```
40
                THUCK - (TCH(b)/WKT-T)/WKT
                return index, value
       29
       30 v def Xiph(cipher,plain,kl):
s.md
                # iterate the plaintext, count the number of repetitions
       31
.. U
                idx, val = vul(cipher, plain, kl)
       32
       33
                counter=0
                counter exepted= (len(plain)+kl-1)//kl
       34
                v = idx
       35
                while(counter < counter exepted -1):
       36 ×
                     tmp=-1
       37
                    for x in range(v,len(cipher)):
       38 ~
                         if( cipher[x] == (plain[kl*counter+idx] + val) %27):
       39 ~
       40
                             tmp=x
                             break
```

Last Byte Oracle

vr)-1):

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Outline

- Project Recall
- A 20 lines solution
- Performance
- New Challenges



What do we know?

We know 5 plaintext candidates, the encryption scheme, and the ciphertext.

Plaintext Length == 500





Ciphertext Length = = 500 + Ir

.....

Plaintext Key'(concatenate the key until the length >=500, and cut the redundant part) Ciphertext'(Ciphertext without the random characters)

If We have an Oracle which knows the location of each random character, we could eliminate these characters.

Plaintext (denoted as P) Key' (denoted as K') Ciphertext' (denoted as C')

- Shift(P[x],K'[x])=C'[x]
- It's easy to revers if there is no randomness

Plaintext (denoted as P) Key' (denoted as K') Ciphertext' (denoted as C')

- If randomness exists
- Statistical (It's hard because of randomness)
- Brute force:

Combination(500+lr,lr)

How can I make advantages?

Vulnerability Discovery and Exploit

Plaintext Length == 500

Key' (denoted as K')

A fact you did not notice: P[-1] + K'[-1] = C[-1](mod 27)

Ciphertext Length == 500 + Ir

$$P[-1] + K'[-1] = C[-1]$$

$$K'[-1] = K[IDX], IDX = (500 - 1) mod Len(K)$$

 $K'[IDX] = K'[-1] = Val, Val = (C[-1] - P[-1]) mod 27$

How do we eliminate the 4 bad candidates?

In the scheme, the original key is repeatedly used. (We could take advantage from it!)

How many times has the key been used?

$$(500 + len(k) - 1)/(len(k))$$
, for example, $len(k) = 24 \rightarrow (500 + 23)/(24 = 21)$

How many times has the K[IDX] been used?

$$(500 + len(k) - 1)//len(k)$$
 or $(500 + len(k) - 1)//len(k) - 1$

An exploit comes out!

We could use the "additional" information to build a filter Compare the expected_counter to the counter. If a candidate can pass the filter, it maybe the plaintext If can't, pass the filter. It's NOT the plaintext (100%) What about the possibility of fail. ~=0.015

J.00, success

0.05, success = 100.

0.10, success = 100.0%

0.15, success = 100.0%

 $0.20, \, \text{success} = 100.9$

0.25, success

	Success 1					
	5 Choices	10 Choices	50 Choices	100 Choices	10000 Choices	
r=0	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
r=0.05	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
r=0.1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
15	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	100%	100%	100%	100%		

How about the performance?
Fast and precise!
I can do it all day!

	Time Cost for Per Run					
	Choices	10 Choices	50 Choices	100 Choices	10000 Choices	
\	0.003930019s	0.007775409s	0.038110003s	0.09424866s	7.435941219s	
	0.003968138s	0.00903297s	0.042688169s	0.094910076s	8.461290359s	
	\4464785s	0.008744225s	0.045663726s	0.097951498s	8.462076902s	
	`15s	0.008976836s	0.049627956s	0.095542486s	8.945510149s	
		∩09758241s	0.051130914s	0.097419448s	9.582294941s	
			0.04962585s	0.099855525s	9.969549894s	

```
# r = 0.00, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.05, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.10, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.15, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.20, success = 99.96%

# r = 0.25, success = 99.60%
```

```
# r = 0.00, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.05, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.10, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.15, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.20, success = 100.0%

# r = 0.25, success = 99.76%
```

Result For Part One

- The longest time for our program is 281.1690323352814 seconds for testing 10000 test cases.
- No matter if the last byte of the ciphertext is a random character, I can give the correct answer with success rate ~=100%

Extra Credit

Success Rate for Different Plaintext Spaces

	5 Choices	10 Choices	50 Choices	100 Choices	10000 Choices
r=0	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
r=0.05	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
r=0.1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
r=0.15	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
r=0.2	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
r=0.25	99.7%	100%	99.5%	99.0%	80.0%

Time Cost for Per Run

	5 Choices	10 Choices	50 Choices	100 Choices	10000 Choices
r=0	0.003930019s	0.007775409s	0.038110003s	0.09424866s	7.435941219s
r=0.05	0.003968138s	0.00903297s	0.042688169s	0.094910076s	8.461290359s
r=0.1	0.004464785s	0.008744225s	0.045663726s	0.097951498s	8.462076902s
r=0.15	0.004602315s	0.008976836s	0.049627956s	0.095542486s	8.945510149s
r=0.2	0.004800907s	0.009758241s	0.051130914s	0.097419448s	9.582294941s
r=0.25	0.005057936s	0.010028378s	0.04962585s	0.099855525s	9.969549894s

Thank You!

