

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) leverages algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields in order to generate public keys. It can solve the problem of performance-heavy operations with too large keys (f.ex. 2048-bit RSA), as usually for ECC 256 bits are used.

2 NIST elliptic curves

2.1 NIST Standard

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is an American national institute, working under the provisions of the Federal Information Security Management Act. It defines the standards of the curves and its parameters for different key-lengths, in order to achieve implementation with base security accepted by the USA government. As well, it outlines key-establishment schemes, key-derivation and key-pair managements methods, as well as recommendations for DLC-based (Discrete Logarithm Cryptography) key-agreement schemes[4].

For each key-length NIST provides two types of fields[5]:

- **prime field**: it contains a prime number p of elements, which are the integers modulo p , with the field arithmetic being implemented in terms of the arithmetic of integers modulo p ;
- **binary field**: it contains 2^m elements (with m being the degree of the field) which are bit strings of length m , and the field arithmetic is implemented in terms of operations on bits.

As well, two types of curves are given:

- **pseudorandom** curves: with coefficients that are generated from the output of the seeded hash function;
- **special** curves: with coefficients and the field being selected to optimize the efficiency of the arithmetic operations on the curve.

The special curves over prime fields are known as *Edwards* or *Montgomery* curves; meanwhile over binary field they are referred as *Koblitz* curves.

In this paper, there will be inspected in detail pseudorandom curves over prime fields.

2.2 NIST pseudorandom curves over prime fields

2.2.1 Curves parameters

Due to NIST official publication on *Recommended Elliptic Curves for Federal Government Use*[6], all the pseudorandom curves over prime field curves are defined by:

$$E : y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b \mod p$$

with a having a static value of $a = -3$ in every case for the reasons of efficiency.




Fig. 2.1: Examples of curve E with different coefficients b , interactive access: [desmos tool](#)

The following parameters are specifying the curves in details:

- p : prime modulus
- n : the order
- $SEED$: the 160-bit long input seed to the domain parameter generation (SHA-1 algorithm)
- c : the output of the SHA-1 algorithm
- b : the coefficient of the curve, that grants satisfaction of condition $b^2c = -27 \pmod{p}$
- G : the base point with two values:
 - Gx : the x coordinate of the base point
 - Gy : the y coordinate of the base point

The parameters p and n are always given in decimal value, meanwhile the rest in hexadecimal.

2.2.2 P-256: 256-bit length curve

param	value
$p_{(10)}$	115792089210356248762697446949407573530086143415290314195533631308867097853951
$n_{(10)}$	115792089210356248762697446949407573529996955224135760342422259061068512044369
$SEED_{(16)}$	c49d3608 86e70493 6a6678e1 139d26b7 819f7e90
$c_{(16)}$	7efba166 2985be94 03cb055c 75d4f7e0 ce8d84a9 c5114abc af317768 0104fa0d
$b_{(16)}$	5ac635d8 aa3a93e7 b3ebbd55 769886bc 651d06b0 cc53b0f6 3bce3c3e 27d2604b
$Gx_{(16)}$	6b17d1f2 e12c4247 f8bce6e5 63a440f2 77037d81 2deb33a0 f4a13945 d898c296
$Gy_{(16)}$	4fe342e2 fe1a7f9b 8ee7eb4a 7c0f9e16 2bce3357 6b315ece cbb64068 37bf51f5

2.2.3 P-521: 512-bit length curve

param	value
$p_{(10)}$	686479766013060971498190079908139321726943530014330540939446345918554318339765605212255964066145455497729631
$n_{(10)}$	686479766013060971498190079908139321726943530014330540939446345918554318339765539424505774633321719753296395
$SEED_{(16)}$	d09e8800 291cb853 96cc6717 393284aa a0da64ba
$c_{(16)}$	0b4 8bfa5f42 0a349495 39d2bdfc 264eeeeb 077688e4 4fbf0ad8 f6d0edb3 7bd6b533 28100051 8e19f1b9 ffe0fe9 ed8a3c22 00b8f875
$b_{(16)}$	051 953eb961 8e1c9a1f 929a21a0 b68540ee a2da725b 99b315f3 b8b48991 8ef109e1 56193951 ec7e937b 1652c0bd 3bb1bf07 3573c
$Gx_{(16)}$	c6 858e06b7 0404e9cd 9e3ecb66 2395b442 9c648139 053fb521 f828af60 6b4d3dba a14b5e77 efe75928 fe1dc127 a2ffa8de 3348b3c
$Gy_{(16)}$	118 39296a78 9a3bc004 5c8a5fb4 2c7d1bd9 98f54449 579b4468 17afbd17 273e662c 97ee7299 5ef42640 c550b901 3fad0761 353c71

1 Elliptic curves

1.1 Elliptic curve: definition

Elliptic curves are defined over a field K and describe points in its cartesian product K^2 ; they are smooth and projective affine algebraic structures.

The Weierstrass equation of an elliptic curve E over a field K is [1]:

$$E : y^2 + a_1xy + a_3y = x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_4x + a_6$$

what in case of the fields with characteristic different than 2 or 3 (i.e. the smallest number of summands n of the field's identity element e so $ne = 0$), the affinitic equation of the elliptic curve can be simplified to:

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B$$

$$A, B \in K$$

1.2 Elliptic curve: point addition

The structure of elliptic curves fulfills the necessary requirements for its points to form an algebraic group with a certain addition law.




Fig. 1.1: Operations on an elliptic curve [[2]](#references)

With $P, Q \in E$ - being two points on an elliptic curve group E - and L being the line connecting those points, the third point R can be defined where the intersection of L with E happens. Then, the result of $P + Q$ is located on the residual point of the intersection R' .

The coordinates of the result (x_{res}, y_{res}) can be calculated as:

$$x_{res} = s^2 - x_p - x_q$$

$$y_{res} = -y_p + s(x_p - x_{res})$$

with s being the slope of the line L through P and Q :

$$s = (y_p - y_q) / (x_p - x_q)$$

With O being the neutral point in the group E , the following properties are fulfilled:

- $P + O = P$
- $P + Q = Q + P$
- if $P \in E$ then there exists a point Q such that $P + Q = O$
- if $P, Q \in E$ then $P + Q \in E$
- for $P, Q, R \in E$ is satisfied $(P + Q) + R = P + (Q + R)$

1.4 Multiplication of EC point with integer

Any point P on the elliptic curve can be added to itself resulting in:

$$P + P = 2 * P$$

Continuing the addition multiple n times yields to:

$$P * n = P + P + \dots + P (n - \text{times})$$

As multiplication is defined by the point addition, it always results in another point on the elliptic curve.

For point doubling, i.e. $R = 2 * P = P + P$, the following formula holds:

$$x_R = s^2 - 2x_p$$

$$y_R = -y_p + s(x_p - x_{res})$$

with s :

$$s = (3x_p^2 + a)/2y_p$$

1.5 Elliptic Curves over finite field

The ECs used in ECC are strictly defined over finite field F_p , with p being a prime number bigger than 3. Hence, the field is a square matrix with dimensions $p \times p$. Hence, the points of a given curve are limited to integer coordinates within its field matrix and all algebraic operations will result in a point within that field.

3 Brainpool elliptic curves

3.1 Brainpool standard

Brainpool elliptic curves are curves which are standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) - an international open standards organization - and are described in RFC-5639[8].

It presents a set of domain parameters defining cryptographically strong groups on elliptic curves for different key-length encryption schemes.

