. We provided an option like C in all questions (see Figure 5.3), because we did not want to force participants to choose between two options when they did not have a good reason. There were two questions designed based on each factor that we use in our algorithms (see Section 4.3). The questions were randomly placed in the questionnaire. Figure 5.3 shows an example question from the relevance questionnaire which was designed to test whether participants perceive saliency as a factor in relevance. The input for our algorithms was the task model depicted in Figure 5.1.

## Participants

Each participant group originally had 40 participants. We limited the participant pools to those with the highest confidence level on the crowdsourcing website in the United States, Britain, and Australia. Test questions were included to check the sanity of the answers. We eliminated participants providing wrong answers to our sanity questions, and participants with answering times less than 2 minutes. The final number of accepted participants in each group is provided in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Number of participants

| appraisal variables | # of participants |
|---------------------|-------------------|
| Relevance           | 29                |
| Desirability        | 35                |
| Expectedness        | 33                |
| Controllability     | 33                |

### 5.1.3 Results

Each question in our questionnaires was designed based on different factors that we use in our algorithms (see Section 4.3). For each of the four questionnaires we provide an example question, and describe how each question relates to a specific factor within the corresponding algorithm. The input for our algorithms was the task model depicted in Figure 5.1. The complete list of questions is provided in the Appendix. Additionally, we provide the p-value for each question, using a binomial distribution, with a probability of success of 0.33, which is the probability of selecting the right answer if the participant is simply guessing.

#### Expectedness

Figure 5.3 shows an example question from the expectedness questionnaire. In this example, with respect to Algorithm 3 (line 6), option A is more expected because the task related to this option provides the next available task in the focus stack (see the task model in Figure 5.1). Although the task in option B is part of the existing task model, it is considered as unexpected by our algorithm, since it is not live in the plan. We provided option C to determine whether the participants will similarly differentiate between these two options. This question was presented to the participants to determine whether their decision for the expectedness of this event is similar to the output of the expectedness algorithm. For this question, the human decision was 97% similar to the algorithm’s output.

Results for the expectedness questionnaire are presented in Figure 5.2 (Refer to Expectedness summary table). As shown in this table, there is strong evidence that

| Question | Factor   | Equivalent Condition | Number of Matching Answers | p-Value |
|----------|--|----------------------|----------------------------|---------|
| 1        | Live goal vs. Necessary focus shift                    | No                   | 31                         | « 0.001 |
| 2        | Live goal vs. Not part of shared plan                  | No                   | 32                         | « 0.001 |
| 3        | Live goal vs. Not part of current branch               | No                   | 27                         | « 0.001 |
| 4        | Necessary focus shift vs. Not part of shared plan      | No                   | 33                         | « 0.001 |
| 5        | Necessary focus shift vs. Not part of current branch   | No                   | 32                         | « 0.001 |
| 6        | Not part of shared plan vs. Not part of current branch | No                   | 24                         | « 0.001 |
| 7        | Live goal  | Yes                  | 14                         | 0.093   |
| 8        | Not part of current branch                             | Yes                  | 14                         | 0.093   |
| 9        | Necessary focus shift                                  | Yes                  | 22                         | « 0.001 |
| 10       | Not part of shared plan                                | Yes                  | 29                         | « 0.001 |

Figure 5.2: Expectedness results.

the results are not random; in fact, for questions 1-6 and 9-10, human participants showed between 67 and 100 % agreement with our algorithms, with p-values of «0.001 when compared with a random population. Questions 7 and 8 were the only two questions that did not show a statistically significant p-value. It should be noted that these questions are comparing equally expected or equally unexpected situations, none of which our algorithms would consider most-expected or most-unexpected.

Imagine you have pressed the two slices of bread (one covered with strawberry jam and one covered with peanut butter) together and passed it to Mary. Which of the following two actions is **more expected**?

- A. Mary puts the given sandwich into a zip lock bag after cutting it in half.
- B. Mary puts some pickles on another slice of bread.
- C. Equally expected.

Figure 5.3: Example expectedness question.

## Controllability

Figure 5.5 shows an example question from the controllability questionnaire. The algorithm's output is option B, and is determined by Algorithm 4 (line 3), similarly to the expectedness example above. In this example, option B is more controllable than option A, because the self over total ratio of the responsibility of the predecessors of the given task (see *Autonomy* in Section 4.3.4) is higher than the ratio in option A; i.e., self is responsible to spread peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam on another slice of bread. In this question, the humans decision was 90% in agreement with the algorithm's output.

| Question | Factor                       | Equivalent Condition | Number of Matching Answers | p-Value |
|----------|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|---------|
| 1        | Agency                       | No                   | 28                         | « 0.001 |
| 2        | Autonomy (contributors)      | No                   | 17                         | 0.009   |
| 3        | Autonomy (predecessors)      | No                   | 30                         | « 0.001 |
| 4        | Succeeded predecessors ratio | No                   | 19                         | 0.001   |
| 5        | Available inputs             | No                   | 30                         | « 0.001 |
| 6        | Agency                       | Yes                  | 30                         | « 0.001 |
| 7        | Autonomy (contributors)      | Yes                  | 24                         | « 0.001 |
| 8        | Autonomy (predecessors)      | Yes                  | 18                         | 0.003   |
| 9        | Succeeded predecessors ratio | Yes                  | 23                         | « 0.001 |
| 10       | Available inputs             | Yes                  | 25                         | « 0.001 |

Figure 5.4: Controllability results.

Results for the controllability questionnaire are presented in Figure 5.4 (insert controllability summary table). As shown in the table, the p-value is  $< 0.01$  for each of the ten questions. The two questions with the lowest human agreement with the algorithms both relate to autonomy of the participants with 52% and 55%.

## Desirability

Figure 5.7 shows an example question from the desirability questionnaire. The output based on the Algorithm 2 (line 14) is option C, since in both option A and

Imagine you want to make a peanut butter sandwich. Which of the following two actions is **more controllable**?

- A. You can spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and you need Mary to spread strawberry jam on the second slice of bread.
- B. You can spread the peanut butter on one slice of bread and strawberry jam on the second slice of bread.
- C. Equally controllable.

