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Reader's guide

What would a globally just world look like? How could we begin to make improvements towards a more globally just world? One central debate concerns what the principles governing interactions among the world's diverse people should be. Should we be aiming at more equality among people? What responsibilities do we have to ensure people are well positioned to enjoy prospects for a decent life, or at least to reduce poverty worldwide? What should the aim of redistribution be? Because of its enormous influence, we discuss John Rawls' answers to these and other questions, but we also canvass several highly critical responses to Rawls' views. How could we begin to make improvements towards a more globally just world? Because we need to have more systematic ways of managing our collective interests, we need to introduce better global governance arrangements. We discuss arguments concerning the desirability and obligation to attend to global governance in a more concerted way and—in the case study—discuss further ways in which to realize global justice.

Introduction

Any student who has read a newspaper that covers contemporary affairs must have been struck by the existence of at least some injustice in our world today. In some places, people live in constant fear of attack because of their ethnic affiliations, or are being forced from their homes because of civil war, or are suffering the threat of starvation on a massive scale because of staggering levels of poverty. In other places, leaders are accused of 'crimes against humanity': genocide, corruption, or a failure to attend to the basic needs and liberties of their people. Sometimes, people seem too eager to intervene in the affairs of other states, such as when they go to war or seem eager to press for 'regime change'. In other cases, they appear too passive and are accused of not doing enough, such as when an apparent case of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or massive violation of basic human rights is at issue.

What would a globally just world look like? Various theorists advocate different models of global justice, which might consist of various components (which are not necessarily mutually exclusive), such as advocating that every person be well positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, the universal promotion of human rights, global equality of opportunity, a more equal distribution of resources globally (or, at least, ensuring that all have enough to meet their basic needs), or promoting the autonomy of peoples who stand in relations of equality to one another. There is also debate about how best to realize the desired elements, what principles should govern our interactions at the global level, and how to improve the management of our global affairs.

Contemporary theorizing on this topic has been enormously influenced by John Rawls' work, especially his book *The Law of Peoples* (1999), and also by the position known as cosmopolitanism. In apparent contrast to nationalists, who believe that we have stronger obligations to members of our nation than to non-members, cosmopolitans believe that all individual human beings have equal moral worth and that national borders do not importantly diminish the strength of our moral obligations to others. There is considerable debate among contemporary cosmopolitans concerning what are our obligations to others, but one area of considerable agreement is that Rawls' account of our obligations to others in the global arena is defective.

The term cosmopolitanism originated with the Stoics. Stoicism rejected the idea that one should be importantly defined by one's city of origin, as was typical of Greek males

KEY CONCEPTS 13.1

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitans see themselves as citizens of the world—as members of a global community of human beings, with robust responsibilities to others in the global community. Cosmopolitans believe that all individual human beings have equal moral worth and that the strength of our moral obligations to others is not importantly diminished by national borders.

of the time. Rather, it insisted that all were '*citizens of the world*'. The Stoics' idea of being a citizen of the world neatly captures the two main aspects of cosmopolitanism, especially as it is understood today: a thesis about identity and one about responsibility (Scheffler, 1999). As a thesis about identity, being a cosmopolitan indicates that one is a person who is marked or influenced by various cultures. As a thesis about responsibility, cosmopolitanism generates much discussion, as we will come to see. Roughly, the idea is that, as a cosmopolitan, one should appreciate that one is a member of a global community of human beings. As such, one has responsibilities to other members of the global community. As Martha Nussbaum (1996) elaborates, one owes allegiance 'to the worldwide community of human beings' and this affiliation should constitute a primary allegiance. As a thesis about responsibility, cosmopolitanism guides the individual outward from local obligations and prohibits those obligations from crowding out responsibilities to distant others. Cosmopolitanism highlights the responsibilities that we have to those whom we do not know, but whose lives should be of concern to us.

Rawls' *Law of Peoples*

In *A Theory of Justice* (1971), Rawls sets out to derive the principles of justice that should govern liberal societies and, by employing all the apparatus attached to the original position—that is, the hypothetical choosing situation—he famously endorsed two principles: one protecting equal basic liberties, and a second permitting social and economic inequalities when, and only when, they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (known as the difference principle) and attached to positions that are open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (the principle of fair equality of opportunity). In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls' focus is on the principles that should govern closed communities—paradigmatically, nation states. Some cosmopolitans—first Charles Beitz (1979), and then Thomas Pogge (1989)—argued that these two principles should apply globally, because the same kind of reasoning that led to their endorsement at the domestic level should apply to the global case.

KEY THINKERS 13.1

John Rawls (1921–2002)

John Rawls was an American liberal who is widely credited with reviving the discipline of political philosophy through the publication of *A Theory of Justice* in 1971. In this work, Rawls develops the social contract tradition to justify principles guaranteeing equal liberties, equal opportunity, and a distribution of economic goods that makes the worst off as well off as possible. These principles apply within a state, but not across them. *The Law of Peoples* (1999) extends the idea of a social contract to deal with the global context. In this book, Rawls argues for general principles that both liberal and non-liberal societies should be able to accept as the defining norms to regulate their interactions.

KEY CONCEPTS 13.2

A people

A 'people' is a group of persons that are united by sufficient commonalities in areas such as: culture; tradition; a sense of kinship; history; sentiments; world views. Although they may be politically organized, they may or may not occupy a distinct state—for example, some indigenous people may think of themselves as distinct people, but may not have their own state, such as the Basque people. This concept figures heavily in Rawls' discussions of global justice.

I KEY TEXTS 13.1

John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (1999)

In this text, Rawls extends the idea of a social contract to deal with the global context. He argues for general principles that both liberal and non-liberal societies should be able to accept as the defining norms that can regulate their interactions. These include principles acknowledging the independence of peoples (rather than of individual persons), their equality, that they have a right to self-defence, and that they have duties of non-intervention, to observe treaties, to honour a limited set of rights, to conduct themselves appropriately in war, and to providing limited assistance for peoples living in certain kinds of unfavourable conditions.

It was something of a disappointment, then, when Rawls later weighed in on the issue explicitly against such a suggestion. He argued that, although the two principles should apply within liberal societies, they should not apply across them. Rather, in the international arena, Rawls thinks that different principles would be chosen—and we discuss his reasoning next.

In *The Law of Peoples* (1999), Rawls aims to derive the laws to which well-ordered peoples would agree. For Rawls, well-ordered peoples include reasonable liberal peoples and '*decent non-liberal peoples*' (see further below).

