Digitalization: Reliablity-Availability-Security

Digitalization: Critical Enablers

Key Parameters

Reliability

Availability

Security

Power Outages & Uptime Challenges

Reduction of Downtime – Technical measures

RELIABILITY MEASURES

- Scalability
- Futuristic Approach
- Predictive Maintainence

AVAILABILITY MEASURES

- Redundant Architecture
- Lightning Protection
- Modularity

SECURITY MEASURES

- Trends
- Standard

An Open System for Limitless Automation



- Implementation and acceptability of developer friendly language such as C, C++, Python, Json
- Openness of IEC protocols such as OPC UA, Profinet, Modbus, Profibus, DNP, IEC 60870-5-104 etc.
- Support Cloud/IT Functions like MQTT, SQL, SNMP, Rest API for Digitalization
- Scalable and Future oriented

Digitalization: **Reliability**, Availability and Security

Predictive Maintenance



- Asset Health Tracking
- Timely Maintenance
- Demand Management
- Lower Outages

Power Outages & Uptime Challenges

Reduction of Downtime – Technical measures

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- Trends
- Standard

Digitalization: Reliability, **Availability** and Security

Redundancy & Protection meets Modularity

Redundancy

Surge Protection

Modularity

Redundant Protection Architecture

- Reundant Protection for Sensitive Equipment
- Eliminate Failure of relay
- Ensure Safe Operations

Ring Network

Redundant Relay

Breaker

Digitalization: Reliability, **Availability** and Security

Power Redundancy



QUINT POWER power supply

QUINT S-ORING redundancy module

Surge protection PLUGTRAB-SEC

Electronic circuit breaker PTCB

Digitalization: Reliability, **Availability** and Security

Network Redundancy



Industrial Ethernet Switch

- Managed and Unmanaged Switch
- IEC 61850 Complaint Switches
- HSR/PRP switches for Industrial Redundancy

Lightning Resilience

- Avoiding unplanned system failures and downtime
- Protection against risks include lightning and surge hazards that cause fires, outages and data loss

Solution:

- Supply concepts consisting of power supply in UPS systems, device protection and surge protection.
- Holistic and suitable protection zone concept and consideration of protective measures according to IEC

Digitalization: Reliability, **Availability** and Security

Lightning Protection

Surge protection for power supply
From the feed-in to the end device, our protective devices for power supply of type 1, type 2 and type 3 protect you against defects from lightning currents and overvoltage.

Type 1/2

Type 1+2

Type 2

Type 3

Digitalization: Reliability, **Availability** and Security

Holistic solutions with Modular Solutions

Smart Services



Protect Power Data

Power Outages & Uptime Challenges

Reduction of Downtime – Technical measures

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SECURITY MEASURES

- Trends
- Standard

CYBER SECURITY

Cyber Attacks across Globe



- Red ECHO- March 2021
- REDFROXTROCT- 2021
- TAG-38 April 2022



Cyber Attacks across Globe

Cyber crime cases go from 25 to 155 in two months

Action follows suspension of a woman PI from Kasturba Marg police station for not registering one

FAIZAN KHAN
faizan.khan@mid-day.com

At Andheri police station alone, around 41 FIRs were registered against cyber crimes. PIC/ISTOCK

THE suspension of a police inspector for not registering a cyber crime spurred police across the city to register around 155 of the cases in past two months. Before the departmental action, the Mumbai police had registered only 25 cases. The statistics about online FIR details in past two months (May 1 to June 30) that were accessed by mid-day from Maharashtra police's online FIR facility, also suggest that few police stations have been updating the records in Mumbai. The figures will go up if every police station updates the system on a daily basis.

During the first week of March this year a woman approached Kasturba Marg police to register an FIR regarding a debit card related fraud. When there was no response, the complainant reached out to the Joint Commissioner (law and order), who suspended PSI Varsha Gavit who was the duty officer. She had allegedly kept the complaint letter with her for two months instead of forwarding it to the concerned officer.

"Cyber fraud needs to be addressed with extreme seriousness and should always be taken as a challenge. Most police stations don't register FIRs in cyber crimes as it requires expertise and skill to crack the cases, which sometimes takes a lot of effort and time. In Mumbai the police are burdened with festivals, patrolling, action against traffic violators etc. But cyber crimes need to be addressed separately, because in future they are going to escalate and emerge as a big challenge," a senior IPS officer told mid-day.

After the PSI's suspension, at Andheri police station alone, around 41 FIRs were registered in past two months.

