JSON Web Tokens (JWT) Attacks

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1.1. JSON


```
"4afadf00acff2e0bd29a11ebfdaef56d": {
"extensions": ["log", "asm", "dot"],
"status": "success"
},
"4b190749eec02de25e9f2f0617540a4c": {
"extensions": ["log"],
"status": "error"
"8c139876f8cfab51c14385e6f0d293bc": {
"extensions": ["asm", "dot"],
"status": "success"
```

JSON (JavaScript Object Notation):

- a lightweight, languageindependent data format
- is designed for data transmission and storage.
- Has a similar structure with JavaScript objects
- key-value pairs enclosed in curly braces { } separated by commas.

- Traditional authentication methods: session cookie
- Session: saves log in state in server side
- Cookie: contains session ID in client side (Session and Persistent)
- → Number of users authenticated ~ cost of storage
- → Session is recorded on a specific server → user can only access on that server
- → Do not contain much authentication data
- → Some vulnerabilities: session hijacking, CSRF,...

JWT: an open standard (RFC 7519) for transmitting authentication information between a server and a client as a secure JSON string with a digital signature.



Valid JWT Signature Verified eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwi

YWRtaW4iOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTUxNjIzOTAyMn0.KMUFsIDTnFmyG3nMiGM6H9FNFUROf3wh7SmqJp-QV30

JWT structure:

```
JSON CLAIMS TABLE

{
    "alg": "HS256",
    "typ": "JWT"
}
```

```
JSON CLAIMS TABLE

{
    "sub": "1234567890",
    "name": "John Doe",
    "admin": true,
    "iat": 1516239022
}
```

```
JWT SIGNATURE VERIFICATION (OPTIONAL)

Enter the secret used to sign the JWT below:

SECRET

Valid secret

a-string-secret-at-least-256-bits-long
```

JWT header:



Valid JWT Signature Verified ey]hbGci0iJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIi0iIxMjM0NTY30DkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwi YWRtaW4iOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTUxNjIzOTAyMn0.KMUFsIDTnFmyG3nMiGM6H9FNFUROf3wh7SmqJp-QV30

- contains info about token type and encryption algorithms used to create digital signatures for tokens
- Base64 encode JSON objects => encode string called header
- Often has 2 properties: alg and typ
- Ex: HMAC-SHA256 using secret key to sign JWT

JWT payload:

```
JSON CLAIMS TABLE

{
    "sub": "1234567890",
    "name": "John Doe",
    "admin": true,
    "iat": 1516239022
}
```

```
Valid JWT
Signature Verified

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwi
YWRtaW4iOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTUxNjIzOTAyMn0.KMUFsIDTnFmyG3nMiGM6H9FNFUROf3wh7SmqJp-QV30
```

- Encoded in based64
- Often contains:
 - iss (issuer): the issuer of the token.
 - sub (subject): the owner of the token, often the user ID.
 - aud (audience): the application or API that uses the token.
 - exp (expiration time): the token's expiration time.
 - nbf (not before time): the time before which the token is not valid.
 - iat (issued at time): the time when the token was issued.
 - jti (JWT ID): a unique ID for each token.
 - ..

JWT signature:


Header + Payload + Secret key

HMAC/RSA

JWT Signature string

→ Ensure the integrity of the payload






When should JWTs be used:

- User authentication: granting access to the web pages or apis
- User account management: storing account-related information
- Info exchange between apps/ internal micro services: auth.mahcompani.com; mail.mahcompani.com,...

