



Going Passwordless

A Practical Guide to Passkeys in ASP.NET Core

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The problem with passwords



Passwords...

For users

- **Have to remember password**
 - Not complex enough
 - Re-use
 - Post-its 😅
- **Phishing**

For developers

- **Need to store passwords**
 - Plain text 😱
 - Salted and hashed
- **JavaScript injection and other attack vectors**



How to solve?

- **Guidance to non-techies**
 - “Remember a few different ones”
- **Guidance to (somewhat) techies**
 - “Use a password manager that creates random passwords”



<https://haveibeenpwned.com/> - July, 2025



Multi-factor authentication!

- Adds another step to the authentication process
- Need to store backup keys
- Text messages are insecure
- Deliverability <https://blog.stillgreenmoss.net/sms-2fa-is-not-just-insecure-its-also-hostile-to-mountain-people>
- Need another app



What if we could get rid of passwords?

- No need to remember passwords
- No need to store password
- No risk of passwords getting compromised




Let's fix this – passwordless!



Public-key cryptography/signing

- **Client generates private/public key**
 - Client stores private key
 - Server stores public key
- **Login becomes signing and validating**





Public-key cryptography/signing

- **3 actions:**
 - **Generate** key pair and store on client + server
 - **Sign** a message with private key
 - **Verify** message with public key
- **Solves breaches**
 - Public key useless by itself
- **Still leaves some other issues...**



Phishing

Client

I am Maarten!
Fake.com
UT12RSZ


Fake.com

I am Maarten!
Fake.com
UT12RSZ

Example.com



I am Maarten!
Fake.com
UT12RSZ





Replay

Client


I am Maarten!
Example.com
LKJ98SD

Example.com

I am Maarten!
Example.com
LKJ98SD


Other client

I am Maarten!
Example.com
LKJ98SD





Replay





Public-key cryptography/signing

- **Generate, sign, verify**
- **Solves breaches**
 - Public key useless by itself
- **Solves phishing**
 - Include origin in message
- **Solves replay**
 - Include server challenge in message



FIDO, U2F, hardware keys



FIDO alliance

- “The FIDO Alliance is an open industry association with a focused mission: reduce the world’s reliance on passwords.”
- Consortium of big companies, government organizations, security researchers





Universal Second Factor (U2F)

- **Public-key cryptography/signing**
- **Security keys**
 - Usually physical hardware keys (e.g. Yubikey)
- **New concepts!**
 - **Attestation** to prove type of security key
 - **User presence** to prove the user is there
 - **Signature counter** to detect cloned keys
 - **Statelessness** to derive keys (work around limited storage in hardware)



Image from YUBICO



Statelessness

- **Limited storage in hardware key**
- **Symmetric root certificate in hardware key**
 - Credential ID + public key for origin stored on server
 - Credential ID contains encrypted seed to re-generate private key
- **Some issues...**
 - Credential ID needs to be retrieved from server (discoverability)
 - Ideally needs username/password to do so (verification)
 - Reset root certificate == all credentials lost



Passkeys (and WebAuthn)



Passkeys

- **Public-key cryptography/signing**
- **U2F properties**
 - Attestation, user presence, signature counter
- **Stateful**
 - Helps discoverability, reset single credential, synchronization
- **Options**
 - Require user verification (e.g. PIN/biometrics), platform vs. cross-platform, UI hints, ...
- **Authenticators**



Authenticators


- **Hardware keys**
- **Software keys**
 - Operating system (+ Trusted Platform Module (TPM))
 - Password manager
 - 👁️ Synchronization between multiple devices
 - 👁️ Cross-device login (access web app on desktop, sign in on mobile)



Demo

Logging in with a passkey







WebAuthn (client side)

- Protocol exposing U2F (CTAP1) and FIDO2 (CTAP2)
- Browser API
 - `navigator.credentials.create()`
 - `navigator.credentials.get()`
 - (2 more)
 - <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Navigator/credentials>
- OS-specific APIs to use WebAuthn with native apps (not covered in this talk)



WebAuthN (server-side endpoints)

- **Register a key**
 - `PasskeyCreationOptions` generates a value to sign + crypto + options
 - An endpoint to store the credential
- **Use a key**
 - `PasskeyRequestOptions` generates a value to sign + crypto + options
 - An endpoint to validate the credential



ASP.NET Core and passkeys



Libraries

- **Community**
 - [FIDO2.NET](#)
 - [WebAuthn.Net](#)
- **Commercial**
 - [RockSolidKnowledge FIDO2 for ASP.NET Core](#)
- **Microsoft**
 - [.NET 10](#)



