

# From Elected to Appointed: The Economic Consequences of Central Takeovers on Public Procurement\*

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## Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of central takeovers on local jurisdictions. Using a novel dataset covering the universe of state contracts in Turkey, we analyze the differences between elected and centrally appointed mayors in their practice of law and resultant economic efficiency. We find that central takeovers adversely affect the rule of law in public procurement, with appointed mayors being more likely to misuse regulatory provisions, resulting in significant economic costs. Specifically, appointed mayors abuse the procurement regulation 23 pp more than elected mayors and reduce the use of competitive *sealed-bid auctions* by 33 pp. Such malpractice inflates contract prices by 24% and reduces value for money by 40%. These results are robust to a variety of tests, including a Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) approach. Our analysis suggests that the primary mechanism driving these outcomes is the lack of local accountability faced by appointed mayors. In contrast, we do not find any evidence of better quality procurement through expanded discretion.

**JEL Codes:** D72, D73, H57, H76, K42

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# 1 Introduction

Across the globe, there’s a concerning erosion in democratic values and institutions amidst rising authoritarianism. Such authoritarian rules not only result in deteriorated human and political rights but also bear significant costs in terms of economic development and the well-being of citizens (Sen, 2001; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). These regimes, often motivated by desires to curb dissent or enhance resource extraction, increasingly intervene in local jurisdictions, notably through *central takeovers*.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, despite the pervasive global trend towards autocratization and its local manifestations, evidence remains limited regarding the cost of oppression or the inefficiency of authoritarian agenda at the local level.

This paper investigates how central takeovers of local jurisdictions affect public procurement practices and efficiency at the local level. Central takeovers refer to the replacement of elected local officials by appointees from the central government. Such takeovers modifies the incentive structures within local governments, leading to significant implications for policy outcomes across various domains (Martinez-Bravo et al., 2022).<sup>2</sup> Crucially, central takeovers eliminate the downward accountability of officials to the residents of the locality. Instead, they establish upward accountability towards the central government as the appointed officials’ careers hinge on their relationships with the central ruler who holds the power to appoint, promote, and dismiss them. Consequently, the central takeovers engenders a moral hazard problem where the central ruler may fail to penalize underperforming officials, especially those contributing value to their rule (Myerson, 2021).

We inquiry the consequences of such central takeovers, and the corresponding moral hazard problem, within the context of public procurement.<sup>3</sup> As an economic activity through which large sums of public funds flow into private hands, public procurement is particularly vulnerable to corruption through diversion of funds by public officials (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003; Olken, 2007; Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Titl and Geys, 2019; Baltrunaite, 2020; Baranek and Titl, 2020; Bosio et al., 2022). In this paper, using a novel measure of law abuse, we specifically analyze how often appointed and elected politicians abuse legal provisions provided by the procurement regulation beyond their intended use. We then

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<sup>1</sup>Examples of central authorities seizing control in local jurisdictions can be seen in China (Shen and Tian, 2020; Martinez-Bravo et al., 2022), Vietnam (Malesky et al., 2014), Russia (Beazer and Reuter, 2022), and Turkey (Tutkal, 2022).

<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., Hessami (2018) for evidence on attracting municipal grants, and Lim (2013) and Mehmood (2022) on court decisions.

<sup>3</sup>Public procurement, the process through which public authorities purchase goods and services from the private sector, is a crucial function of governments and a major component of public spending. According to the World Bank, it accounted for 12% of the global GDP in 2019 (Bosio et al., 2022) and has a significant impact on private sector development, economic efficiency, and social welfare (Ferraz et al., 2015).

quantify the economic costs of such malpractices and explore the likely mechanisms that might explain the observed differences between the appointed and the elected.

To answer these questions empirically, we use a novel administrative dataset covering the universe of state contracts granted in Turkey between 2014 and 2019. With its increasingly authoritarian regime, Turkey provides an ideal context to study the central takeovers of local governments. The country passed an emergency decree in September 2016 that amends the municipal law, making it possible for the central government to replace elected mayors with appointed ones. Over the following two years, the Turkish government sacked 95 elected municipal mayors and appointed trustee mayors in their stead. Appointed mayors were all mid-level bureaucrats (governors of the same district or province as the municipality) in the state apparatus, resulting in a change in local accountability. Importantly, appointments did not change the extent of fiscal or administrative authority of mayors; appointed mayors have the same powers as the elected ones.

Using geographic and temporal variation across trustee mayor appointments, we causally estimate the effect of central takeovers on public procurement practices using a staggered Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design. To put it differently, we compare the state contracts granted by elected mayors with those granted by appointed trustee mayors in terms of *law abuse* and *contract terms*. Accordingly, our main outcomes concern abuse of law and resulting contract terms, namely the price of the contract and the value for money. Our outcomes regarding abuse of law measure how often public officials use existing regulations beyond their scope.

We first measure this by the unjustified use of the *unforeseen event* clause, a typical clause in procurement regulations intended to deal with cases of extreme urgency. The use of this clause is only justified during catastrophic events that could not be foreseen by the procuring entity (*force majeure* events such as natural disasters, pandemics) and that require immediate handling of the procurement due to a risk to lives or property. This clause, when invoked, allows the procuring agency to use the more discretionary *negotiation* procedure that gives them the power to choose who to invite to bid on the contract without the necessity to publicize the contract notice. The unforeseen events clause, when used in an unjustified manner, serves as a loophole to evade the more demanding legal requirements of the *sealed-bid auction*.<sup>4</sup>

Our second outcome is based on the use of *threshold* clause, another typical clause in

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<sup>4</sup>Sealed-bid auction is regarded as the most competitive auction method in public procurement since any potential contractor can compete in the contract awarding process, and a contract notice has to be published in advance.

procurement regulations allowing to use the more discretionary negotiation method in contract awarding when the value of the purchase is below a certain threshold. This clause is intended by law to facilitate a “fast-track” procedure for small purchases without dealing with the more demanding requirements of a sealed-bid auction. However, officials can alter the contracts to stay below the threshold and gain more discretion in contract awarding. We investigate both how often public officials invoke this clause and whether it entails cost manipulation when they do so.

Our findings indicate that the central takeover of local governments deteriorates the rule of law in public procurement. We find that centrally appointed trustee mayors abuse the unforeseen event clause significantly more (23 percentage points) than elected mayors. Similarly, the share of procurement spending with the unforeseen event clause is significantly higher under trustee mayors (28 percentage points) compared to elected mayors.

These adverse effects come at the expense of more competitive sealed-bid auctions. Under trustee mayors, the use of sealed-bid auctions and the share of spending with sealed-bid auctions decreases by 33 and 28 percentage points, respectively. Remarkably, the decrease in the share of spending with sealed-bid auctions equals the increase in the share of spending with unforeseen event clauses (28 percentage points). Furthermore, use of unforeseen events clause by trustee mayors drives the contract prices up by 24% and lowers the rebate –i.e., value for money– by 40%. Regarding the use of the threshold clause, there is no statistically significant difference between elected and appointed mayors. However, a deeper look into the estimated cost distribution of contracts reveals that both types of mayors engage in substantial cost manipulation at comparable levels to attain more discretion.

We next explore three potential mechanisms that might explain the observed differences between elected and trustee mayors. First, we inquire about the possibility of trustee mayors holding a distinct policy agenda –e.g., dictated by the central government– than elected mayors. Second, a strand of literature in political economy shows that more discretion might lead to quality increases in public procurement. Accordingly, we consider whether trustee mayors used more discretion in contract awarding to deliver better quality services (e.g., Decarolis et al., 2020). Third, we analyze the plausibility of local accountability – or removal thereof– mechanism by focusing on re-election incentives of mayors and voters’ ability to detect malpractices by public officials. Our preferred mechanism is the lack of local accountability making mayors less accountable to local voters, as trustee mayors typically have no re-election incentives but career incentives that depend on their relationship with the ruling elite. We discuss these mechanisms in more detail in Section 5.3.

We check the robustness of our results to several alternative specifications, including different versions of the outcome; alternative assumptions such as conditional and unconditional parallel trends; inclusion of controls; and an alternative identification strategy using a Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT). We also test and reject several alternative mechanisms, including more natural disasters in trustee-appointed municipalities; violence history of the region; and adverse selection of governors as trustee mayors.

This paper makes three contributions to related literature. First, although there has been an active literature on authoritarianism, there is still scant evidence on its local manifestations.<sup>5</sup> Our central contribution to this literature, therefore, relates to our focus on bringing in causal evidence for the effects of central takeovers on politician behavior and economic efficiency in public procurement at the local level. The closest papers to ours are by Beazer and Reuter (2022) and Gasparyan (2022). While the former investigates the effect of central takeovers on unsafe housing stock, the latter focuses on the amount of spending, taxation, and contracts to non-local suppliers by municipal mayors. We complement these studies by focusing on i) incentive structures within local governments, ii) the specific ways in which appointed officials exploit legal provisions, and iii) the toll of these malpractices in terms of economic efficiency.