Vinay Choubey, Jt Commissioner (law and order) said they are registering cyber crimes on priority. "We have been getting several complaints from citizens regarding cyber fraud. Complaints are also made to us on Twitter. We have also been doing several initiatives for awareness so that people understand they should not share sensitive information."

"It's good to know that more and more FIRs are being registered, because earlier it would take months to get an FIR registered. This way cops can make the public aware of trending cyber crimes. Cyber criminals are adopting new methods of committing fraud and citizens should know them so that they are well equipped to protect themselves. Many people are not yet aware of the modus operandi behind frauds on matrimonial sites, digital wallets, etc. It's extremely important that cyber cops not only register the FIRs but also inform the public about cyber crimes," said Ritesh Bhatia, a cyber crime investigator.

India's No 2 victim of cyber crime

Report says impact of attacks is immense, with many feeling cheated

Divyesh Singh

With increasing use of computers and the Internet through broadband penetration, the risk of being a victim of cyber crime has increased. Indian net users have been one of the most favourite targets of cyber criminals. In fact, a recent research report by global e-security solutions provider Norton has shown that 74% Indian web users have been victims of cyber crime.

The report pointed out that India is the second most victimised nation after China in terms of cyber attacks or cyber crime. It includes virus attacks, botnet attacks, online credit card frauds, lottery frauds, identity thefts, hacking attacks and attacks through social networking sites on personal profiles, which could include sexual harassment online and cyber-bullying.

Around 65% Internet users worldwide have been victims of cyber crime, but in India it is greater.

The report revealed that the impact of such attacks has been immense on victims who feel ripped off or cheated. High emotional impact has affected their personal and professional lives.

Around 38% victims feel angry, while 31% have been left feeling annoyed and cheated and 46% among them are upset. Eighty-eight percent victims feel they are themselves to blame for the attack.

Only 8% Indian users think it will not happen to them and that they cannot be victims of cyber crime.

Most Indians believe cyber criminals cannot be brought to justice as police and other agencies cannot go beyond borders to take action against those who easily swindle money out of people's accounts.

The next time you surf the net, consider this: You may be a click away from becoming the next cyber crime victim.

The study by Norton revealed the staggering prevalence of cyber crime: Two-thirds (65%) Internet users globally, and over three-quarters (76%) Indian web surfers have fallen victim to cyber crimes, including computer viruses, online credit card fraud and identity theft.

Despite being left with a feeling of helplessness, only 50% Indian adults think that they will change their behaviour and take action legally when targeted.

Surprisingly, only 37% victims of cyber crime have reported it to the police.

"We all pay for cyber crime, either directly or through pass-along costs from financial institutions," said Adam Palmer, Norton lead cyber security adviser.

Delhi registered 1850% rise in cyber crime cases

Jatin Anand
jatin.anand@hindustantimes.com

NEW DELHI: Statistics prove that the Capital is on the receiving end of a bitter onslaught in cyber space as the Delhi Police, in particular, and the security establishment, in general, struggle to confront the challenge.

While the police face a debilitating manpower crunch in its cyber cells, other security agencies still prefer to view cyber attacks from an obsolete perspective.

"In a day and age where American government-sponsored hackers are targeting Iran's nuclear programme and terror outfits such as the Indian Mujahideen (IM) are conducting recruitment drives over the internet, our security agencies still take weeks to trace creators of fake profiles on Facebook," said a Delhi-based hacker, who wished to remain anonymous.

"Just two weeks ago, the official webpage of Delhi University's (DU) English department was hacked by a Pakistan-based group. If you look at official estimates, hacking in India is now done like never before," said another hacker, who is pursuing his engineering from a private college.

The hacker's claim, when viewed with arrested Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) commander Syed Zabiuddin Ansari's admission that he was operating nine email accounts post 26/11 attacks, may not be entirely off the mark.

According to figures compiled by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), cases of hacking registered an increase of 1850% — from just two cases in the year 2010 to 39 in 2011.

VIRTUAL ASSAULT

June 22: DU's English department's website was hacked by a Pakistan-based hacker, 'Anon CIOJP' as revenge for India's 'transgressions into Pakistan's cyberspace'

May 12: Shubham Kansal, 22, was arrested for uploading his former classmates' phone number on a fictitious Facebook page replete with provocative pictures

March 5: Two foreign nationals were arrested for hacking into the bank account of a company and subsequently siphoning off ₹16 lakh

The sheer volume of such cases, registered under Section 66(2) of the Information Technology (IT) Act, seems to make Delhi the most vulnerable Indian city when it comes to cyber attacks. Not even a single case of hacking was registered in other metropolitan cities such as Mumbai and Kolkata or even Chennai and Hyderabad in 2011.

