

Ransomware Using Smart Contracts

Team : Green's Club

Submitted By


Mohit Vaid


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Introduction

- Common Ransomware Scheme





Smart Contract



Scheme

Preliminary




Generate



Victim




Victim



Scheme


Step 0 : Init



Attacker deploys smart contract C to a public blockchain (Ethereum), and initializes it by calling init() function with a ransom amount

Scheme


Step 1 : Infection



id_v : Id of the victim
 id_f : Id of the encrypted files
 C_f = Commitment

Scheme

Step 2 & Step 3



Scheme



Step 2 & Step 3



3. Response

2. Challenge ()



Response

Attacker calls $getID()$

- Smart Contract will send the Identifier (Id) and the id of file
- Attacker calls $revealKey(id_v, id_f)$
- $dk_f = Hash(MasterSK, id_v || id_f)$
Returns (id_v, dk_f)

Challenge

Victims Asks for proof
by calling

$getFreeDecryption(id_v, \{id_f\}, c)$

Scheme

Step 5 – Pay Ransom

4.payRansom (ransom, id_v, c)



Smart Contract



Verifies

- If $\text{ransom} \geq \text{Ransom set by attacker}$

VictimID.Ransom == True

Scheme

Smart Contract

Step 5 – Pay Ransom



5. Disclosure

4.payRansom (ransom, id_v , c)



Attacker calls revealDecryptionKey()

Return (idv, MasterKey)

Scheme

Verification



5. Disclosure

Verifies



Smart Contract

SMART CONTRACT

$h_1 \rightarrow \text{Hash}(\text{MasterKey})$

If $h_1 == c$

Returns MasterSK, to Victim

Else

Return the Ransom to the Victim

Conclusion

- Demonstrated how smart contract works enduring Guarentes to victim in Ransomware
- There are very few Countermeasures for this beyond causing an intentional Hard Fork in the block chain to eliminate smart contract
 - Very Difficult to perform, also puts whole system at risk
- More Challenging work
 - Zero Knowledge Proof : For proving legitimacy of the attacker
 - State Channels: This could help reduce number of exchanges messages on main blockchain

- attacker uses a symmetric encryption algorithm enc
- with a key k to encrypt x , such that $\text{enc}_k(x) = c$. He also uses a
- hash function h to compute $h(k) = y$. She then sends these values
- c and y to Victim, together with a zero-knowledge proof that c is the
- ciphertext of x under the key k and that $h(k) = y$.