Second, our findings regarding discretion in contract awarding tie our paper into a more extensive literature on the role of politician discretion (Palguta and Pertold, 2017; Coviello et al., 2018; Duffo et al., 2018; Tulli, 2019; Decarolis et al., 2020; Baltrunaite et al., 2021; Bandiera et al., 2021; Carril et al., 2021; Hanspach, 2023; Szucs, 2023). This literature, drawing on well-identified causal estimates from several settings, seeks to understand whether discretion improves policy outcomes or rather strengthens rent-seeking behavior. However, these studies exclusively focus on a specific malpractice, namely cost manipulation through threshold clause. This focus effectively limits the study samples to small purchases under a certain threshold. Complementing these studies, we expand the analytical toolkit of this literature by introducing a novel measure of law abuse based on the unforeseen event clause, which can be abused for all kinds of contracts regardless of the value of the procurement.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, although there has been a long theoretical and empirical literature on political de-/centralization,<sup>7</sup> disagreement remains about the costs and benefits of decentralization,

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<sup>5</sup>An exception is Martinez-Bravo et al. (2022) who provide evidence from China on the role of local elections in autocracies.

<sup>6</sup>The unforeseen event clause we investigate is not specific to the public procurement regulation of Turkey. Similar versions can be found in the procurement regulations of the EU countries, the UK, the US, etc. See, for example, Article 32(c) that regulates the use of the negotiated procedure without prior call for competition for reasons of extreme urgency in the EU procurement law.

<sup>7</sup>For theoretical work, see Seabright (1996), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), Lockwood (2002), Besley

as well as its effects on corruption (Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Malesky et al., 2014; Cloutier, 2017; Arora et al., 2023). This is partly due to the limited empirical evidence, which is predominantly cross-country and correlational, and partly to the complexity of settings within which decentralization occurs concurrently with other reforms or involves several changes in the institutional framework of the country at once (Treisman, 2007).

Our contribution to this literature relates to the underlying mechanisms. Our unique setting allows us to probe and single out the potential mechanisms that might have been effective in driving the adverse effects of centralization.<sup>8</sup> In this particular setting, central takeovers only change the mayor from an elected to an appointed one in the affected municipalities, without bringing any change in the fiscal and administrative authority of mayoral offices. This helps us discern local accountability as an effective tool that disciplines politicians, consistent with the more established literature on electoral accountability.<sup>9</sup>

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on the empirical setting, public procurement in Turkey and the legal framework that regulates it. Section 3 describes the data sources and variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results, robustness checks, alternative mechanisms, and explores potential mechanisms. Section 6 concludes with some policy implications.

## 2 Institutional Background

In this section, we first discuss the political background, and second, provide information about the characteristics and appointment of trustees. Finally, we provide details about the public procurement regulations in Turkey.

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and Coate (2003), and Myerson (2021), among others. The limited empirical evidence, on the other hand, comes mostly from cross-country studies or the US, and typically provides correlational findings (e.g., Fisman and Gatti, 2002a; Fisman and Gatti, 2002b; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Faguet, 2014).

<sup>8</sup>Our comparison uses trustee mayors appointed by President Erdoğan’s government and elected mayors from President Erdoğan’s *Justice and Development Party* (AKP hereafter). The restriction of elected mayors to elected AKP mayors –rather than including opposition mayors, too– ensures that we do not pick up any effect of typical horizontal accountability mechanisms such as judicial or media investigation. We relax this restriction only in certain analyses when a comparison of trustee and opposition mayors is of interest *per se*. We explicitly state it in those analyses.

<sup>9</sup>For studies on electoral accountability, see Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Besley and Case (1995), Persson and Tabellini (2002), List and Sturm (2006), De Janvry et al. (2008), Ferraz and Finan (2011), Ashworth (2012), Lim (2013), Hessami (2018), Aruoba et al. (2019), Lopes da Fonseca (2020), Finan and Mazzocco (2021), and Mehmood (2022, among others).

## 2.1 Political Background and Trustee Appointments

Dismissal of the elected mayors and the appointment of the trustee mayors were possible thanks to the state of emergency declared in the wake of the failed *coup d'état* attempt of July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2016. During the state of emergency that continued for two years, the Turkish government legislated through emergency decree-laws, arguing that these were necessary to dismantle the “Gülenist network,” which was behind the coup and had penetrated deeply into the Turkish state. However, the emergency decrees were also used to target the pro-Kurdish opposition, even though the two movements were known to be hostile against each other. People’s Democratic Party (HDP) and its sister party, Democratic Regions Party (DBP), which held the majority of the municipal offices in the Kurdish provinces, came under attack with the emergency decree-law no. 674 of 1 September 2016.<sup>10</sup> This decree amended the municipal law, allowing the government to replace elected mayors, deputy mayors, or council members with trustees appointed by the state authorities if there were charges against them about offenses of aiding and abetting terrorism and terrorist organizations.<sup>11</sup>

The replacement of the elected mayors started on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2016, with 24 mayors being sacked and continued throughout the state of emergency, removing 95 elected mayors out of 102 in two years. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the mayoral offices taken over by trustee mayors and those held by elected (AKP) mayors. Our region of interest hosts 254 municipalities located within 168 districts in 18 provinces. Out of the 254 municipalities, 102 (%40) are held by the pro-Kurdish party BDP and 95 (%37) by AKP.<sup>12</sup>

Table 1 reports the characteristics of AKP –*control*– and trustee-appointed BDP –*treatment*– municipalities prior to trustee appointments. Although the AKP municipalities tend to be on average slightly more populous and host more business enterprises, these differences are not statistically significant. On the other hand, while AKP vote share in 2014 was higher in AKP municipalities and BDP vote share in BDP municipalities as expected, AKP still had significant support in municipalities held by BDP mayors (%31).

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
<sup>10</sup>Official Gazette, September 1, 2016: <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/09/20160901M2-2.htm>

<sup>11</sup>Most of these charges were made under the rather far-reaching anti-terrorism law of Turkey. Transnational observers have repeatedly criticized this law due to “its broad and excessively vague definition of terrorism, organized crime and propaganda,” arguing that it acts as “an instrument for the repression of internal dissent” (EU, 2016).

<sup>12</sup>Out of 95 trustee-appointed BDP municipalities, we drop four of them as they were very small and did not grant any contract during our period of interest.



Figure 1: Municipal offices held by trustee and elected (AKP) mayors



*Notes:* The map shows geographical locations of the mayoral offices held by elected AKP and centrally appointed trustee mayors. Red and blue dots indicate the municipalities held by, respectively, AKP and trustee mayors. The borders shown correspond to provincial borders.

Table 1: Municipal characteristics

Variable	Control mean	Treatment mean	Difference p-value
Population	85366.55	98367.22	0.62
Number of enterprises	3757.07	4436.89	0.56
Nightlight	-0.23	-0.22	0.27
AKP vote share	0.48	0.31	0.00
BDP vote share	0.16	0.52	0.00
No. of municipalities	95	91	

*Notes:* The table reports the municipality characteristics separately for the control and treatment groups, which consists of respectively, municipalities held by BDP (i.e., later on trustee-receiving municipalities) and municipalities held by AKP. The means of variables are calculated over municipalities across two years before the treatment (2014 and 2015). Nightlight variable is normalized in the sample of districts of Turkey. AKP vote share and BDP vote share indicates the votes shares of these parties in the 2014 local elections. Difference p-value column reports the p-values from t-tests.

Finally, our region of interest, Southeast Turkey, has experienced armed conflict between the Turkish state and Kurdish militia forces since the 1980s (Ozsoy, 2013; Yarkin et al., 2015; Yegen, 2016). The frequency of armed conflict events fluctuates over time, with periods of escalation followed by more peaceful intervals. However, the trustee appointments were



not grounded on concrete evidence of offenses like aiding or abetting terrorism. Instead, they have been widely perceived as manifestations of AKP’s strategies to exert control over local regions, suppress opposition, and strengthen its hold on power (Tutkal, 2022). In support of this, OHCHR (2017) reports that “[i]n most cases, the ‘trustees’ were appointed immediately following the arrest of the democratically elected officials, indicating a high degree of coordination between the judiciary and the executive branches.” Venice Commission of the Council of Europe also called the Turkish government “[t]o repeal the provisions introduced by the Decree Law N° 674 which are not strictly necessitated by the state of emergency, in particular concerning the rules enabling the filling of vacancies in the positions of mayor, vice-mayor, local council member, by the way of appointments” (EU, 2017), to no avail.

## 2.2 Getting to Know the Trustees: Governors in Turkish Central Administration

In Turkey, the local public administrative system functions through a dual structure: one involving locally elected municipal authorities responsible primarily for local infrastructure and services like road development, construction zoning, and water facilitation, and the other comprising appointed governors representing the central state at the provincial and district levels (Tan, 2020). The majority (75 out of 95) of the trustees in our sample are the governors of the same district in which they are appointed as trustee mayor, while the rest are either provincial governors (replacing the mayors of metropolitan municipalities) or their deputies. Provincial and district governors - *valis* and *kaymakams* in Turkish, respectively- play pivotal roles at the local level in Turkey’s highly centralized public administration system. They are appointed by the central government and serve as critical intermediaries between the central authority and localities. While they are not the ultimate decision-makers on public services provided by the municipality, they have administrative tutelage responsibility over municipalities. They also oversee a wide range of provincial or district administration functions, supervising various local branches of central ministries and government agencies and ensuring coordination and harmony among different state institutions within their jurisdictions (Çapar, 2015).

