

# the complete n00b's guide to Cloud Security

Cassandra Young aka muteki  
@muteki\_rtw



# Who's “muteki”?

- Azure/O365 SysAdmin with a focus on Security
- Computer Science Grad Student  
(aka glutton for punishment)
- Blue Team Village Organizer
- Jack of All Trades
- Lives for international travel, scuba diving, woodworking, jigsaw puzzles and baking
- Not entirely sure how she got here?

Cassandra Young

Pronouns: she/her

Twitter: @muteki\_rtw

LinkedIn: [linkedin.com/in/cassandray](https://www.linkedin.com/in/cassandray)

GitHub: [github.com/muteki-apps](https://github.com/muteki-apps)



# Fundamentals





# Fundamentals | Take Note!



THINK COMPONENTS



LEARN CODE



BE FLEXIBLE

# Fundamentals | The Shared Responsibility Model

Responsibility	SaaS	PaaS	IaaS	On-prem	
Information and data	Customer	Customer	Customer	Customer	RESPONSIBILITY ALWAYS RETAINED BY CUSTOMER
Devices (Mobile and PCs)	Customer	Customer	Customer	Customer	
Accounts and identities	Customer	Customer	Customer	Customer	
Identity and directory infrastructure	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer	Customer	RESPONSIBILITY VARIES BY SERVICE TYPE
Applications	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer	Customer	
Network controls	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer	Customer	
Operating system	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer	Customer	
Physical hosts	Microsoft	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer	RESPONSIBILITY TRANSFERS TO CLOUD PROVIDER
Physical network	Microsoft	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer	
Physical datacenter	Microsoft	Microsoft	Microsoft	Customer	

 Microsoft  Customer



On-prem  
Infrastructure

Internal HR  
App  
(EC2)

HR  
Database  
(RDS)

Purchases  
Function  
(Lambda)

Customer  
Database  
(RDS)

3rd party payment  
processing service

FaaS  
manage  
code, libraries

Application  
Web Server  
(EC2)


pay  
no OS!  
Can  
manage  
OS!  
IaaS

Example:  
Star Trek  
Swag Station 9

User Interface




# Key Areas | Identity & Access Management






```
2  "Version": "2012-10-17",
3  "Statement": [
4    {
5      "Sid": "VisualEditor0",
6      "Effect": "Allow",
7      "Action": [
8        "lambda:CreateFunction",
9        "lambda:InvokeFunction",
10       "lambda:GetFunction",
11       "lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration",
12       .....
13       "lambda:UpdateAlias",
14       "lambda:UpdateCodeSigningConfig",
15       "lambda:UpdateFunctionCode",
16       "lambda:CreateAlias"
17     ],
18     "Resource": "*"
19   }
20 ]
```






Payment service



Roles in  
Star Trek:  
Swag Station 9


3 Lambda returns results  
4 EC2 assumes role to  
5 Save result to DB








# Key Areas | Resource Segmentation | AWS Networking





Set for no external traffic

Segmentation in Star Trek Swag Station 9

talks to external service



## AVAILABILITY ZONE A

### VPC

Security Group A  
(DBGroup)

EC2

EC2

Security Group B

RDS DB

RDS DB

Inbound rules

Outbound rules

Tags

#### Inbound rules

Type	Protocol	Port range	Source
MYSQL/Aurora	TCP	3306	sg-03ecf9b16a40ebef8 (DBGroup)

# Key Areas | Data Protection | AWS Examples

AWS documentation details service endpoints and the protocols they accept:

Layer	Service	Encryption in Transit	Encryption at Rest
FaaS	AWS Lambda	HTTPS only	Env. variables encrypted at rest (RAM only, no permanent storage)
PaaS	AWS DynamoDB	HTTPS only	Default: encrypted, AWS owned key AWS managed
IaaS	AWS EC2	HTTP and HTTPS	Default: not encrypted, options available if configured



# Key Areas | Data Protection | AWS S3 Example

## SSE-S3:


Server-Side Encryption  
with Amazon S3-Managed Keys

## SSE-KMS:

Server-Side Encryption with  
Customer Master Keys (CMKs)  
Stored in AWS Key Management Service

## SSE-C:

Server-Side Encryption with  
Customer-Provided Keys





# Key Areas | Data Protection | HIPAA

- Customers who execute an AWS BAA may use any AWS service in an account designated as a HIPAA Account, but they may only process, store and transmit PHI using the HIPAA-eligible services defined in the AWS BAA.
- AWS maintains a standards-based risk management program to ensure that the HIPAA-eligible services specifically support HIPAA administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.
- AWS's BAA requires customers to encrypt PHI stored in or transmitted using HIPAA-eligible services in accordance with guidance from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS).
- AWS offers a comprehensive set of features and services to make key management and encryption of PHI easy to manage and simpler to audit, including the AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS). Customers with HIPAA compliance requirements have a great deal of flexibility in how they meet encryption requirements for PHI.



