

Web Advertising

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OUTLINE

◆ Web Advertising

- Definition of Web-Advertising
- Greedy algorithm
- BALANCE algorithm
- Generalized-BALANCE algorithm

Types of Web Ads

- ◆ Advertisers post ads directly
 - Craig's List, auto trading sites, social networks

Screenshot of a Craigslist search results page for "cars & trucks" in Los Angeles, showing various vehicle listings.

Search filters on the left include:

- search titles only
- has image
- posted today
- bundle duplicates
- include nearby areas

MILES FROM ZIP: miles from zip

PRICE: min max

MAKE AND MODEL: make / model

MODEL YEAR: min max

ODOMETER: min max

checkboxes for:

- cryptocurrency ok
- delivery available

language of posting: condition, cylinders, drive, fuel, paint color, size, title status, transmission, type

reset update search

Gallery view selected. Results: 1 - 120 / 3000. Newest items first.

Items listed:

- 2013 Toyota Prius (NORWALK) - \$6100
- 1972 Jaguar V12 E-Type Series III 2+2 Coupe Stock# 745 (Santa Monica, CA) - \$52500
- 1969 Ford Mustang Fastback SKU:C0393 351 V8 (Henderson, NV) - \$29800
- 2008 Kia Sportage SUV 4 Cylinder Low Miles 1 Owner Clean Title (Corona) - \$3550
- 2008 GMC Yukon Denali (Brentwood) - \$10998
- Clean Title Acura Rsx 2003 TypeS (\$5500) - \$5500
- Auto Group (www.ajautogroup.net) 2002 Toyota Sequoia Limited 2WD 4dr SUV - \$5495
- 2005 Mercedes-Benz E320 Sedan - APPROVED W/ \$1495 DWN *OAC!! (\$1949) - \$1949

Types of Web Ads

- ◆ Advertisers pay for display ads to be placed on websites
 - Often has a fixed price per *impression* (one display of the ad with download of page by a user)

Autotrader  Cars for Sale ▾ Sell My Car Value My Car Car Research & Reviews ▾ Find Local Dealers Loans Insurance 

Cars for Sale > Los Angeles, CA > Honda

Honda Cars for Sale in Los Angeles, CA 90089 

1-25 of 1,000+ Results 

Most Popular Honda Models



Honda Civic



Honda Accord



Honda CR-V



Honda Insight



Honda HR-V



Honda Odyssey



Honda Fit

Location

Radius: 25 Miles ZIP code: 90089

Delivery to Your Door 

Include vehicles that can be delivered to you

Price

What can I afford?

Min Price: \$2,377 Max Price: \$59,380

Good Price (683) Great Price (1,663)

[More info](#)

Condition

New (14,940)

Featured Dealer



Carson Honda 

★★★★★ (424) 287-5013

[Get Directions](#) | [Contact Dealer](#)

New 2019 Honda HR-V FWD Sport 
\$23,265
Est. Finance Payment: \$354/mo.
[View payment details](#)

Carson Honda 
Conveniently located!!



Similar vehicles in stock 

Types of Web Ads

◆ Online stores show ads

- Amazon, Macy's, etc.
- Selected by store to maximize probability customer will buy product
- Collaborative Filtering

Boiron Arnica Gel, 2.6 Ounce, Topical Pain Relief Gel by Boiron

★★★★★ 2,532 customer reviews | 97 answered questions Amazon's Choice for "bruise healing cream"



About the product

- Before pain gets in your way, treat it naturally at the first sign with Arnicare and feel better faster. Arnicare helps to relieve muscle pain and stiffness and to reduce pain, swelling, and discoloration from bruises. Arnicare Gel has a cooling effect for fast pain relief. This non-sticky, non-greasy gel is quickly absorbed by the skin. Arnicare Gel works best when applied at the first sign of pain.
- Arnica montana (or Mountain daisy) has been used for centuries as a natural pain reliever, and today, it's one of the most popular homeopathic medicines in the world. Arnica is trusted by professional athletes to soothe sore muscles, by prominent cosmetic surgeons to relieve post-procedure pain, and by savvy moms to treat

[More](#)