Governors are career bureaucrats, appointed for life through a centrally administered selection process overseen by the Ministry of Interior (Law on the Officers of Ministry of the Interior, 1930). The exam for selection into governorship has two equally weighted parts: a standardized written exam and an interview that is conducted by the Ministry staff. Once

selected, the governor candidates go through a three-year-long internship and then proceed to become a district governor of a small and relatively developed district, 5<sup>th</sup> class according to the classification of the Ministry of Interior,<sup>13</sup> via lottery. As long as they are deemed successful at their posts, they move up on the scale of district types, rotating every two or three years. Starting from the interview stage, the governors are evaluated by their superiors within the Ministry of Interior all along their career routes. When they are district governors, the evaluation is done by the provincial governors. These evaluations would form the basis of their promotions along the ranks, in which the final decision is the President's. As such, the profession is highly hierarchical, and career prospects are dependent on the governor's ability to appease their superiors, including the central government.

## 2.3 Public Procurement Regulations in Turkey

Current public procurement law in Turkey was crafted via a lengthy deliberation and bargaining process between the successive Turkish governments and the EU and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO, from 1999 to 2002. It was legislated as part of the post-2001 crisis economic reforms, just before AKP (*Justice and Development Party*) government's first term started at the end of 2002. AKP resisted both the new public procurement law and the newly established independent regulatory agency, the Public Procurement Authority (PPA), albeit with little success (Ercan and Oguz, 2006). The original law that came into effect in early 2003 was in line with EU Procurement Directives. However, in the years to come, successive AKP governments redesigned the procurement framework according to their needs. While the PPA lost its independence and the ability to investigate possible corruption cases in the absence of formal complaints, hundreds of amendments to the law have been made since as early as July 2003, generally bending the law to include more exceptions and more discretion to the procuring agencies (Gürakar, 2016).

In the current form of the law, when the public administration uses the negotiation procedure for procurement, it invites only select companies without publicizing the tender notice. As such, the procurement document can only be bought by the invited parties. The law also rules out any objection to the outcome of this procedure by a party that was not invited in the first place (Demircioğlu, 2014; Yıldırım, 2018).

There is anecdotal evidence of law abuse as early as 2008 (Gürakar and Meyersson,

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<sup>13</sup>Districts are classified according to their socioeconomic and geographic conditions (*Regulation on Appointment, Evaluation and Relocation of Civil Administrators*, 1986)

2016). Demircioğlu (2014) describes how administrations in Turkey abuse the negotiation procedure in the law, and deems this as clear violation of the law. He also argues such tender irregularities develop into corruption in procurement. Yıldırım (2018) also provides anecdotal evidence of this abuse from more recent period.

Before presenting our results on how the central appointment of trustee mayors changed procurement practices and outcomes in impacted municipalities, we present our data and empirical strategy.

### 3 Data

We use a novel administrative dataset covering the universe of state contracts distributed in Turkey between 2011 and 2019.<sup>14</sup> It provides detailed information at the contract level, including but not limited to contract awarding method; type of the procurement (*construction*, *goods*, or, *services*); industry code of the procurement; estimated cost of the procurement, price of the contract, and rebate value; name, district, and province of the procuring state agency; name of the contractor, contract date, etc. From this dataset, we use the contracts granted in the provinces where affected municipalities are located between the two local elections in 2014 and 2019.

We complement this contract-level dataset first with information on the trustee mayor appointments. These include the name of the municipality and appointment date of the trustees ranging between September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2016 and August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2018. Second, we complement it with administrative data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (*TURKSTAT*) on the number of business enterprises and population at the municipality level. Finally we add nightlight data at the district level as a proxy for the level of economic development.

*Outcomes.*—We focus on two sets of outcomes. Our first set of outcomes concerns the contract awarding method, i.e., whether the contract is awarded through the unforeseen event clause, threshold clause, or a sealed-bid auction. Using this information, we construct the following two outcome variables at the municipality level: i) the monthly share of each contract awarding method, and ii) the monthly share of spending with each contract awarding method based on contract prices.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>The data is publicly available for individual queries on the webpage of the Turkish Public Procurement Authority (*Kamu İhale Kurumu*).

<sup>15</sup>The sealed-bid auctions are the most common contract awarding method in our sample. 65% of all contracts are awarded through sealed-bid auctions. The remainder is awarded with more discretionary negotiation method justified through *unforeseen event* or *threshold* clauses.

Our second set of outcomes measure the economic performance of mayors in public procurement based on contract terms. We specifically focus on *contract price*, *rebate*, and *estimated cost* of the procurement. *Contract price* indicates what the procuring entity pays to the contractor. *Estimated cost* is calculated by the procuring entity before the contract awarding process based on the specifics of the purchase. *Rebate*, i.e. value for money, is the discount rate procuring entity attains in contract awarding and calculated as follows:

$$\text{Rebate} = \frac{\text{Estimated Cost} - \text{Contract Price}}{\text{Estimated Cost}}$$

Higher rebate values are more favorable in terms of public interest as they imply that procuring entity pays relatively little compared to the estimated cost of the purchase.

*Main Variable of Interest.*—We are specifically interested in how central takeovers affect the public procurement practices in local governments. Accordingly, our main explanatory variable is a binary indicator of whether a contract is awarded by an appointed trustee mayor as opposed to an elected mayor. We formally define it as follows:

$$\text{Trustee}_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if contract } i \text{ is granted by a trustee mayor} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

*Control Variables.*—In all analyses, we control for the number of business enterprises and population level at the municipality level; and the level of nightlight at the district level to proxy the economic development level of the area. We also include year, province, procurement type, and industry fixed effects whenever appropriate.

## 4 Empirical Strategy

In this section, we discuss the details of our empirical strategy. To estimate the effect of central takeovers on law abuse in local governments, our analysis makes a comparison of elected mayors to appointed trustee mayors in their use of *unforeseen event* clause, *threshold* clause, and *sealed-bid auctions*. More specifically, we estimate how much elected and trustee mayors differ in: i) monthly share of contracts awarded with each contract awarding method, and ii) monthly share of spending with each contract awarding method based on contract prices.

We use a staggered Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design to causally estimate these differences. Our DiD setting comprises of multiple time periods (60 months) with the treatment

group including 95 municipalities that have been appointed trustees at different points in time –in the span of two years– and remain treated until the end of our analysis period. The never-treated control group consists of 95 municipalities with an elected AKP mayor in the provinces where the trustee-appointed municipalities are located.<sup>16</sup> This unique setting enables us to compare elected and trustee mayors who have the same powers and who are aligned with the same ruling elite –*Erdoğan’s regime*– net of horizontal accountability mechanisms such as judicial or media investigation.

Using this DiD setting and the estimation method by Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021), we first estimate the group-time average treatment effects where groups are defined at the municipality level based on when they first received the trustee mayor. We then aggregate these group-time average treatment effects to an overall treatment effect. In all estimations, we cluster the standard errors at the municipality level. We report the overall treatment effects from these estimations in Section 5.

Our main identification assumption for the causal interpretation of the estimated effects is that the treatment group would have followed a similar trend to that of the control group in the absence of trustee appointments, i.e., the *parallel trends* assumption.<sup>17</sup> Following Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021), we test the plausibility of parallel trends assumption by estimating dynamic treatment effects, i.e., treatment effects based on the length of exposure to the treatment. This method allows us to test both the conditional and unconditional parallel trends, and construct confidence intervals that are robust to potential multiple hypothesis testing problems. In Section 5, we report the dynamic effects and plausibility of the parallel trends assumption.

After estimating the overall treatment effect and the dynamic effects, we proceed to test the robustness of these results in Section 5.1.1. We first show that our results are similar under *unconditional parallel trends* and *parallel trends conditional on controls* assumptions<sup>18</sup> and to the inclusion of controls. We also show that our results remain the same when we use different versions of the outcome and an alternative specification of the control group.

Finally, we show that our results also replicate with a regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) design. This analysis uses a different sample than the DiD estimations. Specifically,

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<sup>16</sup>We show that our results are substantively similar when we use a control group of not-yet-treated municipalities instead of never-treated municipalities. Corresponding results are reported in the Appendix.

<sup>17</sup>Although parallel trends assumptions are not testable due to lack of counterfactual, the standard practice is to run a pre-test of it (Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2021). This implies testing whether treatment and control groups follow a similar trend before the treatment.

<sup>18</sup>The estimation method developed by Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) is able to attain unbiased estimates under the assumptions of both unconditional parallel trends and parallel trends conditional on covariates.

we compare trustee mayors with elected DBP mayors whom they replaced using an RDIT design and show that the results are remarkably similar to those from DiD estimations.

## 5 Results

In this section, we first present our baseline analysis and results. We then provide our results regarding the economic cost of central takeovers in Section 5.2. Finally, in Section 5.3, we probe the underlying mechanisms that help explain our baseline results.

### 5.1 Baseline Analysis

We start by estimating the group-time average treatment effects on i) monthly share of contracts awarded with each contract awarding method, ii) monthly share of spending with each contract awarding method based on contract prices, and iii) monthly share of each contract awarding method based on estimated cost of the contracts, using a staggered Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design (Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2021).

To investigate the dynamic effects and assess the plausibility of parallel trends assumption, we first aggregate group-time average treatment effects to dynamic effects based on the length of exposure to the treatment. Figures 2 and 3 plot these dynamic effects by the length of exposure to the treatment, i.e., *relative month*. According to Figure 2, before the trustee appointments, treatment and control groups do not significantly differ from each other in the share of contracts awarded with the unforeseen event clause, giving credibility to our DiD design. In contrast, after trustee appointments, the use of unforeseen event clause by trustee-appointed municipalities start to increase and this effect persists for almost 2 years.


