Detecting Heterogeneous Treatment Effect with Instrumental Variables

Michael Johnson, Hyunseung Kang

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
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Inferring Heterogeneity from Exploratory Methods with IV
- 3. Conclusion

Introduction

- In 2008, investigators interested in understanding causal effect of Medicaid on various financial and health outcomes
- In an ideal world: RCT and randomly force/deny Medicaid on eligible participants
- A (popular) alternative: An encouragement (IV) design that by random chance nudges people to enroll in Medicaid.




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
If the core IV assumptions are satisfied, then the complier average treatment effect (CATE) can be estimated as the effect of Medicaid (Angrist et al. 1996)



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Intent-to-treat measures effect of lottery on the outcome

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- Groups may be known prior to analysis, but what if they're not?
- Goal: Estimation & honest inference of discovered heterogeneous CATE

Inferring Heterogeneity from

Exploratory Methods with IV

Proposed Two-Staged Solution

Data pre-processing: Pair match lottery winners and losers on pre-lottery covariates

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Stage 1: Find potential effect modifiers of Medicaid through exploratory machine learning methods (CART)

- Compute |Y| to prevent effects of double-dipping data
- Use CART with |Y| as outcome and X as predictors to find potential effect modifiers

Proposed Two-Staged Solution

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
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Stage 2: Simultaneous testing of effect modifiers of Medicaid

• Use closed testing on CART tree

Data Pre-Processing: Matching



- Potential treatment: d_{zij} ; Potential outcome: r_{zij} , for $z \in \{0,1\}$
- Similar to the usual Fisher's sharp null, assume $r_{1ij}-r_{0ij}=\lambda(d_{1ij}-d_{0ij})$ for all i,j
 - $r_{1ij} \lambda d_{1ij} = r_{0ij} \lambda d_{0ij}$ for all i, j

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| Matched Pair i | Individual 1 | Individual 2 |
|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Possibility 1 | Lottery Winner | Lottery Loser |
| Observe | $r_1 - \lambda d_1$ | $r_0 - \lambda d_0$ |
| Under null | $r_0 - \lambda d_0$ | $r_0 - \lambda d_0$ |
| Possibility 2 | Lottery Loser | Lottery Winner |
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
•
$$|Y_i| = |\pm (r_{0i1} - \lambda d_{0i1} - (r_{0i2} - \lambda d_{0i2}))|$$

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•
$$|Y_i| = |(r_{0i1} - \lambda d_{0i1} - (r_{0i2} - \lambda d_{0i2}))|$$


Stage 1: Why |Y|, not Y?



• tl;dr Without |Y|, the data is double-dipped and the type I error is inflated

Stage 1: Using |Y| and CART to Discover Potential Effect Modifiers


- Y: Whether or not an individual currently owes money for medical expenses
- H_{0_s} : $\lambda = \lambda_s = 0$




• How do you test to whether a *potential* effect modifier is a *true* effect modifier?


- How do you test to whether a potential effect modifier is a true effect modifier?
- How do you do this without inflating the familywise type I error rate?


- How do you test to whether a potential effect modifier is a true effect modifier?
- How do you do this without inflating the familywise type I error rate?
- <u>Solution</u>: Closed testing (Marcus et al. 1976) for nested or tree-structured hypotheses




- A family of hypotheses is closed under intersection
- ullet Each hypothesis is level lpha
 - Kang et al. (2016) test for matching and IV setting









Theorem

Above procedure strongly controls FWER.

Conclusion

Summary and Future Work

Summary

- Valid simultaneous discovery and inference of heterogeneous treatment effect using instrumental variables
- Use |Y| with CART to discover potential effect modifiers
- Use closed testing on CART to test for true potential effect modifiers and strongly control for family wise error rate
- Medicaid had a larger impact on complying young men and women who do not self-identify as Asian in reducing medical debt

Future Work

- Determine how CART splits based on treatment effect and compliance rate
- Investigate method with other machine learning exploratory methods
 - LASSO, Random Forests

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Matching & IV

- Potential treatment: d_{zij} ; Potential outcome: $r_{zij}^{(d_{zij})}$ for $z \in \{0,1\}$
- The estimand of interest is the effect ratio

$$\lambda = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} r_{1ij}^{(d_{1ij})} - r_{0ij}^{(d_{0ij})}}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} d_{1ij} - d_{0ij}}$$

$$\stackrel{\text{IV}}{=} E[R_1 - R_0 \mid C = complier]$$