"It's about time that the word 'hacking' stopped being a negative term for our security establishment," said Jiten Jain, a cyber security analyst, who wants to bring hackers and security agency officials together at The Hackers' Conference later this month.

"There is a tremendous pool of talent, in the form of young hobbyist hackers. Cyber security can't be left to salaried government officials working nine-to-five shifts," Jain said.

दलाल इंजीनियरिंग कॉलेज संचालकों को बेच रहे हैं ब्योरा, सीबीएसई ने जांच कराने का लिया फैसला

जेईई मेन का गोपनीय डाटा लीक

हिन्दुस्तान एक्सक्लूसिव

नोएडा | प्रभात उपाध्याय

13 लाख छात्रों का डाटा कंसल्टेंसी फर्म और दलालों के पास

03 साल की सजा हो सकती है डाटा लीक करने पर

> छात्रों का ब्योरा पूरी तरह गोपनीय होता है। यदि कोई पैसा लेकर इसे बेच रहा है तो यह अपराध है। डाटा बाहर कैसे पहुंचा, इसकी जांच की जाएगी। -राजबीर सिंह, कार्यकारी निदेशक, जेईई मेन (जैब)

जेईई मेन (ज्वाइंट इंट्रेंस एग्जामिनेशन) के परीक्षार्थियों का गोपनीय डाटा लीक हो गया है। कंसल्टेंसी फर्म चलाने वाले इसे प्राइवेट इंजीनियरिंग कॉलेजों को पैसे लेकर बेच रहे हैं। 'हिन्दुस्तान' द्वारा मामला उजागर करने के बाद सीबीएसई ने मामले की जांच कराने का फैसला किया है।

आईआईटी, एनआईटी और देश के प्रमुख इंजीनियरिंग कॉलेजों में दाखिले के लिए जेईई-मेन 2015 की परीक्षा में शामिल 13 लाख छात्रों का डाटा कंसलटेंसी फर्म और दलालों के पास है। इस डाटा में छात्र का नाम, माता-पिता का नाम, पंजीकरण नंबर, जन्म-तिथि, मोबाइल नंबर, ई-मेल आईडी, राज्य का नाम और पिन कोड मौजूद है। दलाल प्राइवेट इंजीनियरिंग कॉलेज संचालकों को ई-मेल और फोन पर पैसे लेकर छात्रों का ब्योरा देने को कह रहे हैं। एक छात्र के ब्योरे के लिए 5 रुपये मांगा जा रहा है। यदि कोई सारे छात्रों का डाटा लेना चाहता है तो उसे 65,000 रुपये देने होंगे। वहीं दिल्ली-एनसीआर के छात्रों के डाटा के लिए 7 हजार रुपये की मांग की जा रही है।

5 लाख रुपये जुर्माना भी हो सकता है: आईटी एक्ट की धारा 43-बी के अनुसार यदि कोई भी गोपनीय डाटा को बेचता या खरीदता है तो उसे 3 साल की कैद और 5 लाख तक का जुर्माना हो सकता है। इसके अलावा, जिसके पास डाटा को संरक्षित और रखरखाव करने की जिम्मेदारी है उसे आईटी एक्ट की धारा 67-सी के तहत तीन साल की सजा हो सकती है।

साइबर विशेषज्ञ व कंप्यूटर सोसायटी ऑफ इंडिया के नोएडा चैप्टर के चेयरमैन अनुज अग्रवाल कहते हैं कि लीक डाटा में छात्र का मोबाइल नंबर भी है। ऐसे में यह छात्र की निजता से भी जुड़ा है। आईटी एक्ट के तहत निजता के ब्योरे को सार्वजनिक करने पर 3 साल की सजा और 2 लाख के जुर्माने का प्रावधान है।

डाटा लीक होने से क्या होगा नुकसान

जेईई मेन में शामिल अभ्यर्थियों का ब्योरा प्राइवेट इंजीनियरिंग कॉलेजों के हाथ लगने पर वे इसका फायदा उठा सकते हैं। उत्तर प्रदेश समेत कई राज्यों के प्राइवेट इंजीनियरिंग कॉलेजों में जेईई मेन के स्कोर के आधार पर दाखिले के लिए सीटें आरक्षित हैं। दाखिला प्रक्रिया काउंसलिंग के बाद ही शुरू होती है। पर डाटा हाथ लगने के बाद कॉलेज पहले से ही छात्रों को संपर्क कर अपने संस्थान में दाखिले का प्रलोभन देना शुरू कर देते हैं।