Rawls argues that the Law of Peoples he endorses is a realistic utopia. It is realistic in Rawls' view, because it takes account of many real conditions, by (for example) assuming that a fair amount of diversity exists in the actual world, and that not all peoples of the world do, or can reasonably be made to, endorse liberal principles.

Rawls' derivation occurs in several stages. First, he concerns himself only with liberal peoples and the principles they would endorse. He employs two '*original positions*' to derive his Law of Peoples for liberal peoples, the first of which grounds the social contract of the liberal political conception of a constitutionally democratic regime, while the second operates among representatives of liberal peoples.

In the first original position, parties must decide the fair terms of cooperation that will regulate the basic structure of society. After the principles governing the liberal society have been derived, Rawls moves to the international level. At this stage, the second original

BOX 13.1

Rawls' Eight Principles governing his Law of Peoples

1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
5. Peoples have the right to self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.
6. Peoples are to honor human rights.
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.

(Rawls, 1999, p. 37)

position is employed to derive the foreign policy that liberal peoples would choose. The representatives of peoples are subject to an appropriate veil of ignorance for the situation: for example, they do not know the size of the territory or how powerful they are.

In addition to the Eight Principles that Rawls believes would be chosen by liberal peoples, he believes that three organizations would be selected:

- one aimed at securing fair trade among peoples;
- one that enables people to borrow from a cooperative banking institution;
- one that plays a similar role to that of the United Nations, which he refers to as '*a Confederation of Peoples (not states)*' (1999, p. 42).

And having posited that liberal peoples would select the Eight Principles and three organizations, Rawls shows how decent hierarchical peoples would select the same principles and organizations.

But what is a decent people, according to Rawls? Rawls specifies that, for a people to count as a decent one, at least four central conditions must be met. First, the society must not be aggressive: it must conduct its affairs in ways that are peaceful and respectful of other societies. Second, the system of law and its idea of justice must secure basic human rights for all members of the people. It is, however, important to realize that the list of particular rights that must be secured is very short. It includes only:

1. the right to life, by which he means the rights to the means of subsistence and security;
2. the right to liberty, which equates to freedom from slavery or forced occupation, but also includes some liberty of conscience—enough to ensure freedom of religion and thought;
3. the right to personal property;

BOX 13.2

Rawls on 'Kazanistan'

Imagine an idealized Islamic people named 'Kazanistan.' Kazanistan's system of law does not institute the separation of church and state. Islam is the favored religion, and only Muslims can hold the upper positions of political authority and influence the government's main decisions and policies, including foreign affairs. Yet other religions are tolerated and may be practiced without fear or loss of most civic rights, except the right to hold the higher political or judicial offices ... Other religions and associations are encouraged to have a flourishing cultural life of their own and to take part in the civic culture of the wider society.

(Rawls, 1999, p. 76)

4. the right to formal equality, by which he means that similar cases be treated similarly.

Rawls thinks all peoples (whether liberal or non-liberal) should be able to endorse this pared-down list of human rights. The third condition that a decent people must satisfy is that judges and others who administer the legal system must believe that the law incorporates an idea of justice that includes a common good. Fourth, a decent people must have a '*decent consultation hierarchy*', in which the significant interests of all members of the people are taken into account.

Rawls then suggests that a decent hierarchical people would accept the Law of Peoples he earlier derived. He points out that decent people would be committed to it, given the commitments that they would have by the very definition of what counts as a decent people.

So what might be an example of a decent, non-liberal people that Rawls would be prepared to count as '*well ordered*'? Rawls describes a case of a hypothetical decent hierarchical people—'Kazanistan'—which he considers meets his requirements.

Rawls believes that Kazanistan can be admitted to the society of well-ordered peoples. In terms of its foreign policy, liberal societies should tolerate states such as Kazanistan. For those who have trouble with the idea that such a society should be considered as a member of the Society of Peoples—by which Rawls means something like the international community of all of those peoples who follow the principles of the Law of Peoples in their relations—Rawls believes that '*something like Kazanistan is the best we can realistically—and coherently—hope for*' (1999, p. 78). Moreover, he thinks that liberal peoples should '*try to encourage decent peoples and not frustrate their vitality by coercively insisting that all societies be liberal*' (1999, p. 62). By way of further defence of the view, Rawls argues that it is crucial that we maintain '*mutual respect among peoples*' (*ibid.*).

Another crucial area of difference between cosmopolitans and Rawls relates to our duties of assistance. According to Rawls, some societies '*lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered*' (1999, p. 106). Well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist such societies to become part of the society of well-ordered peoples. He then offers some further thoughts on the duty of assistance. The aim of assistance is to:

... help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of the society of well-ordered peoples. This defines the target of assistance. After it is achieved, further assistance is not required, even though the now well-ordered society may still be relatively poor.

(Rawls, 1999, p. 111)

The aim is to realize and preserve just (or decent) institutions that are self-sustaining. According to Rawls, the political culture of a burdened society is all-important to the levels of prosperity experienced in particular societies: wealth owes its origin and maintenance to the political culture of the society, rather than to, for example, its stock of resources (1999, p. 108). Indeed, he says:

I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their political virtues.

(Rawls, 1999, p. 108)

Rawls does engage directly with central claims made by some (although not all) cosmopolitans, who maintained that the principles of justice that applied in *A Theory of Justice*—particularly the difference principle—should apply globally. He takes up Charles Beitz's claim that, because a global system of cooperation already exists between states, a global difference principle should apply across states as well. Rawls argues against this, for a couple of reasons, but notably, as we have just seen, because he believes that wealth owes its origin and maintenance to the political culture of the society, rather than to its stock of resources, for example. Furthermore, any global principle of distributive justice that we endorse must have a target and a cut-off point, which are secured by ensuring the requirements of political autonomy. When a people are able to be self-determining and can manage their affairs '*reasonably and rationally*', we have discharged our duty of assistance.

BOX 13.3

Rawls on the duty of assistance

Two liberal or decent countries are at the same level of wealth (estimated, say, in primary goods) and have the same size population. The first decides to industrialize and to increase its rate of (real) saving, while the second does not. Being content with things as they are, and preferring a more pastoral and leisurely society, the second reaffirms its social values. Some decades later the first country is twice as wealthy as the second. Assuming, as we do, that both societies are liberal or decent, and their peoples free and responsible, and able to make their own decisions, should the industrializing country be taxed to give funds to the second? According to the duty of assistance there would be no tax, and that seems right; whereas with a global egalitarian principle without target, there would always be a flow of taxes as long as the wealth of one people was less than that of the other. This seems unacceptable.