Figure 3 reveals a consistent reverse pattern for the share of contracts awarded with sealed-bid auctions. Specifically, the treatment and control municipalities do not differ from each other before trustee appointments. After central takeovers, however; the share of contracts awarded by sealed-bid auction declines significantly for the trustee-appointed municipalities. Similarly, the effects persist for almost 2 years. Figure A.1 in the Appendix reports the dynamic effects for the threshold clause, for which we do not find any difference between the treatment and control municipalities either before or after the treatment.<sup>19</sup> Note that the confidence intervals around the dynamic effects are robust to multiple hypothesis testing

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<sup>19</sup>We report the tests of both conditional –with controls– and unconditional –without controls– parallel trends for our other outcomes in the Appendix A.1 and A.2. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level.

both in conditional and unconditional parallel trends assumption checks.

Figure 2: Dynamic effects: share of contracts awarded with the unforeseen event clause



*Notes:* The figure plots the dynamic effects from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) based on length of exposure to the treatment. The outcome variable is the monthly share of contracts awarded with the unforeseen event clause. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.


We then aggregate these dynamic effects into overall treatment effects by taking the weighted average of group-time treatment effects.<sup>20</sup> Table 2 presents the results for the first outcome: *monthly share of contracts* awarded with each contract awarding method. The first two models reports the share of contracts awarded with the unforeseen event clause, which is normally reserved for situations of extreme urgency and allows procuring entity to exercise more discretion in contract awarding. Trustee mayors use this clause significantly and substantially more than their elected AKP counterparts. Specifically, trustee mayors invoke this clause 23 percentage points more than the elected mayors, which is a substantial effect considering the control group mean (0.12).

The increase in the share of contracts awarded with the unforeseen event clause comes at the expense of more competitive sealed-bid auctions. Trustee mayors award much fewer contracts with the competitive sealed-bid auctions compared to the elected mayors. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 show this clearly: the trustee mayors award contracts through sealed-bid auctions 33 percentage points less than the elected mayors, whose mean share of contracts awarded with sealed-bid auctions is 0.61.

<sup>20</sup>Weights are chosen proportional to the group sizes.



Figure 3: Dynamic effects: share of contracts awarded with sealed-bid auction



*Notes:* The figure plots the dynamic effects from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) based on length of exposure to the treatment. The outcome variable is the monthly share of contracts awarded with sealed-bid auction. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

We next report on how much elected and trustee mayors differ in their use of threshold clause. This clause allows procuring entities to bypass the sealed-bid auction and use the more discretionary negotiation method for small purchases below a certain threshold. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2 show that trustee mayors are statistically not different from the elected mayors in their use of threshold clause of the procurement law.

The absence of such difference does not necessarily mean that the officials do not abuse this clause. To further analyze the case of threshold clause, we focus on cost manipulation practices, i.e., artificial manipulation of the estimated cost to keep it just below the threshold value. To test whether public officials have been engaging in such cost manipulation, we first normalize the estimated cost of the contracts by dividing it with the corresponding threshold value.<sup>21</sup>

Figure 4 plots the density distribution of the contracts granted by elected and trustee mayors. The dashed gray line corresponds to the mass point where the estimated cost of the contracts equals to the threshold value. Figure 4 shows clear evidence of bunching just before the threshold values, both by elected and trustee mayors. In sum, both types of mayors

<sup>21</sup>The threshold values are annually decided by the Public Procurement Authority in Turkey. We divide the estimated cost of each contract by the threshold value announced for the same year.

Table 2: DiD estimates: monthly share of contract awarding methods

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee	0.226 [0.146, 0.307]	0.234 [0.147, 0.320]	-0.311 [-0.444, -0.178]	-0.328 [-0.459, -0.196]	0.036 [-0.092, 0.164]	0.041 [-0.076, 0.158]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.12	0.12	0.61	0.61	0.26	0.26
Num.Obs.	4731	4731	4731	4731	4731	4731

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of the respective contract awarding method. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

engage in substantial cost manipulation to gain more discretion in contract awarding.<sup>22</sup>

So far, we have reported treatment effects on the share of contracts granted with each awarding method. However, one can argue that the changes in the frequency of contract awarding methods are not consequential *per se* unless they are also accompanied by respective changes in the amount of spending. Our next outcome serves this purpose. Accordingly, we first show the effect of trustee appointments on the *monthly share of spending* with each contract awarding method based on contract prices.

Table 3: DiD estimates: monthly share of spending based on contract prices


	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee	0.269 [0.186, 0.351]	0.282 [0.192, 0.371]	-0.267 [-0.401, -0.133]	-0.277 [-0.424, -0.131]	-0.002 [-0.124, 0.120]	-0.004 [-0.120, 0.112]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.13	0.13	0.65	0.65	0.22	0.22
Num.Obs.	4681	4681	4681	4681	4681	4681

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of spending with the respective contract awarding method and calculated based on contract prices. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

Table 3 reports the results of this analysis, which are in line with our baseline results. Under trustee mayors, the share of spending with unforeseen event clause is 28 percentage points higher than that of the elected mayors. This increase in spending with the unforeseen event clause is equivalent to the decrease in spending with the sealed-bid auctions.

<sup>22</sup>We also show that trustee mayors are similar to elected DBP mayors –whom they replaced– in terms of cost manipulation. See Figure A.5 in the Appendix.

Figure 4: Cost manipulation for more discretion: elected vs. trustee mayors



*Notes:* The figure plots distributions of estimated cost of contracts under elected (AKP) and trustee mayors. The dashed line corresponds to the threshold value below which the procuring authority attains more discretion in contract awarding process.

### 5.1.1 Robustness Tests

We conduct a series of analyses to show the robustness of our results to alternative versions of the outcome, alternative assumptions, and a different identification strategy. First, as detailed in the previous section, we report evidence for the plausibility of both conditional and unconditional parallel trends assumption. Accordingly, our DiD estimations in Tables 2 and 3 report estimates that are consistent with each other from models with and without control variables, which we refer to as our *baseline* analysis. Second, we repeat the same type of analysis with three different versions of our outcome variables, as also described in the previous section. The results indicate that central trustee appointments have quantitatively and qualitatively similar effects on each outcome.

Third, we test the robustness of our results to the specification of the control group. Our baseline analysis uses a control group of municipalities that have never been treated, i.e., that have never been appointed a trustee mayor. Alternatively, we construct a control group of not-yet-treated municipalities. Doing so includes the pre-treatment periods of trustee-appointed municipalities in the control group. As shown in Appendix A.4, our results remain

both quantitatively and qualitatively similar.

Finally, we use an entirely different empirical strategy and estimation technique. We compare trustee mayors with the mayors whom they replaced (elected DBP mayors) in a before/after-trustee comparison using a Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) design (Hausman and Rapson, 2018). Our running variable in this setting is the number of days relative to the trustee appointment date with the cut-off value set as 0. Accordingly; treated units fall to the right of the cut-off, whereas non-treated units fall to the left.

For estimation, we follow Calonico et al. (2015) and use a non-parametric approach with a triangular kernel and allow for different bandwidths at different sides of the cut-off. On each side, we use optimal bandwidths that minimize the mean-squared error (MSE). We, however, also experiment with manually chosen bandwidths to show that results are not driven by a specific bandwidth choice.

We present baseline results from our RDiT analyses in Table 4.<sup>23</sup> This analysis compares the state contracts granted by trustee mayors and elected DBP mayors whom they replaced. Remarkably, the bias-corrected robust RDiT estimates show very similar results to our baseline DiD estimates, proving the robustness of our results to an entirely different identification strategy. In particular, trustees are more likely to use the unforeseen event clause compared to the elected DBP mayors by around 19-21%. Similarly, they are less likely to distribute state contracts with sealed-bid auctions by around 26-31% depending on the model specification. In line with the baseline results, we do not find a difference in the use of threshold clause.

### 5.1.2 Alternative Mechanisms

In this section, we test and reject several alternative mechanisms that could explain the estimated differences between elected and appointed trustee mayors in their practice of the procurement law. First, one could argue that trustee mayors might be using the unforeseen event clause more often due to a larger number of natural disasters in their jurisdictions. To investigate this possibility, we check whether trustee-run municipalities suffered more natural disasters during the analyzed period. According to the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT)<sup>24</sup>, no natural disasters were recorded in the region (where both trustee-appointed and

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<sup>23</sup>See Figures A.6, A.7, and A.8 in the Appendix for the regression discontinuity (RD) plots.

<sup>24</sup>EM-DAT accepts an event as a disaster if any of the following three holds: there are at least ten deaths because of the event, 100 or more people are affected/injured or become homeless, there is a declaration by the country of a state of emergency and/or appeal for international assistance. See <https://public.emdat.be/data> for more details.

elected-mayor municipalities are located) during our period of analysis.