न्यूनतम तीन साल तक डाटा गोपनीय रखना होता है

छात्रों से संबंधित डाटा को न्यूनतम तीन साल तक गोपनीय रखना होता है। कई मामलों में यह अवधि न्यूनतम 8 साल भी है। ऐसे में परीक्षा के दो महीने के अंदर ही छात्रों का ब्योरा लीक होने पर विशेषज्ञों ने सवाल उठाया है।

यूपीएसईई का डाटा भी हो चुका है लीक

उत्तर प्रदेश के इंजीनियरिंग और प्रबंधन कॉलेजों में दाखिले के लिए आयोजित राज्य प्रवेश परीक्षा (यूपीएसईई) का डाटा भी लीक हो चुका है। छात्रों का ब्योरा कॉलेज के पास पहुंचने के बाद उन्होंने छात्रों को प्रलोभन देना भी शुरू कर दिया है। यूपीटीयू इस मामले की जांच करवा रहा है।

PHOENIX CONTACT

Cyber Security Risk across All Sectors



Source: Sectrio IoT and OT Threat Landscape Assessment Report – 2022

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Cyber Security

Cyber security is the practice of defending computers, servers, mobile devices, electronic systems, networks, data Applications, devices, Plant Operations, financial assets and people against ransomware and other malware, phishing scams, data theft and other cyberthreats.

Cyber Security in Power Sector

- IT Cyber Security: Focused mainly on manipulated data e.g. Servers etc.
- OT Cyber Security: Focused mainly on managing Physical / field asset, e.g. RTU, Meters, SCADA etc.

The Aspects of IT and OT

IT

OT

Follows CIA Policy

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

Follows AIC Policy

- Availability
- Integrity
- Confidentiality

PHOENIX CONTACT

The Aspects of Cyber Security



CYBER SECURITY

Standards in Cyber Security

Standards in IT

- ISO 27000 Series (ISO 27001 and ISO 27002)
- NIST (Used by US Govt)
- COBIT
- CIS (Center for Internet Security)
- NERC-CIP

Standards in OT

- IEC 62443
- NIS 2.0 (Network & Information Security) Directive
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)
- Cyber-Resilience-Act (CRA)

PHOENIX CONTACT


IEC 62443
Standard for IACS

IEC 62443 structure and systematics

IEC 62443 structure and systematics

Type of Challenges

Inadequate network segmentation

Unauthorized access to systems,

Weak authentication and insufficient access controls

Human errors (e.g., a mistake, or lack of awareness, etc)

Malicious actions – cyber attacks

System failures (e.g., a hardware failure, software bug, a flaw in a procedure, etc) Outdated software

Attack Impact

Damage to Transformer and Breakers

Safety of Human life and financial losses

Data loss

Disrupt the Grid operation, Power Transmission and Distribution.

Interruptions to Power Transmission

Organization reputation

PHOENIX CONTACT

Cyber Security Trends in Power Sector

Cyber Security Regulations 2024

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
(MINISTRY OF POWER)
Sewa Bhawan (North Wing), Room No. 622, 6th Floor,
R. K. Puram, New Delhi-110066
Tel. Fax -011-26103246, email: celegal-cea@gov.in
Website: www.cea.nic.in

PUBLIC NOTICE

In accordance with the Section 177 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), proposes to notify the **draft Central Electricity Authority (Cyber Security in Power Sector) Regulations, 2024.** The proposed draft regulations are available on the CEA Website www.cea.nic.in for inviting public comments. The Regulations can also be inspected in the office of Chief Engineer (Legal), Sewa Bhawan (North Wing), Room No. 622, 6th Floor, R. K. Puram, New Delhi-110066 on any working day till **10th September, 2024** between 1100 hrs to 1600 hrs.

2. All the Stakeholders including the public are requested to send their comments on the draft regulations to Chief Engineer (Legal), Sewa Bhawan (North Wing), Room No. 622, 6th Floor, R. K. Puram, New Delhi-110066 by post or through e-mail (celegal-cea@gov.in) latest by **10th September, 2024.**

(Rakesh Kumar)
Secretary, CEA



Power Finance Corporation SCADA/DMS,
System under RDSS - Govt. of India
Model Technical specification

CHAPTER-9: TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF RTU

9.0 General

The Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) shall be installed at primary substation to acquire data from Multifunction Transducers (MFTs), discrete transducers & status input devices such as CMRs etc. RTU & shall also be used for control of Substation devices from Master station(s). The supplied RTUs shall be interfaced with the substation equipment, communication equipment, power supply distribution boards; for which all the interface cables, TBs, wires, lugs, glands etc. shall be supplied, installed & terminated by the Contractor. Further , the equipments indicated in the MoP order no 12/34/2020-T&R dtd 08.06.21 & CEA /PLG/R&D/MII/2021 dtd 11.6.21 and any amendment from time to time shall be adhered to. This chapter is applicableto Group A,B,C & new RTUs of Group U as per functional requirements

9.1 Design Standards

The RTUs shall be designed in accordance with applicable International Electro- technical Commission (IEC), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer (IEEE), American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and National Equipment Manufacturers association (NEMA) standards, unless otherwise specified in this Technical specification. In all cases the provisions of the latest edition or revision of the applicable standards in effect shall apply.