The curves are described with regard to Wierstrass' definition:

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B$$

3.2 Brainpool curves

3.3.1 Curves parameters

The Brainpool curves are defined with similar parameters to NIST standard; used in the official publication symbols are:

- p : prime number (modulus) specifying the base field, $p > 3$
- a and b : the coefficients of the E , satisfying $4a^3 + 27b^2 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$
- G : the base point with two values:
 - x : the x coordinate of the base point
 - y : the y coordinate of the base point
- q : the prime order of the group generated by base point G (equivalent of NIST n parameter), such that $qG = 0$
- h : the cofactor of G in E , $h = E(F_p)/q$

In the further implementations, the given here parameters naming convention will be used.

3.3.2 brainpoolP256r1: 256-bit length curve

The curve for 256-bit length key is identified by the Curve-ID `brainpoolP256r1`, and has the following parameters:

param	value
-------	-------

param	value
$p_{(16)}$	A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D52620282013481D1F6E5377
$q_{(16)}$	A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7
$a_{(16)}$	7D5A0975FC2C3057EEF67530417AFFE7FB8055C126DC5C6CE94A4B44F330B5D9
$b_{(16)}$	26DC5C6CE94A4B44F330B5D9BBD77CBF958416295CF7E1CE6BCCDC18FF8C07B6
$Gx_{(16)}$	8BD2AEB9CB7E57CB2C4B482FFC81B7AFB9DE27E1E3BD23C23A4453BD9ACE3262
$Gy_{(16)}$	547EF835C3DAC4FD97F8461A14611DC9C27745132DED8E545C1D54C72F046997
$h_{(10)}$	1

3.3.3 brainpoolP512r1: 512-bit length curve

The curve for 512-bit length key is identified by the Curve-ID `brainpoolP512r1` , and has the following parameters:

param	value
$p_{(16)}$	AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA703308717D4D9B009BC66842AECDA12AE6A380E62881
$q_{(16)}$	AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA70330870553E5C414CA92619418661197FAC10471DB1D
$a_{(16)}$	7830A3318B603B89E2327145AC234CC594CBDD8D3DF91610A83441CAEA9863BC2DED5D5AA8253AA10A2EF1C98B9AC8B57F1117
$b_{(16)}$	3DF91610A83441CAEA9863BC2DED5D5AA8253AA10A2EF1C98B9AC8B57F1117A72BF2C7B9E7C1AC4D77FC94CADC083E6798405C
$Gx_{(16)}$	81AEE4BDD82ED9645A21322E9C4C6A9385ED9F70B5D916C1B43B62EEF4D0098EFF3B1F78E2D0D48D50D1687B93B97D5F7C6D50
$Gy_{(16)}$	7DDE385D566332ECC0EABFA9CF7822FDF209F70024A57B1AA000C55B881F8111B2DCDE494A5F485E5BCA4BD88A2763AED1CA2E
$h_{(10)}$	1

4 Implementation: Elliptic curve over finite prime field and ECDH

4.1 Preliminary considerations

In order to achieve certain level of security, the selection of the curve parameters and the base point is important; hence, in this realization, the Brainpool defined curves will be used.

Apart of that, the required protection depends on the implementation and its environment: if the hardware that runs it is completely secured and separated, the time-invariant implementation may be sufficient. If the implementation of ECC is located on the physically accessible device, it has to be robust against side-channel attacks (power consumption and its analysis, electromagnetic emanations, active fault injection, etc.), then more security measures needs to be taken, with techniques of randomization being essential in it[3]. In this lab, the hardware vurnerabilities are not taken in considerations, hence the focus will be on achieving time-constant implementation.

Furthermore, all the processing will be performed on a personal machine. This has to be taken in consideration when evaluating time measurements of the processes execution. Below are presented the specifications of the processor.

In [5]:

```
%run systemInfo.py
```

```
[+] Architecture : 64bit
[+] System Name : Linux
[+] Operating System Version : #101~18.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Fri Oct 22 09:25:04 UTC 2021
[+] Platform : Linux-5.4.0-90-generic-x86_64-with-glibc2.27
[+] Processor : x86_64
[+] System Uptime : 0:27 hours
[+] Total number of processes : 357
[+] Number of Physical cores : 4
[+] Number of Total cores : 8
[+] Max Frequency : 4900.00Mhz
[+] Min Frequency : 400.00Mhz
[+] Current Frequency : 1190.73Mhz
[+] Total CPU Usage : 13.9%
[+] Processor 0 : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10510U CPU @ 1.80GHz
[+] Processor 1 : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10510U CPU @ 1.80GHz
```

```

[+] Processor 2 : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10510U CPU @ 1.80GHz
[+] Processor 3 : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10510U CPU @ 1.80GHz
[+] Processor 4 : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10510U CPU @ 1.80GHz
[+] Processor 5 : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10510U CPU @ 1.80GHz
[+] Processor 6 : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10510U CPU @ 1.80GHz
[+] Processor 7 : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-10510U CPU @ 1.80GHz
[+] Total Memory present : 15.34 Gb
[+] Total Memory Available : 12.02 Gb
[+] Total Memory Used : 2.51 Gb
[+] Percentage Used : 21.7 %
[+] Total swap memory : 32.0
[+] Free swap memory : 32.0
[+] Used swap memory : 0.0
[+] Percentage Used : 0.0%

```


4.2 ECDH: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

The ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange) is the scheme that allows derivation of the shared secret key over an insecure channel, based on the private-public key pairs of both sides. It follows the traditional Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange, nevertheless, the key pairs are of elliptic curve type and point multiplication is performed instead of the modular exponentiation.

Considering following properties:

- P_{base} - base point of the curve
- A_{priv} - integer, private key of A
- A_{pub} - point on the curve, $A_{pub} = A * P_{base}$, public key of A
- B_{priv} - integer, private key of B
- B_{pub} - point on the curve, $B_{pub} = B * P_{base}$, public key of B
- K - shared secret key, $K = A_{priv} * B_{priv} * P_{base}$

the algorithm executes following flow:



This results in both sides, A and B, having the same secret shared key that can be used for symmetric encryption.

Based on that, the implementation will be divided into following steps:

- curve data type definition
- curve and field generation functions
- point addition function
- double-and-add algorithm for faster multiplication
- Diffie-Hellman algorithm for shared key generation

4.3 Definition of the curve parameters

The curve parameters were declared with use of Python's `dataclass` [7], introduced in version 3.7. This allowed to keep the code cleaner and to approach further computations rather functionally than object oriented.

```
In [6]: %reset
```

```
In [7]: from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Callable, Any

@dataclass
class Point:
    x: int
    y: int
    def __eq__(self, other):
        return self.x == other.x and self.y == other.y
    def __neq__(self, other):
        return not self == other

@dataclass
class Field:
    p: int # prime modulus
    q: int # order of the base point
    h: int = 1

@dataclass
class EllipticCurve:
    a: int # coefficient
    b: int # coefficient
    base: Point # base point
    field: Field
    inf: Point = Point(0, 0) # point of infinity
    name: str = "undefined"
```

A list of elliptic curves registry was created. In order to extend it, the curve's name needs to be specified in the `ELLIPTIC_CURVES` enum, followingly the object should be instantiated as `EllipticCurve(...args)` and then added to a list `ELLIPTIC_CURVES_LIST`. Each curve can be later retrived with the function `getCurve(name)` where name is a key or a valid value of `ELLIPTIC_CURVES` enum. F.ex.:

```
ec1 = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp512.value)
ec2 = getCurve('brainpoolP256r1')
```

