

The Role of Firms in the Assimilation of Immigrants

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Motivation

Immigrant assimilation: topic of importance for policymakers, public, researchers

Firm heterogeneity + imperfect competition: central to understand labor markets

- ▷ Mounting evidence that *where* someone works—i.e., which *firm*—matters
 - ▷ Firm pay premiums (Abowd et al., 1999, Card et al. 2018)
 - ▷ Learning on-the-job (Arellano-Bover and Saltiel, 2021; Jarosch et al., 2021)
 - ▷ Unemployment duration (Cingano and Rosolia, 2012)
 - ▷ Non-pay amenities (Sorkin, 2018)
 - ▷ Intergenerational labor market outcomes (San, 2021)

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→ *What's the role of heterogeneous firms in immigrants' assimilation?*

How might firms relate to labor market assimilation?

Firm contributions to immigrant-native wage gap

- ▷ Differential sorting into high- and low-paying firms; differential within-firm premiums
- Potentially different explanation of wage gaps:
 - ▷ worker productive abilities + perfect competition, vs. firm choices + imperfect competition

Assimilation in non-pay employer attributes

- ▷ Are firms hiring immigrants very different from those hiring natives?
- ▷ Especially along attributes related to firm quality?

Role of job-to-job mobility

- ▷ Key for wage growth of young labor market entrants (Topel and Ward, 1992)
- ▷ Plausibly important too for newly arrived immigrants...
- ▷ ... yet **commonly limited by regulations**, making immigrants' job mobility hard to study
 - ▷ e.g., unauthorized immigration, visas limiting job mobility

This paper

Context: historical mass migration ~1m. former Soviet Union Jews to Israel (1990s)

- ▷ Immigrants became Israeli citizens on arrival → no differential regulatory restrictions
- Key institutional feature: we can study “unconstrained assimilation”

Data: Israeli population employer-employee data, 1985–2019

- ▷ Featuring: place of birth, date of arrival to Israel, long panel
- ▷ Unusually good admin. coverage of immigrants immediately since arrival

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1. Revisit earnings assimilation, assessing how firms mediate this process

- ▷ Differential sorting (of high- vs. low-paying firms)
- ▷ Differential pay setting (for immigrants vs. natives, within firms)

2. Assimilation in job search and firm ladder climbing

3. Document assimilation in employer attributes (firm quality, segregation)

Summary of Findings: Wages and Firms' Pay Premiums Assimilation

Large initial immigrant-native wage gap (0.60–0.90 log points)

- ▷ Closes 27–29 years after arrival in Israel

Estimation of group-specific AKM wage model:

- ▷ Firm-specific pay premiums for immigrants and natives are highly correlated
- ▷ But lower on average (2%–10%) for immigrants (*differential pay setting*)

Firm Pay Premium Gap explains 10–27% of wage gap during first 10 years

- ▷ Differential sorting and differential *pay setting* are both present

Granular age-at-arrival and arrival-cohort effects

- ▷ We find age effects for wages, but cohort effects for firm pay premiums

Summary of Findings: Job Search and Firm Ladder Assimilation

FSU immigrants **change jobs** more often than comparable natives

- ▷ Consistent with low search capital

Conditional on changing jobs, immigrants take **greater steps up the job ladder**

Job search gaps largest in early years but remain **persistent** (especially for males)

- ▷ Immigrants may be intrinsically more mobile, never “assimilating” along this dimension

Summary of Findings: Assimilation in Non-Pay Employer Attributes

Immigrants initially employed at small, young, segregated, and less desirable firms

- ▷ Convergence faster in firm age
- ▷ Convergence slower in firm size, firm desirability, and segregation
- ▷ Eventual catch up with natives (except segregation)

Employment across sectors:

- ▷ Evidence on FSU immigrants' contribution to Israeli high-tech sector expansion
- ▷ Over-representation of immigrants where portability of FSU skills more plausible, and where language barrier less constraining