Table 4: Regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) estimates

	Unforeseen event		Sealed-bid acution		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee mayor	0.196*** (0.075)	0.212*** (0.071)	−0.313*** (0.109)	−0.264*** (0.084)	−0.035 (0.072)	−0.041 (0.065)
Num.Obs.	7812	7812	7812	7812	7812	7812
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Procurement type FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Industry FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Num.Obs.Effective.Left	1175	358	520	408	635	599
Num.Obs.Effective.Right	579	766	595	1045	1402	1072

*Notes:* The table reports estimates obtained from RDiT estimations using Calonico et al. (2015) with triangular kernel and optimal bandwidths which are allowed to differ between two sides of the cut-off. The dependent variables are binary indicators of whether the contract is awarded with the respective contract awarding method. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. *Procurement type FE* indicates the type of the procurement: goods, services, or construction. *Industry FE* variable indicates the industry code of the procurement and include 44 levels. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

A second alternative mechanism is the adverse selection of governors as trustee mayors. In other words, if the governors who were appointed as trustee mayors –*trustee governors*– were “bad apples” to start with, this could explain the observed differences in contract awarding practices (Leon, 2013). We test this adverse selection mechanism by comparing contracts granted by trustee mayors in their governorship offices to the contracts granted by other similarly ranked governors in Turkey. The results, presented in Table A.6 in the Appendix, show that trustee governors are not different than their fellow governors in terms of their use of the unforeseen event clause, threshold clause, and sealed-bid auction method. Therefore, it is not likely that the adverse selection of governors explains the differences we observe between trustee mayors and elected AKP mayor.

Third, we consider whether the effects we estimated might be due to the spillovers from the first batch of trustee appointments. This would be the case if the elected mayors from DBP –who were not sacked yet– changed their behavior after witnessing the first set of appointments. Nevertheless, the dynamic effects in pre-treatment periods reported in Figures 2, 3, and A.1 do not support this narrative as the never-treated control group and to-be sacked DBP mayors follow parallel trends until the trustee takeovers.

Another alternative explanation of our results concerns the levels of violence in the region of interest, which has a history of armed conflict. We present three different pieces of evidence, each ruling out this alternative explanation in their own right. First, although the procurement law grants the procuring agencies with a distinct clause that justifies the more discretionary negotiation method for purchases regarding security, this clause is rarely used by mayors: only 1% of all contracts are granted with this clause in the region.

We then conduct two additional tests. First, we run our analysis on a sample of geographically-matched municipalities. We match each trustee-appointed municipality to the three closest neighboring municipalities. This geographically matched sample ensures that treated and control municipalities experience similar levels of violence as the violent events typically take place in rural areas outside the municipal boundaries. The results from the geographically matched sample are substantively similar to our baseline DiD results, reported in Appendix B.2. Second, we repeat our baseline analysis by excluding municipalities with significant violent event history. The results, reported in Appendix B.3, are again substantively similar to our baseline results.

## 5.2 Economic Consequences

Although trustees grant state contracts with more discretion than their elected counterparts by abusing the procurement law, a strand of literature suggests that more discretion might be good for public (See, among others, Coviello et al., 2018; Decarolis et al., 2020). In this section, we analyze whether and how much the documented cases of law abuse and the resultant increased discretion costs to the public. We focus on two outcomes to understand the economic effects of increased discretion: contract price and rebate. The mean rebate value in our sample is 19%, meaning that the public enjoyed 19% discount relative to the estimated cost. The mean contract price is \$485,000 (in 2010 dollars).

When we specifically focus on contracts granted by trustee mayors, the mean rebate values are 16% and 24% in contracts granted with the unforeseen event clause and sealed-bid auction, respectively. In other words, the procuring public agency attains significantly less discount when the trustee mayors grant contracts using the unforeseen event clause. Similarly, while the resulting mean contract price for contracts granted with sealed-bid auction is \$484,000, it increases to \$518,000 when the unforeseen event clause is used, bringing about a 7% increase.

In Table 5, we investigate the economic effects mentioned above in a regression framework. Specifically, we focus on contract price and rebate, and compare how much these outcomes

change when the unforeseen event clause is used instead of sealed-bid auctions separately when the contracts are awarded with trustee and elected mayors. Under trustee mayors, the contracts granted with the unforeseen event clause leads to a 9.5 percentage points decrease in rebate compared to the contracts granted with sealed-bid auctions. This translates into a 40% decrease in rebate (compared to sealed-bid auctions). Contract prices, on the other hand, increase by around 24%.

Under elected mayors, we do not find any price differential between contracts granted with the unforeseen event clause and sealed-bid auctions. We, however, do find that rebate decrease by 8 percentage points when they grant the contract with unforeseen event clause instead of sealed-bid auctions (translating into a 35% decrease in rebate). Together with the baseline results, these findings suggest that the elected mayors use the unforeseen event clause much less often than the trustee mayors. When they do use it, however; the associated economic cost is smaller.

Table 5: OLS estimates for contract terms: trustee and elected (AKP) samples

	Trustee sample		Elected (AKP) sample	
	Price (log)	Rebate	Price (log)	Rebate
Ref.level: Sealed-bid auction				
Unforeseen events	0.216** (0.099)	-0.095*** (0.010)	-0.044 (0.116)	-0.081*** (0.011)
Threshold clause	-0.803*** (0.058)	-0.115*** (0.013)	-0.993*** (0.071)	-0.090*** (0.012)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procurement type FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	4322	4312	3581	3567

*Notes:* The table reports results from OLS estimations. The dependent variable are contract price (in TL, in real terms, in log) and rebate. The main explanatory variable is the contract awarding method and the its reference level is the *Sealed-bid auction*. Trustee sample includes the contracts awarded only by trustee mayors. Elected (AKP) sample includes contracts awarded by elected (AKP) mayors after the first trustee appointment. Covariates include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. *Procurement type FE* indicates the type of the procurement: goods, services, or construction. *Industry FE (2-digit)* and *Industry FE (3-digit)* variables indicate the industry code of the procurement and include 44 and 182 levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

When trustee mayors use the threshold clause, the resulting contract price is significantly lower. This is a mechanical change since the estimated cost of the contracts granted with the



threshold clause need to be below a certain threshold. What is more interesting, however, is that the public enjoys less discount by around 11 percentage points in contracts granted with the threshold clause compared to contracts granted with sealed-bid auction. Elected mayors, on the other hand, fare again better than trustee mayors. They bring about slightly less reduction in rebate along with more reduction in price.

### 5.3 Unpacking Underlying Mechanisms

In this section, we probe the potential underlying mechanisms that help explain the observed differences between elected and centrally appointed trustee mayors. In most central takeover scenarios, there are many simultaneous effects operating through multiple channels that make it hard to disentangle the underlying mechanisms. For example, when the political centralization reforms transfer the responsibilities of some local offices to a central one, the central office utilizes not only a larger budget operationalized over many localities but also a stronger authority overall. While the larger budget and operation scope can create economies of scale and coordination benefits, stronger authority would mean a lack of checks and balances that could harm the decision-making process. Our setting is unique in the sense that central takeovers solely result in the transitioning of the appointed governors to the mayor position within the affected municipalities. Since it is the same office, only with different mayors, there is no change in the fiscal and administrative authority of the mayoral offices. This reduces the number of candidate mechanisms to a few so that we can actually investigate each and offer insights.

We first consider the possibility of trustee mayors holding a different agenda –e.g., an agenda dictated by the ruling elite– than elected mayors. As the central government showed a clear interest in capturing the opposition municipalities through central appointments, it might as well have a distinct agenda to win the hearts and minds of the population to expand its support base in the area. Such an agenda might entail a rapid public service delivery program and necessitate a fast and easy procedure such as the negotiation method.

To test this mechanism, we analyze the levels and the composition of the municipality spending via procurement. We first repeat our main DiD analysis with two different outcomes: monthly total and per capita spending via procurement. We find that the central takeovers increase neither monthly total nor monthly per capita spending via procurement in the treated municipalities (see Appendix B.4).<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>As a caveat, we should note that the central government can use other methods to support the trustees, such as letting them hire more workers or easing their financing constraints. We cannot analyze such factors

We then compare the trustee mayors to the elected mayors, whom they replaced, in terms of their composition of spending. If the trustee mayors took over the office with a special agenda to expand the support base of the ruling party, we should then expect to see trustee mayors pouring more money into purchases related to areas that are deemed important by citizens, such as agriculture and education (Malesky et al., 2014). To check whether this has been the case, we test whether the spending by trustee mayors on important public services differs substantially from that of elected mayors whom they replaced.

Table 6 indicates that trustee mayors mostly do not differ from those elected mayors much in terms of their spending on different public services except in education and transportation. These differences are, however, too small –respectively 1 and 8 percentage points– to conclude a distinct agenda driving our results. To be clear, we do not reject the presence of a distinct agenda held by trustee mayors. We rather argue that this agenda –whether it exists or not– does not seem to drive our results.

The second potential mechanism relates to a central discussion in political economy about whether more discretion leads to better quality services (See, e.g., Coviello et al., 2018; Decarolis et al., 2020). In our setting, this mechanism could be effective as the central takeover of 95 municipalities via trustee appointments could help the central government to reap the so-called benefits of political centralization –namely better coordination and economies of scale– especially when more discretion is enjoyed by these trustees (Seabright, 1996; Arora et al., 2023).

Table 6: Composition of spending

	Agriculture	Construction	Culture	Education	Health	Public services	Security	Transportation
Trustee mayor	−0.005 (0.011)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.012)	−0.008** (0.003)	−0.004 (0.003)	0.034 (0.036)	0.011 (0.012)	−0.083*** (0.021)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procurement type FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	3789	3789	3789	3789	3789	3789	3789	3789

*Notes:* The table reports results from OLS estimations on a sample contracts granted by trustee mayors and the elected mayors whom they replaced. The dependent variable is the monthly share of spending in the respective category. The main variable of interest is *Trustee mayor*, indicating whether the contract is granted by a trustee mayor. Covariates include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. *Procurement type FE* indicates the type of the procurement: goods, services, or construction. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

due to the lack of data. However, even if such complementary methods are used, we contend that the agenda of the government would be mainly reflected in procurement as it is the most direct way of transferring resources to the localities.