What if the last byte is random?

What if random=40%?

What if the length of key is 60?

What really helps me to attack?

The "extra" information is not important,

What really matters is

the key is repeatedly used → Build filters to win!

X-Turbo-Fan Filter Array for different index

- A simple idea to make full use of "Repeated use of the key"
- Concatenate Filters
- TurboFan & Reversed TurboFan

```
tmp = copy.copy(res)
for x in range(5):
   if(res[x]!=0):
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-1],D1[x][:-1])# turbofan-1
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-2],D1[x][:-1])# turbofan-1
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-3],D1[x][:-1])# turbofan-1
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-2],D1[x][:-2])# turbofan-2
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-3],D1[x][:-2])# turbofan-2
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-4],D1[x][:-2])# turbofan-2
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-5],D1[x][:-2])# turbofan-2
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-6],D1[x][:-2])# turbofan-2
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-3],D1[x][:-3])# turbofan-3
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-4],D1[x][:-3])# turbofan-3
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-5],D1[x][:-3])# turbofan-3
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-6],D1[x][:-3])# turbofan-3
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-7],D1[x][:-3])# turbofan-3
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-8],D1[x][:-3])# turbofan-3
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-4],D1[x][:-4])# turbofan-4
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-5],D1[x][:-4])# turbofan-4
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-6],D1[x][:-4])# turbofan-4
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-7],D1[x][:-4])# turbofan-4
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-8],D1[x][:-4])# turbofan-4
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-9],D1[x][:-4])# turbofan-4
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-10],D1[x][:-4])# turbofan-
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-11],D1[x][:-4])# turbofan-
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-5],D1[x][:-5])# turbofan-5
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-6],D1[x][:-5])# turbofan-5
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-7],D1[x][:-5])# turbofan-5
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-8],D1[x][:-5])# turbofan-5
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-9],D1[x][:-5])# turbofan-5
        tmp[x]+=pwn(c[:-10],D1[x][:-5])# turbofan-
```

```
lol = c[::-1]
hah = D1[x][::-1]
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol,hah)# reversed-turbofan-1
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-1],hah)# reversed-turbofan-
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-2],hah)# reversed-turbofan-
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-1],hah[:-1])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-2],hah[:-1])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-3],hah[:-1])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-2],hah[:-2])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-3],hah[:-2])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-4],hah[:-2])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-5],hah[:-2])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-6],hah[:-2])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-3],hah[:-3])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-4],hah[:-3])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-5],hah[:-3])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-6],hah[:-3])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-7],hah[:-3])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-4],hah[:-4])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-5],hah[:-4])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-6],hah[:-4])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-7],hah[:-4])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-8],hah[:-4])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-5],hah[:-5])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-6],hah[:-5])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-7],hah[:-5])# reversed-turb
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-8],hah[:-5])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-9],hah[:-5])# reversed-turbo
tmp[x]+=pwn(lol[:-10],hah[:-5])# reversed-turk
```


Optimization (Randomness=40%) From Original Result(63.8%) to Final Result(97.5%)

- Delete part of "Gap Check" Filter, Because it would wrongly eliminate some valid candidates ⇒ 12% success ⇒ 75.6%
- turbofan *2 without considering the randomness ⇒ + 15% success ⇒ %90.8
- Delete all the "Gap Check" in Filter, +1% success ⇒ 91.6%
- turbofan *2 with considering the randomness \Rightarrow +3.6% success \Rightarrow 95.2%
- turbofan *3 \Rightarrow +2% \Rightarrow 97.3%
- Multi-Level turbofan ⇒ +0.2% ⇒ 97.5% turbofan


Oracle vs Orgr

Tips: The shape of Orgr is like a cute Tyrannosaurus

Time Cost for Per Run (What if we have more than 5 choice)




Oracle vs Orgr






Time Cost for Per 100 Run for Different Randomness



Orgr

Posibility of Win the Game for Different Randomness



How did I solve it?

- Repeated use of the key
 - Catch the nature of the problem
- Read & Try
 - We don't need to get the password/we have plaintext already
 - I tried 4 ways to solve the problem, what you can see is the best two
- Sit down & Think
 - Cybersecurity & Cryptography is a kind of magic
 - Vulnerability Discovery & Exploit is a kind of art