Literature contribution

Immigrants' labor market assimilation

Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985; Lubotsky, 2007; Cohen-Goldner et al., 2012; Abramitzky et al., 2014; Aydemir and Skuterud, 2008; Pendakur and Woodcock, 2010; Carneiro et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2012; Damas de Matos, 2017; Alexander and Ward, 2018; Dostie et al., 2021; Rho and Sanders, 2021; Albert et al., 2021; Adda et al., 2022

- Firms' role in wage assimilation, job search assimilation, employer assimilation
- Unique institutional setting: "unconstrained assimilation"

Imperfectly competitive labor market and migration

Naidu et al., 2016; Dustmann et al., 2021; Amior and Manning, 2021; Amior and Stuhler, 2022

- Degree of within-firm differential pay setting immigrants vs. natives
- Focus on search frictions and mobility restrictions

Firm-driven wage inequality

Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 2013, 2016, 2018; Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2017; Sorkin, 2017; Song et al., 2019; Dostie et al., 2021; Gerard et al., 2021

- AKM framework to study immigrant-native wage gap, *dynamic* in nature

Outline

- 1. Historical and Institutional Context**
- 2. Data**
- 3. Framework: Wages, Firm Ladder, and Assimilation Statistics**
- 4. Results**


Historical context

- ▷ 1989: USSR relaxed emigration restrictions, Soviet Jews started leaving massively
- ▷ Israel accepted FSU Jews unconditionally, encouraged immigration
- ▷ 1989–1999: ~840,000 FSU Jews migrate to Israel (1989 pop.=4.5m)
- ▷ 1989–1991 alone: 345,000 arrivals (7.7% of 1989 pop.)

New York Times

NEW YORK, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1990

50 cents beyond 75 miles from N.Y.



Soviet Jews, part of the largest influx of immigrants to Israel in 40 years, arriving yesterday in Lod.

Rush of Soviet Jews to Israel Rises As Fears of Moscow Chaos Grow

By YOUSSEF M. IBRAHIM

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Dec. 21 — A sudden surge in the number of Soviet Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel this month may well bring the total of Jews settling here this year to more than 200,000, making it perhaps the largest influx of immigrants in 40 years.

The Government has ordered El Al, the national airline, to place every available plane at the disposal of the

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Clearly stated by the surge of immi-
May Be a Record Year

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
Thousands Go to Countri
in Show of War Readin

By PATRICK E. TYLER
Special to The New York Times

BANI SAD, Iraq, Dec. 21 — thousands of poor Iraqis from Bashehad's largest Muslim t

Former Soviet Union Migration to Israel

(Israel Central Bureau of Statistics) [► more](#)



Historical context

- ▷ Negative effects on natives? If any, modest and short-lived
Friedberg, 2001; Cohen-Goldner and Paserman, 2011; Cohen-Goldner et al., 2012
- ▷ On arrival: **citizenship**, benefits, unrestricted residential/employment choices
- ▷ Comprehensive but modest assistance to new arrivals
 - ▷ Hebrew classes (most did not speak the language)
 - ▷ Modest income support; jobs needed shortly after arrival
- ▷ FSU immigrants were **highly educated** (Cohen-Goldner et al., 2012)
 - ▷ College degree among prime-age men: 30% FSU immigrants, 17% Israelis

Institutional Setting: “Unconstrained” Assimilation

- ▷ Israel *encouraged* immigration
- ▷ Citizenship on arrival
 - ▷ No differential labor market regulations wrt. natives
- Immigrants quickly show up on administrative data
 - ▷ Less worry about informality
- Unrestricted job mobility
 - ▷ We can study assimilation free of regulatory constraints
 - ≠ H-1B visas in US and similar programs (e.g., Canada, Australia, Sweden)
 - ≠ Undocumented immigrants



Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with FSU immigrants, 1994

Historical Setting: Additional favorable features for our study

Key features: **numerosity** of the migration wave and **exogeneity** of migration timing

- ▷ Large N is necessary to estimate high-dimensional wage models
- ▷ Less selection: timing of migration decoupled from career dynamics

⇒ Findings speak to **scenarios of free mobility and/or large migration waves**

- ▷ Contemporary regulations in most rich countries limit these scenarios
- ▷ Nevertheless, policy-relevant counterfactual (now and in the future)
 - ▷ German reunification
 - ▷ European Union expansion episodes
 - ▷ 19% of Ukrainian population currently in other European countries (CReAM)
 - ▷ Large-scale migration induced by climate change (Cattaneo and Peri, 2016)