(Rawls, 1999, p. 117)

KEY POINTS

- Rawls argues for the laws to which both liberal and non-liberal peoples could agree.
- He argues, first, that liberal peoples would endorse his Eight Principles and three global organizations, governing trade, loans to countries, and other common affairs.
- Decent peoples must satisfy four conditions: they must be peaceful; they must secure limited basic human rights; those who administer the law must believe that the law incorporates a common good idea of justice; there must be a decent consultation hierarchy.
- Decent peoples are legitimate members of the Society of Peoples. We must not coercively insist that all societies be liberal.
- We have a duty of assistance to help burdened societies to manage their affairs '*reasonably and rationally*'.
- Rawls argues against the application of a global difference principle on several grounds, such as that it does not contain a target and a cut-off point, and also that the causes of prosperity are traceable to local factors, such as culture, values, and character.

Some critical responses to Rawls' *Law of Peoples*

One of the most frequently raised objections is that the background picture Rawls invokes incorporates outmoded views of relations among states, peoples, and individuals of the world. Rawls presupposes that states are (sufficiently) independent of one another, so that each society can be held largely responsible for the well-being of its citizens. Furthermore, according to Rawls, differences in levels of wealth and prosperity are largely attributable to differences in political culture and the virtuous nature of its citizens.

Critics point out, however, that Rawls ignores both the extent to which unfavourable conditions may result from factors that are external to the society and that there are all sorts of morally relevant connections between states—notably, that they are situated in a global economic order that perpetuates the interests of wealthy developed states, with little regard for the interests of those that are poor and developing. We who live in the affluent, developed world cannot thus defensibly insulate ourselves from the misery of the worst off in the world, because we are complicit in keeping them in a state of poverty.

Pogge has done much to show the nature and extent of these incriminating connections (see, for example, Pogge, 1994; 2001; 2002). According to Pogge, two international institutions are particularly worrisome: the **international borrowing privilege** and the **international resource privilege**. Any group that exercises effective power in a state is recognized internationally as the legitimate government of that territory and the international community is not much concerned with how the group came to power, or what it does with that power. Oppressive governments may borrow freely on behalf of the country—that is, the international borrowing privilege—or dispose of its natural resources—that is, the international resource privilege—and these actions are legally recognized internationally. These two privileges have enormous implications for the

KEY CONCEPTS 13.3

The international borrowing privilege and the international resource privilege

The international borrowing privilege refers to the ability of governments to borrow amounts of money on behalf of the country and the obligation of the country to repay the debts.

The international resource privilege refers to the ability of governments to dispose of a country's natural resources in a way that is legally recognized internationally.

prosperity of poor countries, because they provide incentives for coup attempts, often influence the sorts of people that are motivated to seek power, facilitate oppressive governments being able to stay in power, and, should more democratic governments get to be in power, they are saddled with the debts incurred by their oppressive predecessors, thus significantly draining the country of resources needed to firm up fledgling democracies. All of this is disastrous for many poor countries.

Because foreigners benefit so greatly from the international resource privilege, they have an incentive to refrain from challenging the situation (or worse, to support or finance oppressive governments). For these sorts of reasons, the current world order largely reflects the interests of wealthy and powerful states. Local governments have little incentive to attend to the needs of the poor, because their being able to continue in power depends more on the local elite, foreign governments, and corporations. We in affluent developed countries have a responsibility to stop imposing this unjust global order and to mitigate the harms we have already inflicted on the world's most vulnerable people. As an initial proposal for us to begin to make some progress in the right direction, Pogge suggests that we impose a global resource tax of roughly 1 per cent to fund improvements to the lives of the worst off in developing societies.

Critics point out, then, that Rawls ignores the extent to which societies suffering unfavourable conditions frequently result from global factors or, at any rate, from factors

KEY THINKERS 13.2

Thomas Pogge (1953–)

Pogge is one of the most influential contemporary theorists to have developed a cosmopolitan account of our global responsibilities. In *World Poverty and Human Rights* (2002), Pogge argues why people in high-income economies should be more concerned with eradicating global poverty than they are at present. Pogge stresses the increasing importance of global rules and social institutions, the design of which greatly affects the lives of people around the globe. He argues that, by imposing unjust global institutional arrangements—that foreseeably and avoidably perpetuate severe poverty and diseases in the less developed regions—today's affluent countries and their citizens are massively violating the human rights of the global poor.

BOX 13.4

Forst on global domination

[I]n the contemporary world the degree of globalized interdependence has reached a point where it is impossible not to speak of this context as one of justice: in addition to a global context of trade, there is now also a global context of production and of labor, and important actors in those spheres are to be characterized as 'transnational' (especially large companies); there is a global ecological context with all the problems of scarcity of resources, pollution, and so on; there is a global context of institutions from the United Nations to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as of nongovernmental institutions (Greenpeace and Amnesty International, for example); there is a global context of legal treaties and obligations, of technological interdependence (just think of the consequences of an aggressive virus emerging in the World Wide Web), of military co-operations as well as conflicts, of migration within and across continents; and there is, of course, an ever-growing global context of cultural production, consumption, and communication.

But in order to come to a realistic global perspective when thinking about transnational justice, one must take a closer, critical look at these phenomena. For once one takes the history and concrete character of these multiple relations into account, it is a euphemism to refer to them as 'cooperation' or 'interdependence' without further qualification, since such terms imply relations of reciprocity that are obviously absent. Rather, what emerges is a complex system of one-sided and largely coerced cooperation and dependency rather than interdependence. In other words, one sees a context of force and domination.

(Forst, 2001, pp. 165–6)

that are external to that society, and that national policies are often shaped, or even decided by, international factors. They also argue that the boundedness and separateness of political communities is difficult to sustain in today's world, due to phenomena such as globalization and integration (Hurrell, 2001). Rawls assumes that we can talk coherently of bounded political communities that can constitute self-sufficient schemes of political cooperation—but critics argue this is an untenable assumption. Some authors concentrate on showing that we actually have a system of global cooperation between societies and how this would give rise to obligations to the worst off (Hirsch, 2001). Others believe that it is insulting to characterize the relations between states of the world as cooperative, because, in reality, the relationship is rather one of domination and coercion (Forst, 2001).