Accordingly, we test whether more discretion by trustee mayors is associated with better procurement quality. If the trustee mayors delivered better quality procurement by exercising more discretion in contract awarding, we should then observe a higher estimated cost for a similar purchase when it is awarded through the unforeseen events clause than when it is awarded through a sealed-bid auction.<sup>26</sup> To check whether this has been the case, we compare the estimated costs of similar contracts, as identified by the procurement type and industry code of the procurement. To further increase the comparability of the contracts, we use two industry codes: (i) 2-digit industry code culminating in 45 different industrial sectors, (ii) 3-digit industry code culminating in 181 different industrial sectors. Table 7 indicates that the estimated costs –within procurement type and industry– do not significantly change with the use of the unforeseen event clause compared to sealed-bid auction under neither trustee nor elected mayors. This indicates that there is no quality improvement –to the extent that the costs of items can measure it– when the mayors exercise more discretion. We conclude that discretion does not lead to better outcomes in our setting.

It is important to note that, there is a decline in the estimated costs under the threshold clause. This is for two reasons. First, threshold clause is, by law, reserved for small purchases. This mechanically reduces the estimated cost of contracts awarded with this method compared to the other methods. Second, it is an outcome of the manipulation around the threshold: As this clause necessitates the estimated cost to be under a certain threshold, the procurers have to reduce the estimated costs either by dividing the contracts into smaller pieces or by lowering the estimated costs artificially.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, we investigate the plausibility of the local accountability mechanism in driving the observed differences between elected and appointed trustee mayors. As the appointed mayors do not face a downward accountability towards the local residents but an upward accountability to the political figures that can appoint and dismiss them, they fear less from the voters, implying a decrease in local accountability.

To test whether this has been an effective mechanism, we provide three pieces of indirect evidence. We first check whether trustee mayors ran for election in the next local or national elections. We find that only 4 trustee mayors in our sample ran for election. This indicates a lack of local accountability as the trustee mayors did not have an electoral accountability

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<sup>26</sup>Note that the estimated cost of the procurement is calculated by the procuring agency prior to the contract awarding process. Therefore, when the higher quality goods are contracted instead of the regular goods they would have a higher estimated cost. The calculations are based on the unit costs of items decided annually by the Public Procurement Authority.

<sup>27</sup>Note that despite the estimated cost staying under the threshold, the actual contracted price can be higher than the threshold in this type of procurement.

Table 7: OLS estimates for estimated cost: trustee and elected (AKP) samples

	Dept. Variable: Estimated cost (log)			
	Trustee sample		Elected (AKP) sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ref.level: Sealed-bid auction				
Unforeseen events	0.081 (0.103)	0.050 (0.113)	−0.145 (0.112)	−0.126 (0.114)
Threshold clause	−0.970*** (0.066)	−0.947*** (0.076)	−1.135*** (0.068)	−1.179*** (0.082)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procurement type FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE (2-digit)	Yes	No	Yes	No
Industry FE (3-digit)	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num.Obs.	4322	4322	3581	3581

*Notes:* The table reports results from OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the estimated cost of the contract (in TL, in real terms, in log). The main explanatory variable is the contract awarding method and the reference level of it is the *Sealed-bid auction*. Trustee sample includes the contracts awarded only by trustee mayors. Elected (AKP) sample includes contracts awarded by elected (AKP) mayors after the first trustee appointment. Covariates include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. *Procurement type FE* indicates the type of the procurement: goods, services, or construction. *Industry FE (2-digit)* and *Industry FE (3-digit)* variables indicate the industry code of the procurement and include 44 and 182 levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

concern in mind during their trusteeship.<sup>28</sup> Second, reassuringly, according to the Higher Election Board (*YSK*), none of the other candidates who competed in the 2019 local elections in Turkey held similar positions to trustees’ primary positions: district, province, or vice governorship. This further strengthens the argument of appointed trustee mayors lacking local accountability.

Third, our results regarding the abuse of law by elected and trustee mayors provide supporting evidence for the local accountability –or lack thereof– mechanism. Note that, we have already documented: i) trustee mayors abuse the unforeseen event clause much more than elected mayors, and ii) trustee mayors and elected mayors do not differ in how often they use the threshold clause and they both engage in substantial cost manipulation for more

<sup>28</sup>Out of these four, two of them ran for election in their hometowns both in other regions. Therefore, only two actually were candidates in the places where they have been serving as trustees. We drop all four from the sample and repeat our baseline analysis. The results are largely in line with the baseline results and reported in the Appendix A.3.

discretion in contract awarding.

These results resonate well with the findings by Ferraz and Finan (2011) and Lockwood et al. (2022) that types of malpractices that are easily detectable by voters are committed less by officials who face electoral accountability. In our setting, voters can easily detect unjustified uses of unforeseen event clause through the Public Procurement Authority’s electronic platform that is open to the public.<sup>29</sup> The more subtle cost manipulation, on the other hand, is not easily detectable by voters at the contract level but requires data collection and statistical data analysis such as the one in this paper.<sup>30</sup> Taken together, we find the removal of local accountability as an effective underlying mechanism.

## 6 Conclusion

The intricate relationship between the powers of central and local governments have, for long, been a subject of significant debate. Leveraging a unique setting in Turkey, this paper sheds light on the effects of central government takeovers of local jurisdictions on public procurement practices, specifically focusing on law abuse and economic efficiency. Our findings provide robust evidence that trustee mayors, appointed by the central government, display increased tendencies towards exploiting legal loopholes, notably the unforeseen event clause, in public procurement regulations unlike their elected counterparts. Such law abuse costs more to the public in terms of inflated contract prices and reduced value for money.

These results, supported by a rigorous empirical strategy, underscore the importance of local accountability in curbing malfeasance and promoting efficient procurement practices. The shift from elected to appointed mayors seems to engender an environment where discretionary power is more susceptible to misuse, possibly due to reduced local accountability and a heightened focus on maintaining favor with central political elites. Moreover, the absence of differences in the misuse of the threshold clause between both sets of mayors offers a deeper insight into the broader dynamics of discretion and the nuanced ways in which it can be wielded.

Our work contributes to the literature in three key ways. Firstly, it introduces rigorous causal evidence into the discussion of authoritarianism’s local repercussions with fresh in-

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<sup>29</sup>The awarding method of each contract is publicly available at the electronic platform of the *Public Procurement Authority* in Turkey. Anyone can look up whether a certain contract by a certain public entity was awarded with a sealed-bid auction or with the more discretionary method of negotiation without a prior call by invoking the unforeseen event or threshold clause.

<sup>30</sup>In the absence of free and independent media, it is not very likely neither that cost manipulation practices would make it to the news.

sights from Turkey’s authoritarian context. Secondly, it unpacks the potential mechanisms that underlie the behaviors of central appointees, emphasizing the profound role local accountability plays in shaping administrative decisions at the municipal level. And lastly, by introducing a novel metric for gauging law abuse, our study expands the analytical toolkit available for scrutinizing procurement discretion, offering future researchers a more comprehensive lens through which to view such issues.

In summary, as countries grapple with the implications of increasing authoritarianism and its concomitant drive for clinching power in the local (Malesky et al., [2014](#)), understanding the nuanced impacts of such shifts on governance becomes ever more critical. Our findings from Turkey underscore the importance of preserving local accountability structures to safeguard both economic efficiency and the rule of law.

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
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# A Appendix: Robustness Tests

## A.1 Unconditional Parallel Trends

### A.1.1 Outcome: monthly share of contracts awarded with threshold clause


Figure A.1: Dynamic effects: share of contracts awarded with the threshold clause



*Notes:* The figure plots the dynamic effects from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) based on length of exposure to the treatment. The outcome variable is the monthly share of contracts awarded with the threshold clause. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

### A.1.2 Outcome: monthly share of spending based on contract prices

Figure A.2: Dynamic effects: share of spending based on contract prices




*Notes:* The figure plots the dynamic effects from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) based on length of exposure to the treatment. The outcome variable is the monthly share of spending based on contract prices with unforeseen event clause in Panel (a), sealed-bid auction in Panel (b), and threshold clause in Panel (c). Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

## A.2 Conditional Parallel Trends

### A.2.1 Outcome: monthly share of contract awarding methods


Figure A.3: Dynamic effects: monthly share of contract awarding methods





## A.2.2 Outcome: monthly share of spending based on contract prices

Figure A.4: Dynamic effects: monthly share of spending based on contract prices



*Notes:* The figure plots the dynamic effects from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) based on length of exposure to the treatment. The outcome variable is the monthly share of spending based on contract prices with unforeseen event clause in Panel (a), sealed-bid auction in Panel (b), and threshold clause in Panel (c). The estimations control for population, number of business enterprises at the municipal level and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

### A.3 Dropping Trustees Who Ran for Election

Table A.1: DiD estimates: monthly share of contract awarding methods

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee	0.221 [0.134, 0.308]	0.225 [0.132, 0.318]	-0.295 [-0.429, -0.161]	-0.306 [-0.450, -0.163]	0.024 [-0.100, 0.148]	0.025 [-0.100, 0.151]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.12	0.12	0.61	0.61	0.26	0.26
Num.Obs.	4552	4552	4552	4552	4552	4552

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of the respective contract awarding method. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

Table A.2: DiD estimates: monthly share of spending based on contract prices

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee	0.261 [0.179, 0.343]	0.272 [0.173, 0.370]	-0.236 [-0.382, -0.090]	-0.244 [-0.388, -0.101]	-0.025 [-0.161, 0.111]	-0.027 [-0.154, 0.099]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.13	0.13	0.65	0.65	0.22	0.22
Num.Obs.	4504	4504	4504	4504	4504	4504

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of spending with the respective contract awarding method and calculated based on contract prices. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

## A.4 Not-yet-treated Municipalities as a Control Group

Table A.3: DiD estimates: monthly share of contract awarding methods

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Trustee	0.225 [0.149, 0.301]	0.232 [0.149, 0.315]	-0.301 [-0.424, -0.179]	-0.319 [-0.442, -0.195]	0.028 [-0.096, 0.151]	0.035 [-0.075, 0.145]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.12	0.12	0.6	0.6	0.28	0.28
Num.Obs.	4968	4968	4968	4968	4968	4968

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of the respective contract awarding method. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.


