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# What Drives U.S. Treasury Re-use?\*

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## Abstract

We study what drives the re-use of U.S. Treasury securities in the financial system. Using confidential supervisory data, we estimate the degree of collateral re-use at the dealer level through their *collateral multiplier*: the ratio between a dealer’s secured funding and their outright holdings. We find that Treasury re-use increases as the supply of available securities decreases, especially when supply declines due to Federal Reserve asset purchases. We also find that non-U.S. dealers’ re-use increases when profits from intermediating cash are high, U.S. dealers’ re-use increases when demand to source on-the-run Treasuries is high, and both types of dealers’ re-use can alleviate safe asset scarcity. Finally, we document a sharp drop in Treasury re-use at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with a subsequent reversal after the Federal Reserve’s intervention to support market functioning.

*Keywords:* re-use, repo, Treasury, collateral, rehypothecation

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# 1 Introduction

In financial markets, the re-use of U.S. Treasury securities as collateral in **secured financing transactions (SFTs)** is a widespread practice that enhances market functioning.<sup>1</sup> For example, dealers re-use Treasuries to intermediate secured lending from risk-averse lenders to less creditworthy borrowers. Dealers also re-use Treasuries to source and distribute specific securities that may be in high demand, improving underlying market liquidity. From a more conceptual perspective, the re-use of Treasuries also allows for the efficient distribution of Treasuries' safe asset benefits, and has the potential to reduce the costs associated with safe asset scarcity.

Although Treasury re-use is beneficial for market functioning, it also has important financial stability implications. Collateral re-use increases the total amount of leverage in the financial system. Specifically, the re-use of collateral involves the creation of an SFT, increasing the debt of the intermediary involved and mechanically increasing their leverage. In addition, when financial intermediaries re-use counterparties securities, it can create operational barriers that make it harder to access a particular security or create uncertainty around who is entitled to the security in case of default. These problems may be amplified if the activity involves counterparties under jurisdictions with different regulatory treatments of re-use. Furthermore, high levels of collateral re-use can contribute to pro-cyclicality. When market conditions deteriorate, market participants become more reluctant to extend new secured loans or roll over existing transactions. As a result, there will be less collateral available for re-use, and re-use will drop, intensifying the contraction in secured financing activity.<sup>2</sup> The financial stability implications mentioned above highlight the importance of measuring collateral re-use and better understanding the motivations behind it.

Despite the prevalence of U.S. Treasury re-use, its importance for market functioning, and the financial stability risks it poses, **the empirical literature on what drives re-use is scant.** Many existing studies that attempt to characterize re-use in the United States rely on aggregate data and make significant assumptions to measure the activity. In this paper, we fill the gap by **using confidential supervisory data to measure and study what drives Treasury re-use at the individual**

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<sup>1</sup>SFTs include repo, securities lending contracts, and collateral swaps. Re-use is defined as the delivery of collateral sourced through an SFT that must be returned at a later date.

<sup>2</sup>See FSB (2017) for more details on policy makers' concerns surrounding collateral re-use.

dealer level. Following Infante et al. (2020), we construct a dealer-level measure of Treasury re-use, called the collateral multiplier. Conceptually, the collateral multiplier is akin to a money multiplier: it measures SFTs (deposits) as a multiple of the total Treasuries (reserves) owned financed through SFTs (deposits). In other words, the collateral multiplier measures the amount of Treasury-backed SFTs that dealers generate, relative to how much they hold.

To illustrate our measure, we provide a conceptual framework to characterize how the collateral multiplier captures re-use, and then, under this framework, assess how different factors affect the level of re-use. We first show that changes in Treasury supply should change the degree of re-use. Specifically, an increase in the total amount of Treasuries available to dealers would correspond to a decrease in Treasury re-use. Intuitively, if there are more Treasuries available, the need to re-use them is lower. We then discuss three economic incentives for dealers to adjust their level of Treasury re-use, proposed by Infante et al. (2020). The first is the intermediation of cash from risk-averse lenders to less creditworthy dealers through SFTs. The second is the intermediation of specific Treasury securities that may be in high demand, such as on-the-run Treasuries. And the third is the distribution of U.S. Treasuries safe asset status by lending high-quality collateral to counterparties and giving them discretion to use it for their own purposes.

Our conceptual framework leads to four empirical predictions, which we then test using different versions of the collateral multiplier. We consider the total collateral multiplier averaged across dealers, and then separated between U.S. and non-U.S. dealers. This separation captures how firms' motivations for participating in secured funding markets may differ across jurisdictions. We also consider versions of the collateral multiplier using different contracts. Specifically, we calculate a multiplier for all outgoing SFTs and repo separately, as repo is more flexible than other contract types and may be more sensitive to particular economic drivers.<sup>3</sup> In addition, we separate the bilateral repo market from the tri-party market, as we may expect different drivers to take precedence in each market given the different purposes they serve. Specifically, an important difference between these markets is that the bilateral market is a specific-issue repo market, which allows counterparties to identify a particular security as the underlying collateral; while the tri-

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<sup>3</sup>Infante et al. (2018) show that the vast majority of SFTs using Treasury securities are through repo.

party market is a general collateral repo market, which gives the cash borrower the discretion to post any security within a collateral class. Thus, incentives to intermediate securities are likely to be concentrated in the bilateral market whereas incentives to intermediate cash are likely to be concentrated in the tri-party market.

We test these predictions in the time series, using cross sectional averages of the collateral multiplier, and also in simultaneous equation specifications, to exploit individual dealer-level data. Both specifications yield similar results. Our most robust result is that an increase in Treasury supply corresponds to a decrease in Treasury re-use. This sensitivity is particularly strong in the bilateral repo market, consistent with the notion that dealers expand or contract their activity in response to a contraction or expansion of total supply. Importantly, we find that changes in the Federal Reserve’s (Fed’s) holdings of Treasury securities have a stronger, longer-lasting effect on re-use than Treasury issuance. This result suggests that the central bank has powerful tools to balance the trade offs between market functioning and financial stability related to re-use.

Interestingly, we find that dealers’ incentives to re-use Treasury securities differ depending on their jurisdiction. Non-U.S. dealers’ re-use increases with higher profits from borrowing and lending cash across different segments of the repo market. This sensitivity is concentrated in the repo market, underscoring dealers’ incentive to intermediate funds through both the bilateral and tri-party market. In contrast, U.S. dealers’ re-use responds to an increase in demand to source on-the-run Treasury securities, measured through repo specialness. This result is consistent with the notion that dealers increase re-use to distribute specific securities, allowing them to reach those that demand them most.

We then fine tune our empirical strategy to see if the demand for safe assets alters dealers’ incentives to re-use Treasuries. Using an empirical strategy similar to Infante (2020), we use changes in the total outstanding of short-term T-bills to instrument for the demand for safe assets. This analysis provides robust evidence that U.S. firms, and to a less degree non-U.S. firms, increase Treasury re-use in response to an increase in safe asset demand. Similar to the incentive to intermediate securities, as the demand for safe assets increases, dealers increase re-use, distributing the safety of Treasuries to others. From this perspective, the collateral multiplier does in fact capture

the “multiplication” of safe assets whenever they’re in high demand.

The bulk of our analysis excludes quarter-end dates, since dealers in jurisdictions with **quarter-end regulatory reporting** have incentives to dramatically change their capital ratios on those dates, an activity commonly known as **window dressing**. Excluding these observations allows us to focus on the underlying economic drivers that affect re-use beyond regulatory compliance. However, dealers’ behavior around quarter-end is instructive to understand the manner in which dealers engage in window dressing. In a separate analysis, we focus on dealers’ re-use around quarter-end dates and confirm existing studies that document a dramatic decrease in repo market activity for non-U.S. dealers. In addition, we find that this drop corresponds to a decrease in firms’ secured lending rather than a drop in their securities position, consistent with an overall disruption in short-term funding markets. Interestingly, we find that this activity is concentrated in repo, while the multiplier of all SFTs does not change. The difference stems from non-U.S. dealers switching from repo to other SFTs that have a more favorable regulatory treatment, consistent with firms’ incentives to enhance their capital ratios.

These insights have important implications for market functioning and financial stability, and are a starting point to formulate a cost-benefit analysis of Treasury re-use. Our results show that the government can influence the financial system’s re-use activity by changing the supply of Treasuries, particularly through central bank interventions. This insight is in line with Krishnamurthy and **Vissing-Jorgensen (2015)**, **Greenwood et al. (2015)**, and others who highlight the crowding out effect of government debt, but it underscores the importance of central bank actions. Moreover, our results suggest that domestic dealers play an especially important role in the U.S. financial system, because they respond to scarcity of specific securities, enhancing underlying market liquidity. Finally, our results show that dealers’ re-use also plays a role in alleviating the costs associated with safe asset scarcity.

Using these insights, we study the patterns of Treasury re-use during the market disruption triggered by the COVID-19 outbreak. We find that prior to the Federal Reserve’s interventions, Treasury re-use reached its lowest point on record. This drop in re-use is consistent with the narrative that dealers’ holdings of Treasuries became notably elevated as they absorbed Treasuries

sold by outside investors. While we find evidence that dealers did expand their secured lending to levered investors, the drop in the multiplier suggests that this expansion was not commensurate to the increase in outright holdings. In this sense, their support of other counterparties' levered positions was not enough to support normal market functioning. The lack of secured lending is consistent with the notion that dealers were reluctant to increase the size of their balance sheet, in part because of regulatory restrictions. We show that once the Fed announced an increase in their asset purchases, Treasury re-use returned to levels seen earlier in the year. These developments provide further evidence of the effectiveness of Fed purchases to increase the amount of Treasury re-use.

Our findings show that changing the Fed's holdings of Treasuries is an important tool to adjust the level of re-use, and thus, its associated financial stability risks and market functioning benefits. Of particular concern for policymakers are the "collateral chains" created by re-use, in which the same security is used multiple times. These chains increase the interconnectedness of the financial system—the failure of one counterparty to deliver re-used collateral may affect the soundness of others further along in the chain. Because long collateral chains result in multiple transactions with the same type of security, each entity in the chain will have more correlated exposures, which can amplify the effect of a sudden price change of the security used to collateralize the chain. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in weekly Fed purchases results in a 0.38 standard deviation decrease in the average collateral multiplier. Put differently, a \$33 billion dollar increase in weekly Fed purchases leads to a 0.5 increase in the collateral chain. From this perspective, if policymakers are concerned about the level of leverage and interconnectedness in the financial system, shrinking the Fed's balance sheet is an effective tool to decrease the average length of collateral chains. However, a smaller Fed balance sheet increases dealers' exposure to sharp changes in external demand and supply of Treasuries, and thus, can result in disruptions similar to those triggered by the COVID-19 outbreak.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next part of the introduction gives a brief literature review. Section 2 provides the conceptual framework to understand our measure. Section 3 contains the main empirical analysis. Section 4 provides a brief description of our measure amid

Treasury the market turmoil of March 2020 caused by the COVID-19 outbreak.

## **Literature Review:**

This paper contributes to the literature that characterizes how dealers re-use securities as collateral and the financial stability risks associated with this activity. From a theoretical perspective, Gottardi et al. (2019) shows how the intermediation of secured financing by creditworthy dealers may arise endogenously to overcome counterparty credit concerns. Infante (2019) studies the different contracting terms that can emerge when dealers intermediate cash and securities through repos, and Infante and Vardoulakis (2020) show how this activity can introduce a new source of fragility: a run from collateral providers. In this paper, we build on these insights to empirically explore the hypothesis of Infante et al. (2020), and posit other incentives for firms to re-use Treasuries, beyond intermediating cash and securities.