The RTU shall be designed around microprocessor technology. For easy maintenance the architecture shall support pluggable modules on backplane. The field wiring shall be terminated such that these are easily detachable from the I/O module. **The RTU shall comply to IEC62351- 3 for cyber security in communication between RTU and master station and IEC62443-4-2 for cyber security for product** including testing requirement as per MoP order no. 12/34/2020-T&R dtd 08.06.21 & CEA /PLG/R&D/MII/2021 dtd 11.6.21 and any amendment from time to time.

9.2 RTU Functions

All functional capability described herein shall be provided by the Contractor even if a function is not initially implemented.

As a minimum, the RTU shall be capable of performing the following functions:

(a) Acquiring analog values from Multifunction Transducers or alternatively through transducer- less modules and the status inputs of devices from the substation, processing and transmitting to Master stations. Capability to acquireanalog inputs from analog input cards receiving standard signals viz current loops 4-20Ma standard signals such as 0-5vdc etc.for RTD , transducer etc.

(b) Receiving and processing digital commands from the master station(s)

(c) Data transmission rates - 300 to 19200 bps for Serial ports for MODBUS. and 10/100 mbps for TCP/IP Ethernet ports

(d) IEC 60870-5-104 protocol to communicate with the Master station(s) at least 2, IEC 60870-5-101 for slave devices & MODBUS protocol over RS485 interface to communicate with the MFTs. If considered as a part of RTDAS/SCADA solution to use IEC20922 for real time monitoring/control using IEC20922 can be additionally and optionally , used with GPRS also subject to meeting

Cyber Security Trends in Power Sector

Energy Sector:

RDSS Scheme, It is a scheme nation vide scheme to digitalise distribution grids by Center Govt, nodal agency is Ministry of Power (MoP) and Power Finance Corporation (PFC), Since Energy sector (Power Sector) comes under critical infrastructure hence cyber security is considered as a great threat. Following are the measures taken in the scheme:

- Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) shall comply to IEC 62443-4-2 standard for product cyber security
- RTU shall also comply to IEC 62351-3 for communication cyber security for IEC 104 protocol
- RTU shall have in-built firewall system so that no extra firewall is required
- RTU shall have provision to store upto 6 months of logs in its memory
- RTU shall have Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
- FRTU shall have provision to enable/disable unused ports





Power Finance Corporation SCADA/DMS,
System under RDSS - Govt. of India
Model Technical specification

CHAPTER-9: TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF RTU

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Page 154 of 333

How Cyber Security is followed Across Industry

Har Ghar Jal
Jal Jeevan Mission

Infrastructure Sector:

Infrastructure sector, whether it is Water, Building or Metros they falls in critical sector. Recently Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam released its specification on cyber security :

- Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) shall comply to IEC 62443-4-1 standard for product designing
- Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) shall comply to IEC 62443-4-2 standard for product itself
- RTU shall have in-built firewall system so that no extra firewall is required
- RTU shall have provision to store upto 6 months of logs in its memory
- RTU shall have Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
- FRTU shall have provision to enable/disable unused ports



उत्तर प्रदेश जल निगम (ग्रामीण),
प्रधान कार्यालय 6, राणा प्रताप मार्ग, लखनऊ – 226001

पत्रांक– 48 / उ0जा0नि0(ग्रा0)/2022 / दिनांक 22.11.2022

कार्यालय–ज्ञाप

एतद्द्वारा जल जीवन मिशन कार्यक्रम के अन्तर्गत निर्मित/निर्माणाधीन नलकूपों के Automation हेतु नलकूपों पर लगाये जाने वाले Automation System में एक–रूपता बनाये रखने एवं अधिष्ठापित कराए जाने वाले उपकरणों की गुणवत्ता सुनिश्चित किये जाने के दृष्टिगत पेयजल योजनाओं के नलकूपों पर अधिष्ठापित किये जाने वाले समस्त उपकरणों यथा Control Equipment, Measuring Instruments including RTU/PLC Panel, Valve Actuator, Chlorine Analyzer, Automatic Chlorine Dozer, Electromagnetic Flowmeter, Radar Type Level Sensor, Depth Sensor, Pressure Sensor इत्यादि के Technical Specification, Operation and Control Philosophy एवं Process Instrumentation Diagram इस आशय से संलग्न कर प्रेषित है कि उक्त में प्राविधानित विशिष्टियों के अनुसार नलकूपों के Automation System का कार्य कराया जाना सुनिश्चित किया जाये।