Figure 5.5: Example controllability question.

option B, the focus goal has been achieved successfully. Therefore, in this example, both options A and B are desirable. The humans' decision was 77% in agreement with the algorithm's output in this question.

| Question | Factor  | Equivalent Condition | Number of Matching Answers | p-Value |
|----------|---|----------------------|----------------------------|---------|
| 1        | Top level goal is failed                            | No                   | 35                         | « 0.001 |
| 2        | Top level goal is achieved                          | No                   | 29                         | « 0.001 |
| 3        | Predecessors or preconditions of the top level goal | No                   | 35                         | « 0.001 |
| 4        | Focus is achieved                                   | No                   | 34                         | « 0.001 |
| 5        | Focus is failed                                     | No                   | 35                         | « 0.001 |
| 6        | Predecessors or preconditions of the focus          | No                   | 35                         | « 0.001 |
| 7        | Pending or in-progress focus                        | Yes                  | 16                         | 0.040   |
| 8        | Top level goal is failed                            | Yes                  | 23                         | « 0.001 |
| 9        | Predecessors or preconditions of the top level goal | Yes                  | 19                         | 0.003   |
| 10       | Focus is achieved                                   | Yes                  | 20                         | 0.001   |
| 11       | Focus is failed                                     | Yes                  | 21                         | « 0.001 |
| 12       | Predecessors or preconditions of the focus          | Yes                  | 27                         | « 0.001 |

Figure 5.6: Desirability results.

The results of the desirability questionnaire are presented in 5.6 (insert desirability summary table). As shown in the results table, the p-value is less than 0.05 for all of the desirability questions. However, an interesting trend is that human

participants had a level of agreement of 83%-100% when the algorithm's output selected one alternate as more desirable than another alternate. When the algorithm's output chose option C (i.e. rating two situations as equally desirable), the human participants only showed 46%-77% agreement. This may indicated that a higher level of granularity is required in the algorithm when evaluating options with similar levels of desirability.

|  |
|--|
| Which of the following two actions is <b>more desirable</b> ?  |
| A. Imagine you pressed two slices of bread together with peanut butter and strawberry jam on them, and passed them to Mary. Mary cuts the peanut butter sandwich in half and puts them in the zip lock bag.      |
| B. Imagine you want to make the egg sandwich. You have sliced the eggs, put them on one slice of bread, salted them, and waiting for Mary to put some pickles on your eggs. Mary puts some pickles on your eggs. |
| C. Equally desirable.  |

Figure 5.7: Example desirability question.

## Relevance

In the example shown in Figure 5.9, with respect to Algorithm 1, option A is relevant because of Mary's perceived negative emotion (see Equation 4.1). Although option B is relevant (since it achieves the next goal in the shared plan), 83% of participants consider it as less relevant than option A; we believe this is due to the effect of Mary's perceived negative emotion which also generates a higher utility value in our relevance algorithm. Another question also tested belief saliency. However, the options provided only related to the shared plan (i.e., no human emotions in the options). In this case 87% of participants chose the option that accomplished the next goal in the shared plan. Interestingly, when confronted with a negative emotion from their collaborator, human participants deviated from the shared plan and found their collaborator's emotion more relevant than the original plan. It is noteworthy that in both the absence and the presence of emotions the participants

chose the more salient option with respect to our definition of saliency, which was not referenced or provided in the questionnaire.

| Question | Factor            | Equivalent Condition | Number of Matching Answers | p-Value |
|----------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|---------|
| 1        | Belief Saliency   | No                   | 25                         | « 0.001 |
| 2        | Belief Strength   | No                   | 13                         | 0.063   |
| 3        | Belief Recency    | No                   | 28                         | « 0.001 |
| 4        | Motive Insistence | No                   | 25                         | « 0.001 |
| 5        | Motive Urgency    | No                   | 19                         | « 0.001 |
| 6        | Motive Intensity  | No                   | 21                         | « 0.001 |
| 7        | Goal Proximity    | No                   | 20                         | « 0.001 |
| 8        | Goal Specificity  | No                   | 23                         | « 0.001 |
| 9        | Belief Saliency   | Yes                  | 26                         | « 0.001 |
| 10       | Belief Strength   | Yes                  | 22                         | « 0.001 |
| 11       | Belief Recency    | Yes                  | 21                         | « 0.001 |
| 12       | Motive Insistence | No                   | 26                         | « 0.001 |
| 13       | Motive Urgency    | Yes                  | 29                         | « 0.001 |
| 14       | Motive Intensity  | Yes                  | 29                         | « 0.001 |
| 15       | Goal Proximity    | Yes                  | 24                         | « 0.001 |
| 16       | Goal Specificity  | Yes                  | 26                         | « 0.001 |
| 17       | Belief Saliency   | No                   | 17                         | « 0.001 |
| 18       | Motive Insistence | No                   | 3                          | 0.995   |
| 19       | Goal Proximity    | No                   | 4                          | 0.982   |

Figure 5.8: Relevance results.

The complete summary of results for the relevance questionnaire is provided in 5.8 (Insert summary table for relevance). As shown in the table, all questions show 59%-100% agreement with our algorithms and statistically significant p-values except for questions 2, 18 and 19. Question 2 addresses belief strength. Questions 18 and 19 address motive insistence and goal proximity, respectively; both of these questions present situations in which participants must choose whether an intense emotional circumstance, or adherence to the collaboration plan is more relevant (refer to the questionnaire provided in the Appendix). Our algorithms choose that the strong emotional circumstance will be more relevant; however, human participants

generally selected adherence to the collaboration plan to be more relevant.

Imagine you have made the peanut butter sandwich and passed it to Mary to cut it in half. Which of the following two actions is **more relevant**?

- A. Mary starts crying since she cut her finger with a knife.
- B. You begin to boil the water to boil the eggs for your second sandwich.
- C. Equally relevant.

Figure 5.9: Example relevance question.

#### 5.1.4 Discussion

As shown in the results tables in sections 5.1.3 through 5.1.3, the human participants agreed 100% on some questions, while on some other questions there was a much lower level of agreement. Our results indicate that people largely performed as our hypothesis predicted. The *p*-values obtained based on a binomial distribution show the probability of human participants' answers being generated from a random set. The very small *p*-values indicate that the data set is not random; in fact, the high percentage of similarity confirms our hypothesis and shows that the algorithms can help us to model appraisal in a collaboration. The very low level of agreement on a handful of questions may indicate algorithm components that require further refinement before implementation.