Table A.4: DiD estimates: monthly share of spending based on contract prices

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Trustee	0.270 [0.186, 0.354]	0.283 [0.195, 0.372]	-0.258 [-0.401, -0.116]	-0.274 [-0.403, -0.144]	-0.012 [-0.140, 0.116]	-0.010 [-0.130, 0.111]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.13	0.13	0.64	0.64	0.23	0.23
Num.Obs.	4918	4918	4918	4918	4918	4918

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of spending with the respective contract awarding method and calculated based on contract prices. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

## A.5 Cost Manipulation: Trustee mayors vs. Elected (DBP) Mayors


Figure A.5: Bunching around the threshold for expanded discretion: elected (DBP) vs. trustee mayors



*Notes:* The figure plots distributions of estimated cost of contracts under elected (DBP) and trustee mayors. The dashed line corresponds to the threshold value below which the procuring authority attains more discretion in contract awarding process.


## A.6 RDiT Analysis: RD Plots and Estimates

Figure A.6: Regression discontinuity (RD) plot: unforeseen event clause




*Notes:* The figure presents the RD plot for the use of unforeseen event clause with binned sample mimicking the underlying variability of the data (Calonico et al., 2015). The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the contract is awarded with the unforeseen event clause. The cut-off is the trustee appointment day. Polynomials of order 2 are fitted on each side of the cut-off using a triangular kernel.

Figure A.7: Regression discontinuity (RD) plot: sealed-bid auction



*Notes:* The figure presents the RD plot for the use of sealed-bid auctions with binned sample mimicking the underlying variability of the data (Calonico et al., 2015). The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the contract is awarded with a sealed-bid auction. The cut-off is the trustee appointment day. Polynomials of order 2 are fitted on each side of the cut-off using a triangular kernel.

Figure A.8: Regression discontinuity (RD) plot: threshold clause



*Notes:* The figure presents the RD plot for the use of threshold clause with binned sample mimicking the underlying variability of the data (Calonico et al., 2015). The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the contract is awarded with the threshold clause. The cut-off is the trustee appointment day. Polynomials of order 2 are fitted on each side of the cut-off using a triangular kernel.

Table A.5: Regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) estimates using manual bandwidth: 360 days

	Unforeseen event		Sealed-bid acution		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee mayor	0.209*** (0.069)	0.240*** (0.056)	-0.243*** (0.092)	-0.262*** (0.070)	-0.060 (0.074)	-0.057 (0.066)
Num.Obs.	7812	7812	7812	7812	7812	7812
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Province FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Procurement type FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Industry FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Kernel	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular	Triangular
Num.Obs.Effective.Left	1358	1358	1358	1358	1358	1358
Num.Obs.Effective.Right	1819	1819	1819	1819	1819	1819

*Notes:* The table reports estimates obtained from RDiT estimations using Calonico et al. (2015) with triangular kernel and the manually chosen 360-day bandwidth for both sides of the cut-off. The dependent variables are binary indicators of whether the contract is awarded with the respective contract awarding method. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. *Procurement type FE* indicates the type of the procurement: goods, services, or construction. *Industry FE* variable indicates the industry code of the procurement and include 44 levels. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .



## B Appendix: Alternative Mechanisms

### B.1 Adverse Selection of Governors as Trustee Mayors

Table A.6: Adverse selection of governors as trustee mayors

	Unforeseen events	Sealed-bid auctions	Threshold clause
Trustee Governor	−0.018 (0.037)	−0.050 (0.077)	0.086 (0.082)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procurement type FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	1825	1825	1825
R2	0.145	0.300	0.371
R2 Adj.	0.084	0.250	0.326

*Notes:* The table reports results from OLS estimations on the sample of contracts awarded by all district governors before the trustee appointments take place. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the contract is awarded with the respective contract awarding method. The main explanatory variable, *Trustee Governor*, is a binary indicator of whether the contract is awarded by a governor who has been appointed as a trustee mayor later on. Covariates include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. *Procurement type FE* indicates the type of the procurement: goods, services, or construction. *Industry FE* variable indicates the industry code of the procurement and include 44 levels. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

## B.2 DiD Analysis: Geographically Matched Sample

Table A.7: DiD estimates: monthly share of contract awarding methods

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee	0.209 [0.108, 0.310]	0.191 [0.087, 0.294]	-0.287 [-0.408, -0.165]	-0.283 [-0.409, -0.157]	0.048 [-0.057, 0.153]	0.059 [-0.041, 0.159]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.14	0.14	0.59	0.59	0.25	0.25
Num.Obs.	3771	3771	3771	3771	3771	3771

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of the respective contract awarding method. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

Table A.8: DiD estimates: monthly share of spending based on contract prices

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee	0.235 [0.128, 0.342]	0.217 [0.108, 0.327]	-0.225 [-0.362, -0.089]	-0.219 [-0.363, -0.076]	-0.010 [-0.127, 0.108]	0.002 [-0.104, 0.108]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.16	0.16	0.63	0.63	0.22	0.22
Num.Obs.	3722	3722	3722	3722	3722	3722

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of spending with the respective contract awarding method and calculated based on contract prices. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

### B.3 DiD Analysis: Excluding Municipalities with Violent Events

Table A.9: DiD estimates: monthly share of contract awarding methods

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee	0.205 [0.122, 0.288]	0.211 [0.123, 0.300]	-0.281 [-0.428, -0.134]	-0.291 [-0.445, -0.137]	0.021 [-0.133, 0.176]	0.024 [-0.119, 0.166]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.12	0.12	0.61	0.61	0.26	0.26
Num.Obs.	4074	4074	4074	4074	4074	4074

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of the respective contract awarding method. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.


Table A.10: DiD estimates: monthly share of spending based on contract prices

	Unforeseen events		Sealed-bid auctions		Threshold clause	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trustee	0.241 [0.161, 0.322]	0.253 [0.159, 0.347]	-0.234 [-0.390, -0.078]	-0.234 [-0.399, -0.069]	-0.007 [-0.155, 0.141]	-0.019 [-0.155, 0.117]
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean	0.13	0.13	0.65	0.65	0.22	0.22
Num.Obs.	4033	4033	4033	4033	4033	4033

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly share of spending with the respective contract awarding method and calculated based on contract prices. Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

## B.4 Monthly Spending via Procurement

Figure A.9: Dynamic effects: monthly total spending via procurement




*Notes:* The figure plots the dynamic effects from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) based on length of exposure to the treatment. The outcome variable is the monthly total spending via procurement. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

Table A.11: DiD estimates: monthly total spending via procurement

	Total spending in procurement (in million TL)	
	(1)	(2)
Trustee	0.546 [−0.553, 1.645]	0.947 [−0.654, 2.548]
Controls	No	Yes
Num.Obs.	4681	4681

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the monthly total spending in public procurement calculated from contract prices (in million TL, in real terms). Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

Figure A.10: Dynamic effects: monthly per capita spending via procurement



*Notes:* The figure plots the dynamic effects from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) based on length of exposure to the treatment. The outcome variable is the total monthly spending via procurement. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

Table A.12: DiD estimates: monthly per capita spending via procurement

	Per capita spending in procurement (in million TL)	
	(1)	(2)
Trustee	1.233 [−12.463, 14.929]	3.243 [−9.750, 16.236]
Controls	No	Yes
Num.Obs.	4681	4681

*Notes:* The table reports the DiD estimates obtained from staggered DiD estimations using Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021). The outcome variable is the per capita monthly spending in public procurement calculated from contract prices (in million TL, in real terms). Controls include population and number of enterprises at the municipality level, and the level of nightlight at the district level. Bootstrapped-based 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses and are robust to multiple hypothesis testing.