TODO: automatize it more and read parameters of each curve from json file.

```
In [8]: from enum import Enum

# list of available curves
class ELLIPTIC_CURVES(Enum):
    bp256 = 'brainpoolP256r1'
    bp512 = 'brainpoolP512r1'

brainpool_256 = EllipticCurve(
    name=ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp256.value,
    a=0x7D5A0975FC2C3057EEF67530417AFFE7FB8055C126DC5C6CE94A4B44F330B5D9,
    b=0x26DC5C6CE94A4B44F330B5D9BBD77CBF958416295CF7E1CE6BCCDC18FF8C07B6,
    base=Point(
        x=0x8BD2AEB9CB7E57CB2C4B482FFC81B7AFB9DE27E1E3BD23C23A4453BD9ACE3262,
        y=0x547EF835C3DAC4FD97F8461A14611DC9C27745132DED8E545C1D54C72F046997
    ),
    field=Field(
        p=0xA9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D52620282013481D1F6E5377,
        q=0xA9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7,
        h=1
    )
)

brainpool_512 = EllipticCurve(
    name=ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp512.value,
    a=0x7830A3318B603B89E2327145AC234CC594CBDD8D3DF91610A83441CAEA9863BC2DED5D5AA8253AA10A2EF1C98B9A
    b=0x3DF91610A83441CAEA9863BC2DED5D5AA8253AA10A2EF1C98B9AC8B57F1117A72BF2C7B9E7C1AC4D77FC94ADC08
    base=Point(
        x=0x81AEE4BDD82ED9645A21322E9C4C6A9385ED9F70B5D916C1B43B62EEF4D0098EFF3B1F78E2D0D48D50D1687E
```

```

        y=0x7DDE385D566332ECC0EABFA9CF7822FDF209F70024A57B1AA000C55B881F8111B2DCDE49A45F485E5BCA4BD8
    ),
    field=Field(
        p=0xAADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA703308717D4D9B009BC66842AECDA12A
        q=0xAADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA70330870553E5C414CA9261941866119
        h=1
    )
)

ELLIPTIC_CURVES_LIST = [brainpool_256, brainpool_512]

# function to retrieve a curve to work on
getCurve: Callable[[ELLIPTIC_CURVES], EllipticCurve] = lambda name : next(filter(lambda ec: ec.name

```

In [9]:

```

print(getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp256.value))
print(getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp512.value))
print(getCurve('brainpoolP256r1'))

EllipticCurve(a=56698187605326110043627228396178346077120614539475214109386828188763884139993, b=175
77232497321838841075697789794520262950426058923084567046852300633325438902, base=Point(x=63243729749
562333355292243550312970334778175571054726587095381623627144114786, y=382186150937535238931222779640
30810387585405539772602581557831887485717997975), field=Field(p=768849563970453442208097466290016490
93037950200943055203735601445031516197751, q=7688495639704534422080974662900164909273753178441452953
8755519063063536359079, h=1), inf=Point(x=0, y=0), name='brainpoolP256r1')
EllipticCurve(a=629486055797306322766642130647637932407471577062274622713691044545030191428127609802
7990968407983962691151853678563877834221834027439718238065725844264138, b=32457890083289670592748495
8434207791653190900963750191832832366873617917658326349646352512848828261155980077350697377179776481
1498834995234341530862286627, base=Point(x=679205914042457517443564043126919508784315339010252188146
8023012732047482579853077545647446272866794936371522410774532686582484617946013928874296844351522, y
=659224455524011287332474838142961034131271294032626633132744506668701054541525646109770748328865021
6992613090185042957716318301180159234788504307628509330), field=Field(p=8948962207650232551656602815
1591534221626096440983545113445971872000570104135524399179343041919569427654465303864273459379638943
09923928536070534607816947, q=8948962207650232551656602815159153422162609644098354511344597187200057
010413418528378981730643524959857451398370029280583094215613882043973354392115544169, h=1), inf=Poin
t(x=0, y=0), name='brainpoolP512r1')
EllipticCurve(a=56698187605326110043627228396178346077120614539475214109386828188763884139993, b=175
77232497321838841075697789794520262950426058923084567046852300633325438902, base=Point(x=63243729749
562333355292243550312970334778175571054726587095381623627144114786, y=382186150937535238931222779640
30810387585405539772602581557831887485717997975), field=Field(p=768849563970453442208097466290016490
93037950200943055203735601445031516197751, q=7688495639704534422080974662900164909273753178441452953
8755519063063536359079, h=1), inf=Point(x=0, y=0), name='brainpoolP256r1')

```

In [10]:

```

from typing import List
# common divisor functions -> for natural positive numbers
# returns list of divisors of number n
divs: Callable[[int], List[int]] = lambda n: [i for i in range(1, n + 1) if n % i == 0]

# interface: GCD and Bezout coefficients (x, y), so ax+by=gcd(a, b)
@dataclass
class GcdProps:
    gcd: int # prime modulus
    x: int # order of the base point
    y: int = 1

egcdStep: Callable[[int, int, GcdProps], GcdProps] = lambda a, b, g: \
    GcdProps(g.gcd, g.y-(b//a)*g.x, g.x)

# extended GCD euclidean algorithm
egcd: Callable[[int, int], GcdProps] = lambda a, b: \
    GcdProps(b, 0, 1) if a == 0 else \
    egcdStep(a, b, egcd(b%a, a))

# modular multiplicative inverse integer (a/b vs b/a); it is necessary to compute the slope f.ex.
# gcd(a, prime) = x*a + y*prime -> x is the inverse
multInvert: Callable[[EllipticCurve, int], int] = lambda ec, i: \
    0 if i==0 else \
    (ec.field.p - multInvert(ec, -i)) if i < 0 else \
    (lambda g=egcd(i, ec.field.p): None if g.gcd != 1 else g.x%ec.field.p)()

print(egcd(25, 100))
print(egcd(56, 63))
print(egcd(1308, 729))
#print(100000, multInvert(ec1, 100000))