Several critics, then, argue that the basic global structure is a scheme of coercive institutions that importantly affects individuals' life prospects. It should be transformed so that it becomes a fair scheme of cooperation among all citizens of the world. For many of these critics, this is best modelled by considering a global original position in which decision makers have no knowledge of any morally arbitrary features, including country of citizenship. Several argue that the outcome of such an exercise would yield a global difference principle requiring economic inequalities, just in case they work to improve the situation of the worst off in the world, or global equality of opportunity.

One commonly voiced complaint is that the notion of a people is not sufficiently clear or important to do the work that Rawls thinks it can do (Pogge, 1994; Kuper, 2000). Rawls often takes the boundaries of states to mark off distinct peoples and so his view

runs into difficulties. If we take a people to be constituted by commonalities such as shared language, culture, history, or ethnicity, then the official state borders and peoples do not coincide well. National territories are not typically comprised of a single people, nor is it clear that each individual belongs to one, and only one, people.

Furthermore, several critics charge that Rawls' reasons for excluding more socio-economic equality are unconvincing. As Pogge (1994) notes, Rawls assumes that representatives of peoples are interested in the justice of domestic institutions and care nothing about the well-being of members beyond what is essential for just domestic institutions. But why assume this? It is more plausible to assume that each delegate is interested not only in just domestic institutions, but also, all else being equal, in having '*a higher rather than a lower average standard of living*' (Pogge, 1994, p. 208). Even if this interest were only slight, the representatives would be inclined to adopt, at the very least, something like Pogge's global resource tax proposal. If delegates also know that great international inequality can negatively affect the institutions of domestic justice in poor countries, however, representatives would have at least a '*tie-breaking reason to favour a more egalitarian law of peoples over Rawls's*' (Pogge, 1994, p. 214). Critics also note substantial tension in the reasoning that Rawls offers for our interest in socio-economic equality at the domestic level and our apparent disinterest in this at the international level, claiming that the reasons for our interest in equality at the domestic level apply as well to the global.

Another common observation is that Rawls provides very little argument for why decent hierarchical societies would endorse the set of human rights he thinks would become part of the central Eight Principles defining the Law of Peoples. So, it is mysterious why hierarchical societies would choose to be bound by the abridged list of human rights as Rawls believes. Pogge claims that he can see no reason '*historical or philosophical, for believing that hierarchical societies, as such, would incorporate these human rights into their favoured law of peoples*' (1994, pp. 214–15). Liberal societies, by contrast, would want to add more to the list of human rights—for example, freedom of speech, democratic political rights, and equal liberty of conscience. In neither the case of decent hierarchical peoples nor liberal ones would the precise list that Rawls offers be chosen and, moreover, it is noted that the attempt to find a politically neutral Law of Peoples acceptable to both hierarchical and liberal peoples is not promising (Pogge, 1994, p. 215).

Rawls argues for a respectful relationship between states, as representatives of peoples. Indeed, he argues that liberal democratic regimes have an obligation to deal with illiberal decent hierarchical regimes as equals and not to endeavour to impose their values on them. Some might think that Rawls' views appropriately acknowledge the importance of our cultural or national affiliations. Andrew Kuper (2000) argues that Rawls may take cultural pluralism seriously, but that he does this at the expense of taking seriously the reasonable pluralism of *individual persons*. Well-ordered hierarchical societies may well contain individuals who hold liberal ideas; Rawls' account incorporates the wrong kind of toleration for such societies at the expense of liberal values. Rawls' view is not sufficiently sensitive to the individuals within states. Indeed, it would seem that Rawls, in defending non-liberal states as he has, would be forced to defend the rights of states to impose inegalitarian policies on its citizens, even if a majority of the citizens were vigorously against such policies (Blake, 2005, p. 23).

Rawls gets into this kind of bind, according to some critics, because of a mistaken view about what tolerance demands. There is also a debate about what the appropriate unit of toleration should be: legitimate differences among individuals or among peoples. Liberalism does, in certain cases, require commitment to tolerance of views that are not liberal—but critics argue that the appropriate object of toleration should be legitimate differences among individuals, not peoples, because this ensures better tolerance of legitimate differences among individual persons.



See chapter 6

Rawls aims at a realistic utopia, but critics charge that the result is neither sufficiently realistic nor utopian (Kuper, 2000, p. 653). First, you might think that he has not taken account of all the relevant realities: for example, of interdependence or domination in the global arena. To the extent that he has not captured all the salient realities, his Law of Peoples is not as workable, and likely to sustain ongoing cooperative political arrangements and relations between peoples. Furthermore, the view is not very utopian in that the ideals used are too tame to constitute much of an advance over the status quo. In his bow to realism, Rawls has tried to ensure that the Law of Peoples results in stability; yet according to critics, the Law of Peoples that he endorses might be unstable, because it allows tolerance of unjust regimes. Rawls' focus on getting agreement seems to lead him to tailor steps in his argument to produce a result that enjoys wide agreement. Indeed, according to Darrel Moellendorf (2002, p. 15), Rawls '*sacrifices full justice for wider agreement*'.

Other critics charge that Rawls' failure to include democratic rights is quite mistaken. Amartya Sen (1999, pp. 147–8, 154–5), for example, provides extensive evidence to support the claim that non-democratic regimes have severely adverse consequences for the well-being and human rights of those over whom they rule. Sen also argues that respect for human rights and ideas of democracy are not simply Western values, but rather that substantial elements of these ideas can be found in all major cultures, religions, and traditions.

Among those critics who are generally sympathetic to the Rawlsian framework, the most common move has been to 'redo' Rawlsian later views by appealing to his earlier work. This was very much the strategy of theorists such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, Andrew Kuper, and Darrel Moellendorf. Using this kind of approach, popular claims are that we should endorse a global difference principle and/or global equality of opportunity.

KEY POINTS

- One of the most common objections to Rawls' *Law of Peoples* is that he incorporates outdated views of relations among states, peoples, and individuals.
- Thomas Pogge highlights some of the moral connections that we have to people in developing countries. He argues that our failure to reform key aspects of the international order, such as the international resource privilege and the international borrowing privilege, implicates us in the misery of those suffering from poverty in developing countries. We in affluent developed countries must also make amends for the harm already inflicted, by implementing a global resource tax.
- Critics suggest that the notion of a people is not sufficiently clear or morally important to play the kind of role that Rawls assigns it in an account of global justice.

- Critics question whether the arguments for the Eight Principles are persuasive, especially those concerning limited assistance, the very short basic human rights list, and the omission of democratic rights.
- Critics argue that Rawls has not offered a realistic utopia, in that Rawls' account fails to be sufficiently realistic or utopian.

