

Defending Language Models Against Image-Based Prompt Attacks via User-Provided Specifications

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OpenAI's GPT Store is now live with over 3 million custom chatbots to try

Christoph Schwaiger

January 10, 2024 · 2 min read




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LLM-based chatbots are on the rise because they are easy to customize.




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LLM-based Chatbot


System Prompt: You are Parking Pal, a chatbot designed to serve as a parking sign interpreter.

Hi, can you help me with a parking sign?

Of course, I'd be happy to help you. Please upload an image of the sign.




LLM-based Chatbot



System Prompt:

Description and the
guidelines for the chatbot

LLM-based Chatbot



System Prompt:

Description and the guidelines for the chatbot


User input:

Input to the chatbot

LLM output:

Output from the chatbot

MLLM-based Chatbot



System Prompt:

Description and the guidelines for the chatbot


User input:

Input to the chatbot

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LLM-based Chatbot



System Prompt:

Description and the guidelines for the chatbot

Delimitation:

Boundary between system and user prompts

User input:


Input to the chatbot

LLM output:

Output from the chatbot

MLLM-based Chatbot

LLMs can be tricked into following the input instructions and violating the system prompt even with strong delimitation techniques.




Delimitation:

Boundary between system and user prompts


Malicious input:

Input to the chatbot trying to violate a property defined by the system prompt

LLM-based Chatbot




LLM-based Chatbot



Violation:

The output is a potential violation of the chatbot description assuming it was explicitly instructed to not make any sale.

LLM-based Chatbot




Malicious input:

This need not be text, it can be image, video or audio.

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MLLM-based Chatbot



Malicious input:

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
Violation:

The output is a potential violation of the chatbot description assuming it was explicitly instructed to not make any sale.

Prompt Injection Attack:

Prompt injection occurs when an adversary, armed with their own system prompt SP' , manages to manipulate one or more interactions, making the system behave as if its system prompt was SP' .

MLLM-based Chatbot



Original system prompt:

SP

Malicious input manipulates the MLLM to assume the adversarial system prompt


Inferred system prompt:

SP'

Prompt Injection Attack:

Prompt injection occurs when an adversary, armed with their own system prompt SP', manages to manipulate one or more interactions, making the system behave as if its system prompt was SP'.

MLLM-based Chatbot



Original system prompt:

Do not make any sale or sale related commitment to the user

Malicious input manipulates the MLLM to assume the adversarial system prompt

Inferred system prompt:

Make any sale or sale related commitment to the user

Image based prompt attacks:

Image based prompt attacks:

Does this image
looks malicious to
you?



Image based prompt attacks:

Does this image looks
malicious to you?




Image based prompt attacks:

Does this image looks
malicious to you?



Image based prompt attacks:

1. Easier to hide



Image based prompt attacks:

1. Easier to hide
2. Less explored, no popular dataset or detection technique



Image based prompt attacks:

1. Easier to hide
2. Less explored, no popular dataset or detection technique
3. Misbelief that image based attacks can be detected by techniques used for text based attacks by converting images into textual descriptions



Input validation opportunity:


Input validation opportunity:

Syntax check

Text input	Image input
Length of the text	Size of the image
Language of the text	Resolution of the image
...	...
Repetitive patterns	

Input validation opportunity:

MLLM-based chatbots generally use image input for a specific purpose, for example, the parking pal chatbot only wants images with parking sign.




Input validation opportunity:

Semantics check

Text input	Image input
Meaning of the text	Content in the image
...	...

Two step defense pipeline:




Prompt Injection Attack:

Classical code injection attacks have always been a challenge for HTML and SQL. They can be generalized as data becoming a part of the code due to manipulations.


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Compiling Parsing technique:

Decades old technique for detecting code injection attack in HTML or SQL programs.

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The essence of command injection attacks in web applications

[Z Su](#), [G Wassermann](#)

[Acml Sigplan Notices, 2006](#) • [dl.acm.org](#)




Web applications typically interact with a back-end database to retrieve persistent data and then present the data to the user as dynamically generated output, such as HTML web pages. However, this interaction is commonly done through a low-level API by dynamically constructing query strings within a general-purpose programming language, such as Java. This low-level interaction is ad hoc because it does not take into account the structure of the output language. Accordingly, user inputs are treated as isolated

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
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
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
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


Compiling Parsing technique:


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
Compiling Parsing technique for detecting prompt injections:




Compiling Parsing technique for detecting prompt injections:




Compiling Parsing technique for detecting prompt injections:



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


Two step defense pipeline:




Input validation opportunity:

We need a way to describe valid input images




Input validation opportunity:


We use SPML to describe image specifications




Using same infrastructure for input validation:



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Two step defense pipeline:




Case Study:


We generated multiple malicious images which were successfully able to execute prompt injection attack on GPT4-Vision, LLAVA-13B or MiniGPT-4 enabled parking pal chatbot.




(a) Parking sign with malicious readable text written on it.



(b) Image with clear readable malicious text written over a light background.




(c) Image with less readable text from Image 7b due to a translucent overlay.



(d) Image with readable malicious text written over a light background inside a chat bubble with a clip art of a police woman and a police badge intended to show authority.



(e) Image with near invisible malicious unreadable text taken from the Image 7b written over a light background.




(f) Image with readable malicious text in large font written over a light background in multiple tiles.



(g) Image with near invisible malicious unreadable text written over a light background. Similar to Image 7b a police women and a police badge to show authority.

Malicious image input:

What makes an image malicious?



Attack payload:

Descriptions which violate chatbot specification


Attack technique:

Manipulations needed to make MLLM execute the payload



Harmful image input:

What makes a malicious image harmful?



MLLM Capability:

MLLM needs to understand the attack



Attack payload:

Descriptions which violate chatbot specification



Attack technique:

Manipulations needed to make MLLM execute the payload

Attack Payload Detection:

An image which can manipulate the MLLM into violating the chatbot specification will also be filled by the LLM Parse.

Attack Payload Detection:

An image which can manipulate the MLLM into violating the chatbot specification will also be able to fill the partial SPML specification.

This makes SPML specification based detection technique completely dependent on the attack payload instead of attack technique.

Case Study Insights:

1. Larger MLLMs are better in detecting the attack payload using our system.

**Higher accuracy does not
mean more security:**

An image may be malicious
but may not be harmful for a
particular MLLM.

Case Study Insights:

2. Image based prompt attacks are not universal

Larger MLLM harmful images do not become smaller MLLM harmful image:

Smaller MLLM may lack the capabilities to interpret it.

Smaller MLLM harmful images do not become larger MLLM harmful image:

Larger MLLMs may be more robust in handling manipulation and adhering to chatbot specifications

Case Study Insights:

3. Converting image inputs to text and using text-based prompt injection techniques do not always work

Discussion:

Meta specification based detection is only as good as the specification. Anything that is not included in the specification or does not affect the LLM-parse will not affect the chatbot

Discussion:

There is a belief that this is a temporary phenomenon and more powerful MLLMs cannot be manipulated. However, we argue that in architecture where there is a specific component responsible for preventing prompt attack is inherently better

Discussion:

Building chatbots using MLLMs that honors the delimitation between the specification and input is essential for secure customization of LLMs. However, this is an arms race; the defenses will remain susceptible to adaptive attacks

Summary

Defending Language Models Against Image-Based Prompt Attacks via User-Provided Specifications

