# Quantum Speedup on Exhaustive-search Attacks on Cryptosystems

Week 7 Report for Class 75

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Qubits

# Backgrounds

# Mathematical Backgrounds

- Complex numbers
  - Complex plane a + bi = (a, b)
  - Complex polar  $\rho e^{\phi i} = \rho \cos \phi + \rho \sin \phi i$
- 2-dimensional Hilbert space
  - A complex vector space, utilizing conjugate transposes.
  - When constricted to  $\mathbb{R}$ , same as  $\mathbb{R}^2$  vector space.
- Most of the time on Week 4 was spent on understanding the mathematical backgrounds on 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces and special matrices which can only be considered on C.
- Additionally, analyzing Grover's Algorithm implementation in Microsoft Q# was done.

# Qubits

## Qubits

- Quantum Bit(Qubit for short) is a probabilistic vector of information.
- $|0\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ ,  $|1\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$
- A general qubit is represented as  $u = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$

# Three Main Types of Operation

- Creation
- Reversible Operation
- Measurement

#### Creation

• As simple as creating  $|0\rangle$  or  $|1\rangle$ .

# Reversible Operation

- Represented using unitary matrix
  - $U^*U = UU^* = I$ , where  $U^*$  is a conjugate transpose of U
- Two frequently used operations
  - $\bullet \ \, \text{X-gate} \, \, X \! = \! \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \, \text{(so-called NOT gate)}$
  - Hadamard Gate  $H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$
  - Hadamard Gate creates a Quantum Superposition

#### Measurement

- A non-deterministic(probabilistic) measure of a qubit u.
- For a vector  $\mathbf{u} = \begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \end{pmatrix}$  where  $\|\mathbf{u}\| = 1$ 
  - returns "true" with probability  $\|\alpha\|^2$ , and u becomes  $|0\rangle$
  - ullet returns "false" with probability  $\|eta\|^2$ , and u becomes |1
    angle
- Destroys quantum superposition; often called "destructive".

# Grover's Algorithm

#### Overview

- Grover's algorithm can find a specific state satisfying some condition among  $N = 2^n$  candidates in  $O(\sqrt{N})$  time, compared to classical runtime complexity O(N).
- Grover's algorithm exploits qualities of quantum amplitudes to gain advantage of probability seperation.
- $\bullet$  It can brute-force 128-bit symmetric cryptographic key in roughly  $2^{64}$  iterations.

# Algorithm

#### Input:

- A quantum oracle  $\mathcal{O}$  which performs the operation  $\mathcal{O}|x\rangle = (-1)^{f(x)}|x\rangle$ , where f(x) = 0 for all  $0 \le x < 2^n$  except  $x_0$ , for which  $f(x_0) = 1$ .
  - Such quantum oracle is viable, and takes O(1) time.
- n qubits initialized to the state |0>

Output:  $x_0$ , in runtime  $O(\sqrt{2^n})$  with error rate  $O(\frac{1}{2^n})$ 

# Algorithm

#### Procedure:

- $\bullet$   $|0\rangle^{\otimes n}$  (initial state)
- $2 \ H^{\otimes n} \, |0\rangle^{\otimes n} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x=0}^{2^n-1} |x\rangle = |\psi\rangle \ \text{(Hadamard transform)}$
- $(2 |\psi\rangle \langle \psi| I)\mathcal{O}]^R |\psi\rangle \approx |x_0\rangle$  (Grover iteration for  $R \approx \frac{\pi}{4} \sqrt{2^n}$  times)
- $\bullet$   $x_0$  (measure)

Grover iteration in a nutshell: negate the amplitude of the desired state, followed by 'diffusion transform' which increases the amplitude of the desired state and lower the others.

Qubits


# Quantum S-DES Oracle

#### S-DES

- Simplified DES with 2 rounds
- Structure similar to DES but simplified with 10-bit key and 8-bit plaintext.
- Quantum oracle needs to be reversible, of which S-DES is (normally) not.

#### Structure of S-DES

Qubits



# Quantumizing S-DES

- Most parts are permutations or compressions; no problems here.
- Two parts poses a challenge:
- S-Boxes
  - Consists of lookup table: not ideal for our situation.
  - Broken the S-Boxes into fundamental and/or/not-gates
  - Actually, the brute-force method(of checking each cases) enables reusage of ancilla bits, thereby reducing the number of required qubits!
  - Classic gates are not reversible; use CNOT/CCNOT gates to make them reversible.
- 2 Expansion
  - Due to No-cloning theorem, directly copying a qubit is not possible.
  - Use XOR operation to copy the information.



Qubits

# Quantum S-DES Implementation

#### S-DES Obstacles


- Expansion : Directly clone with XOR twice
  - With extra 8 qubits, we can explicitly use expanded plaintext
- S-Box : Passing all the candidates
  - Denote S-Box function as  $f: \{0,1\}^4 \rightarrow \{0,1\}^2$
  - If the dealing plaintext has a basis for  $x \in \{0,1\}^4$ , apply XOR(NOT) to result S-Box qubit

Initially, 34 explicit qubits were used in total.

- 10 qubits for input key
- 1 qubit for making an encryption oracle
- 8 qubits for (intermediate) plaintext
- 8 qubits for expanded plaintext
- 4 qubits for storing S-Box result
- 3 qubit for S-Box ancilla

S-DES implementation is written in Microsoft Q#. Will it run?

Yes, and no.



After allocating 48GB of RAM, System.Runtime.InteropServices.SEHException was raised, indicating an out-of-memory error.

Reducing the number of qubits was necessary...!

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We can directly use plaintext qubits to create result qubits from S-Box. After then we can undo all the operations (permutation, etc.) which altered plaintext.


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We can directly use plaintext qubits to create result qubits from S-Box. After then we can undo all the operations (permutation, etc.) which altered plaintext.

Additionally, each S-Box operation is independent. Thus we can reuse S-box result qubits after re-initialization.

After a bit of debugging and comparing with Python Implementation...



It ran well within 40s (before the second optimization, it took 4x time and memory)



After a bit of debugging and comparing with Python Implementation...

```
Round 1 finished
Round 2 finished
Round 2 finished
rest : 110
[+] Plaintext: 199
[+] Cipher : 110
[+] Key : 934
[+] Result : 0ne

C:#Users\u00fcuser\u00fc\u00fcuser\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00fc\u00
```

Expected cipher matched with Python S-DES implementation output.



Qubits

#### Current Works and Future Plans

# Work in Progress(Mingyu Cho)

- Implemented a non-quantum S-DES(in python) for testing the quantum version.
- Optionally implement Brute-force attack on S-DES?
- Started preliminary analysis on the gate applications
- Looking for possible speedups on the quantum side to aid the simulation

# Work in Progress(Sangheon Lee)

- Implementation of S-DES completed
- Plan to work on Grover
- Constructing test vectors
- Possibly reduce some quantum gates

#### Future Plans

- Construct and test S-DES and apply Grover's.
  - Since S-DES consists of various components, all of these must be implemented carefully and in order
- Hope to import Microsoft Q# implementation to qiskit (IBM Quantum Experience)
- Reduce complexity of quantum gates if possible (as Prof. Hong suggested)