

CSR Nuclear Risk Reduction Fellows

Session 2: 9:00 –11:00 EDT Wednesday May 22, 2024

Session 2 Agenda

- **9:00-10:00 am:** Guest speakers [Karin](#) and [George](#) Look will join to share ideas from some of their historical work shaping landmark arms control and risk reduction steps, from negotiating treaties and the [National and Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers](#) to developing concepts and policy ideas that helped to navigate incredible challenges.
- **10-10:45 am:** Guest speaker [Susan Koch](#) will discuss [The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992](#) (highly recommended reading). She has strong experience and is a great strategic thinker, so she can answer broader questions as well. She will speak for about 20 minutes about her fantastic history of the PNIs, followed by open discussion/Q&A.
- As time permits, we can answer any questions, discuss future session topics/ideas, etc.

Objectives for Sessions 2+

- In the next few sessions, we will bring in guest speakers with unique experiences and knowledge to share. These will be relatively informal, and we hope you come with questions to discuss with them.
- We will also explore some of the most daunting decisions facing the United States and other nations. What are some options for addressing risks from China, and what could future joint measures to mitigate nuclear risks look like? What range of options are there for US/NATO responses as Russia's actions and provocations continue?
- Using CSR's general framework we presented in the first meeting as a tool for generating ideas, through the next few sessions we aim for you to gain a unique understanding of how different tools have been applied, and focus on how different approaches and methods can be applied to address current and future challenges. By focusing on major policy concerns (in particular regarding China and Russia), we will explore the interplay across restraint, relevance, reassurance, readiness, reciprocity, and reductions—and see how and when different measures can advance these principles.

- We'll let you know in advance of the follow-on sessions when we aim to dive deeper into Russia, China, and other subjects reflected in the readings and questions below. Details will be shaped around our expert speakers' availability.

Guiding Questions:

We offer these guiding questions to contribute to your thinking about specific policies and steps. You do not need to develop answers for each of them.

China, Indo-Pacific & related

- Are there things the US could do to help China avoid taking steps which are in neither country's interest regarding nuclear weapons? What types of actions could risk setting back these goals (including steps intended to address other threats/domains)?
- Moving beyond repeating the Reagan-Gorbachev statement, are there any high-level declarations the US and China could make that would signal restraint and be viewed as credible (by each other, regional nations, others)?
- In this region (and others), are there ways to plan options for restraint in certain crisis responses, yet signal in ways that generate doubt or otherwise contribute to deterrence? How can these objectives be balanced?

Russia, NATO & related

- For any given US/NATO actions or moves that aim to meet near term objectives, what types of reactions could we expect? Do they leave open or complicate future decision space, including in creating paths back to the negotiating table someday?
- The US government recently moved to more formally accuse Russia of using chemical weapons in Ukraine. Does this have any implications for US/NATO nuclear posture, policy, etc.? Should it?
- Leaders in Sweden and Poland commented recently about the potential for hosting nuclear weapons in their nations. What could this signal about their understanding of threats, and the related roles and relevance of nuclear weapons?
- In the United States and some allied nations, there is growing public sentiment toward more-nationalistic policies (including to de-prioritize NATO). How should this be considered in weighing policy options?

General

- How does readiness affect the relevance of nuclear weapons, and what are the possible reactions to changes in readiness?
- Do different roles for nuclear weapons (e.g., deter attack, assurance of allies & partners, achieve specific objectives if deterrence fails, hedge against an uncertain future, vis a vis other strategic weapons risks) affect the likelihood of their being used?
- US alliances are intended to be defensive ones. How might different nuclear actions or steps be interpreted (domestically within these nations & by those they seek to deter) as defensive or offensive?
- Think about what a few future arms control agreements could look like with Russia or China (for the sake of simplicity), whether those agreements could be treaties/legal, political, enduring or time-bound, etc. What nuclear capabilities are most important for both sides to control, forestall, or eliminate? How do they reduce the prospects that nuclear weapons will be used?

Suggested Readings:

The following are some of the CSR team's top suggestions for readings and resources. We recommend a combination of reading and skimming, depending on your time availability. Though they all provide good information and ideas, our aim is for them to inspire *your* thinking about the wide-ranging tools available for policymakers to address threats and reduce the risks of nuclear weapons being used (not necessarily because we agree or endorse the ideas presented in full).