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Data: Population administrative records from Israel

1. Matched employer-employee records (1985–2019)
 - ▷ Person and firm IDs, monthly firm-worker indicators, monthly wage, industry
2. Israeli Population Registry
 - ▷ Demographics, country of birth, date of immigration to Israel

Sample Selection: Years 1991–2019, persons of age 25–59

1. Israeli natives, excluding Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews
2. FSU immigrants who arrived in Israel between 1990–1999

► Summary statistics, males

► Summary statistics, females

► Age at arrival distribution

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Group-Specific Job Ladder Wage Model

AKM model incorporating assimilation and group-specific firm pay premiums:

$$\ln w_{it} = \theta_{A_{it}}^{g(i)} + \alpha_i + \psi_J^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\beta_{g(i)} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- ▷ $\ln w_{it}$ = log monthly wage
- ▷ $g(i) \in \{\text{native, FSU immigrant}\} \times \{\text{male, female}\}$
- ▷ $\theta_{A_{it}}^g \equiv f^g(A_{it}) = f^g(\text{years since arrival in Israel})$
- ▷ α_i = person effect
- ▷ ψ_J^g = pay premium firm J pays to workers of group g
- ▷ X_{it} = time and age effects
- ▷ ε_{it} = error term

What's in a firm pay premium?

Two different wage-setting models result in AKM specification:

- ▷ Rent sharing model (Card, Cardoso, Kline, 2016)
- ▷ Monopsonistic wage setting model (Card, Cardoso, Heining Kline, 2018)

Drivers of heterogeneous firm pay premiums ψ_j^g :

- ▷ *Between-firm* differences in pay premiums:
 - Related to firm productivity (average match surplus, value-added per worker)
- ▷ *Within-firm* differences in pay premiums for immigrants vs. natives:
 - Differences in reservation wages, bargaining power, outside options, or firm-specific labor supply elasticities

Identification and normalization

$$\ln w_{it} = \theta_{A_{it}}^{g(i)} + \alpha_i + \psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\beta_{g(i)} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- ▷ Identification of firm effects thanks to **firm switchers**
 - ▷ Large N for FSU immigrants + long panel are key
- ▷ OLS provides consistent estimates under exogenous mobility assumption
 - ▷ ε_{it} conditionally independent of employer transitions
- ▷ Many existing checks consistent with exogenous mobility assumption:
 - ▷ Data from Germany, Italy, Portugal, US, Brazil
Card et al., 2013; Macis and Schivardi, 2016; Card et al., 2016; Song et al., 2019; Gerard et al., 2021
- ▷ Firm fixed effects across groups are not comparable without a **normalization**
 - ▷ Assume mean pay premium in **restaurant** industry is equal to zero for all groups
(Card et al., 2016; Gerard et al., 2021) ▶ CDF industry averages

Assimilation statistics: Overall wage gap

Wage model: $\ln w_{it} = \theta_{A_{it}}^{g(i)} + \alpha_i + \psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\beta_{g(i)} + \varepsilon_{it}$

Statistic: Immigrant-native wage gap, as a function of time since arrival

$$G_A^w \equiv \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it}|M, A_{it}, X_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it}|N, X_{it})$$

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$$G_A^w \equiv \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it}|M, A_{it}, X_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it}|N, X_{it})$$

Interpretation:

$$G_A^w = \underbrace{\theta_{A_{it}}}_{\text{non-firm assimilation}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\alpha_i|M) - \mathbb{E}(\alpha_i|N)}_{\text{baseline differences}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(it)}^M|M, A_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(it)}^N|N)}_{\text{firm assimilation: pay setting and sorting}}$$

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OLS estimation: $\ln w_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$

Assimilation statistics: Within-firm wage gap

Wage model: $\ln w_{it} = \theta_{A_{it}}^{g(i)} + \alpha_i + \psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\beta_{g(i)} + \varepsilon_{it}$

