


Emotions and understanding - Wittgensteinian perspectives

Palgrave Macmillan - Thomism



Description: -

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Philosophy of mind

Emotions (Philosophy)

Wittgenstein, Ludwig -- 1889-1951 Emotions and understanding -

Wittgensteinian perspectives

-Emotions and understanding - Wittgensteinian perspectives

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Phenomenology (philosophy)

What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and inasmuch it is given in the intentional acts. The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.

Thomism

The same goes for the apprehension of mathematical formulae or a number. The methodological aim is just to restrict the scope of concern with these objects and hence the relevant evidence proper to phenomenology: one considers them specifically only as intended i.

Thomism

Philosophers disagree then over how richly intentional and thus, as we might also say, how cognitively rich phenomenal character is. For they desire evil only under the aspect of good, that is, insofar as they think it good.

Phenomenology (philosophy)

Thomas, the future in Rome, published a six volume Summa philosophica 1777 giving an Aristotelian interpretation of Aquinas validating the senses as a source of knowledge. One may even doubt whether that idea should be endorsed on any construal; according to Dretske 1995, conscious states are not states we are conscious of, but states we are conscious with. He often affirmed 's views with independent arguments, and largely followed terminology and.

Phenomenology (philosophy)

Discussion of the first question can be found in the supplement,. Chudnoff2015 furnishes a detailed overview and assessment of the debate. .

Phenomenology (philosophy)

He complained of being misunderstood by his students, and he revised his position as his thought developed.

Thomism

It is often thought that consciousness is the real sticking point here: that is what makes it hard to secure the strong form of necessitation desired, or to put to explanatory use such necessity as we have grounds to think is there. We may thus think of things when we neither perceive them by the senses, nor form sensory images of them by e. Rather, the question is whether the subjective character of your experience when you read, speak, or listen to others, would remain unchanged if all understanding were stripped away, or if differences in how you understood the words were radically switched around.

Phenomenology (philosophy)

But opposition or skepticism regarding all such accounts can coexist with intentionalism in the broadest sense.

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