

Strategic consumer of a durable-goods monopolist

European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management - Monopoly production and pricing of finitely durable goods with strategic consumers' fluctuating willingness to pay

The multipplant monopolist (2)

- Example
 - Marginal cost of 2 plants: $MC_1(q_1) = c_1 q_1$; $MC_2(q_2) = c_2 q_2$
 - Marginal cost of total production:
$$\frac{q_1}{c_1} = \frac{MC_1}{c_1}; \quad \frac{q_2}{c_2} = \frac{MC_2}{c_2} \Rightarrow q_1 + q_2 = Q =$$

$$\frac{MC_1 + MC_2}{c_1 + c_2} = \frac{(c_1 + c_2)}{c_1 + c_2} Q \Rightarrow MC = \frac{c_1 c_2}{c_1 + c_2} Q$$
- By solving the profit maximization problem we get Q^*

$$A - 2BQ = \frac{c_2}{(c_1 + c_2)^2} Q \Rightarrow Q^* = \frac{A(c_1 + c_2)}{2B(c_1 + c_2) + c_2} \Rightarrow$$

$$\Rightarrow q_1 = \frac{MC_1}{c_1 + c_2} Q^* = \frac{A c_1}{2B(c_1 + c_2) + c_2}$$

$$\Rightarrow q_2 = \frac{MC_2}{c_1 + c_2} Q^* = \frac{A c_2}{2B(c_1 + c_2) + c_2}$$

Description: -

- Monopolies.

Monopsonies.

Durable goods, Consumer Strategic consumer of a durable-goods monopolist

- Working papers (European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management) -- no.92-15 Strategic consumer of a durable-goods monopolist

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Durable

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services. This means that after the monopolist has sold to all consumers, there can be no further sales.

Strategic consumers in a durable

We show that a simple myopic policy is optimal when each period's demand is independent and identically distributed i.

Strategic consumers in a durable

The journal publishes highly selective and widely cited analytical, interpretive, and empirical studies in a number of areas, including monetary theory, fiscal policy, labor economics, development, microeconomic and macroeconomic theory, international trade and finance, industrial organization, and social economics.

Strategic Vertical Differentiation and Durable Goods Monopoly, The Journal of Industrial Economics

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Matthew Walls. Publisher Information Since its origins in 1890 as one of the three main divisions of the University of Chicago, The University of Chicago Press has embraced as its mission the obligation to disseminate scholarship of the highest standard and to publish serious works that promote education, foster public understanding, and enrich cultural life. The conjecture sets up a situation in which a monopolist sells a to a where resale is impossible and faces who have different valuations.

Strategic Vertical Differentiation and Durable Goods Monopoly, The Journal of Industrial Economics

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services. The intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future. Thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers--so innocuous and

useful a simplification in other contexts--has proved misleading in the context of durable-goods monopoly.

Monopoly production and pricing of finitely durable goods with strategic consumers' fluctuating willingness to pay

We formulate the problem of a monopolist durable goods producer as a discrete-time Markov Decision Process and prove certain structural properties of the sales and production policy.

Competition in Durable Goods Markets: The Strategic Consequences of Leasing and Selling

Journal Information Current issues are now on the Chicago Journals website. These structural properties facilitate an efficient computational algorithm, which we use in running numerical experiments to explicate the producer's strategy and to conduct equilibrium comparative statics analysis. This allows to link your profile to this item.

Heterogeneous Consumer Expectations and Monopoly Pricing for Durables with Network Externalities

This paper investigates how the presence of social learning affects the strategic interaction between a dynamic-pricing monopolist and a forward-looking consumer population, within a simple two-period model. Demand volatility and production lead time oblige manufacturers of made-to-stock goods to use economic forecasts in deciding on production quantities.

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