```



```
GcdProps(gcd=25, x=1, y=0)
GcdProps(gcd=7, x=-1, y=1)
GcdProps(gcd=3, x=34, y=-61)
```

```
In [11]: # check if point is on curve [in the field Fp]
# y^2 % p = (x^3 + Ax + B) % p
isOnCurve: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point], bool] = lambda ec, p: \
    (p.y**2 - p.x**3 - ec.a*p.x - ec.b) % ec.field.p == 0

# point of infinnity check
isZero: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point], bool] = lambda ec, p: (p.y == ec.inf.y and p.x == ec.inf.x)

# invert the point (y axis)
invert: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point], Point] = lambda ec, p: \
    p if isZero(ec, p) else Point(p.x, (-p.y)%ec.field.p)

# check if two points are inverse
areInverse: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point, Point], bool] = lambda ec, p1, p2: \
    (p1 == invert(ec, p2))
```

```
In [12]: ec1 = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp256.value)
G = ec1.base
Gi = invert(ec1, G)

print(areInverse(ec1, G, Gi))
print(isOnCurve(ec1, G))
```

```
True
True
```

```
In [13]: # slope of the line crossing p1, p2 and inverse of result
# calculates appropriate formula w.r.t if points are on same coordinates
slope: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point, Point], int] = lambda ec, p1, p2: \
    ((p2.y-p1.y) * multInvert(ec, (p2.x-p1.x)) ) % ec.field.p if (p1 != p2) else \
    ec.inf if p1.y == 0 else \
    ((3*p1.x**2 + ec.a) * multInvert(ec, 2*p1.y)) % ec.field.p

sumPoints: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point, Point], Point] = lambda ec, p1, p2: \
    (lambda s=slope(ec, p1, p2): \
        (lambda xr=((s**2 - p1.x - p2.x) % ec.field.p): \
            Point(xr, (s * (p1.x-xr) - p1.y) % ec.field.p) \
                )())()

pointAddition: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point, Point], Point] = lambda ec, p1, p2: \
    p1 if isZero(ec, p2) else p2 if isZero(ec, p1) else \
    ec.inf if areInverse(ec, p1, p2) else \
    sumPoints(ec, p1, p2)

# point doubling
pointDouble: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point], Point] = lambda ec, p1: \
    pointAddition(ec, p1, p1)

print(pointDouble(ec1, G))
print(pointAddition(ec1, G, G))
```

```
Point(x=52575969560191351534542091466380106041028581718640875237441073011616025668110, y=24843789797
109572893402439557748964186754677981311543350228155441542769376468)
Point(x=52575969560191351534542091466380106041028581718640875237441073011616025668110, y=24843789797
109572893402439557748964186754677981311543350228155441542769376468)
```

4.4 Double and add algorithm

The **double-and-add** (DAA) algorithm computes fast multiplication of the point on the curve with a scalar. In the following steps, the cumulative multiplication as well as DAA will be implemented in order to compare their elapse time.

Furthermore, the **Montgomery ladder** approach to DAA computes the point multiplication in a fixed amount of time due to its property of performing the same amount of additions and doubles for any key of the same length[9]. This can prevent leveraging time or power-consumption measurements and their analysis in order to carry out a side-channel attack.

However, it was proven that through application of a **FLUSH+RELOAD** side-channel attack on OpenSSL - one of the most commonly used open-source cryptographic libraries which uses Montgomery ladder in ECDSA - the full private key can be

revealed at a very low cost[10].

4.4.1 Point multiplication with scalar implementations

A function to measure elapse time of function execution was prepared:

```
In [14]: import time

# returns result and execution time of the passed function as an array
elapsedTimeWithResult: Callable[[type(lambda x: None), ...], float] = lambda f, *args: \
    (lambda s=time.process_time(): [f(*args), time.process_time()-s])()

# returns execution time of the passed function
elapsedTime: Callable[[type(lambda x: None), ...], float] = lambda f, *args: \
    elapsedTimeWithResult(f, *args)[1]
```

At first standard multiplication - following scheme $nP = P + P + \dots + P$ ($n - times$) was implemented - in order to compare it with the double and add algorithm at later point.

```
In [15]: # normal multiplication n*P
def pointMultiplySlow(ec: EllipticCurve, p: Point, n: int):
    sum: Point = p
    for x in range(1, n):
        sum = pointAddition(ec, sum, p)
    return sum
```

A function to transform a given number into string of bits (MSB to LSB) and the DAA algorithm. The conversion of the number does not happen inside of the function in order to properly measure execution time of the algorithm itself.

TODO: make a horribly ugly lambda out of it.

```
In [16]: toBinary: Callable[[int], str] = lambda i: bin(i)[2:]

# standard double and add algorithm
def doubleAndAdd(ec: EllipticCurve, p: Point, bits: str) -> Point:
    sum = ec.inf # starting point: neutral element
    # from MSB to LSB
    for bit in bits:
        sum = pointDouble(ec, sum) # double
        if bit == '1':
            sum = pointAddition(ec, sum, p) # add
    return sum

# standard double and add
#doubleAndAdd: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point, int], Point] = lambda ec, p, n: \
#    (lambda sum=ec.inf, bits=toBinary(n): [(lambda bit=bit, partSum=pointDouble(ec, sum): \
#        pointAddition(ec1, partSum, p) if bit == '1' else partSum )() for bit in bits])()
```

```
In [17]: multSlow = pointMultiplySlow(ec1, G, 11)
multFast = doubleAndAdd(ec1, G, toBinary(11))

#print(multSlow == multFast)

reps = 89363

timeMultSlow = elapsedTime(pointMultiplySlow, ec1, G, reps)
print('Slow multiplication: ', timeMultSlow, 's')

timeMultFast = elapsedTime(doubleAndAdd, ec1, G, toBinary(reps))
print('Fast multiplication (double-add): ', timeMultFast, 's')

print('Difference (slow - fast): ', timeMultSlow - timeMultFast, 's')
```

```
Slow multiplication: 17.094601722 s
Fast multiplication (double-add): 0.004490628000002772 s
Difference (slow - fast): 17.090111093999997 s
```

```
In [18]: # Montgomery ladder double and add algorithm
def montgomeryDoubleAndAdd(ec: EllipticCurve, p: Point, bits: str) -> Point:
    r0 = ec.inf # sum register
```

```

    r1 = p # intermediate register
    # from MSB to LSB
    for bit in bits:
        if bit == '1':
            r0 = pointAddition(ec, r0, r1)
            r1 = pointDouble(ec, r1)
        else:
            r1 = pointAddition(ec, r0, r1)
            r0 = pointDouble(ec, r0)
    return r0

daaRes1 = doubleAndAdd(ec1, G, toBinary(11))
m1Res1 = montgomeryDoubleAndAdd(ec1, G, toBinary(11))
#print(daaRes1)
#print(m1Res1)
print(daaRes1 == m1Res1)

```

True

In [35]:

```

# short hand notation for base point of the curve

# slow multiply
slowMultiplyBase: Callable[[EllipticCurve, int], Point] = lambda ec, n: pointMultiplySlow(ec, ec.base, n)

# double and add
doubleAndAddBase: Callable[[EllipticCurve, str], Point] = lambda ec, bits: doubleAndAdd(ec, ec.base, bits)

# montgomery ladder is the default algorithm for multiplication
pointMultiplication: Callable[[EllipticCurve, str], Point] = lambda ec, bits: montgomeryDoubleAndAdd(ec, ec.base, bits)

# montgomery ladder is the default algorithm for multiplication
anyPointsMultiplication: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point, str], Point] = lambda ec, p, bits: montgomeryDoubleAndAdd(ec, p, bits)

# point multiplication (montgomery ladder) with conversion to binary included
pointMultiplyWithInt: Callable[[EllipticCurve, int], Point] = lambda ec, n: montgomeryDoubleAndAdd(ec, ec.base, toBinary(n))

```

4.4.2 Performance measurements

Functions to generate measurements of the performance of both - standard and Montgomery Ladder - algorithms with regard to the timing of their execution time.

The tests were performed on two Brainpool curves (`brainpoolP256r1` and `brainpoolP512r1`) for 3 datasets, each being a list containing 30 prime numbers in different value ranges, so each set would result in elements with fixed - but diverse between each others - number of bits.