Statistic: Immigrant-native wage gap, controlling for employer identity

$$G_{A|J}^w \equiv \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it}|M, A_{it}, J(i, t)) - \mathbb{E}(\ln w_{it}|N, J(i, t))$$

Interpretation:

$$\begin{aligned} G_{A|J}^w = & \underbrace{\theta_{A_{it}}}_{\text{non-firm assimilation}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\alpha_i|M, A_{it}, J(i, t)) - \mathbb{E}(\alpha_i|N, J(i, t))}_{\text{within-firm baseline differences}} \\ & + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^M|M, A_{it}, J(i, t)) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N|N, J(i, t))}_{\text{firm assimilation: pay setting only}} \end{aligned}$$

OLS estimation: $\ln w_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it}\gamma + \phi_{J(i,t)} + \varepsilon_{it}$

Assimilation statistics: Firm pay premium gap

Wage model: $\ln w_{it} = \theta_{A_{it}}^{g(i)} + \alpha_i + \psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\beta_{g(i)} + \varepsilon_{it}$

Statistic: Immigrant-native gap in pay premium, as a function of time since arrival

$$G_A^\psi = \mathbb{E} \left(\psi_{J(it)}^M | M, A_{it} \right) - \mathbb{E} \left(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | N \right)$$

2-step OLS estimation: $\hat{\psi}_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$

Decomposition: differential pay setting vs. differential sorting

$$\underbrace{G_A^\psi}_{\text{firm pay premium gap}} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^M - \psi_{J(i,t)}^N | M, A_{it})}_{\text{differential pay setting (within)}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | M, A_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | N)}_{\text{differential sorting (between)}}.$$

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2. Data

3. Framework: Wages, Firm Ladder, and Assimilation Statistics


4. Results

1. Group-specific AKM

2. Assimilation


Immigrant-specific and native-specific firm pay premiums - Males

100 equally-sized bins ordered according to $\hat{\psi}_j^N$




Immigrant-specific and native-specific firm pay premiums - Females

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
Immigrant-specific and native-specific firm pay premiums - Males

Industry averages



Immigrant-specific and native-specific firm pay premiums - Females


Industry averages



Worker-firm assortative matching - Males

$$\hat{\alpha}_{it} = \delta + \theta \cdot \hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\gamma + \eta_{it}$$


- ▷ Estimated separately by natives/immigrants and by years since arrival
- ▷ Measurement error: use IV (firm premium of other group) (Gerard et al. 2021)



Worker-firm assortative matching - Females

$$\hat{\alpha}_{it} = \delta + \theta \cdot \hat{\psi}_{j(i,t)}^{g(i)} + X'_{it}\gamma + \eta_{it}$$


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Employment assimilation


Can estimate using admin data thanks to observing *date of arrival*

$$employed_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$




Wage assimilation: overall and within firms - Males

$$\ln w_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + \phi_{J(i,t)} + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$




Wage assimilation: overall and within firms - Females

$$\ln w_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + \phi_{J(i,t)} + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$




Firm pay premium assimilation: group-specific and common - Males

$$\widehat{\psi}_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$




Firm pay premium assimilation: group-specific and common - Females

$$\widehat{\psi}_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$




Firm pay premium gap: Dynamic decomposition - Males

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E} \left(\psi_{J(it)}^M | M, A_{it} \right) - \mathbb{E} \left(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | N \right)}_{\text{firm pay premium gap}} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^M - \psi_{J(i,t)}^N | M, A_{it})}_{\text{differential pay setting (within)}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | M, A_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | N)}_{\text{differential sorting (between)}}$$




Firm pay premium gap: Dynamic decomposition - Females

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E} \left(\psi_{J(it)}^M | M, A_{it} \right) - \mathbb{E} \left(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | N \right)}_{\text{firm pay premium gap}} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^M - \psi_{J(i,t)}^N | M, A_{it})}_{\text{differential pay setting (within)}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | M, A_{it}) - \mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^N | N)}_{\text{differential sorting (between)}}$$