Frequently bought together

Boiron Arnica Cream, 2.5 Ounces, Topical Pain Relief Cream

Total price: \$23.12



Add all three to Cart

Add all three to List

- This item: Boiron Arnica Gel, 2.6 Ounce, Topical Pain Relief Gel \$7.99 (\$3.07 / Ounce)
- Boiron Arnica, 60 Tablets, Homeopathic Medicine for Pain Relief \$7.64 (\$0.13 / Count)
- Boiron Arnica Cream, 2.5 Ounces, Topical Pain Relief Cream \$7.49 (\$3.00 / Ounce)

Sponsored products related to this item



[Boiron Arnica Cream, 2.5 Ounces, Topical Pain Relief Cream](#)
★★★★★ 911
\$7.49 [prime](#)



[Bruise Juice Dit Da Jow-Better Than Bruise Cream, 1 Best Bruise Remedy, 100% All N...](#)
★★★★★ 6
\$19.99



[Bruizex Bruise Care Cream: Natural Arnica Montana and Vitamin K, Best for Reducing ...](#)
★★★★★ 20
\$22.99 [prime](#)



[Leg Cramp Tablets by Hyland's, Natural Relief of Calf, Leg and Foot Cramp, 100 Count](#)
★★★★★ 1405
\$9.14 [prime](#)

Types of Web Ads: Search Ads

Google search results for "cars for sale".

Search bar: cars for sale

Filter: All

About 7,790,000,000 results (0.73 seconds)

USAA® Car Buying Service | Find New & Used Cars Today | USAA.com
Ad www.usaa.com/carbuying ▾ (800) 531-8722
Research, Compare Prices & Features On New & Used Cars With USAA®. Start Today! See Market Value In Area. See What Others Paid. Overseas Vehicle Purchase. Special Member Savings. Save On New & Used Autos. Hand Selected Dealers.

USAA® Auto Discounts
Get Discounts On Trucks, SUVs, Cars & Vans. See Available Deals Today.

USAA® Shopping & Deals
Exclusive USAA® Online Shopping, Security & Travel Deals. Learn More

Used Cars For Sale | 1,000s At Your Local CarMax

Ad www.carmax.com/ ▾
★★★★★ Rating for carmax.com: 3.7 - 371 reviews
Search For Your Next Used Car Without Haggling And Without Any Obligations. No Hidden Fees. Fast, Free Appraisals. Nationwide Transfers. Helpful Sales Consultants. Clear & Simple Car Buying. Transparent Sales Process. Stress-Free Shopping. 45,000+ Vehicles. 150+ Locations Nationwide.
Used Cars For Sale · Used Cars · New Cars · Get Pre-Qualified · Ratings & Reviews · Store Locator
📍 8611 La Cienega Blvd, Inglewood, CA - Open today · 10:00 AM – 9:00 PM ▾

Cheap Cars For Sale in Los Angeles, CA - CarGurus - CarGu

Ad www.cargurus.com/ ▾
The best deals on the lowest priced cars from top-rated dealers near you. Millions of

data mining

All News Books Videos Images More Settings Tools

About 462,000,000 results (0.45 seconds)

Data Mining | Download the Free White Paper | SAS.com

Ad www.sas.com/Data/Mining ▾
Data Mining from A to Z. How to Discover Insights & Drive Better Opportunities. Explore Free Trials. AI & Machine Learning. 40+ Years of Innovation. IoT Solutions. Solutions for Hadoop. Leader in Analytics. Cloud Computing. Services: Advanced Analytics, AI Solutions, Business Intelligence.

Free Software Trials


Discover How We Help You Explore, Analyze & Visualize Your Data.

SAS Industry Solutions

We Provide Solutions That Meet Your Industry's Specific Needs.

Search Ads Overview

- ◆ Most lucrative venue for on-line advertising: SEARCH
- ◆ Impression of an Ad
 - Ad is displayed
 - User clicked on the ad link to download the page
- ◆ Search engine charges advertisers for impression of their ads
- ◆ Adwords model (Google): matching search queries to advertisements
 - Require algorithms for optimizing this assignment
 - Greedy algorithms
 - Online algorithms



Google AdWords

Create an ad

To get started, write your first ad below. Remember, you can always create more ads later. [Learn how to write a great text ad](#)

Headline [?](#) INF 553

Description line 1 [?](#) Foundations and applications of data mining

Description line 2 [?](#) Map reduce, LSH, link analysis, stream data -8

Display URL [?](#) www.usc.edu

Final URL [?](#) <http://www.usc.edu>

[+ URLs for mobile](#)

[+ Ad URL options \(advanced\)](#)

Ad preview: The following ad previews may be shown to users. [Learn more](#)

Side ad

INF 553

[www.usc.edu](#)

Foundations and applications of data mining
Map reduce, LSH, link analysis, stream data

Top ad

INF 553

[www.usc.edu](#)

Foundations and applications of data mining Map

Ad extensions expand your ad with additional information or product images.