China

- [Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control](#) *The Washington Quarterly* (CSR can provide access if needed), Rose Gottemoeller, 2020. *NOTE: For our discussion purposes, we suggest focusing on the nuclear-only INF concept.*
- [Getting Past No: Developing a Nuclear Arms Control Relationship with China](#) David Santoro, 2023. *NOTE: For our discussion purposes, we suggest focusing on the section "On First Steps Towards Developing a Nuclear Arms Control Relationship with China."*
- [The Real Motives for China's Nuclear Expansion](#) Tong Zhao, May 3, 2024

- [Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Escalation](#) Cunningham, Fiona S., Fravel, M. Taylor (2019), *International Security*.
- [Blinken in Beijing: An Opportunity to Reduce Nuclear Risk](#) Christine Parthemore and Andrew Facini, January 30, 2023

Indo-Pacific Alliances

- [Joint Press Statement for the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue](#), US DOD, April 11, 2024.
- [United States - Japan Joint Leaders' Statement](#), April 10, 2024.
- [The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States](#), White House press release, August 2023. *NOTE the cooperation areas related/adjacent to nuclear considerations and deterrence, such as AI and bio.*

Russia

- ["Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria for nuclear strike,"](#) Max Seddon and Chris Cook, *Financial Times*, February 28, 2024,
- Escalation [Management in Ukraine: "Learning by Doing" in Response to the "Threat that Leaves Something to Chance"](#) Janice Stein, June 2023. *NOTE: slightly dated regarding the ongoing conflict; for focus on the "Learning by Doing" section onward, not to get bogged down in theory.*

US/NATO

- ["The Changing Nuclear Mind Game,"](#) Rose Gottemoeller, *Foreign Policy*, May 15th, 2024.
- [2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué](#) Issued by the Heads of State and Government, July 11, 2023. Also see [NATO's nuclear deterrence policy and forces](#), July 2023 & [2022 NATO Strategic 2022 Concept](#) (*NOTE: Please pay attention to the risk reduction and arms control language*). Also note: NATO resources are generally consistent but are evolving. *It's important to look directly at what NATO says and understand the overarching vision; and use these kinds of resources to dig into details as it is useful.*
- [Russian Noncompliance with and Invalid Suspension of the New START Treaty](#), Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, March 15, 2023
- [The European security crisis and the future of deterrence](#) Wilton Park summary, Reja Younis and Alice Spilman

Specific Types of Measures

- [Nuclear Risk Reduction A Framework For Analysis](#), Wilfred Wan, 2019. *Note: See the list of measures in the appendix for quick reference. (nearly all elements of CSR's code of responsibility)*
- [The Benefits of Further Declarations of Restraint from the Use of Nuclear Weapons](#) John Gower, October 5, 2021 (*restraint*)
- [Zoom Won't Stop a Nuclear War](#) Sahil Shah and Leah Walker, April 19, 2021 (*reciprocity*)
- [Life beyond Arms Control: Moving toward a Global Regime of Nuclear Restraint & Responsibility](#) Nina Tannenwald, Spring 2020 *NOTE: Lists numerous ideas to scan, with a focus on feasible measures to reduce risks of use. (restraint, reduction)*
- [Nuclear Weapon Sole Purpose: The Strongest Future for U.S. National Security and Global Stability](#) Andy Weber and John Gower, January 12, 2021 (*restraint, relevance*)
- [A Sole Purpose Doctrine for NATO Nuclear Forces? Examining Unilateral Declarations](#), Summary of CSR research/dialogue with prior nuclear fellows, 2023. (*restraint, relevance*)
- There are numerous documents showing how risk reduction ideas are trending in the NPT forum. Here are a few working papers from [the P5](#) in 2022, [the Stockholm Initiative and others](#) in 2022, and [China](#) in 2023.

Quick Links

[CSR Nuclear Weapons Project data site](#)

[CSR Internal Doc - Conceptualizing Nuclear Measures](#)

[CSR Code of Nuclear Responsibility](#)

Note: Some articles can be accessed via JSTOR and ResearchGate (which both offer free accounts for independent researchers) or sage publications. If you encounter issues accessing the article, please contact John at jmoulton@csrisk.org. Further readings are always available at <https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/programs/nolancenter/>