Singh (2011) is among the first papers to empirically document the degree of collateral re-use using quarterly Securities and Exchange Commission filings. That paper proposes a measure of re-use, coined “collateral velocity,” which is the ratio between aggregate collateral received through SFTs to aggregate collateral firms can access. In this paper, we use granular supervisory data to construct precise, firm-level measures of the amount of collateral dealers distribute relative to how much they own, which can be thought of as a “collateral multiplier.” Fuhrer et al. (2016) and Jank and Moench (2020) measure re-use at the security level in the Swiss and European repo market, respectively. These papers empirically show significant scarcity effects, especially from central bank interventions: fewer securities leads to more re-use. Our firm-level analysis in the U.S. confirms the same type of scarcity effect, but also allows us to study how firms’ incentives to re-use high quality collateral differ across jurisdictions and markets.

This paper is related to the literature on repo specialness and its role in Treasury market functioning. Duffie (1996) first documents how repo rates can trade below prevailing market rates when the economic incentive to enter the repo contract is to source a specific security. Krishnamurthy (2002) empirically confirm the no arbitrage relationship between specialness and the price of the on-the-run Treasury. Vayanos and Weill (2008) theoretically show that search frictions cause the more liquid security to trade special and Huh and Infante (2020) show how an increase in special-



ness corresponds to a decrease in liquidity for non-dealers. These two observations together imply that the more liquid security is relatively more illiquid across time when specialness is high, thus we focus on the time series properties of specialness for the on-the-run Treasuries. Keane (1996) documents that repo specialness tends to increase with the Treasury auction cycle as more on-the-run Treasury securities are held by long-only investors that typically do not lend securities. In addition, DAmico et al. (2018) and Corradin and Maddaloni (2020) show how central bank purchases can create scarcity, resulting in an increase in repo specialness in U.S. and European markets, respectively. These papers prove that asset scarcity increases repo specialness. However, Graveline and McBrady (2011) shows that, controlling for Treasury supply, specialness also increases as the demand to hedge interest rate risk increases. This indicates that specialness captures more broadly the need to intermediate specific securities.<sup>4</sup> In our analysis we show that, controlling for Treasury supply, an increase in specialness corresponds to an increase in re-use implying that dealers provide more specific securities though re-use when needed.

Our findings contribute to the growing literature on safe assets and the interaction between publicly and privately produced safe assets. Nagel (2016) shows that the safe asset convenience yield depends on the level of interest rates. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015), Greenwood et al. (2015), and Sunderam (2014) show that an increase in the demand for safe assets prompts private agents to create more short-term debt, making the financial system more fragile. Infante (2020) shows that this sensitivity depends on the safe asset status of the collateral backing that short-term debt, as an increase in the demand for safe assets leads investors to hold longer-term safe assets directly, rather than use them as repo collateral. In this paper we find evidence that both sensitivities are at play: as the demand for safe assets increases, our collateral multiplier increases, suggesting that dealers create more private safe assets through SFTs with the remaining Treasuries they own, and they distribute more Treasuries directly to investors that demand them.

From a historical perspective, Gorton et al. (2020) document that forcing short-term debt to be backed by safe public assets does not necessarily reduce financial fragility. However, Infante and Ordoñez (2020) theoretically show that the use of Treasuries as collateral increases risk sharing

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<sup>4</sup>The additional increase in specialness may be driven by an increase in hedging demand, shorting demand, or search frictions. In this paper we are agnostic as to what drives the level of specialness.

when future macroeconomic volatility increases, demonstrating that using public assets as collateral produces a positive externality. In our analysis we find that an increase in the demand for safe assets increases Treasury re-use, increasing interconnectedness and leverage, but with safe collateral; thus, the overall impact on financial stability is less clear.

Our analysis is complimentary to Correa et al. (2020) who use the same data to study how U.S. banks provide global liquidity. We find evidence that U.S. dealers reduce their re-use with Treasury supply, consistent with Correa et al. (2020) who find that U.S. dealers’ repo remains unchanged with Treasury issuance. In this paper, we also study the behavior of non-U.S. dealers to underscore their different incentives to participate in short-term funding markets.<sup>5</sup> Importantly, our focus is on dealers’ distribution of collateral, rather than their funding.

Finally, our study of Treasury re-use following the COVID-19 outbreak is related to He et al. (2020) and Duffie (2020). These papers highlight that restrictions on dealers’ balance sheets reduced their capacity to intermediate the market, which severely affected market functioning. These insights are consistent with our observation that dealers’ Treasury long positions increase more than their reverse repo, resulting in a large drop in Treasury re-use.

## 2 Conceptual Framework

Traditionally, measuring Treasury re-use has been difficult given the lack of available data. Our measure of collateral re-use is the **ratio of a firm’s total amount of SFTs to the amount of securities they hold that are financed by SFTs**. This measure, which we call the collateral multiplier, is akin to a money multiplier. While the money multiplier measures deposits as a multiple of total reserves owned, the collateral multiplier measures SFTs as a multiple of total Treasuries owned.

Figure 1 gives a stylized illustration of how the collateral multiplier measures the amount of Treasuries dealers make available, or put differently, the amount of Treasuries dealers multiply. The green diamond on the left represents all of the Treasuries available to dealers  $T$ . Each T-account to the right represents an individual dealer, with the dealer furthest to the right being the largest.

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<sup>5</sup>Correa et al. (2020) implicitly recognizes different behavior across jurisdictions by focusing on quarter-end dates. We focus on dealers’ activity outside of their window dressing incentives.

The blue rectangle on the liability (right) side of dealer  $i$  represents its secured borrowing  $R_i$ , and the blue rectangle on the asset (left) side of each dealer represents its secured lending. Dealers also directly hold Treasuries, represented by the smaller green diamonds  $P_i$ . The largest dealer furthest to the right obtains secured funding outside the dealer community. However, for the remaining dealers, all of their borrowing comes from another dealers lending. In the stylized setting of Figure 1, if every dealer has the same collateral multiplier  $m = m_i = R_i/P_i$ , then the total sum of all secured funding  $\sum R_i$  is equal to the multiplier  $m$  times the total amount of Treasuries available to dealers  $T$ . In other words, dealers are creating  $m$  times more liabilities than there are assets, which can be interpreted as dealers multiplying the total amount of Treasuries available.<sup>6</sup>

[Insert Fig. 1 Here]

We interpret  $m$  as measuring dealers intermediation of securities. Specifically, if  $m$  is large (small), then dealers are distributing many (few) Treasuries to clients/counterparties, affecting clients'/counterparties' ability to trade in the Treasury cash market. The collateral multiplier depends on the total volume of Treasuries in the market and dealers ability and/or willingness to intermediate the Treasury cash market.

The multiplier as shown in Figure 1 can also be interpreted as the average amount of times a security is used as collateral through SFTs, that is, the average length of the collateral chain. This interpretation has financial stability implications, as a longer collateral chain is associated with higher leverage and more interconnectedness.<sup>7</sup> Specifically, longer collateral chains increase both the probability and the magnitude of disruptions that propagate throughout the financial system. These events are commonly known as “daisy chains” (see (Fleming and Garbade, 2007)). In the stylized setting of Figure 1, if every dealer has the same collateral multiplier  $m$ , then the average chain length is

$$\sum_i i \frac{P_i}{T} = m$$

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<sup>6</sup>This stylized view of dealer balance sheets illustrates how one collateral class is used and re-used. In reality, dealer balance sheets have other types of assets (e.g., holding of different collateral classes) and liabilities (e.g., equity).

<sup>7</sup>Specifically, FSB (2017) highlight the financial stability implications of large collateral chains. Chang (2019) theoretically studies how collateralized dealer networks that take into account counterparty risk can create contagion.

That is, the volume-weighted average length of the chain is  $m$ . From this perspective, a higher  $m$  increases the likelihood and severity of a “daisy chain” event.

The following subsections describe various drivers that we expect would affect collateral re-use, along with how we should expect the collateral multiplier to respond to changes in these drivers. First, we explain how system-wide re-use should be affected by changes in the supply of Treasury securities, whether caused by Treasury issuance or changes in the Fed’s holdings of Treasuries. Following Infante et al. (2020), we also explore three dealer-specific incentives that motivate dealers to change their degree of collateral re-use: 1) the intermediation of cash through SFTs, 2) the efficient re-distribution of U.S. Treasuries that are in high demand, and 3) the distribution of U.S. Treasuries safe asset status.

## 2.1 Supply Effects

From the stylized perspective of Figure 1, it is easy to see how the multiplier responds to changes in the total amount of securities available to dealers. Keeping the total amount of SFTs constant, an increase in the total amount of Treasuries should decrease the collateral multiplier. Intuitively, a larger supply of Treasuries reduces the need to re-use them.

This insight leads to two empirical predictions. First, the collateral multiplier will decrease with U.S. Treasury issuance. Second, the collateral multiplier will increase with Treasury purchases by the Fed. From this perspective, Fed purchases reduce the amount of Treasuries available to dealers, resulting in a higher multiplier.<sup>8</sup>

## 2.2 Dealer-Specific Incentives Behind U.S. Treasury Re-use

Infante et al. (2020) point to three possible incentives dealers may have to re-use Treasuries.<sup>9</sup> Below, we detail each of these dealer-specific incentives and present an empirical strategy to test their relationship with re-use.

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<sup>8</sup>This framework is silent on the potential effect of an increase in bank reserves.

<sup>9</sup>Infante et al. (2020) characterize these incentives as “drivers.” In this paper we expand the concept of drivers to include supply effects, and characterize firm-level incentives to re-use Treasuries as “dealer-specific incentives.”

### 2.2.1 Intermediation of Cash

The U.S. large dealers stand between the two largest segments of the repo market, intermediating cash from relatively risk-averse cash lenders to less creditworthy cash borrowers. This activity, often referred to as matched book repo, is the simplest form of rehypothecation. If the intermediation of cash is an important economic driver to re-use collateral, an increase in the profitability of matched book repo would lead dealers to participate more heavily in this activity, thereby increasing the collateral multiplier. Empirically, as the spread between the repo rate of cash borrowers and the repo rate of cash lenders increases, matched book repo becomes more profitable, incentivizing dealers to increase their volume of reverse repo and repo.

This activity is likely to be concentrated in either the bilateral or tri-party repo market, as large, creditworthy dealers access both of these markets to raise funding.<sup>10</sup> Dealers intermediate funds between risk-averse cash lenders, such as money market funds, to creditworthy dealers. In particular, from the perspective of Figure 1, an increase in repo borrowing from cash investors will translate into an increase in  $R_1$ .<sup>11</sup> As more of these funds are distributed to other dealers (i.e., larger  $R_i$  with  $i > 1$ ), we would expect an increase in  $\sum_i R_i$ , which causes an increase in the collateral multiplier.

### 2.2.2 Intermediation of Specific Treasury Securities

Dealers rely heavily on SFTs to source and distribute Treasuries that are in high demand. This can result in long collateral chains, as search frictions may cause one security to move between many dealers before it reaches the ultimate user. From the perspective of Figure 1, if the intermediation of specific Treasury securities is an important economic driver, an increase in demand to source securities would increase the average length of collateral chains, thereby increasing the collateral multiplier. Empirically, when the need to intermediate specific Treasury securities is particularly acute, repo specialness—the spread between a general collateral repo rate and the specific issue

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<sup>10</sup>Bowman et al. (2017) show that a large fraction of trades used to calculate SOFR come from the bilateral repo market, indicating its importance for dealers to raise funds.