[Take a tour](#)

Google AdWords

Select keywords

Your ad can show on Google when people search for the keywords you choose here. These keywords also determine which managed placements are good matches for your ads.

Tips

- Start with 10-20 keywords.
- Be specific: avoid one-word keywords. Choose phrases that customers would use to search for your products and services.
- By default, keywords are broad matched to searches to help you capture a wider range of relevant traffic. Use [match types](#) to control this.
- Learn more about [choosing effective keywords](#).

Enter one keyword per line.

```
usc informatics  
usc data mining
```

Category: University Of Southern California
« Add all from this category
« Add southern california university
« Add california southern university
« Add the university of southern california
« Add southern university of california
« Add universities in southern california
« Add university of southern california

campus
« Add university southern california
« Add university in southern california
« Add where is university of southern

california
« Add southern california universities
« Add where is the university of southern

Matching Keywords with Searches

- ◆ Match types: exact, phrase, broad, negative

AdWords KeyWord Match Types

MATCH TYPE	SPECIAL SYMBOL	EXAMPLE KEYWORD	ADS MAY SHOW ON SEARCHES THAT	EXAMPLE SEARCHES
Broad Match	none	women's hats	includes misspellings, synonyms, related searches, and other relevant variations	<i>buy ladies hats</i>
Broad Match Modifier	+keyword	+women's +hats	contain the modified term (or closer variations, but not synonyms), in any order	<i>hats for women</i>
Phrase Match	"keyword"	"women's hats"	are a phrase, and close variations of that phrase	<i>buy women's hats</i>
Exact Match	[keyword]	[women's hats]	are an exact term and close variations of that exact term	<i>women's hats</i>



Online Algorithms


◆ Classic model of algorithms

- Use the entire input to compute some result
 - “offline algorithm”

◆ Online Algorithms

- You get to see the input one piece at a time, and need to make **irrevocable decisions along the way**
- Make decisions without knowing the future
- For search: only know past queries and current query; don’t know what queries will come in later
- Similar to handling data streams

◆ An online algorithm cannot always do as well as an offline algorithm



Example 8.1

- ◆ Knowing the future could help
- ◆ Manufacturer A of conventional furniture
 - bids 20 cents on both terms “sofa” and “chesterfield”
- ◆ Manufacturer B of antique furniture
 - bids 10 cents on search term “chesterfield”
- ◆ Both have monthly budget of \$100
 - B can place its ad 1,000 times, A can place its ad 500 times
- ◆ Query “chesterfield” arrives
- ◆ Can only display one ad
- ◆ Might display A’s ad because A bid more, but...

Example 8.1

- ◆ **Knowing the future could help**
- ◆ Might display A's ad because A bid more
 - 20 cents vs 10 cents
- ◆ However, if there are many queries for "sofa" and few for "chesterfield," B will never spend its full budget
 - B only bids on "chesterfield"
- ◆ Sending "chesterfield" queries to B might increase overall revenue
- ◆ **Without knowing the future, on-line algorithm may not perform as well as offline**

Offline Query-Ad Matching Problem

- ◆ Advertisers, each
 - Bids on keywords : “sofa”: 10 cents/impression
 - Has a budget, e.g., \$100/month
- ◆ A set of queries in some month, say Sep 2015
 - e.g., 600 “chesterfield”, 100 “sofa”
- ◆ Find assignments of queries to bids, such that
 - Total profit is maximized

Greedy Approach

- ◆ Consider two furniture manufacturers A and B
 - A: bids 20 cents on “chesterfield”; 10 cents on “sofa”
 - B: bids 10 cents on “chesterfield”
 - Both A and B have budget: \$100/month
- ◆ Queries (expected): 600 “chesterfield”, 100 “sofa”
 - “chesterfield”: 500 to A => profit: \$100
 - “chesterfield”: 100 to B => profit: \$10

