# **Beyond the Hype:**Al Malware and the Future of Cyber Defense

Candid Wüest

Security Advocate, xorlab



A lecture selected by a Program Council consisting of recognized leaders in the IT and Data Science field.

Warsaw, 04.04.2025 - 05.04.2025





#### **Create basic Malware? Sure!**




Please create a keylogger for Windows in PowerShell

```
powershell
    # Import the required assemblies
    Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms
    Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Drawing
  4
    # Create a form to capture keystrokes
    $form = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.Form
    $form.TopMost = $true
    $form.WindowState = 'Minimized'
    $form.ShowInTaskbar = $false
    $form.FormBorderStyle = 'None'
    $form.Opacity = 0
```



## Behavior stays the same



## In the wild - VBScript

```
Simple email dropper script
// Arrête un processus PowerShell en cours
function arreterProcessusAvecPowerShell()
                                              Fully commented in French
    // Exécution de PowerShell
                                              Still drops common malware
    shellWsh.Run (cheminPowerShell, 2);
                                              June 2024
    // Obtenir la collection des processus en cours
   var serviceWMI = obtenirServiceWMI();
   var requeteProcessus = "SELECT * FROM Win32 Process";
   var collectionProcessus = serviceWMI.ExecQuery(requeteProcessus);
   var enumerateur = new Enumerator(collectionProcessus);
    // Parcours des processus en cours
    for (; !enumerateur.atEnd(); enumerateur.moveNext() ) {
        var processus = enumerateur.item();
        // Si le processus en cours est PowerShell
        if (processus.Name.toLowerCase() === "powershell.exe' Source: HP Wolf Security
```

#### In the wild - PowerShell

```
Malware email (TA547)
# Assuming the Base64 string is direct
$base64EncodedExe = "[base64]" # Repla
                                           Loading Rhadamanthys malware
                                           Commented in English
# Directly convert from Base64 to byte
$decodedBytes = [System.Convert]::From
                                           April 2024
# Use the correct overload of Assembly.Load that accepts a byte array
$assembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($decodedBytes)
# Invoke the assembly's entry point. This assumes no arguments are needed for
if ($assembly.EntryPoint -ne $null -and $assembly.EntryPoint.GetParameters()
    $assembly.EntryPoint.Invoke($null, $null)
} elseif ($assembly.EntryPoint -ne $null) {
    $assembly.EntryPoint.Invoke($null, [object[]] @([string[]] @()))
} else {
    Write-Host "Assembly entry point not found or cannot be invoked directly
                                                           Source: Proofpoint / Symantec
```

#### In the wild - DDoS

```
FunkSec ransomware group
 # Randomized headers to simulate diverse traffic
⊟user agents = [
                                                       Commented in English
     "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) App
                                                        Al assisted development
     Safari/537.36",
     "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10 15
                                                        Jan 2025
     Safari/605.1.15",
     "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; \times64; \times64; \times75.0, George 20100101 111010\times75.0,
     "Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 14 0 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko
     Mobile/15A372 Safari/604.1"
 # Paths for randomness
 paths = ["/", "/login", "/contact", "/about", "/search?q=random" + str(random.randint(1, 1000))]
 # Large payload for HTTP flood
 large payload = "A" * 10000 # Large body content to increase the packet size
 # UDP Reflection amplification packet
 amplified packet data = b' \times 00' * 1024 # 1KB UDP packet for flood
                                                                                    Source: CheckPoint
 # UDP Reflection to boost the attack power (use for IP spoofing and amplification
```


#### **APTs & LLM**



#### VirusTotal

"...to create malware itself, I don't think we're there yet"

- Checked 650K samples
- May 2024



#### **OpenAl/Microsoft**

"...not yet observed particularly novel or unique Al-enabled attack or abuse techniques..."

- Some malware debug
- Oct 2024



#### Google/Gemini

"...did not lead to novel attack capabilities or bypassing of security controls."

- 57 distinct APTs
- Feb 2025

"...have yet to find evidence of threat actors using artificial intelligence to generate new malware in the wild..." - IBM X-Force - Sept'24



## Lowering the entry barrier?

#### Malware builder toolkit Malware-as-a-service

- 1. Find a Hack forum or service
- 2. Pay & get scammed ¯\\_(`ソ)\_/¯
- 3. Pay again
- 4. Get malware




## Generative Al Hosted service

- 1. Find an open LLM or pay for jailbreak
- 2. Basic knowledge about malware
- 3. Basic knowledge about development
- 4. Create malware \*
- \* Cheaper to repeat once learned

It already was, and still is, easy to generate malware

## Poly- / Metamorphic

Each replication instance is different than the previous e.g. encrypted or fully rewritten, with same functionality e.g. BlackMamba, LLMorph III, ChattyCaty






A computer virus that uses a large language model (LLM) to regenerate its code at each infection would be considered *metamorphic*, not just *polymorphic*.

## **Poly- / Metamorphic**


Similar result as when using malware toolkits, modular malware or MaaS

#### Conclusion:

- a) Noisy outbound traffic (or download)
- b) Stub/Loader can be detected.
- c) Behavior & reputation detections
- d) Known since the 90's (e.g. V2Px)



## New malware samples have remained steady



It's an evolution not a revolution




## Autonomous Al malware

Agentic AI malware autonomously adapts in order to achieve a set goal

#### **Example PoC: EyeSpy, Yutani Loop**

- Dynamic code generation and obfuscation
- b) Reasoning to achieve a goal (with agents/MVP)
- Context aware execution and adaption/evasion
- Exfiltration through LLM web requests




## Remember APT Regin?

50+ modules - loaded when needed

#### **Conclusion:**

- Partially already done with IF-THEN
- Al requires an expert-in-the-box approach
- Al Agent process can be unreliable
- Behavior is still detectable




## Agents, agents, agents



+ long term memory

## Own agents in CoPilot – Infostealer anyone?




## Indirect Prompt Injection


"Ignore all previous instructions"

- Needs vulnerable Al app
  - E.g. Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)
- e.g. Morris II Worm

 $\rightarrow$ You can not solve filter issue with more AI







https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2024/m365-copilot-prompt-injection-tool-invocation-and-data-exfil-using-ascii-smuggling/



## Additional Al Threats on the Horizon

## Today **Today**

- Social media bots
- Personalized phishing
- Malware creation
- Auto pentesting
- Prompt injections

## Soon

- Hijack Al supply chain
- Auto Al-attack agents
- Extract Al models
- Large data poisoning
- Hijacking Al agents/MVP

#### **Future**



- Mass real-time fakes
- Personalized malware
- Auto evasion bots
- Misinformation farms
- Al vs. Al fights

## Al is changing the fight

#### Attacker + Al

Low entry barrier / minimal effort
High volume / fast
Automation / scaling
Easier to personalize

#### **Defender**

New attack surface
Current protection can still work
Getting flooded
Al vs. Al



### Conclusion

• Al can help to create malware - but not single-click

- Most threats are Al-supported not Al-powered
- Obfuscation with AI is easy but has low benefit
- Al agents can automate attacks but it has its limits
- Indirect prompt injection and data poisoning increasing
- Traditional protection stack still works if used correctly

## Thank you for watching!

Remember to leave your questions and rate the presentation in the section below.



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OFFICIAL LECTURE OF THE WARSAW IT DAYS

**ΛCΛDEMIC PΛRTNERS** 

## Feedback

Zeskanuj kod i zostaw swoją opinię





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https://warszawskiedniinformatyki.pl/user.html#!/lecture/WDI25-a6d2/rate