<sup>11</sup>Note that  $R_1$  represents the “end-of-the-line” of collateral re-use, consistent with the idea that cash lenders in the non-GCF portion of the tri-party market rarely re-use securities.

repo rate—will be large.<sup>12</sup> Thus, when specialness is high we would expect the average length of collateral chains to increase, resulting in an increase in the collateral multiplier.

This activity is likely to be concentrated in the bilateral repo market, where counterparties can specify the underlying collateral used in a repo transaction. From the perspective of Figure 1, an increase in bilateral market activity will translate into an increase in  $\sum_i i \frac{P_i}{T}$ , as securities are distributed to more counterparties. This would put upward pressure on the collateral multiplier.

### 2.2.3 Distribution of Treasuries Safe Asset Benefits

U.S. Treasuries play a special role as one of the most sought after safe assets in today’s financial markets. These securities provide benefits above and beyond their risk-adjusted return. In addition, existing literature has shown that there is a term structure of the aforementioned benefits.<sup>13</sup> Through Treasury re-use, dealers can source and distribute the benefits of long-term safety for short periods of time. In this sense, dealers can ”multiply” the safe asset benefits of U.S. Treasuries.

From the perspective of Figure 1, an increase in the demand for safe assets would result in an increase in the the volume-weighted length of the collateral chain,  $\sum_i i \frac{P_i}{T}$ . In principal, this effect would operate in both segments of the repo market because the specific underlying security is not important, but rather the collateral class. Note that this prediction is consistent with Infante (2020), which shows that as the demand for safe assets increases, aggregate Treasury repo decreases as more Treasuries are held by non-dealers, who reap the Treasuries’ safe asset benefits. As more Treasuries leave the dealer sector, a decrease in  $T$ , dealers use relatively more SFTs to distribute the safety of the remaining Treasuries they can access. Both of these effects puts upward pressure on the collateral multiplier.

## 3 Empirical Analysis

The conceptual framework of section 2 leads to the following empirical predictions:

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<sup>12</sup>Specialness can capture search frictions, increases in hedging demand, or overall asset scarcity; all of which increase the need to intermediate securities. See the literature review for a discussion on the link between asset scarcity and specialness.

<sup>13</sup>For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and van Binsbergen et al. (2019) shows that investors value long- and short-term safety differently.

- \* **Prediction 1:** An increase in the supply of U.S. Treasuries, caused either by an increase in Treasury outstanding or a reduction in the Fed’s Treasury holdings, leads to reduced Treasury re-use. That is, an increase in Treasury supply decreases the collateral multiplier.
- \* **Prediction 2:** An increase in the profitability of repo cash intermediation leads to increased Treasury re-use. That is, an increase in the spread between dealers’ reverse repo rate and dealers’ repo rate increases the collateral multiplier.
- \* **Prediction 3:** An increase in demand for specific Treasury securities leads to increased Treasury re-use. That is, an increase in repo specialness increases the collateral multiplier.
- \* **Prediction 4:** An increase in the demand for safe assets leads to increased Treasury re-use. That is, an increase in the safe asset convenience yield increases the collateral multiplier.

### 3.1 Data

To estimate dealers’ collateral re-use, we use data from the FR 2052a Complex Institution Liquidity Monitoring Report, which is collected by the Federal Reserve Board in order to obtain a comprehensive view of banking organizations’ liquidity profiles. The largest domestic bank holding companies (BHCs) and foreign banking organizations (FBOs) report FR2052a daily, while smaller BHCs and FBOs report monthly. Reporting entities are required to submit data for the parent company, as well as any subsidiaries with a material presence in the U.S., allowing us to identify the dealer entities of large BHCs. The data detail secured borrowing and lending transactions, whole-sale financing transactions, unencumbered asset positions, and various other activities relevant to overall firm liquidity.

This analysis centers on the U.S. Treasury financing activities of the nine largest primary dealer subsidiaries of Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs).<sup>14</sup> We focus on primary dealer subsidiaries because secured borrowing and lending activities are primarily located in the dealer entity, and because of the particular importance of primary dealers’ activities in the U.S. Treasury

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<sup>14</sup>Our sample is limited to primary dealer entities who report daily without any lapses over one month. These firms are Bank of America, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo.

market.<sup>15</sup> In addition, we limit our sample to external transactions, because dealers’ internal transactions with affiliated entities may be motivated by idiosyncratic factors and are subject to different regulatory constraints. The period of analysis is between January 14, 2016, and April 17, 2020.

The FR2052a data allow us to track the flows of collateral at the individual dealer level, including information about the type of contract and the settlement venue.<sup>16</sup> In addition to the contract type, we can see whether dealers have labelled incoming collateral as encumbered or outgoing collateral as rehypothecated.<sup>17</sup>

Figure 2 illustrates how SFTs (blue rectangles) and cash trades (green diamonds) would appear on a dealer’s balance sheet, highlighting what constitutes encumbered or rehypothecated collateral.<sup>18</sup> On the asset side, incoming collateral can be unencumbered, meaning the collateral is still available for re-use, or encumbered, meaning the collateral has already been re-used or it is restricted from re-use. Unencumbered assets are financed by unsecured debt or equity (yellow ovals). On the liability side, outgoing collateral can be non-rehypothecated, meaning the collateral was sourced from a long position, or rehypothecated, meaning the collateral was sourced from an incoming SFT. Importantly, the FR2052a data does not report encumbered long positions, but non-rehypothecated outgoing SFTs can serve as a proxy, since by definition they are sourced from encumbered long positions.<sup>19</sup>

[Insert Fig. 2 Here]

[Insert Fig. 3 Here]

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<sup>15</sup>Primary dealers are the main counterparties of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and are active participants in U.S. Treasury markets. For example, they are expected to bid in all Treasury auctions at reasonably competitive prices.

<sup>16</sup>Contract types include reverse repos, collateral swaps, securities borrowing, and margin loans for collateral inflows transactions, and repo, firm shorts, collateral swaps, customer shorts, and securities lending for collateral outflow transactions.

<sup>17</sup>Incoming collateral is defined as encumbered if it is simultaneously used in a collateral outflow transaction or the firm is legally, contractually, or operationally restricted from recirculating it. Outgoing collateral is defined as rehypothecated if it was sourced through an incoming SFT. In this paper, re-use and rehypothecation are used interchangeably.

<sup>18</sup>This stylized dealer balance sheet represents transactions involving a single collateral class, allowing us to match up assets and liabilities that use the same collateral.

<sup>19</sup>The identification of non-rehypothecated outgoing SFTs as long positions financed by SFTs has been used in the Federal Reserve’s Financial Stability Report.



Figure 3 shows the total flows of U.S. Treasury collateral for the dealers in our sample. About 85 percent of incoming Treasuries are re-used in outgoing transactions. Infante et al. (2018) show that dealers predominantly re-use Treasuries through repurchase agreements (repos), underscoring the importance of repo for U.S. Treasury intermediation. This importance is likely driven, in part, by the limited restrictions on dealers to re-use repo collateral, the high degree of leverage that can be taken through repos, and the seniority of repos in bankruptcy.

Figure 4 shows the total amount of outgoing Treasury SFTs relative to the total amount of Treasuries owned but financed through SFTs, that is, non-rehypothecated Treasuries. From these aggregate numbers, we see that the total amount of SFTs backed by Treasuries is an order of magnitude larger than the total amount of Treasuries actually owned. In addition, both series exhibit abnormally large dips at a steady frequency. These dips are on quarter-end, which is associated with firms' incentives to window dress on regulatory reporting dates. This incentive has been well documented by Munyan (2017), and quarter-ends have been one of the main focus of Correa et al. (2020). Given that in this paper we want to understand the economic drivers behind re-use, the bulk of the analysis eliminates quarter-end dates. In section 3.7 we explore how the collateral multiplier changes throughout quarter-end.

[Insert Fig. 4 Here ]

Following the conceptual framework described in section 2, the collateral multiplier is the ratio of outgoing collateral to non-rehypothecated outgoing collateral. We first calculate the measure at the dealer level and then take an average across dealers. Because primary dealers lie at the core of collateral circulation, averages of our firm-level measures are valid proxies for estimating re-use at the system-wide level. We also measure the level of re-use by U.S. and non-U.S. dealers, by taking the average multiplier across these separate samples. As mentioned previously, we calculate different versions of the multiplier to measure the degree to which dealers re-use collateral through particular contract types or settlement venues.<sup>20</sup> Figure 5 shows the level of the aggregate and repo collateral multipliers for U.S. Treasuries. The measure shows that primary dealers can create

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<sup>20</sup>When calculating the multiplier for a specific transaction type, the numerator is limited to that specific transaction type, while the denominator is always total amount of non-rehypothecated collateral, which represents the total amount of collateral available for re-use.

up to seven times as many private liabilities backed by Treasury securities as they own. The figure also shows a sharp drop in both collateral multipliers towards the end of our sample period, which coincides with the market turmoil in Treasury markets in March 2020.

We test our framework’s predictions on different versions of the collateral multiplier, as we would expect some predictions to be more salient in different segments of U.S. collateral markets. We first consider the all contracts (aggregate collateral multiplier), and then, isolate the changes in repo (repo collateral multiplier) given that repo is the most prevalent and flexible contract that uses Treasury collateral. We then focus on the tri-party market (tri-party collateral multiplier) where cash-rich investors lend to creditworthy dealers, and thus, we may expect prediction 2 to be more likely. And finally, we focus on the bilateral repo market (bilateral multiplier), where counterparties earmark specific securities, and thus, we may expect prediction 3 to be more likely.

[Insert Fig. 5 Here ]

To measure supply effects, we use auction results published by TreasuryDirect to construct time series of the changes in outstanding T-bills,  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$ , and Treasury notes and bonds,  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$ , to proxy for issuance. We also use the Federal Reserve H.4.1 Statistical Release to calculate changes in the Fed’s holdings of Treasury securities in the System Open Market Account Holdings (SOMA) portfolio,  $\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$ . Figure 6 shows the daily log changes in Treasury bills outstanding and notes and bonds outstanding, along with daily log changes of the Fed’s Treasury holdings. Log changes in T-bills are larger, given that their total outstanding is much smaller than for notes and bonds. Moreover, we see a sharp increase in SOMA holdings of U.S. Treasuries, followed by a large increase in T-bills outstanding towards the end of our sample. These sharp increases in issuance correspond to the official sector’s response to the Treasury market turmoil caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>21</sup>

[Insert Fig. 6 Here ]

We rely on spreads to measure dealers’ incentives to re-use collateral. The degree of cash intermediation in the repo market,  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$ , is measured by the spread between overnight

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<sup>21</sup>See section 4 for more details.

Treasury DTCC GCF Repo Index rate and the BNY Tri-Party Repo Index, downloaded from the The Bank of New York Mellon’s website. Large dealers typically lend in the GCF Repo market and borrow from the general tri-party repo market, making the spread between the two a measure of dealers’ incentives to intermediate cash. Our measure of specialness,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$ , is the spread between the SOFR rate, downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Treasury Repo Reference Rate website, and a trade-weighted on-the-run Treasury repo rate in the specific issue repo market, which is calculated using data provided by the repo interdealer broker community. Finally, the convenience yield for holding safe assets,  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$ , is measured by the yield difference between a contract with a risk-free payoff that does not imply physical ownership of an asset and a risk-free safe asset (e.g., T-bills).<sup>22</sup> In the data, we use the one-month overnight indexed swap rate (OIS) for the risk-free rate, downloaded from Bloomberg and the four-week T-bill rate for the safe asset rate, downloaded from the Federal Reserve H.15 Statistical Release. Figure 7 shows all the spreads we use to capture dealers’ incentives to re-use Treasuries.

