you take yourself to be arguing against so that there is some chance that they will be persuaded.

1) Since we have spent relatively little time on any individual thinker (or group of thinkers like the logical positivists), it is reasonable to think that their views have been presented --- both in the textbook and in lecture --- in a way that is not terribly fair to the person being discussed. That is, one might think either that 1) their *actual* views had to be more sophisticated than presented or 2) even if their actual views were not more sophisticated, it is possible to make their views more plausible while preserving the core of the view. Either by looking more deeply into the view of a certain person (or group of people) that we have studied or by thinking up a reasonable defense on your own, argue (i.e. give reasons) that at least one objection to the view that we discussed can be successfully answered. (Although certain figures were mentioned in class, we did not study Hegel, Heidegger, Adler or Freud. When in doubt about whether we studied a figure, consult your TA or me.) Here is an example:

Quine
Kuhn

   a. We dismissed Popper by noting that holism about testability suggests that no theory is straightforwardly (or "outright") falsifiable since one may always place the blame for a bad prediction on something other than the theory. But, maybe Popper doesn't need to think that theories are straightforwardly falsifiable to solve the demarcation problem. Perhaps we only defeated a rather crude and simplistic version of his view. How could his view be made to be more sophisticated while still solving the demarcation problem?

2) Another thing one might think is that the views that we have dismissed really *cannot* be made more sophisticated without rejecting a core element of the view. One way to argue this is to suggest the most reasonable response to a certain objection to the view and then to suggest that that response will contradict other elements of the thinker's views. For example:

   a. One might think that if Popper doesn't think that theories are outright falsifiable (because of holism about testability) then he thinks instead that we are sometimes justified in thinking that theories are false even if they might be true. But, it can, at least, look as if that claim contradicts his view that induction is unjustified; we come to a conclusion that is not guaranteed by our evidence. If it does, then it

Verification theory of meaning

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holism about testability?

3) In the online forum, it was suggested that a key difference between "green" and "grue" is that I can tell purely observationally whether something is green whereas I cannot tell whether something is grue by observation alone. For example, if I become confused about what year it is and I am unsure whether it is currently 2020 or 2050, if you show me something green, I will be able to tell you that it is green by looking at it (assuming reasonable lighting), but if you ask me whether it is grue, I won't know. (It is grue if it was first observed before 2030 and it is not grue, if it wasn't. But I don't know whether it was or wasn't in the imagined scenario.) Why would the fact that one can observe whether something is green but not whether something is grue suggest that the all emeralds are green induction is more cogent than the induction that concludes that all emeralds are grue? Alternatively, argue that it isn't that fact that suggests that the one induction is better than the other. One way to do that would be to argue that it is some other fact that suggests it. Another way is just to argue directly that it isn't that fact without giving a positive suggestion as to what fact it, instead, is.

4) Has Quine provided convincing reasons to think that there are no analytic truths, that every statement could, in principle, be given up as a response to experiment? If you think he has, why not think that when we come to reject a sentence that we previously took to be analytic, we have simply changed the meanings of the words it contains? For example, though there might be an observation that might make us say "There are non-male bachelors", one might think that we are now simply using the word "bachelor" with a different meaning than before. The idea here is that using the original meaning of "bachelor", "bachelors are male" really was an analytic truth. All he has shown, one might think, is that we can change the meanings of words, but that is obvious insofar as you and I could set up a code in which the word "bachelor" means anything we like and it isn't clear why that fact would show that there are no analytic truths. If, on the other hand, you think Quine hasn't shown that there are no analytic truths, why do so many putative examples of analytic truths seem not to really be so. For example, most would say that "Bicycles have two wheels" is an analytic truth, but bicycles with four wheels (including two additional "training wheels") are routine and well-known to us. So it looks as if it is not straightforwardly part of the meaning of "bicycle" that a bicycle has only two wheels. Why not think that other putative examples of analytic truths are exactly like this in not really being analytic? Perhaps we just lack the ability to imagine their falsity, but they could be false.