## 5.2 End-to-End System Evaluation

As mentioned earlier, collaborative robots need to take into account humans' internal states while making decisions during collaboration. Humans express emotions to reveal their internal states in social contexts including collaboration [35]. Due to the existence of such expressions robots' emotional-awareness can improve the quality of collaboration in terms of humans' perception of performance and preferences. Hence, collaborative robots need to include affect-driven mechanisms in

their decision-making processes to be able to interpret and generate appropriate responses and behaviors. Our aim in this setup was to study the importance of emotional awareness and the underlying affect-driven processes in human-robot collaboration. We examined how emotional-awareness impacts different aspects of humans' preferences by comparing the results from our participants collaborating with an emotion-aware and an emotion-ignorant robot.

### **5.2.1 Implementation**

The implementation of this user-study included three separate parts. The first part incorporated the Affective Motivational Collaboration Framework consisting of all Mental Processes (see left-side of Figure 5.10) as we described in Chapter ???. The second part was implemented to receive action commands from the framework and forward them to the robot to control joints and actuators (see right-side of Figure 5.10). A wizard was the third part of this setting. The wizard did nothing but inform the robot/framework whether the current task performed by either the robot or the participant was achieved successfully. The wizard was completely invisible to the participants, and the wizard had no impact on the robot's decision other than providing input regarding tasks' failure or success.

## **Framework**

The framework includes all of the mechanisms depicted as mental processes in Figure 5.10 along with the mental states. The mental states shown in Figure 5.10 comprise the knowledge base required for all of the mechanisms in the overall model. The details about these mental processes and mental states are described in Chapters 3 and ???. In this user-study, the Collaboration mechanism uses a hierarchy of goals associated with tasks in the hierarchical task network structure depicted in Figure 5.11.




Figure 5.10: Computational framework based on Affective Motivational Collaboration theory (arrows indicate primary influences between mechanisms and data flow).




Figure 5.11: Collaboration structure used as the task model.

## Robot Controller

The robot controller is comprised of two major components: 1) ROS-bridge and 2) joint controller (see Figure 5.10). ROS-bridge<sup>1</sup> provides an API to ROS functionality for non-ROS programs which enables us to send action commands from our framework (implemented in JAVA) to the robot's joint controller. The joint controller receives action commands and translates them into actual joint and actuator commands and sends them to the robot.

<sup>1</sup>[http://wiki.ros.org/rosbridge\\_suite](http://wiki.ros.org/rosbridge_suite)

### 5.2.2 Experimental Scenario

Our scenario was based on a table top turn-taking game that we designed to simulate the installation of a solar panel. Participants collaborated one-on-one with our robot to complete all the given tasks required to install the solar panel. All of the tasks consisted of picking up and placing collaborators' available pegs on predefined spots on the board (see Figure 5.12). Each pick-and-place was associated with the robot's or the participant's task. The robot and the participants had their own unique primitive tasks that they had to accomplish in their own turns. The final goal of installing a solar panel required the robot and the participants to accomplish their own individual tasks. Failure of any task could create an impasse during the collaboration.




Figure 5.12: The layout of the available spots for the human and the robot to place their pegs during the collaboration.




Figure 5.13: The Graphical User Interface (GUI) used during interaction.

## The Robot

We conducted our experiment based on a KUKA Youbot (see Figure 5.14). The robot was stationary on top of a desk and was able to pick up and place available pegs corresponding to the robot’s task. The robot was operated based on Robot Operating System (ROS – indigo) and was receiving commands through the ROS-bridge from our Affective Motivational Collaboration framework (see Figure 5.10). We provided a simple GUI using a touch-screen monitor (see Figure 5.13 and) to a) express the robot’s positive, negative or neutral emotion through an emoticon, b) display the robot’s utterances, c) control turn-taking process of the collaboration, and d) let the participants express (report) their positive, negative or neutral emotion for each turn. The robot used MaryTTS an open-source, multilingual Text-to-Speech Synthesis platform to provide corresponding speech for its utterances in English.

## Interaction Paradigms

At the beginning of each collaboration the robot asked each participant to achieve the overall shared goal, i.e., “installing the solar panel”. Then, before working towards a new goal, the robot informed the participant about the higher level non-

primitive goal (e.g. Prepare Panel – see Figure 5.11) of which the primitives were going to be working towards. The same procedure was used by the robot if there was a decision to switch to another nonprimitive due to the failure of a task in achieving the current goal. After achieving a new primitive goal, the robot either informed the human that it would pursue the next goal, or it informed and passed the turn to the human to execute the next task with respect to the human’s goal. In case of the human’s turn, the robot waited for the human to do a task, then the wizard let the robot know whether the human’s goal was achieved or not. Afterwards the robot made a decision about which goal to pursue and informed the human accordingly. The same procedure was applied to both conditions.

The robot interacted via a) speech, b) the corresponding utterance on the screen, c) negative, positive and neutral expression of emotion through an emoticon on the screen. There were two conditions of the robot: 1) emotion-aware and 2) emotion ignorant. The robot used neutral expression in the case of emotion-ignorance. The interaction was controlled autonomously by the framework we discussed in Section 5.2.1 in both the emotion-ignorant and the emotion-aware cases. The reasoning about which task should be done and controlling the robot was entirely autonomous. Only the perception of the task failure or achievement by the robot or by the participant was done by a wizard monitoring the collaboration outside of the test area. The interaction was structured based on the exact same goals in the same HTN for both conditions. The robot was using the same utterances in both conditions. In the emotion-aware condition the robot used a different behavior in comparison with the emotion-ignorant condition only if the participant was expressing a negative emotion in the event of a failure; i.e., the robot’s utterances were identical in emotion-ignorant and emotion-aware cases if in the latter the participant reported (expressed) a positive or a neutral emotion.

