

Regime Switching, Learning, and the Great Moderation

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- Good vs. bad policy.
 - Lubik and Schorfheide (2004): find monetary policy was destabilizing pre-Volker.
 - Milani (2005): accounting for learning, little evidence of a change in monetary policy
 - Primiceri (2005): Monetary authority was optimizing, but mis-informed.
- Bad luck: bad periods were hit with bad shocks.
 - Sims and Zha (2006): evidence points in favor of bad shocks.
 - Bullard and Singh (2007): bad luck + Bayesian learning.
- Learning
 - It is possible for learning alone to generate time-varying volatility.
 - Depends on how you specify learning process.

- Incorporate bad luck and learning into a New Keynesian model.
- Estimate how much volatility is explained by these sources.
- Marcet and Nicolini (2003) learning.
 - Agents run OLS to form expectations (decreasing learning gain).
 - If agents suspect structural change, switch to a high learning gain.
- Bad luck: regime switching in variance of structural shocks.
 - Low volatility regime
 - High volatility regime

- Continuum of consumer types, each type with a specific labor skill.
- Continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms.
- Calvo (1983) pricing.
- No capital.
- Taylor rule monetary policy.
- Internal habit formation in preferences (mechanical persistence).
- Inflation indexation (mechanical persistence).
- Serially correlated non-policy shocks: technology and preference.

Consumers 5 / 15

• Preferences:

$$E_0^* \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}} \xi_t \left(c_t - \eta c_{t-1} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}} - \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{\mu}} n_t(i)^{1 + \frac{1}{\mu}} \right]$$
 (1)

• Budget constraint:

$$c_t + b_t(i) = \frac{1 + r_{t-1}}{1 + \pi_t} b_{t-1}(i) + \frac{w_t(i)}{p_t} n_t(i) + \Pi_t - \tau_t$$
 (2)

- Notation
 - E_t^* denotes a non-rational expectation.
 - ξ_t : preference shock.
 - $\eta \in (0,1)$: degree of habit formation.
 - $n_t(i)$ consumer type is choice of labor supply.
 - $w_t(i)$ nominal wage.
 - p_t , π_t : price and inflation rate of final good.



- Intermediate good production: $y_t(i) = z_t n_t(i)$
- Calvo (1983) pricing: only a constant fraction, ω of firms can re-optimize their price each period.
- Those who cannot: $p_t(i) = p_{t-1}(i) + \gamma \pi_{t-1}$
- Those who can, maximize:

$$E_t^* \sum_{T=0}^{\infty} (\omega \beta)^T \frac{\lambda_{t+T}}{\lambda_t} \left\{ \left(\frac{p_t(i) \pi_{t+T}^*}{p_{t+T}} \right) y_{t+T}(i) - \Psi \left[y_{t+T}(i) \right] \right\}$$
(3)

- γ : degree of inflation indexation.
- Indexation adjustment through period t + T:

$$\pi_{t+T}^* = \prod_{j=1}^T (1 + \gamma \pi_{t+j-1}) \tag{4}$$

Serially correlated shocks:

$$z_t = \rho_z z_{t-1} + \epsilon_{z,t}(s_t) \tag{5}$$

$$\xi_t = \rho_{\xi} \xi_{t-1} + \epsilon_{\xi,t}(s_t) \tag{6}$$

• Innovations for a given regime are mean zero and iid.

$$Var\left(\left[\begin{array}{c}\epsilon_{z,t}(s_t)\\\epsilon_{\xi,t}(s_t)\end{array}\right]\right) = \left\{\begin{array}{ccc} \left[\begin{array}{ccc}\sigma_{z,1}^2 & 0\\0 & \sigma_{\xi,1}^2\end{array}\right], & \text{if } s_t = 1\\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc}\sigma_{z,2}^2 & 0\\0 & \sigma_{\xi,2}^2\end{array}\right], & \text{if } s_t = 2\end{array}\right.$$

- Two state Markov chain
- Let p_i denote the probability of staying in regime i from t-1 to t.
- Transition matrix:

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} p_1 & 1 - p_1 \\ 1 - p_2 & p_2 \end{bmatrix}. \tag{8}$$

Log-linearized New Keynesian model has the structural form:

$$\Omega_0 x_t = \Omega_1 x_{t-1} + \Omega_2 E_t^* x_{t+1} + \Psi \epsilon_t(s_t)$$
 (9)

- All observable by the agents: $x_t = [\hat{y}_t \ \pi_t \ \hat{r}_t \ \hat{z}_t \ \hat{\xi}_t]'$
- Shocks not observable: $\epsilon_t(s_t) = [\epsilon_{z,t}(s_t) \ \epsilon_{\xi,t}(s_t) \ \epsilon_{r,t}]'$
- Rational expectations solution:

$$E_t x_{t+1} = G x_t, \tag{10}$$

- Agents estimate *G* by least squares.
 - Use as regressors a constant, and all past observations of x_t .