Job search assimilation - Males


$$ChangeEmployer_{it} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$



Note: $Pr(ChangeEmployer_{it} = 1 | natives) = 0.13$

Job search assimilation - Females


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Note: $Pr(ChangeEmployer_{it} = 1 | natives) = 0.10$

Firm ladder climbing assimilation - Males


$$\psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} - \psi_{J(i,t-1)}^{g(i)} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$



Note: $\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} - \psi_{J(i,t-1)}^{g(i)} | \text{natives, switching}) = 0.04$

Firm ladder climbing assimilation - Females


$$\psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} - \psi_{J(i,t-1)}^{g(i)} = M_i \cdot \left[\sum_{a=1}^{29} \beta_a \cdot \mathbf{1}\{A_{it} = a\} \right] + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$



Note: $\mathbb{E}(\psi_{J(i,t)}^{g(i)} - \psi_{J(i,t-1)}^{g(i)} | \text{natives, switching}) = 0.02$


Employer size assimilation - Males

(Log) Number of Employees




Employer size assimilation - Females

(Log) Number of Employees



Employer age assimilation - Males


Dummy = 1 if employer age < 5 years old



Note: $Pr(\text{YoungEmployer} = 1 | \text{natives}) = 0.22$

Employer age assimilation - Females


Dummy = 1 if employer age < 5 years old



Note: $Pr(\text{YoungEmployer} = 1 | \text{natives}) = 0.16$

Employer desirability assimilation - Males


Sorkin revealed preference index (Sorkin, 2018)



Note: $E(SorkinIndex|natives) = -0.05$

Employer desirability assimilation - Females


Sorkin revealed preference index (Sorkin, 2018)



Note: $E(SorkinIndex|natives) = 0.13$

Employer desirability assimilation - Males


Poaching index (Bagger and Lentz, 2019; Dustmann et al., 2022)



Note: $E(PoachingIndex|natives) = 0.497$


Employer desirability assimilation - Females

Poaching index (Bagger and Lentz, 2019; Dustmann et al., 2022)




Note: $E(PoachingIndex|natives) = 0.452$

Employment segregation assimilation - Males




Employment segregation assimilation - Females



Sectoral employment assimilation - Males


Sectoral employment dummies



$Pr(\text{sector} = 1 | \text{natives})$: Tech=0.155, Security=0.012, Education=0.044, Healthcare=0.017


Sectoral employment assimilation - Females

Sectoral employment dummies




$Pr(\text{sector} = 1 | \text{natives})$: Tech=0.075, Security=0.003, Education=0.182, Healthcare=0.057


Year-of-arrival effects: Wage assimilation - Males




Year-of-arrival effects: Firm pay premium assimilation - Males




Year-of-arrival effects: Wage assimilation - Females




Year-of-arrival effects: Firm pay premium assimilation - Females




Age-at-arrival effects: Wage assimilation - Males




Age-at-arrival effects: Firm pay premium assimilation - Males



Age-at-arrival effects: Wage assimilation - Females



Age-at-arrival effects: Firm pay premium assimilation - Females



Conclusion

A novel combination:

- ▷ Historical mass migration episode
- ▷ Administrative population employer-employee data
 - ▷ Long panel (29 years) + good coverage of immigrants immediately since arrival

Interplay between heterogeneous firms and immigrants' assimilation

- ▷ Focus on both pay and non-pay characteristics
- ▷ Firms mediate assimilation in wages
- ▷ Unusually detailed view into immigrants' job search dynamics

Firm-to-firm mobility as an important path for immigrants' labor market success


- ▷ Israeli context free of labor market restrictions for immigrants
- ▷ Policy-relevant:
 - ▷ "Employer-sponsored" visa programs; other regulations limiting job mobility
 - ▷ Current and future large migration wave events

APPENDIX SLIDES


FSU and Total Migration to Israel

(Israel Central Bureau of Statistics)