Global governance: what is it and why is it thought to be desirable?

Global governance refers to how we manage interests affecting residents of more than one state in the absence of a world government or state with a legitimate monopoly on the use of force (or with the ability to enforce laws or rules with legitimate authority). Although the United Nations Security Council has some authority to impose peace, its sphere of activity is limited and its legitimacy is often questioned (because decisions are made by a very small number of nations, rather than giving all nations an equal vote, for example). Moreover, theorists of global governance attend to a multiplicity of our interests besides securing peace. Those who write about global governance are often concerned with interests in areas such as the economy, trade, the environment, or health. Even though one particular body may not currently have legitimate authority to enforce rules, there may be several mechanisms for encouraging compliance and accountability (such as mechanisms concerning consumer choices in the market, citizens' decisions, NGO activities, professional codes of conduct, self-regulation of industries, etc.).

There are two main kinds of argument that can be marshalled to show why global governance is desirable:

- that global governance is necessary, in practice, to deal effectively with our global problems;
- that global governance is required by considerations of justice.

The two sets are hard to separate sometimes, because they often rely on each other.

1. Many pressing problems have global reach

Various significant collective problems have global reach or implications. Collectively, we face threats to well-being and security on a variety of fronts. One obvious case is that of environmental concerns. Some of our decisions, actions, and interactions create conditions that affect us all. Chlorofluorocarbon use in a particular country can destroy the ozone layer, which means that our shield from harmful radiation is ruptured and rendered ineffective, which can significantly affect people who live in an entirely different part of the world from that in which those chemicals are released. An AIDS, SARS, or Avian Flu epidemic in one country can easily spread to others. Someone who has access to weapons of mass destruction in one region can threaten the security of millions in another region. Global problems require global cooperation for effective solution.

2. Interdependence

As just noted, interdependencies of various kinds exist. We are internationally interdependent in several areas: for example, in security, health, trade, travel, and communication. One notable area of interdependence is economic—especially under globalization. This global economic interdependence produces significant benefits, such as a higher rate of economic growth and greater efficiency in production. But participation in the world economy is by no means on equal terms. Some participants have vastly more power than others, depending on a variety of factors, such as the range of products available for export and the perceived value of those exports. A notable example here is the way in which oil-producing countries enjoy significant power in the world economy.

3. Benefiting from injustice

As we have already seen in the previous section, some argue that we are situated in a global economic order that perpetuates the interests of wealthy developed states, with very little regard for the interests of those that are poor and developing. By participating in a global economic order that is governed by unfavourable terms for the worst off, we are complicit in keeping those who live in desperate poverty from moving out of this condition. If we make no reasonable efforts at institutional reform, benefiting from unjust institutional schemes implicates us in them. According to Pogge, everyone has duties to everyone else not to cooperate in imposing an unjust institutional scheme on others. Our responsibilities must keep track with the fact that we are now all part of one global institutional scheme. We cannot insulate ourselves from moral culpability for the practices we support and the institutions in which we participate.

But rather than simply benefiting from unjust institutional *schemes*, some argue that we benefit (or have benefited) more directly from historical or current exploitation.

BOX 13.5

Young on exploitation

Some scholars argue that the current wealth of Europe and North America compared to societies of Africa, Latin America, and South Asia is due in part to the persistence of colonial relations between North and South. The economies of the South depend on capital investment controlled from the North and most of whose profits return to Northern-held corporations. Their workers are often too poorly paid by multinationals or their local contractors to feed their families, and farmers and miners of the South obtain unfavorable prices on a global resource market.

Such deprivation has forced many economies and governments of the southern hemisphere into severe debt to Northern banks and international finance agencies. This indebtedness restricts the effective **sovereignty** of many Southern states, because powerful financial institutions outside them exercise effective control over their internal economic policies. The standard of living and well-being of many people within their jurisdictions declines because of structural adjustment policies outsiders press them to adopt for the sake of foreign investor confidence or international financial stability.

(Young, 2000, p. 248)

4. Associational relations

Some view duties of justice as generated by our associational relations and so argue for global duties of justice in this way. A good representative argument is that of Darrel Moellendorf. His view is that associational relations generate duties of justice—in particular, our economic associations do this. Duties of justice are conventional: they do not arise from the nature of personhood or in virtue of what each person owes all others. Rather, '*duties of justice arise between persons when activities such as politics or commerce bring persons into association*' (2002, p. 32). People can be in association whether or not they intend this association, and this is especially so in the case of economic association. Moellendorf believes that we are now in a situation of owing global duties of justice, because of the global nature of economic association.

But although there is much that is certainly plausible about this kind of argument, it is also vulnerable to criticism such as: why think that the mere fact of interaction should generate duties (Blake, 2005)? Perhaps it is not mere economic association that generates the necessary obligations, but a conjunction of facts: for example, the scope of economic association, that it is no longer voluntary, and that it is sometimes heavily exploitative.

5. What all humans are owed as humans

In contrast to the view that associational relations generate duties of justice, others argue that our duties of justice stem from the nature of personhood, or humanity—or, at any rate, apply to all human beings, irrespective of our associational relations to them. All humans are owed certain kinds of treatment simply in virtue of their being human beings and the basic threshold of adequate treatment includes duties of justice. One way in which to launch the argument proceeds from the observation that vast differences in wealth, power, distribution of natural resources, etc. mean that there are huge asymmetries in the prospects that people have for decent lives and in what those lives consist. The society into which you happen to be born can be a major factor in the sorts of life chances that you are likely to enjoy and the life expectancy, job, income, and level of unemployment that you can anticipate, etc. According to this kind of argument, we should care about what all humans are owed as humans and so we cannot be unmoved by such considerations.

The human rights approach captures the key ideas reasonably well here, although it is not necessary to appeal to human rights to make this kind of argument.

6. Concerns about power, and its effects on freedom and democracy

Differences in levels of power between states mean that there are significant differences in prospects for domination among people in the world. Power differences also entail significant differences for authentic democracy.