• It can be shown that least squares implies recursion:

$$\hat{G}_{t}^{*} = \hat{G}_{t-1}^{*} + g_{t}(x_{t-1} - \hat{G}_{t-1}^{*} x_{t-2}^{*}) x_{t-2}^{*} R_{t}^{-1}$$
 (11)

$$R_t = R_{t-1} + g_t(x_{t-2}^* x_{t-2}^* - R_{t-1})$$
 (12)

- OLS: $g_t = 1/(t-1)$
 - Learning dynamics disappear over time.
 - No suspicion of structural change.
 - Extremely slow to adjust to structural changes.
- Constant gain learning: $g_t = g$ for all t.
 - Bullard and Duffy (2005)
 - Time varying volatility is likely small.

- Marcet and Nicolini (2003): learning is endogenous.
- Let $\alpha_t \equiv 1/g_t$. In OLS case α_t is sample size.

$$\alpha_{t} = \begin{cases} \alpha_{t-1} + 1 & \text{if } \frac{1}{J} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{v=1}^{n} \left| \frac{x_{t-j}(v) - \hat{G}_{t-j}^{*}(v) x_{t-j-1}^{*}}{\hat{G}_{t-j}^{*}(v) x_{t-j-1}^{*}} \right| < \nu \\ \alpha & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(13)

- Notation:
 - n is the number of variables in x_t .
 - $x_{t-i}(v)$: vth element of x_{t-i}
 - $\hat{G}_{t-i}^*(v)$: vth row of $\hat{G}_{t-i}^*(v)$
 - $\alpha \equiv 1/g$ is the constant gain.
 - $\nu \in (0, \infty)$ is a threshold level.

State equation:

$$x_{t} = b_{t} + F_{t}x_{t-1} + v_{t}(s_{t})$$

$$b_{t} = \Omega_{0}^{-1}\Omega_{2}\left(I + \hat{G}_{t}\right)\hat{g}_{0,t}$$

$$F_{t} = \Omega_{0}^{-1}\left(\Omega_{1} + \Omega_{2}\hat{G}_{t}^{2}\right)$$

$$v_{t}(s_{t}) = \Omega_{0}^{-1}\Psi\epsilon_{t}(s_{t})$$

$$Var\left[v_{t}(s_{t})\right] = \left(\Omega_{0}^{-1}\Psi\right)Var\left[\epsilon_{t}(s_{t})\right]\left(\Omega_{0}^{-1}\Psi\right)'$$

Observation equations:

$$GDP_{t} = 100\hat{y}_{t},$$

 $INF_{t} = \pi^{*} + 400\pi_{t},$ (15)
 $FF_{t} = r^{*} + 400\hat{r}_{t},$

- New Keynesian model parameters.
- Variance of the shocks in each state: $\sigma_{z,1}^2, \sigma_{\xi,1}^2$, and $\sigma_{z,1}^2, \sigma_{\xi,1}^2$.
- Probabilities of switching between states: p_1 , p_2 .
- Learning parameters: g and ν .

Estimation 14 / 15

- Kim (1994), Kim and Nelson (1999): form the likelihood.
 - Kalman filter for state-space models.
 - Hamilton (1989) filter for regime switching.
- Plan to estimate:
 - Smoothed estimates of the regime probabilities for each period.
 - Learning gain for each period.
 - Smoothed estimates of the shocks.
 - Out-of-sample forecasts of the model.

- With endogenous gain learning, how sizable of an increase in shock volatility is necessary to explain volatile periods such as the 1970s.
- When did regime changes occur?
- When did learning gain changes occur?
- How do these answers compare to constant gain learning, decreasing gain learning, and rational expectations.
- How well does do competing specifications fit the data.
 - Different assumptions on learning gain.
 - Fixed state regime.