Anon-Pass:

Practical Anonymous Subscriptions

Michael Z. Lee[†], Alan M. Dunn[†], Jonathan Katz^{*}, Brent Waters[†], Emmett Witchel[†]

†University of Texas at Austin

* University of Maryland

Media Subscriptions






Unlimited access subscriptions

The New York Times

Let's build a service



Sharing Resistance

(admission control)



We receive and store information, including personal information, about you including when you enter it on our website and from interactions with our sen or contact you. Non-personal information is information that does not permit contact you information for any purpose. You can choose not to provide personal information we request is required in order to provide our service and the lad



- 1. Introduction
- 2. The information we collect
- 3. How we use the information we collect
- 4. How we share the information we collect

They are collecting information about you.




information, which includes personal information you supply when you subscribe, order, complete a survey, register for one of our sites, enter a contest or provide your e-mail address and 2) Non-personal information collected through technology, which includes tracking information collected as you use the NYT Services.

Anonymous Media

Accesses can't be correlated

Song I

Song 2




Unlinkability

Linked accesses could deanonymize users


Access patterns for enough time could help deanonymize clients

The Netflix Prize dataset
[Narayanan, Shmatikov 2008]
Social networks
[Narayanan, Shmatikov 2009]

But even if tokens are unlinkable...



We assume clients are using a network anonymity service





1910...



Unlinkability

but not sharing resistance

How do we get both?

Unlinkable Serial Transactions [Syverson et al. 1997]
Sharing resistance, unlinkability
but needs unbounded storage

Anonymous Blacklisting Systems [Tsang et al. 2008]
Sharing resistance, unlinkability
but computationally expensive

And also be practical?

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Sharing resistance, unlinkability
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Anon-Pass

Sharing resistance, unlinkability, and efficiency Example: over 12,000 concurrent clients

How?


How is Anon-Pass built?

How is Anon-Pass used?

How does Anon-Pass perform?

How is it built?


Split up time into **epochs**Each user has a **unique** token for an epoch



Each epoch allows a new, unpredictable token

How is it built?

Split up time into **epochs**Each user has a **unique** token for an epoch



Each epoch allows a new, unpredictable token Use a pseudorandom function (PRF)


High Level Protocols


Register

Get a blinded signature on a secret


Login

Prove the token used the signed secret (in zero knowledge)







But songs don't always fit in one epoch




But songs don't always fit in one epoch



But songs don't always fit in one epoch



But songs don't always fit in one epoch And these accesses are implicitly linked



Conditional Linkability

Accesses can be implicitly linked

Baby+ Os

Baby+15s

Baby+30s

Baby+45s

Baby+60s

Baby+75s

Baby+90s

• • •

The service knows when the same song is repeatedly accessed

Client is implicitly linked while accessing the same media

And unlinkability costs
the service provider
(and therefore harms the system)

Re-Up

Our way of getting conditional linkability

Prove the current token and the next token are linked

Trades unlinkability for efficiency

But the client already lost unlinkability while accessing the same media


Re-Up is more efficient

Login proves you should be allowed access Re-Up proves you logged in before

Login takes 10 expensive operations Re-Up takes only 2

Using Login and Re-Up

A client must Login to start a new song And Re-Up to continue playing the same song



To be unlinkable again, the client must wait until the next epoch

Epoch Lengths: Long vs. Short

A **short** epoch means less time to be unlinkable And less delay between client actions

Happy Clients

A **long** epoch means fewer client requests

And <u>lower server load</u>

Happy Server

Choosing an epoch length depends on the service (e.g., 15 seconds for music, 5 minutes for movies)

Re-Up helps balance this tension

Short epochs means less wait between unlinkable actions

Re-Up instead of Login reduces server load

And Anon-Pass is formally proven

Formal proof of security holds under the DDHI assumption

Formal proof of soundness holds under the LRSW assumption

Stated and proved in the paper

How?


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
How is Anon-Pass used?


How does Anon-Pass perform?


How could it be used?

Anonymous Music Streaming Music download over normal HTTP 15 second epoch Unlimited-use Subway Pass NYC's "unlimited" pass 6 minute epoch Account Proxy Multiplex accounts to news sites I minute epoch











Purpose: minimize changes to client applications

Job: Create Login and Re-Up requests Keep the user secret secure


Modified VLC to anonymously stream (54 LoC) No modifications to support browsers

Authentication Server

Purpose: enforce sharing resistance

Job: Verify tokens and token uniqueness Record active tokens

Runs on the service or as a 3rd party



Gateway

Purpose: enforce access control with minimal change to existing services

Job: Prevent unauthorized access and responses Remove verification from the critical path

Runs on the service as a front end server

How?

How is Anon-Pass built?

How is Anon-Pass used?


How does Anon-Pass perform?

Evaluation Environment


quad-core 2.66 GHz Intel Core 2 CPU 8GB RAM I Gbps network

10 client machine to evaluate the streaming music service

An HTC Evo 3D to evaluate the anonymous subway pass



Crypto Cost







HTTP server to stream music 15 second epoch


Add clients until we run out of resources

Used 10 client machines




Music Service Scaling






Anonymous Subway Pass


Problem: Need to rate limit between swipes A long epoch can simulate that timeout But sharing is still possible...






Anonymous Subway Pass

Solution: Login and Re-Up at the same time Accesses during later epochs are linkable






Anonymous Subway Pass

Implemented as an Android application

Clients Login and Re-Up twice (18 minute NYC policy)

Takes only 0.2 seconds (on an HTC Evo 3D)



Anon-Pass

Practical – efficient enough to scale

Flexible – works with different services

Deployable – minimizes service changes