In [36]:

```

import pandas as pd
import numpy as np

# class for calculating common statistics results from any list
@dataclass
class MeasurementsProps:
    data: list
    name: str = 'undefined'
    standardDeviation: float = field(init=False)
    mean: float = field(init=False)
    variance: float = field(init=False)
    median: float = field(init=False)
    max: float = field(init=False)
    min: float = field(init=False)
    def __post_init__(self):
        self.standardDeviation = np.std(self.data)
        self.mean = np.mean(self.data)
        self.variance = np.var(self.data)
        self.median = np.median(self.data)
        self.max = np.amax(self.data)
        self.min = np.amin(self.data)
    def __str__(self):
        return f'- {self.name} {"".join(["-" for _ in range(80-len(self.name))])} \n\tstandard dev

```

In [37]:

```

def measureDoubleAndAdd(ec: EllipticCurve, scalars: List):
    dataTitleMult = 'Multiplicant'

```

```

dataTitleMultBin = 'Multiplicant (bin)'
dataTitleMLTime = 'Montgomery Ladder time'
dataTitleDaaTime = 'Standard DAA time'
dataTitleResultEq = 'Results equal'
# array for data collection
data = {
    dataTitleMult: [],
    dataTitleMultBin: [],
    dataTitleMLTime: [],
    dataTitleDaaTime: [],
    dataTitleResultEq: []
}

for r in scalars:
    rBin = toBinary(r)
    daa = elapseTimeWithResult(doubleAndAddBase, ec, rBin)
    ml = elapseTimeWithResult(pointMultiplication, ec, rBin)
    # save data
    data[dataTitleMult].append(r)
    data[dataTitleMultBin].append(rBin)
    data[dataTitleMLTime].append(ml[1])
    data[dataTitleDaaTime].append(daa[1])
    data[dataTitleResultEq].append(daa[0] == ml[0])

# pandas data frame for pretty print table
pd.set_option('display.width', 140)
df = pd.DataFrame(data)
# results computation
mlMeasurementsResults = MeasurementsProps(
    name = 'Montgomery Ladder Timing',
    data = data[dataTitleMLTime]
)
daaMeasurementsResults = MeasurementsProps(
    name = 'Standard Double-and-add Timing',
    data = data[dataTitleDaaTime]
)

dashes = ''.join( ["=" for _ in range(40-len(ec.name)//2)] )
print(dashes, 'Curve: ', ec.name, ', samples bit size: ', len(toBinary(scalars[0])), dashes)
print(mlMeasurementsResults)
print(daaMeasurementsResults)
print(df)
print()

# data samples: 30 primes from different bit-length ranges
primes1 = [
    11731, 11743, 11777, 11779, 11783, 11789, 11801, 11807, 11813, 11821,
    11827, 11831, 11833, 11839, 11863, 11867, 11887, 11897, 11903, 11909,
    11923, 11927, 11933, 11939, 11941, 11953, 11959, 11969, 11971, 11981
]

primes2 = [
    284059, 284083, 284093, 284111, 284117, 284129, 284131, 284149, 284153, 284159,
    284161, 284173, 284191, 284201, 284227, 284231, 284233, 284237, 284243, 284261,
    284267, 284269, 284293, 284311, 284341, 284357, 284369, 284377, 284387, 284407
]

primes3 = [
    14837491, 14837503, 14837513, 14837519, 14837527, 14837533, 14837539, 14837551, 14837587, 148375
    14837593, 14837609, 14837653, 14837657, 14837663, 14837677, 14837681, 14837687, 14837707, 148377
    14837743, 14837789, 14837807, 14837839, 14837857, 14837861, 14837873, 14837891, 14837897, 148378
]

ecBp256 = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp256.value)
ecBp512 = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp512.value)

measureDoubleAndAdd(ecBp256, primes1)
measureDoubleAndAdd(ecBp512, primes1)
measureDoubleAndAdd(ecBp256, primes2)
measureDoubleAndAdd(ecBp512, primes2)
measureDoubleAndAdd(ecBp256, primes3)
measureDoubleAndAdd(ecBp512, primes3)

```

```

===== Curve:  brainpoolP256r1 , samples bit size:  14 =====
=====

```

- Montgomery Ladder Timing -----
 standard deviation: 0.0007860222000046378
 variance: 6.178308989001308e-07
 arithmetic mean: 0.00510775866666601
 median: 0.004651086000006188
 maximum: 0.007175843999995379
 minimum: 0.004564157000004343

- Standard Double-and-add Timing -----
 standard deviation: 0.0006034981624561635
 variance: 3.642100320879659e-07
 arithmetic mean: 0.0037977051333342613
 median: 0.003578678499998489
 maximum: 0.0062158460000034665
 minimum: 0.0031908280000010336

	Multiplicant	Multiplicant (bin)	Montgomery Ladder time	Standard DAA time	Results equal
0	11731	10110111010011	0.006233	0.005081	True
1	11743	10110111011111	0.007176	0.006216	True
2	11777	10111000000001	0.006902	0.004003	True
3	11779	10111000000011	0.006416	0.004246	True
4	11783	10111000000111	0.005984	0.004175	True
5	11789	10111000001101	0.006105	0.004134	True
6	11801	10111000011001	0.005008	0.003713	True
7	11807	10111000011111	0.004886	0.003790	True
8	11813	10111000100101	0.004848	0.003424	True
9	11821	10111000101101	0.004755	0.003562	True
10	11827	10111000110011	0.004649	0.003382	True
11	11831	10111000110111	0.004602	0.003524	True
12	11833	10111000111001	0.004625	0.003309	True
13	11839	10111000111111	0.004784	0.003683	True
14	11863	10111001010111	0.004995	0.003586	True
15	11867	10111001011011	0.004957	0.003899	True
16	11887	10111001101111	0.004595	0.003960	True
17	11897	10111001111001	0.004569	0.003571	True
18	11903	10111001111111	0.004568	0.003842	True
19	11909	10111010000101	0.004626	0.003255	True
20	11923	10111010010011	0.004607	0.003384	True
21	11927	10111010010111	0.004635	0.003569	True
22	11933	10111010011101	0.004603	0.003545	True
23	11939	10111010100011	0.004581	0.003350	True
24	11941	10111010100101	0.004564	0.003321	True
25	11953	10111010110001	0.006477	0.004507	True
26	11959	10111010110111	0.004653	0.003762	True
27	11969	10111011000001	0.004621	0.003191	True
28	11971	10111011000011	0.004578	0.003416	True
29	11981	10111011001101	0.004628	0.003531	True

===== Curve: brainpoolP512r1 , samples bit size: 14 =====
 =====

- Montgomery Ladder Timing -----
 standard deviation: 0.0008966889252673449
 variance: 8.040510286971061e-07
 arithmetic mean: 0.011110553500000009
 median: 0.010847151499998375
 maximum: 0.014085552999993922
 minimum: 0.009956111000001044

- Standard Double-and-add Timing -----
 standard deviation: 0.0010359271446680844
 variance: 1.0731450490601702e-06
 arithmetic mean: 0.008396928300000184
 median: 0.008230667999999497
 maximum: 0.010651060000000712
 minimum: 0.006423644000001616

	Multiplicant	Multiplicant (bin)	Montgomery Ladder time	Standard DAA time	Results equal
0	11731	10110111010011	0.010265	0.008684	True
1	11743	10110111011111	0.010549	0.009734	True
2	11777	10111000000001	0.009956	0.006424	True
3	11779	10111000000011	0.010500	0.006647	True
4	11783	10111000000111	0.010958	0.007349	True
5	11789	10111000001101	0.010453	0.007410	True
6	11801	10111000011001	0.011157	0.007510	True
7	11807	10111000011111	0.010621	0.008290	True
8	11813	10111000100101	0.010847	0.007318	True
9	11821	10111000101101	0.011088	0.008171	True

