

# CS 258: Quantum Cryptography

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Previously...

# Short Integer Solution (SIS)

**Input:**  $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$  (short, wide)

Chosen uniformly at random

**Goal:** find vector  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$  such that:

$$\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x} \bmod q = 0$$

$$0 < |\mathbf{x}| \leq \beta$$

# Search LWE

**Input:**  $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$  (short, wide) Chosen uniformly at random

$$\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \text{ mod } q \text{ where}$$

$\mathbf{s}$  uniform in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$

$$\mathbf{e} \leftarrow D_\sigma^m$$

**Output:**  $\mathbf{s}$  (in this regime,  $\mathbf{s}$  is whp unique)

**Thm** (restated): If SIS cannot be solved in quantum polynomial time for  $\beta = mq/2\sigma$ , then neither can decision LWE with error  $\sigma$

Now used to justify hardness of LWE

Even earlier...

# Group Action

An (abelian) group action is a triple  $(\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{X}, *)$  where:

- $\mathbb{G}$  is an (abelian) group, written additively
- $\mathcal{X}$  is a set
- $* : \mathbb{G} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$  is an efficient binary operation satisfying

$$g * (h * x) = (g + h) * x$$

- There is some element  $x_0 \in \mathcal{X}$  that can be efficiently computed
- Usually ask that for each  $x, y \in \mathcal{X}$ , there exists a unique  $g \in \mathbb{G}$  such that  $y = g * x$
- Also usually ask that it is possible to efficiently identify elements of  $\mathcal{X}$

**Thm [Kuperberg]:** Dlog in (abelian) group actions can be solved in time  $2^{O(\sqrt{\log q})}$ , where  $q$  is the group order

# Broader Picture: Hidden Shifts

Kuperberg actually solves a much more general problem called hidden shift

Given  $f_0, f_1 : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$  injective, such that  
 $f_1(g) = f_0(a + g)$ , find  $a$       ( $\mathbb{G}$  written additively)

Group action Dlog is a special case of hidden shift where

$$f_0(g) = g * x_0 \quad f_1(g) = g * x_1 = (g + a) * x_0$$

Today: More Quantum Algorithms for Lattices

# LWE as Hidden Shift

Suppose for the moment that LWE had no error

**Input:**  $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$  (short, wide) Chosen uniformly at random

$$\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{s} \bmod q \quad \text{where}$$

$\mathbf{s}$  uniform in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$

**Output:**  $\mathbf{s}$  (in this regime,  $\mathbf{s}$  is whp unique)

Of course, this is easy due by Gaussian elimination

# LWE as Hidden Shift

$$f_0(\mathbf{r}) = \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{r} \bmod q$$

$$f_1(\mathbf{r}) = \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{u} \bmod q = \mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + \mathbf{s}) \bmod q = f_0(\mathbf{r} + \mathbf{s} \bmod q)$$

So solving hidden shift allows us to recover  $\mathbf{s}$

Ok, but what about the error  $\mathbf{e}$  ?

Solution: round


Output closest of  $-q/4, 0, q/4, q/2$

$$f_0(\mathbf{r}) = \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{r} \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4}$$

$$f_1(\mathbf{r}) = \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{u} \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4}$$

Idea: if error small enough, rounding eliminates error

$$\lfloor x + e \rfloor_{q/2} = \lfloor x \rfloor_{q/2} \text{ typically if } e \text{ small}$$



Now if  $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \bmod q$

$$\begin{aligned}f_1(\mathbf{r}) &= \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{u} \bmod q \rceil_{q/4} \\&= \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + \mathbf{s}) + \mathbf{e} \bmod q \rceil_{q/4} \\&=? \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + \mathbf{s}) \bmod q \rceil_{q/4} \\&= f_0(\mathbf{r})\end{aligned}$$


Need to show:

- Rounding actually gets rid of  $e$
- $f_0, f_1$  are injective

# Injectivity


Suffices to only look at  $f_0$ , as hidden shift property will imply injectivity for  $f_1$

$$\begin{aligned} f_0(\mathbf{r}) = f_0(\mathbf{r}') &\iff \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{r} \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4} = \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{r}' \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4} \\ &\implies \|\mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} - \mathbf{r}')\|_\infty \leq q/4 \end{aligned}$$



Max of absolute  
values of entries

# Injectivity



# Injectivity

$$f_0(\mathbf{r}) = f_0(\mathbf{r}') , \mathbf{r} \neq \mathbf{r}'$$

$$\rightarrow \exists \mathbf{v} : |\mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{v} \bmod q|_\infty \leq q/4$$

