Short Title

Author1, Author2

Section I

Subsecrtion 2

Subsecrtion 2

Example Table

Section III

Section IV

Full Presentation Title Subtitle (Optional)

First Author Second Author

Washington University in St. Louis corresponding.author@wustl.edu

Macroeconomics Workshop July 24, 2022

Author1, Author2

Section I

Subsection 2

Example Tabl

Section I

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Section IV

Body slide example 1

- After the outbreak of COVID-19, the global economy experienced ...
- The literature has yet to identify its causes.
 - A survey conducted by World Bank implies
 - However, the recent survey by IMF shows ...
- Three possible causes:
 - 1 Item 1
 - 2 Item 2
 - 3 Item 3

Section III

Section IV

Body slide example 2

- Onstruct a general equilibrium model incorporating ...
- 2 Take the model to the data including the pandemic period.
- 3 Run simulations with the estimated model.

Example Tabl

Section II

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Body slide example 3

- Our findings are threefold:
 - ① Finding 1
 - 2 Finding 2
 - S Finding 3
- Additional Comment 1
- Additional Comment 2

Subsection 1
Subsection 2

Section II

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Section I'

Blocks of Highlighted Text

Block Title

"block" generates this type of block.

Example Block Title

"exampleblock" generates this type of block.

Alert Block Title

"alertblock" generates this type of block.

You can use these commends without a title. If you do so, this type of block will be generated.

Definitions & Theorem

Definition

A good is normal if the demand for it increases as income rises.

Theorem (1st Fundermental Theorem of Welfare **Economies**)

If the price and allocation constitute a competitive equiolibrium, then this allocation is Pareto optimal. Author2

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Lemma, Proof, & Corollary

Lemma (Shepard's lemma)

If $z(\bar{w},q)$ consists of a single point, then $c(\cdot)$ is differentiable with respect to w at \bar{w} and $\nabla_w c(\bar{w},q) = z(\bar{w},q)$.

Proof.

See Chapter 15 of the textbook.

Corollary

A pure strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of a game if and only if it is a degenerated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.

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Table How to include tables

Parameter	Value	S.E.
Parameter 1	3.443	0.562
Parameter 2	2.110	0.910
Parameter 3	0.310	0.096

Table: Table caption

Author1, Author2

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C .. D

Figure How to include figures




Figure: Figure Caption

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$$i_t = i^* + \phi_y(y_t - y^*) + \phi_\pi(\pi_t - \pi^*)$$
 (1)

Section

Subsecrtion 2 Subsecrtion 2

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Example (Figure Slide Code)

```
\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=0.95\linewidth]{sample_fig.png}
\caption{Figure Caption}
\end{figure}
```

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Slide without title.

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Citing References

- Literature focuses on
 - 1 imperfect information [Smith, 2022]
 - 2 transaction cost [Appleseed, 2020]
- This is an example of citing references.

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Example Table

Example Figur

Section IV

John Smith (2022)

"People buy what, when, and why?"

Example Journal of Economic Theory 1(3), 445 – 487.



Jane Appleseed (2020)

"Invest less and consume less"

Microeconomics and Macroeconomics 22(1), 19 - 48.