Three different behaviors could be generated only in the emotion-aware condition. These three behaviors were 1) mitigating the human’s negative emotion and postponing its own task to help the human, 2) goal-management to switch to another

goal which has lower cost with respect to the human’s negative emotion, and 3) task delegation to the human to overcome the impasse. In each run, the human had two pre-coordinated task failures, and the robot had one. If the human expressed negative emotion after the first human task-failure, the robot responded by mitigating the human’s negative emotion by saying “It was not your fault. I can help you with this task” and helping the human by providing a peg to fulfill the human’s task. If the human expressed negative emotion after the second human task-failure, the robot informed the human that they could proceed with another task to save time while simultaneously requesting a new peg (i.e. help) from the supervisor. If the human expressed negative emotion as a result of the robot’s task failure, the robot requested help from the human (who had the correct peg). In the event that the human expressed positive or neutral emotion during these three failures, the robot behaved identically in the emotion-ignorant and the emotion-aware cases, by asking the supervisor for help.

## Environment and Tasks

The environment was set up in the Human-Robot Interaction lab and included the robot, the collaboration board on top of a desk, and the participant standing in front of the robot on the other side of the board (see Figure 5.14). One of the experimenters monitored the interactions using a live stream of a camera in a different room. The experimenter provided only the required perception, i.e., decision on success or failure of the tasks for the robot, through the entire time of the collaboration (see Section 5.2.2).

The tasks were defined based on the HTN structure shown in Figure 5.11 and were executed in a turn-taking fashion by either of the collaborators. For each task either the robot or the participant was responsible to pick up one of the corresponding pegs from their own inventory and place it on the right spot which was colored and tagged the same as the associated peg. Some pegs and corresponding spots on the board had hidden magnets which prevented the pegs from standing upright.

Any peg that fell over was considered a failed task.

### 5.2.3 Hypotheses and Methodology

#### Hypothesis

The non/social functions of emotions impact a collaboration process. Human collaborators prefer to collaborate with others whose behaviors are influenced by these functions of emotions depending on the context. We developed seven hypotheses on positive influence of emotion-awareness and usefulness of emotion function during collaboration:

***Hypothesis 1.*** Participants will feel closer to the emotion-aware robot rather than the emotion-ignorant robot.

***Hypothesis 2.*** Participants will find the emotion-aware robot to be more trustworthy than the emotion-ignorant robot.

***Hypothesis 3.*** Participants will find the emotion-aware robot to have better performance in collaboration than the emotion-ignorant robot.

***Hypothesis 4.*** Participants will find the emotion-aware robot to be more understanding of their feelings than the emotion-ignorant robot.

***Hypothesis 5.*** Participants will find the emotion-aware robot to be more understanding of their goals than the emotion-ignorant robot.

***Hypothesis 6.*** Participants will feel more satisfied about the collaboration when working with the emotion-aware robot rather than emotion-ignorant robot.

***Hypothesis 7.*** Participants will perceive higher level of mutual satisfaction with the emotion-aware robot than emotion-ignorant robot.

#### Procedure

Participants were first given a brief description of the purpose of the experiment. After the short introduction, they were asked to review and sign a consent form. Participants were then provided with a written instruction of their task and the rules




Figure 5.14: Experimental setup.

for collaborating with the robot. Then, one of the experimenters lead them into the experiment room and asked the participants to answer pre-experiment questionnaires. Afterwards, the experimenter went through all the details of the instructions with the participants standing in front of the collaboration board and the robot. The experimenter confirmed participants' correct understanding of the tasks and informed them of types of task failures that might occur during the collaboration. Participants were told that researchers were developing a collaborative robot and would like their help in evaluating their design. Participants were provided with identical instructions and randomly assigned to complete either the emotion-aware or the emotion ignorant condition first. They were told that, after their collaboration with the robot, they would be asked to answer a questionnaire on their experience. After completing the first round of collaboration, participants answered a post-experiment questionnaire that measured their perceptions of the robot, the task, and the collaboration procedure. After answering the first post-experiment questionnaire, participants were told that they were going to collaborate with the

robot one more time and the robot might not necessarily have the same collaborative behavior. After completing the second round of collaboration, participants were asked to answer the second post-experiment questionnaire which consisted of the same questions as the first post-experiment questionnaire. After all, participants were asked to answer an open-ended questionnaire which measured their perception of difference between two runs, their preference of collaborative robot between two runs, and their reasons of preference.

## Measurements

In our study two basic conditions of the robot were tested: a) the emotion-ignorant condition, b) the emotion-aware condition. We measured participants' recall of the collaborative behaviors presented by the robot using an open-ended post-experiment questionnaire. We also specifically asked the participants what behavior of the robot they liked during their collaboration. We also evaluated participants' levels of satisfaction, trust, goal achievement, mutual understanding of goals, mutual understanding of feelings, mutual agreement, and also participants' beliefs about the efficiency of collaboration and their feeling of robot's collaborative behaviors. Seven-point Likert scales were used in these questionnaire items.

## Participants

A total of 37 participants participated in the experiment in 74 trials. Participants were recruited from Worcester Polytechnic Institute's students and staffs as well as other civilians recruited from outside of the campus. The ages of the participants varied between 19 and 74 with an average of 34.2 years before our screening of 4 participants based on our sanity check questions. After this screening the ages of the participants varied between 19 and 54 with an average of 30.8 years old. Of the 33 participants, 21 were female and 12 were male. Each participant participated in 2 trials. In one trial the robot was aware of human's emotion and in the second

trial the robot was ignoring human's emotion. The order of these two trials were randomly assigned to each participant. In general we used emotion-ignorant robot first in 16 experiments, and emotion-aware robot first in 17 experiments.

#### 5.2.4 Results

As discussed in Section 5.2.3, results of the user study were gathered through a 31-question Likert-scale survey that was given to each participant after each run with the robot, and through a 5-question open-ended summary questionnaire at the end of the experiment.