=> Total profit: \$110

Optimal Solution

- ◆ Consider two furniture manufacturers A and B
 - A: bids 20 cents on “chesterfield”; 10 cents on “sofa”
 - B: bids 10 cents on “chesterfield”
 - Both A and B have budget: \$100/mon
- ◆ Queries (expected): 600 “chesterfield”, 100 “sofa”
- ◆ Optimal solution: assignment of queries to bids that generates the largest profit
- ◆ Queries (expected): 600 “chesterfield”, 100 “sofa”
 - “sofa”: 100 to A => profit: \$10
 - “chesterfield”: 450 to A => profit: \$90
 - “chesterfield”: 150 to B => profit: \$15

=> Total profit: \$115

Comparison

Bids	Chesterfield	Sofa	Budget
A	20 cents	10 cents	\$100
B	10 cents		\$100

Queries	Chesterfield (600)	Sofa (100)	Profit
A	500		\$100
B	100		\$10

Greedy, Total profit: \$110


Queries	Chesterfield (600)	Sofa (100)	Profit
A	450	100	\$100
B	150		\$15

Non-Greedy (Optimal), Total profit: \$115


Online Bipartite Matching

The Matching Problem

- ◆ Simplified version of the problem of matching ads to search queries
- ◆ Looking for “Maximal matching” in a bipartite graph
 - involves bipartite graphs with two sets of nodes
- ◆ All edges connect node on left set to node in right set




Example: Bipartite Matching



$M = \{(1,a), (2,b), (3,d)\}$ is a **matching**
Cardinality of matching = $|M| = 3$

Example: Bipartite Matching



$M = \{(1,c), (2,b), (3,d), (4,a)\}$ is a
perfect matching

Maximal matching: a matching that contains the largest possible number of matches


Perfect matching: all vertices of the graph are matched

Matching Algorithm

- ◆ **Problem:** Find a maximal matching for a given bipartite graph
 - A perfect one if it exists
- ◆ There is a polynomial-time offline algorithm based on augmenting paths
 - Hopcroft & Karp 1973, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hopcroft-Karp_algorithm
- ◆ **But what if we do not know the entire graph upfront?**

Online Graph Matching Problem

- ◆ Initially, we are given the set **ads**
- ◆ In each **round**, **one set of query terms is added**
 - Relevant **edges** are revealed
 - Indicate which advertisers have bid on those query terms
- ◆ **At that time, we have to decide to either:**
 - Pair the **query** with an **ad**
 - Do not pair the **query** with any **ad**



(1,a)
(2,b)
(3,d)

Greedy Algorithm

- ◆ Greedy algorithm for the online graph matching problem:

- Pair the new query with **any** eligible ad
 - If there is none, do not pair query

- ◆ How good is the algorithm?

Competitive Ratio

- ◆ For input I , suppose greedy produces matching M_{greedy} while an optimal matching is M_{opt}


Competitive ratio =

$$\min_{\text{all possible inputs } I} (|M_{greedy}| / |M_{opt}|)$$

greedy's worst performance over all possible inputs I


Analyzing the Greedy Algorithm

- ◆ Consider a case: $M_{greedy} \neq M_{opt}$
- ◆ Consider the set Q of queries matched in M_{opt} but not in M_{greedy}
- ◆ **A** is the set of ads that are linked to a non-matched query in Q , and **A** is already matched in M_{greedy}
 - If there exists such a non-matched (by M_{greedy}) ad ● linked to a non-matched query, then greedy would have matched them
- ◆ Since ads **A** are already matched in M_{greedy} then
(1) $|M_{greedy}| \geq |A|$




Analyzing the Greedy Algorithm

- ◆ Summary so far:
 - Queries Q matched in M_{opt} but not in M_{greedy}
 - (1) $|M_{greedy}| \geq |A|$
- ◆ There are at least $|Q|$ such ads in A ($|Q| \leq |A|$) otherwise the optimal algorithm couldn't have matched all queries in Q
 - So: $|Q| \leq |A| \leq |M_{greedy}|$
- ◆ Q' : matched in M_{opt} and also in M_{greedy}
 - $|M_{opt}| = |Q| + |Q'|$ and $|Q'| \leq |M_{greedy}|$
 - $|M_{opt}| \leq |Q| + |M_{greedy}|$
 - Worst case is when $|Q|$ is maximum $|Q| = |A| = |M_{greedy}|$
- ◆ $|M_{opt}| \leq 2|M_{greedy}|$ then $|M_{greedy}| / |M_{opt}| \geq \frac{1}{2}$
- ◆ Competitive Ratio = $\frac{1}{2}$
- ◆ Greedy's worst performance over all possible inputs /