[Insert Fig. 7 Here ]

### 3.2 Aggregate and Repo Collateral Multiplier

In this section, we test the empirical predictions derived from our conceptual framework, outlined at the start of section 3. Specifically, we run the following regression

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \log(DealerCM_t) = & \alpha + \sum_l \eta_l \Delta \log(DealerCM_{t-l}) \\ & \gamma Spreads_{t-1} + \beta \Delta \log(Gov_t) + \theta X_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerCM_{jpt}$ : the average collateral multiplier for  $j$  dealers, where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$ , using  $p$  contracts, where  $p \in \{All\ Contracts, Repo\}$ , at time  $t$ . For each collateral multiplier, we take daily log changes as the dependent variable and include four lags as independent variables to control for serial autocorrelation. We consider averages across different samples of dealers, as collateral re-use may depend on dealers’ regulatory jurisdictions. We also

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<sup>22</sup>Of note, in this paper the empirical measurement of the convenience in has the opposite sign as that of Infante (2020)

winsorize every version of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_t)$  at the 1% and 99% to eliminate the abnormal impact of outliers. In equation (1),  $\Delta \log(Gov_t)$  capture the government supply variables and  $Spreads_{t-1}$  capture the incentive spreads, both described in Section 3.1.

Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our main variables of interest: changes in dealer average collateral multipliers, changes in U.S. Treasury supply, and the relevant spreads capturing dealers' different incentives to re-use Treasuries.

[Insert Table 1]

We also include lagged financial variables as controls  $X_{t-1}$ , which includes:  $(10yr - 2yr)_{t-1}$ , the yield difference between the 10- and 2-year U.S. Treasury yield curve;  $10yrVIX_{t-1}$ , the derivative implied volatility of the 10-year U.S. Treasury;  $VIX_{t-1}$ , the derivative implied volatility of the S&P index;  $MedianDealerCDS_{t-1}$ , the median CDS of all the dealers in our sample; and an indicator for mid-March 2020 to capture a possible structural change amid the COVID outbreak.

[Insert Table 2]

Table 2 shows the results for the specification in equation (1) for the aggregate and repo collateral multipliers. The coefficients on the change in the government variables are consistent with prediction 1: an increase in the supply of Treasury securities, either by a reduction of Treasury supply or an increase the Fed's Treasury holdings, increases the collateral multiplier. The result is present across all specifications. These effects are statistically and economically significant. The sensitivity to changes in SOMA appears to be stronger: a 1 standard deviation change in  $\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$  corresponds to approximately a 0.28 standard deviation change in  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{All, All Contracts, t})$ , whereas  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  and  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$  only correspond to approximately a 0.13 and 0.1 change, respectively.

The results in table 2 also show that the incentive to intermediate cash only affects the collateral multiplier of non-U.S. dealers and the incentive to intermediate securities only affects U.S. dealers. The cash intermediation effect on non-U.S. dealers is stronger for repo, likely because of dealers' flexibility to expand and contract their repo book. The securities intermediation effect on U.S. dealers is stronger for the aggregate collateral multiplier, which also includes firm and client short

activities. These results are consistent with the notion that the incentives to participate in U.S. collateral markets differ across jurisdictions. In all specifications, the collateral multiplier does not show a statistical relationship to the demand for safe assets, measured through the convenience yield.

### 3.3 Bilateral and Tri-party Repo Collateral Multiplier

Our data also allow us to separate repo activity between the tri-party and bilateral repo market. As mentioned in section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, these markets have different types of participants, with different motivations. Using collateral multipliers specific to each market will refine predictions 2 and 3. Specifically, we expect that the effect described in prediction 2 will be active in both the bilateral and tri-party repo market, as large dealers use both markets to raise funds to lend to less creditworthy borrowers. We expect that the effect described in prediction 3 will be concentrated in the bilateral market, which contains the bulk of the collateral chain.

[Insert Table 3]

Table 3 shows the results for the specification in equation (1) for bilateral and tri-party repo collateral multipliers. As with the previous case, the coefficients on changes in government variables for the bilateral repo market are strong and consistent with prediction 1. This result is intuitive as the bilateral market contains a larger portion of the collateral chain: with more securities in the dealer sector, there is less need to distribute them, shortening the average length of the chain. In addition, the effect of SOMA purchases seems to be stronger: a 1 standard deviation change in  $\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$  corresponds to approximately a 0.37 standard deviation change in the bilateral multiplier, whereas  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  and  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$  only corresponds to approximately a 0.2 and 0.1 change, respectively. It is also interesting to note that the effect of note and bond issuance on the bilateral repo collateral multiplier is stronger than for the tri-party multiplier. Because the bilateral market serves to intermediate specific collateral, it is more likely to involve on-the-run Treasury collateral, making it more sensitive to changes in Treasury supply.

The relationship of Treasury supply is weaker in the tri-party market, as it is unclear how much additional borrowing the aggregate dealer sector would require relative to the sector's securities

position. The smaller sensitivity of U.S. dealer’s tri-party collateral multiplier to issuance is consistent with Correa et al. (2020) who document that U.S. dealers rely on other sources of funding to purchase Treasury issuance.

In terms of dealers’ economic incentives, table 3 shows a pattern similar to that of table 2: non-U.S. dealers are more sensitive to matched book profits and U.S. dealers are more sensitive to the demand for specific securities. Non-U.S. dealers’ sensitivity to the GCF repo spread is weakly statistically significant in both tri-party and bilateral repo, consistent with the idea that they increase their matched book repo activity by borrowing more from cash investors. These results suggest that—absent window dressing considerations (see section 3.7)—non-U.S. firms play an important role in channeling funds from risk-averse borrowers to relatively more risk-averse dealers.

Interestingly, U.S. dealers’ re-use is sensitive to specialness in both the bilateral and tri-party markets. As noted before, the sensitivity in the bilateral repo market is likely driven by the need to lengthen the collateral chain to distribute specific securities, which is above and beyond the scarcity effect of changes in overall supply. This implies that U.S. firms endogenously respond to other factors that increase the need to source and distribute on-the-run Treasuries. The sensitivity in the tri-party market is likely driven by the need to fund the increase in repo activity.

### 3.4 Closer Inspection of the Demand for Safe Assets

The analysis in sections 3.2 and 3.3 does not indicate that Treasury re-use is sensitive to the demand for safe assets, proxied by  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$ , our measure of the convenience yield. There may be confounding factors that prevent the previous specifications from capturing this sensitivity. However, following Infante (2020), there is a valid instrument to isolate investors’ demand for safe assets: changes in short-term T-bills outstanding, specifically those with a maturity less than one month, denoted by  $\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_t)$ . Because the four-week T-bill rate is lower than prevailing overnight Treasury repo rates, it is unlikely that dealers would finance shorter-maturity T-bills with general collateral repo. Figure 8 shows that the four-week T-bill rate is generally lower than

the overnight Treasury repo rate (SOFR), even without accounting for the difference in maturity.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, if dealers funded short-term T-bills with overnight repo they would have negative carry, making it very unlikely they would engage in such a trade. Thus, changes in short-term T-bills outstanding only affect cash investors' demand for safe assets. Specifically, changes in the total supply of short-term public instruments isolate changes in cash investors' investment opportunity set, and thus, their demand for safe assets.<sup>24</sup> Importantly, changes in T-bills outstanding are typically known a day in advance, and the Treasury does not respond to opportunistic changes in rates, making changes in short-term T-bills outstanding largely exogenous. These observations imply that the change in short-term T-bill supply is a good instrument to capture changes in the demand for safe assets.

[Insert Fig. 8 Here ]

This empirical strategy leads to the following specification

$$\begin{aligned} (OIS - Tbill)_{t-1} = & \alpha_1 + \varphi_1 \Delta \log(ShTbills_{t-1}) + \sum_l \eta_{1t-l} \Delta \log(DealerCM_{t-l}) + \\ & \gamma_1 Spreads_{t-1} + \beta_1 \Delta \log(Gov_{t-1}) + \theta X_{t-1} + \epsilon_{t-1} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \log(DealerCM_t) = & \alpha_2 + \varphi_2 (\widehat{OIS - Tbill})_{t-1} + \sum_l \eta_{2t-l} \Delta \log(DealerCM_{t-l}) + \\ & \gamma_2 Spreads_{t-1} + \beta \Delta \log(Gov_{t-1}) + \theta X_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where in this case  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  and  $(SOFR - RPSPecial)_{t-1}$ ,  $\Delta \log(Gov_{t-1})$  are  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_{t-1})$  and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_{t-1})$ , and  $X_{t-1}$  are financial data controls used in Table 2.<sup>25</sup> As in the baseline regression, four lags of changes in the collateral multiplier are included to control for serial autocorrelation.

[Insert Table 4]

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<sup>23</sup>There are notable differences before FOMC meetings, where monetary policy expectations of rate cuts push the longer-maturity T-bill rate lower.

<sup>24</sup>Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Infante (2020) model the different sensitivity from changes in long- and short-term government bonds.

<sup>25</sup>Note that we use lagged government supply variables to make the first stage regression time consistent.

[Insert Table 5]

[Insert Table 6]

Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the results of the empirical strategy in equations (2) and (3) for the aggregate, repo, bilateral repo, and tri-party repo collateral multiplier. The coefficient on the convenience yield in the first stage is negative and statistically significant across all specifications. Moreover, all F-statistics of the first stage are greater than 10, reducing any concerns of weak instruments.

Turning to the sensitivity of the convenience yield itself, we find that across all empirical specifications, an increase in the demand for safe assets corresponds to an increase in the U.S. dealers' collateral multiplier. This suggests that as the demand for safe assets increases, U.S. dealers hold less Treasuries relative to their repo activity. That is, they supply more Treasuries to investors outside the dealer market (consistent with Infante (2019)), distributing the U.S. Treasuries' safety.

The coefficients on non-U.S. dealers do not show the same sensitivity, however the analysis in section 3.5, which exploits our dealer-level data even further, provides evidence that our measure of average dealer activity may not be accurately capturing all of individual dealers' incentives.

### **3.5 Simultaneous Equation Regressions**

The analysis so far has concentrated on changes in cross-sectional averages of dealers' collateral multipliers. In this section we exploit the granularity of our data to use information from firm-level activity. Because the cross-sectional sample size is low, we cannot rely on pooled regressions to give us consistent estimates. However, we can run simultaneous equation regression, which takes into account firm-level behaviour.

#### **3.5.1 Baseline Estimation of Simultaneous Equation Regressions**

In this section we estimate the simultaneous equation counterpart of our baseline formulation expressed in equation (4). Specifically, we estimate the following model:



$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \log(DealerCM_{it}) = & \alpha + \sum_l \eta_l \Delta \log(DealerCM_{it-l}) \\ & \gamma Spreads_{t-1} + \beta \Delta \log(Gov_t) + \theta Z_{t-1} + \theta Z_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}\end{aligned}\quad (4)$$

where  $DealerCM_{it}$  is dealer  $i$ 's collateral multiplier at time  $t$ ,  $Z_{t-1}$  are lagged aggregate financial variable controls (i.e., slope of the yield curve, 10-year Treasury VIX, and the S&P VIX), and  $Z_{it-1}$  are lagged individual dealer financial variable controls (i.e., dealer CDS). We estimate the model using the two-step GMM method with a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) residual covariance structure of 21 lags, employing a Newey-West kernel.

