

Realism and Anti-Realism II: *appendix*

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Acquisition argument

1. Suppose that some of the sentences of D have verification-transcendent truth-conditions. [assumption]
2. We understand the sentences of D. [premise]
3. To understand a sentence is to know its truth-conditions. [premise]
4. We know the truth-conditions of the sentences of D. [from 2, 3]
5. If we know the truth-conditions of the sentences of D, then it is possible for us to acquire that knowledge. [premise]
6. It was possible for us to acquire knowledge of the truth-conditions of the sentences of D. [from 4, 5]
7. It was possible for us to acquire knowledge of verification-transcendent truth-conditions. [from 1, 6]
8. It is not possible for us to acquire knowledge of verification-transcendent truth-conditions. [premise]
9. Contradiction. [from 7, 8]
10. The sentences of D do not have verification-transcendent truth-conditions. [1–9]

Manifestation argument

1. Suppose that some of the sentences of D have verification-transcendent truth-conditions. [assumption]
2. We understand the sentences of D. [premise]
3. To understand a sentence is to know its truth-conditions. [premise]
4. We know the truth-conditions of the sentences of D. [from 2, 3]
5. If we know the truth-conditions of the sentences of D, then this knowledge can be manifest in our use of the sentences of D. [premise]
6. Our knowledge of the truth-conditions of the sentences of D can be manifest in our use of the sentences of D. [from 4, 5]
7. Our knowledge of verification-transcendent truth-conditions can be manifest in our use of the sentences of D. [from 1, 6]
8. Knowledge of verification-transcendent truth-conditions cannot be manifest in our use of the sentences of D. [premise]
9. Contradiction. [from 7, 8]
10. The sentences of D do not have verification-transcendent truth-conditions. [1–9]