

# Who Dis?

## Mikhail Sudakov

- Hacker, developer, researcher, educator
- Father, gamer, cat owner, meme enthusiast
- Favorite phrases: “I don’t know”, “Try harder!”
- Sr. Staff Security Researcher @ Trellix
- Grim Reaper (OSEE), OSCE<sup>3</sup>



### Socials:

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- Cryptology (from Greek):
  - Kryptos – “hidden” or “secret”
  - Logos/logia – “study” or “knowledge”

- Includes:

- **Cryptography:**

- Science of hiding the meaning of a message (“writing codes”)

- **Cryptanalysis:**

- Science of forcefully revealing the meaning of a message (“breaking codes”)

- **Steganography:**

- Science of hiding the mere presence of a message (e.g. writing with finger on glass)

- **Steganalysis:**

- Science of revealing the presence of a hidden message




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00110011 00111001 00110111 00110110  
00110101 01000001 00110100 00110011  
00110100 00110010 00110111 00110001  
00110110 00110010 00110011 00110010  
00110100 00111001 00110110 00111000  
00110100 00111001 00110101 00110001  
00110011 01000100 00110011 01000100

# Crypto...

- Is...
  - Brutally complex
  - An incredibly powerful tool
  - A fundamental part of many security mechanisms and protocols
- Is not...
  - A hammer to strike every nail with
  - A solution to all of the world's (security) problems
  - At all reliable unless implemented very precisely and very correctly
  - Something you should **EVER** be inventing and using yourself!


# What Cryptology Is Absolutely NOT




# If you only get one thing out of this...

Let it be this:

→ Never, **EVER**, under any circumstances roll your own crypto



# Crypto in the Triangle of Security



# Threat Model (Adversarial Capability)

Adversarial Strength

- **Ciphertext-Only Attack (Known-Ciphertext):** only a set of ciphertexts
  - *E.g. “a3feac02f2ddbf1c558dc26ec1e68a8a952e0924d” – GO!*
- **Known-Plaintext Attack:** a set of both plaintexts and ciphertexts
  - *E.g. Bletchley Park team Vs Enigma in WW2*
- **Chosen-Plaintext Attack:** can encrypt arbitrarily
  - *Active attacker, defeats non-randomized encryption*
- **Chosen-Ciphertext Attack:** CPA + can decrypt arbitrarily
  - *E.g. padding oracle attack, defeats non-authenticated encryption*



# “Secure” Against **What**??

Cipher	Security Against CO	Security Against KP	Security Against CP	Security Against CC
Caesar Shift				
Vigenère Cipher				
Enigma Machine				
AES				




# AES - Advanced Encryption Standard

- Block cipher:
  - 128-bit block size
- Subset of Rijndael ciphers:
  - Designers: Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen of Belgium
- Varying key lengths:
  - 128, 192, and 256 bits
- Federal standard since 2002
- Superseded DES and 3DES
- Based on substitution-permutation network design
  - Does not use a Feistel network (like DES)


# Important AES Elements

- IV (Initialization Vector)
  - Allows for randomized encryption to thwart Chosen-Plaintext Attacks
  - Gives cipher a direction/entropy/chaos/unpredictability
  - Is a block of 16 bytes (e.g. 0x4740e55b7fdf643945e33c400144d129 )
- Cipher Mode of Operation
  - How the underlying cipher algorithm is implemented on actual blocks
  - Examples: CTR, ECB, CBC, PCBC, CFB, OFB, GCM (special), etc.
- Padding Mode
  - For many block ciphers, it is necessary to pad the plaintext in a block
  - Encoding vs encryption
  - Examples: NULL bytes, 1 | 00...00, ISO10126, PKCS7, etc.

# AES-CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) Mode



# Attack Specifications



- Crypto scheme: **AES-256-CBC-PKCS7**
- Target ciphertext: **a81d5cff84c7badbf53bad80df3c542ba78b0abc8beedea1f7545232c38baed2**
- Ciphertext structure:

Initialization Vector (IV)	Actual AES-CBC Ciphertext
a81d5cff84c7badbf53bad80df3c542b	a78b0abc8beedea1f7545232c38baed2

**!! DEMO TIME !!**




# Some Hash Functions

## Length Extension Attack

- MD5 (Message Digest Algorithm 5) by Ronald Rivest
  - 128-bit output
  - Collisions found in 2004 – **completely broken** and mustn't be used for crypto purposes ever again
- SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) by the NSA
  - 160-bit output
  - Collisions found in 2017 – **broken** and mustn't be used anymore for crypto purposes
- **SHA-2 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2) by the NSA**
  - 256 or 512-bit output – **no known weaknesses**
- SHA-3 (Secure Hash Algorithm 3) by Bertoni, Daemen, Peeters, and Van Assche
  - Is a subset of the broader hashing family called “Keccak”
  - Very different in design than the NSA's SHA family (not vulnerable to length extension attack)
  - 224, 256, 384, and 512-bit outputs – no known weaknesses
  - Was selected as the winner of the NIST's hash function competition
  - Is the current hashing standard as of August 5, 2015



# SHA-256 Cookie Integrity Scheme



# SHA-256 Length Extension Attack

- [Theoretical] Attack on the *Merkle-Damgård construction*, not on SHA
  - It exploits the length extension property of such algs. when used incorrectly
- We want to compute a valid hash for the cookie string:

```
user=attacker;action=view;admin=true
```

- Cannot guess/forge a hash for an arbitrary message, without knowing the key...
  - That would mean finding a collision against the algorithm

# SHA-256 Length Extension Attack

- ...but, we can append an arbitrary string to the end of the original cookie message, like so:

```
user=attacker;action=view<PADDING_BYTES>;admin=true
```

- Unfortunately, padding bytes are required
  - Padding bytes must be precisely computed

- To do that, we must know the full length of the original message
  - Already know the cookie message itself, so we must find the key length
    - Key length can be easily guessed or brute-forced

!! DEMO TIME !!