▶ back



Age at arrival for FSU immigrants in our sample




Summary statistics: Males

	Full Sample			Separate Connected Sample			Dual Connected Sample		
	All	Natives	Immigrants	All	Natives	Immigrants	All	Natives	Immigrants
Worker-years									
N	14,184,464	11,473,932	2,710,532	14,049,132	11,357,729	2,691,403	12,004,116	9,450,027	2,554,089
Salary (2019 Shekels)	15,425	16,464	11,026	15,468	16,515	11,048	15,943	17,217	11,229
Age	39.41	38.96	41.29	39.40	38.94	41.31	39.43	38.93	41.30
Years since arrival	-	-	13.77	-	-	13.76	-	-	13.72
Immigration year	-	-	1993.08	-	-	1993.08	-	-	1993.06
Birth year	1968.02	1968.60	1965.56	1968.03	1968.62	1965.54	1967.82	1968.45	1965.48
Firm: Size	3110.48	3346.94	2109.51	3140.40	3381.15	2124.44	3673.36	4061.23	2238.26
Firm: Age	13.31	13.38	13.02	13.35	13.42	13.05	14.31	14.53	13.47
Firm: Immigrant share	0.13	0.09	0.29	0.13	0.10	0.29	0.14	0.11	0.26
Workers									
N	1,248,506	1,005,521	242,985	1,225,820	987,031	238,789	1,144,119	909,032	235,087
Years observed	11.36	11.41	11.16	11.46	11.51	11.27	10.49	10.40	10.86
Immigration year	-	-	1993.27	-	-	1993.27	-	-	1993.26
Birth year	1971.13	1972.32	1966.21	1971.11	1972.31	1966.11	1970.96	1972.21	1966.12
Firms									
N	335,945	-	-	317,220	-	-	78,597	-	-
Years observed	6.40	-	-	6.43	-	-	10.95	-	-
Immigrant share	0.13	-	-	0.13	-	-	0.21	-	-
Avge. salary (2019 Shekels)	10,280	-	-	10,347	-	-	11,427	-	-
Firm size	14.33	-	-	15.01	-	-	44.89	-	-
Firm age	5.28	-	-	5.26	-	-	7.39	-	-

Summary statistics: Females

	Full Sample			Separate Connected Sample			Dual Connected Sample		
	All	Natives	Immigrants	All	Natives	Immigrants	All	Natives	Immigrants
Worker-years									
N	14,126,360	11,469,601	2,656,759	14,032,200	11,399,939	2,632,261	12,493,944	9,993,273	2,500,671
Salary (2019 Shekels)	9,600	9,969	8,004	9,619	9,988	8,022	9,859	10,288	8,146
Age	39.61	39.14	41.61	39.59	39.12	41.63	39.71	39.23	41.63
Years since arrival	-	-	14.37	-	-	14.36	-	-	14.36
Immigration year	-	-	1993.07	-	-	1993.07	-	-	1993.04
Birth year	1967.96	1968.46	1965.83	1967.97	1968.47	1965.80	1967.77	1968.27	1965.77
Firm: Size	12190.00	13657.58	5854.24	12271.76	13741.01	5908.65	13781.09	15673.36	6219.13
Firm: Age	15.13	15.36	14.15	15.17	15.39	14.19	15.99	16.34	14.60
Firm: Immigrant share	0.11	0.08	0.26	0.11	0.08	0.26	0.12	0.09	0.23
Workers									
N	1,233,509	998,316	235,193	1,215,521	985,208	230,313	1,163,015	936,391	226,624
Years observed	11.45	11.49	11.30	11.54	11.57	11.43	10.74	10.67	11.03
Immigration year	-	-	1993.33	-	-	1993.32	-	-	1993.32
Birth year	1971.41	1972.44	1967.03	1971.40	1972.44	1966.93	1971.32	1972.37	1967.00
Firms									
N	278,889	-	-	263,988	-	-	68,221	-	-
Years observed	6.39	-	-	6.45	-	-	11.24	-	-
Immigrant share	0.14	-	-	0.14	-	-	0.19	-	-
Avge. salary (2019 Shekels)	6,844	-	-	6,891	-	-	7,590	-	-
Firm size	16.87	-	-	17.59	-	-	50.63	-	-
Firm age	5.83	-	-	5.83	-	-	8.18	-	-

CDF of industry averages of firm fixed effects - Native males



CDF of industry averages of firm fixed effects - Native females

back