To understand the differential impact of dealers' incentives to re-use Treasuries across jurisdictions, we run two specifications: One in which all dealers are forced to have the same coefficient on spreads (i.e.,  $\gamma$ ) and another in which we allow for the coefficients to differ between U.S. and non-U.S. dealers (i.e.,  $\gamma^{US}, \gamma^{nonUS}$ ).

Table 7 shows the results of both specifications, across the four types of collateral multipliers. We first observe that coefficients on the supply effects over aggregate, repo, and bilateral collateral multipliers are very similar to those in the average-level analysis. An increase in aggregate supply, whether from Treasury issuance or a decrease in Federal Reserve holdings, results in a decrease in the collateral multiplier. The effects are particularly pronounced in the bilateral market, suggesting that the collateral chains expand and contract as supply outstanding changes. Similar to the average-level analysis, the simultaneous analysis implies that the effects of change in SOMA are stronger than Treasury supply, indicating that central bank action has more of an impact on dealers' response to asset scarcity. In addition, consistent with section 3.3, the supply results are somewhat weaker in the tri-party market.

In terms of dealers' individual incentives, Table 7 confirms the insights from the average-level analysis. First, non-U.S. dealers' repo collateral multipliers are particularly sensitive to intermediation spreads, highlighting their incentive to intermediate cash. This sensitivity is strong in both the bilateral and tri-party repo market, indicating that dealers can raise funds in either segment

of the market to intermediate them. Second, U.S. dealers' collateral multipliers are sensitive to the level of specialness, across all specifications. This sensitivity in both the bilateral and tri-party market suggests dealers both lengthen the chain to distribute securities and also increase funding for this activity. We also see that non-U.S. dealers exhibit a statistically significant sensitivity to specialness, albeit smaller in magnitude than for U.S. dealers.

### 3.5.2 Safe Asset Demand Estimation of Simultaneous Equation Regressions

In this section we estimate the simultaneous equation counterpart of our instrumental variable specification expressed in section 3.4. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \log(DealerCM_{it}) = & \alpha + \varphi(\widehat{Tbill - OIS})_{t-1} + \sum_l \eta_{t-l} \Delta \log(DealerCM_{t-l}) \\ & + \gamma Spread_{t-1} + \beta \Delta \log(Gov_{t-1}) + \theta Z_{t-1} + \theta Z_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where, as in section 3.4 we use changes in short-term T-bills outstanding as an instrument for the demand for safe assets. Table 8 shows the results of both specifications, across the 4 types of collateral multipliers. The results are consistent with those in section 3.4, which show that U.S. dealers' collateral multiplier increases as the demand for safe assets increases. In addition, we find that non-U.S. dealers also increase their collateral multiplier as the demand for safe assets increases.

Consistent with previous literature, this suggests that the dealer sector holds fewer Treasuries as outside investors demand more of them. These sensitivities are concentrated in the bilateral repo market, indicating that dealers also distribute safe assets by extending the length of the collateral chain when demand for them increases.

## 3.6 Weekly Analysis

To understand the longer-term impact of the drivers behind Treasury re-use, we repeat the analysis of sections 3.2 and 3.3 at a weekly frequency using overlapping data. Specifically, we estimate the same empirical model in (1) using 5-day changes in the collateral multiplier  $\Delta^5 \log(DealerCM_t)$

and government outstanding  $\Delta^5 \log(Gov_t)$ , and use 5-day lagged spreads  $Spreads_{t-5}$ . For this analysis, we include two lags of  $\Delta^5 \log(DealerCM_t)$  to control for serial autocorrelation, 5-day lagged financial variable controls  $X_{t-5}$  used in section 3.2, and eliminate the 5 days around quarter-end.

[Insert Table 9]

[Insert Table 10]

Tables 9 and 10 show the results for the weekly frequency analysis. The results are broadly consistent with the results in sections 3.2 and 3.3. The supply effects are concentrated on changes in the SOMA portfolio. These results underscore that changes in Fed asset purchases have a strong, longer-lasting impact on how dealers re-use Treasuries, particularly in the bilateral repo market. We interpret this as central bank action having a direct effect on the length of the collateral chain, consistent with what Jank and Moench (2020) find in the European market.

In terms of economic magnitude, the coefficients in Table 9 show that a 1 standard deviation of increase in  $\Delta^5 \log(SOMA_t)$  results in a .38 increase in collateral multiplier for all contracts.<sup>26</sup> Given that the average size of the Fed’s Treasury holdings during our sample is approximately \$2.4 trillion, this implies that a \$ 33 billion dollar increase in SOMA Treasury holdings corresponds to a 0.56 increase in the aggregate collateral multiplier. From these results, we conclude that the Fed can have a strong, longer-lasting effect on dealers’ re-use, suggesting the central bank has the ability to alter the overall leverage of the financial sector.

The weekly frequency analysis also shows that U.S. dealers are more sensitive to repo specialness, underscoring their role in distributing collateral. In addition, while statistically weaker, the results also show that non-U.S. dealers are more sensitive to repo intermediation spreads, underscoring their role in distributing funds.

### 3.7 Quarter-end Behavior

So far our empirical analysis has excluded quarter-end dates. On those dates, firms’ activity is driven by considerations unrelated to the economic drivers studied in this paper, namely window

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<sup>26</sup>The standard deviation of  $\Delta^5 \log(DealerCM_{All,AC,t})$  and  $\Delta^5 \log(SOMA_t)$  are 0.077 and 0.014, respectively.

dressing. Because of different regulatory reporting frequencies across jurisdictions, some non-U.S. firms have incentives to reduce the regulatory balance sheet size on quarter-end dates (see section 3.1 for more details). The reduction of non-U.S. firms' tri-party repo has been documented by Munyan (2017) and Correa et al. (2020). Our re-use measure can provide additional insights into how these firms are window dressing.

Figure 9 shows the repo collateral multiplier for U.S. and non-U.S. firms near quarter-end dates. The figures depict the average series across all quarter-end dates in our sample. Consistent with existing studies, Figure 9 shows that non-U.S. firms' repo collateral multiplier decreases significantly, indicating a contraction in their repo borrowing. However, given that the multiplier decreases, as does the the total amount of SFTs (see Figure 4), on quarter-end dates we can infer that this contraction is concentrated in rehypothecated repo. That is, in relative terms non-U.S. dealers choose to reduce their lending rather than sell their Treasury positions.

Interestingly, Figure 10 shows that the total collateral multiplier of non-U.S. firms is flat around quarter-end. The difference between multipliers suggests that these dealers are substituting other types of SFTs for repo. A closer look shows that dealers' multiplier for collateral swaps tends to increase sharply on quarter-end dates. This behavior is consistent with firms' incentives to window dress, as dealers can net out their collateral swap positions, resulting in a smaller regulatory burden. In effect, swaps can be thought of as simultaneous repo and reverse repo with the same counterparty, making them eligible for regulatory netting rules (FIN 41).<sup>27</sup>

Consistent with existing studies, we find that non-U.S. dealers reduce borrowing from cash rich investors. Additionally, we find that this reduction in borrowing comes at the cost of a reduction in lending (i.e., reducing matched book repo) and that their activity migrates to contracts that have a reduced regulatory burden.

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<sup>27</sup>Dealers can offset exposures for regulatory purposes if trades 1) are with the same counterparty, 2) have the same maturity, and 3) settle on the same platform.

## 4 COVID-19

In this section, we discuss how the collateral multiplier responded to the volatility in financial markets related to the outbreak of COVID-19 in the U.S. during March 2020.

During the first two weeks of March, there were numerous reports of illiquidity in the Treasury cash market. Market participants described the decrease in market liquidity to be driven, in part, by clients increased selling of Treasuries, which increased dealers’ positions and hindered their market making abilities.<sup>28</sup> Amid these liquidity problems, total Treasury SFT volumes increased notably, as dealers financed their new positions. However, the collateral multiplier decreased significantly at the same time, reaching its lowest level in our sample period during the week when market participants reported the most challenging liquidity conditions (see Figure 5). The repo collateral multiplier followed a similar trend.

The significant decline of the collateral multiplier in early March demonstrates that as dealers’ Treasury positions increased, they did not increase their rehypothecated repo proportionally. If instead dealers had increased the amount of rehypothecated repos relative to long positions, re-use would have “normalized.” Specifically, the expansion of rehypothecated repo would have backed reverse repos, in part, for speculative investors such as hedge funds to take on levered long positions. Dealers’ unwillingness to increase the amount of reverse repos was likely driven by balance sheet constraints. He et al. (2020) and Duffie (2020) suggest that the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), a regulatory initiative which is particularly onerous for Treasury market intermediation, restricted dealers from participating, resulting in the market disruption. Specifically, He et al. (2020) argues that regulatory balance sheet costs reduced dealers’ incentives to both take on more Treasuries and provide repos to speculative investors, which decreased the price of Treasury securities further than maturity-matched OIS rates.<sup>29</sup> And Duffie (2020) suggests that broader clearing mandates for the U.S. Treasury market would limit its reliance on a subset of dealers that are subject to many internal and regulatory constraints.

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<sup>28</sup>For more detail on the Treasury market liquidity problems caused by the COVID-19 crisis, see Michael Fleming and Francisco Ruela, Treasury Market Liquidity during the COVID-19 Crisis, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, April 17, 2020.

<sup>29</sup>In the context of a microstructure model, Huh and Infante (2020) also model the SLR as a size constraint on dealers’ balance sheet, highlighting in interaction between cash and different segments of the repo market.

In the second half of March, emergency actions by the Fed to improve liquidity conditions in the Treasury market coincided with an increase in both the total and repo collateral multipliers. In effect, Figure 11 shows that the aggregate collateral multiplier changed course on March 12th, when the Fed announced a significant expansion of its repo program (March 12th) and asset purchases (March 13th). The figure shows that during that dealers’ total SFTs peaked around the same time. As noted by Infante and Saravay (2020), this suggests that dealers were able to fund their Treasury holdings, but were reluctant to lend them out.

The relationship between developments in the Treasury market and movements in the collateral multipliers during March 2020 can be easily appreciated from the lens of our conceptual framework. All else equal, increased client selling causes an increase in the aggregate supply of Treasuries held by dealers—similar to an increase in Treasury issuance.<sup>30</sup> From the perspective of 1, the green diamond  $T$  would increase, resulting in a decrease in the collateral multiplier. Along the same lines, all else equal, Fed purchases of longer-dated Treasuries cause a decrease in the aggregate supply, the green diamond, resulting in an increase in the collateral multiplier. Our conceptual framework also gives a simple interpretation of how the take-up in the Fed’s repo program may affect the collateral multiplier. Specifically, an increase in takeup would result in an increase in the total amount of SFTs, the right-most blue rectangle, putting upward pressure on the collateral multiplier. Finally, from our framework the SLR can be interpreted as a restriction on the size of dealers’ balance sheet. From this perspective, the rule would have limited the total amount of SFTs to the dealer sector, even if funding were readily available. While this rule would not affect the collateral multiplier of an individual dealer directly, it would limit the amount of re-use for a fixed supply of Treasury securities.

