

In defence of free will - with other philosophical essays

Allen & Unwin - Philosophical skepticism



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Philosophical skepticism

To the extent that modal claims do quantify over possible worlds, the ontological points made about mathematics apply well here too.

Moral Particularism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In response, advocates of non-reductive physicalism respond that there is nothing wrong with such an apparent duplication of causes if it is also specified that the latter metaphysically supervene on the former. However, this position still seems to call for a positive explanation of how synthetic philosophical knowledge might be established without a posteriori evidence, even if it is restricted to trained philosophers. But in other philosophical areas the methodologically naturalistic project may seem less obviously applicable.

Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

There is a practical difference between particularism and generalism, but it is not this. We should, however, distinguish between those who attempt such a reduction directly in physicalistic, such as neurophysiological, terms and those who do so in mentalistic terms, such as by using unconscious mental states or other cognitive notions. Then presumably they have to try to agree at least on which principles are to be taken as relevant that is, to agree on the principles, and to agree that they are the relevant ones in the present case.

Philosophical skepticism

Maia Neto, José Raimundo, 1959—, Paganini, Gianni, 1950—, Laursen, John Christian. But there are also reasons for doubting whether any form of generalism can really be true. The supposed need for principles comes after that decision, not before.

Consciousness

I now turn to questions which focus on motivation. Similarly, there seems no reason why the naturalist realist options in the moral case should be in tension with methodological naturalism.

Philosophical skepticism

Recall a point made at the beginning of our discussion of methodological naturalism. Since non-actual worlds do not inhabit our spatiotemporal realm, an ontologically naturalist realism seems to be ruled out from the start.

Consciousness

The third question asks us what relevance other cases do have to a new case, if not the sort of relevance that the generalist supposes. The Roman politician and philosopher, , was also an adherent of the skepticism of the New Academy, even though a return to a more orientation of the school was already beginning to take place. Thus Mersenne argues that this cannot be the case, since commonly agreed upon rules of thumb can be hypothesized and tested over time to ensure that they continue to hold.

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