10	11827	10111000110011	0.010847	0.007890	True
11	11831	10111000110111	0.011205	0.008648	True
12	11833	10111000111001	0.010789	0.008402	True
13	11839	10111000111111	0.011174	0.010095	True
14	11863	10111001010111	0.011705	0.008427	True
15	11867	10111001011011	0.012407	0.009122	True
16	11887	10111001101111	0.011783	0.010035	True
17	11897	10111001111001	0.010577	0.008745	True
18	11903	10111001111111	0.010800	0.008854	True
19	11909	10111010000101	0.010666	0.007541	True
20	11923	10111010010011	0.010281	0.007662	True
21	11927	10111010010111	0.010342	0.007977	True
22	11933	10111010011101	0.010127	0.007896	True
23	11939	10111010100011	0.010252	0.007570	True
24	11941	10111010100101	0.011448	0.008023	True
25	11953	10111010110001	0.011616	0.008007	True
26	11959	10111010110111	0.012208	0.009508	True
27	11969	10111011000001	0.013050	0.009227	True
28	11971	10111011000011	0.014086	0.010089	True
29	11981	10111011001101	0.011561	0.010651	True

===== Curve: brainpoolP256r1 , samples bit size: 19 =====

- Montgomery Ladder Timing -----
standard deviation: 0.000314967117635537
variance: 9.920428519163818e-08
arithmetic mean: 0.006785067099999746
median: 0.0067346269999996607
maximum: 0.0075992989999998894
minimum: 0.0063335160000050905

- Standard Double-and-add Timing -----
standard deviation: 0.000440120717298964
variance: 1.9370624579575457e-07
arithmetic mean: 0.0050208886666657316
median: 0.0050155079999999613
maximum: 0.0058617299999999454
minimum: 0.0042355229999998409

	Multiplicant	Multiplicant (bin)	Montgomery Ladder time	Standard DAA time	Results equal
0	284059	1000101010110011011	0.007599	0.005599	True
1	284083	1000101010110110011	0.006894	0.005726	True
2	284093	1000101010110111101	0.007087	0.005119	True
3	284111	1000101010111001111	0.006428	0.004890	True
4	284117	1000101010111010101	0.006334	0.004990	True
5	284129	1000101010111100001	0.006825	0.004654	True
6	284131	1000101010111100011	0.006497	0.004711	True
7	284149	1000101010111110101	0.006370	0.005196	True
8	284153	1000101010111111001	0.006650	0.005162	True
9	284159	1000101010111111111	0.006849	0.005244	True
10	284161	1000101011000000001	0.006474	0.004236	True
11	284173	1000101011000001101	0.006605	0.004713	True
12	284191	1000101011000011111	0.006792	0.004774	True
13	284201	1000101011000101001	0.006520	0.004561	True
14	284227	1000101011001000011	0.006592	0.004694	True
15	284231	1000101011001000111	0.006652	0.004566	True
16	284233	1000101011001001001	0.006369	0.004482	True
17	284237	1000101011001001101	0.006603	0.004730	True
18	284243	1000101011001010011	0.007096	0.005041	True
19	284261	1000101011001100101	0.006943	0.004726	True
20	284267	1000101011001101011	0.006530	0.005485	True
21	284269	1000101011001101101	0.006776	0.005754	True
22	284293	1000101011010000101	0.006694	0.004360	True
23	284311	1000101011010010111	0.007455	0.005043	True
24	284341	1000101011010110101	0.006830	0.005494	True
25	284357	1000101011011000101	0.007067	0.005072	True
26	284369	1000101011011010001	0.006970	0.004728	True
27	284377	1000101011011011001	0.006665	0.005210	True
28	284387	1000101011011100011	0.007068	0.005862	True
29	284407	1000101011011110111	0.007319	0.005806	True

===== Curve: brainpoolP512r1 , samples bit size: 19 =====

- Montgomery Ladder Timing -----
standard deviation: 0.0015347327211566943
variance: 2.355404525389032e-06
arithmetic mean: 0.0148430369999998798

median: 0.014206681500002816
maximum: 0.019360505999998168
minimum: 0.013165112999999451

- Standard Double-and-add Timing -----

standard deviation: 0.0014658536476877435
variance: 2.1487269164394632e-06
arithmetic mean: 0.0108219373333246
median: 0.010357449500006055
maximum: 0.016420027999998865
minimum: 0.008657729999995922

	Multiplicant	Multiplicant (bin)	Montgomery Ladder time	Standard DAA time	Results equal
0	284059	1000101010110011011	0.017748	0.012831	True
1	284083	1000101010110110011	0.019361	0.012606	True
2	284093	1000101010110111101	0.017115	0.012993	True
3	284111	1000101010111001111	0.018508	0.016420	True
4	284117	1000101010111010101	0.014397	0.010718	True
5	284129	1000101010111100001	0.013920	0.010167	True
6	284131	1000101010111100011	0.014104	0.010099	True
7	284149	1000101010111110101	0.014348	0.011076	True
8	284153	1000101010111111001	0.013973	0.010522	True
9	284159	1000101010111111111	0.014072	0.012231	True
10	284161	1000101011000000001	0.013859	0.008658	True
11	284173	1000101011000001101	0.013920	0.009972	True
12	284191	1000101011000011111	0.013881	0.010517	True
13	284201	1000101011000101001	0.014418	0.010284	True
14	284227	1000101011001000011	0.014305	0.009302	True
15	284231	1000101011001000111	0.015618	0.009902	True
16	284233	1000101011001001001	0.016012	0.010260	True
17	284237	1000101011001001101	0.016873	0.012072	True
18	284243	1000101011001010011	0.015456	0.011959	True
19	284261	1000101011001100101	0.014519	0.010260	True
20	284267	1000101011001101011	0.014364	0.010434	True
21	284269	1000101011001101101	0.014332	0.010235	True
22	284293	1000101011010000101	0.013670	0.009653	True
23	284311	1000101011010010111	0.013850	0.010431	True
24	284341	1000101011010110101	0.013641	0.010071	True
25	284357	1000101011011000101	0.014052	0.009990	True
26	284369	1000101011011010001	0.013165	0.009807	True
27	284377	1000101011011011001	0.013834	0.010503	True
28	284387	1000101011011100011	0.013869	0.009715	True
29	284407	1000101011011110111	0.014108	0.010971	True

===== Curve: brainpoolP256r1 , samples bit size: 24 =====
=====

- Montgomery Ladder Timing -----

standard deviation: 0.00084639611939219
variance: 7.163863909221582e-07
arithmetic mean: 0.009032804700000223
median: 0.008743536999997303
maximum: 0.011602218000000164
minimum: 0.00816728400000244

- Standard Double-and-add Timing -----

standard deviation: 0.0009148482496189037
variance: 8.369473198307719e-07
arithmetic mean: 0.006736056166666534
median: 0.006380538500000199
maximum: 0.008874547999999432
minimum: 0.005548488000002294

