

# MAGGIE SHI

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## EMPLOYMENT

National Bureau of Economic Research	2022 - 2023
Postdoctoral Fellow in Aging and Health Research	
University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy	2023 -
Assistant Professor	

## EDUCATION

PhD	Columbia University	2016 - 2022
	Economics	
BA	Rice University, <i>magna cum laude</i>	2012 - 2016
	Mathematical Economic Analysis and Statistics	

## PUBLICATIONS

[Regulated Revenues and Hospital Behavior: Evidence from a Medicare Overhaul](#)

with [Tal Gross](#), [Adam Sacarny](#), and [David Silver](#)

*Forthcoming, **Review of Economics and Statistics***

*Abstract:* We study a 2008 policy reform in which Medicare revised its hospital payment system to better reflect patients' severity of illness. We construct a simulated instrument that predicts a hospital's policy-induced change in reimbursement using pre-reform patients and post-reform rules. The reform led to large persistent changes in Medicare payment rates across hospitals. Hospitals that faced larger gains in Medicare reimbursement increased the volume of Medicare patients they treated. The estimates imply a volume elasticity of 1.2. To accommodate greater volume, hospitals increased nurse employment, but also lowered length of stay, with ambiguous effects on quality.

## WORKING PAPERS

[Monitoring for Waste: Evidence from Medicare Audits](#)

*Revise and resubmit, **Quarterly Journal of Economics***

*Abstract:* This paper examines the extent to which public programs should monitor for wasteful expenditure. I study a large Medicare program that monitored for unnecessary healthcare spending, and consider its effect on government savings, provider compliance costs, and patient health. Every dollar Medicare spent on monitoring generated \$24–29 in government savings. The majority of savings stem from the deterrence of future care, rather than reclaimed payments from prior care. The health of the marginal patient denied care is not harmed, indicating that monitoring primarily deters unnecessary care. Instead, the main tradeoff to monitoring is the compliance cost it imposes on providers – for every \$1,000 in Medicare savings, providers incur \$178–218 in higher administrative costs. However, I provide evidence that these costs are driven by the investments providers make to improve compliance, like adopting technology to assess the cost-effectiveness of care, rather than the hassle costs of the monitoring process.

### [Free to Spend? The Effect of Decentralization on Local Governments](#)

with [Andrea Tulli](#)

*Abstract:* We consider how decentralization of fiscal autonomy to local governments affects their budgetary decisions. We study an Italian reform which expanded municipal discretion and responsibility over property taxation, using novel data on what the national government would have done in a more centralized system. Municipalities on average picked higher tax rates than the national government would have. Municipalities respond to additional responsibility by raising more revenue and spending more on public services. Local conditions shape these municipal responses: those with greater political competition or worse economic conditions spend more on public services, but less on administration and public official remuneration.

## WORKS IN PROGRESS

Dependent Coverage and Parental “Job Lock”: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act

with [Hannah Bae](#) and [Katherine Meckel](#)

*Research Question:* How does extending health insurance coverage to young adults affect their parents' labor supply?

Detection, Deterrence, and Adaptation in the Certification of Medical Necessity

with [Ashvin Gandhi](#)

*Research Question:* How do healthcare providers respond to policies that monitor for medical necessity, and how does adaptation mitigate the effectiveness of these policies over time?

The Effect of Deregulation on the Cost, Availability, and Quality of Healthcare

with [Yunan Ji](#) and [Parker Rogers](#)

*Research Question:* How does supply-side deregulation affect the market for healthcare inputs, and how do these effects ripple through the healthcare supply chain?

## AWARDS

Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation Award -- <i>honorable mention</i> National Tax Association	2022
Padma Desai Department Dissertation Award Columbia University	2022
Harriss Second Year Paper Award -- <i>runner up</i> Columbia University	2018
Peter Mieszkowski Prize for Honors Program Research Rice University	2016

## GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Mercatus Center Grant <i>with Yunan Ji and Parker Rogers</i>	2022
R36 Dissertation Fellowship Health Services Research Dissertation Program Agency for Health Research and Quality	2020 - 2022

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

The American Economy - TA	F2018, F2019, F2020
Intermediate Microeconomics - TA	S2019, S2020
Principles of Economics - TA	F2017, S2018

## INVITED PRESENTATIONS (\* *scheduled*)

ASSA*, USC Schaeffer Center*, Harvard/MIT/BU Health Economics Seminar*, NBER Health Care Spring Meeting*, UChicago Booth (Accounting)*	2023
Mathematica, Congressional Budget Office, University at Buffalo, CU Denver, Wisconsin School of Business, Georgia Tech, Brookings Institution, UMass Amherst, Treasury OTA, WashU Olin, UChicago Harris, FTC, Boston University, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, University of Missouri, Binghamton University, Northwestern Kellogg (Strategy), Stanford Health Policy, APPAM, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, UChicago BFI Health Econ Conference, ASHEcon, Policy Impacts Conference	2022
ASSA, EEA, APPAM Student Research Series, Columbia HPM, ASHEcon, WEAI Graduate Student Workshop, EHEC, Congressional Budget Office, SHESG, SEA, NTA, Rice University	2021

YES, NTA

2020

ASHEcon, SOLE

2019

## REFEREING

Journal of Health Economics, Journal of Public Economics, The Economic Journal