#### 7-Point Likert Scale Survey Results

As mentioned previously, the 7-point Likert scale survey was administered at the end of the emotion-ignorant run and at the end of the emotion-aware run for each participant. The 31 questions are generally categorized to evaluate the humans' perceptions of the following seven categories, with 3-7 questions per group: (1) the likability of the robot (2) the level of trust the human feels in the robot (3) the human's perception of the robot's performance (4) the human's perception of the robot's understanding of human's emotions (5) the human's perception of the robot's understanding of human's and collaboration's goals and objectives (6) the human's feeling about the collaboration and (7) the human's perception of the human's and robot's mutual satisfaction with each other as collaborative partners. The questions presented are provided in Figure 5.15.

| Question Category                                | Question  | Question Number |
|--|---|-----------------|
| <b>Likability</b>                                | I felt close to the robot.  | Q1              |
|  | I would like to continue working with the robot.  | Q2              |
|  | I like the robot.   | Q3              |
|  | The robot was interesting.  | Q4              |
| <b>Trust</b>                                     | I trust the robot.  | Q5              |
|  | It was easy to express myself to the robot.   | Q6              |
|  | I trust the robot to perform appropriately in our collaboration.                            | Q7              |
|  | I am confident in the robot's ability to help me.   | Q8              |
|  | I trust the robot to assess my feelings appropriately in our collaboration.                 | Q9              |
| <b>Robot's Performance</b>                       | The robot was repetitive.   | Q10             |
|  | The robot made efficient decisions.   | Q11             |
|  | The robot's decisions improved my performance during the collaboration.                     | Q12             |
| <b>Robot's Understanding of Human's Emotions</b> | The robot understood my emotions.   | Q13             |
|  | The robot is sometimes confused about what I feel about our activities.                     | Q14             |
|  | I feel that the robot, in its own unique ways, is genuinely concerned about me.             | Q15             |
|  | The robot understands some of my feelings and takes them into account in our collaboration. | Q16             |
|  | The robot does not understand how I feel during our collaboration.                          | Q17             |
| <b>Robot's Understanding of Goals</b>            | The robot does not understand what we are trying to accomplish.                             | Q18             |
|  | The robot does not understand what I am trying to accomplish.                               | Q19             |
|  | The robot perceives accurately what my objectives are.                                      | Q20             |
|  | The robot was committed to the collaboration.   | Q21             |
| <b>Human Feeling about Collaboration</b>         | I find what the robot and I are doing is unrelated to my goals.                             | Q22             |
|  | I find what I am doing with the robot confusing.  | Q23             |
|  | The robot and I are working towards mutually agreed-upon goals.                             | Q24             |
|  | The robot and I collaborate on setting goals for us to work on.                             | Q25             |
|  | The robot and I agree on what is important for us to work on.                               | Q26             |
|  | I believe that the robot and I achieved the goals we set.                                   | Q27             |
|  | I am satisfied with the outcome of our collaboration.                                       | Q28             |
| <b>Satisfaction of Collaborative Partner</b>     | The robot was satisfied with my collaborative behavior.                                     | Q29             |
|  | I was satisfied with the robot.   | Q30             |
|  | I understand the robot, and I think it understands me, at least in the best way it can.     | Q31             |

Figure 5.15: The 31 Likert scale questions organized according to their groups.

The results were analyzed using a two-tailed paired t-test to analyze the difference of means between the emotion ignorant and the emotion-aware condition. Refer to Figures 5.18 - 5.22 for the results. As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, participants were randomly assigned to complete either the emotion-ignorant or the emotion-aware run first; analysis of the results revealed no statistically significant difference or consistent pattern based on which run the participant completed first.




Figure 5.16: Results of the Likert scale survey for Likability questions. The p-value for the difference between means is  $\ll 0.001$  for all questions.

### Likability of the Robot

Questions 1 through 4 addressed the likability of the robot. As shown in Figure 5.16, participants rated the emotion-aware robot 1.5-2.1 points higher than the emotion-ignorant robot. These results indicate that participants felt closer with and preferred working with the emotion-aware robot; these results support Hypothesis 1, which stated that humans would prefer to work with the emotion-aware robot over the emotion-ignorant robot.

### Human Trust in the Robot

Questions 5-9 were designed to measure the degree of trust that the human participants felt in the robot. As shown in Figure 5.17, participants trusted the emotion-

aware robot, on average, a minimum of 1.4 points more than the emotion-ignorant robot, both in general and in terms of collaboration performance. In Question 5, participants rated a general statement of trust 1.5 points higher in the emotion-aware case. Additionally, in Question 7, participants rated their trust in the emotion-aware robot to perform appropriately during collaboration an average of 5.9 on a 7-point Likert scale, where 7.0 would indicate maximum trust; this indicates an acceptable level of trust in the robot’s collaborative abilities. These results support Hypothesis 2, that posits that human participants would find the emotion-aware robot to be more trustworthy than the emotion-ignorant robot.




Figure 5.17: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to trust. The p-value for the difference between means is  $\ll 0.001$  for all questions.

### Perception of the Robot’s Performance

Question 10 (which is reverse-scored) measures the participant’s perception of repetitiveness in the robot during the collaboration. In both conditions, participants rated the robot as moderately repetitive, with the emotion-ignorant robot’s average response being about 1.1 points higher than the emotion-aware. This result correlates with several of the open-ended responses which described the emotion-aware robot’s behaviors as “cute” and “interesting”, refer to Section 5.2.4. Question 11, which asks




Figure 5.18: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to the robot’s performance. The p-value for the difference between the means for questions 10, 11 and 12 are 0.001, 0.063 and  $\ll 0.001$ , respectively.

about the efficiency of the robot’s decisions is the only question of the 31 questions that did not have a statistically significant difference between the emotion-aware and the emotion-ignorant case. This correlates with the result of the open-ended question asking which condition of the robot exhibited behaviors that could prevent human error (refer to 5.2.4); in response to this question, several respondents stated that it may be quicker or simpler to call the supervisor in the event of a task failure, rather than changing the order of the tasks. According to the results from Question 12, the participants felt that the emotion-aware robot’s decisions during collaboration improved their own performance, with an average rating of 5.4, while the emotion-ignorant robot only received an average rating of 3.3, indicating that participants felt it was not able to interact in such a way as to increase the human’s performance; refer to results from Question 6. These results support Hypothesis 3, which posited that humans will perceive the emotion-aware robot as being more capable than the emotion-ignorant robot.

### Robot’s Understanding of Human Emotions

In Questions 13 through 17, participants evaluate the robot’s understanding of hu-

mans' emotions. In questions 13, 15, and 16, participants rated the emotion-aware robot, on average, a minimum of 1.8 points higher than the emotion-ignorant robot. In response to questions 14 and 17, which are reverse-scored, participants ranked the emotion-ignorant robot 1.2 and 2.0 points higher, respectively, than then emotion-aware robot. The results of all five questions in this category support Hypothesis 4.