	Multiplicant	Multiplicant (bin)	Montgomery Ladder time	Standard DAA time	Results equal
0	14837491	111000100110011011110011	0.008955	0.007599	True
1	14837503	1110001001100110111111111	0.009180	0.008657	True
2	14837513	111000100110011100001001	0.009699	0.008875	True
3	14837519	111000100110011100001111	0.010875	0.008696	True
4	14837527	111000100110011100010111	0.011602	0.008000	True
5	14837533	111000100110011100011101	0.010298	0.008125	True
6	14837539	111000100110011100100011	0.009153	0.006853	True
7	14837551	111000100110011100101111	0.008783	0.006634	True
8	14837587	111000100110011101010011	0.008364	0.006155	True
9	14837591	111000100110011101010111	0.008167	0.006218	True
10	14837593	111000100110011101011001	0.008413	0.006358	True
11	14837609	111000100110011101101001	0.008285	0.006178	True
12	14837653	111000100110011110010101	0.008622	0.006123	True
13	14837657	111000100110011110011001	0.008891	0.006329	True

14	14837663	111000100110011110011111	0.008557	0.006501	True
15	14837677	111000100110011110101101	0.008788	0.006348	True
16	14837681	111000100110011110110001	0.008365	0.006086	True
17	14837687	111000100110011110110111	0.009899	0.006403	True
18	14837707	111000100110011111001011	0.008416	0.007052	True
19	14837723	111000100110011111011011	0.008345	0.006562	True
20	14837743	111000100110011111101111	0.008287	0.007424	True
21	14837789	111000100110100000011101	0.008330	0.005974	True
22	14837807	111000100110100000101111	0.008315	0.006007	True
23	14837839	111000100110100001001111	0.008705	0.005775	True
24	14837857	111000100110100001100001	0.008386	0.005548	True
25	14837861	111000100110100001100101	0.008423	0.005587	True
26	14837873	111000100110100001110001	0.009276	0.005926	True
27	14837891	111000100110100010000011	0.010014	0.006284	True
28	14837897	111000100110100010001001	0.009673	0.006705	True
29	14837899	111000100110100010001011	0.009919	0.007100	True

===== Curve: brainpoolP512r1 , samples bit size: 24 =====
=====

- Montgomery Ladder Timing -----
standard deviation: 0.0027253905156750594
variance: 7.427753462931566e-06
arithmetic mean: 0.019334427799999315
median: 0.018336880999996197
maximum: 0.03005349999999396
minimum: 0.017872714999995765
- Standard Double-and-add Timing -----
standard deviation: 0.0018244703527386312
variance: 3.3286920680222253e-06
arithmetic mean: 0.014076661933332938
median: 0.013845650500002193
maximum: 0.02169620600000144
minimum: 0.012234827999996867

	Multiplicant	Multiplicant (bin)	Montgomery Ladder time	Standard DAA time	Results equal
0	14837491	111000100110011011110011	0.020438	0.018391	True
1	14837503	111000100110011011111111	0.018371	0.015647	True
2	14837513	111000100110011100001001	0.018250	0.013165	True
3	14837519	111000100110011100001111	0.018264	0.013903	True
4	14837527	111000100110011100010111	0.018322	0.013869	True
5	14837533	111000100110011100011101	0.018295	0.013823	True
6	14837539	111000100110011100100011	0.018826	0.013965	True
7	14837551	111000100110011100101111	0.018096	0.013789	True
8	14837587	111000100110011101010011	0.021999	0.014157	True
9	14837591	111000100110011101010111	0.019804	0.014383	True
10	14837593	111000100110011101011001	0.027936	0.021696	True
11	14837609	111000100110011101101001	0.019070	0.014330	True
12	14837653	111000100110011110010101	0.018418	0.013691	True
13	14837657	111000100110011110011001	0.018256	0.013661	True
14	14837663	111000100110011110011111	0.018300	0.014073	True
15	14837677	111000100110011110101101	0.017873	0.013546	True
16	14837681	111000100110011110110001	0.017882	0.013222	True
17	14837687	111000100110011110110111	0.017940	0.013931	True
18	14837707	111000100110011111001011	0.018072	0.013575	True
19	14837723	111000100110011111011011	0.018310	0.014256	True
20	14837743	111000100110011111101111	0.018674	0.014695	True
21	14837789	111000100110100000011101	0.019338	0.012803	True
22	14837807	111000100110100000101111	0.030053	0.014758	True
23	14837839	111000100110100001001111	0.019105	0.013989	True
24	14837857	111000100110100001100001	0.018214	0.012290	True
25	14837861	111000100110100001100101	0.018338	0.012569	True
26	14837873	111000100110100001110001	0.018564	0.012435	True
27	14837891	111000100110100010000011	0.018336	0.012235	True
28	14837897	111000100110100010001001	0.018320	0.012420	True
29	14837899	111000100110100010001011	0.018371	0.013034	True

The timing analysis showed that the Montgomery ladder was mostly slower than the standard Double-and-add algorithm, which was expected. As well the standard deviation was lower in case of the Montgomery ladder version, pointing to more time-invariant results.

Both algorithms always yielded the same result of the multiplication.

4.5 ECDH: Implementation of key manager model

A simple key management model was implemented as a dataclass which holds an id of the user, the owner's public-private key pair and a list of shared keys (object consisting of an id of another user and calculated with)

```
In [38]: @dataclass
class KeyPair:
    public: Point
    private: int

@dataclass
class SharedKey:
    key: Point
    sharedWith: str
    def __str__(self):
        return f'shared with: {self.sharedWith}, key: {self.key}\n'

@dataclass
class KeyManager:
    ownKeys: KeyPair
    shared: list # list of shared keys
    size: int
    id: str = ''
    def __str__(self):
        return f'--- KEY MANAGER ---\nowner: {self.id} \nkeys size: {self.size} \npublic key: {self.ownKeys.public}\nprivate key: {self.ownKeys.private}'
```

```
In [39]: # ECDH helper functions algorithm
import secrets

#def generateKeyPair(curve: EllipticCurve) -> KeyPair:
#    priv = secrets.randbelow(curve.field.p) # large random number below prime modulus of the field
#    pub = pointMultiplication(curve, toBinary(priv))
#    return KeyPair(public=pub, private=priv)

#def getCurveForKeySize(size: int):
#    if (size == 256):
#        curve = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp256.value)
#    elif (size == 512):
#        curve = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp512.value)
#    else:
#        raise ValueError('Invalid key size; pick 256 or 512.')

generatePrivateKey: Callable[[EllipticCurve], int] = lambda ec: secrets.randbelow(ec.field.p)

generatePublicKeyFromPrivate: Callable[[EllipticCurve, Point], int] = lambda ec, priv: pointMultiplication(ec, toBinary(priv))

generateKeyPair: Callable[[EllipticCurve], KeyPair] = lambda ec: (lambda priv=generatePrivateKey(ec)
    KeyPair(public=pointMultiplication(ec, toBinary(priv)), private=priv))()

getCurveForKeySize: Callable[[int], EllipticCurve] = lambda size: \
    getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp256.value) if size == 256 else \
    getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp512.value) if size == 512 else None

getSharedKey: Callable[[EllipticCurve, int, Point, id], SharedKey] = lambda ec, a_priv, b_pub, b_id:
    SharedKey(anyPointsMultiplication(ec, b_pub, toBinary(a_priv)), b_id)
```

```
In [40]: @dataclass
class EcdhReturn:
    a: KeyManager
    b: KeyManager

# function to generate two key pairs and calculate the shared key between them
# the shared key is calculated twice in order to verify that the results are equal.
def ecdhWithKeyGen(size: int, aId: str, bId: str) -> EcdhReturn:
    curve = getCurveForKeySize(size)
    if (curve is None): raise ValueError('Invalid key size; pick 256 or 512.')
    keysA = generateKeyPair(curve)
    keysB = generateKeyPair(curve)

    sharedForA = SharedKey(anyPointsMultiplication(curve, keysB.public, toBinary(keysA.private)), bId)
    sharedForB = SharedKey(anyPointsMultiplication(curve, keysA.public, toBinary(keysB.private)), aId)

    return EcdhReturn(
        a=KeyManager(id=aId, size=size, ownKeys=keysA, shared=[sharedForA]),
        b=KeyManager(id=bId, size=size, ownKeys=keysB, shared=[sharedForB])
    )
```

```

    )

# check

a_id = 'a-key-1'
b_id = 'b-key-1'

keys = ecdhWithKeyGen(256, a_id, b_id)

print(keys.a)
print(keys.b)

--- KEY MANAGER ---
owner: a-key-1
keys size: 256
public key: Point(x=30147845480387316664590173668972599713641593001161892243164578955697811163956, y
=18579093336557627948350120480783910023670728942758285303145369911438274298304)
private: 53360736277887011372413080047871898999252547535204416264842619042661055031748
shared keys:
  # shared with: b-key-1, key: Point(x=2363092856192500083087414066610041142546825771410035077612332
7485697861860049, y=29390823033769028004872656780348228363242438282190853669498797171026299961170)

--- KEY MANAGER ---
owner: b-key-1
keys size: 256
public key: Point(x=70517931307624186814125767378483331378282109296193646495459520518596538595182, y
=15469011552379737556583258967269706297482650692187077345872026342494344553855)
private: 49757647874544693904937988996843043236537964401698010887024841177116351918467
shared keys:
  # shared with: a-key-1, key: Point(x=2363092856192500083087414066610041142546825771410035077612332
7485697861860049, y=29390823033769028004872656780348228363242438282190853669498797171026299961170)

