

GSOE9210 Engineering Decisions

Problem Set 04

1. At a school fête, a suspicious-looking man is offering bets on the toss of a coin of questionable fairness. The man is offering \$2 for each dollar bet (plus your original dollar) if the contestant chooses the face on the coin correctly.
 - (a) Suppose Alice has a \$10 note in her pocket; represent the gamble as a decision table. Include the option of leaving (L) (*i.e.*, refusing to gamble).
 - (b) If Alice were pessimistic (*i.e.*, she used *Maximin* as her decision rule), would Alice bet on heads or tails, or not bet?
 - (c) Suppose Alice has a similarly pessimistic friend Bob, and both could bet together on the same toss, would that affect Alice's decision?
 - (d) Suppose Alice was friendless but had—instead of one \$10 note—10 \$1 coins in her pocket. How might this affect her decision?
2.
 - (a) Find the value $\frac{3}{4}$ of the way from 4 to 2 on the number line.
 - (b) Find a general expression for the value μ of the way from a to b on the number line.

Consider the decision problem below:

	s_1	s_2
A	2	3
B	4	0
C	3	3
D	5	2
E	3	5

- (c) Plot the actions as points on the Cartesian plane. Find the coordinates of the point μ of the way from B to A.
 - (d) Find the point, $P(x, y)$, on the segment AB that intersects with the diagonal $y = x$.
 - (e) Find the *Maximin* mixed action for the decision problem above.
3. Consider a scenario with four states, two pure actions, and their mixtures (M), where $\mu_A = \mu$:

	s_1	s_2	s_3	s_4
A	4	2	1	3
B	0	1	5	2

- (a) Draw the mixture plot for this problem.
 - (b) Do all states need to be considered when determining the *Maximin* mixed action?
 - (c) Find the *Maximin* mixed action, and the *Maximin* value—i.e., the value of the *Maximin* mixed action—for this problem.
4. A drinks seller can purchase stock of several types of drink: a) hot chocolate; b) iced tea; c) lemonade; d) orange juice.

She knows, from past experience, that on warm days she'll make sales totalling \$10 on hot chocolate, \$40 on iced tea, \$30 on lemonade, and \$40 on orange juice. On cool days, however, her sales total \$30 on hot chocolate, \$0 on iced tea, \$20 on lemonade, and \$10 on orange juice.

- (a) Produce a decision table for this problem.
 - (b) What proportion of drinks should she stock to maximise her guaranteed sales total regardless of the temperature?
 - (c) Draw the admissibility frontier for this problem. Are any actions inadmissible?
5. Alice is considering whether to invest \$1000 over an investment period, and if so on which option to invest. She is looking at an investment market which will either rise (r) in value by 6% or flatten (f) to 0% over the investment period. She will learn the market movement mid-period, at which point she can choose to invest in a fixed rate option (F), which gives a constant return of 2%, or take a risky option (R) which follows the market's movement.

For the fixed option, Alice has the added option to invest initially for a long term (L) (i.e., for the full period), or a short term (S) (half period). If she invests short term she will respond to the market in either of two ways: (a) if the market has risen she'll change to the risky option, earning an average profit of 4%; (b) if the market has fallen she'll reinvest in F but will receive a lower rate, which would reduce her gains to 1% per annum. She must submit her investment instructions (\bar{I} , R, or F, and for the latter, L or S) to her stock broker before the market's movement is known.

- (a) Represent this situation as a decision tree (i.e., in extensive form) and as a decision table.
 - (b) How many information sets are there in this problem?
 - (c) Assuming diversified stock portfolios (i.e., mixtures of investments) are allowed, which mixed strategies are admissible?
 - (d) Which is the *Maximin* mixed strategy?
 - (e) Which is the *miniMax Regret* mixed strategy?
6. Consider the following decision table, in which mixed strategies are allowed.

	s_1	s_2
A	4	0
B	1	4
C	2	1

- (a) Which, if any, strategies are dominated?
- (b) Prove that a possible strategy S , with payoffs 2 and 3 in states s_1 and s_1 respectively, would not be dominated.