Our empirical results suggest that the Fed’s asset purchases had a particularly strong impact on collateral re-use during the COVID-19 outbreak period. To assess the effect of the Fed’s actions taken during the crisis period on the collateral multiplier, we included  $1_{\text{MidMarch2020}}$ , an indicator variable for March 15th, 2020. On this date, the Federal Reserve expanded its asset purchase program, committing to purchase \$500 billion dollars of U.S. Treasuries over the coming months in

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<sup>30</sup>However, it is important to note that most of the selling was reportedly in off-the-run Treasuries, which are less liquid than on-the-run Treasuries created from new issuance.

order to “support the smooth functioning of markets for Treasury securities.”<sup>31</sup>

From our conceptual framework, we would expect that this date would be associated with an increase in dealers’ collateral multiplier. The empirical results in section 3.2 and 3.3 include a dummy variable to capture the change in the Fed policy. However, the results show an insignificant, or even opposing effect. This result suggests that the sharp increase in the collateral multiplier after mid-March was primarily driven by the increase in the Fed’s SOMA holdings during that period. In effect, as shown in figure 6, the increase in the Fed’s SOMA portfolio was the most significant factor affecting the supply of Treasuries during the second half of March. The decrease in aggregate SFTs, along with the increase in the collateral multiplier, both seen in Figure 11, indicate that as the Fed increased its purchases of Treasury securities, dealers’ funding of Treasuries decreased, but their holdings decreased proportionally more, resulting in an increase in the multiplier. That is, the Fed alleviated pressures in the market by taking Treasuries directly off dealers inventories. In tables 11 and 12 we repeat the empirical analysis reported in tables 2 and 3, but exclude changes in the SOMA portfolio. The results show that the coefficient on  $1_{\text{MidMarch2020}}$  is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the policy change on that day had a unique effect on dealers re-use of Treasuries. We interpret the increase in the collateral multiplier as an indication that market functioning had improved, reaching levels seen earlier in the year.

[Insert Fig. 11 Here ]

## 5 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework to understand the main drivers behind Treasury re-use and use confidential supervisory data to explore their empirical relevance. Using a firm-level measure of collateral re-use called the collateral multiplier, we detail how re-use should change with Treasury supply, and explore dealer-specific incentives to adjust re-use, including the intermediation of funds, specific securities, and safe assets. The collateral multiplier can be interpreted as the number of times one security is used for multiple transactions—the length of the collateral chain.

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<sup>31</sup>FOMC statement: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm>.

Our empirical work shows that, similar to other jurisdictions, changes in the overall supply of Treasuries have a significant impact on Treasury re-use: an increase in Treasury supply leads to a decrease in Treasury re-use. Moreover, these sensitivities are concentrated in the bilateral repo market, which we expect to contain a larger portion of the collateral chain. We also find that the effects of central bank interventions are stronger and persist at lower frequencies. These observations combined suggest that the central bank can effectively reduce the interconnectedness of the financial system by reducing the size of its balance sheet.

We also show that incentives to re-use Treasuries have a differential impact on dealers, depending on their jurisdiction. Non-U.S. dealers' Treasury re-use is correlated with yield spreads between different segments of the repo market, indicative of their role as intermediaries of cash. In contrast, U.S. dealers' Treasury re-use is correlated with on-the-run repo specialness, indicative of their role as intermediaries of specific securities. Identifying dealers' differential roles in Treasury re-use allows regulators to monitor market functioning and measure financial resiliency more effectively.

Importantly, we find that U.S. dealers also engage in more Treasury re-use when the demand for safe assets is high. This activity alleviates some of the costs associated with safe asset scarcity, as Treasury re-use distributes safe assets to counterparties that need them most. However, it also increases leverage and interconnectedness with safe asset collateral, which raises other possible sources of risk, such as collateral runs. The overall stability implications of safe asset re-use are an important area of future research.

Finally, we show how re-use was affected by the Treasury market disruptions in March 2020 amid the COVID-19 outbreak. Re-use dropped dramatically as dealers took on more Treasury inventory, at a time when market liquidity was severely strained. We show that re-use rebounded to pre-outbreak levels following the Federal Reserve's announcement of further asset purchases, demonstrating again central banks' important role in curbing or prompting Treasury re-use.

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
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
**Figure 1: Stylized Illustration of U.S. Treasury Re-use**

The green diamond on the left represents all of the Treasuries available to dealers  $T$ , the blue rectangle represent dealer  $i$ 's funding, and the small green diamonds represents dealer  $i$ 's direct Treasury holdings. Dashed arrows represent the purchase of a security, while solid arrows represent SFTs.




**Figure 2: Stylized Illustration of Dealer’s Balance Sheet**

This figure depicts how SFTs and cash positions would appear on a theoretical dealer’s balance sheet for a single collateral class. On the asset side, collateral can be encumbered, meaning it has been re-used or is restricted from re-use, or unencumbered, meaning it is available for re-use. On the liability side, collateral can be rehypothecated, meaning it was sourced from an incoming SFT, or non-rehypothecated, meaning it was sourced from an asset position.




### Figure 3: U.S. Treasury Incoming and Outgoing Collateral Volumes

This figure shows the total volumes of incoming and outgoing U.S. Treasury collateral for the dealers in our sample, as well as the amount of encumbered incoming transactions and rehypothecated outgoing transactions.




### Figure 4: U.S. Treasury Outgoing Secured Financing Transactions

This figure shows the total volume of U.S. Treasury SFTs for the dealers in our sample, as well as the volume that is non-rehypothecated, meaning it was sourced from a firm's holdings. The series depicted in this figure are used at the firm level to calculate the collateral multiplier, which is the ratio between the black line and the red line.




### Figure 5: Collateral Multiplier for Treasury Collateral

This figure shows the aggregate and repo collateral multiplier, our measure of collateral re-use, for U.S. Treasury collateral. The collateral multiplier is the ratio of outgoing collateral to non-rehypothecated outgoing collateral.




### Figure 6: Log Changes in Treasury Supply

This figure depicts the log changes in the total outstanding of U.S. Treasury marketable securities. The series is a proxy of U.S. Treasury issuance.




### Figure 7: Repo Cash Intermediation, Repo Specialness, and the Treasury Convenience Yield

This figure depicts our measure of repo cash intermediation, which is the spread between the GCF rate and the TPR rate; repo specialness, which is the spreads between the SOFR rate and the on-the-run Treasury repo rate; and the the convenience yield, which is the spread between the one-month OIS rate and the four-week T-bill.



### Figure 8: Four-week T-bill Rate and SOFR


This figure shows that the four-week T-bill rate is generally lower than SOFR, the overnight Treasury repo rate. Instances where the T-bill rate is lower coincide with periods of downward policy rate expectations prior to FOMC meetings.





### Figure 9: Average Repo Collateral Multiplier Around Quarter-End


This figure shows the repo collateral multiplier for the 30 days around quarter-end, averaged across the 16 quarter-ends in our sample. Non-U.S. dealers' repo collateral multiplier tends to decline sharply on quarter-end dates, consistent with well-documented window dressing activity.



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form FR 2052a, Complex Institution Liquidity Monitoring Report.

### Figure 10: Average Aggregate Collateral Multiplier Around Quarter-End


This figure shows the aggregate collateral multiplier for the 30 days around quarter-end, averaged across the 16 quarter-ends in our sample. In contrast to the repo multiplier, the aggregate multiplier remains stable around quarter-end for both U.S. and non-U.S. dealers. Non-U.S. dealers tend to substitute contracts with a smaller regulatory burden, such as collateral swaps, for repo on quarter-end.



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form FR 2052a, Complex Institution Liquidity Monitoring Report.

**Figure 11: Total Secured Financing Transactions and the Collateral Multiplier Amid COVID Market Turmoil**

This figure shows the volume of total secured financing transactions and the movement of the aggregate collateral multipliers during the COVID-19 crisis. As secured financing volumes peaked in early March, the collateral multiplier reached its lowest historical level amid deteriorating liquidity in Treasury markets. Subsequent actions by the Fed to improve liquidity coincided with a reduction in secured funding volumes and a sharp increase in the multiplier.



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Form FR 2052a, Complex Institution Liquidity Monitoring Report.

**Table 1: Summary Statistics**

This table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper.  $\Delta \log(CM_{j,p,t})$  is the log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average collateral multiplier of contract/settlement venue  $p$  where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$  and  $p \in \{All\ Contracts, Repo, Bilateral, Tri-party\}$ .  $\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_t)$  is the log change in U.S. Treasury bills outstanding with maturity less than one month,  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$  is the log change in U.S. Treasury bills outstanding,  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding, and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$  is the log change in the Federal Reserve’s U.S. Treasury holdings.  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  is the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  is the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  is the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bill rate. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and “repo spike” dates are excluded.

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{All,AC,t})$	1,041	.0002	.0531	-.1499	.1349
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{US,AC,t})$	1,041	.0003	.0397	-.1092	.0989
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{nonUS,AC,t})$	1,041	.0002	.0935	-.2399	.2479
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{All,Repo,t})$	1,041	.0004	.0525	-.1587	.1309
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{US,Repo,t})$	1,041	.0005	.0414	-.1151	.0963
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{nonUS,Repo,t})$	1,041	.0002	.1005	-.4759	.3941
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{All,Bi,t})$	1,041	.0002	.0568	-.1578	.1296
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{US,Bi,t})$	1,041	.0012	.0458	-.1166	.1155
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{nonUS,Bi,t})$	1,041	-.0013	.1195	-.3330	.2801
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{All,TPR,t})$	1,041	.0008	.0710	-.1917	.1815
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{US})$	1,041	-.0008	.0579	-.1547	.1452
$\Delta \log(DealerCM_{nonUS,TPR,t})$	1,041	.0025	.1158	-.3040	.2868
$\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_t)$	1,077	.0007	.0886	-.2253	.2290
$\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$	1,077	.0008	.0061	-.0414	.0410
$\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$	1,077	.0002	.0007	-.0004	.0047
$\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$	1,078	.0004	.0031	-.0141	.0278
$(GCF - TPR)_t$	1,072	.1138	.1010	-.0580	2.1990
$(SOFR - RPSpecial)_t$	1,061	.2384	.3052	-.2497	1.8755
$(OIS - Tbill)_t$	1,073	.1104	.0903	-.1820	.4105

**Table 2: Drivers of Aggregate and Repo Collateral Multipliers**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (1).  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerCM_{jpt}$  in  $\Delta \log(DealerCM)$ : the log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average collateral multiplier of contracts  $p$  where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$  and  $p \in \{All\ Contracts, Repo\}$ .  $\Delta \log(Gov_t)$  are  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$  the log change in Treasury bills outstanding,  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding, and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$  is the log change in the Federal Reserve's U.S. Treasury holdings.  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bill rate.  $X_{t-1}$  are financial data controls used in table described in section 3.2 (not shown) and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020. Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jpt})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and "repo spike" dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jpt})$					
	All Contracts			Repo		
	All	US	non-US	All	US	non-US
$\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$	-0.971*** (0.272)	-0.738*** (0.171)	-1.267*** (0.485)	-0.832*** (0.253)	-0.628*** (0.199)	-1.096** (0.455)
$\Delta \log(USTNotesOut_t)$	-9.550*** (1.717)	-9.316*** (1.711)	-10.435*** (3.013)	-9.167*** (1.633)	-11.367*** (1.855)	-6.306** (3.138)
$\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$	4.869*** (1.123)	2.444*** (0.887)	7.191*** (1.785)	5.117*** (1.286)	2.201** (0.862)	9.220*** (2.526)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	0.027 (0.032)	-0.028 (0.029)	0.111*** (0.042)	0.033 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.032)	0.152*** (0.045)
$(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$	0.014*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.011 (0.009)	0.012** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.009)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$	-0.041 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.089* (0.047)	-0.038 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.024)	-0.098* (0.052)
$1_{MidMarch2020}$	-0.016 (0.020)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.037* (0.022)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.094** (0.040)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adj RSq	0.197	0.153	0.188	0.199	0.145	0.195
N obs	946	946	946	946	946	946