# Key Areas | Visibility

## Challenges

- Format
- Completeness
- Correlation

## Approaches

- Analyze
- Expand
- Reassess





# Key Areas | Logging | AWS CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs

- Track API calls with **CloudTrail**
  - Defaults 'on' for many services
  - Boto3 library support
  - Integrate with CloudWatch Logs, or Splunk, SIEMs
- Log network interface traffic with **VPC Flow Logs**:
  - Log by VPC, subnet, or network interface
  - Use with other AWS services
- Monitor with **CloudWatch**:
  - Collect and analyze with dashboards
  - Build alerts, trigger other AWS services








3rd party payment processing service

Add extra CloudTrail logs



Add VPC Flow Logs

Can add CloudWatch trigger for unusual traffic



# Key Areas | Logging & Monitoring | More AWS Tools?

- Key Management Service (KMS) - Encryption
- Amazon Macie - Data Classification
- CloudFormation - Templated Deployment
- Config - Inventory / Config Tracking
- Control Tower - Multi-Account Security
- GuardDuty - Threat Detection
- WAF & Shield - DDoS, Web Traffic Protection
- Security Hub - Security & Compliance
- Inspector - App Security
- Any of the tons of 3<sup>rd</sup> party and opensource tools out there?

...but which services are best for *your* organization?



Leveling Up

**OH, YOU USE THE CLOUD?**

**YOU MUST BE SO SECURE**





# Leveling Up | Serverless, Microservices, Containers... Oh My!


## What does Microservices mean?

- Microservices Architecture is a **design pattern**
- **Collection** of loosely-coupled components
- Development and upgrade focus shifted to **component** level


“The microservices architecture is defined as collection of smaller services arranged together in a workflow, often utilizing a serverless platform. Microservices architecture ... [connects] these services or functions in a loosely coupled manner, often hosted separately and communicating via REST APIs or other lightweight protocols.”



## MONOLITHIC ARCHITECTURE



## MICROSERVICES ARCHITECTURE






# Leveling Up | Serverless, Microservices, Containers... Oh My!

## What is Serverless?

- Execution model which abstracts away infrastructure
- Code-focused, obfuscating OS & dependencies
- Simplified development process
- Event-driven, primarily accessed via APIs

**AWS Lambda is Serverless Function-as-a-Service!**








# Leveling Up | Serverless, Microservices, Containers... Oh My!

## What is a Container?

- Abstraction of the application layer
- Isolates processes from the kernel
- Lightweight, easy to orchestrate

“A container is [packaged] up code and all its dependencies [design to run] quickly and reliably from one computing environment to another. ... Containers isolate software from its environment and ensure that it works uniformly despite differences for instance between development and staging.”





How's that different from a Virtual Machine?

No guest OS or hypervisor!

...virtualize the OS instead of the hardware.





# Leveling Up | Serverless, Microservices, Containers... Oh My!

- Container images are open source; proceed with caution
- Yes, you can break out of a container!
- Microservices' multiple components == multiple permission sets
- Yes, you can break out of serverless functions!

...a microservices application  
is as secure as its least secure code,  
& its most lenient permissions boundary.




# seccomp-bpf

21


all programs use  
system calls



rarely-used system calls  
can help an attacker



seccomp-BPF lets you  
run a function before  
every system call




the function decides if  
that syscall is allowed

example function:

```
if name in allowed_list {  
    return true;  
}  
return false;
```

← this means the  
syscall doesn't  
happen!

Docker **blocks** dozens  
of syscalls by default



2 ways to block  
scary system calls


1. limit the container's **capabilities**
2. set a **seccomp-bpf** whitelist

You should do both!

TL;DR:  
Permissions,  
permissions,  
Permissions!!



# Leveling Up | Orchestration & Automation



- Replaces repetitive tasks (automate) & manual management of systems (orchestrate) to code & config files
- Enables flexible, scalable apps & security infra
- When does it makes sense to automate & orchestrate?
- Examples: Terraform & Ansible, CloudFormation (AWS)

Infrastructure as Code!



Are we there yet??

**SECURE**



**ALL THE THINGS**



# Lessons Learned

- You can easily go 0-60, from simple logging to orchestration!
- Cloud services offers varying levels of access & control
- Design your Cloud architecture based on connected components
- IAM and permissions are the new perimeter



# Putting It All Together



**START SIMPLE**



**RE-EVALUATE**



**LEVEL UP**



tips for n00bs

Lay Groundwork

Learn by Doing

Collaborate



so long, and thanks for  
all the fish!

-Cassandra aka muteki  
@muteki\_rtw

