

# Statistical physics approaches to large-scale socio-economic networks

Michael Szell




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Defensio for  
Dr. rer. nat. (Physics)

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Christoph Dellago

Mar 20, 2012

# Data from social systems is hard to get





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## Collective human behavior is poorly understood

# Social systems are Complex systems

- Many elements
- Strong interactions - **Networks**
- Emergence of macroscopic properties

Brain, traffic, internet, society, economy

Power laws, anomalous diffusion, etc.

Castellano, Fortunato and Loreto, Rev Mod Phys 81, 591-646 (2009)


Barabási and Albert, Science 286, 504 (2000)

Park and Newman, PRE 70, 066117 (2004)

Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld, PRL 59, 381-384 (1987)

Metzler and Klafter, Phys Rep 339, 1-77 (2000)







Could **THIS** be a human society?





# Massive multiplayer online games



[www.pardus.at](http://www.pardus.at)

Players live an alternative life, in a virtual universe interacting with many others


- 400,000 registered players
- 12,000 active players
- Online since 2004

## Complete data on human society!

# The framework of the game

- Economic life
  - Trade, produce, make profit
  - Spend money on ships, ...
- Social life
  - Chat, forum, messages
  - Make friends
- Exploratory life (“Science”)
  - Universe and lifeforms

No rules, No goals





# Emergence of complex socio-economic behavior

- Hierarchical groups
- Cartels
- Political parties, diplomacy
- Organized attacks + wars over territory, resources, ...

# Data available

- All actions by all players
- Over 2000 days, with timestamp
- Ongoing generation of new data



# Contributions of the thesis

## 1) Individual

Human behavioral sequences, mobility

## 2) Network

Social dynamics, testing classic hypotheses

## 3) Network-network

Multi-relational organization

Show feasibility of “social labs”

Thurner, Szell and Sinatra, PLoS ONE 7, e29796 (2012)

Szell, Sinatra, Petri, Thurner and Latora, in review (2012)

Szell and Thurner, Social Networks 32, 313-329 (2010)

Szell, Lambiotte and Thurner, PNAS 107, 13636-13641 (2010)

# I) Individual: Behavioral codes

Alphabet of 8 letters = action types


(a) Actions

Player 146 ... **A** **A** A A A C C T **E** T E ...  
Player 199 ... C **A** C A A F C C **E** A C ...  
Player 701 ... C C C C **T** T **T** **C** C T C ...

Actions and received actions



Player 199 ... C A **A** C A A **T** F C **T** C **C** E **E** A C ...

(b)





# I) Individual: Behavioral codes



- Most players are “good”, “bad” players are dominant
- Attack is persistent, Communication is anti-persistent
- Receiving neg actions  $\rightarrow$  Performing neg actions



# I) Individual: Mobility

## Mean Square Displacement



finite universe

$$\nu = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{d}{dt}(\text{MSD})$$




expect finite  
size effect



# I) Individual: Mobility

$\nu = 0.26 < 1$   
Subdiffusive

Order of  
visitations!




Players

Models

## 2) Network: 6 Types

Directed one-to-one interactions




Positive	Negative
Friendship	Enmity
Communication	Attack
Trade	Bounty



## 2) Network: Structural differences

Reciprocity




If I \* you, do you \* me?

Positive				Negative		
	Friends	PMs	Trades	Enemies	Attacks	Bounties
$N$	4,313	5,877	18,589	2,906	7,992	2,980
$r$	0.68	0.84	0.57	0.11	0.13	0.20
$C$	0.25	0.28	0.43	0.03	0.06	0.01
$C/C^{\text{rand}}$	109.52	45.71	131.95	6.13	37.27	13.88
$\rho(k^{\text{in}}, k^{\text{out}})$	0.88	0.98	0.93	0.11	0.64	0.31
YES				NO		

## 2) Network: Structural differences

Clustering



If I \* others, do they \* each other?

Positive				Negative		
	Friends	PMs	Trades	Enemies	Attacks	Bounties
$N$	4,313	5,877	18,589	2,906	7,992	2,980
$r$	0.68	0.84	0.57	0.11	0.13	0.20
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$\rho(k^{\text{in}}, k^{\text{out}})$	0.88	0.98	0.93	0.11	0.64	0.31
YES				NO		

## 2) Network: Structural differences


### In/Out degree correlation

If I \* few/many others, do few/many others \* me?

Positive				Negative		
	Friends	PMs	Trades	Enemies	Attacks	Bounties
$N$	4,313	5,877	18,589	2,906	7,992	2,980
$r$	0.68	0.84	0.57	0.11	0.13	0.20
$C$	0.25	0.28	0.43	0.03	0.06	0.01
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$\rho(k^{\text{in}}, k^{\text{out}})$	0.88	0.98	0.93	0.11	0.64	0.31
YES				NO		



## 2) Network: Structural differences




Being marked as enemy

Marking somebody as enemy

Attacking somebody

Being attacked


## 2) Network: Structural differences




Conflict leads to fat tails

## 2) Network: Evolution

Average degrees grow




Diameters shrink



# Densification


## 2) Network: Triadic closure

### Directed triad classes





## 2) Network: Triadic closure




More generally

Expect over-representation of complete triads in friend networks

## 2) Network: Triadic closure


Triad significance profile = Statistical significances of triad classes in the network compared to random networks



Indicates  
triadic closure


## 2) Network: Triadic closure

Measure all transitions between triad classes over time interval




- Explicit quantitative evidence for triadic closure
- Provide transition probabilities for modeling

### 3) Network-network: Multiplexity






### 3) Network-network: Multiplexity



### 3) Network-network: Multiplexity

Usually:

Nature of relations **unavailable**




### 3) Network-network: Multiplexity

Here:

Nature of relations **available**

**Multiplex network**




### 3) Network-network: Multiplexity

Ignorance of relation types



Loss of essential information!



Positive				Negative			All
	Friends	PMs	Trades	Enemies	Attacks	Bounties	
$N$	4,313	5,877	18,589	2,906	7,992	2,980	18,819
$r$	0.68	0.84	0.57	0.11	0.13	0.20	0.59
$C$	0.25	0.28	0.43	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.42
$C/C^{\text{rand}}$	109.52	45.71	131.95	6.13	37.27	13.88	109.93
$\rho(k^{\text{in}}, k^{\text{out}})$	0.88	0.98	0.93	0.11	0.64	0.31	0.95




### 3) Network-network: Interactions


#### Description of co-existence of links

- Link overlap (Jaccard coefficient)

Low



High




### 3) Network-network: Interactions


#### Description of co-existence of links

- Link overlap (Jaccard coefficient)
- Degree correlation


Low



High




### 3) Network-network: Interactions



Different roles in different networks


### 3) Network-network: Social balance

Theory about cognitive dissonance in social networks



Multiplex network of **friends (+)** and **enemies (-)**





### 3) Network-network: Social balance



What does the data say?



### 3) Network-network: Social balance

				
Strong formulation of balance	B	U	B	U
$N_{\Delta}$	26,329	4,428	39,519	8,032
$N_{\Delta,r}$	10,608	30,145	28,545	9,009
$\mathcal{Z}$	71	-112	47	-5

Evidence for **overrepresentation** of **balanced** triads

Evidence for **underrepresentation** of **unbalanced** triads

# Summary

- Establish a large-scale **socio-economic laboratory**
- **Structural differences** between positive and negative tie networks
- **Testing hypotheses:** Triadic closure, Social balance
- Statistical physics approach

# Collaborators

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Vito Latora

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# Institute

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Section for Science of Complex Systems