**Table 3: Drivers of Bilateral Repo Tri-party Repo Collateral Multiplier**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (1).  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerRepoCM_{jst}$  in  $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_t)$ : the log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average repo collateral multiplier of repos settled in venue  $s$  where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$  and  $s \in \{Bilateral, Tri-party\}$ .  $\Delta \log(Gov_t)$  are  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$  the log change in Treasury bills outstanding,  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding, and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$  is the log change in the Federal Reserve’s U.S. Treasury holdings.  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bill rate.  $X_{t-1}$  are financial data controls used in table 2 (not shown) and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020. Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jst})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and “repo spike” dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_{jst})$					
	Bilateral			Tri-party		
	All	US	non-US	All	US	non-US
$\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$	-0.961*** (0.238)	-0.604*** (0.196)	-1.561*** (0.460)	-0.616 (0.443)	-0.693** (0.346)	-0.544 (0.707)
$\Delta \log(USTNotesOut_t)$	-16.552*** (2.142)	-13.762*** (2.181)	-20.178*** (3.668)	1.284 (2.406)	-6.224** (2.623)	8.314** (4.194)
$\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$	6.860*** (1.380)	2.973*** (0.851)	14.094*** (3.460)	3.076** (1.489)	1.036 (1.167)	4.506** (2.024)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	0.029 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.029)	0.133* (0.076)	0.040 (0.058)	-0.041 (0.040)	0.119* (0.070)
$(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$	0.010** (0.005)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.011)	0.010 (0.007)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.011)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$	-0.022 (0.031)	0.018 (0.022)	-0.096 (0.068)	-0.058 (0.040)	-0.045 (0.036)	-0.063 (0.055)
$1_{MidMarch2020}$	-0.055* (0.029)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.140* (0.075)	-0.029 (0.030)	0.017 (0.026)	-0.061 (0.039)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adj RSq	0.221	0.151	0.223	0.129	0.147	0.127
N obs	946	946	946	946	946	946

**Table 4: Drivers of Aggregate Collateral Multipliers Instrumenting the Convenience Yield with Short-term T-bill Issuance**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (2) and (3).  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerCM_{jt}$  in  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jt})$ : the log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average collateral multiplier for all contracts.  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  is the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bill rate and  $\widehat{(OIS - Tbill)}_{t-1}$  is the fitted value of the convenience yield from the first stage.  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities and  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the SOFR rate.  $\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_{t-1})$  is the log change in Treasury bills outstanding with maturity less than one month.  $\Delta \log(Gov_{t-1})$  are  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_{t-1})$  the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_{t-1})$  is the log change in the Federal Reserve's U.S. Treasury holdings (not shown).  $X_{t-1}$  are financial data controls used in Table 2 and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020 (not shown). Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jt})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. F-value of first stage regressions are reported. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and "repo spike" dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jt})$					
	All		US		non-US	
	1st Stage	2st Stage	1st Stage	2st Stage	1st Stage	2st Stage
$\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_{t-1})$	-0.075*** (0.016)		-0.078*** (0.016)		-0.074*** (0.015)	
$\widehat{(OIS - Tbill)}_{t-1}$		0.522* (0.275)		0.628*** (0.221)		0.296 (0.474)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	0.123 (0.075)	-0.054 (0.063)	0.137* (0.078)	-0.108 (0.072)	0.121 (0.074)	0.033 (0.065)
$(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$	-0.002 (0.013)	0.013 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.014 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.011 (0.010)
F	15.865		13.928		15.576	
P-value		0.000		0.000		0.000
Adj RSq	0.555		0.559		0.555	
N obs	965	947	965	947	965	947

**Table 5: Drivers of Repo Collateral Multiplier Instrumenting the Convenience Yield with Short-term T-bill Issuance**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (2) and (3).  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerCM_{jt}$  in  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jt})$ : the log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average repo collateral multiplier where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$ .  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  is the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bills and  $(\widehat{OIS - Tbill})_{t-1}$  is the fitted value of the convenience yield from the first stage.  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities and  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the SOFR rate.  $\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_{t-1})$  is the log change in Treasury bills outstanding with maturity less than one month.  $\Delta \log(Gov_{t-1})$  are  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_{t-1})$  is the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_{t-1})$  is the log change in the Federal Reserve's U.S. Treasury holdings.  $X_{t-1}$  are financial data controls used in Table 2 and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020 (not shown). Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_{jt})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. F-value of first stage regressions are reported. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and "repo spike" dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_{jt})$					
	All		US		non-US	
	1st Stage	2st Stage	1st Stage	2st Stage	1st Stage	2st Stage
$\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_{t-1})$	-0.075*** (0.016)		-0.076*** (0.016)		-0.073*** (0.015)	
$(\widehat{OIS - Tbill})_{t-1}$		0.566** (0.272)		0.602*** (0.218)		0.460 (0.505)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	0.125 (0.076)	-0.056 (0.069)	0.140* (0.079)	-0.106 (0.073)	0.120 (0.074)	0.039 (0.077)
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-1}$	-0.002 (0.013)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.013 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.010 (0.011)
F	15.000		13.144		15.845	
P-value		0.000		0.000		0.000
Adj RSq	0.555		0.559		0.555	
N obs	965	947	965	947	965	947

**Table 6: Drivers of Bilateral Repo and Tri-party Collateral Multiplier Instrumenting the Convenience Yield with Short-term T-bill Issuance**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (2) and (3).  $DealerRepoCM_{jst}$  is  $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_{jst})$  the log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average repo collateral multiplier of repos settled in venue  $s$  where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$  and  $s \in \{Bilateral, Tri-party\}$ .  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  is the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bills and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  is the fitted value of the convenience yield from the first stage.  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities and  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the SOFR rate.  $\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_{t-1})$  is the log change in Treasury bills outstanding with maturity less than one month.  $\Delta \log(Govt_{t-1})$  are  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_{t-1})$  is the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_{t-1})$  is the log change in the Federal Reserve's U.S. Treasury holdings.  $X_{t-1}$  are financial data controls used in Table 2 and 1<sub>MidMarch2020</sub> an indicator for March 15th 2020 (not shown). Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_{jt})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. F-value of first stage regressions are reported. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and "repo spike" dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_{jst})$									
	Bilateral					Tri-party				
	All		US		non-US	All		US		non-US
	1st Stage	2st Stage	1st Stage	2st Stage		1st Stage	2st Stage	1st Stage	2st Stage	
$\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_{t-1})$	-0.076*** (0.016)	0.732*** (0.289)	-0.076*** (0.016)	0.573*** (0.223)	-0.072*** (0.015)	-0.074*** (0.015)	0.353 (0.396)	-0.073*** (0.016)	0.663*** (0.335)	-0.074*** (0.015)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$	0.129* (0.076)	-0.077 (0.074)	0.140* (0.076)	-0.088 (0.066)	0.121 (0.074)	0.121 (0.073)	-0.028 (0.080)	0.124* (0.075)	-0.116 (0.083)	0.121* (0.074)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	-0.003 (0.013)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.014 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.017 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)
F	14.485		13.429	0.000	14.928	13.556	0.000	13.506	0.000	14.147
P-value		0.000			0.000		0.000		0.000	0.000
Adj RSq	0.556		0.561		0.555	0.555	0.037	0.555		0.555
N obs	965	947	965	947	965	965	947	965	947	947



**Table 7: Simultaneous Equation Regressions of Collateral Multipliers**

This table shows the two-step GMM estimation of equation (4).  $DealerCM_{it}$  is  $DealerCM_{ipt}$  in  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{it})$ : the log change of dealer  $i$ 's collateral multiplier of contracts/settlement venue  $p$  where  $p \in \{All\ Contracts, Repo, Bilateral, Tri-party\}$ .  $\Delta \log(Gov_t)$  are  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$  the log change in Treasury bills outstanding,  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding, and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_{t-1})$  is the log change in the Federal Reserve's U.S. Treasury holdings.  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bill rate. For each contract/settlement venue  $p$  we show results from equation (4) where all dealers have the same coefficients on  $Spreads_{t-1}$  and where U.S. dealers and non-U.S. dealers have different coefficients on  $Spreads_{t-1}$ .  $Z_{t-1}$  are aggregate financial data controls common to all dealers,  $Z_{it-1}$  are dealer-level financial data controls described in 3.5 (not shown) and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020. Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{ipt})$  are included as controls (not shown). The Hansen J-statistic is reported along with its p-value. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and "repo spike" dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{ipt})$							
	All		Repo		Bilateral		Tri-party	
$\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$	-1.007*** (0.084)	-0.998*** (0.084)	-0.875*** (0.102)	-0.873*** (0.103)	-1.149*** (0.115)	-1.148*** (0.115)	-0.644*** (0.117)	-0.625*** (0.120)
$\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$	-8.527*** (0.766)	-8.708*** (0.774)	-9.727*** (0.768)	-9.969*** (0.785)	-15.834*** (1.082)	-15.985*** (1.088)	0.543 (0.975)	0.615 (1.008)
$\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$	3.695*** (0.378)	3.657*** (0.380)	3.868*** (0.394)	3.870*** (0.391)	6.225*** (0.438)	6.246*** (0.435)	0.366 (0.374)	0.420 (0.373)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	0.013 (0.010)		0.023** (0.011)		0.006 (0.013)		0.014 (0.012)	
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}^{US}$		-0.014 (0.010)		-0.018 (0.011)		-0.023* (0.014)		-0.010 (0.014)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}^{nonUS}$		0.077*** (0.017)		0.119*** (0.019)		0.066*** (0.025)		0.067*** (0.023)
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-1}$	0.012*** (0.002)		0.012*** (0.002)		0.009*** (0.002)		0.017*** (0.002)	
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-1}^{US}$		0.013*** (0.002)		0.013*** (0.002)		0.011*** (0.002)		0.018*** (0.002)
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-1}^{nonUS}$		0.010*** (0.003)		0.010*** (0.004)		0.005 (0.005)		0.012*** (0.004)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$	-0.017** (0.008)		-0.019** (0.009)		0.021 (0.013)		-0.023* (0.013)	
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}^{US}$		-0.013 (0.009)		-0.010 (0.010)		0.018 (0.014)		-0.015 (0.014)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}^{nonUS}$		-0.031*** (0.012)		-0.044*** (0.012)		0.023 (0.017)		-0.035* (0.019)
$1_{MidMarch2020}$	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.033*** (0.009)	0.017** (0.008)	0.015* (0.008)
J-Stat	45.419	45.288	45.402	45.195	43.590	43.546	42.874	42.497
p-value	0.999	0.999	0.999	0.999	1.000	0.999	1.000	1.000
N obs	946	946	946	946	946	946	946	946

**Table 8: Simultaneous Equation Regressions of Collateral Multipliers Instrumenting the Convenience Yield with Short-term T-bill Issuance**

