

# Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns - An Extended Temporal Examination

Naela Elmore

MPSA 2023

April 14, 2023

# Outline

Background

Research Question and Theory

Hypothesis

Research Design

Results and Conclusion

Limitations and Further Research

Appendix

# Background

- ▶ Extension on Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) paper, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict”

*323 instances of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900s to 2013*

*The “success rates of nonviolent campaigns have [also] increased [over time]”.*

# Background

- ▶ These statements provide a unique opportunity to study the temporality of these ‘success stories’
- ▶ For example, if we examine the same campaigns of nonviolent resistance – with a temporal extension – are their successes sustained in the long-run?

# Research Question

*Are non-violent resistance campaigns temporally durable?*

# Theoretical Framework

- ▶ This study is theoretically driven by a key variable, *repression*

# Theoretical Framework

- ▶ This study is theoretically driven by a key variable, *repression*
- ▶ Presence of a direct and indirect causal linkage between resistance campaigns and state-sponsored repression
  - ▶ Carey (2006) & Pierskalla (2010); Chenoweth & Stephan (2014); Davenport (2007)

# Theoretical Framework

- ▶ This study is theoretically driven by a key variable, *repression*
- ▶ Presence of a direct and indirect causal linkage between resistance campaigns and state-sponsored repression
  - ▶ Carey (2006) & Pierskalla (2010); Chenoweth & Stephan (2014); Davenport (2007)
- ▶ While the existence of state repression fuels in-the-moment campaign goal success, repression does not yield long-term success



# Hypothesis 1

*NVRCs that experience state-repression during the initial campaign  
are more likely to experience future protest activities*

## Hypothesis 2

*Civil resistance will continue to exceed violent campaigns*

# Empirical Method

- ▶ Large-N original sample gathered by Chenoweth & Shay's NAVCO 2.1

# Empirical Method

- ▶ Large-N original sample gathered by Chenoweth & Shay's NAVCO 2.1
- ▶ Temporally extend dataset until 2020 using the Mass Mobilization Data Project

# Empirical Method

- ▶ Large-N original sample gathered by Chenoweth & Shay's NAVCO 2.1
- ▶ Temporally extend dataset until 2020 using the Mass Mobilization Data Project
- ▶ The unit of Observation is Country-Year

# Empirical Method

- ▶ Large-N original sample gathered by Chenoweth & Shay's NAVCO 2.1
- ▶ Temporally extend dataset until 2020 using the Mass Mobilization Data Project
- ▶ The unit of Observation is Country-Year
- ▶ Final dataset accounts for 162 countries with a temporal scope of 1990 to 2020,  $N = 4,935$

# Variables of Interest

- ▶ **IV** = state repression

# Variables of Interest

- ▶ **IV** = state repression
- ▶ **DV** = protest activities that occur post-initial campaign success




# Variables of Interest

- ▶ **IV** = state repression
- ▶ **DV** = protest activities that occur post-initial campaign success
- ▶ *Campaign Demands*


# Variables of Interest

- ▶ **IV** = state repression
- ▶ **DV** = protest activities that occur post-initial campaign success
- ▶ *Campaign Demands*
- ▶ *State Response Forms*


Total Number of NVRC Protests: 1990 – 2020




# Results: Protest Occurrence 2014 to 2020



# Result: Repression



# Campaign Demands



# Findings

- ▶ Fluctuation in protest activity in the years post initial study

# Findings

- ▶ Fluctuation in protest activity in the years post initial study
- ▶ Non-violent resistance continues to outweigh violent counterpart



# Findings

- ▶ Fluctuation in protest activity in the years post initial study
- ▶ Non-violent resistance continues to outweigh violent counterpart
- ▶ Varying tactics of repression are used steadily throughout the years, but decrease in frequency post 2014

# Findings

- ▶ Fluctuation in protest activity in the years post initial study
- ▶ Non-violent resistance continues to outweigh violent counterpart
- ▶ Varying tactics of repression are used steadily throughout the years, but decrease in frequency post 2014
- ▶ Protests against political behavior and process was consistent throughout the temporal scope

H1: NVRCs that experience state-repression during the initial campaign are more likely to experience future protest activities

- ▶ The hypothesis is supported *to a degree*. There are experiences of future protest activities, but repression might not play a key role.

## H2: Civil resistance will continue to exceed violent campaigns

- ▶ The hypothesis is supported. NVRCs consistently outweigh their violent counterparts from 2014 to 2019

# Limitations and Further Research

- ▶ Using 2 datasets that measure protest occurrence similarly but not identically. Need for unified and more temporally up-to-date data

# Limitations and Further Research

- ▶ Using 2 datasets that measure protest occurrence similarly but not identically. Need for unified and more temporally up-to-date data
- ▶ More detailed coding on the different campaign demands (ie. political behavior, electoral process)

# Limitations and Further Research

- ▶ Using 2 datasets that measure protest occurrence similarly but not identically. Need for unified and more temporally up-to-date data
- ▶ More detailed coding on the different campaign demands (ie. political behavior, electoral process)
- ▶ Coding for regime and regime sub-types, repressive signaling

Thank You


**Naela Elmore - PhD Student**

[Naela.Elmore@utdallas.edu](mailto:Naela.Elmore@utdallas.edu)


*UT Dallas – School of Economic Political and Policy Sciences*




# Resistance Method Total




# Resistance Method 1990 - 2013




# Results: Repression 1990 to 2013




# Results: Repression 2014 to 2020



# Results: Campaign Demands 1990 to 2013



# Results: Campaign Demands 2014 to 2020



# Regression Results

COL	
<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	resis_meth
camp_duration	-0.0003 (0.0003)
camp_goals	0.003 (0.002)
goalschange	-0.002 (0.002)
repression	0.0002 (0.001)
success	0.043** (0.019)
Constant	0.030*** (0.008)
Observations	2,717
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.002
Residual Std. Error	0.215 (df = 2711)
F Statistic	1.973* (df = 5; 2711)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

# Results: Total Protest Occurrence