Worst-case Scenario



- **Worst case** is when $|Q| = |A| = |M_{greedy}|$
- $Q = \{c,d\}$ – queries with no matching ad
- $A = \{1,2\}$ – ads that are adjacent to a query in Q but are already matched to another query
- $|M_{greedy}| = 2, |Q| = 2, |A| = 2$
- **Optimal matching:** (1,c), (2,d), (3,b), (4,a)
- $|M_{opt}| = 4$
- $|M_{greedy}| / |M_{opt}| = \frac{1}{2}$ **(competitive ratio)**

Performance-based Web Advertising

History of Web Advertising

◆ Banner ads (1995-2001)

- Initial form of web advertising
- Popular websites charged \$X for every 1,000 “impressions” of the ad
 - Called “**CPM**” rate
(Cost per thousand impressions)
 - Modeled similar to TV, magazine ads
- From **untargeted** to **demographically targeted**
- **Low click-through rates**
 - Low Return on Investment (ROI) for advertisers

The screenshot shows the homepage of The New York Times on March 12, 2012. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for HOME PAGE, TODAY'S PAPER, VIDEO, MOST POPULAR, and Edition: U.S. / Global. A red box highlights the "SHOP NOW AT MARCJACOBS.COM" banner in the top right corner. Below the header, a large headline reads "Get a Full Times Experience." A search bar is visible, followed by a "BECOME A DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER" button. The main content area features several news articles and a photograph of people in an office setting. On the left, there's a sidebar with various news categories like WORLD, U.S., POLITICS, NEW YORK, etc. On the right, there are columns for OPINION, MARKETS, and AUDIBLE.COM.

CPM...cost per *mille*
***Mille*...thousand in Latin**

Performance-based Advertising

- ◆ **Introduced by Overture around 2000**
 - Advertisers **bid on search keywords**
 - When someone searches for that keyword, the **highest bidder's ad is shown first**
 - Advertiser is charged **only if the ad is clicked on**
- ◆ Similar model adopted by Google with some changes around 2002
 - Called **Adwords**

Web 2.0

- ◆ **Performance-based advertising works!**

- Multi-billion-dollar industry

- ◆ **Interesting problem:**

- What ads to show for a given query?**

- (Today's lecture)

- ◆ **If I am an advertiser, which search terms should I bid on and how much should I bid?**

- (Not focus of today's lecture)

Adwords Problem

◆ Given:

- 1. A set of bids by advertisers for search queries
- 2. A click-through rate (CTR) for each advertiser-query pair
- 3. A budget for each advertiser (say for 1 month)
- 4. A limit on the number of ads to be displayed with each search query

◆ Respond to each search query with a set of advertisers such that:

- 1. The size of the set is no larger than the limit on the number of ads per query
- 2. Each advertiser has bid on the search query
- 3. Each advertiser has enough budget left to pay for the ad if it is clicked upon

Adwords Problem

- ◆ A stream of queries arrives at the search engine:
 q_1, q_2, \dots
- ◆ Several advertisers bid on each query
- ◆ When query q_i arrives, search engine must pick a subset of advertisers whose ads are shown
- ◆ **Goal:** Maximize search engine's revenues
 - **Simple solution:** Instead of raw bids, use the "expected revenue per click" (i.e., Bid*CTR)
- ◆ **Clearly we need an online algorithm!**

The Adwords Innovation

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
A	\$1.00	1%	1 cent
B	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
C	\$0.50	2.5%	1.125 cents

Click through Expected
rate revenue

The Adwords Innovation

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
B	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
C	\$0.50	2.5%	1.125 cents
A	\$1.00	1%	1 cent

Complications: Budget

- ◆ Two complications:

- Budget
 - Click-through rate (CTR) of an ad is unknown

- ◆ Each advertiser has a limited budget

- Search engine guarantees that the advertiser will not be charged more than their daily or monthly budget

Complications: CTR


◆ CTR: Each ad has a different likelihood of being clicked

- Advertiser 1 bids \$2, click probability = 0.1
- Advertiser 2 bids \$1, click probability = 0.5
- Click-through rate (CTR) is measured historically
 - Very hard problem: Exploration vs. exploitation
 - Exploit: Should we keep showing an ad for which we have good estimates of click-through rate
 - or
 - Explore: Shall we show a brand new ad to get a better sense of its click-through rate