उक्त आदेश तुरन्त से प्रभावी होगा।

(घनश्याम द्विवेदी)
मुख्य अभियन्ता (ग्रामीण)

पृ0सं0 एवं दिनांक उपरोक्तानुसार:–
प्रतिलिपि निम्नलिखित को सूचनार्थ एवं आवश्यक कार्यवाही हेतु संलग्नक सहित प्रेषित।

1. प्रबन्ध निदेशक, उ0प्र0 जल निगम (ग्रामीण), लखनऊ ।
2. अधिशासी निदेशक, राज्य पेयजल एवं स्वच्छता मिशन, लखनऊ।
3. समस्त क्षेत्रीय मुख्य अभियन्ता, उ0प्र0 जल निगम (ग्रामीण)।
4. समस्त अधीक्षण अभियन्ता (सिविल/वि0यॉ0), उ0प्र0 जल निगम (ग्रामीण)।
5. समस्त अधिशासी अभियन्ता (सिविल/वि0यॉ0), उ0प्र0 जल निगम (ग्रामीण)।
6. जल जीवन मिशन कार्यक्रम में अनुबन्धित समस्त फर्मो को अनुपालन सुनिश्चित कराने हेतु।

संलग्नक–उपरोक्तानुसार।

मुख्य अभियन्ता (ग्रामीण)

अमृत
Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation



Technical specifications for RTU,Intstruments and Cabling

1) RTU(Remote Terminal Unit)

Bidder should provide suitable modular PLC (all modules mounted on racks). The bidder shall follow below guidelines as common specifications for all PLCs/RTUs.

General Specification:- (For RTU at Tubewells)

- Bidder should provide complete CAT no of offered PLC.
- PLC should have CE/UL certification.
- PLC/RTU should have level2 cyber security certification as per IEC 62443.Cyber security certificate provided by independent third party will be considered.
- Minimum 1 MB built-in memory should be provided for data storage so that data loss can be avoided in absence of communication signals.
- Minimum 02 nosEathernet port.
- PLC/RTU should support DNP3 Protocol.
- PLC/RTU should support HART Protocol.
- For energy meter communication, Separate serial communication module/ built-in port should be provided.
- The PLC/RTU shall support remote upload and download of logic programs, modification, firmware downloads, remote reset function.The user should be able to troubleshoot the PLC/RTU remotely on the wireless communication media.
- Min Digital Input – 32
- Min digital output – 32
- Min analog Inputs – 8
- Min analog outputs – 8
- All Output will have Interposing Relays with min 2 changeover, 6 amp Contacts.
- PLC power supply will be 24VDC. The supply provided to PLC should be redundant and failure in this power supply should be indicated at SCADA.
- RTU panel encloser will be min IP54 certified.

General Specification:- (For RTU at LCS/MCS)

- Bidder should provide complete CAT no of offered PLC.
- PLC should have CE/UL certification.
- Offered PLC should be redundant type along with bump less transfer and Master/Standby PLC failure information should be reflected on MCS Scada.
- PLC/RTU should have level2 cyber security certification as per IEC 62443.Cyber security certificate provided by independent third party will be considered.
- Minimum 32 MB built-in memory should be provided for data storage so that data loss can be avoided in absence of communication signals.
- Minimum 02 nosEathernet port.
- PLC/RTU should support DNP3 Protocol.
- PLC/RTU should support HART Protocol.
- The PLC/RTU shall support remote upload and download of logic programs, modification, firmware downloads, remote reset function.The user should be able to troubleshoot the PLC/RTU remotely on the wireless communication media.
- Min Digital Input – infinite
- Min digital output – infinite
- Min analog Inputs – infinite
- Min analog outputs – infinite
- All Output will have Interposing Relays with min 2 changeover, 6-amp Contacts.

PHOENIX CONTACT

years of passion
for technology
and innovation

Phoenix Contact is a privately owned company founded in 1923 with great depths of added value. It is independent and has the freedom to make its own decisions as a company.

