


# Emotions and understanding - Wittgensteinian perspectives

Palgrave Macmillan - Thomism



Description: -

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Philosophy of mind  
Emotions (Philosophy)  
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## Thomism

We have seen how Brentano addresses this concern, recently renewed in connection with contemporary theories see Kriegel 2009 and Siewert 2013b. The possibility of non-reductive intentionalism may be evident in another important way, particularly relevant to sense experience.

### Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But since sensible things are not actually intelligible, in addition to the intellect, which formally understands, an active power must be acknowledged in the soul, which power abstracts intelligible likeness or species from sense images in the imagination. If being minded or being capable of understanding is essential to what we are, the question of how consciousness figures in mind or understanding is also a question of how it figures in our nature. Part of this lies in figuring out how they are related.

### Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In this section we will set separationism aside, and focus on how intentionalist perspectives differ along this dimension. But these ideas involve no commitment to claiming that what makes a state conscious is its being represented in a special way in the very mind to which it belongs.

## Thomism

But, contra Brentano, this does not mean that experiences continually appear as objects of some inner perception. The project of illuminating the a priori conditions on the basis of which entities show up as intelligible to us is still at the heart of things.

## Phenomenology (philosophy)

We most often start with explicit rules or preformulated approaches and then move to a multiplicity of particular cases, as we become an expert. If pre-emptive challenges to the epistemic significance of consciousness can be met, other issues arise to which the consciousness-intentionality relationship appear relevant.

## **Phenomenology (philosophy)**

The modern philosopher claims, like a sort of confidence man, that if we will grant him this, the rest will be easy; he will straighten out the world, if he is allowed to give this one twist to the mind. And both can say in a very different ways that to understand how consciousness figures in mindedness, one must understand in what ways it is intentional. There are many who disagree with Heidegger's account of the modern technological attitude as the 'enframing' of the world.

## **Phenomenology (philosophy)**

To take first the question of our knowledge of our surroundings: we want to say sense perception plays a role in this. Each of the gates of entry into the topic of intentionality identified above—directedness; conditions of satisfaction; content—arguably opens onto a unitary phenomenon.

## **Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

This overview of consciousness and intentionality in the Brentano-Husserl tradition brings to light several broad areas of discussion. Experts continue to differ considerably over how to interpret his view.

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