

# Horizontal Privilege Escalation via IDOR & Identifier Leakage

## Project Information

- **Analyst:** Mduduzi William Radebe
- **Date:** 07 January 2026
- **Platform:** PortSwigger Web Security Academy
- **Vulnerability Type:** [CWE-639: Access Control Bypass Through User-Controlled Key \(IDOR\)](#)
- **Severity:** High (8.1/10)

## 1. Executive Summary

This report documents a successful **Horizontal Privilege Escalation** attack. The application utilizes Globally Unique Identifiers (GUIDs) to reference user accounts; however, these identifiers are leaked in public profile pages. Due to a lack of server-side object-level authorization, I was able to use a leaked GUID to access a peer user's private account page and exfiltrate their sensitive API key.

## 2. Technical Analysis & Discovery

### The "Security through Obscurity" Flaw

The application designers assumed that because a GUID (e.g., 8ecbd9ca...) is statistically impossible to guess or brute-force, the account pages were secure. This ignores the fact that identifiers are often **leaked** through normal application use.

### Information Disclosure (Reconnaissance)

During a crawl of the public-facing blog, I inspected the metadata associated with user comments.

- **Observation:** Clicking a user's name leads to a "Public Profile."
- **Leakage:** The URL for the public profile discloses the user's "Internal ID."
- **Harvested Identifier (Carlos):** 8ecbd9ca-56d3-4f54-8de8-0c0b1f58b3c8

## 3. Exploitation Methodology (Proof of Concept)

### Step 1: Baseline Establishing

I logged in with my standard credentials (wiener) and accessed my account page:

```
GET /my-account?id=f1ef206f-2d18-4a51-934a-f86e2ac855d6
```

The server correctly rendered my API key and profile details.

## Step 2: IDOR Attempt (Horizontal Escalation)

I performed "Parameter Tampering" by replacing my own ID with the identifier harvested from the user carlos.

**Target URL:**

[https://\[LAB-ID\].web-security-academy.net/my-account?id=8ecbd9ca-56d3-4f54-8de8-0c0b1f58b3c8](https://[LAB-ID].web-security-academy.net/my-account?id=8ecbd9ca-56d3-4f54-8de8-0c0b1f58b3c8)

## Step 3: Verification of Unauthorized Access

The server responded with a 200 OK and rendered the private dashboard for **Carlos**.

- **Data Exfiltrated:** API Key T34l0VxIEW6oNrxpAtr9CnTQmUWfFZ3j

## 4. Root Cause Analysis

Attack Component	Status	Security Risk
Identifier Complexity	High	GUIDs are used, preventing traditional "number-incrementing" attacks.
Identifier Confidentiality	Failed	Internal IDs are exposed in public URLs and metadata.
Authorization Check	Broken	The server checks if the user is <i>logged in</i> , but fails to check if the user <i>owns</i> the requested ID.

## 5. Security Impact & Business Risk

In a production environment, this vulnerability is a high-risk event:

- **GDPR/POPIA Violation:** Unauthorized access to Personal Identifiable Information (PII).
- **Account Takeover:** If the account page allows changing passwords or emails, IDOR leads directly to a full account takeover.
- **API Abuse:** Stolen API keys can be used to perform actions in the name of the victim, potentially leading to financial or reputational damage.

## 6. Remediation & Hardening Recommendations

## A. Implement Object-Level Authorization (Primary)

The application must perform an **ownership check** on the server side for every request. The logic should be:

```
IF (Logged_In_User_ID == Requested_Object_Owner_ID) THEN { Grant Access } ELSE { Deny Access }
```

## B. Use Indirect Reference Maps

Avoid exposing internal database IDs or GUIDs in the URL. Instead, use a temporary, per-session "Reference Map" that translates a random UI value to the actual database ID only for the duration of that user's session.

## C. Secure Identifier Handling

Identifiers used for private actions should not be the same as identifiers used for public profile views.

## 7. Conclusion

This lab demonstrates that **Obfuscation (using GUIDs) is not a substitute for Authorization**. Despite the complexity of the identifiers, the lack of a simple ownership check on the backend allowed for the total compromise of a peer user's private data.

### How to add this to your GitHub (IDOR\_Unpredictable\_Identifiers.md)

1. **In WSL:**  
cd ~/Labs/Network-Security-Analysis-Portfolio/Portswigger\_Labs
2. **Create the file:**  
nano IDOR\_Unpredictable\_Identifiers.md
3. **Paste** the content above.
4. **Save and Push:**  
git add .  
git commit -m "Added IDOR lab writeup with GUID exploitation"  
git push origin main