

In defence of free will - with other philosophical essays

Allen & Unwin - Moral Particularism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

	Q	IS	1	2	3	4	5	6		
	W	SD	W	SD						
Freedom	0.03	0.03	0.47	0.50	-	0.09**	0.48*	0.44*	-0.10*	0.08*
						[0.47, 0.50]	[0.42, 0.53]	[0.41, 0.48]	[-0.12, -0.11]	[0.04, 0.13]
Control	0.00	0.00	0.32	0.33	0.09**	-	0.09**	0.48*	-0.10*	0.11**
							[0.07, 0.09]	[0.47, 0.50]	[-0.12, -0.10]	[0.06, 0.16]
Stress	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.04	0.09**	0.09**	-	0.09**	-0.10*	0.14
								[0.03, 0.14]	[0.04, 0.10]	[-0.01, 0.08]
4-Pointment	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	-	-0.10*	0.03
									[-0.12, -0.08]	[-0.02, 0.07]
1.07 score	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-	-0.10*
										[-0.12, -0.08]
5-Expression	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
										[-0.12, -0.08]

W=QIS represent mean and standard deviation respectively. Values in parentheses indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation separately (or correlation between pairs when bivariate). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

Description: -

- Knowledge, Theory of:

Ethics. In defence of free will - with other philosophical essays

- Library of philosophy

Muirhead library of philosophy In defence of free will - with other philosophical essays

Notes: Bibliographical footnotes.

This edition was published in 1967



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Tags: #Philosophical #skepticism

Philosophical skepticism

This combination of views is less straightforward. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.

Moral Particularism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

While he himself was a critic of the philosophers, Ghazali was a master in the art of philosophy and had immensely studied the field. For if we said merely that if this feature were the only feature, it would decide the issue, we would have said something that is probably both false and, worse, incoherent. It clarifies by contrast, and so illuminates what is required for knowledge and justified belief.

Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

First-Order Representationalism A First-order representational FOR theory of consciousness is a theory that attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed or first-order intentional states. In response, materialists will point out that such experiences can be artificially induced in various experimental situations, and that starving the brain of oxygen is known to cause hallucinations.

Moral Particularism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

For one thing, philosophical questions are often distinguished by their great generality.

Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The details deserve to be worked through, but on the face of things we might expect knowledge of causally significant spatiotemporal moral facts to be synthetic and a posteriori. Strongly interactionist views that allow the conscious mind to make an independent difference to the physical world have few defenders nowadays but see Lowe 2000, 2003; Steward 2015.

Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

There is also something it is like to be a conscious creature whereas there is nothing it is like to be, for example, a table or tree. However, it is not hard to see that even in these latter cases the causal closure thesis played a crucial role.

Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

This is not an argument, and there is nothing going on here that really merits being called inference.

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