Figure 5.19: Results of the Likert scale survey for the questions related to the robot's understanding of human emotions. The p-value for the difference between the means is  $\ll 0.001$  for all of the questions except Question 14, for which the p-value is 0.003.

### Robot's Understanding of Human and Collaboration Goals

Questions 18 and 19 were reverse-scored questions intended to determine whether the humans felt that the robot understood the shared collaboration goal and the human's personal goal, respectively. For both conditions of the robot, the average scores were lower than 3.5, indicating that the human's perceived the robot as having some understanding of the goals. For both questions, the emotion-ignorant robot's average score was significantly higher than the emotion-aware robot's score. Similarly, Question 20 was a measure of whether the human perceived that the robot correctly perceived the human's goal. On average, participants provided an average rating for the emotion-aware robot that was 1.5 points higher than that for the emotion-ignorant robot. Question 21 measured the human perception of the robot's




Figure 5.20: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to the robot’s understanding of goals. The p-value for the difference between the means for all questions is  $\ll 0.001$ , except Question 19, for which the p-value is 0.006.

commitment to the collaboration; for this measure, the average participant score assigned to the emotion-aware robot was 6.2 points out of a maximum of 7 points, indicating that the participants felt that the emotion-aware robot was strongly committed to the collaboration. The emotion-ignorant robot received an average rating of 4.4 points, indicating only moderate commitment. These results strongly support Hypothesis 5, which posits that humans will feel that the emotion-aware robot will better understand their goals than the emotion-ignorant robot.

### **Human’s Feeling about the Collaboration**

Questions 22 through 28 were designed to gauge how the human participants felt about the partnership within the collaboration and the outcome of the collaboration. For each of the 7 questions, the participants ranked the emotion-aware robot as better than the emotion-ignorant robot, by a minimum, on average, of 0.8 points. Questions 24, 27 and 28 addressed whether the robot and the participant were working toward mutually agreed-upon goals and on the outcome of the collaboration; in the emotion-aware condition, participants rated the robot a minimum of 6.1 points,




Figure 5.21: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to the human's feeling about the collaboration. The p-value for the difference between the means is  $\ll 0.001$  for questions 22, 25, 26, and 28. The p-value for Questions 23, 24 and 27 are 0.02, 0.008 and 0.001, respectively.

on average, while rating the emotion-ignorant robot 1-1.6 points lower, indicating that the participants felt a very strong sense of collaboration with the emotion-aware robot, and only a moderate sense of collaboration with the emotion-ignorant robot. Questions 25 and 26 address whether the robot and the participant set the collaboration goals together; these two questions have lower scores than Questions 24, 27 and 28, for both the emotion-aware and the emotion-ignorant case. The lower overall scores are likely due to the fact that the robot decides the task order or action in the event of failure in both conditions; however, the higher score in the emotion-aware case may indicate that emotional awareness can increase a feeling of collaboration. These results support Hypothesis 6 that humans will feel a greater sense of mutual collaboration and understanding about the collaboration with the emotion-aware robot.

### **Human Perception of Mutual Satisfaction with Collaborative Partner**

Questions 29, 30 and 31 were designed to measure the human's perception of the robot's satisfaction with the human, the human's satisfaction with the robot and




Figure 5.22: Results of the Likert scale survey for questions related to satisfaction with collaborative partner. The p-value for the difference between means is  $\ll 0.001$  for all questions.

the mutual understanding between the human and the robot, respectively. The participants provided an average response in the emotion-aware condition of 5.8, 5.9 and 5.7 to Questions 29, 30 and 31, respectively, indicating a high level of mutual satisfaction; all three answers were about 1.4-1.9 points lower, on average, in the emotion-ignorant condition. These results indicate a higher level of satisfaction working with the robot in the emotion-aware condition, and strongly support Hypothesis 7, which posited that humans will feel a greater sense of mutual satisfaction with the emotion-aware robot than the emotion-ignorant robot.

### Results from the Open-Ended Questionnaire

As described in Section 5.2.3, each participant answered an open-ended questionnaire at the end of the study. Figure 5.23 summarizes the questionnaire and which run users preferred for certain conditions (i.e. emotion-ignorant or emotion-aware). Note that some users chose not to state a preference regarding which run they preferred for certain conditions; because we were specifically interested in whether users preferred the emotion-aware case, we considered the ambiguous responses to be fail-

ures in the binomial analysis. The binomial analysis is based off of a population size of 33.

| Question  | Number of Participants Who Did Not Prefer One Run Over the Other * | Number of Participants Favoring Emotion-Aware Robot | p-value |
|---|--|---|---------|
| Which of the two runs with the robot did you prefer?  | 0  | 33  | 0       |
| In which of the two runs did the robot exhibit behavior that could be useful in a more complex task?        | 1  | 30  | < 0.001 |
| In which of two runs did the robot exhibit behavior that could prevent human error?                         | 3  | 18  | > 0.1   |
| In which of the two runs did the robot exhibit behavior that could improve the efficiency of collaboration? | 2  | 26  | < 0.001 |
| What was the most interesting behavior of the robot and in which run did it happen?                         | 5  | 24  | 0.002   |

Figure 5.23: Open-ended questionnaire questions and results. (\*Note: Because we are evaluating whether humans prefer an emotion-aware robot, these results are taken as negative test results when calculating the p-value using the binomial distribution. Only those participants who clearly indicated a preference for the emotion-aware robot are taken as positive test results.)

As shown in Figure 5.23, 100% of users unambiguously preferred the run with the emotion-aware robot. In general, this preference stemmed from a feeling of closeness and partnership, as seen in these responses: “the robot had emotions and responded to my emotions. Also, what it said about my failing was cute and aimed to make me feel better.” Another example is “I liked feeling needed and accounted for; I felt closer to the robot.” Finally, “I saw the changes in its feeling, which motivated me to care more about my act...I also liked that he asked me to correct its failure, although it could ask the supervisor.”