```

ECDH: Brainpool Test Vectors

The data of officially published [\[11\]](#) test vectors of Brainpool curves was collected for keys with length of 256 and 512 bit. Followingly, the functions to compute the public key from the private one, as well as the shared key calculation were tested.

In [44]:

```

@dataclass
class BrainpoolTestVector():
    a: KeyPair
    b: KeyPair
    sh: SharedKey

def getBrainpoolTestVector(a_priv: int, a_x: int, a_y: int, b_priv: int, b_x: int, b_y: int, sh_x: int, sh_y: int):
    return BrainpoolTestVector(
        a=KeyPair(
            public=Point(
                x=a_x,
                y=a_y
            ),
            private=a_priv
        ),
        b=KeyPair(
            public=Point(
                x=b_x,
                y=b_y
            ),
            private=b_priv
        ),
        sh=SharedKey(
            key=Point(
                x=sh_x,
                y=sh_y
            ),
            sharedWith='test-vector'
        )
    )

bp256_testVector = getBrainpoolTestVector(
    a_x=0x78028496B5ECAAB3C8B6C12E45DB1E02C9E4D26B4113BC4F015F60C5CCC0D206,
    a_y=0xA2AE1762A3831C1D20F03F8D1E3C0C39AFE6F09B4D44BBE80CD100987B05F92B,
    a_priv=0x041EB8B1E2BC681BCE8E39963B2E9FC415B05283313DD1A8BCC055F11AE49699,
    b_x=0x8E07E219BA588916C5B06AA30A2F464C2F2ACFC1610A3BE2FB240B635341F0DB,
    b_y=0x148EA1D7D1E7E54B9555B6C9AC90629C18B63BEE5D7AA6949EBBF47B24FDE40D,

```

```

b_priv=0x06F5240EACDB9837BC96D48274C8AA834B6C87BA9CC3EEDD81F99A16B8D804D3,
sh_x=0x05E940915549E9F6A4A75693716E37466ABA79B4BF2919877A16DD2CC2E23708,
sh_y=0x06BC23B6702BC5A019438CEE107DAAD8B94232FFBBC350F3B137628FE6FD134C
)

bp512_testVector = getBrainpoolTestVector(
a_x=0x0A420517E406AAC0ACDCE90FCD71487718D3B953EFD7FBEC5F7F27E28C6149999397E91E029E06457DB2D3E64C
a_y=0x72E6882E8DB28AAD36237CD25D580DB23783961C8DC52DFA2EC138AD472A0FCECF3887CF62B623B2A87DE5C5883
a_priv=0x16302FF0DBBB5A8D733DAB7141C1B45ACBC8715939677F6A56850A38BD87BD59B09E80279609FF333EB9D4C
b_x=0x9D45F66DE5D67E2E6DB6E93A59CE0BB48106097FF78A081DE781CDB31FCE8CCBAEA8DD4320C4119F1E9CD437A
b_y=0x2FDC313095BCDD5FB3A91636F07A959C8E86B5636A1E930E8396049CB481961D365CC11453A06C719835475B12
b_priv=0x230E18E1BCC88A362FA54E4EA3902009292F7F8033624FD471B5D8ACE49D12CFABBC19963DAB8E2F1EBA00E
sh_x=0xA7927098655F1F9976FA50A9D566865DC530331846381C87256BAF3226244B76D36403C024D7BBF0AA0803EAF
sh_y=0x7DB71C3DEF63212841C463E881BDCF055523BD368240E6C3143BD8DEF8B3B3223B95E0F53082FF5E412F42225
)

```

In [48]:

```

import unittest

class TestEcdh(unittest.TestCase):

    def testPublicKeys(self):
        bp256 = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp256.value)
        bp512 = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp512.value)

        keyA_256 = generatePublicKeyFromPrivate(bp256, bp256_testVector.a.private)
        keyA_512 = generatePublicKeyFromPrivate(bp512, bp512_testVector.a.private)

        keyB_256 = generatePublicKeyFromPrivate(bp256, bp256_testVector.b.private)
        keyB_512 = generatePublicKeyFromPrivate(bp512, bp512_testVector.b.private)

        self.assertEqual(keyA_256, bp256_testVector.a.public)
        self.assertEqual(keyA_512, bp512_testVector.a.public)
        self.assertEqual(keyB_256, bp256_testVector.b.public)
        self.assertEqual(keyB_512, bp512_testVector.b.public)

    def testSharedKey(self):
        bp256 = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp256.value)
        bp512 = getCurve(ELLIPTIC_CURVES.bp512.value)
        sharedKey256 = getSharedKey(bp256, bp256_testVector.a.private, bp256_testVector.b.public, 't')
        sharedKey512 = getSharedKey(bp512, bp512_testVector.a.private, bp512_testVector.b.public, 't')
        self.assertEqual(sharedKey256.key, bp256_testVector.sh.key)
        self.assertEqual(sharedKey512.key, bp512_testVector.sh.key)

unittest.main(argv=[''], verbosity=5, exit=False)

```

```

testPublicKeys (__main__.TestEcdh) ... ok
testSharedKey (__main__.TestEcdh) ... ok

```

```

-----
Ran 2 tests in 1.503s

```

```
OK
```

Out[48]: <unittest.main.TestProgram at 0x7f7937461460>

References

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Other resources:

Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Technical Guideline BSI TR-03111, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2018, online-access: https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/TechGuidelines/TR03111/BSI-TR-03111_V-2-1_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1

Buchanan B., *Barebones P256: There Is Beauty in Elliptic Curves*, 2020, online-access: <https://billatnapier.medium.com/barebones-p256-1700ff5a4>

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