## **RSA-CRT Fault Attack**

Let (e,N) be the RSA public key and  $(p,q,|d|_p,|d|_q,|q^{-1}|_p)$  the RSA private key for use with Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Furthermore, assume that the signer produced a faulty signature f, whereby the fault affected only the partial signature modulo p (i.e.  $s_1$  according to the RFC), and later discovered that the signature was invalid and recomputed the signature s, this time without errors.

We know from PKCS #1 that there exist  $s_1, s_2$  s.t.  $s = s_2 + q \cdot \left| (s_1 - s_2) \cdot |q^{-1}|_p \right|_p$  and similarly some  $f_1$  exists s.t.  $f = s_2 + q \cdot \left| (f_1 - s_2) \cdot |q^{-1}|_p \right|_p$ .

From that follows that  $s-f=q\cdot \left|(s_1-f_1)\cdot |q^{-1}|_p\right|_p$ , which means q divides s-f.

Since q is prime, it follows that  $q = \gcd(s - f, N)$ .

## **References:**

• <a href="https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/faults.html">https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/faults.html</a>

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