

# ESTEBAN MUÑOZ-SOBRADO

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## DOCTORAL STUDIES

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<i>Ph.D. in Economics</i>	2024
<b>Toulouse School of Economics</b>	
<i>Visiting Ph.D student</i>	2022
<b>University of Southern California Dornsife</b>	

## PRIOR EDUCATION

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<i>Diplôme Européen d'Economie Quantitative Approfondie</i>	2018
<b>Toulouse School of Economics</b>	
<i>Master in Economic Theory and Econometric [insigni cum laude]</i>	2017
<b>Toulouse School of Economics</b>	
<i>Bachelor in Economics</i>	2014
<b>Universidad de Costa Rica</b>	

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

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**Primary:** Public and Behavioral  
**Secondary:** Contract Theory and Industrial Organization

## PAPERS

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### **Competing for Donations: The Role of Tax Deductibility in the U.S. Charitable Sector [Job Market Paper]**

*Abstract:* Around the world, governments provide tax benefits to incentivize charitable giving. I argue that the current approaches to determining the optimal level of such tax benefits neglect a crucial ingredient. While higher tax benefits increase charitable giving, they also intensify potentially wasteful competition for funds among charities. I build a model where charities use informative advertising to attract individual donors. Competition leads to inefficient fundraising as charities incur excessive advertising costs, and the inefficiency increases as available funds increase. I then estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the universe of Nonprofits in the U.S. paired with data from the country's most prominent charity assessment organization. I document that leakage, the proportion of charities' budget not spent on direct public good provision, goes up to 40 percent in my sample for 2014. Moreover, findings from counterfactual analyses suggest that fundraising accounts for significant endogenous leakage of gross donations into advertising. These findings suggest that estimates that ignore competition must be adjusted downwards to account for charities' endogenous responses to the tax code.

*Presented in:* IIPF 2023 (Logan, Utah), EARIE 2023 (Rome), CEA 2023, ESA World Meeting 2022 (Boston), European ESA Meeting 2022 (Bologna), Mannheim Taxation Conference 2022.

### **Taxing Moral Agents [CESifo Working Paper No. 9867]**

*Abstract:* Experimental and empirical findings suggest that non-pecuniary motivations play a significant role as determinants of taxpayers' decisions to comply with the tax authority and shape their perceptions and assessment of the tax code. By contrast, the canonical optimal income taxation model focuses on material sanctions as the primary motive for compliance. This paper shows how taxpayers equipped with evolutionary Kantian preferences can account for both these non-pecuniary and material motivations. It builds a general model of income taxation in the presence of a public good, which agents value morally, and solves for the optimal linear and non-linear taxation problems.

*Presented in:* IIPF Congress 2022. CESifo Area Conference on Public Economics. Fairness and the Moral Mind workshop. LawPolEcCon. Max Planck Institute for Public Goods and Tax Law. Tilburg Enter Network Seminar. Workshop of Industrial and Public Economics. ECO-SOS, Universitat Rovira i Virgili.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

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**Resource allocation in the presence of moral hazard and endogenous adverse selection** [with Alae Baha]

**The policy diverging effects of public funding of political elections** [with Mauricio Sauma]

## CONFERENCES AND ACTIVITIES

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### 2023

European Association for Research in Industrial Economics 2023 (Rome)

International Institute of Public Finance 2023 (Logan, Utah)

Canadian Economics Association 2023 (online)

### 2022

Economic Science Association Europe Meetings in Bologna

International Institute of Public Finance

Stoney Brooks International Game Theory Conference <sup>1</sup>

Economic Science Association World Meetings in Boston

CESifo Area Conference on Public Economics

Fairness and the Moral Mind workshop. FAIR - Centre for Experimental Research on Fairness, Inequality and Rationality. Norwegian School of Economics

### 2021

LawPolEcCon. Max Planck Institute for Public Goods and Tax Law

Tilburg Enter Network Seminar

Workshop of Industrial and Public Economics. ECO-SOS, Universitat Rovira i Virgili

## REFEREEING

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Games and Economics Behaviour

## WORK EXPERIENCE

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*Research internship in Centro del Desarrollo de la Regulación* 2016

*Lecturer of Introduction to Economics, Universidad de Costa Rica.* 2014/2015

*Research Assistantship with Dr. Boris Segura (UCLA)* 2013/2015

## AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

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*UTI Doctoral Contract* 2017/2019

*Centram. Sup Scholarship by Campus France and the Institute Francais d'Amerique Central* 2015/2017

*Beneficiary of Universidad de Costa Rica's academic development program.* 2015

## TEACHING

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### Toulouse School of Economics

TA, Theory of Incentives (Master 1) 2020,2021

TA, Game Theory (Master 1) 2020,2021

TA, Microeconomics (undergraduate) 2018,2019

### Universidad de Costa Rica

Lecturer, Introduction to Economics (undergraduate) 2014,2015

TA, History of Economic Thought (undergraduate) 2013,2014

TA, Mathematics for Economists 3 (undergraduate) 2013,2014

TA, Mathematics for Economists 2 (undergraduate) 2013,2014

## ADDITIONAL EDUCATION

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*Selected courses from years 1 and 2 of Mathematics Bachelor* 2013/2014

**Universidad de Costa Rica**

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<sup>1</sup> Accepted as presenter, cancelled last-minute due to positive COVID result.

## SKILLS AND SOFTWARE

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**Advanced:** R, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, Mathematica

**Intermediate:** Python

## PERSONAL INFORMATION

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**Citizenship:** Costa Rica

**Languages:** Spanish (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate)

## REFERENCES

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