Greedy Algorithm

◆ Our setting: Simplified environment

- There is **1** ad shown for each query
- All advertisers have the same budget B
- All ads are equally likely to be clicked
- Value of each ad is the same (=**1**)



◆ Simplest algorithm is greedy:

- For a query pick any advertiser who has bid **1** for that query
- **Competitive ratio of greedy is $1/2$**

Bad Scenario for Greedy

◆ Two advertisers A and B

- A bids on query x , B bids on x and y
 - Both have budgets of \$4

◆ **Query stream: x x x x y y y y**

- Worst case greedy choice: $B B B B \underline{\hspace{2cm}} \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$
 - Optimal: A A A A B B B B
 - Competitive ratio = $\frac{1}{2}$

◆ This is the worst case!

- **Note:** Greedy algorithm is deterministic – it always resolves draws in the same way

Greedy algorithm with non-equal bids

- ◆ Greedy algorithm would **assign the query to the highest bidder who still has budget left**

Greedy Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q			
2 nd query q			
3 rd query q			
4 th query q			
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

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Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A1	20	50
2 nd query q			
3 rd query q			
4 th query q			
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

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Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A1	20	50
2 nd query q	A1	0	50
3 rd query q			
4 th query q			
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

Greedy Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

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- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A1	20	50
2 nd query q	A1	0	50
3 rd query q	A2	0	40
4 th query q			
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

Greedy Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A1	20	50
2 nd query q	A1	0	50
3 rd query q	A2	0	40
4 th query q	A2	0	30
5 th query q	A2	0	20
6 th query q	A2	0	10
7 th query q	A2	0	0
8 th query q	No ad	0	0

BALANCE Algorithm [MSVV]

- ◆ **BALANCE** Algorithm by Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani
 - For each query, pick the advertiser with the largest unspent budget
 - Break ties arbitrarily (but in a deterministic way)

Example: BALANCE

- ◆ Two advertisers A and B
 - A bids on query x , B bids on x and y
 - Both have budgets of \$4
- ◆ Query stream: $x \ x \ x \ x \ y \ y \ y \ y$
- ◆ BALANCE choice: A B A B B B _ _
 - Optimal: A A A A B B B B
- ◆ In general: For BALANCE on 2 advertisers
Competitive ratio = $\frac{3}{4}$

BALANCE Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q			
2 nd query q			
3 rd query q			
4 th query q			
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

BALANCE Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A2	40	40
2 nd query q			
3 rd query q			
4 th query q			
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

BALANCE Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A2	40	40
2 nd query q	A1	20	40
3 rd query q			
4 th query q			
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

BALANCE Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A2	40	40
2 nd query q	A1	20	40
3 rd query q	A2	20	30
4 th query q			
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

BALANCE Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A2	40	40
2 nd query q	A1	20	40
3 rd query q	A2	20	30
4 th query q	A2	20	20
5 th query q			
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

BALANCE Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A2	40	40
2 nd query q	A1	20	40
3 rd query q	A2	20	30
4 th query q	A2	20	20
5 th query q	A1	0	20
6 th query q			
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

BALANCE Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q

- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A2	40	40
2 nd query q	A1	20	40
3 rd query q	A2	20	30
4 th query q	A2	20	20
5 th query q	A1	0	20
6 th query q	A2	0	10
7 th query q			
8 th query q			

BALANCE Example: Two advertisers bid on a query q



- ◆ Bidder A₁: bid $x_1 = 20$ budget $b_1 = 40$
- ◆ Bidder A₂: bid $x_2 = 10$ budget $b_2 = 50$
- ◆ Assume ties are broken in favor of A₁

Query q	Assigned to Bidder (A ₁ , A ₂ or No Ad)	Remaining Budget for A ₁	Remaining Budget for A ₂
At start	----	40	50
1 st query q	A2	40	40
2 nd query q	A1	20	40
3 rd query q	A2	20	30
4 th query q	A2	20	20
5 th query q	A1	0	20
6 th query q	A2	0	10
7 th query q	A2	0	0
8 th query q	No Ad	0	0

Analyzing BALANCE

- ◆ Consider simple case (w.l.o.g.):
 - 2 advertisers, A_1 and A_2 , each with budget B (≥ 1)
 - Optimal solution exhausts both advertisers' budgets
- ◆ BALANCE must exhaust at least one advertiser's budget:
 - Because optimal exhausts both
 - If not, we can allocate more queries
 - Whenever both advertisers bid on the query, chosen advertiser's unspent budget only decreases
- ◆ Assume BALANCE exhausts A_2 's budget, but allocates x queries fewer than the optimal
- ◆ Revenue: $BAL = 2B - x$