7. Ensuring burdens are more evenly shared

Without proper global governance, some can perform morally heinous actions with impunity: for example, multinationals that are neither fully accountable to home or host country governments, and that refuse to take appropriate responsibility for their actions. (Examples might include Union Carbide's actions in Bhopal or



KEY TEXTS 13.2**Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (1995)**

Held argues that nation states are embedded in complex interdependence and power relations, making them no longer always capable of guaranteeing democracy, autonomy, or sometimes even the basic well-being of citizens. Held reconstructs an account of democracy, whereby the goal of international institutions and organizations should be to oversee democratic progress. He also discusses various mechanisms that could help us to approximate the ideal of democracy more closely: for example, making greater use of referenda and allocating public funding for deliberative bodies, such as a second chamber of the United Nations, only for democratic nations in which representatives would be elected and accountable directly to democratic peoples.

Nestlé's marketing of infant feeding formula in less developed countries.) Without a concerted effort to create a universal system of norms with reasonable enforcement, some may find it rational not to pay the costs associated with a more level playing field. Moreover, because there is already something that approximates a system of global governance, surely we should ensure that it is a fair one, in which the benefits—and especially burdens—of cooperation and interdependence are fairly shared? The concern is a more general one, as I discuss next.

8. We already have a system of global governance

The significant amount of interdependence that exists has already led to the development of a global regulative structure that governs the world economy and the system of trade. Besides these formal regulations, a variety of informal practices and expectations, built up through repeated transactions, order our interactions at the global level. Because these shared practices, rules, and institutions already exist, we can defensibly investigate whether the terms that govern these (and their consequences) are fair ones. According to this line of argument, we already have a system of global governance, so why not ensure that it is fair?

Many argue that, although there is an effective system of governance that is in place to promote trade and investment worldwide, this governance system is quite contrary to democracy and the interests of billions of people whose lives it influences. We need to ensure that our de facto system of global governance better serves these important interests. This would involve, for example, making the system of governance that regulates trade and investment more inclusive, accountable, and democratic, but it should also include the setting up (or reform) of alternative governance structures to complement this emphasis on economic prosperity.

What models are there for systems of global governance that better realize these desiderata? Those developing the project called 'cosmopolitan democracy' or 'global social democracy' have much to say on this topic.

KEY POINTS

- Global governance refers to the management of interests affecting residents of more than one state, in the absence of a single body that has legitimate authority to enforce rules.
- Arguments for the desirability of global governance include that many pressing problems have global scope and our fates are interdependent in many domains. Moreover, because we already have a de facto system of global governance, we ought to ensure that it is fairer than it currently is. We have duties to ensure a fairer system of global governance (it is variously argued), given our associations with others in the global economic order, the benefits we derive from it, what all humans are owed as humans, concerns about power, and its effects on freedom and democracy, ensuring that burdens are more evenly shared, and the fact that our current system of global governance is unfair.

Conclusion

What would a globally just world look like? Would it consist of self-governing autonomous peoples who respect each others' rights to introduce laws of their choosing, even if they violate key liberal ideas, such as freedom from discrimination in holding political office, as Rawls' *Law of Peoples* allows? Does Rawls' limited duty of assistance—that is, ensuring the essentials of political autonomy, even though people may still be quite poor—adequately capture the extent of what we owe one another? Alternatively, would a globally just world include redistribution according to a global difference principle, such that inequalities in socio-economic goods would only be justified when they serve to improve the position of the world's worst off? Might global justice require a commitment to global equality of opportunity or a global resource tax, as some of Rawls' critics maintain?

As we have seen, there is a vigorous debate on such questions between Rawls and his critics. A key difference between the parties is whether the unit of equality should be peoples or individuals. For Rawls, we must promote equality among peoples; cosmopolitans believe each individual person deserves a certain kind of equal treatment and respect that Rawls' account seems to ignore. Another main point of difference revolves around different views about the relations among states, peoples, and individuals, and different views concerning the causes of prosperity—whether they are ultimately traceable to local or global factors. Rawls hopes to have presented a realistic utopia, but his critics argue that he has not succeeded, in that his account is neither sufficiently realistic nor utopian.

Whatever vision of global justice you endorse, the extent of global poverty must constitute one of the central obstacles to realizing global justice in the world today. The case study will suggest important reforms to current practices that could considerably alleviate one of the most important stumbling blocks to a globally just world,

such that we can better enable the poor in developing countries to help themselves better.

Another area in which we could make progress in relation to realizing a more just world concerns better global governance arrangements. Many pressing problems have global scope and our fates are interdependent in many domains. We have duties to ensure a fairer system of global governance (it is variously argued), given our associations with others in the global economic order, the benefits we derive from it, what all humans are owed as humans, concerns about power, and its effects on freedom and democracy, and ensuring that burdens are more evenly shared. Moreover, because we already have a de facto system of global governance, we ought to ensure that it is fairer than it currently is. Again, the case study will suggest ways in which reforms to our current global accounting, taxation, and disclosure practices might easily be introduced, and how such reforms would help to close the gap between theory and practice in realizing global justice.

CASE STUDY

Funding to address global poverty

Global poverty has reached staggering proportions. On some estimates, about 20 per cent of the world's population now subsists below the international poverty line. Those living in this condition have lives that are characterized by severe deprivation, as evidenced by their being unable to meet their basic needs—because, for example, they lack access to safe drinking water, basic sanitation, adequate shelter, or are severely undernourished. Half the population of the world—nearly three billion people—live on less than US\$2 per day. As Kofi Annan, ex-UN Secretary General, recently said: '[Y]et even this statistic fails to capture the humiliation, powerlessness and brutal hardship that is the daily lot of the world's poor.'

Current global poverty is one of the most pressing obstacles to realizing global justice. There are several ways in which we can assist those in poor countries better to help themselves. Small reforms to international practices can better promote a culture of more accountability and responsiveness to the needs of those suffering from such severe poverty. In this case study, I show relatively simple ways in which we can promote the interests of the world's worst off by simple reforms to some of our current practices, such as those governing the sale of resources and those governing accounting practices in the world today. We first discuss our international double standards in the sale of resources and why we should aim for consistency.

International double standards: why we should aim for consistency

Foreign aid, although desirable, is by no means always necessary to finance improvements for the worst off. In many cases, the revenue that would be derived simply from resource sales, if it were to be actually received and properly spent, would be more than enough to finance the necessary provisions for helping people to meet their needs.¹ This is especially clear if we look at the case of oil and the crippling corruption that sometimes surrounds its sale.