When asked in which of the two runs the robot exhibited behavior that could be useful in a more complex task, 90.9% chose the emotion-aware robot. In general, respondents thought that the emotion-aware robot was better at problem solving, more adaptable, and more capable of handling the social complexities that occur in collaboration, as shown in responses such as “The robot explained motives...which is important to keep a team communicating and on the same pace.” Also, “When we failed he initially switched to a new task and then came back to the originally failed task. It kept me from getting irritated and negative.” Finally, “The more

complex, the more necessary it is to understand how humans think and operate...an empathetic robot can adapt, encourage and help.” It is worth noting that one respondent preferred the emotion-ignorant case, saying “In a more complex task it might be better for the robot to take control and simply tell me what to do; trying to be understanding and collaborative wouldn’t be as important as doing the task correctly.”

The only question that did not provide statistically significant support in favor of the emotion-aware robot related to which case the robot exhibited behavior that could prevent human error. About 36.4% of respondents thought that the emotion-ignorant robot was more likely to prevent human error; however, all but one of these cited calling the supervisor as the main method of preventing human error, in spite of the fact that the instructions indicated that the robot’s need to call the supervisor counted against the collaboration. Of the 54.5% who thought that the emotion-aware robot was better at preventing human error, most cited the robot’s ability to console the human as the main behavior that could prevent human error. Respondents indicated that this enabled them to move on and feel better about the collaboration, as with this response: “The robot switched to a different task and we came back to an error later. This allowed my mind to move away from being frustrated. I was able to complete a different task which felt like a win - then come back and finish the error. Making my mind move away from frustration could definitely prevent more errors.”

When asked in which of the runs the robot exhibited behavior that could improve the efficiency of the collaboration, 78.8% responded with the emotion-aware case; of these, the vast majority stated that this was because of the robot’s ability to change the order of tasks in the event of a failure, and to ask the human for help.

Finally, when asked in which run the most interesting behavior occurred, 72.7% chose the emotion-aware condition. Of these respondents, 12 individuals stated that the robot’s attempt to console the human by saying “It was not your fault” in response to the human’s negative emotion that occurred as a consequence of the

human's failed task was the most interesting behavior, and a majority mentioned that it actually made them feel more positive. Six participants referred to the robot's ability to understand and express emotion. Several participants referred to the robot's ability to communicate, including the ability to ask questions. Of those who responded with the emotion-ignorant case, most found the ability to call the supervisor, and mechanical functions, such as gripping, to be most interesting.

## **Impact of Demographics**

As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, we recorded certain demographic information from each participant, including age and gender. We also had each participant complete several personality questionnaires. Although it was not the primary purpose of the study, we investigated the Likert scale results to determine if there were any relevant trends based on the demographics and personalities of the participants. A close study of the results did not reveal any identifiable pattern based on gender or personality.

Age did reveal an interesting pattern. We divided the participants into two groups, below 30 years of age and 30 or above. While question-by-question comparisons revealed only a few statistically significant differences based on age, a general pattern emerged. For all but four of the 31 questions presented, the younger age group reported higher scores than the older age group (or lower, in the case of reverse-scored questions) for the emotion-aware robot. In the emotion-ignorant case, the younger group tends to score the robot nearer to the same value as the older age group for all but seven questions, leading to a pattern in which the score drop between the emotion-aware and the emotion-ignorant case was more for the younger group than for the older group; the seven questions that broke this pattern were 7, 9, 11, 12, 18, 19 and 22.




Figure 5.24: Impact of age on results of Likert scale questions related to likability.




Figure 5.25: Impact of age on results of Likert scale questions related to trust.




Figure 5.26: Impact of age on results of Likert scale questions related to performance.




Figure 5.27: Impact of age on results of Likert scale questions related to robot's understanding of human's emotions.




Figure 5.28: Impact of age on results of Likert scale questions related to robot's understanding of goals.




Figure 5.29: Impact of age on results of Likert scale questions related to human's feeling about collaboration.




Figure 5.30: Impact of age on results of Likert scale questions related to satisfaction with collaborative partner.

### 5.2.5 Discussion

Based on the results, all participants prefer to work with the emotion-aware robot. Humans find the emotion-aware robot more likable and more trustworthy, as indicated in the Likert-scale responses and the open-ended questionnaire responses. Based on the responses, the emotional interaction with the robot can help create a sense of closeness and enjoyment that makes humans want to continue working with the robot.

The results also indicate that the emotion aware robot can better maintain a collaborative relationship. Both Likert-scale responses and Open-Ended Questionnaire responses indicate this. Humans felt a stronger sense of the robot's commitment to the collaboration, and greater understanding of their goals and emotions from the robot. Several open-ended responses also indicated that the robot was able to successfully motivate people and maintain their commitment to the collaboration, especially when tasks failed. Additionally, as shown in Section 5.2.4, humans rated the emotion-aware case much higher than the emotion-ignorant case when asked

which robot's decisions improved their performance, in essence acknowledging that their collaborator's (i.e. the robot's) decisions had a significant impact on their performance. As some of the open-ended responses indicated, successfully managing emotions within the collaboration can help keep the collaboration on track, and prevent distractions due to guilt and other negative emotions.

Finally, the emotion-aware robot developed a stronger sense of partnership through greater communication. The participants felt better understood by the emotion-aware robot, and felt that the goals were more mutually agreed-upon, refer to Section 5.2.4. As evidenced in the following response, the emotion-aware robot was successfully able to create a sense of partnership through its more open communication style: “Communication is very important. In the first run (i.e. emotion-aware) the robot states what tasks he is working on, it is clear and straight-forward. Also during the first run the robot cares about the human(me)'s feelings and cheers me up when I failed at the tasks, I think that could also improve efficiency of collaboration, because it would be more like a team or partnership.”

# CHAPTER 6

## CONCLUSION

### 6.1 Discussion

This thesis presents Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory and our AMC framework. They are built on the combination of SharedPlans theory of collaboration [103] and the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions [162] [223]. Our motivation to develop AMC framework was the lack of a theory describing the processes involved in a dyadic collaboration as well as their relationship and influences on each other. In particular, in this thesis we emphasized the reciprocal influence of the collaboration structure and the appraisal processes in collaboration. We provided algorithms and methods to compute several appraisal variables and their influence on collaboration processes, e.g. goal management, in this context. In general, our contribution in this thesis was synthesizing prior work on appraisal and collaboration to provide a theory which describes emotion-regulated goal-driven behaviors within a dyadic collaboration. A further contribution of this thesis is to make note of the influence of motives on coping process in collaboration. We also validated our individual appraisal algorithms as well as our overall framework (end-to-end system evaluation) by conducting an online crowd-sourcing user-study and an in-house user study respectively. The first user study investigated whether humans and our appraisal algorithms provide similar answers to certain questions (events) with respect to the change of particular factors involved in our algorithms. The second user study investigated a) the importance of emotional-awareness in collaboration, and b) the

overall functionality of the AMC framework to autonomously control interactions of a collaborative robot.