11

Production sites

Germany | China | Taiwan | India | Poland | Sweden | Switzerland | Turkey | Argentina | Greece | USA

100,000

Products

22,000

Employees worldwide

75%

Sales abroad

10,200

Employees in Germany

25%

Sales in Germany

Group Executive Board:

Frank Stührenberg (CEO)
Axel Wachholz (CFO)
Frank Possel-Dölken (CDO)
Dirk Görlitzer (COO, President BA ICE)
Torsten Janwlecke (COO, President BA DC)
Ulrich Leidecker (COO, President BA IMA)

1923 > TODAY

Founded in Germany

Present in more than 100 countries

PHOENIX CONTACT

Over
100,000
innovative
products

PHOENIX CONTACT


Phoenix Contact’s
360° Security Offering

Our standard of quality: 360° Security

- ✓ Secure development process (IEC 62443-4-1)
- ✓ Integration of important security functions in our products (IEC 62443-4-2)
- ✓ Consulting on how to secure your system (IEC 62443-2-4)
- ✓ Entire security solutions (IEC 62443-3-3)
- ✓ Regular updates and security patches as part of the PSIRT process

PHOENIX CONTACT

Phoenix Contact Solutions for Cyber Secured Solutions

Certification according to

- IEC 62443-4-1: Secure product development
- IEC 62443-4-2: Technical Security Requirements
- IEC 62351-3: TLS Encryption

PHOENIX CONTACT

Cyber Security Certificates

ZERTIFIKAT ◆ CERTIFICATE ◆ 認證證書 ◆ СЕРТИФИКАТ ◆ CERTIFICADO ◆ CERTIFICAT

CERTIFICATE

No. IITS2 029429 0027 Rev. 00

Holder of Certificate: PHOENIX CONTACT GmbH & Co. KG
Flachsmarktstr. 8
32825 Blomberg
GERMANY

Certification Mark:

Product: IACS components

Model(s): PLCnext Control
(Configuration: Security Profil active)
AXC F 1152, AXC F 2152, AXC F 3152

Tested according to:
IEC 62443-4-1:2018
IEC 62443-4-2:2019
PPP 15003B:2021 (IEC 62443-4-1: Full ML3 Process Profile)

The secure development lifecycle and the resulting product(s) were assessed on a voluntary basis and complies with the essential requirements. The certification mark shown above can be affixed on the product. It is not permitted to alter the certification mark in any way. In addition, the certification holder must not transfer the certificate to third parties. See http://www.tuvsud.com/ps-cert for details.

Test report no.: 21CR03S047
Valid until: 2024-10-20

Date, 2021-11-19 (Nadia Patricia Stefan)

Page 1 of 1
TÜV SÜD Product Service GmbH • Certification Body • Ridlerstraße 65 • 80339 Munich • Germany

TÜV®

DNV

ATTESTATION OF CONFORMITY

No. 10484600-DSO 24-4043

Issued to:
PHOENIX CONTACT GmbH & Co. KG
Flachsmarktstraße 8
32825 Blomberg
Germany

For the server product:
AXC F 3152 PLCnext Control
Software version: PLCnext IEC 61850 V1.1.0
Firmware version: 2023.9.0
Hardware version: 06 | S/N: 1368266346

The server product has not been shown to be non-conforming to:

IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2

Communication network and system security - Profiles including TCP/IP

Security extension applied on IEC 61850-8-1 Edition 2

The conformance test has been performed according to IEC 62351-100-3:2020 Ed.1, in combination with IEC 61850-8-1 edition 2.1, with server product protocol, model and implementation conformance statements: "Protocol Implementation Description (PICS/P10T) v1.0, Date: 29-January-2024".

The IEC 62351 test cases related to the following conformance requirements have been verified with a positive result:

Conformance to selected TLS protocol features:	Conformance to certificate support:	Conformance to cryptographic algorithm support:
TLS versions: 1.2 TLS Resumption using HelloRequest TLS Resumption at least every 24 hours TLS Resumption using session tickets TLS Renegotiation at least every 24 hours TLS Renegotiation using HelloRequest TLS Renegotiation extension	Support of multiple CA Maximum supported certificate size is 8.192 bytes Follow certificate validation rules according to RFC 5280 Certification revocation state validation using CRL Acceptance of any certificate from an authorized CA Simple chain of trust PKI Complex chain of trust PKI	RSA 1024, 2048, 3076, 4098, ECDSA with 256-bit keys Curve secp256r1 SHA-256 SHA-1

This attestation is granted on account of conformance test cases carried out at DNV in The Netherlands and performed with DNV UniGrid Telecontrol Simulator version 2.5.0 (2023). This attestation has been issued for information purposes only, and the archived DNV Verification report no. 10484600-DSO 24-4044, including remarks and limitations, will prevail.