Consider how, for example, US\$1.4bn in oil revenue disappeared in Angola in 2001—an amount equal to about a third of state revenue. Because the international oil companies refuse to disclose how much money they paid for oil in Angola, it is impossible for Angolans to monitor where money paid for oil actually went. Natural resources should be held in trust by the state for the benefit of (at least) all citizens of a country. Citizens thus should be entitled

to information concerning the sale of their resources. Moreover, recognition of ownership of these resources is acknowledged in the law of developing countries. For example, Angolan law establishes that all underground or continental shelf liquid and gaseous deposits of hydrocarbons within the national territory are the property of the Angolan people. If they do so belong, those people are entitled to information about how their resources are being managed. Such information helps citizens to keep governments accountable for the sale of their resources and the management of revenues that are thereby generated. This information is standardly disclosed in the developed world and the extension to the developing world is long overdue. A promising way to prevent such corruption is to ensure that oil payments become more transparent. This is standard practice in the developed world, for example, when oil companies operate in Europe's North Sea or the Gulf of Mexico.

This problem is very serious. For example, in Angola, oil revenue makes up about 90 per cent of the state budget. It is estimated that, during the last five years, about a third of the entire state budget has disappeared. The United Nations has been relied on to assist with the shortfall. A similar picture emerges in many other developing countries—notably, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea.

Regulation is clearly needed. Relying on voluntary disclosure tends to punish the more scrupulous and risk their business being transferred to less scrupulous operators. Indeed, when BP announced that it intended to publish what it had paid for oil, it was threatened with termination of its contract. Required payment disclosure is the only fair option, because it levels the playing field for all, and eliminates the current international double standard between required levels of transparency in the developed and developing world. Companies can be made to publish what they pay by various mechanisms: for example, it might easily be made a condition for the listing of oil companies on major stock exchanges (such as those of London or New York) that they adopt the transparency practice.

The lessons we learn about the case of oil seem quite generalizable. More transparency in payments and in the flow of money to less developed countries, more generally, would eliminate the ease with which corruption can flourish and would ensure that payments intended to benefit the citizens of a country actually do so.

Tax avoidance, tax havens, and transfer pricing: how they exacerbate global poverty

There are many ways in which reforms to our tax laws can better assist with the goal of alleviating global poverty. By understanding some of the current tax practices that are widely used in the world today, we can see that many of the beneficiaries of globalization are shirking their responsibilities, both to their home societies and to the societies in which they do business, through avoiding paying taxes. Failure to pay taxes has a dramatic effect on all countries, but especially on developing ones. States are not usually able to collect all of the taxes they are owed—especially from powerful multinational corporations—which results in substantial losses in revenues. Receiving more of the taxes that poor developing countries are owed will allow these countries enormous sources of funds with which they could do much to address some of the structural causes of local poverty, which might include having more resources for education, job training, health care, infrastructural development, capital investment, and so on. In this way, we would be better enabling those in poor countries to help themselves.

It seems to be quite easy for at least some people to avoid paying taxes in today's world. It is estimated, for example, that one third of total Gross Domestic Product is held offshore in tax havens or otherwise effectively beyond the reach of taxation.¹ It is further estimated that

about half of all world trade passes through tax haven jurisdictions, as profits are shifted to places where tax can be avoided.³ The policy of transfer pricing and other complex financial structures—which I will discuss shortly—reduce transparency, thus facilitating tax evasion. It is estimated that, through such schemes, developing countries lose revenue that is greater than the annual flow of aid.⁴ Locating just 0.5 per cent of the holdings in tax havens could be enough to finance fully the United Nations' Development Goals for 2015, thereby halving global poverty.⁵

Tax evasion threatens both development and democracy, especially in developing countries. Because large corporations and wealthy individuals are effectively avoiding taxation, the tax burden is frequently shifted onto ordinary citizens and smaller businesses. Governments often thereby collect much-reduced sums that are insufficient to achieve minimal goals of social justice, such as providing decent public goods and services. Cuts in social spending are inevitable and these cuts can have a dramatic effect on other goals, such as developing and maintaining robust democracies. Moreover, because most developing countries are in competition in trying to attract foreign capital, offering tax breaks or tax havens may seem to provide an attractive course. But as states compete to offer tax exemptions to capital, the number of tax havens increases, thereby making all developing countries worse off. Corporations pay much reduced, if any, taxes, and ordinary citizens have to bear more of the cost of financing the social and public goods necessary for sustaining well-functioning communities.

The use of tax havens is an important channel for tax evasion and constitutes a major reason why many corporations pay very little, or even no, income tax. Economic activity is often declared as occurring in places within which taxes are low or non-existent, rather than accurately recorded as occurring where it actually took place.

'Transfer' pricing is a recognized accounting term for sales and purchases that occur within the same company or group of companies. Because these transactions occur within the company, there is wide scope to trade at arbitrary prices, instead of at market-attuned ones. If a multinational company has a factory in one country, but sells its products to foreign subsidiaries in other countries, it can artificially construct the buy and sell prices to record a loss, because the trade occurs within the same company. A multinational company, for example, may have a factory in country F. The factory produces products—say, microwave ovens—for US\$50 and sells these to a subsidiary in the same group that is based in country T, which is a tax haven. The company's accountants might define the price of the transfer as the cost of production: in this case, US\$50. Then, the subsidiary in T sells the product to a foreign subsidiary in country S for US\$200. If the price of the good to consumers in country S is US\$150, the good has then been sold at a loss of US\$50, technically. Because the cost of the good from the tax-haven country, S, is US\$200 and the sale price is US\$150, a net loss of US\$50 may be recorded in country S—a loss that can be offset against other taxes to be paid (in country S). Despite a real profit of US\$100 (US\$150–US\$50—that is, the actual sales price less the actual cost of production), the company ends up declaring a net tax loss. These accounting schemes, and variations on these general themes, are extremely widespread and currently perfectly legal. About 60 per cent of all world trade occurs within multinational corporations, with about 50 per cent passing through tax havens.⁶

The Tax Justice Network calls for the initiation of a democratic global forum, comprised of representatives from citizen groups and governments across the world, which should engage in widespread debate on these issues and the possibility of implementing policies such as the following.

1. We should develop systems of unitary taxation for multinationals to put a stop to the entirely false shifting of profits to countries with low or no taxes.
2. States should cooperate with each other to reduce the destructive effects of tax competition between themselves.
3. They should consider the possibility of '*establishing regional and global tax authorities that can represent the interests of citizens*'.⁷

Whereas such reforms might have seemed quite out of the question pre-September 2001, since 9/11, there is considerable interest in phasing out tax havens. Loopholes in international taxation greatly assisted in financing terrorist organizations. In light of this, there is substantial support for setting international standards for transparency in accounting and for better monitoring of all flows of money.