Analyzing Balance



■ Queries allocated to A_1 in the optimal solution

■ Queries allocated to A_2 in the optimal solution

$$\text{Optimal revenue} = 2B$$

Balance Algorithm:

Assume Balance gives revenue = $2B-x$ or $B+y$


Unassigned queries can only be assigned to A_2
(if we could assign to A_1 we would, since we still have budget)

Goal: Show we have $y \geq x$

Case 1) $\leq \frac{1}{2}$ of A_1 's queries got assigned to A_2
then $y \geq B/2$, so $y \geq x$ ($y+x = B$)

BALANCE exhausts A_2 's budget

B1



Analyzing Balance

■ Queries allocated to A_1 in the optimal solution

■ Queries allocated to A_2 in the optimal solution

$$\text{Optimal revenue} = 2B$$

Balance Algorithm:

Assume Balance gives revenue = $2B-x$ or $B+y$

Unassigned queries can only be assigned to A_2

Goal: Show we have $y \geq x$

Case 2) > $\frac{1}{2}$ of A_1 's queries got assigned to A_2 , consider last of A_1 's queries assigned to A_2 :

- 1) $B_2 \geq B_1$ since Balance chose A_2
- 2) $B_2 \leq B/2$ (since at least $\frac{1}{2}$ of A_1 's queries got assigned to A_2)
- 3) $B_1 \leq B_2 \leq B/2$ so x (or B_1) $< B/2$ and $x + y = B \rightarrow y \geq x$

Balance revenue is minimum for $x=y=B/2$ (i.e., Max $x = B/2$)

Minimum Balance revenue = $3B/2$

Competitive Ratio = 3/4

BALANCE: General Result

- ◆ For Balance algorithm with many bidders
- ◆ In the general case, worst competitive ratio of BALANCE is $1 - 1/e = \text{approx. } 0.63$
 - Interestingly, no online algorithm has a better competitive ratio!
- ◆ Let's see the worst case example that gives this ratio

Kalyanasundaram, B., & Pruhs, K. R. (2000). An optimal deterministic algorithm for online b-matching. *Theoretical Computer Science*, 233(1-2), 319-325.

Worst case for BALANCE

- ◆ **N advertisers:** A_1, A_2, \dots, A_N

- Each with budget $B = N!$

- ◆ **Queries:**

- $N \cdot B$ queries appear in N rounds of B queries each

- ◆ **Bidding:**

- Round 1 queries: bidders A_1, A_2, \dots, A_N
 - Round 2 queries: bidders A_2, A_3, \dots, A_N
 - Round i queries: bidders A_i, \dots, A_N

- ◆ **Optimum allocation:**


Allocate round i queries to A_i ,

- Optimum revenue $N \cdot B$

- ◆ **BALANCE:**


- Assigns each query in round 1 to N advertisers equally, since all bid on q_1
 - Prefers bidder with largest remaining budget
 - For q_2 , divided equally among A_2, A_3, \dots, A_N
 - For each query q_i , advertisers A_i, \dots, A_N get queries

BALANCE Allocation



- Eventually, budgets of higher-numbered advertisers exhausted
- j is approximate value where all advertisers are out of budget or do not bid on remaining queries

BALANCE Allocation



- Eventually, budgets of higher-numbered advertisers exhausted
- j is approximate value where all advertisers are out of budget or do not bid on remaining queries

Last round, last bidder used up all budget, B :

$$B \left(\frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N-1} + \cdots + \frac{1}{N-j+1} \right) \geq B$$

Euler showed that as k gets large, $\sum_{i=1}^k 1/i$ approaches $\log_e k$.

$$\log_e N - \log_e (N-j) = 1,$$

$$(1+1/2+\dots+1/n) - (1+1/2+\dots+1/(n-j)) = 1/(n-j+1)+\dots+1/n$$

- So we want j such that $\ln N - \ln (N-j) = 1$ (approximately)
- $j = N(1-1/e) \rightarrow$ Each round has revenue B so the approx. total revenue is $B \times j$
- Approximate revenue of Balance Algorithm is $BN(1-1/e)$
- Competitive ratio is $1-1/e$

Kalyanasundaram, B., & Pruhs, K. R. (2000). An optimal deterministic algorithm for online b-matching. *Theoretical Computer Science*, 233(1-2), 319-325.