**Claim:** with overwhelming probability over  $\mathbf{A}$ , no such  $\mathbf{v}$


**Proof:** for any  $\mathbf{v}$ ,  $\Pr_{\mathbf{A}_i} [|\mathbf{A}_i \cdot \mathbf{v} \bmod q| \leq q/4] = 1/2$

$$\rightarrow \Pr_{\mathbf{A}} [|\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v} \bmod q|_\infty \leq q/4] = 2^{-m} = 2^{-\Omega(n \log q)}$$


Union-bound over all  $2^{n \log q}$  choices of  $\mathbf{v}$

$$\rightarrow \Pr [\exists \mathbf{v} : |\mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{v} \bmod q|_\infty \leq q/4] \leq 2^{-\Omega(n \log q)}$$

Rounding eliminates **e**



# The problem with rounding



# The problem with rounding

Each entry has a  $\approx O(\sigma/q)$  chance of being too close to a rounding boundary

Over  $m$  entries, probability of some error is  $\approx O(\sigma m/q)$

# Can we apply Kuperberg?

- Prepare  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2q^n}} \sum_{\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, b \in \{0,1\}} |\mathbf{r}, b\rangle_{\mathcal{A}} |0\rangle_{\mathcal{B}}$
- Apply  $U_f$  where  $f(\mathbf{r}, b) = f_b(\mathbf{r}) :$   
$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2q^n}} \sum_{\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, b \in \{0,1\}} |\mathbf{r}, b\rangle_{\mathcal{A}} |f_b(\mathbf{r})\rangle_{\mathcal{B}}$$
$$= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2q^n}} \sum_{\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, b \in \{0,1\}} |\mathbf{r}, b\rangle_{\mathcal{A}} |\lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + b\mathbf{s}) + b\mathbf{e} \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4}\rangle_{\mathcal{B}}$$

# Can we apply Kuperberg?

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2q^n}} \sum_{\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, b \in \{0,1\}} |\mathbf{r}, b\rangle_{\mathcal{A}} \left| [\mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + b\mathbf{s}) + b\mathbf{e} \bmod q]_{q/4} \right\rangle_{\mathcal{B}}$$

- Measure  $\mathcal{B} \rightarrow$  Measurement outcome  $z$   
State collapses to  $\mathbf{r}, b$  consistent with  $z$

If  $\mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + b\mathbf{s}) \bmod q$  is far from rounding boundary,

$$[\mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + b\mathbf{s}) + b\mathbf{e} \bmod q]_{q/4} = [\mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + b\mathbf{s}) \bmod q]_{q/4}$$

→ State collapses to  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|\mathbf{r}, 0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|\mathbf{r} - \mathbf{s} \bmod q, 1\rangle$  ✓

# Possible issues with applying Kuperberg

1. The shift lives in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$  instead of  $\mathbb{Z}_{2^n}$

Turns out to not be a problem

2. The errors

Big problem!!!

If  $\mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + b\mathbf{s}) \bmod q$  is **close** to rounding boundary,

$$\lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + b\mathbf{s}) + b\mathbf{e} \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4} \neq \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + b\mathbf{s}) \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4}$$

→ State collapses to  $|\mathbf{r}, b\rangle$

Recall next step of Kuperberg: apply  $\text{QFT}_q$  to first register, measure

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n}} \sum_{\mathbf{t}} |\mathbf{t}, b\rangle e^{i2\pi \mathbf{r} \cdot \mathbf{t}/q} \rightarrow |\mathbf{t}, b\rangle$$

# Combining Samples

$$\mathbf{t}_0, |\psi_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}e^{-i2\pi\mathbf{s}\cdot\mathbf{t}_0/q}|1\rangle$$

Good sample

Bad sample

$$\mathbf{t}_1, |\psi_1\rangle = |b\rangle$$

$$\text{CNOT}|\psi_0\rangle|\psi_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0,b\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}e^{-i2\pi\mathbf{s}\cdot\mathbf{t}_0/q}|1,1-b\rangle$$

Measure second qubit:  $|0\rangle$  or  $|1\rangle$

Combining with bad samples gives bad samples

Kuperberg requires  $2^{O(\sqrt{\log(q^n)})} = 2^{O(\sqrt{n \log q})}$  samples

If any of those samples are bad, Kuperberg fails

→ Need  $\sigma m/q = 2^{-\Omega(\sqrt{n \log q})}$  to have decent chance of all samples being good

It turns out that, in this regime, classical attacks already exist

Significant open question: can Kuperberg's algorithm be made robust to errors?