Processing flow:



Pros:

- No need to store session data on server, language-independent,...
- Compact (Base64-encoded) → easily sent in HTTP headers, URLs, or cookies
- Ideal for microservices or single sign-on (SSO) systems
- Scales well across distributed systems and load-balanced environments
- Flexible structure: add or remove properties easily

Cons:

- Payloads are Base64-encoded, not encrypted → risk of data exposure
- Non-revocable, large-size token
- Can be abused if not handled securely

Create a JWT:


```
jwt_create_decode.py > ...
    # pip install pyjwt
    import jwt
    import secrets
    Ctrl+I to chat, Ctrl+K to generate
    secret key = secrets.token_urlsafe(32) # 32 bytes ~ độ dài 43 ký tự an toàn cho JWT
    print("Generated secret key:", secret key)
   payload = {'user id': 'n33r9'}
    algorithm = 'HS256'
    jwt token = jwt.encode(payload, secret key, algorithm=algorithm)
   print("JWT token:", jwt token)
        decoded = jwt.decode(jwt token, secret key, algorithms=[algorithm])
        print("Decoded payload:", decoded)
    except jwt.InvalidTokenError as e:
        print("Error decoding JWT:", str(e))
```

```
Generated secret key: nn3J1ib-hfJeMRXQUL8ZqHZR62Dwedfrqct7CTsV5G0

JWT token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjoibjMzcjkifQ.w-6-ztDq91E7A0R8nCmu-N40FP322gMOGMC_fvhEK0M

Decoded payload: {'user_id': 'n33r9'}
```

2.1. JWT attack definition:



Type 1: Modify the JWT info value

- **Issue**: decodes a JWT token without verifying its signature = trusts any token's payload even if it's invalid, expired, or tampered
- Risk: An attacker can modify the payload (e.g., change "isAdmin": false to "isAdmin": true) and send the forged token.
- Mitigate: validate the token's signature before trusting or decoding its content.

Modify the JWT info value:

- Lab 1: https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt/lab-jwt-authentication-bypass-via-unverified-signature
- Lab 2: https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt/lab-jwt-authentication-bypass-via-flawed-signature-verification

Type 1: Modify the JWT info value:

- Some security-related questions:
 - Does the website verify the signature?
 - Does the website trust the algorithm specified in the token?

Type 2: Bruteforce the security key

- Lab 3: https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt/lab-jwt-
 - authentication-bypass-via-weak-signing-key
 - Does the website verify the signature? Yes
 - Does the website trust the algorithm specified in the token? Yes
 - Is the security key strong enough? Can we guess it, thencreate the new payload remake the JWT signature? (The goal is to impersonate the *administrator*)

- * JOSE Headers and Self-signed JWTs
- JOSE headers: Besides 'alg' and 'typ'

JWK (JSON Web Key): an object JSON to represent a key.

JKU (JWK Set URL): URL contains a set of public courses in the JWK

KID (Key ID): an ID for the public key used to verify the JWT signature...

- * JOSE Headers and Self-signed JWTs
- JOSE headers:

```
{
    "kid": "ed2Nf8sb-sD6ng0-scs5390g-fFD8sfxG",
    "typ": "JWT",
    "alg": "RS256",
    "jwk": {
        "kty": "RSA",
        "e": "AQAB",
        "kid": "ed2Nf8sb-sD6ng0-scs5390g-fFD8sfxG",
        "n": "yy1wpYmffgXBxhAUJzHHocCuJolwDqq175ZWuCQ_cb33K2vh9m"
    }
}
```

```
{
    "alg": "RS256",
    "jku": "https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json"
}
```

* JOSE Headers and Self-signed JWTs

Self-signed JWTs:

Issuer & Verifier all have the same secret key

Type 3: Attack on JWK parameter in Self-Signed JWTs

Lab 4: https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt/lab-jwt-authentication-bypass-via-jwk-header-injection

Lab 5: https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt/lab-jwt-authentication-bypass-via-jku-header-injection

Lab 6: https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt/lab-jwt-authentication-bypass-via-kid-header-path-traversal

Type 3: Attack on JWK parameter in Self-Signed JWTs

?1 Why Lab 5, we have to generate RSA key, whereas, using the symmetric key for

Lab 6?

?2 Lab 6:

- 7. Replace the generated value for the k property with a Base64-encoded null byte (AA==). Note that this is just a workaround because the JWT Editor extension won't allow you to sign tokens using an empty string.
- 2. In the header of the JWT, change the value of the kid parameter to a path traversal sequence pointing to the /dev/null file:

```
../../../../dev/null
```

How to define this path? Change to this "../../dev/null", get the same result

Thank you!