Global taxes: some possibilities

As we have seen, Thomas Pogge suggested that we introduce a global tax to begin to make amends for the unjust global order that we have been imposing on the poor in developing countries. So what prospects are there for introducing global taxes in the world today?

In fact, we do already have some global taxes, for example, on deep seabed mining, which were incorporated in the UN Law of the Sea Convention in the 1980s. Furthermore, recommendations for various global taxes have a fairly long history. A number of proposals have been made for various global taxes. There has been much research on these various taxes, including on how they could be fairly implemented and their predicted effects, and several governments—such as those of France, The Netherlands, Brazil, and Austria—have given their support to the idea for some time now. In general, much support for these taxes has been expressed, but powerful interest groups in many rich countries have sometimes reacted negatively towards these ideas.

Two taxes, in particular, have gained attention:

- a tax on the carbon content of commercial fuels—commonly referred to as a carbon tax;
- a currency transaction tax—often referred to as a **Tobin Tax**, after James Tobin, who first floated the idea in the 1970s.

It is estimated that well over half of the US\$1tn in currency transactions that occur every day are speculative and, as such, are potentially destabilizing to local economies.⁸ Local currencies can devalue rapidly, causing major financial crises, such as those that occurred in East Asia in 1997–98, Brazil in 1999, and Argentina in 2001. When the local economy is in the grip of such crises, millions of people can be significantly harmed.

In the 1970s, James Tobin suggested a small tax on currency trades to ward off such eventualities, to '*throw sand in the wheels*' of the markets, slowing down speculation and promoting more long-term investing. The purpose of such a tax would be to reduce destabilizing trades and the order of magnitude proposed is considerably less than 1 per cent on each trade. The tax would promote more stability and the conditions for development, and, depending on how low it was set, this might be achieved without damaging positive market operations.⁹

The USA, Japan, the European Union, Switzerland, Hong Kong, and Singapore account for 90 per cent of currency exchange transactions. It is hard to believe that we could not collect the tax effectively from such countries if the will were to be mobilized to do so,

because the tax could easily be imposed at the point of settlement and could be levied through computer programs installed in banks and financial institutions. Currency deals already carry an administrative charge in most countries—certainly, in the main currency exchange countries—so the administrative feasibility of such a tax is already plain. A tax of just 0.2 per cent is predicted to raise about US\$300bn annually.

The tax has had considerable support not only from NGOs, but has also gained mass backing from politicians and others—including George Soros, who himself made billions through speculative trades, and more than 800 Members of Parliament from five continents, who signed an international declaration in support of the tax.

A number of other proposals have been made, but have not received the same levels of support and attention as the Tobin and carbon taxes, although some seem clearly worthy of much support. These others include an email tax, a tax on world trade, a tax on international arms trade, and aviation fuel taxes.

QUESTIONS

1. What principles does Rawls argue might regulate the interactions of liberal and non-liberal peoples in the world?
2. What does Rawls mean by 'decent peoples'?
3. What duties of assistance do we have, according to Rawls?
4. Why does Rawls argue against the endorsement of a global difference principle?
5. Do you think Rawls' example of Kazakhstan constitutes a decent people who should be admitted to the society of well-ordered peoples?
6. How does Thomas Pogge argue that we, in affluent developed countries, are morally connected to global poverty in developing countries? What actions does he suggest we take?
7. How do critics challenge the eight principles that form the basis of Rawls' Law of Peoples?
8. Has Rawls offered a realistic utopia? Why does Rawls think he has? Why do critics think he has failed?
9. In what ways do cosmopolitans disagree with Rawls' account of justice at the global level?
10. What is global governance? Why is it desirable?

FURTHER READING

- Caney, S. (2005) *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Examines the principles that should govern global politics.
- Held, D. (2004) *Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus*, Cambridge: Polity Press. An accessible overview of ways in which we could improve the global order, such that the result is a more democratic and just basic institutional structure.
- Jones, C. (1999) *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Argues for a form of cosmopolitanism involving protecting human rights, while also defending the view from several varieties of critics.

- Kuper, A. (2004) *Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Develops an account of representation so that we can ensure the global order is more responsive to the interests of the world's people.
- Mandle, J. (2006) *Global Justice*, Cambridge: Polity Press. One of the best, most accessible, introductory books on global justice, surveying core concepts and central debates, while also promoting a distinctive view about an account of global justice, inspired by Rawls' *Law of Peoples*.
- Martin, R. and Reidy, D. (2006) *Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?*, Malden, MA: Blackwell. A good, balanced mix of critical and defensive essays on Rawls' *Law of Peoples*.
- Moellendorf, D. (2002) *Cosmopolitan Justice*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. One of the best contemporary comprehensive accounts of global justice published to date, covering theoretical and public policy issues.
- Nussbaum, M. (2006) *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. In which Nussbaum, one of the most influential contemporary cosmopolitans, develops her capabilities approach to issues of justice, including global justice.
- Pogge, T. (2002) *World Poverty and Human Rights*, Cambridge: Polity Press. Contains some of Pogge's most influential writing on our global responsibilities, including more details of the global resources tax that he recommends.
- Tan, K.-C. (2004) *Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Argues that cosmopolitan justice can adequately take account of the appropriate nationalistic and patriotic commitments that people have.

WEB LINKS

- www.camdun-online.gn.apc.org The Campaign for a More Democratic United Nations aims to reform the UN to make it more democratic.
- www.cceia.org The Carnegie Council is a resource for ethics in international affairs, declaring itself 'the voice for ethics in international policy'.
- www.ceedweb.org/iirp The Tobin Tax Initiative provides a range of resources on the Tobin Tax proposal.
- www.globalpolicy.org The Global Policy Forum contains a good range of current articles relating to progress towards global justice or suggestions for reform.
- www.international-political-theory.net International Political Theory is a resource that includes links to excellent, just-published, scholarly articles on topics in international political theory.

ENDNOTES

¹ New Zealand Herald (2002) 'Oil and corruption', 9 April, p. 10.

² See Oxfam (2000).

³ French Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn speaking to the Paris Group of Experts in March 1999, quoted in Christensen and Hampton (1999).

⁴ Oxfam (2000) p. 3.

- ⁵ Christian Aid (2005) p. 11.
- ⁶ Sikka (2003), p. 11.
- ⁷ Declaration of the Tax Justice Network, p. 4, available online at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=17.
- ⁸ Wahl and Waldow (2001).
- ⁹ See Paul and Wahlberg (2002) pp. 6–9.



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