A positive solution would give a sub-exponential-time attack on LWE, which would give lattice crypto a significant efficiency penalty

Even beyond LWE, making robust to errors could be important for realizing Kuperberg on a realistic quantum computer

# Other possible algorithms

Quasi-polynomial attack on hidden shifts over  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , when  $q = 2^r$

Note that for LWE, hardness is robust to modulus, and can take it to be power of 2

Idea: combine several samples at a time

$$\mathbf{t}_j, |\psi_{\mathbf{t}_j}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}e^{-i2\pi\mathbf{s}\cdot\mathbf{t}_j/q}|1\rangle$$

Write  $|\psi_{\mathbf{t}_1}\rangle|\psi_{\mathbf{t}_2}\rangle\cdots$  as

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^\ell}} \sum_{\mathbf{b} \in \{0,1\}^\ell} |\mathbf{b}\rangle e^{-i2\pi\mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T}\mathbf{b}/q}$$

Where  $\mathbf{T} = (\mathbf{t}_1 \ \mathbf{t}_2 \ \cdots \ \mathbf{t}_\ell)$

Idea: combine several samples at a time

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^\ell}} \sum_{\mathbf{b} \in \{0,1\}^\ell} |\mathbf{b}\rangle e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T} \mathbf{b}/q}$$

Let's assume mod 2 that  $\mathbf{T}$  has a 1-dimensional kernel

Will be true if we choose  $\ell \approx n + 1$

Idea: combine several samples at a time

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^\ell}} \sum_{\mathbf{b} \in \{0,1\}^\ell} |\mathbf{b}\rangle e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T}\mathbf{b}/q}$$

Now apply map  $|\mathbf{b}\rangle \mapsto |\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{T}\mathbf{b} \bmod 2\rangle$ , and measure second register  $\rightarrow \mathbf{z}$

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |\mathbf{b}_0\rangle e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T}\mathbf{b}_0/q} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |\mathbf{b}_1\rangle e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T}\mathbf{b}_1/q} \\ &= e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T}\mathbf{b}_0/q} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |\mathbf{b}_0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |\mathbf{b}_1\rangle e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T}(\mathbf{b}_1 - \mathbf{b}_0)/q} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Where  $\mathbf{b}_0, \mathbf{b}_1$  are the two values with

$$\mathbf{T}\mathbf{b}_0 \bmod 2 = \mathbf{T}\mathbf{b}_1 \bmod 2 = \mathbf{z}$$

Idea: combine several samples at a time

$$e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T} \mathbf{b}_0 / q} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |\mathbf{b}_0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |\mathbf{b}_1\rangle e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T} (\mathbf{b}_1 - \mathbf{b}_0) / q} \right)$$

Now map  $|\mathbf{b}_0\rangle \mapsto |0\rangle, |\mathbf{b}_1\rangle \mapsto |1\rangle$

$$e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T} \mathbf{b}_0 / q} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |1\rangle e^{-i2\pi \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{T} (\mathbf{b}_1 - \mathbf{b}_0) / q} \right)$$

Global phase doesn't matter:  $|\psi_{\mathbf{T}(\mathbf{b}_1 - \mathbf{b}_0)}\rangle$

Idea: combine several samples at a time

Now, observe that  $\mathbf{T}(\mathbf{b}_1 - \mathbf{b}_0)$  is even, say  $2\mathbf{t}'$

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1\rangle e^{-i2\pi\mathbf{s}\cdot 2\mathbf{t}'/q} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|1\rangle e^{-i2\pi\mathbf{s}\cdot \mathbf{t}'/(q/2)}$$

Reduced the modulus by factor of 2

Each step divides number of samples by  $\approx n$   
divides modulus by 2

Number of samples needed:

$$\approx n^{\log q} = 2^{(\log n)(\log q)}$$

For LWE parameters, this is  $2^{O(\log^2 n)}$ , quasi-polynomial!

But, errors still break this algorithm

# Multiple shifts

# Multiple shifts

$$f_0$$

$$f_1(\mathbf{r}) = f_0(\mathbf{r} + \mathbf{s})$$

$$f_2(\mathbf{r}) = f_0(\mathbf{r} + 2\mathbf{s})$$

...

If we could go all the way to  $f_q$ , we'd actually get a periodic function. Maybe something in between makes the problem easier?

# Multiple shifts for LWE

$$f_j(\mathbf{r}) = \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot \mathbf{r} + j\mathbf{u} \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4} = \lfloor \mathbf{A}^T \cdot (\mathbf{r} + j\mathbf{s}) + j\mathbf{e} \bmod q \rfloor_{q/4}$$

Larger  $j$  means larger errors → definitively  
can't get all the way to periodic

To date, no attack on LWE based on any of these ideas

Next time: when using post-quantum  
building blocks is not enough