After our introduction in Chapter 1, we presented theoretical background on the two major foundations of our theory in Chapter 2. First, we reviewed the prominent computational collaboration theories including SharedPlans and Joint Intentions theories. We focused on main concepts characterizing requirements of a collaboration introduced by these theories. We also provided the similarities and differences between these theories in terms of their essential concepts as well as their theoretical and practical applications. These applications involved the fields of robotic and artificial agents. Then, we continued discussing what emotions are and more importantly how they can influence one's cognition and social life. We also presented the role of emotions in communicating one's internal states to convey information to others as the basic rationale behind different social emotions. We confined our discussion about emotion by addressing the importance of artificial emotions in social robots or agents. Third, we reviewed the computational models of emotions including appraisal theory as well as their similarities, differences and applications in autonomous agents and robots. Finally, we introduced the concept of motives, work in related fields and a brief description of three social motives based on the psychological theories.

Later, we introduced our Affective Motivational Collaboration Theory in Chapter 3. We discussed all the mechanisms involved in our theory. These mechanisms include different functions, each of which are designed to process and provide a particular value required in overall operation of the system. Among these mechanisms our focus was on Collaboration, Appraisal and Coping mechanisms. However, other mechanisms such as Motivation also play important roles in influencing the overall behavior of the agent using our framework. We also discussed the events that we consider in a collaborative environment including utterances, primitive actions and observable behaviors. We described how each mechanism handles these events. We believe it is important to focus on functions of emotions and their influence on col-

laboration processes. Therefore, we briefly described a set of emotion functions and how they are related to the collaboration context. Then, we continued by explaining the input, output and function of each mechanism involved in our architecture as well as the Mental States as the knowledge-base required by all the mechanisms, to input or output data in the form of beliefs, intentions, motives, goals and emotion instances. All of these Mental States can be defined and distinguished by their attributes. We have a collection of different attributes for each mental state. The description of all of these attributes are provided as the final section of this chapter.

In Chapter 4, we introduced our overall framework using AMC theory in more detail such as the main functions implemented in the Collaboration mechanism. As a major part of our contribution, we explained our algorithms to compute the values associated with the appraisal variables that we implemented as part of our framework. We use these algorithms to compute the values of relevance, desirability, expectedness and controllability of an event occurring during the collaboration. All of these algorithms process the data provided by the collaboration structure. Reciprocally, we provided the details of how we use the outcome of the appraisals to influence the collaboration structure. We also introduced our algorithm for the goal management process. Then, we explained details of the coping strategies, e.g. Active Coping, involved in our Coping Mechanism and the underlying processes associated with these coping strategies. We also included details about the Motivation mechanism, the types of motives we implemented, their descriptions and the way we compute the values of these motives. We also briefly described other mechanisms in our framework. Finally, we describe the elicitation of different emotion instances in our framework and how they are interpreted according the different contexts during collaboration.

As mentioned previously, we carried out two user-studies which validated our framework. The first study was designed to test whether humans and our appraisal algorithms perceive certain factors in our algorithms similarly. The result, which validated our algorithms, are presented in Chapter 5. Our second study, which was

designed to test the overall functionality of AMC framework, was also presented in Chapter 5, and is summarized in the following section.

## 6.2 End Results

With the above contributions, we ended with a final user-study as our end-to-end system evaluation. Using the KUKA Youbot robot, we show how using AMC framework with emotional awareness can enable the robot to collaborate with the participants in such a way that all of the participants prefer collaborating with the robot with emotional awareness running our framework.

In this user-study, we assigned participants to collaborate with an emotion-aware and emotion-ignorant robot in a random order. Overall, about half of the participants were assigned to collaborate with the emotion-aware robot first and then with the emotion-ignorant robot. All of the participants collaborated with the robot in both conditions. We asked participants to answer our questionnaires with which we investigated the preference of the participants between two robots from different point of view. In general, all of the participants preferred collaborating with the robot with emotional-awareness. Also, in almost all of the important detailed factors, e.g. likability, participants significantly preferred collaborating with the emotion-aware robot. Interestingly, we could not find any significant influence of the order in which the participants' collaborated with the emotion-aware robot, i.e. collaborating first with the emotion-aware robot or second. Another interesting point about our final user-study was the participants' answers to our open-ended questionnaires. In general, participants found the emotion-aware robot to be interesting, effective at maintaining teamwork, adaptable and a good collaborative partner.

### 6.3 Future Work

This work makes way for a number of potential extensions. In particular, we believe that extensions to the system could be made by employing emotion functions we discussed in Chapter 4. By acquiring these emotion functions, one potential extension could be to begin exploring how different perceived or elicited emotions can influence different aspects of collaboration in a particular context. For instance, how the agent can interpret meaning of anger while the collaborators are negotiating pursuing or abandoning a given goal. Since the meaning of many social emotions are defined in the field of psychology, the agent can use these meanings to improve likability or other important factors in the collaboration.

Secondly, while our main contribution focused mainly on enabling an agent to improve different aspects of collaboration, one possible area of future work would be to explore ways in which the agent can improve a chosen aspect of the collaboration, e.g. trust or performance. In particular, an interesting extension would be to enable the agent to perceive which aspect of the collaboration is suffering and needs to be improved at any given time. For example, if the human collaborator is losing interest in achieving a given goal, the agent can try to motivate the human collaborator with the right decision and ultimately behavior. This way the agent would be more adaptive during collaboration.

Finally, in addition to expanding the adaptability of the agent to the human collaborator's internal state, future extensions are also possible in the other mechanisms as well. For example, an interesting area to explore is the ability to expand and employ more elaborate computational models of motivation and theory of mind. These extensions could provide more information about the human collaborator and help the agent to act on more accurate model of the human's internal state. As with the above cases, the improvements in mental states and learning abilities are also left as potential areas for further exploration.

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## **APPENDIX A**