Demo


.NET 10 passkey support





.NET 10 passkey support

- Part of ASP.NET Identity (`Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity`)
- Included in Blazor Web App with Individual Authentication template
 - Not (yet?) in Razor Pages / MVC / scaffolding, but it works there
- Entity Framework Core-based store
 - `IdentitySchemaVersions.Version3`
 - Adds `AspNetUserPasskeys` table





Demo

Storage and session data





Storage and session data

- Passkey creation / request options stored in `ClaimsPrincipal`
 - Abstracted through `SignInManager<TUser>`
 - `IdentityConstants.TwoFactorUserIdScheme` auth scheme
 - No server-side state is needed
- Only `AspNetUserPasskeys` table is needed for persisting passkeys data



Considerations



Passwordless!

- .NET 10 template UX drives towards passkey in addition to password
- `PasskeyInfo.IsBackedUp` will be `true` for many password managers
 - You can also require backed-up credentials
- Consider hinting the user to remove password
 - `_userManager.RemovePasswordAsync(User)`



Implement Passkeys Well-Known URLs

- Is passkey support available?
- <https://www.w3.org/TR/passkey-endpoints/>

```
GET /.well-known/passkey-endpoints
```

```
{  
  "enroll": "https://example.com/account/manage/passkeys/create",  
  "manage": "https://example.com/account/manage/passkeys"  
}
```



Recovery

- What when someone loses their passkey?
- Up to you!
 - Username, e-mail, 2FA, backup code, support call with ID proof, ...



Relying Party ID / Origin



Passkeys contain origin, forever

No way to change URL – it would invalidate all passkeys



Relying Party ID / Origin

- Passkey creation/signing options include a Relying Party Id
- Browser verifies Relying Party Id against current origin
- Browser signs credential with current origin
- Server verifies signature against list of supported origins



Relying Party ID / Origin

- Passkey creation/signing options include a Relying Party Id
 - Defaults to current origin domain
 - Override in `IdentityPasskeyOptions` options:
`options.ServerDomain = "example.com";`



Relying Party ID / Origin

- Passkey creation/signing options include a Relying Party Id
- Browser verifies Relying Party Id against current origin
 - More specific origin with less specific RP ID is supported

Origin	RP ID	WebAuthn
https://example.com	example.com	✓
https://www.example.com	www.example.com	✓
https://www.example.com	example.com	✓
https://example.com	www.example.com	✗



Relying Party ID / Origin

- Passkey creation/signing options include a Relying Party Id
- Browser verifies Relying Party Id against current origin
- Browser signs credential with current origin
- Server verifies signature against list of supported origins
 - Defaults to current origin domain
 - Override in options:

```
options.ValidateOrigin = c => ValueTask.FromResult(  
    !c.CrossOrigin || c.Origin == "https://example.com" || c.Origin == "...");
```



Passkeys on subdomains

- Set Relying Party ID to be more general?

```
options.ServerDomain = "example.com";
```



user-content.example.com



Passkeys on subdomains

- Set Relying Party ID to be more general, configure allowed origins?

```
options.ServerDomain = "example.com";  
options.ValidateOrigin = context => ValueTask.FromResult(  
    !context.CrossOrigin ||  
    context.Origin == "https://example.com" ||  
    context.Origin == "https://www.example.com" ||  
    context.Origin == "https://login.example.com"
```



user-content.example.com



Beware of user content...

- **Do not just default to using the most general Relying Party ID**
 - Could allow unintended logins
 - Could allow creating/using credentials and exfiltration
- **Don't serve user content from the same domain**
- **Use a common authentication endpoint**
 - e.g. [Duende IdentityServer](#) at `login.example.com`



Passkeys on multiple domains

- Support same passkey on `example.com`, `example.org`, `example.net`
- Use the [Related Origin Requests \(ROR\)](#) extension to FIDO2

```
GET /.well-known/webauthn
```

```
{  
  "origins": [  
    "https://example.com",  
    "https://example.co.uk",  
    "https://example.be",  
    "https://other-example.com"  
  ]  
}
```



Passkeys on multiple domains

- Not flexible, all origins must stay around forever
- Recommendation: use a common authentication endpoint
 - e.g. [Duende IdentityServer](#) at `login.example.com`



User
www.example.com



User
www.example.co.uk

Do passkeys here



IdentityServer
login.example.com



User
www.example.be



User
www.example.org



Summary



Summary

- The problem with passwords
- Going passwordless with public-key cryptography/signing
- U2F, FIDO2, WebAuthn
- .NET 10
- Relying Party ID and Origin



Recommended reading

A Tour of WebAuthn by Adam Langley

<https://duende.link/tourofwebauthnbook>





Thank you!

duendesoftware.com

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