The test has been carried out on one single specimen of the server product as referred above and submitted to DNV by PHOENIX CONTACT GmbH & Co. KG. The manufacturer's production process has not been assessed. This attestation does not imply that DNV has verified any server product other than the specimen tested.

Arnhem, February 5, 2024

Issued by:

K. Lazaridis
Test Engineer

DNV

O. Serban
Team Leader & Principal Consultant
Interoperability of Power Systems

IMPORTANT: Remarks apply to this implementation. See the resulting report for full details. Publication of this document is allowed. Publication in total or in part and/or reproduction in whatsoever way of the contents of the above-mentioned report(s) is not allowed unless permission has been explicitly given either in the report(s) or by previous letter.

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DNV Netherlands B.V.
Utrechtseweg 310-B50, 6812 AR ARNHEM, The Netherlands
P.O. Box 9035, 6800 ET ARNHEM, The Netherlands
Tel. +31 26 356 9111
Fax. +31 26 351 3683
www.dnv.com
contact@dnv.com

DNV

ATTESTATION OF CONFORMITY

No. 10484600-DSO 24-4041

Issued to:
PHOENIX CONTACT GmbH & Co. KG
Flachsmarktstraße 8
32825 Blomberg
Germany

For the server product:
AXC F 2152 PLCnext Control
Software version: PLCnext IEC 61850 V1.1.0
Firmware version: 2023.6.1
Hardware version: 06 | S/N: 1371972989

The server product has not been shown to be non-conforming to:

IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2

Communication network and system security - Profiles including TCP/IP

Security extension applied on IEC 61850-8-1 Edition 2

The conformance test has been performed according to IEC 62351-100-3:2020 Ed.1, in combination with IEC 61850-8-1 edition 2.1, with server product protocol, model and implementation conformance statements: "Protocol Implementation Description (PICS/P00T) v1.3, Date: 29-January-2024".

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TLS versions: 1.2 TLS Resumption using HelloRequest TLS Resumption at least every 24 hours TLS Resumption using session tickets TLS Renegotiation at least every 24 hours TLS Renegotiation using HelloRequest TLS Renegotiation extension	Support of multiple CA Maximum supported certificate size is 8.192 bytes Follow certificate validation rules according to RFC 5280 Certification revocation state validation using CRL Acceptance of any certificate from an authorized CA Simple chain of trust PKI Complex chain of trust PKI	RSA 1024, 2048, 3076, 4098, ECDSA with 256-bit keys Curve secp256r1 SHA-256 SHA-1

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Arnhem, February 5, 2024

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P.O. Box 9035, 6800 ET ARNHEM, The Netherlands
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Fax. +31 26 351 3683
www.dnv.com
contact@dnv.com

PHOENIX CONTACT

Phoenix in Energy Sector

Phoenix Contact

Smart City: Feeder Automation System

*Applications:
Ring Main Unit, Compact Sub Station



- LTE modem
- Power supply unit
- Uninterruptible power supply incl. buffer module
- RTU and I/Os
- Additional components such as surge protection, device circuit breakers, etc.

PHOENIX CONTACT INSPIRING INNOVATIONS

Phoenix Contact

Smart City: Feeder Automation System

Phoenix Solution

(Hardwired)

Transformer

Energy Meter
(Modbus)

Control Center

FRTU

RMU

CSS

5G



Firewall

Ethernet Switch

PHOENIX CONTACT INSPIRING INNOVATIONS

Architecture of Transformer Monitoring System



Central SCADA/DMS

Firewall

Ethernet Switch

Transformer

Relay

Sensors

Transformer Monitoring Unit

GPRS

PxC Products

Sensors

PHOENIX CONTACT INSPIRING INNOVATIONS

Phoenix Contact

Substation Automation System



*Substation Automation System:

- Acquiring data from Meters, Protection Relay
- Acquiring Hard wired data from field
- RTU works as Data concentrator device, acquiring
- Data on various protocols.
- IEC 62443-4-2 Cyber Secured RTU

*Communication Protocols:

- IEC 104/101, MODBUS TCP/IP for Metering
- IEC 61850, DNP3.0, FTP and OPC

*Phoenix Products:

- Remote Terminal Unit
- LDMS Software
- Managed Ethernet Switch

PHOENIX CONTACT INSPIRING INNOVATIONS

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Phoenix in Energy Industry



Smart City Project in many states

RMU Automation

Smart Grid Automation

RDSS Project in many states

Transformer Health Monitoring System

More Than 40K Installations in India

SAS Project in many states

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Cyber Security Need of an Hour

Meet us in Exhibition Hall & lets collaborate on making Digitalization Reliable, Available and Secured.

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