This table shows the two-step GMM estimation of equations (5).  $DealerCM_{it}$  is  $DealerCM_{ipt}$  in  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{it})$ : the log change of dealer  $i$ 's collateral multiplier of contracts/settlement venue  $p$  where  $p \in \{All\ Contracts, Repo, Bilateral, Tri-party\}$ .  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bill rate. For each contract/settlement venue  $p$  we show results from equation (4) where all dealers have the same coefficients on  $Spreads_{t-1}$  and where U.S. dealers and non-U.S. dealers have different coefficients on  $Spreads_{t-1}$ .  $\Delta \log(ShTbillsOut_{t-1})$  is the log change in Treasury bills outstanding with maturity less than one month is used as an instrument for  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$ .  $\Delta \log(Gov_{t-1})$  are  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_{t-1})$  the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_{t-1})$  is the log change in the Federal Reserve's U.S. Treasury holdings (not shown).  $Z_{t-1}$  are aggregate financial data controls common to all dealers,  $Z_{it-1}$  are dealer-level financial data controls described in 3.5, and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020 (not shown). Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{ipt})$  are included as controls (not shown). The Hansen J-statistic is reported along with its p-value. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and "repo spike" dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{ipt})$							
	All		Repo		Bilateral		Tri-party	
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	-0.052** (0.026)		-0.068** (0.034)		-0.093** (0.039)		-0.047** (0.023)	
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}^{US}$		-0.075*** (0.026)		-0.096*** (0.033)		-0.099** (0.039)		-0.065*** (0.024)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}^{nonUS}$		0.013 (0.027)		0.016 (0.036)		-0.067 (0.046)		-0.003 (0.032)
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-1}$	0.010** (0.004)		0.011* (0.006)		0.009 (0.007)		0.017*** (0.004)	
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-1}^{US}$		0.011*** (0.004)		0.012** (0.006)		0.009 (0.007)		0.019*** (0.004)
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-1}^{nonUS}$		0.005 (0.005)		0.008 (0.007)		0.009 (0.008)		0.012* (0.006)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$	0.558*** (0.094)		0.802*** (0.119)		0.853*** (0.136)		0.546*** (0.116)	
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}^{US}$		0.527*** (0.093)		0.768*** (0.118)		0.841*** (0.141)		0.503*** (0.120)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}^{nonUS}$		0.512*** (0.093)		0.732*** (0.115)		0.841*** (0.141)		0.515*** (0.118)
J-Stat	43.790	43.700	43.700	43.512	41.518	41.292	43.040	42.018
p-value	0.997	0.993	0.997	0.993	0.999	0.997	0.997	0.996
N obs	947	947	947	947	947	947	947	947

**Table 9: Drivers of Aggregate and Repo Collateral Multipliers — Weekly Regressions w/ Overlapping Data**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (1) at a weekly frequency with overlapping data.  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerCM_{jpt}$  in  $\Delta^5 \log(DealerCM)$ : the 5-day log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average collateral multiplier of contracts  $p$  where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$  and  $p \in \{All\ Contracts, Repo\}$ .  $\Delta^5 \log(Gov_t)$  are  $\Delta^5 \log(TbillsOut_t)$  the 5-day log change in Treasury bills outstanding,  $\Delta^5 \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  the 5-day log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding, and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$  is 5-day the log change in the Federal Reserve’s U.S. Treasury holdings.  $Spreads_{t-5}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-5}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-5}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-5}$  the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bills.  $X_{t-5}$  are financial data controls used in table 2 (not shown) and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020. Two lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jpt})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. The 5 days around quarter-end and “repo spike” dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta^5 \log(DealerCM_{jpt})$					
	All Contracts			Repo		
	All	US	non-US	All	US	non-US
$\Delta^5 \log(TbillsOut_t)$	-0.575** (0.292)	-0.320 (0.241)	-0.716 (0.524)	-0.510* (0.309)	-0.442 (0.301)	-0.433 (0.506)
$\Delta^5 \log(USTNotesOut_t)$	-2.747 (3.285)	-4.965** (2.318)	1.759 (5.933)	-1.328 (3.185)	-5.601** (2.592)	7.247 (6.228)
$\Delta^5 \log(SOMA_t)$	2.083*** (0.559)	2.096*** (0.329)	2.280** (0.951)	1.869*** (0.556)	2.040*** (0.362)	1.658 (1.020)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-5}$	-0.066 (0.067)	-0.023 (0.048)	-0.135 (0.123)	-0.106* (0.064)	-0.052 (0.061)	-0.160 (0.117)
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-5}$	0.037*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.022 (0.020)	0.033*** (0.012)	0.049*** (0.012)	0.009 (0.018)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-5}$	0.123* (0.072)	0.058 (0.058)	0.187 (0.116)	0.141* (0.077)	0.065 (0.068)	0.254** (0.119)
$1_{MidMarch2020}$	0.066 (0.072)	-0.024 (0.045)	0.123 (0.118)	0.055 (0.052)	-0.028 (0.046)	0.134 (0.086)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adj RSq	0.244	0.269	0.220	0.242	0.251	0.244
N obs	714	714	714	714	714	714

**Table 10: Drivers of Bilateral Repo Tri-party Repo Collateral Multiplier— Weekly Regressions w/ Overlapping Data**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (1) at a weekly frequency with overlapping data.  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerRepoCM_{jst}$  in  $\Delta^5 \log(DealerRepoCM_t)$ : the 5-day log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average repo collateral multiplier of repos settled in venue  $s$  where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$  and  $s \in \{Bilateral, Tri-party\}$ .  $\Delta^5 \log(Gov_t)$  are  $\Delta^5 \log(TbillsOut_t)$  the 5-day log change in Treasury bills outstanding,  $\Delta^5 \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  the 5-day log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding, and  $\Delta \log(SOMA_t)$  is 5-day the log change in the Federal Reserve's U.S. Treasury holdings.  $Spreads_{t-5}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-5}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-5}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-5}$  the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bills.  $X_{t-5}$  are financial data controls used in table 2 (not shown) and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020. Two lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jpt})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. The 5 days around quarter-end and “repo spike” dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta^5 \log(DealerRepoCM_{jst})$					
	Bilateral			Tri-party		
	All	US	non-US	All	US	non-US
$\Delta^5 \log(TbillsOut_t)$	-0.684* (0.377)	-0.205 (0.362)	-1.335* (0.696)	-0.278 (0.531)	-0.825* (0.465)	0.440 (0.836)
$\Delta^5 \log(USTNotesOut_t)$	-4.194 (3.657)	-6.672** (3.073)	1.668 (7.427)	4.997 (4.232)	-2.309 (3.435)	12.596* (6.864)
$\Delta^5 \log(SOMA_t)$	3.767*** (0.624)	3.093*** (0.437)	5.426*** (1.305)	-0.381 (0.682)	-0.094 (0.560)	-1.068 (1.028)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-5}$	-0.064 (0.083)	0.029 (0.052)	-0.198 (0.194)	-0.158* (0.093)	-0.237** (0.104)	-0.057 (0.140)
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-5}$	0.037** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.014)	0.010 (0.027)	0.016 (0.017)	0.034** (0.013)	0.002 (0.026)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-5}$	0.178** (0.088)	0.086 (0.075)	0.312* (0.173)	0.100 (0.085)	0.019 (0.072)	0.172 (0.125)
$1_{MidMarch2020}$	-0.161** (0.076)	-0.132*** (0.047)	-0.256 (0.165)	0.301*** (0.070)	0.167** (0.069)	0.447*** (0.114)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adj RSq	0.244	0.296	0.171	0.209	0.163	0.242
N obs	714	714	714	714	714	714

**Table 11: Drivers of Aggregate and Repo Collateral Multipliers with Fiscal Government Controls**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (1).  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerCM_{jpt}$  in  $\Delta \log(DealerCM)$ : the log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average collateral multiplier of contracts  $p$  where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$  and  $p \in \{All\ Contracts, Repo\}$ .  $\Delta \log(Gov_t)$  are  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$  the log change in Treasury bills outstanding and  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding.  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bill rate.  $X_{t-1}$  are financial data controls used in table 2 (not shown) and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020. Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jpt})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and “repo spike” dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jpt})$					
	All Contracts			Repo		
	All	US	non-US	All	US	non-US
$\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$	-1.054*** (0.256)	-0.784*** (0.169)	-1.390*** (0.462)	-0.918*** (0.239)	-0.669*** (0.197)	-1.253*** (0.431)
$\Delta \log(USTNotesOut_t)$	-11.502*** (1.875)	-10.297*** (1.710)	-13.310*** (3.256)	-11.209*** (1.827)	-12.253*** (1.812)	-10.003*** (3.707)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	0.022 (0.030)	-0.030 (0.028)	0.104** (0.041)	0.028 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.031)	0.143*** (0.044)
$(SOFR - RpSpecial)_{t-1}$	0.014*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.011 (0.009)	0.012** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.009)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$	-0.027 (0.026)	0.000 (0.020)	-0.070 (0.045)	-0.024 (0.027)	0.003 (0.024)	-0.073 (0.046)
$1_{MidMarch2020}$	0.061*** (0.018)	0.040*** (0.013)	0.082*** (0.026)	0.044*** (0.016)	0.038*** (0.012)	0.051** (0.025)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adj RSq	0.179	0.145	0.175	0.178	0.139	0.177
N obs	946	946	946	946	946	946

**Table 12: Drivers of Bilateral Repo Tri-party Repo Collateral Multiplier with Fiscal Government Controls**

This table shows the empirical results from equation (1).  $DealerCM_t$  is  $DealerRepoCM_{jst}$  in  $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_t)$ : the log change of the  $j$  dealer-level average repo collateral multiplier of repos settled in venue  $s$  where  $j \in \{All, US, non-US\}$  and  $s \in \{Bilateral, Tri-party\}$ .  $\Delta \log(Gov_t)$  are  $\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$  the log change in Treasury bills outstanding and  $\Delta \log(USTnotesOut_t)$  the log change in U.S. Treasury notes outstanding.  $Spreads_{t-1}$  are  $(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$  the spread of the GCF Treasury repo rate minus the TPR rate,  $(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$  the spread of the SOFR rate minus the repo specials rate for on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities, and  $(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$  the spread of the one-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate over the four-week Treasury bill rate.  $X_{t-1}$  are financial data controls used in table 2 (not shown) and  $1_{MidMarch2020}$  an indicator for March 15th 2020. Four lags of  $\Delta \log(DealerCM_{jst})$  are included as controls (not shown), with p-value reported of lags equal to zero. The sample runs daily from the 15th of January 2016 to the 17th of April 2020. Quarter-end and “repo spike” dates are excluded. Dependent variable is winsorized at the 1% and 99%. Newey-West standard errors with 21 lags are reported. \*, \*\*, \*\*\*, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	LHS: $\Delta \log(DealerRepoCM_{jst})$					
	Bilateral			Tri-party		
	All	US	non-US	All	US	non-US
$\Delta \log(TbillsOut_t)$	-1.078*** (0.235)	-0.659*** (0.195)	-1.800*** (0.451)	-0.672 (0.427)	-0.712** (0.342)	-0.624 (0.683)
$\Delta \log(USTNotesOut_t)$	-19.246*** (2.282)	-14.946*** (2.135)	-25.764*** (4.394)	0.071 (2.605)	-6.642** (2.613)	6.534 (4.505)
$(GCF - TPR)_{t-1}$	0.024 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.028)	0.121 (0.081)	0.037 (0.057)	-0.042 (0.039)	0.114* (0.069)
$(SOFR - RPSpecial)_{t-1}$	0.010** (0.005)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.011)	0.010 (0.007)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.011)
$(OIS - Tbill)_{t-1}$	-0.004 (0.030)	0.025 (0.023)	-0.058 (0.062)	-0.049 (0.039)	-0.042 (0.036)	-0.051 (0.053)
$1_{MidMarch2020}$	0.053*** (0.015)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.081*** (0.027)	0.020 (0.021)	0.033** (0.016)	0.010 (0.030)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adj RSq	0.188	0.142	0.192	0.126	0.148	0.124
N obs	946	946	946	946	946	946