


In defence of free will - with other philosophical essays

Allen & Unwin - Consciousness



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Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Each such action is wrong overall, despite any redeeming features it may have.

Consciousness

We need to distinguish here between an interest in claims which, as it happens, have modal implications, on the one hand, and an interest in those modal implications themselves, on the other. Perhaps the most popular contemporary alternative to fictionalism is the version of non-naturalist realism offered by the neo-Fregean thesis that abstract mathematical beliefs can be justified as analytic truths that follow from logic and certain meaning stipulations. For example...feeling hungry... has an immediate cognitive effect, namely, the desire to eat....

Moral Particularism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

On the other hand, if conscious mental activity is identical with brain activity, then it would seem that when all brain activity ceases, so do all conscious experiences and thus no immortality. So, for example, any being who thinks about the square root of two will do so in virtue of instantiating some physical properties, but these can be different physical properties in different cases—in one human being it may be one set of neural arrangements, in another a different set, and in other life forms it might involve nothing like neural properties at all.

Moral Particularism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

If so, then a challenge to the naturalist status of modal claims will threaten the naturalist status of all philosophy.

Moral Particularism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Currently, one method used is simply to study some aspect of neural functioning with sophisticated detecting equipments such as MRIs and PET scans and then correlate it with first-person reports of conscious experience. Our concept forming mechanisms simply will not allow us to grasp the physical and causal basis of consciousness. A counter-example to this claim would be a case where, for peculiar reasons no doubt, the fact that

one has promised to do something is either no reason to do it or even a reason not to do it.

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