## C Appendix: List of DBP Municipalities with Appointed Trustees

Table A.13: Metropolitan Municipalities, in Alphabetical Order

Name of the Province	Appointment Date	Name of the Trustee	Governorship Office	Province Category
Ağrı	03.01.2017	Musa Işın	Governor of the Province (GP)	3rd
Batman	11.09.2016	Ertuğ Şevket Aksoy	GP	3rd
Bitlis	27.11.2016	Ahmet Çınar	GP	4th
Dersim	17.11.2016	Olgun Öner	Vice GP	4th
Diyarbakır	01.11.2016	Cumali Atilla	Etimesgut, Ankara Governor	2nd
Hakkari	11.09.2016	Cüneyt Epçim	Vice GP	4th
Mardin	17.11.2016	Mustafa Yaman	GP	2nd
Siirt	17.11.2016	Ceyhun Dilşad Taşkın	Vice GP	4th
Şırnak	11.09.2016	Turan Bedirhanoglu	Vice GP	4th
Van	17.11.2016	İbrahim Taşyapan	GP	2nd

Table A.14: District Municipalities, in Alphabetical Order

District / Province	Appointment Date	Name of the Trustee	Governorship Office	District Category
Akdeniz / Mersin	18.12.2016	Hamdi Bilge Aktaş	GP	1
Akpazar / Dersim	10.05.2017	Kenan Aktaş	Mazgirt, Dersim Gov.	4
Artuklu / Mardin	13.12.2016	Şakir Öner Öztürk	GP	3
Atabağı / Siirt	18.03.2017	Mehmet Kocabey	Baykan, Siirt Gov.	4
Bahçesaray / Van	16.02.2017	Serhat Karabektaş	GP	6
Balveren / Şırnak	17.03.2017	Turan Bedirhanoglu	Şırnak Vice Gov.	NA <sup>31</sup>
Başkale / Van	22.01.2017	Abdulselam Öztürk	GP	4
Başverimli / Şırnak	11.09.2016	Savaş Konak	Silopi Gov.	2

<sup>31</sup>Some rural towns have municipalities even though they are not a district. Hence they do not have governors and are not categorized like districts. Such municipalities are marked with Not Applicable (NA) in the list.

Table A.14: Continued from previous page

District / Province	Appointment Date	Name of the Trustee	Governorship Office	District Category
Baykan / Siirt	20.12.2016	Mehmet Kocabey	GP	4
Beğendik / Siirt	30.03.2017	Hakan Şeker	Pervari Gov.	NA
Beşiri / Batman	11.09.2016	Mustafa Maslak	GP	4
Beytüşşebap / Şırnak	03.03.2017	Murat Şener	GP	4
Bismil / Diyarbakır	02.04.2017	Turgay Gülenç	GP	3
Bozova / Şanlıurfa	09.01.2017	Zekeriya Göker	Elazığ Vice Gov.	4
Bulanık / Muş	11.09.2016	Ömer Şahin	GP	4
Cizre / Şırnak	11.09.2016	Ahmet Adanur	GP	2
Çaldıran / Van	15.02.2017	Tekin Dünder	GP	4
Çatak / Van	06.01.2017	Hacı Asım Akgül	GP	4
Çukurca / Hakkari	12.08.2016	Mehmet Mut	GP	4
Dargeçit / Mardin	11.09.2016	M. Yaşar Yeşiltaş	GP	4
Derik / Mardin	11.09.2016	M. Fatih Safitürk	GP	4
Dicle / Diyarbakır	14.02.2017	Alparslan Kılıç	GP	4
Digor / Kars	09.02.2017	Mustafa Güngör	GP	4
Dişadin / Ağrı	11.09.2016	Mekan Çeviren	GP	4
Doğubayazıt / Ağrı	24.01.2017	Ulaş Akhan	GP	3
Edremit / Van	11.09.2016	İbrahim Özkan	Van Vice Gov	3
Eğil / Diyarbakır	07.03.2017	Kürşad Atak	GP	4
Erciş / Van	11.09.2016	Mehmet Şirin Yaşar	GP	3
Erentepe / Muş	13.06.2017	Hacı Arslan Uzan	Bulanık, Muş Gov	NA
Eruh / Siirt	11.09.2016	Murtaza Dayanç	GP	4

Table A.14: Continued from previous page

District / Province	Appointment Date	Name of the Trustee	Governorship Office	District Category
Esendere / Hakkari	07.02.2017	Mahmut Kaşıkçı	Yüksekova, Hakkari Gov	NA
Fındık / Şırnak	19.01.2017	Osman Demir	Güçlükonak, Şırnak Gov	NA
Gercüş / Batman	11.09.2016	Ünal Koç	GP	4
Gökçebağ / Siirt	06.02.2017	Ceyhun Dilşad Taşkın	Siirt Vice Gov	NA
Görümlü / Şırnak	02.10.2017	Savaş Konak	Silopi Gov.	NA
Güroymak / Bitlis	28.11.2016	Ufuk Özen Alibeyoğlu	GP	4
Gürpınar / Van	03.02.2017	Osman Doğramacı	GP	4
Halfeti / Şanlıurfa	23.12.2016	Şeref Albayrak	GP	6
Hani / Diyarbakır	05.10.2016	Şaban Arda Yazıcı	GP	4
Hınıs / Erzurum	11.09.2016	Bülent Ay	GP	4
Hizan / Bitlis	24.12.2016	Bülent Hamitoğlu	GP	4
Hoşhaber / Iğdır	11.09.2016	Bilgehan Karanfil	Iğdır Vice Gov	NA
İdil / Şırnak	21.09.2016	Ersin Tepeli	GP	4
İkiköprü / Batman	11.09.2016	Mustafa Maslak	Beşiri, Batman Gov	NA
İpekyolu / Van	11.09.2016	Önder Can	Van Vice GP	3
Karaçoban / Erzurum	28.12.2016	Muhsin Duran Kalkan	GP	4
Karakoçan / Elazığ	31.01.2017	Cemil Sarıoğlu	GP	4
Karayazı / Erzurum	05.12.2016	Kamil Aksoy	GP	4



Table A.14: Continued from previous page

District / Province	Appointment Date	Name of the Trustee	Governorship Office	District Category
Kayabağlar / Siirt	12.04.2017	Musa Uçgöl	Kurtalan, Siirt Gov	NA
Kayapınar / Diyarbakır	12.08.2016	Mustafa Kılıç	GP	2
Kızıltepe / Mardin	04.12.2016	Ahmet Odabaş	GP	2
Kocaköy / Diyarbakır	06.02.2017	Yusuf Turhan	GP	4
Konakkuran / Muş	10.05.2017	Soner Kırılı	Malazgirt, Muş Gov.	NA
Kömür / Adıyaman	29.08.2018	Adem Kaya	Adıyaman Vice Gov	NA
Kulp / Diyarbakır	23.01.2017	Fatih Dülgeroğlu	GP	4
Kumçatı / Şırnak	06.01.2017	Turan Bedirhanoglu	Şırnak Vice Gov	NA
Lice / Diyarbakır	02.10.2017	Sinan Başak	GP	4
Malazgirt / Muş	12.02.2016	Soner Kırılı	GP	4
Mazıdağı / Mardin	11.09.2016	Halit Benek	GP	4
Muradiye / Van	17.01.2017	Mehmet Fatih Çelikel	GP	4
Mutki / Bitlis	23.12.2016	Mehmet Kılıç	GP	4
Nusaybin / Mardin	11.09.2016	Ergün Baysal	GP	3
Ovakışla / Bitlis	03.11.2016	Bülent Tekbıyıkoglu	Ahlat, Bitlis Gov	4
Ömerli / Mardin	06.01.2017	Erol Korkmaz	GP	4
Özalp / Van	11.09.2016	Serdar Karal	GP	4
Rüstemgedik / Muş	14.04.2017	Hacı Arslan Uzan	Bulanık, Muş Gov	NA

Table A.14: Continued from previous page

District / Province	Appointment Date	Name of the Trustee	Governorship Office	District Category
Saray/ Van	15.02.2017	Mehmet Halis Aydın	GP	4
Savur / Mardin	01.03.2017	İdris Koç	GP	4
Sırtköy / Şırnak	08.11.2016	Ersin Tepeli	İdil, Şırnak Gov	NA
Silopi / Şırnak	11.09.2016	Savaş Konak	GP	2
Silvan / Diyarbakır	11.09.2016	Murat Kütük	GP	3
Sur / Diyarbakır	11.09.2016	Bilal Özkan	GP	2
Suruç / Şanlıurfa	11.09.2016	Tarık Açıkgöz	Şanlıurfa Vice Gov	3
Şemdinli / Hakkari	07.12.2016	M.Fuat Türkman	Bingöl Vice Gov	4
Tekman / Erzurum	06.01.2017	Kemal Karahan	GP	4
Tutak / Ağrı	12.01.2017	Erkan İsa Erat	GP	4
Tuzluca / Iğdır	11.09.2016	İbrahim Civalek	GP	4
Uludere / Şırnak	27.01.2017	Mehmet Fatik Yakınoğlu	GP	4
Uzgörür / Muş	11.09.2016	Ömer Şahin	Bulanık, Muş Gov	NA
Varto / Muş	11.11.2016	Mehmet Nuri Çetin	GP	4
Veysel Karani / Siirt	23.12.2016	Mehmet Kocabey	Baykan, Siirt Gov	NA
Viranşehir / Şanlıurfa	09.01.2017	Ömer Çimşit	GP	3
Yenişehir / Diyarbakır	08.12.2016	Mehmet Özel	GP	2
Yolalan / Bitlis	24.12.2016	Bülent Hamitoğlu	Hizan, Bitlis Gov	NA
Yüksekova / Hakkari	19.12.2016	Mahmut Kaşıkçı	GP	3

## D Appendix: Contractors of Trustee Mayors

### D.1 Repeating Contractors




Figure A.11: Average company shares for each auction method in trustee-run municipalities

## D.2 Local vs. Non-local Suppliers




Figure A.12: Local contract share distribution of companies that secured state contracts with the unforeseen event clause




Figure A.13: Local contract share distribution of companies that secured state contracts in sealed-bid auctions




Figure A.14: Local contract share distribution of companies that secured state contracts with the threshold clause