General Version of the Problem

- ◆ Balance works well when bids are 1,0
- ◆ In practice, bids and budgets can be arbitrary
- ◆ In a general setting, BALANCE can perform poorly
- ◆ Example 8.9: Consider two advertisers A_1 and A_2
 - A_1 : $bid_1 = 1$, $budget_1 = 110$
 - A_2 : $bid_2 = 10$, $budget_2 = 100$
 - Consider: we see 10 instances of q
 - BALANCE always selects A_1 because it has largest remaining budget
 - Earns total revenue = 10
 - Favors advertiser with larger remaining budget
 - Optimal earns 100

Modifications Needed to BALANCE Algorithm

- ◆ Bias choice of ad in favor of higher bids
- ◆ Consider the fraction of budget remaining, so we bias toward using some of each advertiser's budget
- ◆ More “risk averse”: don’t leave too much of any advertiser’s budget unused

Generalized BALANCE Algorithm

- ◆ **Arbitrary bids:** consider query q , bidder i
 - Bid = x_i ,
 - Budget = b_i ,
 - Amount spent so far = m_i ,
 - Fraction of budget left over $f_i = 1 - (m_i/b_i)$
- ◆ Define $\psi_i(q) = x_i * (1 - e^{-f_i})$ $\psi(psi)$
 - $bid * (1 - e^{-(fraction\ of\ budget\ left)})$
- ◆ Allocate query q to bidder i with largest value of $\psi_i(q)$
- ◆ Same competitive ratio ($1 - 1/e$)

Example 8.10

- ◆ Bidder A_1 : $x_1 = 1, b_1 = 110$
- ◆ Bidder A_2 : $x_2 = 10, b_2 = 100$
- ◆ First occurrence of query q : fraction 1 of budgets b_1 and b_2 remain
- ◆ $\psi_1(q) = x_1(1-e^{-f_1}) = 1(1-e^{-1}) = 1 - 1/e = 0.63$
- ◆ $\psi_2(q) = x_2(1-e^{-f_2}) = 10(1-e^{-1}) = 6.3$
- ◆ So first q is awarded to A_2
- ◆ $\psi_2(q)$ decreases, but for the next 9 instances of q : $\psi_2(q) > \psi_1(q)$ and queries are awarded to A_2
- ◆ For 10th instance of q , remaining fraction of budget b_2 is $1/10$
- ◆ $\psi_2(q) = x_2(1-e^{-f_2}) = 10(1-e^{-1/10}) = 0.95$, which is > 0.63
- ◆ After 10 queries q , have spent all of A_2 's budget, and additional queries q will be awarded to A_1
- ◆ Total revenue for 10 queries $q = 100$
- ◆ Generalized Balance Algorithm: Successfully biased toward higher bids, took into account fraction of budget remaining

Additional Observations

- ◆ Algorithm as described **does not account for possibility that click-through rate differs for different ads**
- ◆ **Multiply bid by CTR when computing ψ**
- ◆ Also can **consider historical frequency of queries**
 - ◆ **Use historical frequency to predict future frequency**

Adwords Aspects Not in Our Model

Matching bids and search queries:

- ◆ In our simplified model, advertisers bid on sets of words
- ◆ An advertiser's bid is eligible to be shown for search queries with exactly the same set of words as advertiser's bid
- ◆ In reality, Google, Yahoo, Microsoft all offer advertisers “broad matching”: inexact matches of the bid keywords
- ◆ Examples: subsets, supersets, words with very similar meanings
- ◆ Charge advertisers based on complicated formulas that take into account how closely related the search query is to the advertiser's bids
- ◆ Proprietary algorithms

Adwords Aspects Not in Our Model

Charging Advertisers for Clicks

- ◆ In our simplified model, when a user clicks on an ad, the advertiser is charged the amount they bid
- ◆ Known as a first-price auction
- ◆ In reality, search engines use a more complicated system known as a second-price auction
- ◆ Each advertiser pays approximately the bid of the advertiser who placed immediately behind them in the auction
 - Example: First-place advertiser would pay the bid of the second-place advertiser plus one cent
- ◆ Less susceptible to being gamed by advertisers than first-price auctions
- ◆ Lead to higher revenues for search engines
 - <https://blogs.cornell.edu/info2040/2012/10/27/google-adwords-auction-a-second-price-sealed-bid-auction/>