


Emotions and understanding - Wittgensteinian perspectives

Palgrave Macmillan - Thomism



Description: -

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Philosophy of mind

Emotions (Philosophy)

Wittgenstein, Ludwig -- 1889-1951 Emotions and understanding -

Wittgensteinian perspectives

-Emotions and understanding - Wittgensteinian perspectives

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Tags: #Consciousness #and #Intentionality #(Stanford #Encyclopedia #of #Philosophy)

Phenomenology (philosophy)

But that interpretation would be resisted by those who regard it as crucial to seeing what makes Heidegger differ from Husserl that we take him to deny we are ordinarily conscious of things in dealing with them see Dreyfus 1991; K  ufer and Chemero 2015.

Phenomenology (philosophy)

On this interpretation, if instead you have a subjectively indistinguishable snake-hallucination, you may have what is in other respects the same noema, minus the snake constituent. Should we accept that subjective character would be invariant across scenarios described in terms of such variations? Any being is the adequate object of understanding in general.

Thomism

In offering an alternative to his perspective, one might try to locate a significant difference in kind between minded and mindless beings in something other than consciousness. Argumentum ex gradu, or the ; and 5.

Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

On the other hand, one may wonder if one can do justice to the subjectivity of experience, its perspectival and error-prone nature, while maintaining some form of object-dependence. And whatever occurs on the way to the end under the motion of something else is also a cause.

Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Furthermore, it has been claimed that a number of elements within phenomenology mainly Heidegger's thought have some resonance with Eastern philosophical ideas, particularly with and. Relatedly for Merleau-Ponty: the organization and adjustment of movements involved in bodily understanding, though norm-guided, and experienced, must not be regarded as always chosen— your moves are objects of personal choice only when specifically endorsed for reasons.

Thomism

If this is right, then it is hard to see how we could get a notion of intentionality to cover both cases, as long as this is understood as some kind of reference to what might not exist. Thoughts, unlike roads, can direct you to a city that is not there. Substances are things which exist per se or in their own right.

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