MAGGIE SHI

m.shi@uchicago.edu University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy www.maggie-shi.com 1307 E. 60th Street Chicago, IL 60637 Last updated: July 2023 **Employment** University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy 2023 -Assistant Professor National Bureau of Economic Research 2022 - 2023 Postdoctoral Fellow in Aging and Health Research **Professional Affiliations** National Bureau of Economic Research 2023 -Faculty Research Fellow - Economics of Health Education PhD Columbia University 2016 - 2022

Publications

BA

Regulated Revenues and Hospital Behavior: Evidence from a Medicare Overhaul

with <u>Tal Gross, Adam Sacarny</u>, and <u>David Silver</u>

Forthcoming, Review of Economics and Statistics

Rice University, magna cum laude

Abstract: We study a 2008 policy reform in which Medicare revised its hospital payment system to better reflect patients' severity of illness. We construct a simulated instrument that predicts a hospital's policy-induced change in reimbursement using pre-reform patients and post-reform rules. The reform led to large persistent changes in Medicare payment rates across hospitals. Hospitals that faced larger gains in Medicare reimbursement increased the volume of Medicare patients they treated. The estimates imply a volume elasticity of 1.2. To accommodate greater volume, hospitals increased nurse employment, but also lowered length of stay, with ambiguous effects on quality.

2012 - 2016

Working Papers

Monitoring for Waste: Evidence from Medicare Audits

Revise and resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the tradeoffs of monitoring for wasteful public spending. I study a large Medicare program that monitored for unnecessary healthcare spending and consider its effect on government savings, provider behavior, and patient health. Every dollar Medicare spent on monitoring generated \$24–29 in government savings. The majority of savings stem from the deterrence of future care, rather than reclaimed payments from prior care. I do not find evidence that the health of the marginal patient is harmed, indicating that monitoring primarily deters unnecessary care. Providers subject to monitoring face increased administrative costs. However, these costs are mostly incurred upfront and include investments in compliance technology to assess the medical necessity of care.

Free to Spend? The Effect of Decentralization on Local Governments

with Andrea Tulli

Abstract: We consider how decentralization of fiscal autonomy to local governments affects their budgetary decisions. We study an Italian reform which expanded municipal discretion and responsibility over property taxation, using novel data on what the national government would have done in a more centralized system. Municipalities on average picked higher tax rates than the national government would have. Municipalities respond to additional responsibility by raising more revenue and spending more on public services. Local conditions shape these municipal responses: those with greater political competition or worse economic conditions spend more on public services, but less on administration and public official remuneration.

Works in Progress

Dependent Coverage and Parental "Job Lock": Evidence from the Affordable Care Act

with Hannah Bae and Katherine Meckel

Research Question: How does extending health insurance coverage to young adults affect their parents' labor supply?

Quantity Regulation in Healthcare

with Ashvin Gandhi

Research Question: How do healthcare providers respond to policies that limit the quantity of care they can provide, and how does adaptation mitigate the effectiveness of these policies over time?

Awards

Outstanding Doctoral Dissertation Award honorable mention National Tax Association	2022
Padma Desai Department Dissertation Award Columbia University	2022
Harriss Second Year Paper Award runner up Columbia University	2018
Peter Mieszkowski Prize for Honors Program Research Rice University	2016
Grants and Fellowships	
Emerging Ventures Grant with Yunan Ji and Parker Rogers	2022
R36 Dissertation Fellowship Health Services Research Dissertation Program Agency for Health Research and Quality	2020 - 2022
Teaching	
The American Economy - TA	F2018, F2019, F2020
Intermediate Microeconomics - TA	S2019, S2020
Principles of Economics - TA	F2017, S2018
Invited Presentations (* scheduled)	
ASSA, USC Schaeffer Center, NBER Health Care Spring Meeting, Harvard/M Health Economics Seminar, UChicago Booth (Accounting), CEPRA/NBER V Aging and Health	
Mathematica, Congressional Budget Office, University at Buffalo, CU Denver, School of Business, Georgia Tech, Brookings Institution, UMass Amherst, Treas WashU Olin, UChicago Harris, FTC, Boston University, Federal Reserve Bank of University of Missouri, Binghamton University, Northwestern Kellogg (Strategy Health Policy, APPAM, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, UChicago BFI Health Conference, ASHEcon, Policy Impacts Conference	sury OTA, of Dallas, y), Stanford
ASSA, EEA, APPAM Student Research Series, Columbia HPM, ASHEcon, W. Graduate Student Workshop, EHEC, Congressional Budget Office, SHESG, SE Rice University	

YES, NTA 2020 ASHEcon, SOLE 2019

Professional Service

Referee: American Economic Review, AEJ: Economic Policy, Journal of Health Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Economic Journal, Quarterly Journal of Economics

Scientific Committee: National Tax Association Conference (2023)